G.V. Golosov Comparative political science and Russian politics, 2010-2015: collection of articles / Per. from English I.S. Grigoriev. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of the European University in St. Petersburg, 2016 .-- 668 p. ISBN 978-5-94380-211-9

A collection of scientific articles by a well-known Russian political scientist, published in English in 2010-2015, translated into Russian. The articles are devoted to both methodological problems of political science, including instruments for measuring the fragmentation and nationalization of party systems, and substantive problems of comparative political science and the study of contemporary Russian politics. The main topics of the articles are democracy and electoral authoritarianism, the formation of party systems in Russia and abroad, the mechanisms of functioning and the political consequences of electoral systems, the representation of women in legislative bodies of power, political processes in the regions of Russia. For teachers of political science, graduate students, students, as well as for anyone interested in politics and political science.

From the author. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .7
Effective number of parties: a new approach. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... nine
Classification of party systems: a methodological study. ... ... 35
To the classification of party systems in democracies, step one: establish
updating the unit of analysis. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 65
To the classification of party systems in democracies, step two: remove-
assignment of units to categories. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 97
The format and longevity of the party system: an empirical assessment. ... ... 125
Regional elections in Russia, 2003-2007: incorporation of regional
autocracies. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 148
Regional roots of electoral authoritarianism in Russia. ... ... ... ... ... 178
Party systems in autocracies: models of emergence, stable
vosti and survival. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 203
Political machines: a concept and its implications for research
post-Soviet space. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 232
Proportional representation and authoritarianism: a case of reform
we are the regional electoral legislation in Russia. ... ... 259
The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Authoritarianism: A Curious Case
tea application of the method of largest average Imperiali in Russia 279
The last refuge of political regionalism: electoral
blocs in elections to Russian regional legislative
collection, 2003-2005. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 308
In defense of mixed electoral systems with a single vote. ... ... ... ... 334
Does Electoral Authoritarianism Promote Representation
women? According to the data of elections to regional legislative
collections in Russia 1999-2011. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 361
Interdependence effect in mixed unrelated electoral
systems: an empirical test of data on women's participation in subnational elections. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 382
The role of co-optation in the process of creating systems with a dominant party: the case of Russia. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 411
Territorial genealogy of Russian parties and transplant
ness of political machines. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 436
September 2013 Russia Regional Election: Worst of Both
worlds. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 459
The influence of different methods of distribution of mandates in proportion to
national system on the fragmentation of the legislature: the case of Russia. ... ... 477
Nationalization of the Party System: Problems of Measurement in Application
nii to federal states. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 504
Factors of nationalization of the party system. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 529
Unusual dynamics of nationalization of the party system in Russia. ... 555
Party system fragmentation factors: cross-nationalism
following. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 584
The Influence of Spoiler Parties: Instrumental Manipulation of Politics
parties in the conditions of electoral authoritarianism,
tea of ​​Russia. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 614
Party systems, electoral systems and parliamentary frag-
mentation: a cross-national empirical study. ... ... ... 643
Summary. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 668

Navalny is Putin 2.0, an authoritarian politician and a potential new dictator. Navalny is the only real leader who deserves the opposition-minded part of society to unite around him. The discussion that has unfolded around the figure of Navalny in recent days has shown that fears about the views, character and tactics of the most famous opposition leader in Russia are as great as his popularity among opponents of the current government. Who is afraid of Alexei Navalny and why and how substantiated are these worries? Who is Navalny - Russian Trump, Russian Macron, or perhaps the rejuvenated reincarnation of Yeltsin?

Freeing himself from arrest, where he spent a month after the massive protests on Russia Day on June 12, Navalny took several controversial steps. Initially, a situation arose with the activist Alexander Turovsky, who was beaten by special forces in one of Navalny's election headquarters. Turovsky stated that "I never saw any help from Navalny. I did not hear a single word of support or participation in the fate of the person who participated in his campaign literally at the risk of his life."... The situation turned out to be so egregious that accusations of arrogance, lack of empathy and unwillingness to defend his own supporters were made against Navalny. Even more questions were raised by Navalny's statement that if Putin agrees to a "peaceful transit of power", the current president and his family should be provided with security guarantees:

Finally, Navalny's decision to hold a debate with one of the former separatist leaders operating in eastern Ukraine, Novorossiya leader Igor Strelkov (Girkin), made a big splash. The debate is scheduled for July 20.

All this became the reason for the dispute between analysts, journalists and political activists about Navalny. The extreme positions "for" and "against" in these discussions look something like this.

Russia is poor in opposition, and there is no doubt that Alexei Navalny is currently the most gifted opposition politician. He did not commit any significant mistakes, and most importantly, he is constantly acting. After all, this is the main requirement for a politician: to be constantly afloat, to find some new moves. The authorities are fighting him hard enough. Despite this, Navalny has always managed to find some kind of answer that allows him to expand his target audience. Leader? Yes, of course, the leader. But you need to understand that politics in the world is becoming more personalized. Russia is no exception here - it is an objective trend. The very word "leader" in Russian has negative connotations, simply because we have unpleasant memories of Stalin, who was called a great leader. But politics, I repeat, has always been personalized. To reproach a politician for wanting to be a leader means reproaching him for wanting to be a politician. I understand that some of the commentators who scold Navalny for notorious leaderism simply do not want the Russian opposition to have a leader, that is, to have opposition in Russia. Other people develop a strange aberration of consciousness based on negative historical experience. But if we want Russia to be a democracy, we must come to terms with the fact that Russia will have political organizations with leaders.

Leader? Yes, of course, the leader. But politics in the world is becoming more personalized

​- You are talking about a negative historical experience, but here you can recall a not so old experience, not Soviet, but, say, the turn of the 1980s-90s. To many, Navalny resembles Yeltsin at the beginning of the perestroika career that brought him to the presidency. Then, too, there was a lot of talk about Yeltsin as a battering ram against the communists, which should fulfill this historical function, and then, they say, we'll figure it out. The consequences were, as we know, very ambiguous, like the entire period of Yeltsin's rule. Maybe the current worries are just caused by the fact that people are afraid of repetition: an opposition leader who comes to power, but then does not build a system in which there would be democratic checks and balances?

There was a very definite rationale in conversations about Yeltsin, namely: Yeltsin, in general, was not a democrat. He was by birth a nomenklatura worker, at some point he parted ways with the Communist Party, but, as many rightly suspected, this did not make him a democrat. He became and remained to the end of his career a completely consistent anti-communist, but he also had pronounced authoritarian tendencies. I do not observe any serious authoritarian tendencies in Navalny. His claims to lead a political movement are natural in any democratic order. If there is politics, then there must be people who claim to play prominent roles in it. Navalny is not burdened with the kind of life and political experience that Yeltsin had. I understand that, as they say, a frightened crow is afraid of a bush, but you need to realize that these are completely different situations - then with Yeltsin and the one that now exists with Navalny.

- You also mentioned the international context, the trend towards personification of politics. We see people like Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron emerging - very different, but nevertheless they have something in common. They are somewhat omnivorous in terms of ideology, if we talk about traditional ideologies, left or right. Is there a danger here that the program of some real social change will be replaced by a personality: believe me, and I will do everything? After all, this has happened more than once in history.

It is necessary to distinguish between personalization and de-ideologization of politics. These are different things. Personalization is an objective trend that simply brings politics back to its natural state. Politics has almost always been deeply personalized. The only exception is a rather short post-war period, somewhere until the 1960s, when mass political parties reached their peak and flourish. They served as intermediaries in the relationship between the masses and politicians. In these conditions, the politician did not need to be bright. This does not mean that there were no outstanding politicians at that time; it is enough to recall de Gaulle, for example. But nevertheless, the voter could identify himself directly with the party, he did not have to follow a specific politician. However, the era of mass parties has passed irrevocably. They were killed by the welfare states in the West, and in particular by the mass media, which led to the death of the party press. The parties simply did not have the amount of work they did with voters in the middle of the last century. Now the parties are also important, but they perform mainly organizational functions during election campaigns, they have become such machines for collecting votes, they solve technical problems. And the person who attracts votes, appears in the media and becomes visible to the voter is a politician, a person. You can't do anything with this, we will live in a world in which this trend will only grow, including in connection with the development of social networks. It is much easier for a politician to be noticed now than before. Moreover, if you are invisible, you cannot become a politician.

It’s much easier for a politician to be noticed than it used to be.

Does this kill ideology? Sometimes yes, sometimes no, it depends on the specific situation in the country. You said that there is a big difference between Trump and Macron, I would like to highlight this difference. The phenomena of Trump and Macron, in my opinion, are completely different orders. Trump is a conservative politician, he has a very consistent, in my opinion, ideological agenda that combines social conservatism and nationalism. To tell the truth, I see no significant departure from this agenda in Trump's rhetoric. I have no sympathy for this ideology, but I must admit that Trump's success is largely due to the fact that he was able to successfully combine two things at the level of rhetoric: these are conservative ideas that the Tea Party in the United States has long professed, but she could not provide them with sufficient citizen support, and the kind of nationalism that has proven appealing to the masses in the United States.

As for Macron, the situation is different there. French politics has always been ideologically polarized and remains so. The French think of themselves in ideological coordinates. But at the same time, both the socialists and the right-wing Republicans party at the beginning of the current presidential campaign discredited themselves to such an extent that they left the drift as a choice either to the extreme left, like Melanchon, or to the extreme right, like Marin. Le Pen. But at the same time, a significant mass of voters remained who were not ready for such a drift.

- That is, Macron picked up the ownerless?

Yes, I picked up the ownerless, and it was, I repeat, situational. When Macron begins to pursue real politics, she will turn out to be either the right, which is most likely, or the left. The coordinate system, traditional for French politics, will be restored. Here we are dealing with a fluctuation, an oscillation of the system. However, in the case of Trump, on the contrary, this is a completely natural course of events, a usual pendulum of movement of the electorate from the left to the right.

- You say that in some cases the personification of politics kills ideology, in others it does not. But isn't it killing at the same time democracy and its institutions? The temptation is too great to turn this personification into something more - into Caesarism, Bonapartism, dictatorship, you can call it differently.

Elections can be organized anywhere, but the very structure of democracy is designed in such a way as to prevent the transition to a dictatorship. Does this mechanism work perfectly? No, it always comes with risks. We know of cases of the establishment of authoritarian regimes as a result of the coming to power of democratically elected leaders. But generally, the system works, especially in older democracies like the United States. We see what is happening with Trump now. He even implements those moments of his election program that actually fit into the framework of traditional American politics with colossal difficulty. He faces constant resistance, even though his party now has a majority in both houses of the US Congress. Is it right that part of the American public is concerned that the risk of authoritarianism could materialize? Of course it is correct. Because public opinion plays an important role in democracy. Should we take these risks in a very dramatic way? I guess not.

- The United States, as you said yourself, is a fairly old, well-established democracy. The same cannot be said about Russia; everything is not very good with democratic institutions. Therefore, perhaps, the risk of another authoritarianism is higher?

I consider it high, naturally. But in order to come to the conclusion that this risk is high, you do not need to be a political scientist. It is enough just to be guided by common sense and understand that the good will not come out of the bad right away. Any way out of a bad situation is fraught with the possibility that in reality it will only get worse. The political struggle is needed precisely in order to neutralize risks. Of course, it would be bad if at the moment of Russia's exit from the authoritarian order, whenever that happened, only Navalny remained in the political arena. There is nothing particularly terrible in this, because in the conditions of democratization, a natural counterbalance to it would arise immediately. Already now we see a lot of people who criticize Navalny partly because they are going, if he wins, to immediately form an opposition to him within the framework of the democratic order. In this regard, I am more worried about the fact that the current government is constantly cleaning up the political field with repressive measures, corrupting possible other politicians, and thus really contributes to the fact that Navalny may remain the only real politician at the time of the change of power. This is bad. I don't see Navalny himself cleaning this field, he can't do it, and I suppose it's useless. This risk comes from the current government.

