Gennady was born on March 14, 1947 in Berlin, in the family of the Soviet military pilot Nikolai Troshev. Soon after the birth of the boy, the family returned to their homeland. Gena's childhood passed in the Caucasus, in Grozny. His father died at 43, and his mother Nadezhda Mikhailovna alone pulled three children.

After school, Gennady entered the Kazan Higher Tank Command School: the cadets were fully supported by the state, and the mother had to raise two younger daughters ... Then he graduated from the Military Academy of Armored Forces and the Military Academy of the General Staff.

I had to serve in my native North Caucasian military district. Career rapidly went uphill: by 1994, Troshev became the commander of an army corps. During the First Chechen War, he commanded the 58th Army, and then led the United Group of Forces, receiving the rank of Lieutenant General. After the end of hostilities, he became deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District.

Since August 1999, during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, Troshev commanded federal troops that fought the militants on the territory of Dagestan. Then he became the head of the Vostok grouping, and in April 2000, already with the rank of colonel-general, he headed the United Federal Forces in the North Caucasus. Until December 2002, he commanded the troops of the North Caucasus Military District.

Among the 88 people killed in the plane crash in Perm was General Gennady Troshev, one of the most respected and beloved Russian commanders by his subordinates.

Shortly before his death, he finished his third and, as it turned out, the last book "Chechen Breakdown", which he presented to "Rossiyskaya Gazeta". The former commander of the grouping of troops in the North Caucasus again took up his pen in order, as he himself writes, "to warn everyone against repeating the serious mistakes made in the 90s - both political and military." Here is an excerpt from the book.

Before his death, General Troshev tried to warn everyone against repeating the mistakes made in the 90s

Diplomats in uniform

One of the main tasks was to convince the civilian population of Chechnya: the army did not come to kill and plunder, but only to destroy the bandits. What to hide, a few years ago many Chechens saw us as invaders. Therefore, in those autumn days, it was necessary to deal not only with direct duties (that is, to lead the troops), but also with "diplomacy" - to meet with heads of village administrations, elders, clergy, and ordinary residents. And this happened almost daily.

Then some leaders reproached me for excessive liberalism, called me "a kind uncle." But I am convinced that I did the right thing.

I have already mentioned that I was born and raised in these places, I know customs and traditions, the Chechen mentality well, I know how to keep myself in conversation with an old man, and how - with a young one. Chechens respect the one who behaves with dignity and does not humiliate the dignity of another, who respects the customs of the mountaineers. After all, you can talk in an ultimatum form - to threaten, intimidate, accuse. But a simple inhabitant of a stanitsa or village - a plowman or a cattle breeder - is not guilty of the war, so why enroll him as an enemy? He goes to negotiations in order to peacefully resolve the issue, and not convince me of the righteousness of the bandits.

I tried to talk to everyone adequately. If a person is older than me, I spoke to him respectfully - to you. He explained clearly what the army and the federal government wanted. At the same time, he did not bother, but spoke the truth. I asked the negotiators to then tell the villagers about our goals and attitude. If I began to dissemble, they would immediately feel the falsity of my words: after all, such meetings were usually attended by elders, wise people, who discern where the truth is and where is deceit ... They believed me. And I immediately believed in the sincerity of their aspirations for peace - already at the first negotiations in the Shelkovsky region.

Cultural sweep

What issues were discussed at such meetings? Variety. In the beginning, I listened to people. They spoke with one voice that they were tired of anarchy and lawlessness, they wanted a normal, solid government to be established. Disappointed with Maskhadov's promises, they do not believe him.

Closer to Gudermes, serious difficulties began. From the intelligence data, I knew that there were militants in the settlements who were going to resist. But here, too, we again resorted to using the method of "people's military diplomacy." We approached this or that settlement within a "cannon shot" distance (so that we could hit the enemy with fire, but he did not reach us), blocked it, and then invited the local delegation to negotiate. People, as a rule, came - the head of the administration, representatives of elders, clergy, teachers - from three to ten people.

