LVIV-SANDOMIR OPERATION 1944 - strategic offensive operation of the troops of the 1st and 4th (from August 6) Ukrainian fronts in the Great Patriotic War, about carried out on July 13 - August 29 with the goal of defeating the German army groups “Northern Ukraine”, establishing the western regions of Ukraine us and the southeastern region of Poland.

After the completion of the Soviet troops' offensive in the Right-to-be-registered Ukraine in 1943-1944, the 1st Army Ukrainian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Ko-nev) reached the border southwest of the city of Kovel, west of the city clans of Lutsk, Ter-no-pol, Ko-lo-myya, Ku-you and the preparations for the Lvov-Sandomierz operation. The front line at the beginning of the operation included: 1st and 3rd Guards, 13th, 18th, 38th and 60th General Military High, 1st, 3rd, 5th Guards and 4th Tank Armies; 2 con-no-me-ha-ni-zed groups (KMG), 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, 2nd and 8th (from July 16) air force -mii - a total of 1.1 million people, 16.1 thousand guns and missiles, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, over 3.2 thousand aircraft. In front of the war front, the German army group “Northern Ukraine” (Colonel General J. Garpe) was formed in the composition of the German 1st and 4th tank armies and the Hungarian 1st army, supported by the aviation of the German 4th air fleet (all 900 thousand people, 6.3 thousand guns and missiles, over 900 tanks and assault guns, about 700 aircraft). On the right-hand side of the main strikes of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they prevailed against the enemy in a living force at almost 5 times, art-til-le-rii - 6-7 times, tanks and self-propelled guns - 3-4 times, sa-mo-le-tah - 4.6 times.

For-we-sat, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation was aimed at encircling and destroying the Lvov-Brod group against the enemy. -ka, os-vo-bo-dit Lvov, diss-cut the army group "Northern Uk-rai-na", throw one part of it into the Po-lesya region, the other - to Kar-pa-tam, and the main forces of the front go out to the edge of the Vistula River. Pre-du-smat-ri-va-elk at one time delivered two powerful blows: in the center - from the Ter-no-po-la region to on the right to Lviv; on the right wing - from the area south of Lutska to Ra-va-Russkaya. To ensure the Lviv strike group from the south, an auxiliary strike on the Stani-Slavsky on the right-hand side NI.

First stage

On the morning of July 13, the 3rd Guard (Colonel General V.N. Gor -dov) and the 13th General Military Army (Lieutenant General N.P. Pu-khov) of the Army, whose troops departed on July 15 moved to a depth of 25-30 km, along the front up to 60 km. On July 16-17, the Cavalry Mechanized Group (25th Tank and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) was introduced into the breakthrough by Lieutenant General V.K. Ba-ra-no-va and the 1st Guards Tank Army (Colonel General of Tank Troops M.E. Ka-tu-kov), formations of some swarm on July 18th for-si-ro-va-li of the Western Bug River south of So-ka-la, and the Horse-Mechanized Group by this time for-hva-ti-la De-rev -lya-ny, from-re-zav pu-ti from-ho-yes to the west of the Brod-skaya group of pi-rov-ke of the enemy. On the 2nd half-day of July 14, the main forces of the 60th ( Colonel General P.A. Kurochkin) and the 38th (Colonel General K.S. Mos-ka-len-ko) general army. The units of the 38th Army of the medical-linen moved forward, overcoming the joint-against-against-nor -ka and repelling strong counter-attacks of his operational reserves (2 German tank divisions). Troops of the 60th Army together with re-to-you from the 3rd Guards Tank Army (Colonel General Tan - of the troops of P.S. Ry-bal-ko) to the end of July 15th through the enemy’s defense in the area of ​​​​Kol-to-va, about- ra-zo-vav the so-called Kol-tovsky ko-ri-dor (shi-ri-noy 4-6 km, depth up to 18 km). Through no-no, the main forces of the 3rd Guard (July 16) and the 4th (July 17) were introduced into the breakthrough July 18th) tank armies. By the end of July 18, the joint unit of the 3rd Guards Tank Army for-si-ro-wa-li the Pel-tev River and went to the region Dzed-zi-lov, Krasnoye, De-rev-lya-ny, part of her forces united with the Cavalry Mechanized Group of Ba-ra-no-va, completing the encirclement there are up to 8 divisions of the Brod group of pi-rov-ki against-no-ka, and the main forces of the 4th tank-co-army (Colonel-General D. D. Le-lyu-shen-ko) went to the Ol-shan-tsy district and settled down to Lvov. The Brodskaya group of pi-rov-ka enemy on July 22 was raz-z-la-na, and the 1st Guards Tank-co-army in mutual-mo-action-st- vii with the Horse-Mechanized Group of Ba-ra-no-va, following from-the-way-against-no-ka, for-si-ro-va-la from the river San in the Yaro-sla-va region and for-hva-ti-la platz-darm on its western coast. The first units of the 4th Tank Army rushed to Lvov on July 22, and the 3rd Guards Tank Army went around he and his se-ve-ra, on the morning of July 24, went to the Yavo-rov region, Go-ro-dok, Mos-tis-ka, from-re-manufactured from-ho- Yes, the Lviv group pi-rov-ke the enemy to the west. As a result of the concentric attacks of the 3rd Guards Tank Army from the west, the 60th Army from the east and 4th th tank army from the south on July 27, Lvov was os-vo-bo-z-day. 1st Guards Army (Colonel-General A. A. Grech-ko), transferred to the station on July 16 at Sta-ni-Slavsky on the right -le-nii, for-si-ro-va-la river Gni-laya Li-pa, on July 24-la os-vo-bo-di-la the city of Ga-lich, and on July 27-la - the city of Sta-ni -slav (now not Iva-no-Frankovsk). On July 23, the 18th General Military Army (Lieutenant General E.P. Zhu-rav-lev) moved to the station, howl -a ko-swarm, acting in the foothills of the Carpathians, on July 27 went to the region south of Ka-lu-sha.

Second phase

The 1st stage of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation was completed on July 27, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced to the main direction up to 220 km and split the group of armies "Northern Ukraine" for 2 parts: the os-tats of the German 4th tank army from-ho- di-li to Vis-le, and the troops of the German 1st tank and the Hungarian 1st army - to the southwest, to Kar-pa-tam. Co-man-do-va-nie ver-mah-ta hastily, but you-moved your reserves for this from the depths and from other parts of the front -government for the restoration of the defense front along the western bank of the Vistula. Headquarters of the Verkhov-no-go Glav-no-ko-man-do-va-niya (VGK) July 27, pri-ka-za-la: to the 1st Ukrainian front with-environment -then make efforts on your right wing, str-mi-tel-but go to the Vis-le, force it on the move and grab- there is a parade ground on the western bank; at the central station of the front-ta ov-la-det go-ro-da-mi Sa-nok, Dro-go-bych, Do-li-na, and si-la-mi 1st Guards and 18 The th-society-of-the-how-how-army to seize and firmly hold-to-live through the Kar-pa-you. Development of the station, 3rd Guards, 13th General Military, 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Armies and KMG (31st tank and 6th guards cavalry corps) Lieutenant General S.V. So-ko-lo-va 29 - 31 July for-si-ro-va-li Vis-lu and za-hva-ti-li on its western coast to the south and to the north San-do-mi-ra of several parade grounds. By the end of August 1, the southern parade ground had been expanded to 30 km along the front and 20 km inland. Teach-you-the-development of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the 2-distance-on-the-right-le-ni-yam (san- to the world-sko-mu and the Car-pat-sko-mu), the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the directive of July 30th when-la-ra-za-la-ra-za-vat to is-ho - on August 5, from the troops of his left wing (1st Guards, 18th General Army and 8th Air Army) 4th Ukrainian Front (general Colonel I.E. Petrov). In na-cha-le av-gu-sta pro-tiv-nik per-re-bro-force in the San-do-mi-ra region 16 divisions (including 3 tanks ), 6 brigade assault guns, several separate battalions of heavy tanks (Ko-ro-lion tiger type) ) and carried out a series of counter-strikes with the aim of establishing a San-do-Mir parade ground. To develop the most powerful counter-attack group against the enemy in the area of ​​the city of Melets and beyond go ras-shi-re-niya parade ground-dar-ma on August 4 from the ru-be-zha Ba-ra-nuv, Pa-dev was introduced into the battle 5th Guards Ar- Miya (Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov), who on August 8th, the main si-la-mi, went to the r-bezh (ex-key) Shid-luv, Stop -no-tsa, But-you-Kor-chin. On August 14, at the parade ground, the 4th Tank Army was re-bro-she-na. By the end of August, the front’s army, having repelled all the enemy’s counter-attacks, firmly established itself on the parade ground. On August 29, the 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, having successfully completed the Lvov-Sandomierz operation on foot, at the order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters moved to the defense on the ru-be-zhe Yuze-fuv, La-guv, Dem-bi-tsa, more precisely Kros-no, Sa-nok, Ku-ty.

Losses

As a result of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 350 km, defeating the German army group “Northern Ukraine” paradise" (out of 56 divisions of thunder-le-ny 32 and uni-ch-same-ny 8; only from July 14 to July 31 against-tiv-nick on-te -relied without return about 200 thousand people, over 2.2 thousand guns and missiles, 500 tanks, 10 thousand car tires), os-in -bo-di-li the western regions of the Ukraine and the south-eastern regions of Poland, for-si-ro-va-li the Vis-la River, for-grabbing the croup - a parade ground in the San-do-mi-ra area and have created favorable conditions for the further-on-stu-p- leniya. According to the Soviet troops in the operation, there were: human - about 289.3 thousand people, including over 65 thousand people - non-returnable; guns and mi-no-metov - over 1.8 thousand; tanks and self-propelled guns - over 1.2 thousand; combat sa-mo-le-tov - 289.