The government constantly cleans the political field with repressive measures

​- You recently published a series of articles on models of transition from authoritarianism to democracy in different countries, from Spain to Brazil. Have you managed to identify any indispensable conditions that allow you to assert with a high degree of confidence that yes, in this case, you will get democracy, a simple change of scenery will not end? Or is each case absolutely individual, and in each case it all depends on how the card goes?

There are, of course, general laws of democratization. The main one is that, in general, for a regime change, not necessarily in the direction of democracy, it is necessary that within the ruling class, and a rather narrow class - on the scale of Russia, say, several thousand people who make key decisions - there should be serious dissatisfaction with what policy is being pursued by the top of the ruling group. In literature, this is sometimes called the split of the elites. This is the key condition. We know of no examples of democratization where there would be no such split. The second condition is that at the moment when such disagreements arise, there should be opposition politicians in the country who do not belong to this narrow ruling class. Because within the ruling group, authoritarianism can only be replaced by another authoritarianism. It is necessary that some factions within this group begin to interact with the opposition, which is not involved in the current government. How to interact? In the traditional political science literature, there was such an idyllic notion that there must necessarily be some kind of formal pact, a peace agreement on the transfer of power. This is not necessarily the case. But in essence, the process always boils down to the fact that a coalition is being formed from some parts of the ruling group and parts of the opposition.

And the third condition so that the change of the regime does not lead to the formation of a new authoritarianism is that the population, firstly, has some dissatisfaction with the existing authoritarian order, and secondly, at least a little level of understanding that the alternative to this order is precisely democracy. It is important that people internalize the idea that any government that does not change sooner or later becomes bad, even if it starts out good. This is the essence of the democratic conviction that the government should be replaceable. If this idea is communicated to the broad masses in one way or another, then the process of democratization is facilitated. However, the first condition, I must repeat once again, is the key one, and it is precisely this condition that I do not see in Russia now, to tell the truth. The second condition is also very bad. On the surface of the Russian opposition spectrum, no one except Navalny is now observed, all the rest are more or less incorporated into the existing system, interact with it much more widely and comprehensively than Navalny does.

- Is Navalny still interacting?

I would like to say more about this. One of the rather common thoughts in the stream that is now pouring out on Navalny is that he is an agent of the Kremlin. It is difficult to argue this idea, since we all see that the Kremlin is treating Navalny rather harshly. The only thing that he still has not done is not put him in prison for a long time, although this option is also not ruled out, Navalny constantly walks under such a threat. But if I found out that some kind of minimal coordination between the Kremlin, some groups within the narrow ruling class, and Navalny exists, then, firstly, it would not surprise me, and secondly, it would not belittle me. my eyes Navalny. Moreover, I believe that if political success awaits Navalny, and this is possible, then such coordination should be established. Russian politics is not of a public nature; a significant part of the political processes takes place latently.

The art of politics is the art of using people in general, but a real politician knows how to use not only his friends, but also enemies.

​- Well, suppose one day the facts emerge that yes, there is such, as you call it, coordination. At the same time, for years Navalny has been building himself the image of an uncompromising fighter against the regime. News of "coordination" on such an image will deal an irreparable blow. Is not it so?

No. Because politics is interaction, it is needed so that people, to put it bluntly, do not kill each other. When politics enters the real phase of the power struggle, enemies very often interact with each other. Moreover, they use each other. The art of politics is the art of using people in general, but a real politician knows how to use not only his friends, but also enemies. Moreover, we must extend this maxim to both the ruling politicians and the opposition. If you know how to use your enemy, then you are a real politician. I would like to believe that Navalny can do that too. But you need to understand that when you use someone, you allow yourself to be used - this is inevitable. The art of compromise in this case is not to allow yourself to be used to the detriment of your business - it is really difficult, but real politicians can do it.

- In this context, the recent loud statement by Navalny that if something happens he is ready to provide Putin with security guarantees, and at the same time he will have a much tougher attitude towards Medvedev, do you consider the right political move?

The fact that Putin will need to provide security guarantees suggests the overwhelming majority of possible scenarios for democratization in Russia. From this point of view, what Navalny said is just an obvious thing. As for the gradation of guarantees of what to give to Putin, what to give to Medvedev, we must proceed from the fact that the real leader of the regime is Putin, and Medvedev, both from the point of view of Putin himself and from the point of view of Navalny, is such a consumable. Navalny concentrates his blow on the topic of corruption, from this point of view, he cannot be particularly soft towards Medvedev. But the most important thing is that Putin, with all the personal obligations he has to Medvedev, will not have much incentive to defend him if something happens.

Perhaps Putin will be able to put an end to Navalny's political activities if, after the presidential elections, he deems it appropriate

​- The process, which is officially called the Russian presidential election, will take place soon. Putin is likely to end up in the Kremlin for another term. Could the main political content of this period be the emergence of conditions for potential democratization, which, as you say, have not yet matured in Russia? Or is it running a longer distance, here five or six years won't do?

Hard to say. The Putin regime has developed as a regime of personal power. Such regimes to a large extent develop depending on the moods, states, thoughts of the people who lead them. There is no institutional logic that we could use as the basis for forecasting the further development of the regime. It is now more or less clear to me that this regime has not yet passed the peak of its development. But what his policy will be when this peak is reached, and what the logic of his disintegration will be, largely depends on the personal circumstances of Vladimir Putin, literally on his health. If this health is good, then I believe that he will be able to make enough efforts to slow down the development of a real opposition in Russia. It is possible that he will eventually be able to put an end to Navalny's political activities if, after the presidential elections, he deems it possible and expedient. Then the Russian opposition will largely have to start all over again. But predicting such outcomes is extremely difficult. After all, we cannot guess the individual preferences of Putin, but only the general logic of his behavior related to the preservation of power. What conclusions he personally will come to about the optimal strategy for maintaining power is a completely separate question, which is difficult to answer.

Yaroslav Shimov

Deputy Director of the RS Russian Service since July 2017.

