Black nuclear material market. Atomic black market. All this requires an international community of intensive efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime - both within the existing set of measures and by developing new solutions.
"Die Welt": a lot says that nuclear weapons can get into the hands of international terrorism. How real is such a danger?
Mohammed Al Baradei (Mohammed Al Baradei): At the moment, such a danger is potential. However, there is a real danger that radioactive material can get into the hands of terrorists. With it, they can make a "dirty bomb." There are many people such a weapon, of course, it would be impossible to destroy, but to cause a big panic and fear it is in a state.
"Die Welt": how big is the danger of the fact that certain nuclear powers can convey the "bomb" in the hands of terrorists?
Baradei: I do not know any state that would be ready to supply terrorists with nuclear weapons.
"Die Welt": American delegation, which recently visited North Korea, reported the disappearance of 800 nuclear fuel rods. Can you assume that Pyongyang creates a nuclear weapon?
Baramey: North Korea has long been able to produce nuclear weapons. But the likelihood that the regime is engaged in the regeneration of spent fuel rods, today is very large. North Korea believes that it is under threat, in siege. This feeling of threats to the tepe with the technological capabilities of Pyongyang puts the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
"Die Welt": If Pyongyang really decided to use fuel rods to create a "bomb", how much will it take for this time?
Baramey: It depends on whether the regime has complete documentation and whether the production process itself has begun, which we do not know. North Korea has many engineers and scientists specializing in the field of nuclear energy. It is impossible to exclude that they are already working on a certain time. In any case, you can talk about several months, but not years.
"Die Welt": What conclusions did you make that I recently opened Libya's nuclear program? Is it possible to assume that there is an international network through which states and terrorist organizations can provide themselves to the necessary means for the production of weapons?
Baradei: Libya confirmed our assumptions: there is a well-developed black market, on which nuclear materials and the necessary equipment are offered worldwide. Its scale turned out to be, however, more than expected. In addition, we were frightened as much as this network is. It is similar to a network of organized crime and drug carriers.
"Die Welt": Some observers argue that the center of this network is in Pakistan.
Baramey: I can't say anything about this. The Government of Pakistan is investigating the case when some scientists allegedly provided prohibited services in the nuclear sector. It further declares that he deprives all smugglers of knowledge of the right to classes in the field of atomic technology.
"DIE WELT": Iran recently gave an international agency for atomic energy (IAEA) to conduct inspection. The country confessed with this, which has already been far advanced in the creation of an atomic bomb. For hawks in the USA, this is the proof of the "inefficiency" of the IAEA.
Baramey: This is nonsense. It is impossible to inspect the equipment for enrichment if it is used at the laboratory level. This is not able to make any control system of the world. This does not mean that Iran used an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which admits the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as a cover. The country is able to carry out its military program and within the framework of the contract, and at the same time no one will know about it. Decisive is the presence of a system capable of disclosing nuclear programs whose implementation is under production. Here we need any information.
"Die Welt": Does the safety of the old Soviet nuclear arsenal disturb you?
Baramey: Yes. This is a dangerous inheritance. From one of this arsenal you can steal a large amount of uranium or plutonium and, God forbid, real weapons. The protection of these arms arsenals is the question of financial resources, and they are missing.
"DIE WELT": the contract on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons allows for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but it allows countries to easily go to the threshold for atomic weapons. Is it possible to somehow adugge to the current realities?
Baramey: dealing with Iran, Iraq and Libya, we found that the contract has a number of shortcomings and loopholes. They must be eliminated. Here I mean, above all, four points: First, we must limit the right to enrich uranium and plutonium in the framework of nuclear programs implemented for peaceful purposes. Secondly, we need to thoroughly review the rules for controlling exports in order to introduce more stringent restrictions on the sale of equipment and splitting materials. Thirdly, the IAEA requires broader powers to control. Fourthly, we must revise the reservation that allows the state to exit a contract within a three-month term. In my opinion, the spread of nuclear weapons should be despite just like slavery or genocide. There should be no right to transmit atomic equipment.
"Die Welt": Iran can be made to open your nuclear program, and Israel is not?
Baramey: No. As for large states, concerns small countries. Absolute security for one country means it is possible for another, absolute danger. It is impossible to demand Livia and Iran to abandon nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and Israel will allow to leave all types of weapons that he now has.
Insurance materials contain estimates of exclusively foreign media and do not reflect the position of the EOSMI's editorial office.
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1. Introduction
5. Strengthening of the NPT
7. Iran's problem
9. Conclusion
List of sources
1. Introduction
The first prerequisites for nuclear weapons appeared in the 19th century, and in the middle of the 20th century, the first tests of the newest type of weapons were conducted in the United States - a nuclear bomb. The first bomb is blown up in the USA in July 1945. In order of testing. The second and third were discarded by the Americans in August of the same year to the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - this is the first and only in the history of mankind the case of the combat use of nuclear weapons. In 1949, nuclear weapons appeared in the USSR, in 1952 in the UK and in 1960 in France. The presence of a nuclear weapon attached to it the status of the superpower and guaranteed certain military safety and stability. In subsequent years, China joined the number of owners of nuclear weapons. Assessing the possible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons during an armed conflict led to the fact that UN member states came to an agreement on the need to ban free access to nuclear weapons and the need for international control over nuclear technologies and the use of nuclear energy.
2. Agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
The military use of atomic energy began in 1945, when the Americans held a test in the Alamogordo desert, and then applied nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From this point on, the countdown of the development of atomic weapons began. In 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant was opened in Obninsk. There was a balance between the military use of atomic energy and peaceful use. The international community faced the question of how H6e to allow nuclear weapons to propagate, as this can cause the deepening of instability in the world, and at the same time discover the path to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is from this time that work begins on the development of international norms to limit nuclear weapons, which in the final form were called "Agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."
It participates all states of the world, except India, Israel, DPRK and Pakistan. Thus, on coverage, it is the most comprehensive arms control agreement. The contract divides the participating States into two categories - nuclear and non-nuclear. The nuclear countries attributed to the nuclear explosive device at the time of signing the contract: Russia, the USA, China, the United Kingdom and France. All of them are at the same time constant members of the UN Security Council. Non-nuclear countries are not eligible for the creation of nuclear weapons.
The NPT came into force in 1970 and originally had a period of 25 years. In 1995, the Conference of the Participating Countries and the Extension of the NPT extended a contract for an indefinite period, making it an indefinite.
3. The main provisions of the contract
The Agreement establishes that the state with nuclear weapons is considered that which produced and exploded such a weapon or device before January 1, 1967 (that is, the USSR, USA, the United Kingdom, France and China).
Under the contract, each of the States Parties to the Agreement with nuclear weapons undertakes not to transmit anyone this weapon or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them either directly nor indirectly; Equally, as in no way help, do not encourage and not encourage any state that does not possess nuclear weapons, to the production or acquisition by any other way of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them.
Each of the States Parties to the Agreement not possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to take from anyone to nuclear weapons and / or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as control over them either directly nor indirectly; Equally, how not to produce and do not acquire any other way of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to make any help in their production.
The contract establishes the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the Treaty. The contract obliges its participants to exchange equipment, materials, scientific and technical information for these purposes, to promote the receipt of non-nuclear states from any peaceful use of nuclear explosions.
An important addition to the Agreement is the UN Security Council resolution of June 19, 1968 and identical statements of three nuclear powers - the USSR, USA and Great Britain on the security guarantees of non-nuclear member states. The resolution provides that in the case of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state or the threat of such an attack, the Security Council and above all, its permanent members with nuclear weapons will immediately act in accordance with the UN Charter to reflect aggression; It also confirms the right of states on individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter until the Security Council will adopt the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. In the statements with which each of the three powers made when adopting this resolution, it is indicated that any state that committed aggression with the use of nuclear weapons or threatening such aggression should be aware that its actions will be effectively reflected with the help of measures taken in accordance with UN Charter; They also proclaimed the intention of the USSR, the USA and the UK to assist the non-nuclear member of the contract, which will be subjected to a nuclear attack.
Five states with nuclear weapons assumed commitments to not apply it against states who do not have such a weapon, with the exception of the situation when they respond to a nuclear strike or an attack with the use of conventional funds committed in alliance with a nuclear state. These obligations, however, were not included in the text of the contract itself, and the specific form of such obligations could change over time. The United States, for example, indicated that they can apply nuclear weapons in response to an attack with the use of non-nuclear "weapons of mass destruction", such as biological or chemical weapons, since the United States cannot apply in response. UK Defense Minister Joff Hong indirectly pointed to the possibility of using nuclear weapons in response to an attack with the use of ordinary weapons implemented by any of the "Iraev states".