Sources:

Great Fatherland: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: Do-ku-men-you and ma-te-ria-ly, 1944-1945. M., 1999. T. 16. Book. 5/4;

Ko-nev I.S. For-pi-ki ko-man-du-th front. M., 2003;

Zhu-kov G.K. Re-thinking and thinking. 13th ed. M., 2010. T. 2.

On July 13, 1944, the strategic offensive Lviv-Sandomierz operation began. This was Stalin's sixth blow. The operation was carried out by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Western Ukraine. In addition, already during the operation itself, the 4th Ukrainian Front was formed for an offensive in the Carpathian direction.

The Red Army almost completely defeated Army Group “Northern Ukraine”: 32 enemy divisions (including the division of Ukrainian SS collaborators “Galicia”) lost 50-70% of their personnel, and 8 divisions were completely destroyed. Soviet troops completed the liberation of the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR from the Nazis. The defeated enemy troops were thrown back beyond the San and Vistula rivers. In addition, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Vistula River and created a powerful bridgehead in the area of ​​​​the city of Sandomierz. As a result, conditions were created for an offensive in the Silesian direction.


The operation was of strategic importance - the entire German front was split in two. Now the connection between the northern and southern parts of the Wehrmacht passed through Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which made it difficult for reserves to maneuver.

Conditions before surgery

As a result of successful offensive operations of the Soviet troops in the winter and spring of 1944, two huge protrusions were formed at the front: one north of Pripyat, it protruded towards the Soviet side, the so-called. The “Belarusian balcony”, the second one south of Pripyat, was facing the German side.

The “Belarusian balcony” was destroyed during the Belarusian offensive operation that began on June 23. Even before the completion of Operation Bagration, it was decided to complete the liberation of Ukrainian territory and begin military operations in South-Eastern Poland.

The southern salient was formed as part of the major Soviet successes during the Spring Offensive in Ukraine. Here the armies of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts wedged themselves deeply into the German defenses. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I. S. Konev, after completing the offensive operations of the winter - spring of 1944, went on the defensive in the second half of April 1944. The front armies occupied a 440-kilometer sector on the line west of Lutsk, east of Brody, to the west are Tarnopol, Chertkov, Kolomyia, Krasnoilsk. German troops were pressed against the Carpathians. Soviet troops covered Army Group Center from the southern direction, divided the enemy front, separating Army Group Northern Ukraine from Army Group Southern Ukraine. This seriously complicated the interaction, maneuver and transfer of German reserves. This ledge created favorable conditions for the Red Army’s attack on Lviv and Bucharest.

Having suffered a crushing defeat in the spring of 1944 precisely in the southern strategic direction, the German command expected a Soviet offensive in the south. Considering the deep penetration of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lvov direction, the German command was waiting for the main blow here. In the opinion of the German military-political leadership, to the north, in Belarus, only auxiliary offensive operations of the enemy could be expected. Therefore, by the beginning of summer, the bulk of the Wehrmacht's mobile armored formations were concentrated south of Pripyat. Here the Germans held 18 tank divisions out of the available 23 divisions on the Eastern Front. Directly in the defense sector of the 1st Ukrainian Front there were 10 enemy tank divisions.

The German command sought to hold Western Ukraine at all costs, in order to have a springboard for a possible counter-offensive and a cover area for South-Eastern Poland. The southeastern region of Poland had great economic (Silesian industrial region) and military-strategic importance.

Assessing the military-strategic situation that had developed by the summer of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to conduct a series of successive offensive operations. The first blow was delivered in Belarus, the second in Ukraine. As a result, they planned to liberate the remaining part of the Byelorussian SSR, part of the Lithuanian SSR, Western Ukraine and South-Eastern Poland. To do this, it was necessary to defeat the main forces of the German Army Group Center and Northern Ukraine.


Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front I. S. Konev by position

Operation plan

In early June, Joseph Stalin invited Ivan Konev to present his ideas about a future offensive. The headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front did a lot of work planning the operation. Its goal was to dissect and destroy in parts the army group “Northern Ukraine”, liberate Western Ukraine and begin liberation from the occupiers of Poland.

The front command decided to launch two powerful strikes and break through the enemy’s defenses in two directions. The first strike was planned to be delivered from the Lutsk area along the Sokal - Rava-Russkaya - Yaroslav line. The second blow was delivered from the Tarnopol (Ternopil) area along the Lviv-Przemysl line. The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in two directions made it possible to encircle and destroy the Lvov-Brod group, create a large gap in the German defense and capture the key enemy defense point - Lvov. Army Group “Northern Ukraine” was cut into two parts, one part was planned to be thrown back to the Polesie region, the other to the Carpathians. After this, the main forces of the front were supposed to reach the Vistula, having the opportunity to begin the liberation of Poland.

The shock group of the front in the Rava-Russian direction included: 3rd Guards Army, 13th Army, 1st Guards Tank Army, cavalry-mechanized group (1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 25th Tank Corps). From the air, the northern group of the 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by four aviation corps of the 2nd Air Army. The strike group (14 rifle divisions, two tank, mechanized, cavalry corps, and 2 artillery breakthrough divisions) was supposed to strike in a 12-kilometer breakthrough section.

The front's attack group in the Lvov (southern) direction included: the 60th and 38th armies, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the 4th Tank Army, a cavalry mechanized group (6th Guards Cavalry Corps and 31st Tank Corps ). From the air, the actions of the northern strike group were supported by five air corps of the 2nd Air Army. The southern strike group (15 rifle divisions, 4 tank, 2 mechanized, cavalry corps and 2 breakthrough artillery divisions) struck on a 14-kilometer front.

An auxiliary attack in the Galich direction was carried out by troops of the 1st Guards Army. The guards were supposed to use the success of the neighboring 38th Army and break through the enemy's defenses, advancing on Galich and Stanislav. The 1st Guards Army was supposed to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dniester in the area north of Galich. This blow ensured the advance of the southern group of the front from the left flank and pinned down the enemy’s reserves. To solve this problem, a strike force was formed consisting of five rifle divisions and the 4th Guards Tank Corps.

The 18th Army and the left wing of the 1st Guards Army were given the task of firmly holding their occupied lines and being ready to strike in the Stanislav direction. The 5th Guards Army remained in the front reserve. At the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, she was transferred from the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 47th Rifle Corps (from the 1st Guards Army) was also transferred to the front reserve.

On July 7, the front presented the operation plan to Headquarters. After careful study, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved the operation plan. The idea of ​​delivering two main attacks in the Russian and Lvov directions raised some doubts. However, Konev was able to convince Headquarters that the decision was correct. The Supreme Command headquarters made some changes to the operation plan. Tank armies and KMG were not to be used to break through enemy defenses, but to develop the first success. Tank troops followed in the second echelon and were supposed to enter the battle after breaking through the enemy defenses. The cavalry-mechanized groups were supposed to launch an offensive on the second day of the operation, after the tank armies entered the battle. In addition, the Headquarters recommended giving feasible tasks to rifle formations on the first day of the operation, when the infantry was supposed to break into the German defenses. According to the SVGK, the level of tasks assigned to the rifle divisions was overestimated.


Soviet soldiers fight on the streets of Lvov

Strengths of the parties. Soviet Union

The 1st Ukrainian Front included:
- 3rd Guards Army under the command of General Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov;
- 13th Army under the command of Nikolai Pavlovich Pukhov;
- 60th Army under the command of Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin;
- 38th Army under the command of Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko;
- 1st Guards Army under the command of Andrei Antonovich Grechko;
- 5th Guards Army under the command of Alexei Semenovich Zhadov;
- 18th Army under the command of Evgeniy Petrovich Zhuravlev;
- 1st Guards Tank Army under the command of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov;
- 3rd Guards Tank Army of Pavel Semenovich Rybalko;
- 4th Tank Army of Dmitry Danilovich Lelyushenko.

The front also included two cavalry-mechanized groups (25th and 31st tank corps under the command of F.G. Anikushkin and V.E. Grigoriev, 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps of V.K. Baranov, S.V. Sokolov), and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps. From the air, the front was supported by the 2nd Air Army under the command of S.A. Krasovsky and the 8th Air Army by V.N. Zhdanov.

The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front was supported by partisan detachments. Significant partisan formations were relocated to the western regions of Ukraine and further to the southeastern regions of Poland. Before the start of the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they delivered strong blows to German communications on the Lviv-Warsaw and Rava-Russkaya-Yaroslav lines. They destroyed several large enemy garrisons and paralyzed traffic on the roads. The German command was forced to throw three divisions against the partisans, which facilitated the offensive of the Red Army.

In addition, during the operation to liberate Lvov, the Polish Home Army (about 7 thousand bayonets) raised an uprising. The Polish command planned to occupy Lviv and form a Polish administration, which would represent the Polish government before the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the Soviet government.

Already during the operation (July 30), the 4th Ukrainian Front was created. It was headed by I.E. Petrov. The 18th Army and the 1st Guards Army were included in the front from the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 4th Ukrainian Front received the task of attacking in the Carpathian direction.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of 84 divisions (74 rifle, 6 cavalry and 4 artillery divisions), 10 tank and mechanized corps (7 tank and 3 mechanized corps), 4 separate tank brigades, 18 separate tank and 24 self-propelled gun regiments. In total, the front consisted of 843 thousand people (together with the rear, about 1.2 million people), more than 16 thousand guns and mortars over 76 mm (according to other sources, about 14 thousand), 2.2 thousand tanks and Self-propelled guns (according to other sources, 1.6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns), about 2.8 thousand combat aircraft (according to other sources, 3,250 aircraft).


Soviet artillerymen cross the Dnieper in the Lvov direction under the cover of a smoke screen

Germany

The Red Army was opposed by Army Group “Northern Ukraine”. It consisted of 41 divisions (34 infantry, 5 tank, 1 motorized) and two infantry brigades. The German group consisted of more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers (with more than 900 thousand people in the rear), 900 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 6.3 thousand guns and mortars, about 700 aircraft.