G. V. GOLOSOV COMPARATIVE POLITICS Textbook. - 3rd ed., Rev. and add. - e Europ. University in St. Petersburg, 2001. - 368 p. (Proceedings of the Faculty of Politics, Sciences and Sociology; issue 2). 18ВМ 5-94380-010-7 Scientific editor - Y.D. Shevchenko “With the support of the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation). Russia ”The textbook covers the origins and nature of comparative politics, theoretical tools of political research, and their main areas of application: political culture and participation, interest groups, political parties, elections, the executive branch, parliaments and non-elected governments. The educational material is richly illustrated with examples from the political life of various countries and statistical What LIFE I © G. Golosov, 2001 © Letniy Sad Publishing House, 18ВМ 5-94380-010-7 cover, 2001 CONTENTS FOREWORD 5 Chapter I THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SCIENCE 9 The origin of modern political analysis 10 Behaviorism 14 The emergence of comparative political science 17 Development and modern state of comparative political science 23 Chapter II THEORETICAL MEANS OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 35 Basic concepts of political analysis 35 Cross-national comparison 40 Nation state 52 Chapter III POLITICAL REGIMES 63 The problem of classification of political regimes 63 Authoritarian regimes 68 Models of democracy 92 Chapter IV POLITICAL CULTURE AND PARTICIPATION ... 100 Political culture and political participation ... 100 culture 104 Political subcultures …………………………………………… ... 110 Political culture of the elite 113 Ideology 117 Political participation 123 Chapter V INTERESTED GROUPS 131 Classification of interest groups 132 Channels and sources of influence 137 N eocorporatism 144 Chapter VI POLITICAL PARTIES 150 Functions and classification of parties 151 Classification of party systems 162 Origin and development of party systems 171 Chapter VII ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 186 Electoral systems of the majority 189 Proportional and mixed electoral systems 200 Electoral engineering and manipulation of the electoral system 211 Chapter VIII Expressive Voter Behavior 223 Theories of Rational Voter Behavior 235 Electoral Politics and Institutional Influences on Voter Behavior 243 Chapter IX EXECUTIVE POWER 254 Functions and types of executive power 254 Presidential systems 264 Parliamentary system 281 Chapter X PARLIAMENTS 287 Classification of parliaments and their functions 289 Organizational structure of parliaments 301 Political structure of parliaments 306 Chapter XI NON-ELECTED AUTHORITIES 314 Bureaucracy 314 Army 326 Judiciary 331 Media and politics 334 AFTERWORD 339 REFERENCES 342 INDEX OF SCHEMES AND TABLES 352 INDEX OF NAMES 354 INDEX OF COUNTRIES AND REFERENCES 359 FOREWORD Five years have passed since the manuscript of the second edition of this textbook was submitted to Novosibirsk University Press. Do you need a third? A characteristic phenomenon after the last few years is an abundant, never-ending stream of educational literature on political science. One gets the impression that Russian politologists are only doing what they write textbooks: after all, there is quite a bit of research literature on the problems of contemporary Russian politics (at least in monographic form), and the one that exists is usually not written and published. in Russian. The very word “political scientist” in Russia is much more often attributed to professional organizers of election campaigns, political consultants and journalists than to representatives of the corresponding academic discipline, which is rather widely represented in universities. There is no one to study politics. Scientists are busy with textbooks. This state of affairs, of course, is not accidental. Textbooks are not only the final stage in the formation of any scientific discipline, but to a certain extent they are also the initial stage. Most of the literature on political sciences published in Western Europe and the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was also intended for teachers and students - after all, the scientific community did not yet exist, and research works in political science simply did not have an addressee. ... It was the textbooks that constituted the community in the sense that the main "message" of each of them was: political science is what is written here; the other political science is wrong. A rather high level of conceptual and methodological innovation is also characteristic of educational literature circulating today in Russia. Perhaps some of these textbooks will indeed form the basis of scientific circles or even, who knows, entire research areas of local significance. In the textbook offered to the reader's attention, starting from its first version (1994), I did not pursue broad goals like the creation of a new science or a radical reform of the existing one. On the contrary, I proceeded from the recognition that political science already exists, if not in Russia, but in the world around it. Good or bad, this science in its current form has been developing for several decades, and the main task of the textbook is simply to inform the interested reader about its development and current state. This goal is neither ambitious nor original, and it cannot be said that it is alien to some of the already published textbooks. However, at best, these textbooks inform the reader about the state of science ten years ago. The previous editions of this work are also outdated - after all, political science does not stand still. Hence - the desire to make changes and additions to the textbook reflecting the development of science, but at the same time preserve the systematic nature of the presentation of the material. Let me dwell in more detail on the main differences between this edition and the book that was published five years ago. The main part of the changes is due to the need to bring the content of the textbook more in line with the current state of research practice. The material characterizing the leading paradigms at the present stage of the development of comparative political science - the theory of rational choice and neoinstitutionalism - has been expanded somewhat. When describing political regimes, much more than before, attention is paid to the problems of democratization. Added chapters on political culture and interest groups. Separate chapters on electoral systems and electoral behavior have been singled out from the chapter “Political Parties and Elections”. It is precisely these important and rapidly developing research directions in the previous edition of the textbook that an unforgivably little space was devoted to. The chapters on the executive branch, parliaments, and unelected governments have changed less significantly, but there are also changes there. The statistical material has been expanded and updated to illustrate certain provisions of the textbook. As in the previous edition, I considered it possible to refrain from citing bibliographic references in the text. The bibliography at the end of the book serves a different purpose. The fact is that during the work on the textbook, a large number of research works were used. References to each of them in non-foreword 1 would rarely make the text of a textbook unreadable. But it would be incorrect and, perhaps, unethical to completely do without a reference and bibliographic apparatus. The bibliography lists those books and articles that are mentioned - and sometimes even cited - in the textbook. It is clear that such a list cannot claim to be an exhaustive bibliography on comparative political science. Some of the works included in it are only indirectly related to this discipline. Conversely, it did not include many works in Russian, which I would strongly recommend to use in the educational process. But in the end, working with literature is a task that I cannot do for each individual teacher or student. In addition, the list contains corrections of some inaccuracies that crept into the previous edition of the textbook. Basically, however, the concept of the textbook has remained unchanged. It is intended for people studying comparative political science, both for teachers and for undergraduate and graduate students, as well as for all those who, for civic reasons or because of their occupation, feel the need to join modern political knowledge. As a textbook, the book breaks with the bad tradition of Soviet social science, which demanded from such publications exhaustive and final answers to all questions. On the contrary, the main focus in the presentation of theoretical material is given to competing concepts and discussions in which the scientific community develops. For readers hungry for absolute truths, this tutorial is unlikely to help. Paying due attention to the theory, I attached special importance to “squeezing” as much empirical data, illustrations, and examples from the life of individual states into the text of the textbook as possible. It is my hope that the book can be used as a reference on a wide range of policy issues. This publication became possible within the framework of cooperation between the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology of the European University in St. Petersburg and the Department of Sociology, Politology and Management of the Sociological Faculty of Samara State University, carried out under the program of support for the departments of the Megaproject “Development of Education in Russia” of the Institute “ Open Society ". I express my deep, sincere gratitude to the Institute. It is important to note that the role of the department support program was not only and not so much in financing the publication (although there is no need to say that it most likely would not have happened without this), but in the opportunity given to me to correlate the content of the textbook with the requests of modern teaching practice at the university. An important role in the work on the textbook was played by my communication with my Samara project colleagues, as well as with professors, graduate students, and graduates of the European University in St. Petersburg. I would like to express special gratitude to V.Ya. Gelman and Yu.D. Shevchenko, whose advice and comments contributed a lot to the content of my work, as well as M.Yu. Kondratyeva, who kindly took on a significant part of the organizational burdens associated with the reprint of the book. Chapter I THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SCIENCE Comparative political science was formed as a separate part of a complex, substantively and methodologically diversified discipline, which is commonly called political science, or political science. Therefore, the first challenge facing any systematic description of comparative political science is to clarify its role in the broader body of political knowledge. And this task is not at all as simple as it might seem at first glance. The fact is that the generally accepted position on this issue in the scientific community has not developed. Some researchers believe that comparative political science is primarily a sub discipline, the specificity of which is expressed in its method. At the same time, there is a position (defended, for example, by the famous scientist Gabriel Almond in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences), according to which comparative political science is an intrascientific movement brought to life largely by the social context of the functioning of political knowledge. As a textbook author, I certainly cannot claim to resolve the ongoing controversy in the research literature. All that I consider myself entitled to do is to provide the reader with material sufficient to form his own opinion. This chapter will focus primarily on the "movement for comparative political science." Its background, the main circumstances of its origin and development will be considered. Along the way, the object of analysis will be some of the theoretical approaches that have had a particularly strong impact on comparative political science - behaviorism, structural functionalism, rational choice theory, and neoinstitutionalism. The specificity of the comparative method in political science will be disclosed in the next chapter. 10 The origins and development of comparative political science The origins of modern political analysis Modern political science (podilica! Zepse) is a phenomenon of relatively recent origin. At first glance, this statement contradicts the fact that politics - one of the most striking and fascinating aspects of human activity - attracted the attention of thinkers already at the dawn of civilization, and Aristotle, Niccolo Macia velli, John Locke and other philosophers of the past. However, as David Easton points out, "for centuries, from classical antiquity to the late nineteenth century, the study of political life remained not a discipline in the strict sense of the word, but a collection of interests." Initially, the political problem of teak gave food for thought to philosophers, then jurists joined them, and in the 19th century, with the emergence of sociology, politics immediately fell into the field of view of this science. The separation of political science as an academic discipline took place at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in the United States, where departments of political science were organized at several universities - mainly by the efforts of philosophers, legal scholars and sociologists. In Western European countries, such a development was observed much later, after the Second World War, and it proceeded under the noticeable influence of American models. The only exception is Great Britain, where an original and mature tradition of political research has long existed. But British political science is increasingly feeling the impact of American standards. The last ten years have been marked by the rapid development of political science and its wide distribution throughout the world. She also came to the countries of the former USSR. However, to this day, most of the individual members of the International Political Science Association live in the United States. Calculations carried out by the Canadian political scientist J. Lapons testify to the share of representatives of this country in research practice (Tables 1, 2). Why was political science and, according to Heinz Elo's definition, still "a predominantly American phenomenon"? The answer to this question stems from some of the characteristics of American society, which arose as a collection of immigrants, deprived of common historical roots and forced to identify themselves. The origin of modern political analysis II ,% (in brackets) 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 USA (37.5) USA (38.5) USA (29.0) USA (26.8) USA (30.0) Canada (6.9) Canada (8.6) Canada (6.8) Brazil (9.3) Germany (7.6 ) France (6.9) England (8.1) USSR (5.2) France (6.6) England (6.8) England (6.4) France (4.3) FRG (4.8) FRG (6.6) India (6.4) FRG (5.4) FRG (3.8) India (4.4) Canada (4.2) Canada (5.7) Switzerland (2.9) Czechoslovakia (2.6) Finland (3.9) India (4.2) France (4.6) Norway (2.4) Poland (2.6) Yugoslavia (3.7) USSR (4.2) Holland (3.3 ) Polypa (2.4) Switzerland (2.6) Korea (EOzhn) (3.3) England (3.8) Italy (2.5) Israel (1.9) India (1.9) France (2.2) SFRY (3.1) Finland (2.2) Japan (1.9) Japan (1.9) Israel (2.3) SFRY (1.8) Table 2 Share of publishers and editors of major political science journals (data for 1979 ) by country,% Country Publishers Editors USA 46.1 46.1 England 12.8 12.8 Canada 5. 1 7.6 Finland 5.1 2.5 France 5.1 7.6 Germany 5.1 5.1 with the state. It is often said that the United States is “multicultural,” that is, it includes numerous and alien cultural orientations, “a society that shares some common political values.” One of the mechanisms for the reproduction of these values ​​is political science. Already in elementary school, the American is confronted 12 The origin and development of comparative political science with some of its elements, attending the so-called lessons of citizenship (Civic dazzles). In high school, he studies the US Constitution, and once at the university, he has the opportunity to attend a wide range of political science courses (in some state educational institutions, such courses are mandatory). Many millions of students graduate each year with a BA in Political Science. So the number of professional political scientists in the US shouldn't be surprising. These are mainly university teachers. All of the above, of course, does not explain the reasons for the spread of political science outside its historical homeland. On the contrary, we have the right to ask: if the task of this science is to reproduce a certain, nationally-specific system of values, then can it take root, say, in Russia? Maybe, because this is not her only task. From the past of our country, we are well acquainted with "political science", which was almost exclusively concerned with justifying the existing order as a whole and individual power decisions - the "theory of scientific communism." There could be no other political science in the USSR. Being closed, the Soviet political system did not need research tools that would reveal the true motives and mechanisms of power. The American state, with all its inevitable national characteristics, is democratic. In a democracy, justifying the existing regime in the eyes of the population is an important but far from the only concern of those in power. Forced to compete with each other, they are interested in objective cognitive means that would allow them to foresee the consequences of their own actions, to seek reelection through effective politics and rational organization of election campaigns. In the United States, political scientists are ubiquitous in the service of political practice and governance. Many of them are consultants to federal government bodies, state administrations, political parties, and private firms. Research is widely funded by the government and private foundations. In addition, a higher political education is considered highly desirable for a person who risked making power his profession. Thus, it is precisely democracy that creates the preconditions for the emergence of a scientific knowledge based on facts and aimed at fixing patterns - knowledge about politics. From this point of view, the American origin of modern political science is an accidental circumstance, and the history of the discipline itself can be viewed from the angle of gradually overcoming its nationally determined specificity. Looking ahead, we can say that the movement for comparative political science played a special role in this process. However, for the first two decades of its existence, political science remained almost exclusively an American discipline. Philosophers who joined it (such as Harold Laski, who published his "Grammar of Politics" in 1925) provided their colleagues, former lawyers, with a convincing justification of two main theses: first, that democracy is the best and most a progressive form of government, to which all peoples will inevitably come; second, America (or perhaps Great Britain) is the most complete embodiment of democratic principles. Hence, it was possible to view all other states - insofar as they did not follow the Anglo-Saxon model - as deviations, which essentially made it possible to ignore their experience in research practice. The main theme of political science at the time was the distinction between British (parliamentary and unitary) and American (presidential and federal) forms of democratic government. This uncomplicated research framework made it possible to accumulate large volumes of material, which was mainly of a historical and constitutional-legal nature, and to draw simple conclusions about the laws of political life. The style of science was more descriptive than analytical, and its focus was on political institutions - the executive branch, parliaments, the