The article VI and the preamble of the contract states that nuclear states will strive to reduce and destroy their nuclear reserves. Nevertheless, for more than 30 years of the existence of the contract, little was done in this direction. In Article I, nuclear states undertake not to "encourage any state that does not possess nuclear weapons ... to acquire nuclear weapons" - but the adoption of military doctrine, based on the possibility of applying a proactive impact, as well as other threats to the use of the armed force, can In principle, we consider how such a motion. The X article states that any state has the right to get out of the contract if it considers that it is forced to do this in view of any "emergency event" - for example, in view of the alleged threat.
The contract itself does not establish a mechanism for checking its compliance, as well as an international body that monitors its implementation. Such a monitoring is carried out by review conferences convened every five years. As a rule, review conferences are held in New York in May. In the breaks between them, by decision of the 1995 Conference, the sessions of the Preparatory Committee are collected - two sessions in the period between conferences.
In practice, the International NPC compliance function is performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with which each Participant of an Agreement not possessing nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude the appropriate agreement.
4. International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) was established in 1957 in accordance with the UN Decision of December 4, 1954 and enters the UN system with which a special agreement is associated. It annually presents a report on its activities to the UN General Assembly and, if necessary, to the UN Security Council. The main area of \u200b\u200bactivity is the peaceful use of atomic energy. The IAEA convenes international scientific forums to discuss the development of nuclear energy, directs specialists to various countries for assistance in research work, provides mediation interstate services for the transfer of nuclear equipment and materials. Much attention in the activities of the IAEA is given to the issues of ensuring the safety of nuclear power, especially after the accident at the Chernobyl NPP in 1986. However, one of the most important functions is to control the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, with the control of the observance of the NPT. Each contract not possessing nuclear weapons is obliged to conclude an appropriate agreement with the IAEA, which is the world's only international inspector on nuclear guarantees and monitoring security measures in the field of civilian nuclear programs.
According to agreements signed with states, the IAEA inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities for reconciling the location of nuclear materials, testing tools established by the IAEA and observational equipment, inventory of nuclear materials. Together, these and other control measures provide an independent international certificate that States follow their commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To control the implementation of current agreements on guarantees signed by the Agency with 145 Member States of the IAEA (as well as Taiwan,), 250 IAEA experts daily in all parts of the world conduct inspections on places to verify the action of guarantee agreements. The purpose of inspections is to make sure that nuclear materials are applied in legitimate peaceful purposes, and are not used for military purposes. Thus, the IAEA contributes to international security and multiplies efforts to terminate the distribution of weapons and the movement to the world free from nuclear weapons.
With the IAEA, agreements on guarantees of various types, such as the guarantee agreements relating to the non-proliferation treaty, these agreements require non-nuclear states to provide all their activities associated with the full nuclear fuel cycle from non-nuclear states. Other types of agreements relate to warranties at single enterprises. The guarantees of the IAEA under an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and are indispensable to ensure the implementation of the contract.
Currently, 146 states consist in the IAEA. Management bodies - convened annually General Conference (General Conference) of all member countries, the Board of Governors of 35 people, guiding the Agency's practical activities, and the Secretariat that carries out the current work (is headed by the Director General). The headquarters of the IAEA is located in the International Vienna Center. In addition, the IAEA contains regional offices in Canada, Geneva, New York and Tokyo, Laboratories in Austria and Monaco and a research center in Trieste (Italy), which manages UNESCO. With 2005, the organization is headed by Mohammed Al-Baradei.
Speaking at the 2005 conference, Al-Baradei presented proposals to strengthen and tighten the non-proliferation regime. In particular, he proposed to tighten the actions of the UN Security Council against any country that comes out of the day; tighten the investigations and prosecution of any illegal trade in nuclear materials and technologies; accelerate the nuclear disarmament of the NPT participants with nuclear weapons; Take measures aimed at eliminating the existing security deficit in regions similar to the Middle East and Korean Peninsula.
The tightening of requirements, he explains that at present, about 40 countries in the world have the potential opportunity to create nuclear weapons. In the world there is a real "black market" of nuclear materials, more and more new countries are attempting to acquire technologies for the production of materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons. There is also an obviously pronounced desire of terrorists to get weapons of mass destruction.
This is the most important disadvantage of this regime. Member countries themselves defined which objects to put under the guarantees of the IAEA. This opened the opportunity to violate the contract, since any state could hide the presence of infrastructure for the creation of nuclear weapons, and to test his IAEA did not have the right. At the same time, even such limited inspections allowed to open some facts of illegal activities. First of all, in the early 1990s, during the inspections conducted by the IAEA in North Korean facilities, the implementation of Pyongyan secret and highly large-scale nuclear program was revealed.
This lack of inspection regime became particularly obvious after during the first war in the zone of the Persian Gulf 1990-91. It was found that Iraq quite actively performed a secret nuclear program. As a result, in 1996, an agreement was reached under the IAEA on the model additional protocol to guarantee agreements. Such protocols were invited to sign all states, including nuclear. The IAEA inspectors received the right to visit objects not declared by the receiving party as nuclear. This significantly expanded the possibilities of Verification Verification Agency.
To control the supply of hazardous nuclear materials, the States Parties that have nuclear technologies in the 1970s. Created two informal "club" - a group of nuclear suppliers (GPE) and the Tsangger Committee. Although the decisions of these structures are not legally binding, the participating countries voluntarily fulfill them. At the meetings of the "clubs" uniting several dozen countries, control lists of materials and technologies are agreed, the export of which is subject to control by the competent bodies of the States parties. In addition, political decisions are also considered there. In particular, in 1992, a group of nuclear suppliers decided to prohibit the transfer of any nuclear technologies (including peaceful purposes) to countries that did not provide all their nuclear facilities under the guarantee of the IAEA, naturally, with the exception of five nuclear powers in NPT.
5. Strengthening of the NPT
non-proliferation nuclear weapon Iranian
Recently, discussions were revived on revising or strengthening a number of NPT positions. However, the document reflects the carefully verified global balance of interests and compromises between almost two hundred countries of the world. Under these conditions, making changes and additions to it contains the risk that the "opening" of the package may lead to avalanche-like growth of proposals and requirements from many states. As a result, the existing contract itself may be buried under the load of these queries. Therefore, the majority of states do not show the readiness to "open" the document for new negotiations on its improvement.
Nevertheless, the discussion is conducted. The yield of the DPRK from the NPT in 2004 and the subsequent nuclear testing has attracted attention to article 10 of the document regulating the output from it. This article allows any member state to emerge from the NPT, if the highest interests of its national security are jeopardy. Such a state should send a notification of the exit to the depository and UN to the states and by the UN, and after 6 months. It can consider itself free of obligations under the contract.
The DPRK took advantage of this right to twice - in 1994 and 2004. The precedent created by Pyongyan showed that states may be within the NPT, it is quite legally legally to develop nuclear technologies (hiding military components of atomic programs), and if necessary, to exit the contract and not suffer from punishment. The understanding of the unacceptability of this provision began to grow.
A number of proposals have been put forward. First, it is generally prohibited from the day. This radical idea did not meet any serious support, since it contradicts the sovereignty of states and there is a contrary to the established general international legal practice. Another proposal is to oblige the states emerging from the NPT, refuse the benefits of them as a result of membership in the contract. They would have to return nuclear equipment, materials and technologies to suppliers. They would also deprive the right to continue such deliveries. But such a proposal that does not require compulsory amendments to the document itself, was negatively met by most developing countries. These states pointed out that in practice, the materials and technologies obtained by the state received by the published state would be extremely difficult and indirectly such a position would actually weaken the use of military force against countries who left the treaty.
The lively debate is conducted and around Article 4, recognizing all participating States by the right to the peaceful use of atomic energy and a binding state with nuclear technologies, to assist those countries that do not have such technologies. At the same time, there are technological similarities between peaceful and military nuclear programs. So, if the state acquires uranium enrichment technology to the levels required for the production of fuel for nuclear power plant (several percent of the content of uranium-235 isotope), it will basically have almost all the necessary knowledge and technologies for its further enrichment to the weapons level (over 80 % Uranium-235). In addition, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) NPP reactors are raw materials for obtaining another weapon material - plutonium. Of course, the creation of Radiochemical enterprises is required to develop Plutonium from SNF, but the very presence of high-tech raw materials for such production is an important stage of realizing a possible weapon program. Under these conditions, the production of weapons uranium and plutonium suitable for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device is only a matter of time and political will.