The army group was led by Joseph Harpe (Harpe). The army group consisted of the German 4th Panzer Army under Walter Nehring, Erhard Routh's 1st Panzer Army and the Hungarian 1st Army. Already during the battle, the Army Group “Northern Ukraine” included the 17th Army (the newly formed army, the 17th Army was destroyed in May 1944 in the Crimea and restored in Galicia and Southern Poland), the 24th Tank Corps, and also a number of infantry divisions from other directions, 2 tank divisions, a division of SS troops "Galicia" from Ukrainian traitors and several other individual units. From the air, the army group was supported by the 4th Air Fleet.

The Germans, in anticipation of the Red Army's offensive, launched active engineering work and prepared a powerful defense. It was especially deeply echeloned in the Lviv direction. Three defense lines up to 40-50 km deep were prepared here. The first line of defense was 5-6 km deep. The second defense line was located 10-15 kilometers from the front edge. The third line of defense ran along the banks of the Western Bug and Rotten Lipa rivers. A number of cities, including Lviv, were turned into strong strongholds and prepared for all-round defense.

German military builders took advantage of the rugged nature of the terrain, forests, swamps and large rivers. The Western Bug, Dniester, San and Vistula were serious natural obstacles, reinforced by engineering structures. In general, the terrain in the offensive zone of the Soviet troops was varied. In the northern direction there is a plain replete with swamps; in the Lviv direction, in the center - hills, ravines with steep slopes and rivers; the southern direction is mountainous.

The German command had serious operational reserves. Two tank and infantry divisions were stationed southwest of Kovel, two tank and infantry divisions near Lvov, two tank and two infantry divisions near Stanislav (they were transferred to the north). Well-developed communications allowed the enemy to quickly maneuver their reserves.


Soviet officers inspect the German Marder III medium anti-tank self-propelled gun, which was knocked out on the outskirts of Lvov.


German medium tank Pz.Kpwf. IV Ausf. J, destroyed in Western Ukraine

Regrouping of troops

On the eve of the operation, a significant regrouping of forces was carried out, since the main forces of the front by this time were located on the left flank. The 1st and 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies needed to be transferred, and the 38th Army had to be brought up. It should be noted that the Germans knew about the concentration of Soviet troops in the Stanislav and Lviv directions (the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front). In the Lvov direction there was the most powerful and dense German defense. However, the attack on the Rava-Russian direction largely came as a surprise to the enemy. Here the German group was less strong. And the terrain was more convenient and accessible for the use of mobile armored formations.

In order to hide the preparation of the operation from the enemy, the Soviet command simulated the concentration of two tank armies and a tank corps on the left wing of the front. To do this, they used false transportation of armored vehicles by rail, simulating the unloading of tank units and their march to concentration areas before the offensive. There were active radio communications in these areas. To deceive the Germans, they built many models of tanks, vehicles, guns and other equipment.

The actual transfer of troops was carried out at night, with all possible precautions and camouflage measures. It was not possible to completely deceive the enemy, but the transfer of forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army to the area south of Lutsk and the 4th Tank Army to the Zbarazh area was kept secret.

Of the available 84 divisions, only 28 divisions were intended for defense and operations in auxiliary areas. The rest were located in the main directions. As a result, in breakthrough areas, one Soviet division accounted for 1.1 km. And without taking into account operational reserves. The Germans had one division defending a section of the front 10-15 km away.

Up to 90% of the available tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the directions of the main attacks. 349 tanks and self-propelled guns were allocated for direct support of rifle units. The combined arms armies that operated in the main directions had 14 armored vehicles per 1 km of the breakthrough area. Already during the offensive, it became clear that the infantry did not have enough direct support tanks. The situation was especially difficult in the Lviv direction, where the enemy had the most powerful defense. To support the rifle divisions, it was necessary to send part of the forces of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank armies.

As a result of the enhanced regrouping of forces, the Soviet command managed to create a huge superiority over the German troops in the breakthrough areas: in men by almost 5 times (along the entire front the ratio was 1.2: 1 in favor of the Red Army), in guns and mortars - by 6- 7 times (along the entire front 2.6: 1), in tanks and self-propelled guns - 3-4 times (along the entire front 2.3: 1).

Such a concentration of forces and means was necessary to break through the enemy’s strong defenses. The Soviet command took into account that the German defense was well developed, deeply echeloned, had a developed fire system, anti-tank defense and serious operational reserves. On other sectors of the front the balance of forces was approximately equal. In some areas of the defense of the 18th Army, which had a long line of responsibility, German troops even had an advantage in strength.

Soviet artillery played a major role in breaking through the German defenses. The front, in addition to divisional and regimental artillery, included 4 breakthrough artillery divisions, 9 anti-aircraft divisions, 9 artillery-cannon brigades, a howitzer artillery brigade, a mortar brigade, 4 guards mortar brigades, 6 anti-tank fighter brigades, 4 howitzer brigades, 36 anti-tank fighter brigades, 19 mortar, 14 guards mortar and 17 anti-aircraft regiments. Up to two-thirds of this firepower was concentrated on the main directions of the offensive. In breakthrough areas, the density of guns and mortars reached 255 units per 1 km. Regimental, divisional, corps and army artillery groups were formed in the shock groups of the front. Particularly strong artillery groups were created in the Lvov direction. This impressive firepower was supposed to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses. In total, they planned to spend 1 hour 40 minutes on technical training.

To be continued…

Lviv-Sandomierz operation or as it is also called in historical sources – Lviv-Sandomierz offensive operation – tactically and strategically important, large in scope and significance, the operation of Soviet troops to liberate Western Ukraine and Southern Poland from large military German and Hungarian combat groups.

The operation took place from July 13 to August 29, 1944 on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and Poland, and ended in a confident, albeit bloody, victory for the Soviet Union.

A huge role in the victory over the Hungarians and Germans was played by the forces of Polish and Ukrainian partisans, who weakened the enemy defenses and contributed to a successful offensive.

Conditions before surgery

After Odessa was liberated, the USSR opened up a free path to Western Ukraine, where a large enemy military group was stationed, the “Northern Ukraine” army. Before the start of the Lviv-Sandomierz operation of 1944, Hitler persistently told his military leaders that it was impossible to lose the territories of Western Ukraine and Poland, as this would be a catastrophic economic blow for Germany.

To achieve this, the German military command built a powerful defensive line, consisting of two defense lines, although it was planned to build one more. The sudden offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and 4th Ukrainian fronts interrupted the work and significantly reduced the enemy’s defensive capability.

Before the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the USSR had not yet created such a huge front-line formation - the number of soldiers exceeded 1.2 million soldiers, tens of thousands of guns and mortars, thousands of tanks and aircraft.

The Red Army's offensive consisted of two powerful attacks. As a result of the attacking actions, it was planned to cut through the enemy forces and destroy the Army Group “Northern Ukraine”.

Simultaneously with the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, an even larger and no less important from a strategic point of view operation, Operation Bagration, took place, the goal of which was to liberate the territory of Belarus from German forces.

Balance of power

The forces of the Soviet Union before the start of the offensive consisted of the following units:

  • The Home Army is a controversial military formation of Polish partisans who either supported the Soviet Union or entered into open battle against them.
  • 1st Ukrainian Front.
  • 4th Ukrainian Front.

Total strength of the Red Army forces was approximately 1.2 million people, 14 thousand guns, more than two thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about three thousand aircraft.

Soviet troops were commanded Marshal of the USSR Ivan Konev and the commander of the tank corps, Lieutenant General Ivan Petrov.

The forces of Germany and its ally, Hungary, before the offensive of the Red Army consisted of the following units:

  • Army Group "Northern Ukraine", which included the 1st and 4th German tank armies.
  • SS Troops Division "Galicia".
  • 4th Air Fleet.

The commander-in-chief of the German forces was appointed Colonel General of the Wehrmacht - Joseph Harpe.

Germany was inferior to the USSR, both in numbers and in the number of self-propelled guns, tanks and aircraft. Time was not on their side either. The Red Army was advancing unexpectedly quickly and the Wehrmacht forces simply did not have enough time to prepare a defense - Hitler’s demands to hold the defense were almost impossible to fulfill.

Encirclement and defeat of the German group in the ford area

Before the start of the military operation, the Soviet command was informed of the German plans. Knowing that the enemy would immediately retreat to the second line of defense in order to hit the first with powerful artillery fire, the Red Army had to immediately attack the second line.

July 13, 1944 A massive offensive began in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. After two days of fighting, the spacecraft forces were able to break through 20 km deep into the German defense. With the help of Baranov's mechanized group, Soviet infantry quickly penetrated the defensive positions of the Northern Ukraine Army.

July 17th The 1st Guards Tank Corps entered the battle, with the help of which the spacecraft broke through another 20 km deep into the front. On the same day, Soviet troops entered the territory of Silesia (historical region of Poland) .

In the Lviv direction, the Germans quickly recovered from the blow and formed and stopped the advance of the Soviet troops with the forces of two tank divisions. On July 15, the Germans launched a counterattack in this direction, which is why the USSR had to deploy additional forces to contain the enemy in this area.

Despite the serious onslaught of the enemy, the spacecraft managed to stop the counter-offensive and already on July 18, the German defenses in both directions were broken - the enemy retreated 80 km.

Heroes of the Soviet Union - tank crews of the 45th Guards Tank Brigade

On the same day, Soviet troops successfully crossed the Western Bug.

Now the way to Lvov was open for the USSR forces. On July 22, the encirclement and complete destruction of the German group in the Brody area began - by the end of the day, most of the enemy soldiers were killed, and a third were captured.

July 23 Polish partisans (Home Army) started an uprising in Lviv. Taking advantage of this, Soviet troops tried to capture the city with tank divisions, but this attack did not bring success. Then the spacecraft launched a massive attack on the city with infantry forces and surrounded the city on the other side with tank units. Already on July 27, Lvov was liberated.