judiciary, and, less often, political parties. Classic examples of this approach, which went down in history as institutional, were Hermann Feiner's monumental Theory and Practice of Modern Government (1932) and Karl Friedrich's Constitutional Government and Politics (1937). The main drawback of the institutional approach was already obvious to his contemporaries: it did not allow describing and explaining one of the main factors of the democratic process - the political behavior of the masses. What happened in the 30s was aimed at overcoming this shortcoming. a scientific revolution that has largely changed the face of political research. As a result, a fundamentally new - behavioristic - approach to the study of political phenomena was developed. Behaviorism We have seen that modern political science arose at the junction of two long-standing humanitarian disciplines - philosophy and law. Meanwhile, back in the 19th century. Attempts were made to create social sciences that would study the laws of social development in approximately the same way as natural science comprehends the laws of nature. One of these attempts is associated with a phenomenon known as behaviorism. This word, which is difficult to pronounce in Russian, is a derivative of the English "behayyuyr" (behavior). Proceeding from the principle that science should study only the directly observable, the first behaviorists - psychologists - proclaimed the transition from the study of consciousness to the analysis of human behavior. Behavioral sociologists, in turn, laid the foundation for the study of concrete behavior in both formal (legally formed) and informal groups. Political scientists were next in line. The initiators and followers of this movement, who belonged mainly to the Chicago school of American political science (Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, Leonard White, etc.), insisted on the priority of studying political behavior in institutions, groups and in the political process in the whole. They focused their main attention on the analysis not so much of the state as of power and the process of its implementation. Behaviorism in political science is a methodological orientation, the purpose of which is to analyze political phenomena by observing the behavior of individuals and groups consisting of them. The two concepts - behavior and observation - used in this definition, themselves need definitions. By political behavior it is customary to understand any behavior of an individual - verbal (verbal) or non-verbal, which characterizes him as a member of a certain political community. In other words, the study of political behavior is a study of the political life of society through the prism of individual behavior. As for observation, it should be understood as obtaining information in various ways - direct (when, for example, a political scientist examines a gathered crowd) and indirect (when he uses documentary evidence of the behavior of individuals - data on election results, on the number of those who abstained from voting. etc. etc.). Distinguish between observations of a natural and artificial nature. The first takes place when we observe political behavior in conditions existing independently of us, for example, when we analyze the results of elections. The second is when the researcher himself evokes the behavior of interest to him, most often by means of a questionnaire study, less often by a laboratory experiment. It is necessary to dwell especially on two main advantages that the application of behaviorist methods has given to political science. First, it is taking into account the psychological aspect of politics, which was previously not taken into account at all. C. Merriam suggested that the basis of political reality is the individual human will and passions, in particular the thirst for power and the use of force. From the very beginning, behaviorism sought to find and use research methods that allow not only to assess external behavior and its results, but also to determine the psychological background of this behavior, in other words, such methods that would make it possible to see political relations through the prism of the experiences of those involved in them people. Second, behaviorism has always been characterized by an orientation toward quantitative research methods. Such requirements as reliance on data obtained in the course of sample surveys, content analysis, etc., their strict systematization and mathematical processing were recognized as fundamental for any policy research. Behavioral political science classics - Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How by Harold Lasswell (1936), The Vote by Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee (1954), People's Choice by Paul Lazarsfeld, Gabriel's Civic Culture Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) - built on the generalization of huge amounts of data. 16 The Origin and Development of Comparative Political Science In his early essay "The Current State of the Study of Politics" (1925), Charles Merriam pointed out an acute lack of scientific knowledge as the main drawback of political science. If we consider the properties inherent in natural scientific research to be scientific, then it must be admitted that this deficiency has survived to this day. But nevertheless, to some extent it has been overcome, and this is to a decisive degree the merit of the behaviorists. Behaviorism has significantly expanded the understanding of how ordinary people see politics and how they behave when they become participants in the political process. However, the actual methodological achievements are much more important. It was within the framework of behaviorism that the main methods of applied political research were developed: 1) statistical studies of political activity, in particular, research related to elections; 2) questionnaires and surveys; 3) laboratory experiments; 4) application of game theory to the study of political decision making. Thus, it can be said that behaviorist political science was the first type of empirical - that is, data-oriented - political research. Empirical science is concerned with, firstly, describing reality, and secondly, explaining it. The opposite of the empirical approach is the normative one, which asks primarily the question of what policy should be, rather than what it is. In particular, many constructions of adherents of traditional institutionalism were normative in nature. And yet the "behaviorist revolution" by itself was unable to cope with the new challenges that faced political science after the Second World War. First, due to its nature, behaviorism paid increased attention to quantifiable aspects of politics (elections, public opinion, etc.), while everything else disappeared from the field of view of researchers. Secondly, a rigid focus on solving specific problems did not allow developing a theoretical vision of politics as a whole, and, therefore, methods for studying the processes taking place on a national and international scale. Thirdly, and this is perhaps the most important thing, behaviorism did not create methodological prerequisites in order to overcome the provincial isolation of American political science, its narrow focus on solving problems associated with the political process in the USA. Meanwhile, the need for this was brewing. The emergence of comparative political science In the 30s. basically, the structure of political science that exists to this day was determined. Its core was a subdiscipline that accumulated knowledge about domestic politics in a single country - in this case, of course, in the United States. It is customary to call it national policy - not because it deals with interethnic relations (the concept of "ethnic politics" is used to convey this semantic connotation), but precisely because the focus here is on the processes that are closed within the framework of the national states and flowing at the national level. One can speak, for example, about "American politics", "British politics", etc. politics". The normative theorizing about politics — political theory — has retained its relative isolation and status as a subdiscipline. Gradually, specific research methods have emerged that define the face of modern analysis of international relations. As separate subdisciplines, "public administration" was constituted (Puhl Acicus) and the theory and practice of local government (Stihle ancl loca! to find its place as the seventh (and far from the last in time) - comparative political science The emergence of comparative political science is associated with a number of circumstances that once again remind us that science - and especially political science - is not developing in isolation from the problems of the "big world" First of all, during the 1930s and 1940s, the role of the United States in the world community changed qualitatively. 18 The origin and development of comparative political science, the public, unexpectedly for many of its citizens, turned out to be “the leader free world ”, one of the two superpowers. And this made us pay much more attention than before to what was happening overseas. Thus, the first stimulus for the emergence of comparative political science was the need to expand, so to speak, the geographical horizons of political science. But this was not the end of it. We have seen that the political scientists of the 1920s. could afford a somewhat naive view of the dictatorships that existed in the world as something temporary, accidental, and not blanding scientific interest. However, by the beginning of the 40s. the exception seemed more likely to be democracy: in Germany Hitler was in power, in Italy - Mussolini; The "brown plague" spread throughout Europe. Consequently, a need arose for conceptual means that would allow including authoritative modes in the field of analysis. This need did not disappear after the Second World War. First, the authoritarian superpower, the USSR, remained the main adversary of the United States in the international arena; communist regimes were established in China, in a number of other countries of Asia, Eastern and Central Europe. Secondly, after 1945, more and more independent states - former colonies - began to appear on the world arena. Not all of them have chosen a democratic form of government. But even where such attempts were made, democratic institutions, contrary to constitutions and laws, clearly played very different roles than in the United States and Western Europe. And this also required expanding the conceptual framework of political science. The mass emigration of scientists from Western Europe to the United States is one of the reasons for a non-scientific nature that gave rise to comparative political science. Persecuted from the old continent by political persecution, war and economic turmoil, these people brought to America a European theoretical and methodological culture. It is enough to name just a few names, each of which is a milestone in the history of political science: Karl Deutsch, Otto Kirkheimer, Paul Lazarsfeld, Karl Levenstein, Hans Morgenthau, Franz Neumann, Joseph Schumpeter. Of course, most of them have nothing to do with the movement for comparative political science. However, their very presence in the political science departments of American universities created there the co-emergence of comparative political science 19 a completely new intellectual environment, incompatible with the national isolation of the previous decades, and contributed to the intensification of theoretical research. The center of the comparative political science movement was the Evanston Seminar at Northwestern University, USA, chaired and thought leader by Roy Makridis. In a statement published in 1953 in the American Review of Political Science (Amensan Poitca1 Saince Nevlew), the members of the seminar accused modern political science of provincialism, divorce from the real political process, as well as mostly descriptive (descriptive). ) character and for the first time formulated a movement-specific idea of ​​how to do away with these shortcomings: by developing the scientific-comparative method. Of course, the idea that comparison is meant to play an important role in policy research was not too revolutionary. I noted above that even in the traditional institutional analysis there were comparative (comparative) elements. The pioneering nature of the movement for comparative political science was expressed in the fact that the objects of comparison were now not institutions, but political phenomena amenable to study with the help of behaviorist methods. It is clear that a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of such an approach was the development of grounds on which comparable elements would be distinguished in fundamentally different political systems. This task was solved as a result of the perception by political science of the achievements of structural functionalism. Like behaviorism, structural functionalism came to political science from the outside - from sociology, within the framework of which it made a rather long and complex path of development. Within the framework of this textbook, there is neither the need nor the opportunity to consider the process of transition from simple functionalism to its structural version - it is enough to indicate the names of the people who carried out this theoretical movement: Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Robert Merton, and especially Talcott Parsons. Structural functionalism in sociology was characterized by an understanding of society as an infinite set and interweaving of human interactions. In this social system, however, relatively stable elements can be found. They form the structure. The units of structure are not 20 The origin and development of comparative political science are unambiguously associated with specific individuals, but are the positions of individuals in the system. Finally, functions are those that are performed by structural elements. So, structural and functional analysis is the identification of the structure of society (or any of its areas) and the subsequent study of the functions performed by its elements. It is not difficult to understand that the “substitution” of politics in place of “any sphere” looked quite justified. Thanks to this “substitution,” the very problem was solved that, in principle, behaviorism could not cope with - the vision of politics as a whole, as a system at the end turned out to be worked out. But is there a set of functions that any political system that strives for both survival and efficiency should have? Considered today a classic - both in its disarming simplicity and in its long-term influence on the development of political science - the solution was proposed in David Easton's article "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems" (1957). Easton defined the political system as "interactions through which values ​​are authoritatively distributed in society." Putting the analysis of the conditions necessary for the survival of a political system as a priority task, he believed that four main categories should be considered: the political system itself, its environment, reaction and feedback. By being “open”, a political system is subject to environmental influences that can be destructive if the system itself has not taken measures to prevent such an outcome. These measures consist in adequate reactions that allow the system to adapt to external conditions. Easton described this process in cybernetic terms: input-output-feedback. The result of the process is the preservation of the system through change (Scheme 1). Entrance Exit Requirements Support Political system Power decisions> ^ Feedback Scheme 1. The model of the political system according to D. Easton The emergence of comparative political science 21 As you can see, Asch-is improved in the form of demands or support. Requirements mean an opinion directed to the authorities about the desirable or undesirable distribution of values ​​in society. Support ensures that governments are relatively stable and empowers them to translate environmental requirements into appropriate solutions. Hence the political process is the process of transferring relevant information from input to output. “Gatekeepers” - political parties and interested groups - perform a selection function at the entrance, so that not all demands reach the political system. Finally, decisions of power, affecting the environment, bring new demands on life. This is feedback. What is the point of presenting politics in such an abstract and schematic form? Easton's model at least gives us a kind of framework for organizing thinking. In addition, it is easy to see that Easton and other representatives of structural functionalism have opened the doors of political science widely to natural science terminology, especially to the rich and mature language of systems analysis. Although the process of mastering the terminology was not without cost, on the whole it turned out to be fruitful. Finally, the turn to the study of informal mechanisms of state functioning and political decision-making was very important. Since 1957, structural functionalism has advanced quite far in the study of political systems. There is a joke among political scientists: the best way to do justice to Easton is to admit that his model has become redundant. As a more modern one can be considered the "list" of functions allocated within the political system by Gabriel Almond and George Bingham Powell Jr. (1978): political recruitment, political socialization, political communication, expression of interests, rallying according to interests, "making" politics, executing decisions. Structural functionalism made it possible to include in the field of comparative analysis a large group of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America - the "third world", which had not previously been spoiled by the attention of political scientists. In the late 50s. a group of members of the Evanston Seminar and other scholars formed the Committee on Comparative Political Science of the American Research Council 22 The Origin and Development of Comparative Political Science of the Social Sciences. Committee Chairman G. Almond openly advocated the restructuring of political science on structural-functionalist grounds, and saw the main task of the comparativists in the study of the “third world”. In connection with the shift in the focus of research activity, the theories of modernization have come to the fore in a number of the leading analytical tools of comparative political science. Modernization theories have no universally recognized creators. Among sociologists, back in the 19th century. noted a significant difference between "traditional" and "modern" societies (although they used a different terminological framework), include Karl Marx and Emil Durkheim. However, this idea came to comparative political science mainly due to the perception of the theoretical constructions of the outstanding German scientist Max Weber, introduced into the context of structural and functional analysis by T. Par-sons. In a traditional society, the individual is not self-reliant - he belongs to a broader group of one level or another (clan, family, tribe, caste, class, religion). Belonging to a collective ensures the survival of the individual, but on the condition of complete subordination to the group in behavior, lifestyle and even thinking. And this is not the only cost of traditional solidarity. Its downside is the isolation of the members of this group from the surrounding collectives, which are perceived as "outsiders". From this point of view, traditional society, as Sun Yat-sen aptly put it, resembles a pile of sand. Modern society, on the other hand, is based on individual freedom. In it, a transition is made from an unambiguous group belonging of an individual to a diverse role relationship between people, from an “assigned” social position to that achieved through