Since the direct prohibition of the creation of national industries for the enrichment of uranium and recycling in the contract is absent, a number of countries have put forward the following proposal. Countries, not yet have such production, could voluntarily refuse him. In exchange for this, states already providing these technologies would guarantee them to supply nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants and research reactors at a fair price. To give such guarantees a greater reliability, international production centers, joint ventures involving interested countries, as well as the "fuel bank" under the auspices of the IAEA, could be created for the production of reactor fuel. Of course, the suppliers would repatriate the SNF, which would remove the concerns about its possible use for the operation of weapons plutonium.
This initiative also did not cause enthusiasm in developing countries. They are afraid that in the case of its adoption of the country of the world will be separated on those who have the right to the scientific production of nuclear materials and devoid of such law. Concern causes the fact that the refusal to geographical expansion of such capacities will supply existing manufacturers to a privileged position and allow them to monopolize the fast-growing market of peaceful nuclear energy. As a result, prices will grow even more, and this will strike at least developed countries. No exception that manufacturing countries will be able to manipulate supply to achieve political goals and providing pressure on recipient states.
In general, the question of the discriminatory nature of the NPT is very acute. As mentioned above, this document divides the country of the world on those who have the right to possess nuclear weapons (nuclear "five"), and on those who do not have such a right (all others are more than 180 countries). During the negotiations on the conclusion of the NPT, non-nuclear countries went on such a decision in exchange for two conditions: first, the acquisition of access to nuclear energy (recorded in Article 4, see above) and, secondly, the promise of nuclear powers to strive for nuclear disarmament (Article 6).
According to many non-nuclear states, not only developing, nuclear powers do not fulfill their obligations under Article 6. The main discontent causes the fact that four of them (USA, Russia, United Kingdom and France) are not ready to talk about universal and complete nuclear disarmament. Some nuclear powers are trying to react to such criticism. So, the Government of Great Britain conducted a study of the conditions under which we can talk about full nuclear disarmament. China declares its commitment to universal and complete nuclear disarmament, but refuses to go to any disarmament steps until other nuclear powers disarm to a relatively low level of Chinese nuclear potential. Probably Russia carrying the main burden of nuclear disarmament would be helpful to nominate any positive initiative with respect to universal and complete nuclear disarmament.
Criticia causes the refusal of the same four nuclear powers to make a commitment not to apply the first nuclear weapons. China declares adherence to this principle, although this promise cannot be checked and is clearly propaganda. Unfoliated non-nuclear countries and the reluctance of nuclear powers to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in their national security concepts.
Many non-nuclear countries, primarily developing, require the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by analogy with already signed conventions prohibiting other species, chemical and biological. Although it is obvious that in the foreseeable future, such a convention has no prospects, this issue is constantly rising at review conferences of the NPT member states and meetings of preparatory committees.
Recently, the USA and the United Kingdom have been criticized, which has begun to modernize their nuclear forces. The concern of the fate of the Russian-American process of reducing strategic offensive arms after the expiration of the START Treaty in 2009 and the Russian-American Moscow Treaty (SNP Treaty) in 2012 regularly put forward requirements, primarily to Russia and the United States on the beginning of the negotiation process. to reduce tactical nuclear weapons. In particular, they require a report on the implementation of the presidential nuclear initiatives 1991-1992, according to which a significant part of the tactical nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States was removed from combat duty, and in the future or eliminated or placed on central storage facilities. As far as can be judged by the existing open information, Russia has not fully fulfilled these decisions that are not legally binding.
6. Unrecognized nuclear states
Another challenging problem is to give a universal NPT. Outside it remains 4 states - India, Israel, Pakistan and DPRK. All these countries are nuclear, although this is not recognized as a contract, since three of them produced nuclear tests after the document entered into force, and Israel does not recognize at all (but also does not reject) the presence of nuclear weapons. The accession of these states by the NPT is possible only as non-nuclear, i.e. In the event that, according to the example of South Africa, the late 1980s - early 1990s, they will agree to destroy their nuclear potential. Otherwise, we would have to revise the relevant provisions of the document, to which the participating States are clearly not ready.
The DPRK in 2006 agreed to eliminate its nuclear program in exchange for assistance from the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, as well as in response to the political concessions of Washington. Currently, Pyongyang is starting to implement commitments. Therefore, in the future, the return of the DPRK in the NPT is not excluded.
Israel officially expresses in support of the creation in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, but only after achieving a sustainable world in the region. Given the uncertainty of the prospects for durable Arab-Israeli settlement, the foggy remains the prospects for the denuclearization of Israel. Officially, Israel also did not test the nuclear weapons. At the same time, there are reason to believe that such a test was produced by it together with South Africa in the late 1970s.
Unlike Israel, India and Pakistan are ready to return to nuclear-free status only with recognized nuclear powers. India for the first time experienced a nuclear explosive device in 1974, stating that he made it in the "peaceful" purposes. After that, she abstained from such tests until 1997, although it had the necessary technologies and materials. Such restraint was most likely due to the reluctance to provoke Islamabad. From the point of view of conventional weapons and armed forces, India significantly exceeds Pakistan and, therefore, does not need nuclear deterrence.
However, in 1997, Delhi still decided to conduct nuclear tests. It provoked Pakistan to respond. As a result, India lost its military advantages. Most likely, Delhi decided to conduct nuclear tests to try out the nuclear warheads created after 1974, prior to the entry into force of a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests (CTBT).
Currently, the international community actually completed with the nuclear status of India and Pakistan. Sanctions introduced by a number of countries against these states after they conduct nuclear tests in 1997, mostly removed. The emphasis is that Delhi and Islamabad have become sources of distribution of nuclear materials and technologies. They do not enter into a pile, nor in the Tsenger Committee and, therefore, have no obligations to export control.
At the same time, Pakistan is a special danger. If India unilaterally created an effective national export control mechanism, Pakistan, on the contrary, has become the main source of illegal supplies of nuclear materials and technologies. At the beginning of the current decade, the activities of the underground international network led by the "Father" of the Pakistani nuclear bomb of A.K. Khan. There is reason to believe that this network has delivered technology and materials for the implementation of North Korea, Iran and Libya nuclear programs. Special alarm is the fact that A.K. Khan, apparently, had a "cover" in the state authorities Pakistan. In this country, it is extremely unlikely that such deliveries were carried out bypassing the power structures. Indirectly this information confirms the fact that after the disclosure of the underground network A.K. Khan was pardoned by the president of Pakistan and is under house arrest. However, there are no guarantees that Khan's accomplices and his patrons in Pakistani power structures do not continue to supply the emerging international nuclear "black market".
In addition, there are concerns about the security of the storage of Pakistani nuclear ammunition and the possibility of their unauthorized use. It is assumed that for security reasons, they are rejected from the means of delivery and are located on one of the most protected military bases, where the actual residence of the President of Musharraf is located. Nevertheless, the risk that they may be in foreign hands as a result of the state coup were preserved. It was reported that the tracking of Pakistani nuclear warheads is a priority for the US Securities and Israel. The United States also grieves Islamabad in the implementation of some technical measures to strengthen nuclear safety.
In relation to India, a course was taken to gradually withdraw it from the international "nuclear" isolation. According to the decision of the GPE from 1992, it is forbidden to supply any nuclear materials and technologies to this country. This creates serious problems for the development of Indian nuclear power, since Delhi cannot import nuclear reactors and fuel for them. Russia built a reactor for nuclear power plants in Kudankulam, referring to the fact that the corresponding agreement was achieved before the decision of the PC (the completion of the existing contracts in 1992 was permitted). However, the Russian Federation and India faced serious problems in the supply of fuel for this NPP, allowing the gyap refused. According to available information, fuel was still delivered.
In 2005, India and the United States concluded a nuclear deal. In accordance with it, Washington removes the supply restrictions in India materials and technologies in exchange for a number of concessions from the Indian side. Among them is the division of civil and military nuclear facilities and the statement of the first warranties of the IAEA. According to Americans, such a decision will allow to fix the dimensions of the Indian nuclear complex of military assignment and limit the extension of the country's nuclear potential. When concluding a nuclear transaction in Washington, the fact that India responsibly relates to the fight against illegal exports of nuclear materials and technologies and has never been a source of deliveries to a nuclear "black market".
The implementation of the transaction requires sanction by the PCP, since it contradicts its decision from 1992. The United States officially appealed to this organization asking India "as an exception" special status. This request caused discontent of a number of non-nuclear states, first of all, with the technical capabilities of creating nuclear weapons, but making a political decision to abandon the acquisition of nuclear status. Among those countries - Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Norway. At one time, they refused to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a number of privileges, including those related to obtaining unhindered access to the international market of peaceful nuclear technologies. Therefore, from their point of view, the provision of similar privileges of India, who did not sign the NPT and created nuclear weapons, undermines their status and creates an incentive for other countries to follow the Indian example in violation of its non-proliferation obligations. The opposition in the gyp was unexpectedly strong, and while the request of the United States was not satisfied.
