demographic indicators. Abstract: Demographic indicators as an indicator of the social development of society. Policy documents in the field of population adopted at the UN World Population Conferences
Rostov State University
Faculty of Sociology and Political Science
Essay on the course of social medicine
"Demographic indicators as an indicator of the social development of society"
Completed by: 3rd year student
Correspondence department
Specialty: Social work
Samokhin T. A.
Lecturer: Ph.D. Assoc.
Nikulina M.A.
Rostov-on-Don
Plan
Introduction
1. Indicators of fertility, mortality and life expectancy
2. Age structure of the population
3. Abortion Statistics
4. Health indicators
5. Marriage and divorce rates
Conclusion
Bibliography
Suggestion
Introduction
"Demography is the science of the laws of population reproduction in their socio-historical conditionality. Demography studies the patterns of phenomena and processes that together form the process of population reproduction (birth rate, death rate, marriage rate), sex, age and marriage and family structures of the population, their dependence on living conditions, cultural characteristics, environmental factors, etc. On this basis, demography learns the laws (causes) of the level and dynamics of demographic processes, develops forecasts of the future size and composition of the population, as well as measures to control demographic processes.
Demographic indicators are the most important for characterizing the population of each country in terms of its sustainable development. All of them can be grouped into a data system and divided into the following groups:
General demographic, economic, mortality and birth rates, marriage and divorce rates, health indicators. The latter, in turn, can also be divided into separate positions.
This topic is interesting for several reasons: firstly, the complexity of the demographic situation in the world is obvious to most of the globe. The media, periodically raising this topic, inform people, citing terrible statistics. We are observers of the aging of the world's population. Therefore, in my work, I tried to show trends in demographic indicators in the world over the past fifteen years. In the aggregate, the demographic situation in Russia is also considered.
1. Indicators of fertility, mortality and life expectancy
Often these indicators are given as general measures of the quality of life of the population, since they indirectly reflect many aspects of the well-being of the population, including income and nutrition, environmental quality, access to healthcare, drinking water and sanitation.
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years that a newborn will live if the conditions for survival that exist at the time of his birth remain unchanged throughout his life. This indicator does not say how long the child will actually live; it reflects the life expectancy for a person born in a particular year. Mortality under age 5 indicates the number of newborns who die before reaching the age of five out of 1000 newborns. Since infants and children are the most feared by malnutrition and poor hygiene conditions, they serve as indicators as the main cause of high mortality in most developing countries. Thus, the most effective way to extend life expectancy at birth in these countries is to reduce mortality before the age of 5 years.
During the second half of the twentieth century. conditions for maintaining health in the world as a whole have improved to a greater extent than in the entire previous history of mankind. On average, in low- and middle-income countries, life expectancy at birth increased from 40 years in 1950 to 65 years in 1996. Over the same period, the average under-5 mortality rate for this group of countries fell from 280 to 80 cases per 1000 children. However, these gains still lag far behind those of high-income countries, where average life expectancy at birth is now 77 years and the average under-5 death is 7 per 1,000.
Throughout the twentieth century. national indicators of life expectancy showed a direct dependence on the level of GDP/GNP per capita. As a rule, the higher the per capita income, the higher the life expectancy, although this ratio does not explain all the differences between regions and countries. Two other major factors in increasing national and regional levels of life expectancy are: 1) improvements in medical technology (some countries are clearly leading in their application); 2) improving the sanitary and hygienic conditions of life through the state policy of expanding the population's access to safe drinking water, the construction of sewerage facilities and the control of food quality. Education - especially for women and girls - is also extremely important, as wives and mothers, armed with knowledge about healthy lifestyles, can play a significant role in reducing the health risks to their family members.
These two additional factors explain how most developing countries today manage to close their gap with developed countries in terms of population health, despite the fact that they in most cases fail to close their gap in per capita income. Such a "jump" is possible in large part due to advances in medical technology, public health and education, which allow developing countries to "get more health" per unit of national income. Thus, in 1900, life expectancy in the United States was 49 years with a per capita income of over $4,000. Today, the average life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa is 50 years with a per capita income of less than $500.
Life expectancy for men in Russia in 1995 was remarkably low (only the countries of Central Africa followed Russia), and the lag behind that for women is the largest in the world (14 years). This situation is explained mainly by a sharp decline in life expectancy for men - from 64 years in 1990 to 58 in 1994. In four years, mortality among Russian men aged 25 to 54 increased by almost 50%. It is believed that the reason for this was a decrease in income and an increase in nervous stress due to the transition period in the economy, a decrease in the quality of medical care and a drop in its accessibility, and also - to no small extent - an increase in alcohol consumption and smoking. Similar, albeit less dramatic, changes in male life expectancy have also taken place in a number of other former Soviet republics.
In virtually all other countries, life expectancy at birth has increased in recent years. In developing countries, this increase was attributed to a sharp decline in under-5 mortality. The best results have been achieved through improved methods of combating infectious diseases (which primarily affect children), such as gastrointestinal and helminthic infections, etc. In many countries, an increase in per capita income has improved the living and nutritional conditions of most families. Developing country governments have invested in public health (providing drinking water and sanitation, conducting mass immunization programmes), training medical personnel, building hospitals and clinics, and providing free medical care. But much remains to be done. Malnutrition remains a serious problem, especially among women and children, and infectious diseases, which are largely preventable, continue to kill millions of people. Thus, the average global rate of immunization against measles is 80%, and annually this disease alone takes the lives of more than a million children. This problem is especially acute in the countries of Central Africa, where the immunization rate is the lowest - less than 60%.
2. Age structure of the population
The health and life expectancy of a country's population is reflected in its age structure, i.e., different percentages of different age groups in the total population. The age structure of the population can be shown in the form of a "population pyramid", which is also called the "age-sex pyramid". The population is divided into males and females, as well as into age groups (i.e. groups in 5-year increments - or groups in increments of one year). What the "population pyramids" of low- and high-income countries look like now (1995) and those that are expected to be characteristic of them in the future (2025) Notice how the shape pyramid shows higher birth and death rates (especially for children) and higher life expectancy in low-income countries.
In poor countries, the base of the pyramid is wider and the pyramid has a more pronounced triangular shape, rather than pear-shaped or rectangular, as in high-income countries.
Rostov State University
Faculty of Sociology and Political Science
Essay on the course of social medicine
"Demographic indicators as an indicator of the social development of society"
Completed by: 3rd year student
Correspondence department
Specialty: Social work
Samokhin T. A.
Lecturer: Ph.D. Assoc.
Nikulina M.A.
Rostov-on-Don
Plan
Introduction
1. Indicators of fertility, mortality and life expectancy
2. Age structure of the population
3. Abortion Statistics
4. Health indicators
5. Marriage and divorce rates
Conclusion
Suggestion
Introduction
"Demography is the science of the laws of population reproduction in their socio-historical conditionality. Demography studies the patterns of phenomena and processes that together form the process of population reproduction (birth rate, death rate, marriage rate), sex, age and marriage and family structures of the population, their dependence on living conditions, cultural characteristics, environmental factors, etc. On this basis, demography learns the laws (causes) of the level and dynamics of demographic processes, develops forecasts of the future size and composition of the population, as well as measures to control demographic processes.