I used to talk to them for two hours. He persuaded that the troops did not come to destroy houses and kill residents, although we know that there are bandits in the village. We are giving you time to gather the people and talk. I warn you right away: the troops will enter the village without firing. But if someone shoots in the direction of my soldiers, we will immediately return fire.

I said everything honestly. He asked to explain the situation to the residents and give an answer. It doesn't work out peacefully - tell me about it, I tried to convince the delegation, otherwise the tactics will be different ... After a few hours the negotiations were resumed. The elders gave their word that no one would shoot.

After that, units of the internal troops and militia carried out a sweep under the cover of units of the Ministry of Defense. It was then that the term "cultural cleansing" came into use. For many, this expression caused laughter, frank irritation - they say that to stand on ceremony with them - you need to act harshly. I insisted on my own. At the headquarters meetings, where representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who were directly involved in the cleansing operations, were also present, he strictly demanded that the commanders not engage in looting when inspecting yards and houses.

This tactic resonated. We were not shot in the back, and in many villages civilians (I'm talking about Chechens) sometimes treated our soldiers with bread, milk - which had never happened before, if you take the first war. Chechens often came to my command post - they invited me to visit a school, speak at a rally ... This testified that the army in the republic was greeted as a liberator and not as a conqueror.

"This is Troshev, he will not shoot"

When the troops left this or that settlement, refugees returned there, and those who had a roof over their heads - their houses were not damaged. They were often forced to leave the village by bandits who, on the eve of the arrival of the federals, were driving fear: "The Russians will come and they will cut you all. Either resist or leave the village." Of course, people were afraid. But, returning to the village, they made sure that their housing and property were safe and sound. Therefore, after a while, the topic of threats of shelling or any kind of repression was no longer raised at the talks. And the local Chechens asked about, for example, whether it was possible to return to their homes tomorrow. Sure. And they came back. Thus, peaceful life in the northern regions of the republic was restored faster.

Of course, not always and not everywhere everything went as smoothly as we would like. But it should be emphasized: the majority of Chechens were happy about our arrival in the republic.

There, near Gudermes, I met the mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, a man of a difficult fate. In the first Chechen war, he supported Dudayev and opposed the introduction of Russian troops into Chechnya. But then he decisively broke not only with the bandits, but also with Maskhadov. Kadyrov publicly condemned the actions of the Wahhabis who invaded Dagestan, openly called on the Chechen people to fight the bandits and destroy them.

The method of military diplomacy paid off in the mountains as well. There I met with Supyan Taramov. He is from Vedeno. Grew up and studied with Shamil Basayev. In the first war he did not fight against us, but he did not support the Russian troops either.

I remember there was such a case. Near Kadi-Yurt, I was negotiating, but someone really wanted to disrupt them: they provoked local residents, several hundred people (mostly women), and they moved from the village of Suvorov-Yurt in our direction.

We were in a hostile mood. As it turned out later, they were told that the troops would wipe Kadi-Yurt off the face of the earth in a few hours. And I arrived there virtually without protection: with me only a few officers in an infantry fighting vehicle. Upon learning of the provocation, I called in a couple of helicopters just in case.

They began to circle above us. Fortunately, however, no military force was needed. Seeing me, the crowd immediately calmed down. Many recognized me, stretched out their hands for a handshake ... An elderly Chechen woman came out: "People, this is Troshev! He will not shoot. Disperse! Everything will be fine."

My father, Nikolai Nikolaevich, was a career officer, a military pilot. After graduating from the Krasnodar Aviation School, he was sent to the front. He ended the war in Berlin in May 1945. A year later, in Khankala, a suburb of Grozny, he met the Terek Cossack Nadia, my mother.