Thus, through various pressure and cooperation measures, the international community encourages unrecognized nuclear states to voluntarily adopt at the national level measures for effective control over the export of nuclear materials and technologies. At the same time, they are involved in international regimes capable of limiting their nuclear potentials. Thus, joining the CTBT or at least compliance with the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing prevents the modernization of nuclear forces of unrecognized nuclear powers that do not have effective means of computer simulation of such tests. In the case of the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of testing of splitting materials, they will also not be able to produce armory nuclear materials and, therefore, increase their nuclear potential.
7. Iran's problem
The disadvantages of the NPT mode very brightly shows the situation around the Iranian nuclear program. In this situation, two aspects should be allocated. The first is the Iranian uranium enrichment program, the second is to resolve the issues of compliance with Tehran Agreement on the guarantees with the IAEA, which was signed back in 1974 in the doubt that Iran fulfills its obligations under an agreement, a long time ago. However, only in 2002, cosmic snapshots were published, where nuclear facilities are visible. Contrary to its obligations, Tehran did not inform the IAEA on creating these facilities and on other types of activities in the nuclear field. The IAEA demanded the provision of all information on an undeclared activity of Iran. However, for several years, Iranian leadership could not satisfy the requirements of the Agency.
If the situation around the agreement of 1974 is a violation of the international non-proliferation regime, the question of Iran's uranium program is more complicated. In accordance with Article 4 days, Iran, as well as any other non-nuclear member state, has the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Tehran argues that he seeks to acquire technical opportunities for uranium enrichment solely to establish its own fuel production for nuclear power plants. So far there is no reason to believe that Iran managed to produce highly enriched uranium, not to mention the weapon. However, having received power to enrich uranium to the level to use it as fuel, it will be able to apply the same technology for its further enrichment before the weapon level. But these are only concerns, and they are not coded in the text of the NPT and other international legal documents.
The United States and their allies insist that Iran should stop the uranium program. In their opinion, he can realize his rights arising from article 4 days, only when performing all other provisions of the contract. Such argument is controversial. Therefore, Washington made serious international efforts to delegitimize the Iranian program. At the same time, he fully took advantage of Tehran's reluctance to resolve questions from the IAEA. Infinite tightening with the provision of necessary documentation, constant problems with the admission of international inspectors, the aggressive rhetoric forced all major powers to agree that the issue of Iran is assigned to the UN Security Council. But then the Iranian leadership did not go for concessions, which opened the way to adopt several resolutions of the SS, requiring from Tehran to resolve issues from the IAEA and stop the uranium enrichment program. Iran in the caller manner rejected these resolutions than violated its obligations as a UN member. This allowed Americans to legally reinforce their position.
At the same time, the requirements of the UN Security Council resolutions included requirements for Iran's uranium program, which are unlikely to be consistent with the current international legal regime of non-proliferation. Why the Russian Federation and China agreed with this, it is not clear. Such a position had a great promotion of Washington and made it difficult to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. If Iran even worst questions from the IAEA, that he finally promised to do, Moscow and Beijing will still be subject to the strongest pressure from the West in order to introduce new, more stringent, sanctions at the UN Security Council level against Tehran.
8. Other elements of the international legal regime, complementing the NPT
There are a number of international legal instruments that complement the NPT. Some of them were signed before the conclusion of this contract. These documents prohibit or limit the deployment of nuclear weapons in separate geographic areas and spatial environments, and also impose limits to certain types of weapons nuclear activities. International legal documents are complemented by voluntary measures taken by states unilaterally.
There are four regional treaties for the creation of nuclear weapons free zones. The Tlatello treaty prohibits such deployment in Latin America and the Caribbean countries, Rarotong Agreement - in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean, Pelinda Paul Agreement - and Africa and the Bangkok Agreement in Southeast Asia. Back in the late 1950s. Non-surfactant was announced Antarctica. In addition, Mongolia declared a nuclear zone. There is a discussion of creating such a zone in Central Asia, but so far this idea is not implemented. The initiative to create a nuclear-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe was rejected by Central European countries. They feared that the creation of such a zone would prevent them with admission to NATO.
As a result, all southern hemispheres and a small part of the northern are declared as a result of nuclear weapons. However, the jurisdiction of these documents is limited by the national territory of the signatory countries, as well as their territorial waters. International waters remain open to swimming ships of nuclear states with nuclear weapons on board. A number of states do not prevent the entry of ships, which are likely to have nuclear weapons on board, in their territorial waters and ports, as well as the flight of military aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear weapons through their airspace.
Two documents prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in two natural environments - on the seabed and in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. But these documents are also not free from flaws. First of all, they do not contain verification mode, which allows securingly deployment there.
In 1963, the USSR, the USA and the United Kingdom signed a nuclear test agreement in three environments - in the atmosphere, on the surface and under water. Other nuclear powers did not join this contract. France continued to carry out nuclear tests under water on the Mururoa atoll, China - terrestrial nuclear tests at the Lobnor Polygon in the province of Xinjiang. South Africa, probably, together with Israel, conducted a nuclear test under water.
In 1996, an agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests (CTBT) was opened for signing. He had to enter into force after its ratification with 44 states with nuclear technologies. Among them are all unrecognized nuclear powers. Most of the 44 countries, including Russia, France and the United Kingdom, have already ratified this agreement. China and the United States signed it, but not ratified. Nevertheless, the prospects for the entry into force of this document remain uncertain due to the obstructionist policy of the United States administration, which announced that it would not put this contract for ratification.
Nevertheless, all official nuclear powers are voluntarily refrain from nuclear testing: Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom - from the late 1980s., And France and China - from the mid-1990s. India, Pakistan and the DPRK conducted nuclear tests underground, clearly seeking to limit the international criticism of their actions. At the same time, since 1997, India and Pakistan also adhere to a voluntary moratorium. The organization of the CTBT continues to function, designed to ensure compliance with this contract. It is curious that the contributions to this organization are made by the United States.
Within the framework of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, multilateral preliminary negotiations are being conducted to conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the production of weapons-splitting materials. Such a convention would be an additional barrier on the way of the emergence of new nuclear states, and would also limit the material base to build the nuclear potential of countries with nuclear weapons. However, these negotiations went to a dead end. Initially, they were blocked by China, demanding that the US agreed to conclude an arms deployment contract in space. Then Washington announced that he did not see the meaning in such a contract, since, from his point of view, his observance is not verifiable.
The current international legal regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has developed around the day, managed to slow down the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. More than a dozen states with technical capabilities to create nuclear weapons voluntarily refused to acquire nuclear status. There is a precedent, when one of the countries, South Africa, went to the elimination of the already established nuclear potential. This mode had a deterrent impact on the states who did not join the NPT. They were forced to make self-restraints when conducting nuclear tests, as well as take measures to prevent leaks of their nuclear technology. Even the most problematic case of the DPRK, which created nuclear weapons in violation of obligations under the Agreement, still suggests that the fact of violations mobilized the international community for active actions aimed at eliminating the nuclear program of this country and returning to the NPT. At the same time, the inspection regime created under the IAEA revealed the facts of violations and was a newly involved in monitoring the implementation of the denuclearization of this country.
At the same time, designed in the 1960s. The document needs adaptation to new realities. The spread of scientific and technical knowledge allows increasing number of countries to develop nuclear technologies and using loopholes in the contract, close to the creation of nuclear weapons. Another problem is the risk of nuclear distribution among non-state groups that actually does not regulate practically.
All this requires an international community intensive efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime - both within the framework of the existing measure of measures and by developing new solutions.
9. Conclusion
The non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons is aimed at ensuring stability and security in the world. In 1963, when only four states had nuclear arsenals, the United States government made a forecast that over the coming decade will appear from 15 to 25 states possessing nuclear weapons; Other states predicted that this number may even increase to 50. Concerns about the emergence of nuclear weapons in a politically unstable state led to the formation of a closed "nuclear club" from the five first developers of nuclear weapons. The rest of the countries could only use the "peaceful atom" under international control. These initiatives did not arouse the contradictions of the global community, most countries signed a contract voluntarily refusing to obtain nuclear weapons, moreover, agreements prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a number of regions of the world were concluded. These regions received the status of nuclear-free zones. Near the conventions, any tests of nuclear weapons were prohibited not only on Earth, but also in space.