individual choice and efforts. If traditional society is characterized by an agrarian economy based on relations of personal dependence, then the onset of "modernity" entails the development of machine production, factory labor discipline and market relations. Strictly speaking, this transition from “traditionalism” to “modernity” is called modernization (sometimes the term “development” is used in the same sense). Especially important for comparative political science was the idea that modernization is associated with the emergence of “modern” political institutions - rational bureaucracy, political representation, and, ultimately, democracy. The synthesis of structural functionalism with the theories of modernization allowed for a real breakthrough in the study of the “third world”. The "golden fund" of comparative political science includes the works of Lucien Pye "Communications and Political Development" (1963), Joseph Lapalombara "Bureaucracy and Political Development" (1963), a collection edited by L. Pai and S. Verba "Political Culture and Political development ”(1965), as well as a number of other publications. However, at the same time, dissatisfaction with the methodological means that dominated the discipline was brewing. In the second half of the 60s. in comparative political science is facing a serious crisis. Development and current state of comparative political science Second half of the 60s. - this, admittedly, is not the best period in the development of the United States and Western Europe. The "leader of the Western world" was deeply caught up in the hopeless Vietnam war, and the political protest of black Americans who stood up for their civil rights was added to the antiwar movement in the United States. Western European countries in 1968 witnessed massive youth unrest, which peaked during the "May Revolution" in Paris. In the Third World, revolutionary movements spread more and more and more and more often politicians who rejected the Western model of development came to power. Neither politicians nor scientists could afford to ignore these alarming symptoms. Comparative political science turned out to be especially sensitive to the shifts in public consciousness. Its theoretical foundations came under fire: structural functionalism and the theory of modernization. The most powerful thesis of the critics of structural functionalism was that the processes of change and development are reduced either to the return of a given system to its previous state, or to the establishment of a new equilibrium, and the main attention is focused on the problem of stability and survival of the system. Considering this approach as a manifestation of a purely ideological, conservative orientation, critics declared the inability of structural functionalism to describe and analyze the conflict. Since conflict is at the heart of politics, structural-functionalist models were declared completely inadequate to the subject of research. It is clear that this kind of criticism came mainly from young, radical political scientists, many of whom were influenced by what was observed in the late 1960s. "Marxist Renaissance". However, representatives of the older generation did not stand aside from this fad, according to which the claims of structural functionalism to be more scientific in comparison with the institutional approach turned out to be untenable, and the main result of the import of terminology from theoretical natural science was the transformation of the language of political science. into a jargon that is hard to understand even for the "initiates". The theory of modernization was criticized even more severely. As the main shortcomings of these theories, they noted their Eurocentrism (that is, an implicit approach to European-American civilization as having realized the only correct, most progressive version of development) and the teleologism associated with it - the idea of ​​social progress as movement towards a predetermined goal, which in this case was the Americanized “modernity”. The emergence of an alternative theory of "dependence" (derenenous geory) is also connected with the criticism of the theories of modernization. From the point of view of this theory, one of the leading representatives of which is Ferdinando Enrique Cardoso (later he was elected president of Brazil - a rather rare case when a prominent political scientist becomes a successful politician), the interaction of the developed "North" and the developing "South" does not at all contribute to the large-scale modernization of the latter. Penetrating into the "third world", transnational corporations create there only separate modernized sectors of the economy and social strata. The rest of the society remains traditional. And even worse, the “modernized” sector turns out to be the means by which the “North” conserves the most archaic economic structures and restrains the development of the country as a whole, thereby facilitating the conditions for its exploitation. Politically, the “dependence” thus characterized does not result in democratization, but in the establishment of extremely reactionary political regimes. This conclusion was quite consistent with the Latin American political practice of the 60-70s. Later, however, it turned out that many conclusions of the theory of "dependence" were exaggerated. After more than thirty years, it can be stated that far from everything in this criticism has turned out to be fair and has stood the test of time. Indeed, structural functionalism places particular emphasis on the sustainability of political systems. However, attention to social change is not at all alien to him. Moreover, as Harry Eckstein notes, it is within the framework of structural functionalism that it becomes possible to study “rapid, catastrophic transitions” from one stable social state to another. It cannot be denied that modernization theories understood the development process of the Third World countries in a somewhat unilateral way. But the theory of "dependence", which just as unequivocally prescribed the fate of the backward fiefdom of the "gorilla" dictators, did not escape the reproach for this. If we take practice as a criterion of truth, then it should be noted that in most Latin American countries in the 80s. there was a transition from authoritarianism to democracy - in full accordance with the forecasts of modernization theories. However, at the end of the 60s. criticism of the previously dominant theoretical foundations plunged comparative political science into a state of deep crisis, which lasted for about fifteen years. During this entire period, works were published almost every year, the authors of which claimed to create a new "big theory" capable of eliminating all difficulties. It is neither necessary nor possible to consider these theories in detail. The most serious, according to Howard Wiarda, among them were: the "state-society" approach (sihe - coae ^ y arrgoch), the corporatist approach, the "new political economy", the politico-cultural approach. It should be emphasized that each of these theoretical models, organizing around itself this or that volume of empirical research, brought certain scientific results, and some of them flourish to this day. In this respect, the period of the crisis was not at all sterile. The theoretical debates of the late 1960s and 1970s also left their mark. In particular, criticism of structural functionalism forced many comparators to focus on the development of theoretical foundations, methodology and technical aspects of applying the comparative method itself, which at the stage of the “movement for comparative politics” - no matter how paradoxically, very little attention was paid. The crisis of modernization theories led to the fact that the discipline "rediscovered" Western Europe for itself. And finally, it was in the 70s. Two interrelated theories that are now the undisputed leaders (although not monopolists) in the field of comparative political research methodology have come to the fore: rational choice theory and neoinstitutionalism. Like the “big theories” of the previous generation, the theory of rational choice (modifications of which can be called differently: the theory of public choice, models of the rational actor, the economic approach to politics) came to political science from the outside - from economics and sociology, where it originated in the early 50s. In 1957, Anthony Downs' classic work, The Economic Theory of Democracy, was published, marking the beginning of the expansion of rational choice theory into the political sciences. For quite a long time, however, it remained the property of political theory, American nationality policy, and international relations theory. The path of rational choice theory to comparative studies has been a thorny one. And this is not surprising: the differences between her and the concepts prevailing in comparative political science were too deep. Structural functionalism claimed to have a holistic, theoretically consistent vision of the political system. The system dominated its own elements, and since they were recognized as the ability for autonomous actions, it determined these actions. Therefore, the main task of the researcher is to understand the logic of the development of the whole. Of course, this task is difficult. But if it is fulfilled, then the logic of the actions of the individual elements of the system becomes self-evident. On the contrary, the theory of rational choice, in principle, does not contain any complex and detailed vision of the social system. In its basic premises, this is a very simple theory. She focuses all her attention on a separate participant in social activity, who is called just that - acyor (doer). In the Russian terminological tradition, this term is more Development and the current state ... 27 all (although not completely) corresponds to the concept of "subject"; the tracing word "actor", with an emphasis on the first syllable, has also taken root in Russian-language literature, although it sounds rather ridiculous. Some scholars also suggest saying "actor", but theatrical associations are not entirely appropriate here. Be that as it may, an actor or a subject can be both an individual and a group. Two basic characteristics are attributed to his actions: they are ego-true and rational. The first means that by any of his actions the subject seeks to increase (maximize) his own benefit, the second - that at the same time he takes care of reducing (minimizing) the efforts spent on achieving the goal. Subjects are by no means omniscient: in fact, in some cases, the effort spent on obtaining information about the shortest path to a result outweighs the value of the result itself. Without having all the information available, they are, of course, capable of making mistakes. Thus, following the leading modern representatives of the theory of rational choice, William Riker and Peter Ordeshuk, we can formulate its main postulate as follows: the subject uses the most complete information available at the moment at an acceptable cost to achieve his own goals - whatever they may be - at the lowest cost (as we can see, this theory is not in vain called the "economic approach"). Presented in this form, the "foundations" of the theory of rational choice look quite trivial. In European (continental) sociology, there is a whole class of theories, from some versions of Marxism to Freudianism, that do not recognize human behavior as either selfish or rational. However, a person who is not wise in theoretical intricacies is inclined to look at his own actions in full agreement with the theory of rational choice. So, does it make sense to ascribe some theoretical value to the statements of obvious, from the point of view of common sense, facts? The point is that these statements are only the first step in the theory of rational choice. Undoubtedly, it would be trivial if the activity of an individual subject were in its focus. But in reality she is interested in interaction, which, in fact, is considered as the only reality worthy of analysis. By interacting with each other, subjects - even if they act in an absolutely rational and selfish way - may win or lose, depending on their chosen strategy. One of the achievements of the theory of rational choice is that it reduces all the diversity of human activity to several simplified models - games - and in each of them determines the optimal strategies for individual subjects. The results obtained in this case, firstly, are nontrivial, and secondly, they are widely used to explain social (including political) phenomena and to predict them. Here we are approaching the threshold beyond which the theory of rational choice ceases to be simple and turns out to be very sophisticated, overgrown with jargon accessible only to its adherents and by no means generally available mathematical and formal logical tools. The review text on comparative political science is hardly a good starting point for crossing this threshold. But it would be unfair to leave the reader completely in the dark about how rational choice theory "works." An "economical" solution to this problem consists, apparently, in limiting oneself to one example, which is not the most difficult, although, perhaps, not the most indicative one. From the point of view of rational choice theory, games fall into two categories. One of them is of no theoretical interest. These are "zero-sum games" (7th-8m-gatez), where the victory of one of the participants quite unambiguously turns into the defeat of the other. There can be no question of any strategy here: the one who is stronger achieves the maximum result. Examples include a soccer match and a bandit brawl over loot. Much more interesting is the "non-zero-sum game" (pop-7th-sit-atez). The theory of rational choice distinguishes several such games. It is worth repeating that each of them is a simplified model, through the prism of which one can see seemingly very dissimilar social and political collisions. Of the didactic goals, each game corresponds to some simple story, almost an anecdote, and a name that follows from this story. There are, for example, the games "chicken" and "family quarrel". Here we will consider only one of them - the famous “prisoner's dilemma.” It is believed that this particular model of interaction is most often encountered in the analysis of political life. Development and current state ... They were arrested, put in separate cells and interrogated daily. Any communication between them is impossible, but both know that there is no strong evidence against them. The main hope of the investigation is a voluntary confession. this hope will not come true, then each of the prisoners will be sentenced to only three years in prison.This situation in the language of the theory of rational choice is called the point of positive equilibrium. a lighter punishment - only one year, but the second will be forced to spend 25 years in prison.Finally, if both go to voluntary confession, each will face a ten-year imprisonment. flax equilibrium (Scheme 2). First prisoner Confession Non-recognition 8 And X ev X with X Rch 10 years in prison negative equilibrium 10 years in prison 1 year in prison 25 years in prison §. e x 25 years in prison a year in prison 3 years in prison positive equilibrium 3 years in prison Scheme 1. “The Prisoner's Dilemma” Now let's follow the reasoning of our selfish, rational prisoner. If his accomplice confesses, then he will receive 25 years for stubbornness or 10 for compliance. So it’s better to confess. If the accomplice keeps silent, then recognition again provides the best result - one year in prison instead of three. The second prisoner, of course, reasoned in exactly the same way. As a result, both confess and receive their top ten. But if each of them were silent, then individual results would be much better. It may be argued that cases when communication between interaction participants is completely blocked are almost never met in reality. Well, let's imagine that during a break between interrogations, one of the prisoners managed to send a note to the other's cell with a proposal not to confess and a promise that he himself would stand to the end. Would that change the situation? No, because even then each of the prisoners would have a strong incentive to deceive the other and confess. We must remember that behavior based on blind trust in a partner is neither selfish nor even rational. “The Prisoner's Dilemma” has earned particular popularity among political scientists involved in international relations. Indeed, this game makes it easy to simulate any of the largest conflicts of the 70s and 80s, when the world arena was almost completely dominated by two superpowers. Take the problem of arms control. Both the USSR and the USA preferred a result in which the enemy disarmed, but their own nuclear arsenal would be preserved "just in case." Unilateral disarmament was naturally the worst possible prospect. As a result, both sides continued the arms race. All speculatively understood that the partial disarmament of the superpowers would benefit both the USSR and the USA (positive equilibrium point). The trouble is, as with the unfortunate prisoners, the jointly preferred strategy contradicted the individually preferred one. Such modeling is rarely used in comparative political science. This is understandable: comparativists, as a rule, have to deal with more complex interactions involving many subjects and suggesting a wide range of potential strategies for each of them. The integration of rational choice theory into comparative political science is made possible by the fact that this theory contains not only a description of the “prisoner's dilemma”, but also offers a way out of the impasse it generates. Let's go back to our prisoners. Suppose that each of them, weighing the expediency of a confession, takes into account one sad circumstance: if he leaves prison before his accomplice, he will be immediately killed by his friends, not without reason suspecting the early release of betrayal. This radically changes the situation in favor of the point of Development and the current state of ... 31 positive equilibrium. Indeed, it is better to serve three years and stay alive than to die in a year or to serve ten years. The lesson from this generally not very favorable story for the characterization of human nature is this: in order to force the subjects to choose jointly preferred strategies, it is necessary to make a small change in the rules of the game, the essence of which is an inevitable and quite definite punishment for choosing an individually preferred strategy. What should we keep in mind when talking about the rules of the game in politics? The answer is obvious: these rules - at least in a democracy - are determined by the constitution and informal norms of political behavior and are embodied in institutions. That is why the approach that applies the achievements of rational choice theory to the problems of comparative political science is called neoinstitutionalism. There is a fundamental difference between it and the "old" (formal legal) institutionalism that prevailed in political science in the 1930s. In the past, the attention of scholars was mainly attracted by the legal aspects of the state structure. It must be said that a general revival of interest in political institutions took place immediately after the end of the “postbehavioral revolution”, when studies of the real functioning of constitutions, parliaments, bureaucracy, etc. ... But, like the “old institutionalists,” the scientists of the new generation could not answer the main question - which institutions are you really important and what is their impact on political behavior? Rational choice theory played a decisive role in the formation of neoinstitutionalism precisely because it views parliaments, governments, and party systems as those “binding constraints” within which active interaction of political actors takes place. In this case, the main tasks are to determine the points of positive and negative equilibrium within each of the institutions, to explain and predict the behavior of subjects, as well as to identify the conditions under which they would choose jointly preferred strategies. In solving their problems, neo-institutionalists make extensive use of spatial and mathematical modeling of the political process. 