In 1958, my father fell under the so-called Khrushchev reduction and was dismissed from the Armed Forces. This fate befell many captains and majors in those years - young, healthy, full of strength and energy men. The father was extremely painful about what had happened. It got to the point that somehow, with his inherent directness, he hacked me: "So that your feet are not in the army!"

I understood that there was an unhealing, painful wound in his soul. This does not go unnoticed. He passed away in the prime of life - at 43.

I always remembered my father's order and after graduating from school I entered the architectural department of the Moscow Institute of Land Management Engineers. However, after the death of his father, he had to leave school and go home, as the family was in a difficult situation. I got a job, helped my mother and sisters. But when the time came to fulfill my sacred duty to the Motherland and put on a military uniform, I submitted a report with a request to enroll me as a cadet of the Kazan Higher Command Tank School, thereby violating my father's ban. I am sure that I did the right thing then, and I have no doubt that if my father were alive, he would be happy for his son. And not at all because Troshev Jr. rose to the rank of general and became commander of the district troops. My father was very fond of the army, and, apparently, this feeling passed on to me. In fact, I continued the main work of his life, which I am proud of.

I still remember with gratitude my first commanders: platoon commander - Lieutenant Solodovnikov, company commander - Captain Korzevich, battalion commander - Lieutenant Colonel Efanov, who taught me the basics of military science.

Almost thirty years later, the knowledge gained within the walls of the school, and then in two academies, had to be applied not only in everyday life, but also in war. In war - special in all respects. In the war that the army was waging, due to objective and subjective circumstances, on its territory against bandits and international terrorists. In the war that took place in my homeland. In a war that went by special rules and did not fit, by and large, into any classical schemes and canons.

The tragic events of recent years in the North Caucasus were perceived ambiguously in our society in the mid-90s, and even now they cause controversy.

Maybe I would never have taken up my own memoirs. However, many books have already been published, which directly or indirectly tell about the events in Chechnya. Surprisingly, most of the authors are terribly far from the problems that they touch upon in their "work". They did not really see and do not know either the war, or the people (whose names nevertheless appear on the pages of books), or the mentality of local residents, or the army. In general, thanks to this lightweight approach of some authors, a whole mythology of armed conflicts in the North Caucasus has been created.

Down and Out trouble started. Based on these myths created by the writing fraternity, a new growth of tales about the Chechen war begins to grow. For example, as an axiom, Russian society has already accepted the thesis about the complete mediocrity and powerlessness of the army in the first Chechen campaign. Now, relying on this dubious thesis, another generation of "specialists on Chechnya" is building their equally dubious concepts and conclusions on a crooked foundation. What can come of this, other than an ugly design?

For me, a person who has gone through both Chechen wars, who participated in battles with the Wahhabis in Dagestan, it is difficult to put up with speculation, or even with outright lies about the events that I know for certain.

Another circumstance prompted me to take up the pen. The Chechen war made many politicians, military leaders and even bandits widely known both in our country and abroad. Most of them I knew and know personally. I met and talked with some, with others I was in a common formation - shoulder to shoulder, with others I fought for life and death. I know who is who, what lies behind the words and actions of each person involved. However, the image that the press or they have created for themselves is often not true. I admit that my assessments are too personal. But even in this case, I believe that I can publicly express my attitude towards many "famous characters of the Chechen wars." Even obliged to do this, if only for the sake of completeness of the picture.

Talking about the war in the North Caucasus was also prompted by my desire to warn everyone against repeating the serious mistakes made in the 90s, both political and military. We must learn the bitter lessons of Chechnya. And this is impossible without a sober, calm and deep analysis of all the events that have taken place in this republic over the past ten years. I hope that my memories will contribute to this.

Diaries, which I tried to keep as regularly as possible, were a good help in my work on the book. Memory is an unreliable thing, so I sometimes wrote down many episodes in detail, giving my assessments of the events. Therefore, the reader will find many diary fragments.