However, now a number of countries find a desire to join the "nuclear club", whenever they have the presence of nuclear weapons caused by their national security requirements. These countries include India, Pakistan. However, their official recognition as nuclear powers is hampered not only to counter the contract member countries, but also the nature of the contract itself. Israel officially does not officially confirm the presence of nuclear weapons, but does not join the contract as a non-nuclear country. A completely special situation consists of North Korea. Ratifying the NPT, North Korea led the development of peaceful nuclear programs under the control of the IAEA, but in 2003 North Korea officially emerged from the day and closed access to the IAEA inspectors to their nuclear laboratories. Later was officially announced about the first successful tests. The world community, headed by the UN, has taken a number of attempts to persuade the Northern Korea to turn its nuclear program, but this has not led to anything. As a result, it was decided to convene the UN Security Council to resolve the issue of sanctions for North Korea. In the secret development of nuclear weapons, Iran is also suspected.
The case with North Korea creates a dangerous precedent when the development of nuclear weapons comes out from under international control. There is a risk of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist organizations. To prevent these hazards, the IAEA demands to tighten the sanctions against the country's violators, strengthen control over nuclear fuel and equipment.
All these questions were raised at the next conference in 2005, but then countries could not come to a common opinion on these issues.
Among the most striking trends in the sector under consideration can be noted. There are no necessary conditions in the world to ensure maintaining the non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons: individual states are actively preventing the creation of an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence on the basis of generally accepted principles and norms of international law; For many years there is no progress on disarmament forums and negotiations; Attempts are being made to replace measures to non-proliferate the legal nature with one-sided actions and various political initiatives.
The state of affairs in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament issues is concerned about the UN General Assembly. In its resolution adopted at the 55th session in 2000, this UN main authority requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study on the essence of modern education in the designated sphere, its current state and methods of development L and promotion. The prepared study was highly appreciated by the General Assembly, which in 2002 expressed the conviction that "today there is more than ever the need for education on the specified issues."
Issues of restricting imports of materials and sensitive technologies should be solved not only by the limited number of importing countries. It is preferable that decisions on such issues are taken as part of the coordination of the positions of all interested countries, including especially the exporting states of peaceful nuclear power products.
This position is founded, firstly, on the conciliation of international law, the main regulator of international relations. Secondly, for the successful functioning as a whole, a sustainable balance of interests is required for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the interests of free access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, on the other - the interests of non-reflection with peaceful nuclear programs.
In the preamble of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of 1968 (paragraph 6), the principle of accessibility to all states of the benefits of peaceful application of nuclear technologies was enshrined. Article IV of the Treaty directly provides for the right of all its participants to develop studies of production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, which reflects the freedom of state in possession, construction, use, etc. Nuclear installations for electricity and other non-military needs.
A sufficient basis for the greatest access of non-nuclear states to the global achievements of scientific and technical thought in the nuclear field should be the adoption of maximum commitments in the field of international control.
However, it is necessary to further improve the Institute for International Control, the expansion of its scope. The existing practice of implementing the norms of this institute requires the settlement of many issues.
Thus, for example, there was a need for scientific study in order to create new international legal norms of such aspects, as the responsibility of employees of international organizations and other persons on which the obligation to implement international control measures is imposed. Determining the legal nature of such responsibility, its presence and adequacy is just an example of issues requiring scientific consideration.
In order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, incl. For the successful functioning of international control requires the improvement of the internal legislation of states.
The efforts of states in the field of national normation must be focused in the following areas:
1) Recognition of crimes and the establishment of criminal liability for acts, the consequence of which will be the spread of nuclear weapons. Even a superficial analysis of the sources of criminal legislation in individual foreign countries shows, despite the presence of many countries of crimes related to nuclear dissemination in the criminal law, not all possible acts are criminalized. There is no uniformity in fixing the elements of the composition of crimes.
The question arises. Is it not advisable to develop and adopt internationally an Convention, where would the acts that need to be considered criminal and establish a punishment? It is thought to be appropriate for a number of reasons, among which: the agreement will establish the legal obligation of states to introduce criminal prosecution for specific crimes, the list of which will be formulated; They will find permission issues of legal cooperation to combat these offenses, including legal assistance issues, etc.
Recognition of crimes of mentioned acts will allow the possibilities of national law enforcement agencies, which will become an additional obstacle to nuclear distribution.
2) Formation of a reliable export control system. Effective regulation of legislation in the field of export of materials and technologies sensitive to distribution will eliminate any transboundary movement of export items that can contribute to the creation of nuclear weapons.
In this regard, it seems at least two aspects. First. International law should establish legal obligations to establish national export control systems. The second, deeply worked at the international model of such systems will help States to form effective export control mechanisms.
3) Regulation measures to ensure nuclear safety, the content of which today is interpreted more widely. Along with the task of neutralizing the danger from nuclear materials (preventing a spontaneous chain reaction, protection against radiation infection, etc.), it is necessary to reliably protect such materials from unlawful capture, use, etc., i.e. From their illegal turnover.
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The events of the past few years in the field of nuclear distribution caused a special anxiety of the international community for the fate of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These events attached additional relevance to the development of new measures aimed at strengthening the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and to strengthen its main legal framework - a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) of 1968, certificates appeared confirming the existence of an underground transnational "nuclear network" of intermediaries and companies He led by Dr. Abdul Khaan's leadership by Dr. Abdul Kadir Khanom - the so-called Cauna case. This network provided sensitive nuclear technology and expertise Iran, Libya and, possibly to other countries. It strengthened concern about the dissemination of potential opportunities for the creation of nuclear weapons both among states and among non-state actors, and contributed to the emergence of new initiatives aimed at preventing illegal transfer of nuclear technologies and materials.
In this regard, a series of facts uncovered in 2004 confirmed the rumor circulating long time that the leading Pakistani nuclear physicist Dr. A.K. Khan stood behind the back of the network engaged in illegal nuclear smuggling. Dr. A.K. Han for two decades held the post of director of the research laboratory. Khan (KRL RESEARCH LABORATORIES - KRL) in the Pakistani city of Kahuta. In this company in 1998, the first nuclear explosive device of Pakistan was created. Dr. Khan possessed significant autonomy in the implementation of the Pakistani nuclear program and in Pakistan it is called the "father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb." He is considered to be the national hero of Pakistan.
The origins of the "Cause of Khan" go back to the beginning of 2002, when Pakistan President P. Musharraf began a campaign for extrusion from the army and a special service of that segment, which in the 1990s. He promoted the formation of the Afghan Movement "Taliban" Pakistani-nuclear physicist was sentenced to the Netherlands court to four years of conclusion. On December 16, 2005, the court of the Dutch city of Alkmaar sentenced the entrepreneur Henka Slebos by the year of the conclusion for the sale of Pakistan nuclear technologies abducted by him while working in Yurenko in the 1970s. .
At this, the investigation into the activities of the Consortium "Yurenko", in fact, ceased. In the press, however, there were messages about the existence of close contacts between Dr. A.K. Khan and European business. The authors of these publications reminded that the Pakistani scientist was educated at the Polytechnic Institute of Western Berlin, and later - at the University of Dutch city of Delft. However, governments and law enforcement agencies of Britain, Germany and Holland claims to the activities of Yurenko did not have.
As the nuclear network is expanded (and only about 50 people were involved), A.K. Khan started selling nuclear technology. Despite the approval of the Pakistani officials on the non-profit of the government of this country to the activities of the Han Network, US experts believe that there are evidence that high-ranking Pakistani political and military leaders were also involved in the export of nuclear technology from Pakistan. This happened, despite the fact that on the part of Islamabad was provided with written assurances by the US government (for the first time by President of Zia-Ul-Haku in November 1984, then in October 1990 by the President of the Gulham Ishek Khan) and countless official statements of Pakistani The authorities are that the watchlist of Pakistan in the field of non-proliferation is flawless.
Thus, the nuclear network A.K. Khan was not "Wall-Mart" (a popular cheap American supermarket), as the general director of the IAEA Mohammed El-Baradey called it, and rather was a "export-import enterprise". Starting from the mid-1980s, parallel to the initial oriented network under the direction of the head of the Pakistani Commission on Atomic Energy (CAEP) Munir Ahmad Khan arose and developed a branch of a nuclear network focused on exports under the direction of Dr. A.K. Khan. In the late 1990s. The network of Khan has become more decentralized, as A.K. Han discovered that he was under supervision. Its network has become a "privatized subsidiary" network of imports of nuclear technology.