Demographic indicators are the most important for characterizing the population of each country in terms of its sustainable development. All of them can be grouped into a data system and divided into the following groups:
General demographic, economic, mortality and birth rates, marriage and divorce rates, health indicators. The latter, in turn, can also be divided into separate positions.
This topic is interesting for several reasons: firstly, the complexity of the demographic situation in the world is obvious to most of the globe. The media, periodically raising this topic, inform people, citing terrible statistics. We are observers of the aging of the world's population. Therefore, in my work, I tried to show trends in demographic indicators in the world over the past fifteen years. In the aggregate, the demographic situation in Russia is also considered.
1. Indicators of fertility, mortality and life expectancy
Often these indicators are given as general measures of the quality of life of the population, since they indirectly reflect many aspects of the well-being of the population, including income and nutrition, environmental quality, access to healthcare, drinking water and sanitation.
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years that a newborn will live if the conditions for survival that exist at the time of his birth remain unchanged throughout his life. This indicator does not say how long the child will actually live; it reflects the life expectancy for a person born in a particular year. Mortality under age 5 indicates the number of newborns who die before reaching the age of five out of 1000 newborns. Since infants and children are the most feared by malnutrition and poor hygiene conditions, they serve as indicators as the main cause of high mortality in most developing countries. Thus, the most effective way to extend life expectancy at birth in these countries is to reduce mortality before the age of 5 years.
During the second half of the twentieth century. conditions for maintaining health in the world as a whole have improved to a greater extent than in the entire previous history of mankind. On average, in low- and middle-income countries, life expectancy at birth increased from 40 years in 1950 to 65 years in 1996. Over the same period, the average under-5 mortality rate for this group of countries fell from 280 to 80 cases per 1000 children. However, these gains still lag far behind those of high-income countries, where average life expectancy at birth is now 77 years and the average under-5 death is 7 per 1,000.
Throughout the twentieth century. national indicators of life expectancy showed a direct dependence on the level of GDP/GNP per capita. As a rule, the higher the per capita income, the higher the life expectancy, although this ratio does not explain all the differences between regions and countries. Two other major factors in increasing national and regional levels of life expectancy are: 1) improvements in medical technology (some countries are clearly leading in their application); 2) improving the sanitary and hygienic conditions of life through the state policy of expanding the population's access to safe drinking water, the construction of sewerage facilities and the control of food quality. Education - especially for women and girls - is also extremely important, as wives and mothers, armed with knowledge about healthy lifestyles, can play a significant role in reducing the health risks to their family members.
These two additional factors explain how most developing countries today manage to close their gap with developed countries in terms of population health, despite the fact that they in most cases fail to close their gap in per capita income. Such a "jump" is possible in large part due to advances in medical technology, public health and education, which allow developing countries to "get more health" per unit of national income. Thus, in 1900, life expectancy in the United States was 49 years with a per capita income of over $4,000. Today, the average life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa is 50 years with a per capita income of less than $500.
Life expectancy for men in Russia in 1995 was remarkably low (only the countries of Central Africa followed Russia), and the lag behind that for women is the largest in the world (14 years). This situation is explained mainly by a sharp decline in life expectancy for men - from 64 years in 1990 to 58 in 1994. In four years, mortality among Russian men aged 25 to 54 increased by almost 50%. It is believed that the reason for this was a decrease in income and an increase in nervous stress due to the transition period in the economy, a decrease in the quality of medical care and a drop in its accessibility, and also - to no small extent - an increase in alcohol consumption and smoking. Similar, albeit less dramatic, changes in male life expectancy have also taken place in a number of other former Soviet republics.
In virtually all other countries, life expectancy at birth has increased in recent years. In developing countries, this increase was attributed to a sharp decline in under-5 mortality. The best results have been achieved through improved methods of combating infectious diseases (which primarily affect children), such as gastrointestinal and helminthic infections, etc. In many countries, an increase in per capita income has improved the living and nutritional conditions of most families. Developing country governments have invested in public health (providing drinking water and sanitation, conducting mass immunization programmes), training medical personnel, building hospitals and clinics, and providing free medical care. But much remains to be done. Malnutrition remains a serious problem, especially among women and children, and infectious diseases, which are largely preventable, continue to kill millions of people. Thus, the average global rate of immunization against measles is 80%, and annually this disease alone takes the lives of more than a million children. This problem is especially acute in the countries of Central Africa, where the immunization rate is the lowest - less than 60%.
2. Age structure of the population
The health and life expectancy of a country's population is reflected in its age structure, i.e., different percentages of different age groups in the total population. The age structure of the population can be shown in the form of a "population pyramid", which is also called the "age-sex pyramid". The population is divided into males and females, as well as into age groups (i.e. groups in 5-year increments - or groups in increments of one year). What the "population pyramids" of low- and high-income countries look like now (1995) and those that are expected to be characteristic of them in the future (2025) Notice how the shape pyramid shows higher birth and death rates (especially for children) and higher life expectancy in low-income countries.
In poor countries, the base of the pyramid is wider and the pyramid has a more pronounced triangular shape, rather than pear-shaped or rectangular, as in high-income countries.
In low-income countries, over a third of the population is under the age of 15; in high-income countries, this figure does not exceed 20%. Demographically, this means that larger age groups are poised to enter childbearing age and the reduction in family size will be offset by an increase in the number of parents. Such "demographic inertia" will help to maintain high birth rates, despite the decline in fertility. From a social and economic point of view, the high proportion of children in the population means that many are still simply too young to work, and in the short term will be the dependents of those who are already working. This is the main reason for the relatively high dependency ratio in most developing countries. While high-income countries have an average of two workers for every child or elderly, in low-income countries the ratio is 1:1.5.
High-income countries face the problem of population aging - an increase in the proportion of elderly, unemployed citizens, both by increasing life expectancy and by reducing the birth rate. In 1996, persons aged 60 and over accounted for an average of 18% of the population of these countries, and by 2010 their share is projected to increase to 22%. In some high-income countries, such as Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan and Sweden, the proportion of the elderly in the population has already reached or exceeded 21%. In Russia, the share of the population aged 60 years and over was about 17% in 1996 (which is projected to increase to 18% by 2010), and the dependency ratio was in line with the average for high-income countries.
The aging of the population leads to increased pressure on the systems of pensions, social security and health care. As life expectancy increases in developing countries, they will also have to face the challenge of population aging. It is expected that for them the problem of population aging will be even more acute, not only because of the lack of financial resources, but also because: 1) the growth rate of life expectancy, and hence the aging of the population, is much higher in them; 2) they will have a relatively high dependency ratio, with both children and the elderly.