32 The origin and development of comparative political science The differences between neoinstitutionalism and behaviorism are no less significant. All adherents of the new direction - from political theorists to empiricists who master huge amounts of statistical data - agree on two basic premises. First, unlike behaviorism, neo-institutionalism is alien to the idea that a conscientious observer armed with scientific methods has everything necessary and sufficient to judge the true motives of human behavior. From the point of view of a neoinstitutionalist, people behave in one way or another not because they want to, but because the system of institutional constraints prevailing over them dictates one or another course of action. One and the same individual can act in completely different ways, being placed in different institutional conditions. Therefore, political interests, which within the framework of behaviorism were taken as an observable reality, are subject to reconstruction within the framework of neoinstitutionalism. For clarity, coarsening the situation, we can say that for the behaviorist the judgment “I don’t like kiwi” (and the corresponding behavior) expresses the individual’s taste preferences, and for the neoinstitionalist, this most often means that the individual cannot afford kiwi , or the exotic fruit is out of stock, or something else. The task of neoinstitutional analysis is to find out what exactly. Second, behaviorists tended to view the interests of groups as the sum of the interests of individuals within these groups. A group of workers behaves this way and not otherwise, for all its members are workers. For neoinstitutionalists, on the contrary, collective interests are formed in the process of transformation (sometimes beyond recognition) of individual ones, and the logic of this process is set again by institutions. The new theoretical toolkit opens up broad prospects for comparative research. Let us take the problem of the relationship between the executive and representative powers, traditional for comparative studies. Already within the framework of formal legal institutionalism, several variants of such relationships have been described. Neoinstitutionalism, reducing these options to processes amenable to theoretical modeling, makes it possible to move from their description to explanation. For example, it has been shown that the chronic instability of systems with a dual response - Development and the current state ... 33 by the government's ownership (before the president and parliament) is explained by the absence in such systems of effective sanctions against the choice of individually preferred behavior. The importance of this kind of research especially increased in the 1980s, when a number of countries faced the problem of choosing the optimal democratic structure. It is no coincidence that the research direction dealing with the comparative analysis of democratization processes (the so-called transitology is the science of transitions to democracy, which will be discussed in Chapter 3), makes extensive use of the means of the theory of rational choice. At present, rational choice theory and neo-institutionalism largely determine the shape of political science. And the claim to leadership always turns into fierce criticism from competitors. Many scholars question both the ideological foundations of "rationalism" and its cognitive value. I will touch on only one - and far from the strongest - aspect of this criticism, which has a direct bearing on comparative political research. Suppose we are faced with the task of explaining the behavior of political parties of a certain ideological orientation during election campaigns. We have data for several dozen countries at our disposal. From the point of view of rational choice theory, the first step in such an investigation is to define the goal that all these parties pursue. Only after that it will be possible to compare strategies, talk about equilibrium points, develop a mathematical apparatus, etc. The problem, however, is that by ascribing to everyone without exception the same goal - say, increasing the number of votes cast for a party , - we already admit a strong distortion of the cognitive perspective. As prominent experts on party politics Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda have shown, there are also parties that seek to enter the government (and they can deliberately concede some of their voters to a potential coalition partner), attract public attention to a particular problem, and strengthen their organization or expand internal party democracy. Moreover, individual parties can combine these goals and change them in the course of a single campaign. Failure to pay attention to this, critics argue, dramatically reduces the value of research findings. 34 The origin and development of comparative political science Research practice will show how consistent the claims of the theory of rational choice and neoinstitutionalism for methodological leadership in political science. It should be recognized that the start was quite impressive, and some of the results obtained can no longer be deleted from the history of the discipline. Obviously, the success of "rationalism" is largely due to the fact that it has succeeded in realizing the old dream of political scientists about being more "scientific", which is often associated with the use of quantitative analysis and formal modeling. Despite its relative youth, comparative political science has passed a rather difficult path of development. His logic is seen in the gradual transition from the study of formal institutions of government to the analysis of the real political process. But we have seen that political science still cannot do without analyzing the institutions of power. That is why the institutional approach, the criticism of which began the history of comparative political science, now - albeit in a qualitatively changed form and with the prefix "neo" in the name - again dominates. From this point of view, comparative political science has gone through a development cycle. Hopefully, this cycle will not be the last. Moreover, the leadership of neoinstitutionalism is far from complete. Today, few people dare to argue that some approach is the only correct and applicable to such a complex object as politics. Therefore, another important result of the forty-year history of the discipline is the assertion of methodological pluralism and a variety of theoretical models in it. Many of them remained outside the scope of this chapter only because of the need for strict selection of material. I saw my task in highlighting the main thing in the history of comparative political science, which especially clearly affects its modern appearance. Chapter II THEORETICAL MEANS OF COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES In the previous chapter, the snakes briefly described the main theoretical approaches that replaced each other (and more often coexisted) in the history of comparative political science. At the same time, attention was mainly focused on the differences between individual research attitudes. However, it should be emphasized once again that comparative political science is a single scientific whole, which means that there are more or less generally accepted concepts and theoretical models. This chapter will be devoted to them. First, we will consider a number of concepts common to all subdisciplines of modern political analysis - such as power, politics, the state. Basic Concepts of Political Analysis Let's start with a group of concepts that are not specific to comparative political research. Being fundamental, these concepts are developed within the subject framework of political theory and are “imported” by other subdisciplines, making up what is in common that allows us to talk about the relative conceptual unity of modern political science. We should immediately make a reservation that to present these concepts in their entirety would mean writing a textbook on political theory, leaving comparative political science "for later." Therefore, only a brief and, if necessary, fragmentary essay is given here, informing the reader about the positions most widely represented in the literature. The object of comparison in political studies is always (although in some cases only ultimately) the distribution of power in different societies. Indeed, power is the main thing in politics. But what is power? Even in everyday life, this word is used in many different meanings. Fate has power over a person. Habit dominates the smoker. The father has authority over the children, the state over the subjects. Of course, we should immediately discard some of these meanings as irrelevant to the topic. Let us, however, remember that in any social science, concepts - in order to avoid misunderstandings - must be correlated with everyday usage. This makes us look for a definition that at the same time would be strict and “sensitive” to common sense. In the social sciences, this work has been going on for a long time, and the number of proposals has exceeded fifty. Here are some typical examples. So, power is a special type of behavior based on the possibility of changing the behavior of other people (Herbert Simon); achievement of certain goals, obtaining intended results (Talcott Parsons); the possibility of using known means, in particular violence (Harold Lasswell and Abra ham Kaplan); a special kind of relationship between the manager and the controlled (Maurice Duverger); the ability to make decisions governing the distribution of benefits in conflict situations (Harold Lasswell). It is hardly worth choosing the true one from this variety of definitions. We need to make a different kind of choice: accept the definition that is considered the most influential in modern political science. This was proposed back in 1957 by Robert Dahl in an article that was called “The Concept of Power”. Dahl interpreted power in terms of causality. This definition sounds somewhat unusual in Russian: "A has power over B when A is the cause of a certain behavior of B, provided that without the influence of A, he would behave differently." The definition deserves attention for the very reason that it is often used by political scientists-applied experts to analyze real situations. The first and most important thing inherent in Dahl's definition is the understanding of power as a relationship. It makes no sense to talk about power without specifying in relation to whom this power can be applied. Moreover, each type of relationship is characterized by special, only inherent characteristics of power. Power can act as a result of a relative equilibrium of the most diverse resources at the disposal of the ruling and subordinate individuals - money, time, knowledge, weapons, connections, social status, etc. D. L has power over B precisely because he has a large amount of one of these resources (or several at once), and sometimes - if he surpasses B in the ability to use these resources. In addition, there is often a certain C, whose power extends to both L and B. Of course, it would be a gross oversimplification to refer the above only to individual individuals. This is how one should approach all elements of the political system. For example, it makes no sense to talk about the power of the American president in general: in relation to Congress - this is one power, in relation to the Supreme Court - another, and in relation to the media - a third. The second feature of Dahl's definition is that it does not take into account the means of exercising power. And they are very different: this is violence (or the threat to resort to it), and bribery, and manipulation (including consciousness), and persuasion, and negotiations - the list could be continued. In this case, however, the concept of "power" is used as an "umbrella" - it covers all the means by which some people change the views or behavior of others. Some authors propose to distinguish between influence and power, implying that the latter is more violent. By the way, Dahl himself was inclined towards this. But since we recognize the diversity of the means of exercising power, there is no need to get into this kind of terminological subtleties. It is worth adding to this that in reality it is very rare to find power based solely on violence. Another important source of power is authority, when A obeys B due to the recognition that B has the right to give orders, or, for example, believing that it is in his own interests. In most cases, power is a combination of violence and authority, although the ratio of the ingredients in this mixture can vary greatly in different societies. And the last thing. It follows from Dahl's definition that A's intention alone to influence B's views and behavior is clearly not enough. There must also be a well-founded belief that the order will be carried out, that it will be met with obedience. Thus, not everyone who claims to power actually has it - it happens that power turns into a fiction in connection with the widespread failure to comply with its orders. At the same time, it is not so rare that the subordination of B precedes the explicit expression of the will of A, for the subordinate individual knows what his behavior would suit the ruling one. From the examples given (fixing, of course, only extreme, limiting situations), we can conclude that a correct understanding of power is impossible without taking into account the position of the subject individual. The same goes for all elements of the political system. Let us assume that it is of a purely democratic character and, therefore, the voters have power over the government. This authority is explicitly exercised only once every four or five years - on the day of the general election. However, long before the next election campaign, the government is forced to avoid steps that would turn voters against it. When dealing with power, you need to be as attentive to what is not happening as to what is happening. A lot of controversy and different readings are also associated with the concept of "politics". It is often understood as a struggle for power and the exercise of power. Taking this definition as the most widespread - it can be found both among orthodox Marxists and among no less orthodox followers of Parsons - one clarification is necessary. Dahl's understanding of power allows for the possibility of interpreting politics as a relationship between individuals. However, this would be wrong. Politics is the process by which groups make collective decisions. Group sizes vary from family to the entire international community. It doesn't matter in this case. The way of making decisions does not matter either. But what makes them political is their collective nature, that is, the fact that they affect all members of the group. Determining the essence of politics, they often also pay attention to the fact that it deals with the distribution of values ​​available in a limited number. The need for a struggle for power (authority) is explained precisely by the fact that people belonging to the same group rarely show complete agreement on the problems of distribution. The collective nature of political decisions does not imply that all members of the group are equally involved in making them. Basic Concepts of Political Analysis 39 As the eminent Italian sociologist Gaetano Mosca wrote in 1884, “at any time and in any place, everything that is a prescriptive part in management, the exercise of power and contains a command and responsibility, there is always competence a special class, the elements of which can really vary in very different ways depending on the specifics of the century and country; however, no matter how this class develops, it is always being formed as an insignificant minority against the mass of governed subordinate to them ”. Mosca himself called this class political. Later, his compatriot Vilfredo Pareto proposed another term, elite, which is now widely used to reflect the circle of people directly involved in the decision-making process. The paired concept of mass captures that majority of the members of the group, which is either completely removed from decision-making, or is capable of exerting only an indirect influence on it. It is easy to see that the political aspect is easy to ascribe to any joint activity related to the distribution of the values ​​available in a limited number. As social groups and organizations become more complex, decision-making processes become orderly, and appropriate regular procedures are developed. In other words, the collective decision-making, being separated from the daily activities of people, acquires a special framework. On the scale of an individual country (or, using more rigorous terminology, of an individual macrosocial organism), such a framework is the state. What is the specificity of the state in relation to all other organizations that streamline decision-making processes? According to R. Dahl (in this case he acts as a continuation of the tradition dating back to Max Weber), the state is the only regulator of the legal use of force within a given territory. While clear enough, this definition nevertheless needs some additional clarifications. First, this definition does not imply that violence is carried out only by the state. In any society, there is a greater or lesser amount of non-state, but still not punishable by law, violence, for example, during sports (if not on the football field, then at least in the ring) or in the family. 40 Theoretical Means of Comparative Political Research Second, Dahl does not mean that the state exists only by force. Not at all. And even vice versa: violence is, from the point of view of a scientist, an unstable source of power; that and only that state power that manages to form and maintain in the people the conviction that the existing order is best suited for a given society functions effectively. M. Weber defined such power as legitimate. After these clarifications, it is appropriate to repeat: the state is a state only when its claim to be the only regulator of the use of force by other social institutions and individuals is justified. Therefore, in a country engulfed in civil war, there is essentially no state. At the same time, very different organizations fall under the definition of Dahl - from primitive tribal to modern liberal-democratic. Not all of them are equally the focus of comparative political science. The comparativist is primarily interested in the similarities and differences recorded when observing the political life of national states. A detailed analysis of this concept will be done later. Cross-national comparison It can be said that comparison stood at the cradle of social sciences in general and political thought in particular: it was already used by Aristotle, when, together with his students, he undertook a gigantic - unfortunately, only to a small extent - a study of "constitutions" , political devices of 158 ancient Greek states-policies. To this day, it is often argued that all social research is "comparative research in one form or another" (Stanley Lee-berson). From this point of view, the very term "comparative political science" looks like a tautology. But the fact is that the unconscious use of comparisons that does not obey generally accepted (conventional) rules does not yet create comparative research practice, just like actions according to the principle of "trial and error" with a certain similarity to a scientific experiment. they are not. The specificity of comparative socio , causal, connections. The parallel between comparison and experiment is not accidental. In theoretical natural science, the most valuable are the results obtained under the conditions of a laboratory experiment controlled by the researcher. In the study of politics - as in the social sciences in general - such conditions are very rare. It is not even a matter of the well-known ethical difficulties that arise in any social experiment, but above all that the political process has an extremely multifactorial character. It is so complex that some factors cannot be artificially isolated from others. So, in its pure form, a political experiment is impossible. Therefore, comparison takes over its role. In order to more clearly represent this "experiment-substituting" role of comparison, one can rather roughly and schematically model one of the ways of its application in political science. Suppose we investigated and described five separate political systems - A, B, C, O, E. For system A, characteristics are allocated - variables - (1,2,3,4,5), for В - (1 , 3,4,5,7), for C - (1, 3, 4, 7, 8), for B - (2, 5, 7, 8, 9), for E - (2, 5, 6, 8, 9). Let us also assume that we are interested in what are the reasons leading to the appearance of characteristic (1). Then this variable will be called dependent, and the assumed (hypothetical) factors leading to its appearance - independent variables. Taking a glance at the lists of variables presented above, one can at least make the conclusion that in the presence of characteristics (3) and (4), the system necessarily has characteristic (1). A stronger formulation is that a causal link is established between the independent variables (3) and (4) and the dependent variable (1). If we take into account that in real studies, each of the variables is based on a large array of factual data (and not in statics, but in dynamics), then it is not difficult to understand how much comparison expands the possibilities of understanding political phenomena. First, it is only by comparison that one can get mature generalizations about politics. Second, comparison also acts as a cognitive verification mechanism. 