After clarifying the activities of the Consortium "Yurenko" began investigating the activities of other companies. In March 2004, the United States accused Dubai company "ES-EM bi-computers" (SMB Computers) in the illegal transit of Pakistani nuclear technologies. As a result of the Customs Services Operation in Dubai, as part of the application for the application (PSI), a vessel with a load of sensitive nuclear materials intended for illegal exports was intercepted. SMB Computers were company (Epson), Palm (Palm), Acer (Aser) and Samsung (Samsung) partners. However, the question of whether they were associated with the activities of the AK network Khan (and if so, to what extent), remained unexplained.
February 20, 2004 Representatives of the IAEA presented the leadership of Switzerland a list of two companies and 15 individuals suspected in participation in the network A.K. Khan. On October 13, 2004, a Swiss businessman Urs Tinner was detained in Germany, suspected of nuclear technology supplies to Libya. Malaysia police accused W. Tinner in involvement in order for the production of component parts to centrifuges obtained by local Malaysian companies. To date, "Case Tinner" remains unfinished, although in 2008 the Swiss authorities announced the termination of the prosecution of this businessman.
As A.V. writes Fenenko, "South Africa also fell under the international investigation. In January 2004, a retired Officer of the Israeli Army Asher Carney, who lived in South Africa, was detained in the United States, who was selling dual-use goods through his company in Cape Town and, perhaps in India. On September 3, 2004, a businessman from South Africa Johan Maeer was charged with an involvement in Khan Nuclear Network. In the warehouses belonging to Meer the Machine-Building Plant in the South African town of Vanderbidjlpark (60 km south of Johannesburg), 11 containers containing components and documentation for processing centrifuges were discovered. On September 8, 2004, citizens of Germany Gerhard Visser and Daniel Gaigs were arrested in South Africa, also accused of cooperation with A.K. Khan. However, the question of the involvement of South African business to the case of the Khan remains open: On August 22, 2005, the court session in connection with the newly discovered circumstances was transferred to an indefinite period. "
In June 2004, M. Al-Baradei's general director of M. Al-Baradey visited the city of Dubai - the main transit center of illegal supplies of nuclear technologies to Iran and Libya. But the authorities of the UAE did not prevent specific data on the contacts of their business with representatives of Pakistan.
In 2004-2005 American and Western European researchers tried to summarize the scattered data on the nuclear network A.K. Khan. SIPRI experts analyzed in detail the problem of supplying Pakistani nuclear technologies. According to this analysis, it is assumed that in the late 1980s. Khan began to order a greater number of centrifuge components from foreign suppliers than was required for the Pakistani program for the creation of nuclear weapons, and then secretly sold surplus to third countries. This allowed him to sell the components of the Centrifuge R-1 Iran. Subsequently, he sold the collected P-1 when the Pakistani program for the enrichment of uranium moved to more advanced P-2 centrifuges. He also provided Iran on the design of the Centrifuge R-2 design.
As for the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Khan began selling Libya nuclear technology in the mid-1990. And it continued to do this until 2003. Supplies included centrifuges and assembly components for undeclared Libyan uranium enrichment program. According to the IAEA, Libya also received a detailed engineering description of nuclear weapons from the "foreign source". It was not publicly confirmed that the description came from Pakistan, but American officials noted that it was the design of an implosive uranium ammunition developed by China in the 60s. And, by rumors transmitted to Pakistan. According to the US government, the Hana network could receive up to $ 100 million from sales of Libya alone. According to American experts, it is to the case with the supply of nuclear technology to Libya from Pakistan, the expression M. Al-Baradei "Nuclear Wall-Mart" is applicable.
As for the DPRK, the delivery to this country appears to be reduced to the transmission of Pyongyang centrifuges (P-1 or P-2), data on its design, as well as gaseous uranium hexafluoride. Perhaps it was about the supply of a nuclear fuel engineering design, suitable for delivery with a ballistic missile. In exchange, North Korea passed Pakistan the secrets of developing rocket technology based on the SCUD system (P-17).
At the same time, the Russian expert A.V. rightly believes. Fenenko, "So far, a number of questions remain that does not allow to put the final point in the case of the Khan. Firstly, it causes bewilderment why the West countries easily believed information emanating from representatives of Iran and Libya, the states whose regimes of decades were evaluated in the United States and in Western Europe as "authoritarian". At the end of 2003, Tehran and Tripoli were objectively interested in the exposure of the transnational network of nuclear technology providers. At this time, the IAEA accused Iran and Libya in carrying out illegal nuclear activities, and in such a situation, the Libyan and Iranian government was naturally tried to prove that nuclear technologies came to these countries from abroad, and not produced in Iran and Libya. "
Secondly, it is not clear why international observers were not allowed to A.K. Khan and other Pakistani scientists. Perhaps the management of Pakistan feared that there would be a leak of closed information about the Pakistani nuclear potential. Opposition parties who opposed the regime of the President P. Musharraf, insisted that the official Islamabad himself was involved in the sale of nuclear materials and technologies. The third option cannot be ruled out: the international investigation could show how far the connection of the nuclear network A.K. Khan extended outside Pakistan. The international community (including the United States) did not show persistence to force the Pakistani leadership to admit independent investigators to A.K. Khan.
Thirdly, it is difficult to definitely answer the question, is it connected with A.K. Khan with internal political conflicts in Pakistan. The Pakistani military traditionally are in difficult relations with the state apparatus - it suffices to recall the anti-government conspiracy of General Abbash in 1995 or attempts to attempt for President P. Musharraf in December 2003 and in 2004-2005. By the way, now the former president P. Musharraf came to power as a result of a military coup on October 12, 1999. It is impossible to exclude that the case of A.K. Khan is associated with the "purges", which official Islamabad conducted in the army and power structures in 2002-2004, and this allows to doubt some sources of information.
Fourth, activity of the network A.K. Khan concerns the problems of entering sensitive nuclear technologies in the hands of international terrorists, for example Al-Qaida. On October 23, 2001, two nuclear physicists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmoud (former director of Kaep) and Choudri Abdul Masdzhid (former director of the Pakistani military enterprise NEW Labs) were detained in Pakistan Afghanistan, they personally met with the leader of Al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden and could convey to him the secrets of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, which this international terrorist organization seeks to get.
Thus, the exposure of the activity of the nuclear network A.K. Khan strengthened the concerns of the international community with respect to the risk of distribution emanating from individual specialists or non-state suppliers of nuclear materials and technologies operating or independently or in collusion with government officials. Special concern was raised, the nature and scale of the activity of the network A.K. Khan on the "black market" of nuclear technology. The opinion was expressed that the network of Khan was a small part of this market. Being a source of illegal supplies, the Hana network successfully overcame many legal and regulatory measures developed to prevent the dissemination of technology to the creation of nuclear weapons. These facts in turn led to the fact that Impulse was given to new initiatives in the field of non-proliferation. First of all, such as the US Initiative - Ibor, as well as the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1540, aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime through state requirements to consider as a criminal supply of the private sector in the "black market", creating a rigid export control system and ensuring Safety of all sensitive materials within their borders.
Unfortunately, you have to admit that, despite the exposure of the nuclear network A.K. Khan and the adoption by the international community, including within the framework of the UN, a number of measures aimed not to prevent the emergence of new "illegal nuclear networks", such a threat is still apparently still exists. It comes primarily from non-state actors, as well as from the states of the so-called nuclear parking (for example, Iran, DPRK). In this regard, the international community needs to strengthen further actions to strengthen national control systems for nuclear exports in key states - suppliers of sensitive nuclear technology. In addition, in the framework of the IAEA, it is necessary to insist that all nuclear activities have adopted the standards provided for by the Additional IAEA Protocol. Avoid the danger of the emergence of new illegal "nuclear networks" is possible only by all-effective control over the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies.
In the forecast plan, it appears that if the international community does not take urgent measures described above, the case of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be applied another irreparable blow. And in this regard, it is symptomatic that Pakistan is a country where the underground "nuclear network" appeared, A.K. Khan, today is the main one, if not the most important danger from the point of view of the sensitive nuclear technology, or even the weapons of mass destruction (whatever ) In the hands of international terrorists and Islamist tuned radicals, in the case of a collapse of state power in Pakistan and coming to the management of the country of Islamist-radicals. But this is possible, in our opinion, only with the condition that the Islamist radicals will be supported by the Pakistani army, which, by the way, played not the last role in the supply of sensitive nuclear technology, in particular, in Iran. (This small article does not describe the role of the Pakistan General Mirza Aslam Raga in the early 1990s. Of the last century in the case of nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), but in Western sources used by the author of this article, this role is sufficient eloquently.) Of course, the seizure of the nuclear assets of Islamabad Islamists is a hypothetical scenario of the development of the situation around Pakistan's nuclear weapons, but it has the full right to exist. This is possible only in the case when Pakistan becomes the so-called "Failed State" ("failed state"), which in the conditions of the new crisis of power in this country cannot be excluded. And the topic of control (both internal and external) over the nuclear assets of Islamabad is a separate topic requiring the writing of a separate article, which is preparing the author to publication.