The shape of the population pyramid in Russia is very different from that which is typical for both developed and developing countries. Firstly, several ledges are clearly visible, which makes the pyramid look more like a Christmas tree. This is due to the sharp declines in the birth rate caused by tragic historical events such as World War I and the Civil War (small age groups corresponding to the age of 80 years and more), famine during the years of collectivization (small age groups corresponding to the age of 60 years) and World War II. (age groups around 50 years old). The subsequent distortions of the population pyramid - in its lower part - are caused by two periods of the "demographic echo" of the Second World War. The much smaller age groups born during the war years produced the smaller age groups of those who are now 25-30 years old, that is, those born in the early 1970s. Their children, in turn, gave birth to even smaller age groups, which include those babies who are being born now. According to some estimates, the "demographic echo" of the Second World War has caused about 13% of the current sharp decline in the birth rate in Russia.
Another characteristic feature of Russia's population structure is the world's lowest ratio of men to women - 88 to 100. This is partly the result of wars, but the most important factor here is the world's largest gap between the life expectancy of men and women noted above. This imbalance in favor of women is especially noticeable in older age groups. While the number of women and men at the age of 36 is almost the same, at the age of 49 the ratio between men and women is already 90:100, at the age of 64 it is 70:100, and at the age of 71 it is only 40:100. In Russia, there are almost twice as many women per man aged 60 and over (194 women per 100 men). In high-income countries, this imbalance among the elderly is almost three times smaller (133 women per 100 men). In low-income countries, the ratio is even lower, at 104 women to 100 men, but reasons for this perceived "advantage" in developing countries include higher birth deaths ("maternal mortality") and discrimination against women, including discrimination in access to health care.
In Russia in 1993, the birth rate fell by
15% and reached 9.0 births per thousand people.
Now we are seeing a downward trend in the number of children in the family. According to the State Statistics Committee of Russia, most Russians today consider it most acceptable to have one child.
If earlier 3-4 children in a family were absolutely normal, now large families have become much less common. But as before, families of rural residents are characterized by a larger number of children than urban families.
Until now, the birth rate in rural areas is significantly higher compared to the birth rate in large cities, despite the fact that the socio-economic situation has led to the uncontrollability of the urbanization process in many countries, including Russia. The percentage of the urban population in individual countries is: Australia -75; USA - 80;
Germany - 90. In addition to large cities - millionaires, urban agglomerations or merged cities are growing rapidly.
According to 1993 data, the death rate was 16.6 deaths per 1,000 people.
Compare: in the USA - 9.0 people, despite the fact that life expectancy there is 72 years, in Russia only 57.7 years.
The main causes of death today are diseases of the so-called endogenous plan, i.e. associated with disruption of the most important systems of the human body. Therefore, an increase in the proportion of older people in the total population leads to an increase in the total number of deaths, and hence the overall mortality rates. This trend has also been observed in the past, for example since 1939. to 1970 the proportion of people aged 57 years and older increased from 6.8% to 11.8%. If in 1973 49.5% of all deaths accounted for those who died from diseases of the circulatory system, then in
1985 - 53.4% and this figure remained the same until 1995. But in 1985. 15.5% died from neoplasms (cancer) and 12% died as a result of accidents, then the corresponding values for 1995. were 17.5% and 16%.
The increase in mortality from such diseases is characteristic, first of all, for older people, because. The “peak” of mortality shifts to this age group.
abortion statistics.
Abortion statistics have always been taboo. The number of abortions per thousand women of childbearing age in Russia is 83. And what about the West:
Germany - 5.1; Austria - 7.7; France - 13.8. This list can be continued, which does not change the essence, among the countries of Western Europe we remain the undisputed leaders in terms of the number of abortions, and our lead over the rest is simply amazing. It is noteworthy that if you move across the map of Europe from West to East, the number of abortions increases. In Hungary - 35.6; in Yugoslavia - 38.6; in Bulgaria - 67.2. According to tacit data at the end of 1994. of the total number of registered pregnancies, only 32% ended in childbirth, the rest
68% - abortions.
Abortion is one of the main causes of low birth rates and negative natural population growth. Such a huge number of abortions in our country is primarily due to the economic situation in today's Russia. For several years now, our country has been in a socio-economic crisis, which is the reason for such a demographic phenomenon as abortion. Most of the abortions are done by women aged 16 to 25 years. this social stratum is in the most unfavorable financial situation. After all, a young single woman is simply not able to adequately provide for herself and her child.
The moral and moral health of people also affects the percentage of abortions. After all, you will agree that over the past few years the moral framework has greatly expanded, and many moral principles in the eyes of today's youth look irreparably outdated and completely unacceptable.
And, despite all the efforts of the Russian Government, the number of abortions continues to grow, and in order to stop this process and bring abortion statistics into the world framework, it will take more than one year and more than one decade, provided that this can be done at all.
Child mortality.
The statistics of infant mortality in Russia are frightening. This figure is today 18.6; those. 18-19 deaths under the age of one year per 1000 live births. Compare: in the USA 5 out of 1000 newborns die, in Canada and Japan - 7, in the most developed countries of Western Europe - from 6 to 8. In modern Russia, infant mortality is almost 3 times higher than in the civilized world.
Suicide
The population of Russia, although to a small extent, is affected by the percentage of suicides.
We can say that from 1992 to 1995. the number of suicides increased markedly from 46,125 to 61,000 respectively. Then, in the period from 1995 to 1996, their number slightly decreased. The sharp increase in the number of suicides since 1992 to 1995 due to the crisis development of the country's economy and the decline in production, as well as a sharp deterioration in the socio-economic condition of Russia. Note that Russia is in the top ten countries with the highest percentage of suicides, up to 2007.
Also horrifying is the percentage of criminal offenses, in particular murders, in terms of which we are already approaching the United States, which is the clear leader in this area. Murders affect not so much the demographic state of Russia as the social one.
Health indicators
As the health of the world's population improves, the burden of all kinds of diseases decreases. At the same time, the pattern of diseases is rapidly changing from predominantly infectious diseases that pose a particular risk to infants and children (eg diarrhoea, helminthic infections, measles) to non-communicable diseases that mainly threaten adults (cardiovascular disease, cancer). While there are relatively inexpensive and effective ways to control most infections, many non-communicable diseases are much more expensive to treat. Moreover, to significantly reduce the number of the latter, changes in the behavior and lifestyle of adults will be required.
The importance of lifestyle choices can be illustrated by the example of the health gap between Eastern and Western European countries. This gap is mainly widened by strokes and heart attacks; the main risk factors in this case are excessive alcohol consumption, smoking, unbalanced diet and lack of exercise. All these factors, especially smoking, are more active in the countries of Eastern Europe, including Russia. According to statistics, Russian men are the most heavy smokers in the world, second only to South Koreans, and Russian women are among the most heavy smokers.
Cigarette smoke is more harmful to health than all air pollutants combined. It is becoming increasingly clear that smoking affects not only the smokers themselves (about half of whom die prematurely due to smoking-related diseases, including cancer, cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases), but also the so-called "passive smokers", i.e. smokers. e. those who are often in the same room with smokers. According to some estimates, for passive smokers, the risk of cancer increases by 30%, and the risk of cardiovascular disease - by 34%.