42 Theoretical Means of Comparative Policy Research The methods of comparison used in the social sciences are very diverse. The main ones include: a comparative-comparative method aimed at revealing the nature of dissimilar objects; historical-typological comparison, explaining the similarity of objects not related in their origin by the same conditions of formation and development; historical and genetic comparison, explaining the similarity of phenomena as a result of their relationship in origin. The art of comparative studies consists in the skillful use and combination of all these approaches, however, in comparative political science, the first of them is mainly used. And this is not accidental: it is the comparative-comparative method that makes it possible to theoretically consistently carry out cross-national comparisons (croszna ^ dupa! Comradeson - comparing countries among themselves), without which political comparativism is inconceivable. What is the criterion for distinguishing comparative research from other types of political analysis? In the literature, there are three main options for answering this question. The simplest, and even the most obvious, version is that a comparative study is based on the attraction of comparable data obtained in at least two different countries (Michael Armer). This definition, however, is rejected by most comparativists as too narrow. Indeed, what about the so-called comparatively oriented case study (companion (1Ve! Y openecite saze stilchis), which has long since established itself as one of the most fruitful genres of comparative studies? that they include data on one country in a wide comparative context, the identification of which is not considered as an independent research task. Another - more complex and scientific - version of the answer was proposed by the famous methodologists of comparative political science Adam Przeworski and Henry Thune. In his opinion, the specificity of cross-national comparison is expressed in the fact that this research strategy is implemented at two main levels, one of which is macrosocial, which means that the variables identified at this level characterize society as a whole. each of the selected cross-national comparison of 43 variables fixes some particular character the theory of society. The purpose of the comparative study, according to Przeworski and Tjun, is to reveal the relationships between the variables of the second level. However, macrosocial variables are used as the main tool to achieve this goal. An example would be the work of Robert Alford, published in 1963, Party and Society, in which the relationship between voters' belonging to a social class and the choice of a party when voting in different countries (second level variables) is explained using such macrosocial variables as indicators of industrialization and urbanization. However, upon closer examination, this approach to the definition of cross-national comparison turns out to be even narrower than the previous one. Not only does it exclude a comparatively oriented case study, but also studies aimed at identifying the dependence of some macrosocial variables on others, for example, the political regime on indicators of economic development, are also out of sight. Meanwhile, such studies are rightfully included in the "golden fund" of comparative political science. It is easy to see that there is something in common between the above approaches to defining the specifics of cross-national comparison. As the most influential contemporary methodologist of comparative analysis, Charles Ragin, notes, it is “the use of macrosocial units,” in whatever way it is done. Ragin argues that it is the recognition of the analytic value of macrosocial variables and their application to the explanation of empirically observable processes that is the criterion by which one can distinguish the comparative from the noncomparativist. To illustrate his point, Ragin gives the following example. Suppose a researcher comes to the conclusion that in Great Britain there is a strong connection between the class of the voter and the choice of the party when voting, and explains this by the fact that Great Britain is an “industrial society”. This proposition assumes that "society" can exist within the national state, that there are several different "societies", and that some of them can be characterized as "industrial", while others - not. These are, according to Ragin, the signs of cross-national analysis. But if the Marxist thesis that “relations of production determine political consciousness” were proposed as an explanation for the same phenomenon, the researcher could avoid cross-national comparison. The merit of Ragin's approach is that, while broad enough, it also separates comparative research from non-comparative research. First, as we have just seen, theoretical models are possible that do not attach much importance to cross-national differences (although some modifications of the same Marxism by no means exclude a comparative approach). Second, if a researcher shuns theory and is completely absorbed in the empirical study of a particular case, he will not necessarily introduce his findings into a comparative context. For example, the judgment “the level of voting for the US Democratic Party depends on the number of black voters” is not comparative. Of course, the object of study in the social sciences is always society. However, only for comparativists the existence of different societies (macrosocial units) appears as a necessary element of the explanatory procedures they use. Methodologists of comparative analysis are not very fond of discussing the question of why macrosocial units differ according to such a generally random criterion as the presence of formal signs of national statehood. Indeed, a satisfactory theoretical explanation for this can hardly be found. From the point of view of the needs of research practice, the reasons lie on the surface. We live in a world divided by state borders; in a world where the most important political processes - such as elections or regime change - take place at the national level, and statistical agencies, even if they operate on an international scale (which is not always the case), publish data for individual countries. Therefore, cross-national comparison is a natural choice for a comparativist. However, it must be seen that this choice is fraught with a number of serious methodological difficulties that deserve a separate analysis. Along the way, we will consider research strategies used in comparative studies to eliminate or at least partially neutralize these complexities. Cross-National Comparison 45 The Problem of Comparability Alisdair McIntyre opens her controversial article, "Is Comparative Political Science Possible?" A man undertook a cross-national study of the pits. From the very beginning, he rejected the common idea that the origin of different types of holes is explained in different ways, referring to the fact that then the abstract concept of “pit” would be superfluous. The study yielded interesting results: it was found that there is a direct correlation between the aggregated pit digging ability of society and the level of economic development; that the war is accelerating the digging (in Vietnam, the growth rate of the number of holes was noticeably higher than the average), and much more. “This man's accomplishments were not noticed by anyone but me,” writes McIntyre. "But if he had put his talent at the service of political science and studied modernization, urbanization, or political violence, not pits, then I would not be surprised if he reached a high position in the American Political Science Association." Freed from the ironic shell, McIntyre's thought turns out to be not only simple, but also quite traditional for some areas of the methodology of social cognition. Societies are unique, each of them is a unique ensemble of cultural attitudes, political practices and institutions. Therefore, any attempt to single out comparable elements in them leads to a simplification of reality, which significantly devalues ​​the conclusions from cross-national comparison. But even if we did take the risk of isolating such elements, then even then there is no guarantee that the same causal connections exist in different societies: similar consequences can be caused by completely different reasons. The strategy used by comparativists to eliminate (or at least partially neutralize) this problem was described by the leader of the “movement for comparative political science” Roy Makridis: “Comparison includes abstraction; specific situations and processes as such cannot be compared with each other ... Therefore, to compare means to single out certain types and concepts, and this is done by distorting the unique and the concrete. " Phenomena become objects of comparison in a conceptually assimilated, transformed form. Hence the enormous importance of theoretical models for comparative political science. Already structural functionalism claimed to be the password of a means by which the entire variety of phenomena observed in political life can be reduced to a limited number of simple and comparable analytical units. As shown in the previous chapter, this is the task today of rational choice theory and neoinstitutionalism. It is clear that the more heterogeneous the phenomena in the field of view of the researcher, the more effort must be spent on their “theoretical processing” (French comparativists Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassi call it conceptual homogenization). In this case, the loss of information cannot be avoided. It is believed, however, that they will be compensated for by the ability, which is acquired in return, to compare what initially seemed incomparable. A negative effect of conceptual homogenization is also believed to be that it implicitly discriminates against some societies in relation to others. The comparative researcher does not exist in a vacuum. Before becoming a theorist, he is formed as a person belonging to a particular society and shares the values, norms and prejudices inherent in this society. All this influences the means of conceptual homogenization used. We have seen that one of the main drawbacks of structural functionalism was seen by its opponents in "adjusting" developing countries to the standards of the United States and Western Europe. The main tenets of the theory of rational choice are also often criticized for the fact that they are consistent with only one - and precisely the "Western" - socio-cultural reality. The political life of many countries of the "East" and "South" is replete with examples of actions that cannot be qualified as either selfish or rational. Apparently, it is possible to neutralize this kind of costs of conceptual homogenization by developing theoretical means that would be as free as possible from the features of national limitations. Cross-national comparison 47 “Too many variables - too few cases” There are a limited number of countries in the world. Therefore, far from all possible variations of political systems - and even more so their elements - are given to us in direct observation or even in historical experience. Even among existing or once existing societies, far from all are described to the extent that would allow them to be used as objects of interethnic comparisons. The renowned researcher Arend Leiphart wrote that there are “too few cases” at the disposal of the comparativist. The other side of the dilemma he formulated is no less obvious: since social life is infinitely diverse, the number of distinguishable variables also tends to infinity. At the same time, we cannot afford to a priori discard some of them as insignificant, since in different national contexts they can play different roles. Comparative political science employs a number of strategies to address the Leiphart dilemma that deserve a brief description. The simplest solution would be to maximize the range of cases covered by the study, while deliberately limiting the number of observed variables. Such studies, falling under the definition of the comparative method proposed by A. Przeworski and G. Thune, were actually carried out. Moreover, for some time in the 60s. in comparative political science, the genre of comparative statistical research prevailed. What is he like? Suppose we use data on several dozen liberal democracies in order to reveal the relationship between the percentage of industrial workers in the country's population and the level of voting for social democratic parties, and on this basis, draw a conclusion about the presence or absence of a model in different countries " working voting ". From a technical point of view, this is not a difficult task. If we have two rows of numbers expressing the values ​​of the dependent and independent variables for each of the countries, then a computer armed with the simplest statistical program will need fractions of a second to tell us the correlation coefficient between these two series. And the correlation coefficient is the statistical index, which fixes the presence, direction and strength of the connection between two parameters presented in digital form. Moreover, statistics enable us to establish how several independent variables affect one dependent. This is called multiple regression. There are also more complex statistical procedures, a general description of which can be found in any textbook on social statistics. It should be noted that, like any developing science, this discipline is not devoid of problems, and the more complex the applied method of statistical analysis, the more disagreements it causes even among specialists. In political science, simple and generally accepted methods such as those noted above are most often used, although they also have their drawbacks. However, this is not the main problem associated with the use of the comparative statistical method. They are informative, not technical. Let's go back to the above example. In order for the stated research problem to be solved by means of statistical analysis, it is necessary to translate it from the language of theoretical concepts into the language of numbers, or, as they say, “operationalize concepts”. But even the first of the variables is included in the fabric of research - is operationalized - not without problems: sometimes it is not so easy to determine who is considered to be workers and who is not. But especially a lot of difficulties are associated with the operationalization of the second variable, distinguished on the basis of ideological characteristics. Here are just two examples. In Italy, the socialist party traditionally enjoys modest electoral support. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that there is no model of “workers' voting” in the country, since a significant part of Italian industrial workers have always voted for the communists. In Venezuela, the Democratic Action Party, being completely social-democratic in its ideological orientation, enjoyed mainly the support of the middle class in the elections. Therefore, it is wrong to ascribe to Venezuela the model of “working voting”, no matter how eloquently the statistical data testify in favor of such a result. Given that this series of examples can be continued, it is not hard to imagine how depressingly inadequate the results of the study as a whole would be. Cross-national comparison 49 What is the main difficulty of the strategy illustrated above? The fact that the analysis of a large number of cases forced the researcher to distract himself from the mutual influence of variables at the intra-system level, for example, from the existence in Italy of a strong com-party that influences the behavior of worker-voters, and from the social-democratic sympathies of the Venezuelan middle class. To avoid this complexity, it is sometimes recommended to resort to comparisons of the “second order”, that is, to compare not separate variables, completely isolated from the intrasystem context, but whole “hierarchies”, chains of interrelated variables. Comparisons of the "second order" become possible only by limiting the number of cases that are in the field of view of the scientist. Paradoxically, one effective way to solve the problem of too many variables - too few cases is to deliberately limit the number of countries covered by the study while increasing the number of monitored variables. In this case, two opposite strategies are possible - "the greatest similarity" and "the greatest difference". The meaning of the “most similar” strategy is to limit the field of analysis to a group of countries that are substantially similar to each other in a number of important characteristics (variables). The researcher can take these characteristics as constant, which allows him to fully concentrate on the mutual influence of the variables of interest. In our “working vote” example, restricting the field of study to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden would make it more justifiable to ignore the role of the Communist Parties and the social democratic sympathies of the middle class. On the other hand, the number of operationalized variables could be significantly expanded due to characteristics that vary from country to country. The main drawback of this strategy is that it encourages the researcher to choose geographically and culturally close countries as objects of comparison, but at the same time requires them to be presented as completely unaffected by each other. This makes it easier to search for "patterns". Unfortunately, this ease often turns out to be deceiving, because in reality, both similarities and differences within a region or another supranational historical community are often explained precisely by mutual influences. On the contrary, the strategy of “greatest difference” consists in comparing the countries that act for the researcher as “represent- 50 theoretical means of comparative political