Washington, 2 Oct- RIA News. The IAEA INCIDENT AND TRAFFICKING DATABASE program is "under threat" from Russia because of Litvinenko's case. Such a statement was made by Assistant US Secretary of State Christopher Ford, which is responsible for issues of international security and non-proliferation.
We are talking about the program to track incidents and illegal turnover of nuclear materials - "the only one in the world, which is trying to keep records of radioactive and nuclear materials that are not under control," he clarified.
According to the official, recently information about "use of the Kremlin Radioactive Polonya for Poisoning Alexander Litvinenko in 2006" has come to the database of this program. At the same time, Ford did not explain exactly how Russia threatens the IAEA.
Also, politician said that in the territory of the former USSR there were several cases of smuggling of radioactive materials, including in Georgia and Moldova in the 2000s.
"At least there was a couple of cases with Chechen groupings in Russia, when the terrorists tried to use" dirty "bombs (using radioactive materials. - Approx. Ed.), Although unsuccessfully. Partly due to decades of weak security measures in Russia and Other parts of the former Soviet Union after the Cold War - the problems that the US assistance programs were able to help for some time, "we cannot be sure how many radioactive and nuclear materials are already in the black market," said Assistant Secretary of State.
Litvinenko case
The ex-officer of the FSB Alexander Litvinenko fled to the UK, where he died in November 2006 shortly after receiving British citizenship. It happened after joint tea party with entrepreneurs Andrei Lugov and Dmitry Kovtun.
The examination revealed a significant amount of radioactive polonium-210 in its body. The main suspect passes meadow. He denies the charges, and the case of the case calls "theatrical farce".
In Moscow, they stated that the case was politicized, and the investigation is opaque.
What happens to the protection programs of Russian nuclear materials? Is it possible to control the minatom and how much is it closed from Russian society?
Question: How big is the Russian black market of radioactive materials and and what are the latest trends of this illegal business? Who are sellers and who are potential buyers in this black market?
Answer. Elena Sokova: Let's first decide that we mean under the "black radioactive materials market." Very often, the concepts of nuclear and radioactive materials are used interchangeably, which is incorrect. In fact, radioactive materials are a very broad category, which includes and splitting materials (used both for military purposes and for the production of nuclear fuel); and radioactive isotopes, most used in industry and medicine; And finally, radioactive waste generated during various operations with splitting materials. The first category of materials is usually called nuclear materials. Among them, weems highlighting weapons nuclear materials, that is, those materials that can be used to produce a nuclear bomb with virtually no additional processing. Such materials include plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium with uranium-235 content of more than 90 percent. Lower enrichment uranium, but with uranium-235 content at least 20 percent can also be used to create weapons, but in this case the amount of uranium to create a bomb increases many times. For example, if 90 percent uranium needs only 8 kg, then a 20 percent will be required at least about 60 kg.
With regard to the "black market", until recently, it was basically about the "black market" of nuclear materials that can be used to produce weapons. The possibility of leakage of such nuclear materials caused and causes the greatest fear, since the complexity of their production is the main obstacle for countries or terrorist organizations seeking to create nuclear weapons. Possible buyers may be states, terrorists, international organized criminal groups, separatist ethnic or religious groups, etc.
Low-enriched uranium and other elements of the uranium group, as well as isotopes, in contrast to the previous category, are available on the commercial market. Of course, nuclear fuel will not be sold to everyone. On the other hand, no nuclear power plant will buy nuclear fuel on the cheap of the unknown merchant. The same story and isotopes. The "black" nuclear waste market seems unlikely, although recently aggravated concerns about the creation of so-called. "dirty" or radiation bomb, in which the usual explosive is used to spray the radioactive material. It should be borne in mind, however, that the degree of locality caused by the use of the "dirty bomb" is significantly exaggerated - the danger to the life and health of the population is less than less, and only a relatively small territory can be contaminated.
Therefore, let's limit to the consideration of the black market of nuclear materials. Like any market, it is determined by the availability of supply and demand and their ratio. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was found that the system of control and protection of nuclear materials was closely related to a certain political and economic system, including the lack of private entrepreneurship, a monopoly of foreign trade, strict control over the border crossing, etc. The system designed to resist the external enemy (foreign spies or armies) was not designed for any employee of a nuclear enterprise who was accustomed to relative financial well-being and prestigious in Soviet times and suddenly turned out to be in a depressing financial situation, can be reached by the company's gate A couple of kilograms of uranium in the hope of selling it. In Soviet times, if it had even happened, such an employee, first, did not find the buyer, and secondly, quickly would be "under the cap" KGB. I had to urgently rebuild the system of control over nuclear materials, adapting it to the market and democracy, especially since the market, especially at first, was wild, and the democracy of the wilderness; In such conditions, the control system existing in the West could not withstand. Moreover, articles on the fabulous amounts periodically appeared in printing, which could be reserved for nuclear materials. In addition, the Soviet system of control was not calculated on the emergence of such a threat as nuclear terrorism. Who at that time could present the emergence of the Chechen problem, al-Qaida and so on.?
But back to demand and suggestion. In 1992-1995, there are the highest number of well-known and later confirmed theft of theft of nuclear materials from Russian objects. The most serious cases include: theft of 1.5 kg of uranium with 90 percent enrichment in Podolsk from the "Light" enterprise in 1992, theft of 1.8 kg of uranium 36 percent enrichment from the naval base in Andreva Libe in 1993, Confiscation in 1995 in Moscow 1.7 kg of uranium 21 percent enrichment, previously stolen from the factory in Elektrostal. In all cases, the theft was produced by direct workers of objects or with their help. It is characteristic that the above cases and a number of other less significant incidents lead to the conclusion that the most often materials were stolen from enterprises related to the production of nuclear fuel, or from naval bases where nuclear submarines are atomic. Moreover, the loss of materials is most often detected after the criminals were caught. Another characteristic feature of these cases is that the thieves did not have a preliminary order for materials and stole them from the calculation to find the buyer alone. Apparently, finding the buyer was not so simple, and inept attempts to sell goods were prevented before nuclear materials crossed the border.
The whole series of incidents with highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Western Europe is a mansion, primarily the so-called "Munich" and "Prague" cases of 1994-1995. Both belong to the special police operations speaking by the customer of the material. In the West, they argue that nuclear materials in both cases had Russian origin. Russia rejects these statements. While the point in determining the source of materials is not delivered.
In most of the operations in the black market, as it turns out during the investigation, the criminals are issued for weapons low-enriched uranium or radioactive isotopes, and even in general, there are nothing to do with nuclear materials. So it was also in a very recent case in December 2001, when six members of the Balashikhinsky criminal group were arrested, trying to issue uranium fuel pills of low enrichment for highly enriched uranium. By the way, this is almost the first case in Russia, in which organized crime appears. Apparently, the sale of nuclear materials is too dangerous and little profitable. The Minister of Atomic Energy of Rumyantsev said in his interview after some time after this incident, that the uranium pills were abducted from the plant in the power plant long before the detention of criminals and that the special services for many years led to the Balashikha group for many years. Among the detainees were the FSB officer, but whether he was introduced to the group either included its composition on his own initiative and remained unclear.
After 1995 and up to 2000, reports of theft and losses of nuclear materials in Russia were practically absent. If any cases arose, they concerned rather radioactive materials. A large role is that such cases declined to decline, measures taken by the Russian government with the financial and technical assistance of the West on strengthening both the physical protection of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials and on the implementation of an adequate accounting and confole system. True, some attribute the decrease in activity in the black market of nuclear materials to the fact that criminals began to act more professionally, or the more strict restrictions on this kind of information were introduced. Estimate the validity of such estimates is difficult - the lack of information can be reinforced by one and another point of view.
The only loud business of the 1995-2000 period is associated with the report of the head of the FSB of the Chelyabinsk region in 1998 on the successful suppression of theft of 18.5 kg of material that could be used to create nuclear weapons, a group of employees of one of the nuclear enterprises of the region. This is the only message where the amount of material is sufficient for the manufacture of a nuclear fuel engineering. In most other cases, where weapon nuclear materials appear, it was about grams, a maximum of one or two kilograms. Complete clarity with this case, however, no. Part of the experts estimate it is rather skeptical and talk about the desire of the local FSB to heal (especially since at least in open printing, no information appeared in the future, and the case, judging by everything, was not transmitted). Others, on the contrary, argue that the accuracy of this report managed to confirm on informal channels in Minatom. This case was also given in the recent report of the CIA, but for some reason not as an attempt is already presented, but as the stealing, although with the reservation, that the case was not officially confirmed.