The governments of developed countries are making special efforts to combat smoking and reduce the losses to society caused by smoking. There are special taxes on tobacco products, restrictions on their advertising are introduced, and propaganda campaigns are carried out on the dangers of smoking. The highest taxes on cigarettes are provided in the countries of Western Europe. According to a 1998 report by the World Watch Institute, smokers in Norway were forced to pay $5.23 in taxes for each pack of cigarettes, or 74% of the total price; in the UK, taxes were $4.30, or 82% of the pack price. The experience of many countries has shown that tobacco taxes are an effective tool in the fight against smoking: a 10% increase in the price of cigarettes leads to a 5% reduction in the number of adults who smoke and a 6-8% reduction in young people aged 15 to 21 years old, who tend to have a lower income.
The same report goes on to report that while smoking rates are declining in Western Europe and the US, they are increasing in most developing countries, especially among women and young people. US and European tobacco companies, faced with declining demand for their products in their own countries, are finding ways to increase production by penetrating foreign markets where government regulation is weaker and consumers are less informed about the dangers of smoking or less concerned about their health. Over the past 10 years, the share of exports in total cigarette production in the two largest exporting countries - the UK and the US - has roughly doubled, reaching 60% and 30% respectively. If current trends in smoking continue, then by 2020 tobacco-related deaths will increase from 3 million to 10 million cases in the world annually, and 70% of such cases will occur in developing countries.
Marriage and divorce rates
Marriage in demography is understood as the process of formation of married (married) couples in the population, which includes both first and second marriages. In combination with the processes of widowhood and divorce, marriage is one of the most important factors affecting the reproduction of the population. For more than 30 years, more than a million marriages have been concluded in Russia every year (the years of maximum marriage: 1960 - 1499.6 thousand marriages, 1977-1979 - more than 1.5 million), but since 1992 their number began to decline sharply (1991 - 1277.2 thousand, 1992 - 1053.7 thousand, 1993 - 1106.7 thousand, 1994 - 1080.6 thousand, 1995 - 1075.2 thousand ). In 1996, the number of registered marriages in Russia for the first time turned out to be less than 1 million (in 1996 - 866.6 thousand). The reverse trend was observed with the number of divorces: if in 1960-1961. In Russia, less than 200 thousand divorces were registered annually, but already in 1972 their number for the first time exceeded 400 thousand, and in 1976 - over 500 thousand. In 1991, the annual number of divorces for the first time approached the mark of 600 thousand (597 ,9), and in 1992-1996 it exceeded this enormous value (1992 - 639.2 thousand, 1993 - 663.3 thousand, 1994 - 680.5 thousand, 1995 - 665 .9 thousand). In 1996 alone, the number of registered divorces decreased significantly and amounted to 562.4 thousand.
More illustrative characteristics of general trends are the marriage and divorce rates, which are calculated as the ratio of the number of marriages entered into and dissolved during the calendar year, respectively, to the average annual number of the present population.
The lowest values of the marriage rate were observed in 1996 in the least urbanized and socially equipped regions of Russia: the Komi-Permyak National District (1.9 per 1000 population) and the Perm Region (4.3), the Republic of Ingushetia (3.7), the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (4.1) and Arkhangelsk Region (4.7), Republic of Tyva (4.3), Republics of Mari El and Udmurd Republic (4.7 each), Irkutsk Region (4.8), Kirov Region, Republic of Buryatia Ust-Orda Buryat National and Koryak Autonomous Okrugs (4.9 each), and the highest - in the relatively prosperous Samara Region, Stavropol Territory (6.2 each), the Republic of Bashkortostan (6.3) and Krasnodar Territory (6.5) , the cities of St. Petersburg (6.9) and Moscow (7.6), the Moscow region close to Moscow (7.2), in one of the North Caucasian republics (Kabardino-Balkaria - 6.3), as well as intensively developed territories of Siberia and the Far East, in the population structure of which the population of working age prevails: Khanty-Mansiysk and Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenetsky) national districts, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) and the Kamchatka region (6.4 each), the Tyumen region (6.6 ), Chukotka Autonomous (7.3) and Yamalo-Nenets National (8.1) districts.
The maximum values of total divorce rates in 1996 were recorded in the capital region (Moscow - 5.1 and the Moscow region - 4.6), Kaliningrad (4.8), Murmansk (5.0), Sakhalin (4.6) and Kamchatka (5.9) regions with regional centers that are large port cities, Samara region (4.8), which seems to be quite prosperous, and territories with extreme natural and climatic conditions (Khabarovsk Territory - 4.7; Tyumen Region - 5.3; Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenetsky) National District - 5.8, Magadan Region - 6.1, Yamalo-Nenets National District - 6.8 and Chukotka Autonomous District - 8.9 per 1000 population. for national territorial entities: (2.9), Republics of Kalmykia (2.9), Kabardino-Balkaria (2.9), Mordovia (2.8), Udmurt (2.7), Karachay-Cherkess (2.7) , Buryatia (2.6), Altai (2.6), Mari El (2.5), Chuvash (2.4), North Ossetia-Alania (2.2), Tyva (1.3), Dagestan (1 ,1), Ingushetia (0.4), as well as for the national districts of Aginsky Buryatsky (1.7), Komi-Permyatsky (1.2) and Ust-Ordynsky Buryatsky (1.1).
It is easy to see that there are certain correspondences between the processes of marriage and divorce across the territories of Russia - territories with higher values of marriage rates are characterized by lower values of divorce rates and vice versa.
Conclusion
So, in the work, the main demographic indicators characterizing the level of social development of society were shown and disclosed. Based on the official figures cited, one can conclude that the current situation is extremely unfavorable and confirm the forecast about the "aging of the nation." A certain demographic policy of the state influences the improvement or deterioration of indicators. The effectiveness of social policy in Russia was extremely weakened due to the economic crisis in August 1998 and the instability of the economic sphere. The attempt of the state to provide assistance to the general population did not lead to improvement, which was expressed in the ongoing trend towards a sharp reduction in the birth rate, a continuing increase in mortality, a decrease in the coefficient of natural increase to negative values, which led to depopulation, which became a reality for Russia from the point of view of the prospects for its historical development . The last critical year for Russia was 2003, after which there was a tendency to improve the main demographic indicators, thanks to the measures of the Russian government and personally President V.V. Putin.