July 27 the first stage of the operation was completed - the goal was achieved , the army of “Northern Ukraine” was divided into two more vulnerable parts and suffered huge losses, which significantly reduced its combat effectiveness and led to its further and complete defeat.

The USSR forces did not give the enemy the opportunity to recover from the blow - the offensive continued. The task was set to seize bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula River without any delay. Already on July 28, the spacecraft reached the river and began crossing.

In order not to weaken the onslaught, the Soviet command transferred additional fresh forces from which the 4th Ukrainian Front was created.

In the area of ​​the small town of Sandomierz, Soviet tank units encountered serious resistance from the Germans and were forced to retreat. Their progress was hampered by the lack of air support.

On August 1, the Red Army completely captured the area of ​​​​the city of Sandomierz and strengthened the bridgehead on the western side of the river. All efforts of the Germans to stop the forced ones were unsuccessful - they tried to blow up the dam and stop the ferries with the help of mines.

The Germans tried to recapture the bridgehead and launched an offensive north of Sandomierz. The Wehrmacht forces tried so hard to dislodge the Soviet soldiers that the command was forced to send additional forces to hold the bridgehead. The front reserve was activated - the 5th Guards Army.

Thanks to reinforcements, it was possible to stop the enemy advance on August 8th. Meanwhile, in another direction of force, General Konev’s army expanded the bridgehead by another 50 km.

11th August The Germans decided to go on a counteroffensive again, using their new brainchild - tanks "Royal tiger", which at that time had analogues in terms of the power of weapons and armor. However, their plan failed - the tanks were ambushed. Most of them were destroyed and several fully working samples fell into the hands of Soviet soldiers.

By the middle of the same month, Soviet troops repulsed another counter-offensive of the German army, encircled and defeated it. On August 15, spacecraft forces stopped the offensive at the Krasnorilsk-Sanok line.

Results and consequences of the operation

The main forces of the front managed to liberate the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, as well as the important industrial region of Poland - Silesia , which dealt a serious blow to the German war machine.

The forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front defeated the powerful German army “Northern Ukraine” (approximately 25% of the total strength remained alive, 8 divisions were completely destroyed).

After the attack by the spacecraft, the once strong and indestructible German front was broken in two, which significantly worsened the strategic position of the Wehrmacht - now the Germans had to spend much more time maneuvering with reserves.

Thanks to the rapid offensive, the enemy was unable to properly organize defense and destroy many architectural monuments of the city of Lviv. The objects were mined, but the Germans fled with their tail between their legs and were unable to activate the charges.

During the winter campaign of 1944, Soviet troops, having defeated the southern strategic group of Nazi troops, liberated not only Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea, but also a significant part of the western regions of Ukraine. In mid-April, the 1st Ukrainian Front temporarily went on the defensive at the line west of Lutsk - Chervonoarmeysk - west of Ternopil - Kolomyia - Krasnoilsk. On May 15, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev took command of the front forces.

In front of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the enemy army group and “Northern Ukraine” operated under the command of Colonel General J. Harpe, which occupied the defense from Polesie to the Carpathians. It included the 4th and 1st German tank armies and the 1st Hungarian army. This army group was supported by the 4th and 8th aviation corps of the 4th air fleet.

The Wehrmacht's mission: Army Group “Northern Ukraine” had the task of holding the occupied lines and preventing a breakthrough of Soviet troops into the Lvov region and into the important industrial and oil region of Drohobych - Borislav. At the same time, with the defense of the front section between Polesie and the Carpathians, the enemy hoped to cover the operational directions leading to the southern regions of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Silesian industrial region, which were of great economic importance for Nazi Germany.

The enemy, trying to keep the part of Ukrainian territory that remained in his hands, created a deeply echeloned defense. It was especially strong east of Lvov. The rugged terrain, forests, wetlands, and the Western Bug, Dniester, San and Vistula rivers contributed to the construction of strong defensive lines. The enemy built three defense lines 40-50 kilometers deep. The first strip, 4 to 6 kilometers deep, consisted of three to four continuous trenches connected by passages. The second line was located 8–10 kilometers from the front line of defense and was much weaker in engineering than the first. The third strip ran along the western banks of the Western Bug and Gnilaya Lipa rivers. Its equipment had not yet been completed at the beginning of the Soviet offensive. In addition, the enemy was preparing defenses on the Dniester, San, and Vistula. The cities of Vladimir-Volynsk, Brody, Hrubieszow, Rawa-Ruska, Lvov, Stanislav and many large settlements were turned into strong centers of resistance.

The task of the Red Army: The plan for the summer-autumn campaign of 1944 provided for the launch of an offensive by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front after the defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center in Belarus. In accordance with this, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front prepared the main considerations for conducting an operation with the aim of defeating Army Group Northern Ukraine and completing the liberation of Ukraine. The front commander presented these considerations at the beginning of June to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Taking them into account, Headquarters finally determined the plan of the operation and on June 24 issued a directive to the front commander. According to this directive, the front had to prepare and conduct an operation to defeat enemy groups in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The front troops were ordered to defeat the Lviv and Rava-Russian groups and reach the line Hrubieszow - Tomaszuv - Yavorov - Galich, for which to deliver two strikes: the first - from the area southwest of Lutsk in the direction of Sokal - Rawa-Russka and the second - from the Ternopil area to Lviv.

Tank landing of a reconnaissance battalion during the Lvov offensive, 1944.

From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova

Following the 3rd Guards Tank Army, on the morning of July 17, 1944, the 4th Tank Army, commanded by Colonel General D. D. Lelyushenko, began to enter the battle. Having passed the “Koltovo corridor”, the army had to develop a rapid offensive to the left of the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the direction of Zvongrad (15 kilometers southeast of Lvov) - Gorodok. The army was ordered not to get involved in frontal battles for Lvov, but to bypass it from the south and southwest. On July 17 and 18, due to strong enemy counterattacks on the flanks, it was not possible to completely bring the army into the breakthrough. Part of its forces, together with the troops of the 60th Army, repelled enemy counterattacks south of Zolochev. By the end of July 18, the 10th Guards Tank Corps reached the Olynanitsa area, deeply enveloping the enemy tank group from the south.

The 4th Tank Army, bypassing large defense centers and destroying small enemy groups, advanced towards Lvov from the south. At dawn on July 22, the advanced units of the army approached the southern outskirts of Lvov and began street fighting. The enemy offered stubborn resistance. Our soldiers and officers showed massive heroism and courage in these battles. Especially during the assault on the city, the soldiers of the 10th Guards Ural Volunteer Tank Corps under the command of Major General of Tank Forces E. E. Belov distinguished themselves.

The feat of the crew of the T-34 “Guard” tank of the 63rd Guards Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade has gone down in history forever.

The Guard crew (from left to right): tank commander A.V. Dodonov, gunner-radio operator A.P. Marchenko, loader N.I. Melnichenko, battalion commander P.V. Chirkov, driver mechanic F.P. Surkov. 1943 Photo by Mikhail Insarov.

The command assigned the crew the task of breaking through to the city center and hoisting a red flag at the Lviv City Hall. The tank was commanded by Lieutenant A.V. Dodonov, mechanic F.P. Surkov drove the car, and turret gunner A.A. Mordvintsev cleared the road with cannon fire. Radio operator A.P. Marchenko, who knew the city well, was instructed to show the way to the tank, and then climb the town hall and strengthen the red flag.

Gunner-radio operator A.P. Marchenko of the Guard tank of the 63rd Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade, 1943.

On July 22, the Guard tank, acting as part of its unit, broke through to the city center. Surkov drove the car to the very entrance of the town hall. Marchenko with a group of machine gunners, having destroyed the enemy guards, burst into the building, climbed the tower and hoisted a scarlet flag on it. The Nazis, seeing the Soviet banner, opened fire on the town hall and the tank. When leaving the building, Marchenko was seriously wounded and died a few hours later. For six days the Guard tank fought in the city. During this time, the crew destroyed over a hundred fascist soldiers and officers and burned eight enemy tanks. Finally, the enemy managed to knock out a Soviet tank. Lieutenant Dodonov was killed, turret gunner Mordvintsev and driver Surkov were seriously wounded. At the initiative of the workers of Lvov, a tank was installed on a high pedestal on Lenin Street. It recalls the heroism of Soviet soldiers in the fight against the fascist invaders. The government highly appreciated the combat exploits of the tankers. For courage and bravery, a number of soldiers of the 63rd Guards Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and among them the commander of this brigade, Colonel M.G. Fomichev, foreman F.P. Surkov, commander of the T-34 tank P.P. Kuleshov and tank platoon commander D.M. Potapov.

Soldiers of the 29th Guards Unecha Motorized Rifle Brigade, who formed the basis of the assault groups, fought bravely alongside the tankers. Motorized rifles, supported by tank fire, knocked out German machine gunners and snipers who had settled there from the attics and basements of buildings and, together with sappers and scouts, cleared the way for the tanks.

Major A.H.'s battalion Ishmukhametov, breaking through with Chelyabinsk tank crews to the city center, destroyed three “tigers”, six “panthers”, four guns with anti-tank rifles and grenades, and more than 300 enemy soldiers and officers with automatic and machine-gun fire. About a hundred Nazis were captured. The crews of the anti-tank guns, in particular, Sergeant Major Karchevsky, who died as a hero, showed particular courage and skill. Wounded in the head A.Kh. Ishmukhametov continued to command the battalion until the complete liberation of Lvov.

61st Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Zhukova was advancing west of M.G.’s brigade. Fomicheva.

Commander of the 61st Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade N. G. Zhukov. USSR, 1940-1943. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

A tank platoon under the command of 19-year-old Komsomol member Vladimir Markov moved forward in short bursts from one building to another, combining fire with maneuver, destroying three enemy tanks, two guns and up to a platoon of enemy infantry.