In general, the evaluation of all messages associated with thefts or illegal trade in nuclear or radioactive materials is not easy. The IAEA conducts accounting of such cases since 1993, including sends requests to countries that appear in messages, with requests for confirmation or refutation of information. However, there are no mechanisms for a compulsory message of such data or their checks. Therefore, even the most complete and official databases for transactions in the black market of nuclear and radioactive materials cannot claim that reliably reflect absolutely all cases. However, general trends according to these data can be traced. Including - from where and where materials came, who performer who is the customer. Unfortunately, Russia and the former countries of the Union, occupy the "honorable" first place in the IAEA database.
One of the trends of recent years is an increase in cases, compared with the beginning and mid-90s, illegal trade in nuclear or issued for nuclear materials in the Asian direction and a decrease in the number of cases in Europe. What is this change in the direction of streaming of materials? Strengthening radiation monitoring and opportunities of special services in Asian countries, which finally began to catch the deltsi from nuclear business? Market movement closer to potential buyers, whether countries or terrorist organizations?
As I said above, very often radioactive materials and isotopes are trying to issue nuclear materials. However, it is impossible to work out that one cannot make a nuclear bomb. Many of them are dangerous by themselves and can cause serious diseases, and even be fatal. If you remember, in 1995, on the instructions of Basayev, a container with a radioactive isotope of Cesium-137 was buried in Izmailovsky Park. There was also a case when radioactive substances were used to eliminate rivals on business. Recently, in Georgia, several hunters found in the forest old, Soviet battery time using cesium isotope and received a very high degree of infection, right up to skin burns.
Of course, the number of victims will be not comparable to losses from the explosion of a nuclear bomb and, as noted above, often (especially in the press) can be found highly overestimated assessments. For example, at the end of the past - the beginning of this year, one firm tried to sell the New York City Hall program for calculating the defeat from the "dirty bomb," which, according to experts, overestimated the damage of two or three times. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that if the damage to multiply to the psychological effect, the result may be significant. If no one will die from radiation, then many people can simply flood due to flight.
Despite the fact that the picture seems to be relatively safe, it is worth keeping in mind that we have only successfully extensive operations or discovered disappears. There are no guarantees that some part of illegal transactions ended with the transfer of nuclear materials. To determine whether such transactions and what is the relationship between disclosed and undisclosed affairs, is impossible.
Question: What are the main dangers in the protection system around Russian nuclear facilities?
Answer. Elena Sokova: The most urgent measures to ensure the protection of nuclear materials in Russia were undertaken in the mid-90s. We mainly concerned those objects where nuclear weapons and weapons nuclear materials are kept or produced. Even according to the CIA estimates, this category is not perfect, but it is quite reliably protected. Nevertheless, a lot of cases left here until the situation is brought to Optimum. Physical protection and accounting and control of other nuclear materials remain on the agenda. According to US Department of Energy, the share of buildings and enterprises to which the necessary protective systems were supplied (including even fences) is only 37 percent of the total number of objects in need of improving the level of security on international standards. There is still a lot to do, while you can say that technical and organizational conditions are provided to prevent the leakage of materials and protect against attack on nuclear facilities.
Among the most important tasks for the near future can be called consolidation of nuclear materials on a limited number of objects. It is clear that the fewer objects, the faster and more efficient, can be protected by the protection of each of them to the required level.
It is also necessary to achieve a speedy introduction and strict implementation of the current system of accounting and control of nuclear materials. It is precisely due to the absence of accurate inventory data on the number of nuclear materials in the Soviet times in enterprises, we cannot say for sure, whether all the corners were identified and were not charged somewhere in the garage in the beginning and mid-90s stocks.
Unfortunately, violation of the rules of accounting and control of nuclear materials still takes place. At the end of last year, a letter was a famous letter of the head of the Gosatomnadzor, where he describes the case of improper indication in the accompanying documents of the number and state of spent fuel from submarines aimed at recycling on the "lighthouse" in the Chelyabinsk region. It turned out that the sent nuclear fuel, in contrast to the specified in the documents, was from a damaged reactor, moreover, in some elements, up to half of the fuel was laid. The Lighthouse staff was at risk, the search for "missing" fuel was urgently organized.
The fear is also a huge amount of accumulated spent nuclear fuel, both from nuclear power plants and submarine reactors. Research institutions conducting experiments with nuclear materials are close attention, where control and protection are often much weaker than at the fuel cycle enterprises and military production. And finally, it is necessary to establish strict and tough control over the radioactive isotopes in industry and medicine.
It is necessary to clean up the technique of metals. Quite often, the goal of theft is precious and non-ferrous metals from nuclear facilities, including submarines. The loss of a small platinum plate can jeopardize the safety of the entire crew and cause the catastrophe. The tower of the bucket from a special excavator clears radioactive dawns, not only causes material losses, but also stops the already slow work on the cleaning of radioactive sites. Last fall in the city of Vozsk, where the Mayak plant is located, enterprising metal collectors disassembled 100 meters of railway tracks, on one of the branches of the driveway to the plant.
Question: Do you agree with the statement that minatom is much more closed from Russian society than from Western donors, (in particular, on the tables of officials of the US Department of Energy, sometimes more closed information than in the Russian parliament)?
Answer. Elena Sokova: Minatom is closed both from its own and others. With regard to the military program, the secrecy is justified and is practiced by all countries with nuclear weapons. Another thing is the accountability of the activities of nuclear enterprises and the minatom itself to the government, including the Duma and society. Unreasonably limited and trimmed are the possibilities of independent state control. Gosatnadzor lost a significant number of its supervisory rights, compared to what he had in the early 1990s. Even what remains is not fully applied.
Financial transparency of Minatom's activities is minimal. For so many years they have been trying to achieve transparency from the minatom of transparency in the use of funds from the US transaction "Megaton-on-Megawatts". The case with a spent fuel from Kozloduy (Bulgaria), when Minatom was forced to publish the amount of the transaction, and the price per kilogram, and even provided information as much as the funds were listed to the Krasnoyarsk Territory, proves that it is possible to achieve transparency in principle. So far this is a single case. Information openness of Minatom to the public, to put it mildly, wishes the best. The other day, Minister Rumyantsev and himself admitted it at a meeting with environmental organizations.
I do not think that the miner is more open to the West. Another thing is that between Russian and American departments there is an exchange of information, which in principle is not refined. Paradoxically, it often happens that governments are divided by the information they hide from their public. This happens often - for example, one of the applications to the contract to reduce strategic offensive weapons is classified, since the data contained in it could be used by terrorists. From this point of view, indeed, the United States sometimes know about the Russian nuclear industry more than Russian citizens.
Question: Russia in the West is increasingly - both in official circles and in the press are called a large radioactive hole. What do you think?
Answer. Elena Sokova: The hole, perhaps, is not the word. One value of the word "hole" is associated with a hole where everything falls. In this meaning, this name is fully applicable, especially if we talk about radioactive waste and the more about the plans for the import of spent nuclear fuel. Such pomex dumps in Russia and so abound. A recent report on the construction of a nuclear waste burial, including foreign ones, on one of the Kuril Islands is particularly alarming.
Another meaning of the word "hole" is a hole through which everything is dried. So far, most of the stolen nuclear materials have been identified and intercepted before they left the territory of Russia. To provide both Russian and international security, it is necessary to close even the smallest holes on Russian nuclear facilities and ensure reliable protection for nuclear materials, their accounting and control. As showing reports of recent months, there are still a lot of holes, including in the barriers of closed cities. One of these holes was unhindered by the deputy of the Duma Mitrokhin with a group of ecologists and cameramen to penetrate the closed city of Zheleznogorsk. One of the arrested in Sverdlovsk Chechens, who traded weapons and explosives, turned out to be a valid pass to the territory of the city of Forest, where nuclear warheads are collected.
In recent years, in Minatom's reports, the financial condition of the industry has improved. But is it increased by financing works in this area? He instills the hope of increased attention to these issues in Russia after the events of September 11, as well as renewed cooperation in this area between the United States and Russia. However, the scale of the problem is so great that the years and significant amounts of money are needed. Without constant control at the highest political level and concentration of effort and resources, it is unlikely to do.
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