Bibliography
1. Alisov N.V.; Khorev B.S. Economic and social geography of the world. Textbook - M. Gardariki, 2000
2. Gundarov I.A. Demographic catastrophe in Russia: causes, overcoming mechanism, M., 2001
3. Population of Russia 1999, Seventh Annual Demographic Report, M., 2000
4.Population of Russia 2006, Thirteenth Annual Demographic Report
5. Electronic demographic magazine - demoscope.ru
6.Website of the WHO project - Who.com
Demographic indicators as indicators of social change Demographic indicators can be indicators of social change, both positive and negative. One of these indicators is the out-of-wedlock birth rate, which reached 30% in Russia in the mid-2000s. On the one hand, the growth of illegitimate births has nothing to do with the growth in the number of informal marriages in developed countries, where they are due to the transformation of the family institution and the growth of women's economic independence. "Record" figures were recorded in the degrading rural areas of the North-West of the European part and the Urals, where the share of illegitimate births is 35-40%, and in the Komi-Permyatsk Autonomous Okrug - 62%. In the Urals, Eastern Siberia and the Far East, a high extramarital birth rate is typical for depressive industrial "cities-factories", mining villages that do not have a developed socio-cultural urban environment; it exceeds 40% in urban settlements of the Perm, Irkutsk, Magadan, Sakhalin regions . The socialization of unwanted children living in poverty and abandonment, in the long term, leads to the reproduction of marginal forms of adaptation. At the same time, in more prosperous regions, there has been a trend towards the modernization of relations in this area. In 2006, 44% of extramarital births were registered at the joint application of the spouses, and the proportion of children born to single mothers who are not in both formal and informal unions does not exceed 7%. Another social indicator is the mother's age at childbirth, which increased from 25.3 to 27.0 years from 1990 to 2007. Postponing the birth of children to a later date, which is characteristic of developed countries, is beginning to appear in Russia in connection with the priority of professional and career growth for women with a high level of education. Like any innovation, this process begins with the largest cities. Russian women aged 25-29 give birth to children a quarter less than those aged 20-24, and in Moscow and St. Petersburg, on the contrary, 15-20% more often. In federal cities, the shift of births towards older ages was noticeable as early as the first half of the 1990s; now this trend is developing most rapidly in Moscow. In other large cities and regions, economic conditions have not yet developed that provide a significant increase in the number of high-paying jobs for women and contribute to a shift in fertility to older ages. Across the country, the birth rate of young mothers began to decline. In Moscow, already in the first half of the 1990s, early motherhood at the age of 15-19 was rarer than in the country as a whole. In recent years, the decline in fertility in the youngest age group has been fastest in regions with large urban agglomerations. They already have widespread family planning, even in low-status and low-income groups of the population, which contributes to the reduction of early births. In the republics of the North Caucasus and southern Siberia, which have not completed the demographic transition, the birth rate of young mothers is declining more slowly. The structure of births by mother's age is shifted towards older ages, but for a different reason - the persistence of large families. However, the dynamics of births at the age of 25-29, in contrast to the rest of Russia, was mostly negative, which indicates a trend towards a reduction in large families. However, after the introduction of "maternity capital" in 2007, there were signs of a rejuvenation of the birth rate. Regional dynamics of age-related mortality rates can also be considered as an indicator of social degradation. The main cause of death among the working-age male population was mortality from external causes, it is high in the North-West, the European North and part of the Urals, in the regions of Eastern Siberia, in the Far East and in almost all autonomous districts of the east of the country (5.5-7.8% ). The maximum mortality of men of working age is still characteristic of the most socially problematic regions - the Republic of Tyva and the Komi-Permyatsk Autonomous Okrug (9.6-12.6% in 2006). Differences in male mortality are the main reason for regional differentiation in life expectancy. There are three factors that influence this indicator. The first is related to natural and climatic conditions, this is the so-called "northeast gradient" - a reduction in life expectancy in the direction from the southwest to the northeast. The second factor is the way of life and the prevalence of asocial phenomena, primarily alcoholism. In the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus, where it is minimal, life expectancy is the highest. And only the third factor is the modernizing impact of higher incomes and education: in Moscow, the life expectancy of men is 6-10 years higher than in the neighboring regions of the Center, and the population of the northern oil and gas autonomous districts of the Tyumen region lives 3-7 years longer than the population regions of Central Russia. The lowest life expectancy for men in 2006 was in Koryak Autonomous Okrug (52 years) and Tyva (53 years). In these regions, the negative impact of all factors is summed up, so not only men, but also women (62 years old) live a short life. Such low longevity rates for both sexes is an obvious example of social degradation.
- DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES IN PSKOV REGION
- Influencedemographicsituationsonprocesses
Rice.5.1. SystemicconnectionsnumberspopulationAndhisagestructures.
The total population of the region, first of all, directly or indirectly, determines the size of the demographic burden on the main life-supporting subsystems of the regional socio-economic system - health care, transport, telecommunications, housing and communal services. The population size in certain age groups in its own way affects the state of individual subsystems of the regional economy and social sphere. populationpopulationVagebelowable-bodied and its dynamics directly determine the state of general education systems and preschool institutions and, indirectly, the state of the vocational education system, employment of the population and its general standard of living. The latter is due to the temporary withdrawal of part of the economically active population (women) from the economy for the period of maternity leave and parental leave, as well as a concomitant certain decrease in the average per capita income. populationpopulationVable-bodiedage and its dynamics are one of the main factors determining the state of the regional economy. This also applies to the state of the regional system of vocational education and training (retraining) of personnel, and to the overall level of employment and, as a result, to the value of the gross regional product. As a result, the revenues of the regional and local budgets, as well as the average per capita income and standard of living of the population as a whole, directly depend on the working-age population. populationpopulationVagehigherable-bodied and its dynamics directly determines the magnitude of the demographic burden on the social security system and, indirectly, the employment of the population and its general standard of living. The connection with employment is mainly characterized by the number of pensioners aged 55-65 and the degree of their interest in continuing their labor activity. As for the influence of the population over the working age on the general standard of living, everything here is determined by the ratio of average monthly pensions and the available average per capita income of the population. Under the current situation, when average pensions are less than 50% of the average per capita income of the population, the size of the population of retirement age and the average standard of living of the population of the region are inversely related.
- The main characteristics of the demographic situation
- low birth rate;
relatively high mortality rate
- a large proportion of the population above the working age
negative impact of migration processes.
Rice.5.2. populationpopulationareasonStartof the year(thousandpeople)
Rice.5.3. pacedecreasenumberspopulationareas
The values of the main demographic indicators that determine the dynamics of the natural movement of the population in 2005 are shown in fig. 5.4. On fig. 5.5 - 5.7 dependencies are shown that characterize the age structure of the birth rate, the dynamics of the reduced birth rate and the trends in the change in birth rates in various age groups. Attention is drawn to the low value of the reduced birth rate, at which, in the conditions of the existing mortality rate, not only expanded reproduction is impossible, but also any significant reduction in the rate of population decline in the region. Comparing the actual values of the birth rate with the values of the mortality and migration rates (Fig. 4), we can conclude that even if a certain decrease in mortality rates is achieved, and migration growth is stimulated due to external migration. coefficient
fertility,
providing
stabilization
numbers
population
areas,
must
be,
How
minimum,
V
2
times
more,
how
V
the present
time
.
Rice.5.4. Dynamicsmajordemographicindicators
in the Pskov region.
Fig.5.5.AgestructurefertilityV2007 G.
(live births per 1000 women of the corresponding age).
Fig.5.6.Dynamicsgivencoefficientfertility
(live births per 1,000 women aged 15-45)
Analyzing the dependences of Fig. 5-7, we can conclude that, since 2005, there has been a trend towards an increase in the birth rate in the region as a whole for all age groups. However, it should be noted that this trend is fully manifested only for the age group of 25-39 years, which accounts for only 50% of all births. In other age groups, in particular, in the group of 20-24 years old, which is the most significant for overall fertility rates, there is a steady decline in the birth rate reduced to a given age (Fig. 5). Apparently, the trend towards a shift in the maximum birth rate towards older age, characteristic of many European countries, will be observed in the future, so it can be expected that the age group of 25-35 years old will become increasingly important in the process of population reproduction (Fig. 5.7 ).