Tank platoon commander of the 61st Sverdlovsk Tank BrigadeV.A.Markov. Bryansk forests, 1943. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

The tank crews of S. A. Denisov’s 62nd Guards Perm Tank Brigade also performed remarkably well. Part of the brigade's forces with other units of the 4th Tank Army fought intense battles in the area of ​​​​Knyazhe and Zolochev with the enemy, who was trying to break out in the southern and southwestern directions from the encirclement in the area of ​​​​the city of Brody. Other units of the brigade fought for the liberation of Lvov.

Commander of UDTKHER.Belov and S.A.Denisov. Lvov offensive operation, 1944.

Through the joint efforts of the 4th Tank Army and the 60th Army, the city of Lvov was completely liberated on July 27.

Having lost Lvov and Stanislav, the Nazi command began to take urgent measures to stabilize its defenses on the Vistula and the Carpathians. The enemy attached particular importance to defense at the line of the Vistula River. Despite the extremely difficult situation in Belarus, the Nazi command concentrated significant reserves against the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the end of July and the first half of August, seven divisions from Army Group Southern Ukraine were transferred to Army Group Northern Ukraine, including three tank divisions, seven infantry divisions from Germany, three infantry divisions from Hungary and the command of the 17th Army, whose troops were defeated in Crimea. In addition to these 17 divisions, six brigades of assault guns, several separate tank battalions armed with new super-heavy tanks of the “Royal Tiger” type, and other units were deployed to the Vistula, in the Sandomierz area.

Commander of UDTKHER.Belov, Lvov, July 1944. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

However, these forces could not seriously change the situation. Over the 18–19 days of the operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced to a depth of 200 kilometers in a zone whose width reached 400 kilometers. These successes, as well as the victories of Soviet troops in Belarus, contributed to the further development of the offensive.

In the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at the end of July made a decision according to which the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts were to cross the Vistula on a wide front from Warsaw to the mouth of the Wisłoka River, seize several bridgeheads on the opposite bank for a subsequent offensive to the borders fascist Germany.

On July 27 and 28, the Headquarters ordered the 1st Ukrainian Front to rapidly develop an offensive in a western direction, to prevent the enemy from taking up defensive positions on the Vistula, to cross the river on the move, and to seize a bridgehead in the Sandomierz area.

In the period from August 11 to 15, the corps, like other formations of the 4th Tank Army, was transferred to the Sandomierz bridgehead to strengthen its defense. Operating in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, on August 17–18, the corps, together with combined arms formations, struck at enemy units that had launched a counteroffensive and thwarted their attempts to reach the Vistula. In September the defense became stable.

On October 21, 1944, Colonel N.D. Chuprov was appointed commander of the corps, and General E.E. Belov again returned to the post of deputy commander of the 4th Tank Army.

At the end of 1944, the corps included the 1222nd Novgorod Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, later renamed the 425th Guards Novgorod Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment.

The victory of Soviet troops in the western regions of Ukraine was of great military-political and strategic significance. As a result of the successful implementation of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the troops of the 1st and the 4th Ukrainian Fronts created during the offensive completed the liberation of Soviet Ukraine. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, together with troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, liberated a significant part of Polish territory east of the Vistula. An important result of the fighting of the 1st Ukrainian Front was the crossing of the Vistula and the formation of a vast bridgehead in the Sandomierz region, which could serve as a “springboard” for a new decisive offensive towards the south-eastern border of Nazi Germany.

In the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front defeated one of the four enemy strategic groupings on the Soviet-German front - Army Group Northern Ukraine. 32 divisions were defeated and 8 divisions were completely destroyed. In the battles for the liberation of the western regions of Ukraine, Soviet soldiers increased the glory of the Red Army, showed high combat skill, and displayed mass heroism. More than 123 thousand soldiers and officers were awarded government awards, and 160 people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

A new book from the author of the bestsellers “Penal Battalions and Barrier Detachments of the Red Army” and “Armored Troops of the Red Army.” THE FIRST study of the history of the creation and combat use of Soviet tank armies during the Great Patriotic War.

They have come a long and difficult path from the first failures and defeats of 1942 to the triumph of 1945. They distinguished themselves in all the major battles of the second half of the war - on the Kursk Bulge and in the Battle of the Dnieper, in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other strategic offensive operations. Possessing crushing power and phenomenal mobility, the Guards tank armies became the elite of the Red Army and the main striking force of the “Russian blitzkriegs” that broke the back of the previously invincible Wehrmacht.

In the Lviv-Sandomierz offensive operation, preparations for which were discussed in the chapter concerning the 1st Guards Tank Army, the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were assigned one of the decisive roles. According to the plan of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev was supposed to strike in two directions - in Rava-Russian and Lvov. In the Rava-Russian direction, the 3rd Guards, 13th Armies, 1st Guards Tank Army and the horse-mechanized group of General V.K. were supposed to attack. Baranova. The 60th and 38th armies, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the 4th Tank Army and the cavalry mechanized group of General S.V. attacked Lvov. Sokolova.

In accordance with order No. 00596/239/op Marshal I.S. Konev on July 7, 1944, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was initially planned to be introduced into a breakthrough on the first day of the operation in the 60th Army zone in the direction of Zolochev, Firleivka, Busk, Kamenka Srumilova, Zholkev, Yanov with the goal of defeating the Lvov enemy group. Developing the offensive, she had to bypass Lviv from the north and north-west, prevent the enemy from retreating from the city to the north-west, and on the fourth day of the operation capture the area of ​​​​Krechow, Yanov, Yamelna, Mokrotyn, Zholkiev. Strong forward detachments were ordered to capture Yavorov and the river crossings. San in the Yaroslav region and southeast. In the Kholoyuv area it was necessary to enter into combat cooperation with the 13th Army, in the Rawa-Russka area - with the 1st Guards Tank Army and the cavalry-mechanized group of General Sokolov, and in the Wielkopolje, Suchowol area - with the 4th Tank Army.

Later, Marshal Konev decided to introduce the 3rd Guards Tank Army into a breakthrough on the second day of the operation after the infantry had overcome the entire tactical zone of enemy defense and reached the line Podgorce, Sasov, Strutyn, Plugow. By the end of the second day of the operation, it was ordered to go to the area of ​​​​Kamenka-Strumilova, Dzibulki, Remenuv, Zhultanets. To support the 60th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies, the 1st Guards Assault and 5th Fighter Aviation Corps were allocated. In order to hide the intent of the operation and the regrouping of front formations, headquarters, on the instructions of Marshal Konev, developed an operational camouflage plan. They were supposed to simulate the concentration of two tank armies and a tank corps on the left wing of the front.

In preparation for the operation, the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army conducted sandbox exercises with unit and formation commanders. “Losing the upcoming task P.S. Rybalko conducted it in a highly qualified manner, noted Marshal I.S. Konev, - with knowledge of the matter, providing for a number of possible cases and difficulties that may arise when the army performs combat missions. At the same time, he paid attention to the organization of the service for the restoration, repair and combat nutrition of tank troops. All this was sorted out against the background of the tasks assigned to one or another brigade or corps. Particular attention was paid to organizing interaction with aviation, artillery and, of course, with the army in whose sector the corps or brigade entered the breakthrough.”

By decision of General Rybalko, the formation of army troops was in two echelons: in the first - the 7th Guards Tank and 9th Mechanized Corps, in the second - the 6th Guards Tank Corps. The 91st separate tank brigade was allocated to the army commander's reserve. For the period of breakthrough of the enemy defense, on the instructions of the front commander, the 29th heavy tank regiment of the 7th Guards Tank Corps and the tank battalion of the 6th Guards Tank Corps were transferred to the 28th Rifle Corps of the 60th Army for use as NPP tanks . After breaking through the defense, they returned to their corps. Starting position for entering the breakthrough on the western bank of the river. The troops of the first echelon of the army were supposed to occupy Seret during artillery preparation.

By the beginning of the operation, the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were equipped with materiel and personnel and were intensively engaged in combat training. The army additionally included the 10th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, the 16th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, one division of the 33rd Cannon Artillery Brigade and one division of the 1251st Cannon Artillery Regiment. The combat strength of the army as of July 1, 1944 is presented in table No. 33.

Table No. 33


As of July 15, the army numbered 41,862 men, 222 field, 39 anti-tank and 80 anti-aircraft guns, 271 mortars, 72 rocket launchers, 379 tanks and 119 self-propelled guns, including 323 T-34s and 42 IS-122s. The training of the arriving crews of tanks and self-propelled guns was low, which required the organization of additional classes to study the equipment, maintain and drive combat vehicles over rough terrain. The weak point of the army was the provision of vehicles. Of the 6,575 vehicles of various types, only 3,969 were on the move. This did not make it possible to fully provide the infantry with transport. Therefore, General Rybalko ordered special attention to be paid to the training of motorized rifle units. During tactical exercises, mechanized brigades and motorized rifle battalions were tested in their ability to make 25-, 40- and 50-kilometer marches in a limited time (25 km - 4 hours, 40 km - 6 hours, 50 km - 8 hours).

The army's supply of basic supplies was sufficient to conduct offensive operations. Diesel fuel reserves amounted to 4 filling stations, gasoline - 3.3 filling stations, ammunition - on average more than 3 rounds of ammunition, food - more than 20 daily.

In the zone of the upcoming offensive of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the 349th and 357th Infantry Divisions, which, according to front headquarters estimates, each had 6 thousand active bayonets, were defending. Each division occupied a defense area about 20 km wide. In the area of ​​Sasov and Zolochev, the 8th Tank Division was in reserve, with approximately 120 tanks and self-propelled guns. There was information about the arrival of the 14th SS Division "Galicia" in the Zolochev, Krasnoye area.