I cannot help but express my gratitude to those who helped in the work: Colonel V. Frolov (officer of the operational management of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District), Lieutenant Colonel S. Artemov (head of the analytical department of the editorial office of the Military Bulletin of the South of Russia), and other employees of the district newspaper. My special thanks to the military journalists Colonels G. Alekhin and S. Tyutyunnik, who actually became the co-authors of this book.

Thinking about these memoirs, I saw my future readers in those who lost relatives and friends in Chechnya, who probably want to understand why and how their sons, husbands, brothers died ...

Fate brought me in a war with different people: with politicians, and with the military leaders of the highest rank, and with the leaders of bandit formations, and with ordinary Russian soldiers. I happened to see them in different situations. Each of them showed himself in different ways: someone was firm and decisive, someone was passive and indifferent, and someone played his "card" in this war.

I preferred to talk primarily about those with whom I personally met, whom I saw in the case (for example, I do not write about Dzhokhar Dudayev). But among the characters there are many of those who fought on the other front line. Of course, I expressed my attitude towards those notable figures, whose names are on everyone's lips. As in any memoir, the author's assessments are controversial, sometimes very personal. But these are my assessments, and I think I have a right to them.

In a difficult, extreme situation, the whole essence of a person is manifested as on an x-ray, you can immediately see who is worth what. There is everything in war - cowardice, stupidity, and unworthy behavior of servicemen, and mistakes of commanders. But this cannot be compared with the courage and heroism, dedication and nobility of a Russian soldier. We owe him all the best in our military history. No matter how competently and beautifully the commander draws an arrow on the map (the direction of attack of the blow), an ordinary soldier will have to "drag it on his shoulders". Our Russian soldier needs to bow at his feet for bearing the heaviest burden of military trials and not breaking down, not losing heart.

Unfortunately, not everyone with whom I walked shoulder to shoulder along the difficult roads of the Caucasus are mentioned in this book. But I gratefully remembered and will remember my combat colleagues, comrades in arms (from soldier to general), who, in a difficult hour for the new Russia, stood up to defend its integrity. And to those who laid down their heads on the battlefield, I bow low: eternal glory to them!

Journalists were very fond of Gennady Troshev: of the "Chechen" generals of this rank, he was the most accessible and sociable. Once, during the siege of Argun, a group of Russian and Western journalists was brought to Troshev's position. It was a great fortune to get to the front line, and no other general would have allowed this. After the journalistic interest in military operations was satisfied, the general showed us his kung - a rather comfortable command vehicle.

"Here I sleep," the general showed, "and here I have dinner." The assistants imperceptibly tried to wink at the general: they say that such details are not needed, otherwise the foreigners are too curious about something. But Troshev did not notice this. He answered all questions, joked and simply, without pathos, explained why the Russian army had come to Chechnya. It turned out that the fighting general is handsome, and his subordinates are not monsters who came to kill, but tired guys who defend their homeland and dream of peace. One of my colleagues, a Spanish journalist, then said: "This general is a very smart politician."

General Troshev really had every chance to follow in the footsteps of his colleague General Shamanov, who replaced the commander's kung for the governor's chair. But it was his passion for politics that played a cruel joke on him.

Many officers who knew the general closely believe that the book "My War" was the beginning of his end. In fact, the book was written, of course, not by General Troshev, but by his subordinates from the newspaper "Military Bulletin of the South of Russia". With the invoice, operatives helped by providing entries from the combat log, which recorded everything that happened since the beginning of the second Chechen war. True, the general immediately forgot about his co-authors and did not mention them at any press conference. However, as you know, many well-known officials and politicians write books in the same way.

The book "My War" became a kind of bestseller, it was even going to be published abroad. They say that this was prevented by the chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, who zealously watched the literary successes of his subordinate. “After the book came out, he changed a lot,” one of Troshev’s former subordinates told me. “It was no longer possible to just approach him on any issue.

The increased popularity of Troshev did not suit either Envoy Kazantsev or Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, who knew well about Troshev's ambition and were not at all sure of his controllability.