Fig.5.7.AgestructurefertilityV2006 year
(live births per 1000 women of corresponding age)
and observed trends in its change
Another indicator that largely determines the demographic situation in the region is a fairly high mortality rate, and, first of all, this refers to the mortality rate among the able-bodied population. On fig. 5.9 5.10 shows dependencies characterizing the values and trends of change in the given mortality rates in different age groups. 
Rice.5.8. DynamicscoefficientinfantilemortalityVPskovareas.
Rice.5.9. Givenoddsmortality(numberdeceasedon1000 Humanrelevantage) inPskovareasV2006 G.
(
;
;
;
-
oddsmortalityVseniorages)
Rice.5.10. Dynamicsgivencoefficientmortalityamongable-bodiedpopulationPskovareas.
Analyzing the dynamics of mortality rates in different age groups (Fig. 10, 11), we can draw the following conclusions:
- the region is seeing a steady decline in infant mortality
- there is a marked decrease in child (0-4 years) mortality
- marked decrease in mortality in all age groups
- observed
conspicuous
decline
mortality
V
age
group
45-60
years
(V
period
2003-2006
y.y.
on
8-10
%);
- however, the region is experiencing a marked increase in mortality
| Number of deaths per 1000 population | Number of children deaths before 1 year per 1000 live births |
||
| Murmansk region | |||
| Komi Republic | |||
| Saint Petersburg | |||
| Arhangelsk region | |||
| Kaliningrad region | |||
| county average | |||
| Republic of Karelia | |||
| Vologda Region | |||
| Leningrad region | |||
| Novgorod region | |||
| Pskov region | |||
| County averages | in the Pskov region |
||
| from diseases of the circulatory system | |||
| from neoplasms | |||
| from unnatural causes | |||
| from respiratory diseases | |||
| from diseases of the digestive system |
(Published in the Journal of the New Economic Association, 2011, No. 9, p. 176-180)
I belong to the category of specialists who are extremely skeptical about the achievements of our demographic policy. Moreover, I believe that all our problems are further exacerbated as a result of such measures as stimulating the birth rate. I write and talk a lot on this subject. I don't want to repeat myself. In the annual reports “Population of Russia”, I consistently promote this idea, based on empirical research data. I use data not only from government statistics, but also from selective studies, which lead to the simple idea that everything is not so simple here and that it is hardly possible to correct the demographic situation with dashing, cavalry attacks.
I now want to raise just one question that few people raise, except for professionals involved in specific demographic analysis. Let us turn to the Concept of Demographic Policy, which was officially adopted in 2007 and on the basis of which modern policy is built and the measures that are explicitly or implicitly present in it are consistently implemented.
Anyone who has even flipped through this document will surely pay attention to the so-called "target indicators" - quantitative indicators that need to be achieved by a certain year: life expectancy, total fertility rate, migration balance, and even a specific population. And as a demographer, I have repeatedly expressed the opinion that these indicators are not suitable in principle as target, strategic indicators.
Let me illustrate with two examples: the total fertility rate and life expectancy.
First, these are very complex indicators. Despite the fact that many are used to them, when they open statistical reference books, they interpret them completely wrong. First of all, these are market indicators related to the so-called “conditional generation”. Or in other words: the expected indicators of the final birth rate and life expectancy that we will have for real generations, provided that nothing changes for a very long time. And even just because these indicators are initially expected, i.e. hypothetical, setting them as long-term goals is very dangerous.
Secondly, the purely mathematical side of the issue, which I will illustrate on such an integral indicator as life expectancy. We often say: in Russia, men live 62 years. In fact, a very small proportion of men live exactly 62 years. This indicator tells how many years, on average, an average newborn born in a given (estimated) year is expected to live if the age distribution of deaths for a given generation does not change over many, many years (until the last of its representatives at the age of 100-110 years).
A good analogue of life expectancy is the reading of a car's speedometer, which shows a change in instantaneous speed: now 70 kilometers per hour, and a little pedal is released - 60, a little pressed - 80. Does this mean that the car will pass 70, or 60, or 80 in an hour kilometers? Doesn't mean at all. We would cover the indicated distance if we pressed the pedal with the same effort for an hour, maintaining the same speed, and there were no turns, no roughness of the road where we would need to slow down, etc., and , on the contrary, it would not be necessary at some point to accelerate in order to overtake another car. And also imagine some very complex drive belt to our speedometer, when we have not one car, but 140 million cars, and each one is driven by our citizens - representatives of their generations, corresponding age groups. Every thread stretches to this speedometer.
In demography, we are accustomed to working with generations, a set of different generations that make up the population of a country. Each generation, by the fixed moment for which we estimate the expected birth rate or life expectancy, has passed its part of the life path in accordance with its age, having experienced certain events and solving in its own way the problems that had to be faced in life. And we suddenly tell them that all of them together (that is, on average!) Need to reduce mortality by so many percent or, even more funny, increase life expectancy by so many percent! For some generations, this is simply impossible, due to the fact that they have already passed a significant part of their life path. Others, the youngest, could still imagine that they would change their behavior in response to changing socioeconomic conditions. But after all, we often lay down policy measures to change these conditions, based on the current market circumstances.
Consider the age distribution of the "table numbers of the dead" (i.e., the distribution of the dead of the conditional generation) for different years, for example, for 1959 - already very far from today (life expectancy for men then was 62.8 years), - and for 1987, with which we like to compare everything, because then our mortality table was the best (the result of the anti-alcohol campaign and the euphoria of the population in the early years of Gorbachev's "perestroika", when the life expectancy for men suddenly increased by two years (up to 64 .8 years), and, finally, for 2008 (life expectancy - 61.8 years).
What do these data show? Let's take the data for 1959 and 1987. There are essentially no shifts in the age distribution of deaths. The modal (most common) age of death for men was the same - about 75 years for two life tables separated by almost 30 years! The modal duration of life from 1959 to 1987 did not move, did not even stir. Despite all the annual fluctuations in the intensity of mortality, including those caused by a powerful anti-alcohol campaign, the average life expectancy has not changed, remaining for men in the region of 75 years, and not 63 or 65 years, as is often believed, focusing on the indicator of life expectancy in 1959 and 1987 There was a long period of increase in mortality - from the mid-1960s, then for several years it declined - in the mid-1980s, but the average age of death remained the same. In fact, this means that the resources that were biologically given to an adult have not increased due to the achievements of civilization. It should be noted that the entire Soviet period did not provide a person with additional opportunities to help him live longer. That is, some natural resource was realized, but nothing more. Here, of course, we leave aside the problem of infant mortality. The survival rate of children has fundamentally increased due to immunization, the use of antibiotics, etc. However, apart from successes in childhood, there were no other successes.
Now let's look at the distribution in 2008. It should be emphasized that here, too, the modal age of death for men has not changed much: it is also above 70 years. Another thing, and this is seriously alarming, is that in Russia now even more people began to die in middle age, which distinguishes the current situation from what we had, for example, back in 1959 and in the “very successful” 1987. I would not go further into history here. But I could draw the age distribution of deaths in 1897, i.e. at the end of the 19th century, and we would see almost the same picture in relation to the most typical age of death for adult men. That's how long we've been marking time!