The enemy, trying to delay the advance of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, created a developed defense system, consisting of three lines. The first strip included a continuous system of trenches, reaching 3-4 lines in some areas. In a number of areas ahead of the first trench, 50-200 m away, there were combat guard positions that had full-profile trenches with communication passages to the main trench. The trench of the first line was connected by communication passages with the second line. The second line of trenches ran at a distance of 200–300 m from the first, and the third line – 1.5–2 km. The second defense line was equipped at a depth of 6-10 km from the front edge. It was a continuous trench with a full profile. In addition, there was information about the presence of a second rear defensive line 30–40 km from the front line along the line Povoch, Sasov, the village of Dembitsa, Zolochev and a third line along the river. Western Bug, Krasnoe, r. Peltev.

Despite the constant study of the enemy grouping, the front command at the beginning of the offensive failed to fully reveal the fire system and the deployment of its reserves, including tank divisions in the Lvov direction.

On the evening of July 12, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the Rava-Russian direction. She established that the enemy began to withdraw his troops, leaving a military outpost at the front line. In this regard, Marshal Konev decided to immediately go on the offensive with the forward battalions of the divisions located in the direction of the main attack of the 3rd Guards and 13th armies. Soon they overcame the main line of defense, advancing 8-12 km.

In the Lvov direction the breakthrough took place in a more tense situation. On July 14, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation and massive air strikes, the main forces of the 60th and 38th armies went on the offensive. But by the end of the day, they had advanced only 3–8 km, continuously repelling the attacks of the operational reserves brought into the battle by the enemy, consisting of two tank divisions. To assist the troops of the 60th Army, General Rybalko decided to bring two brigades of first-echelon corps into battle.

On the morning of July 15, artillery preparation was carried out. At the same time, aviation from the 2nd Air Army launched an air strike against the enemy. As a result, his tank divisions suffered significant losses, and command and control was disorganized. At 8:30 a.m., the 69th Mechanized Brigade of the 9th Mechanized Corps, together with units of the 15th and 28th Rifle Corps, attacked the enemy in the Perepelniki area. The 56th Guards Tank Brigade of the 7th Guards Tank Corps, together with units of the 28th Rifle Corps, entered the battle in the Gukalovce area. By the end of the day on July 15, the troops of the 60th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies had broken through the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 18 km, forming the so-called Koltovsky (Koltuvsky) corridor 4–6 km wide. This narrow strip of terrain between Koltov and Trostsyanets Maly, in the interfluve of the Western Bug and Zolochuvka, stretching 20 km in the north-west direction, was the only, with great difficulty, breach in the enemy’s defenses in the Lvov direction. From both sides it was shelled by artillery, mortar and even machine-gun fire. In addition, the enemy tried to cut the Koltovsky corridor with attacks in converging directions.

Marshal Konev was faced with a difficult problem: to introduce a tank army through a narrow corridor or to continue the struggle to expand it. The latter led to the loss of precious time - the enemy command could bring additional reserves to this area and disrupt the offensive of the front forces. After a comprehensive assessment of the situation, the front commander decided to introduce the main forces of the 3rd Guards Tank Army into battle in a period of apparent success. On the morning of July 16, following the advance detachments, they began moving along one route. To ensure their advancement, six aviation corps were allocated.

By the morning of July 17, the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army reached the river. Zlochówka and crossed to its western bank. Without further encountering organized enemy resistance, the advance detachment of the 7th Guards Tank Corps occupied Kutkozh, cutting the Lviv-Brody railway. The advance detachment of the 9th Mechanized Corps captured Krasny. The next morning the crossing of the river began. Peltev. The 71st mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps captured Busk after a stubborn battle. Its advance detachment, moving in a north-eastern direction, occupied Derevlyany, where by the end of the day parts of General Baranov’s cavalry-mechanized group arrived, closing the encirclement ring around the enemy’s Brod group. On July 19, rifle units of the 60th Army took Koltuv, eliminating the enemy’s attempts to close the breakthrough gate at the neck of the corridor.

The enemy, trying to avoid encirclement, launched counterattacks on the morning of July 17 to eliminate the gap that had formed and intercept the communications of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. In this difficult situation, Marshal Konev decided to bring another, 4th Tank, army into the battle through the narrow neck of the breakthrough. Its entry was ensured by the actions of two attack, two bomber and two fighter aviation corps. The expansion of the breakthrough was entrusted to the 106th Rifle and 4th Guards Tank Corps. The 31st Tank Corps was also deployed here.

During July 17 and 18, formations of the 4th Tank Army crossed the Koltovsky corridor. Timely measures taken to hold the corridor subsequently played a decisive role in repelling the enemy’s attempts to release his troops encircled at Brody.

The introduction of two tank armies into a breakthrough through a narrow corridor is, of course, an indicator of the courage, risk, determination, unshakable will and creative approach of the front commander to the use of large mobile formations in specific conditions of the situation. At the same time, it should be noted that given the difficult situation created, half of the armored formations (31st Tank, 4th Guards Tank and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps) had to be used to secure the flanks of the corridor. The troops moved in a solid column along a forest road washed out by rain. In addition, both tank armies were not actually introduced into the breakthrough, but were “pushed” through a narrow gap along one route, which delayed their entry.

At the same time, the sequential introduction of two tank armies into battle with the goal of quickly reaching Lvov made it possible to develop the tactical success achieved at the beginning of the operation into operational success. The troops of the 3rd Guards Tank and 13th Armies were located 20–30 km from the city, and the 10th Guards Tank Corps of the 4th Tank Army reached the Olshanitsa area (40 km east of Lvov). The front commander, trying to build on the success, gave the following order:

"1. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army, no later than the morning of July 20, will take Lvov by a roundabout maneuver from the north and north-west. I order General Baranov’s group to capture Zholkiev.

2. The commander of the 4th Tank with a swift attack bypassing Lvov from the south in cooperation with the 3rd Tank to capture Lvov. Ensure the operation from the south from the directions of Przemyshlany and Mikolajów. 93 Tank Brigade should be left in the Koltów area until the enemy is eliminated." .

In accordance with this, at 11 a.m. on July 19, General Rybalko ordered units of the 7th Guards Tank and 9th Mechanized Corps to immediately turn to the southwest and develop an offensive in the direction of Lvov. However, difficult weather conditions did not allow the corps to quickly take their starting position for the offensive. Enemy aircraft bombed vehicles with ammunition and fuel that were barely crawling through the mud with almost impunity. Therefore, the corps were able to go on the offensive only on the morning of July 20.

Marshal Konev foresaw the possible difficulties of capturing Lvov with a sudden attack from the north. Therefore, at 4 o’clock on July 20, he ordered the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army: “If you encounter strong resistance when attacking Lviv from the north and northeast, go around Lviv deeper from the west.” The 4th Tank Army was supposed to strike bypassing the city from the south, and the troops of the 60th and 38th armies were to attack Lviv from the east.

Despite all efforts, on July 20, the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army failed to capture Lvov. Marshal Konev, recalling this, noted that the commander made a mistake in assessing the area in front of Lvov and did not properly take into account the approaches to the city. In an effort to take Lvov as quickly as possible, General Rybalko moved his troops towards the city directly along the Krasnoe - Lvov road and ran into a peat bog, which is northeast of Lvov. This was the most difficult place for tank forces to operate. Meanwhile, the front order of July 20 indicated: to bypass Lvov deeper from the west. “I was very concerned about the actions of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, which, instead of deep bypassing Lvov, got involved in protracted battles for passes on the outskirts of the city,” writes Konev. “I attached particular importance to her swift throw. But, unfortunately, P.S. Rybalko, an experienced army commander, always distinguished by the thoughtfulness of his operational decisions, this time was drawn into heavy battles near Lvov on very inconvenient terrain, and he did not take advantage of the favorable situation for the army to maneuver around the city from the north-west and west.”

How did the headquarters of the 3rd Guards Tank Army assess the current situation? The “Report on the combat operations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the Lvov-Przemysl operation from 14.7 to 28.7.44” noted:

“Already in the evening of July 19, it became clear to the commander that the possibility of a surprise attack on Lviv from the northeast and capturing the city had slipped away. There was only one hope left - that the enemy had not yet managed to bring large reserves to Lvov and his small garrison could be defeated by our attack. In the operation against Lvov, a rare opportunity presented itself - with a sudden strike, on the move, crush small groups of the enemy on the way and quickly burst into the city with tanks and troops, scatter the garrison that did not have time to organize the defense of the city and quickly capture this largest center of Western Ukraine; this was quite possible for the 3rd Guards Tank Army on July 17 and 18; it was already difficult to accomplish on July 19 and almost impossible later. By 19.00 20.7, the enemy brought up some already battered, but still quite combat-ready troops (20th motorized division, 16th tank division, part of the remaining forces of the 340th infantry division) for the defense of Lvov, as well as fresh 101st from the rear mountain rifle division, 68th and 168th infantry divisions and special forces. parts of the garrison of Lvov and occupied lines and strongholds convenient for defense. In addition, the enemy removed everything that was possible from the southern Lviv sector and transferred it north of Lvov, sensing a great threat from here.” .

The actions of enemy aviation, which had complete air supremacy, were assessed as a fairly significant factor countering the advance of army troops.

While the corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army unsuccessfully tried to break through to Lvov from the north, the troops of the 60th Army, with the participation of the 91st separate tank and 16th self-propelled artillery brigades, completed the defeat of the enemy’s Brod group by noon on July 22.

On the night of July 22, troops of the 4th Tank Army began the assault on Lvov. In the evening, Marshal Konev sent his representative to the headquarters of the 3rd Guards Tank Army with the following order:

“The 1st Guards Tank Army captured Oleszyce, Lyubachev and is rapidly advancing on Yaroslav, which created an advantageous situation for deep coverage of the enemy’s Lvov group and its defeat. I order:

First. Cover up against Lvov.