One of people close to Troshev once told me such a case. Once General Kazantsev, the then commander of the North Caucasus Military District, summoned his deputy to the carpet. The commander was distinguished by an intemperate disposition, in fits of anger, in addition to the usual army mate, he allowed himself other liberties - for example, he threw objects that came to hand at his subordinates. In general, the officers went to his office as to Calvary. On that day, Troshev was unlucky, his commander was clearly out of sorts. Scolding his subordinate for some kind of offense, General Kazantsev became more and more infuriated, especially since Troshev was confident and calm. In anger, Kazantsev threw a telephone receiver at Troshev. Troshev picked up the receiver and said: "If you do this again, this tube will fly in the opposite direction." They say that General Kazantsev did not allow himself to do this anymore in the presence of Troshev. But he probably didn’t forgive his disobedience.

Perhaps, the Chechens' rather good attitude towards him played against Troshev. Suffice it to recall the bloodless capture of Gudermes. While the commander of the "West" group, General Shamanov, demolished entire villages, Troshev achieved victories in more peaceful ways. In the fall of 1999, he embarked on a risky venture - he went to Gudermes to meet with the influential Yamadayev brothers, who held key posts in Maskhadov's army. The general convinced the authoritative Chechens that it was pointless to fight, that Maskhadov would no longer rise and that the troops would still take Gudermes, only with heavy losses. And he agreed - Gudermes was taken without a fight. This was perhaps the largest victory not only in the east, but in the entire second campaign. The army has proven that it can take entire cities without violence.

"Troshev is a good man," the Chechens used to say about him. The general endeared them to him by the fact that he repeatedly declared his "Chechen" roots: they say, he was born in Grozny, and spent his childhood there, and his mother was buried in the Chechen land. "This people is close to me, this land is dear to me, and I did not come here to destroy," the general said. Only the closest officers knew that the general was not born at all in Grozny, but somewhere between Germany, where his military father served, and Kabardino-Balkaria, where his father was transferred after serving abroad. The rest - about childhood in Grozny and his mother buried there - was true.

And when the general refused the offer to head the Siberian Military District, information appeared about Troshev's plans for the presidency of Chechnya. And it immediately became clear that they were trying to send the general to Siberian "exile" specifically to cool his exorbitant political ambitions. But something else is interesting: what had to be promised to the general (or how to scare him) so that he would agree to the deliberately disastrous position of adviser on the Cossacks. Most likely, we will never find out.

There were legends about General Troshev. So, he could not sleep for days, sharing with his subordinates all the hardships of military life (the soldiers lovingly called him "baty"). He personally flew around the territory of hostilities in a helicopter, and in the battle for Argun gave commands from the air, from the window. Somehow, in the fog, the helicopter almost ran into a high-voltage line, and only the skill of the pilot Alexander Dziuba, who passed Afghanistan, saved the commander's life. Another time, a general's helicopter was shot down, and he sat down right in the cemetery. But no one was hurt.

Troshev tried, where he could, to avoid bloodshed. The Vostok grouping often managed to take settlements without a fight. For the operation in Dagestan and the courage shown during the hostilities in Chechnya, the general was awarded the title of Hero of Russia. The award was presented personally by President Boris Yeltsin.

Unlike his other colleagues, Gennady Troshev was always open to the press, wrote several books about the events in Chechnya, the most famous of which is “My War. The Chechen Diary of a Trench General ”(2001).

In December 2002, Troshev received a new appointment - to head the Siberian Military District. And this is after so many years of life and career have been devoted to the Caucasus! The general resigned. In February 2003, he took up the post of adviser to the president, oversaw the issues of the Cossacks. It was said that it was all for a reason. They say that the general was seriously guilty: his name was associated with the death of the legendary sixth company of 90 special forces, who stood in the way of a two-thousand-strong group of militants who were trying to break into the Argun Gorge area. But this is only speculation, there are no direct facts ...