Thus, when setting goals for the growth of life expectancy, in my opinion, we should first of all focus on the indicator of modal life expectancy. How can we jump over this secular barrier, how can we move the typical age of death to a later age? But other countries were able to do this in the last third of the 20th century.
In order to set life expectancy goals, as in developed countries, it is necessary to understand what needs to be done, what we have not been able to do (or have not done at all?) for many, many decades. The problems and tasks that need to be addressed must be formulated in the concept of long-term development in a completely different way than the official Concept of Demographic Policy proposes.
What do we need to do to consistently increase the survival of the elderly, to prevent deaths in middle age? It is necessary to think carefully about how to formulate practical tasks, what indicators to choose to assess the degree of achievement of goals set at a qualitative level. Otherwise, obtaining the desired "figure", more than conditional in itself, turns into a game, mixed with populism.
The same problem of interpretation arises with regard to the indicator "total fertility rate". There are various indicators that can be used to evaluate fertility. And when they ask me what is its level, for example, in Russia, I always find it difficult to answer this question unambiguously. Because I need to know which audience, with what level of professionalism, is asking the question, because with the help of five different indicators, I can answer this question in different ways.
It is one thing - the final birth rate of real generations, i.e. the average number of children actually born or expected to be born by the age of 50, representatives of real generations (women born in certain years). This is, so to speak, the true birth rate, which ensures the reproduction of generations with this or that regime and, ultimately, the reproduction of the entire population.
There are no significant shifts in the final birth rate of generations up or down for a long time. “Stimulating” pronatalist measures, which many politicians are now proud of, gave a surge in the intensity of childbearing in 2007, 2008, which quickly faded in 2009 and 2010, but did not bring an increase in the birth rate of real generations!
When they tell me that the birth rate in Russia has increased, I answer that I have no evidence of this yet. Generations of men and women born in the 1970s and most likely in the 1980s will not have more children than previous generations.
If anything has jumped up, it is the total fertility rate, which is published in reference books and to which the authors of the official Concept of Demographic Policy are guiding us. In the 1980s, this figure jumped up (influenced by stimulus measures of the then policy), and some interpreters then clapped their hands with joy, although there was not much change in the birth rate of real generations. Then the total fertility rate collapsed in the 1990s, and the same people shouted that we had almost a catastrophe - "the lowest birth rate in the world." Then it began to gradually rise, now here is a sharp jump of recent years, presented in a pink light by its creators. There are no final calculations for 2010 yet. But it is already obvious that the "birth rate growth" measured by this indicator has ended. As history teaches us, it is most likely to be followed by a decline in this popularly loved indicator. Behind all the differences are not so much changes in the desired and actual number of children in families, but changes in the desired and actual time of their birth, i.e. search for the best age of parenthood and intervals between births of children.
At the same time, if we take other indicators of fertility, which are not so opportunistic and less dependent on changes in the birth calendar in real generations, then over the course of two decades they will demonstrate amazing stability. For example, the indicator of the average birth order or the indicator of the final birth rate of conditional generations, which has recently become popular among specialists, adjusted in one way or another, taking into account shifts in the average age of the mother at the birth of children in each order. These indicators provide more reliable estimates of the current level of fertility, they act in concert and indicate that in Russia for two decades the final birth rate has been maintained at the level of 1.5-1.6 births per woman, which is close to the estimate of the expected final birth rate. fertility for generations of women born in the 1970s. Even taking into account the data of recent years, no revolution in the birth rate is observed. Most likely, we will not see it in the foreseeable future. I will be glad if there is no further downward slide, which has a long evolutionary retrospective.
Therefore, my thesis is this: one should be very careful in evaluating the results of the current policy, relying on generally accepted market statistics. They are easy enough to obtain based on current statistics, but their interpretation is not at all as simple as it seems. Even for experts. They are hardly worth using as target indicators of demographic policy. In international comparisons, they can still be applied with certain reservations, but when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of specific policies, I would be careful not to use them.
One more note. Probably all of you will not be surprised when you learn that in 2010 there will be no increase in life expectancy. Moreover, most likely, there will even be some reduction in it. And I expect that this reduction will be attributed to the extraordinary heat wave we experienced last summer. Indeed, the increased number of deaths can be assessed in different ways, but somewhere around 50,000 deaths were “excessive”, i.e. caused by this heat.
But I do not really agree that everything can be attributed to this heat. What kind of system is this, a social, economic, healthcare system, in which a country, due to temporary temperature anomalies, loses so many human lives that life expectancy indicators are falling? In France, too, there was a heat wave not so long ago, and the number of deaths has also increased there, although not in the same proportion as in our country. Who became its victims? Just as in Russia, the victims were mostly people in hospitals. That is, those who, due to the severity of their condition, could not be taken home or put under air conditioning, etc. And in Russia, the overwhelming number of sudden deaths were people in hospitals. And why? Hospitals are not adapted to the conditions of hot weather - neither technically nor professionally, they can not really resist such heat. After that, serious conclusions were drawn in France. There, the standards, protocols for medical and other procedures were immediately revised.
I always remember Chevengur by Andrey Platonov: there is a sun, which means there will be a harvest, there is no sun, which means there will be nothing to eat, - the expectation of happiness from God and from the sky, and, accordingly, writing off our troubles to natural forces, instead of in order, on the contrary, to look for reasons in our own mistakes and the poor performance of the social system itself, which is designed to protect our health.
Now about the forecast. Let me remind you that at meetings of various commissions and expert groups that preceded the adoption of the official concept of demographic policy, the demographic forecast was discussed: if all the proposed measures are put into effect, then by 2015 there will be such and such a birth rate, such and such a death rate, such and such a -the number of population, and after this date, population growth will begin. I do not know a single specialist who could reproduce this forecast of the Ministry of Health and Social Development. That is, with those given parameters that were indicated as targets for fertility, mortality, migration, it was not possible by the specified year to reach the population dynamics expected as a result of the implementation of demographic policy measures, and even more so - to get a turn towards growth.
At the same time, Rosstat, which has experienced specialists and the “ability” to count, did not turn out the demographic forecasts as optimistic as those of the Ministry of Health and Social Development. Conflicts began between those who are officially responsible for policy and those who, by the nature of their activities, should be engaged in monitoring its implementation, statistics and the corresponding forecast. Rosstat's latest published demographic projections (primarily optimistic) have been changed as a result of strong political pressure to be more optimistic, approaching the unrealistic target forecasts of the Ministry of Health and Social Development.
When it was literally shown on the fingers that with the given potential of natural reproduction it was impossible to approach this target forecast, the go-ahead was given from above to increase the migration gain, which immediately appeared in the forecast of Rosstat. It is not very clear what were the grounds for a sharp revision of the migration ideology. This strong-willed decision led to positive shifts in political rhetoric in favor of migrants, as politicians realized that without migrants, no stabilization is even close to expected.