Second. The main forces of the army should bypass Lviv deeper, with the task of quickly reaching the area of ​​Yavorov, Mostyska, Sudovaya Vyshnya, and cutting off the escape routes for the enemy Lviv group to the west. Go around the Yanovsky forest from the north. 31st Tank Corps - destroy the enemy group in the Star area. and Now Jaryczew, Dziedzilow and after completing the task remain in the area of ​​​​Dziedzilow, Now. Yarychev" .

The army troops, following the order of the front commander, began a march to bypass the Yanovsky forest. By the end of the day on July 23, the 6th Guards Tank Corps reached the Yavorov area, sending one brigade to Mostiska, the other to Janow. At this time, the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps approached the southwestern outskirts of Lviv, intercepted the Stryiskoe highway and cut off the enemy’s escape routes to the south and southwest. By the morning of July 24, the 7th Guards Tank Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army occupied Ship Cherry with its main forces and one brigade of Grudek-Yagelonski. By three o'clock in the afternoon, the main forces of the 9th Mechanized Corps entered the Yavorov area.

The chapter “The First Guards Tank Army” sets out in detail all the issues relating to the instructions of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to defeat the enemy’s Lvov group, the development of plans by the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the enemy’s measures to save their troops in the Lvov region.

Let us recall that the enemy managed to strengthen the group operating near Lvov with three divisions transferred there from the Stanislav area. General G. Guderian, appointed on July 20 as Chief of the General Staff of the High Command of the Ground Forces, took energetic measures to restore the defense front along the western bank of the Vistula. Reserves were hastily moved here from the depths and from other sectors of the front.

In accordance with the plan developed by the commander and headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front and presented to Stalin on July 23, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was to reach the Vistula near the mouth of the river. Wisłoka, cross it and bypass Krakow from the north. However, Stalin rejected this plan on July 24, demanding first of all to defeat the enemy’s Lvov group and prevent it from retreating beyond the river. San or Sambir. He ordered the use of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps to capture the Yaroslav, Przemysl (Przemysl) area in order to cut off the main routes of the enemy Lviv group to the west. The formations of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies were to defeat the Lvov group and capture the city of Lvov in cooperation with the 60th Army. The attack to the west in the coming days was ordered to be limited to access to the river. San with the capture of crossings and bridgeheads on the western bank of this river.

Stalin demanded that on July 26 he be presented with a plan for further actions after the capture of Lvov. We talked about its contents in the chapter dedicated to the 1st Guards Tank Army. Here we will only say that the 3rd Guards Tank Army was ordered to go on the offensive from the area of ​​Żolynia, Przewursk, Grodzińsko-Dolne to Stoberna, Sędziwusz, Dąbrowa Tarnowska, Opatowiec (on the Vistula River), Miechów, bypassing Krakow from the north and north -west. The start of the operation is approximately August 3–5.

While all these plans were being developed and refined, Marshal Konev on July 24 demanded that the 3rd Guards Tank Army move with its main forces to the area of ​​Mostiska, Sudovaya Vishnya, Yavorov and defeat the enemy’s Lvov grouping. Part of the forces was to attack Gródek-Yagelonskiy, Lvov and assist the 60th and 4th Tank Armies in capturing Lvov. Subsequently, the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were ordered to capture Medyk, Nizhankowice and cut off the enemy’s escape route to Przemysl. According to the decision of General Rybalko, formations of the 6th Guards Tank Corps were to advance in a western direction and capture Przemysl. The 7th Guards Tank Corps was ordered to assist the troops of the 60th and 4th Tank Armies in the liberation of Lvov. The 9th Mechanized Corps and the 91st Separate Tank Brigade were given the task of advancing in a southerly direction in order to block the retreat routes of the enemy Lvov group to the southwest.

By this time, the troops of the 13th Army, operating north of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, were approaching the river. San. Units of the 1st Guards Tank Army crossed the river north of Yaroslav and fought on the northern outskirts of Yaroslav, and General Baranov's mechanized cavalry group crossed the San at Radymno.

By 3 o'clock on July 25, the forward detachment of the 6th Guards Tank Corps of General V.V. Novikova went along the Mostiska - Przemysl highway to the river. Vyar, the bridge across which was blown up by the enemy, and the banks of the river were mined. Therefore, the main forces of the 56th Guards Tank Brigade of the corps, having shifted to the south, crossed the Vyar at Negrybka and by the end of the day reached the southeastern outskirts of Przemysl. However, the surprise of the action was lost and it was not possible to take the city on the move. In this regard, General Rybalko sent a letter to the corps commander with the following content:

“You won’t be able to take a city with tanks, since you’ve lost surprise. It is necessary to bring up the infantry. Conduct thorough reconnaissance, especially carefully identifying the most dangerous firing points located inside the city. For reconnaissance, it is necessary to use partisan scouts who know the city well. Infiltrate infantry, machine gunners, and partisans into the city. Only after a thorough reconnaissance can a battle be organized to capture the city, using the full power of artillery fire. The entire burden of capturing the city should fall on the infantry and artillery, while tanks can be used in extremely limited numbers as part of assault detachments (3-5 tanks).” .

During July 26, on the western bank of the river. The 51st Guards Tank and 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 6th Guards Tank Corps crossed Vyar near Negrybka. Units of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade continued fighting on the southern outskirts of Przemysl and at the same time part of their forces intercepted the Przemysl-Dynow highway west of the city, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to withdraw troops to the west or transfer reinforcements to Przemysl. At 9 o’clock in the evening, after a powerful fire attack by the corps’ artillery, the 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigade captured the heights that dominated the interfluve of Sana and Vyara in a night assault, and then continued the offensive towards the center of Przemysl. The 53rd Guards Tank Brigade took advantage of this and entered the city along the Dobromilskoye Highway. By 9 o'clock on July 27, Przemysl was completely cleared of the enemy.

On the morning of July 26, units of the 7th Guards Tank Corps began an attack on Lvov through Grudek-Yagelonskiy, and the 52nd Guards Tank Brigade and two motorized rifle battalions of the 9th Mechanized Corps, united in a group under the command of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ziberov, - via Janow. At 2 o'clock the 56th Guards Tank Brigade took part in the assault on Lvov, and at 8 o'clock in the evening - the 280th Rifle Division of the 13th Army, temporarily subordinate to the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. By 10 a.m. on July 27, rifle units of the 60th Army began to enter the city from the north and east, and troops of the 4th Tank Army advanced to the city center. By evening, Lvov was completely cleared of the enemy.

The 9th Mechanized Corps, blocking the withdrawal routes of the Lvov group to the southwest, occupied Rudki with the forces of one brigade on July 25 and reached the Dniester in the Chaikovichi region. The next morning, the advance detachment of the 7th Guards Tank Corps captured Sambir with a surprise attack. Units of the 91st Separate Tank Brigade occupied Nizhankovice, Nizhevets, Gusakov, Dobromil and Khyrov. The enemy's retreat routes from the Lvov region to Przemysl and beyond the river. The San were blocked. He made desperate attempts to break through to Przemysl. On the morning of July 28, the enemy forced the advance detachment of the 7th Guards Tank Corps to leave Sambir. On July 31, units of the 91st Separate Tank Brigade were driven out of Hyruw, but held Dobromil and Nizankowice.

As a result of the successful actions of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Army Group “Northern Ukraine” was cut into two parts: the remnants of the 4th Tank Army rolled back to the Vistula, and the 1st Tank Army and the Hungarian 1st Army rolled back to the southwest, to the Carpathians. The gap between them reached up to 100 km. By decision of Marshal Konev, the cavalry-mechanized group of General Sokolov and formations of the 13th Army rushed into it.

To fulfill this task, Marshal Konev on July 28 sent directive No. 92/NSh to the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army with the following content:

“Upon the 60th and 4th Tank Armies reaching the line of Przemysl, Dobromil, Sambir, I order:

1. Concentrate the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the area of ​​Krakovets, Medyka, Yavoriv for subsequent actions in the directions of Yaroslav, Rzeszow, Kolbuszova, Mielec, Staszow.

2. Prepare crossings across the river. San for tanks at Sinyava, Yaroslav, Radymno and across the river. Wisłok north of Przewursk.

3. An additional order will be given about the start of the army’s offensive.

4. Put the materiel in order, bring up fuel and ammunition.

5. Receipt, execution to convey" .

General Rybalko decided on the night of July 29 to cross the San with the main forces of the army and reach Kolbushov with the lead corps by the end of the day. Taking into account possible enemy resistance in the Rzeszow area, it was planned to bypass the city from the north with the forces of the 6th Guards Tank Corps and from the south with the forces of the 9th Mechanized Corps. Before the army troops had time to begin carrying out the assigned task, on the morning of July 29, headquarters received a new directive from the front commander:

“In order to prevent the enemy from occupying a defensive line along the river. Vistula and the capture of a bridgehead on the western bank of the river. Wisla for further actions I order:

From the concentration area, in accordance with my directive No. 92/NS dated 28.7.44, attack on the morning of 29.7.44 with vanguards and on the morning of 30.7.44 with the main forces in the direction of Rzeszow, Kolbuszow, Mielec, in cooperation with the 13th and 1st tank armies to force R. Vistula in the Baranów sector, the mouth of the Wisłok River and by the end of 2.8.44 seize the bridgehead of Staszow, Bydlowa, Budziska, Plisko Wola. Conduct reconnaissance on Szydłów, Stopnica, Nowy Korchin" .

Meanwhile, the advanced detachments of the 1st Guards Tank and 13th Armies crossed the Vistula near Baranów on the evening of July 29, capturing two bridgeheads 2–3 km deep on the opposite bank by the next morning. On the morning of August 1, the main forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army crossed the Vistula.