I want to note that, even if the optimistic scenario for mortality and fertility is implemented, we need such a scale of migrants to compensate for the negative natural increase that I would like to ask if it is theoretically possible. And, more specifically, where will migrants (for permanent residence) come from in such numbers to compensate for the natural decline. A special report was made on replacement migration, prepared at the time by UN experts, in which hypothetical calculations for different countries were presented. These calculations show that in a number of cases replacement migration is a very important component of population dynamics, capable of making up for its natural decline. But in such situations, in which some countries of Eastern Europe found themselves, and in particular Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, it is unrealistic to speak of a completely replacement migration. Even if there were migrants in such a volume, the country would hardly be able to integrate them in such a quantity.
Institute of Demography, Higher School of Economics, Moscow
With the help of various demographic indicators, different indices are calculated that characterize the social economic development of the country
1. index of "physical quality of life" (IFKZh, PQLI), proposed by the American specialist M.D. Morris
The IFCS describes the level of well-being achieved on the basis of three indicators: the infant mortality rate; life expectancy at 1 year of age; adult literacy rate. For each of the three indicators, a measurement scale is constructed from 0 to 100, on which the worst level for the countries under consideration is Xi,thin. -- corresponds to the score "0", and some hypothetically better level (infant mortality rate, equal to 77‰; life expectancy at the age of 1 year, equal to 77 years; adult literacy rate, equal to 100%) - Xi, opt. -- corresponds to the score "100".
IFCI is the arithmetic mean of integer scale estimates of actual indicators - Xi - of the three listed indicators: FORMULA STR.520 is not widely used 2. demographic transition index Stra521-formula
For studying the dynamics of population reproduction in different countries. In addition, the use of the FDI confirmed the strong positive impact (correlation coefficients were 0.65-0.85) of the demographic transition on the overflow of labor from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector (according to the Kuznets curve, this process is decisive poverty alleviation factor in developing countries), economic modernization, and GDP per capita in the Asia-Pacific region (Ogawa, Jones and Williamson, 1993).
- 3. HDI (human development index) - a statistical indicator developed within the framework of the United Nations Development Program as a tool for assessing the effectiveness of socio-economic programs, determining the priorities of social and demographic policy. It is calculated on the basis of arithmetic average indices characterizing the lag of country indicators of life expectancy, enrollment in primary education, and per capita income from the highest achievements in these areas.
- 4. KN (quality of the population) - a set of properties of the population that characterize its reproduction in the system of social and natural relations.
The properties of the population take the form of observable and quantitatively measurable qualities, characteristics (fertility, mortality, education, qualifications) that can develop both within the framework of a stable type of population reproduction and lead to its changes.
Improving the qualities of the characteristics of the population (primarily health and education) makes it possible to increase the economy of population reproduction.
The general principle of improving KN is a proportional change in the corresponding qualitative characteristics
KH index: Index of one quality characteristic.
Sum Ri = 1.
The index shows how the real state of the set of qualitative characteristics corresponds to the optimal one. Each qualitative characteristic can be reflected through a set of indicators reflecting its aspects (for example, health with the help of mortality, disability, physical development, etc.). The maximum values from the inter-regional comparison are taken as optimal indicators.
IN In the most general sense, demographic transition or demographic modernization means the process of transition from the state characteristic of pre-industrial societies, in which population reproduction is determined by high mortality and high birth rates, to the current state, with low mortality and low birth rates. These changes in dynamics are called the first and second demographic transitions. The first is characterized by a drop in mortality, the second - by a drop in the birth rate. In the period between the first and second transitions, there is a fairly significant increase in population (the so-called population explosion). After the completion of the second transition, a new phase of stability begins, which may even be characterized by a slight decrease in the population. Almost all developed countries of Europe completed both of these stages in the 19th century.
However, in recent years, the role of one factor that was previously not taken into account has gradually become noticeable. It's about migration. In the modern world, the impact of immigration on the dynamics of the population of developed countries has become so significant that it is no longer possible to ignore it. While the local population remains stable or even slightly declining, migrants from developing countries are becoming more visible. This allowed Coleman to formulate the concept of the third demographic transition: a special phase in the development of the country's population, during which migration makes the most significant contribution to the population dynamics.
Research shows that as migrants naturalize, their birth rates drop to the national average by about the second generation. On the other hand, representatives of the second generation are usually the most alienated from public life.
In order to assess how significant the processes called the third demographic transition are, it is enough to refer to the forecasts that demographers build. Extrapolation of current trends allows us to say that by 2050 the "white" population of the United States will be in the minority. The remaining accounting groups will be dominated by "Hispanic" immigrants, who will leave behind the flag long-established "African Americans" in the United States, constantly entering "Asians" and a few descendants of the indigenous "Indian" population. The fate of native americans, Coleman said, shows what awaits a country whose inhabitants do not think about immigration policy. A similar fate (the loss of the leading positions of the “whites”) awaits Great Britain by 2100. The only difference will be the dominance of the mysterious "mixed" group among the immigrants.
The main difficulty in counting lies in the fact that it is not entirely clear who should be considered "ours" and who should be considered newcomers. Demographers from different countries solve this problem in their own way. In "continental" Europe, citizens and non-citizens are usually taken into account. Additional problems are added by self-identification.
Additional Information
If the first demographic transition was expressed in changes in the levels of fertility and mortality, and the second - in changes in sexual behavior, the organization of family life and its forms, then the third demographic transition affects the last remaining component that characterizes the population, namely its composition. Low birth rates lead to a change in migration policy, and migration, in turn, has an impact on the composition of the population. Ultimately, it can lead to a complete change in this composition and the replacement of the current population by a population that is either migrants, or their descendants, or a population of mixed origin. And if current trends continue until the end of the century, then the main factor influencing the characteristics of the population will be migration, and not the difference in the birth rate of the indigenous population and migrants.
The demographic transition is a logical change in the historical phases through which any population passes as society modernizes.
New migration flows are making an ever-increasing contribution to the formation of the population of WE, North America, Australia
Immigration leads to changes in the ethnic composition of host countries
Migrants and their descendants in conditions of low birth rates are gradually replacing the current population
Great Britain: population decline according to forecasts by 2071 can occur only with a non-zero balance of migration: the greater the influx of migrants, the higher the population will be. At zero, there will be a decrease. (up to 25 years of growth)
The total fertility rate is lower than that of the indigenous population only for people from the Caribbean. The share of the population of non-British origin is growing. (late 90s)
Sweden: with zero migration population decrease by 2050 (growth up to 25 years, then decrease).
According to the standard forecast, an increase of 1 million people (from 9 to 10 million).
Growth of those born abroad.
The Netherlands: up to the age of 20, with zero migration, the number grows, then drops by the year 50.
With non-zero migration, population growth to 40, then a slight decrease.
Results 3 DP:
Growth in the share of immigrants in the countries of the USA, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Austria.
Changes:
- Composition of the population
- · While maintaining the trend, the main factor influencing demo indicators is migration
- Implications of self-determination of migrants and persons of mixed origin
If the trends continue, then we will talk about the 3rd transition, not only changing the birth and death rates, but also the composition of the population
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