In the offensive zone of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, events developed as follows. On the evening of July 29, the forward detachment of the 6th Guards Tank Corps approached the river. Wislock. Having crossed the river, the corps reached the Kolbushov area by the end of the next day. Units of the 7th Guards Tank Corps, having crossed the San, reached Lancut, occupied the day before by the troops of the 13th Army, and the 9th Mechanized Corps, together with the 117th Rifle Division of the 13th Army, began the battle for Rzeszow. However, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, trying to increase the success of the 1st Guards Tank Army, ordered General Rybalko to withdraw the corps from the battle and on the morning of July 31, cross the Vistula in the Tarnobrzeg-Baranów sector with his forces. Units of the 6th Guards Tank Corps were supposed to cross the river in the Durda area, and the 7th Guards Tank Corps - in the Khmelev area.

At the specified time, formations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army began crossing the Vistula. It was provided by the forces of the 18th pontoon battalion, assigned to the army by order of the chief of the front engineering troops and included in the army of the 182nd motorized engineering battalion. By the evening of July 31, they launched the first ferry across the river, along which 23 tanks and self-propelled guns and two motorized rifle battalions of the 7th Guards Tank Corps were transported to the western bank of the Vistula on the night of August 1. Later, two more crossings were prepared. On the night of August 2, 4 30-ton and 2 60-ton ferries were already operating on the Vistula, which by 10:30 a.m. ensured the crossing of units of the 6th and 7th Guards Tank Corps to the left bank of the river.

After crossing the Vistula, the troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army went on the offensive in the northern and northeast directions, and the 3rd Guards Tank Army went on the offensive in the west and southwest. The enemy made desperate attempts to push back the front troops that had reached the Sandomierz area. First of all, he launched a series of counterattacks on the flanks of the troops located on the right bank of the Vistula, from the areas of Tarnobrzeg and Mielec. With counter strikes from the north and south in the general direction of Baranów, the enemy sought to reach the crossing area, cut off the formations of the 1st and 3rd Guards Tank Armies located behind the Vistula from the rest of the front forces and restore defenses along the left bank.

To repel enemy counterattacks, units of the 11th Guards Tank Corps, the 64th Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 9th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, as well as some rifle and artillery units located on the right bank of the Vistula were brought in connections.

The actions of the southern enemy group, which included two tank and about two infantry divisions, were especially dangerous. On August 3, the enemy launched a strike from the Mieltz area in the direction of Baranów and broke through to the crossings. During fierce battles, the enemy's Melets group was defeated by the forces of the 9th Mechanized Corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army, which advanced to the bridgehead from the front reserve. The enemy's bridgehead in the Tarnobrzeg area was also eliminated.

By the morning of August 4, the 95th Infantry Division of the 5th Army approached Baranów. It, together with the 69th Mechanized Brigade, with the support of combined tank groups of the 6th and 7th Guards Tank Corps, pushed the enemy back from the crossings. By this time, the bridgehead in the Sandomierz area had been expanded to 45 km along the front and to 25 km in depth.

The crisis at the Baranów crossings prompted the front command to involve additional forces from the 5th and 13th armies in clearing the eastern bank of the Vistula from the enemy, and by August 7, the eastern banks of the Vistula and Wisłoka rivers were cleared of the enemy to the Zochowu area.

While stubborn fighting was going on on the right bank of the Vistula, the main forces of the 6th and 7th Guards Tank Corps, located on the left bank of the river, continued the offensive. By midnight on August 2, units of the 7th Guards Tank Corps cleared Staszow of the enemy. The 6th Guards Tank Corps, without encountering resistance, reached the Szydłów-Stopnica line. On the morning of August 3, the advance detachment of the corps - the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade - approached Wislica on the bank of the river. Nida. The advance detachment of the 51st Guards Tank Brigade tried to seize the Shchutsin crossing on the move, but was unsuccessful. Reinforcing the forward detachment with units of the 22nd Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 71st Guards Heavy Tank Regiment did not help either. The enemy continuously increased its forces in the crossing area, stubbornly holding the bridgehead, which made it possible to influence the flanks of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. On August 7, the enemy managed to push back the 22nd Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By decision of General Rybalko, the 91st separate tank brigade was sent to strengthen it. On August 9, the main forces of the 58th Infantry Division of the 5th Army reached the crossing. But all this did not allow to break the enemy’s resistance.

The attempts of the 3rd Guards Army to expand the captured bridgehead north of Sandomierz were also unsuccessful. In this situation, Marshal Konev decided to suspend the offensive in the Krakow direction and transfer the efforts of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to the Kielce direction in order to expand the bridgehead to the north. On August 3, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front ordered General Rybalko, on the morning of August 4, to go on the offensive with one tank corps from the Staszow area in the direction of 1 km west of Opatow, Denkow, Magon with the task, together with the 1st Guards Tank Army, to destroy the enemy Sandomierz group. In case of weak enemy resistance in Ostrovets, it was ordered to capture this city. Marshal Konev informed that two rifle divisions of the 5th Army would approach the bridgehead occupied by the troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army by the end of August 4.

However, the rifle divisions of the 5th Army were delayed in their approach, and therefore, in agreement with the front commander, the timing of the offensive and the tasks of the 3rd Guards Tank Army were clarified. With the forces of the 6th Guards Tank Corps, it was supposed to hold the Szydłów-Stopnitsa line, and on August 5, the 7th Guards Tank Corps went on the offensive to Bogorya, Ivaniska, Ostrovets and by the end of the day to capture Ostrovets, where, according to intelligence data, the headquarters of 4 enemy's 1st Tank Army. Units of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army were given the task of developing an offensive in the direction of Opatow, Ozarow.

The offensive of the 7th Guards Tank Corps (37 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns, 917 active bayonets) began at 10 a.m. on August 5. The forward detachment of the corps (55th Guards Tank Brigade) captured Bodziechów with a surprise attack at 9 a.m. on August 6 and cut the Ostrowiec-Sandomierz highway, thereby causing panic among the enemy. However, he soon recovered and counterattacked the brigade from different directions. Having lost 14 tanks, she was forced to leave Bodziechów. By the end of the day, the main forces of the corps had reached the area of ​​Lagow and Nieskuzow. The 8th Mechanized Corps did not advance, so the 7th Guards Tank Corps received the task of striking in the direction of Opatow and Ozarow on August 7th. But he also failed to capture the Opatow region. On August 8, the 9th Mechanized Corps concentrated in the Staszow area, completing the liquidation of the Mieleck enemy group. General Rybalko decided, covering himself with part of the forces of the 9th Mechanized Corps from the directions of Kielce and Ostrowiec, to strike with the main forces of the army bypassing the Opatow resistance center from the north in the general direction of Ozarow. The right-flank 7th Guards Tank Corps was ordered to continue the attack on Stodoli.

The enemy, relying on pre-prepared defenses, repelled all attacks of the 9th Mechanized and 7th Guards Tank Corps during August 10th. On the morning of August 11, the enemy, having brought up the fresh 3rd Panzer Division from Romania and the 16th Panzer Division from near Sanok to the Khmilnik area, struck in the general direction of Staszow and Baranow. He managed to break through the defenses of the 112th Infantry Division of the 13th Army and occupy Raków and Szydłów. To counter a possible enemy breakthrough to Staszow, the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army advanced the 91st Separate Tank Brigade to Hancza with a forced march. Through the joint efforts of the 6th Guards Tank Corps, the 91st Separate Tank Brigade and the 97th Rifle Division, the enemy attack on Staszow was repelled. Then the enemy launched a counterattack on August 13 with units of four tank, one motorized and several infantry divisions from the Stopnitsa area. In six days of fierce battles, formations of the 5th Guards, 3rd Guards Tank Armies and the 31st Separate Tank Corps inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, who was forced to stop attacks. Units of the 4th Tank Army were transferred to the combat area from near Sambir, which made it possible to further strengthen the defense on the bridgehead.

On August 14, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front made another attempt to cut off the Opatow and Sandomierz salients with the combined efforts of combined arms and tank armies. During four days of stubborn fighting, the 7th Guards Tank and 21st Rifle Corps advanced 5–6 km, occupying Stodoly. The offensive of the 9th Mechanized Corps was not successful. However, the formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army, advancing to the right of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, occupied Jakubowce, Sobutka and by the end of August 17 established contact with the bridgehead of the 3rd Guards Army on the western bank of the Vistula. As a result, the Sandomierz enemy group was surrounded.

On August 20, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front ordered the 3rd Guards Tank Army to prevent the enemy from breaking through from the Opatow ledge to the southeast, south and southwest. By this time, the army had suffered heavy losses, numbering only 102 tanks, 46 self-propelled guns and 3,701 active bayonets. Ammunition stocks were reduced to 1 round of ammunition or less, and there was only 0.1 refills of gasoline available. Meanwhile, the Opatów enemy group had noticeably strengthened. The 3rd, 17th and 23rd tank divisions were additionally transferred to its composition. From August 20 to 31, the enemy launched more than 40 fierce attacks in the Kielce direction, trying to find weak points in the defense of the 3rd Guards Tank Army. Despite all his efforts, he failed to break through in the Stopnitsa area. The enemy's greatest achievement was the displacement of army troops to the south beyond the Zawichost-Stodoly-Opatów road.

Simultaneously with repelling the enemy counterattack in the Stopnitsa area, troops of the 3rd Guards, 1st Guards Tank and 13th Armies conducted military operations to expand the Sandomierz bridgehead in a northern direction. On August 18, formations of the 13th and 3rd Guards armies captured Sandomierz, expanding the bridgehead across the Vistula to 75 km along the front and up to 50 km in depth. After this, the 1st Guards Tank Army was withdrawn to the front reserve. Until the end of August, troops of the 3rd Guards Tank Army continued to repel enemy counterattacks in the northern section of the bridgehead.

We talked about the results of the Lviv-Sandomierz operation in the chapter dedicated to the 1st Guards Tank Army. Let's just say that the fighting was extremely persistent and bloody. The irretrievable losses of the 3rd Guards Tank Army amounted to 381 tanks and self-propelled guns.