Textbook. - 3rd ed., Rev. and add. - e Europ. University in St. Petersburg, 2001. - 368 p. (Proceedings of the Faculty of Politics, Sciences and Sociology; issue 2). 18VM 5-94380-010-7

Scientific editor - Y.D. Shevchenko

"With the support of the Open Society Institute

(Soros Foundation). Russia"

The textbook covers the origins and nature of comparative political science, theoretical tools for political research, and their main areas of application: political culture and participation, interest groups, political parties, elections, the executive branch, parliaments and unelected governments. The educational material is richly illustrated with examples from the political life of various countries and statistical

For students of higher educational institutions studying in the direction and specialty "Political Science", graduate students, teachers and researchers, as well as for everyone who is interested in the problems of political LIFE I

FOREWORD 5

Chapter I

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SCIENCE 9

Origins of Modern Political Analysis 10

Behaviorism 14

The Rise of Comparative Politics 17

Development and current state of comparative political science 23

Chapter II

THEORETICAL MEANS OF COMPARATIVE

POLITICAL RESEARCH 35

Basic concepts of political analysis 35

Cross-national comparison 40

Nation State 52

Chapter III

POLITICAL REGIMES 63

The problem of classification of political regimes 63

Models of Democracy 92

Chapter IV

POLITICAL CULTURE AND PARTICIPATION ... 100

Political culture and political socialization 101

Civic Culture 104

Political subcultures ………………………………………… ... 110

Elite Political Culture 113

Ideology 117

Political participation 123

Chapter V

INTERESTED GROUPS 131

Classification of interest groups 132

Channels and sources of influence 137

Neocorporatism 144

Chapter VI

POLITICAL PARTIES 150

Functions and classification of lots 151

Classification of party systems 162

The origin and development of party systems 171

Chapter Vii

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 186

Electoral systems of majority 189

Proportional and mixed electoral systems 200

Electoral engineering

and manipulation of the electoral system 211

Chapter VIII

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 223

Theories of Expressive Voter Behavior 223

Theories of Rational Voter Behavior 235

Electoral politics and institutional influences

on voter behavior 243

Chapter IX

EXECUTIVE POWER 254

Functions and types of executive power 254

Presidential Systems 264

Parliamentary system 281

Chapter X

PARLIAMENTS 287

Classification of parliaments and their functions 289

Organizational structure of parliaments 301

Political structure of parliaments 306

Chapter XI

NON-ELECTED AUTHORITIES 314

Bureaucracy 314

Judiciary 331

Media and politics 334

AFTERWORD 339

REFERENCES 342

INDEX OF DIAGRAMS AND TABLES 352

INDEX OF NAMES 354

COUNTRY INDEX AND REFERENCE

INFO 359

FOREWORD

Five years have passed since the manuscript of the second edition of this textbook was submitted to the Novosibirsk University Publishing House. Do you need a third? A characteristic phenomenon of recent years is an abundant, never-ending stream of educational literature on political science. One gets the impression that Russian political scientists are only engaged in writing textbooks: after all, there is quite a bit of research literature on the problems of contemporary Russian politics (at least in monographic form), and the one that exists is usually written and published not in Russian. The very word "political scientist" in Russia is much more often attributed to professional organizers of election campaigns, political consultants and journalists than to representatives of the corresponding academic discipline, which is rather widely represented in universities. There is no one to study politics. Scientists are busy with textbooks.

This state of affairs, of course, is not accidental. Textbooks are not only the final stage in the formation of any scientific discipline, but to a certain extent also the initial stage. Most of the literature on political sciences published in Western Europe and the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was also intended for teachers and students - after all, the scientific community did not yet exist, and research works in political science simply did not have an addressee. It was the textbooks that constituted the community in the sense that the main "message" of each of them was: political science is what is written here; the other political science is wrong. A rather high level of conceptual and methodological innovation is also characteristic of educational literature circulated today in Russia. Perhaps some of these textbooks will really form the basis of scientific circles or even - who knows - entire research areas of local significance. In the textbook offered to the reader's attention, starting from its first version (1994), I did not pursue broad

6 Foreword

staff goals like the creation of a new science or a radical reform of the existing one. On the contrary, I proceeded from the recognition that political science already exists, albeit not in Russia, but in the world around it. Good or bad, this science in its current form has been developing for several decades, and the main task of the textbook is simply to inform the interested reader about its development and current state. This goal is neither ambitious nor original, and it cannot be said that it is alien to some of the already published textbooks. However, at best, these textbooks inform the reader about the state of science ten years ago. The previous editions of this work are also outdated - after all, political science does not stand still. Hence - the desire to make changes and additions to the textbook, reflecting the development of science, but at the same time preserve the systematic nature of the presentation of the material. Let me dwell in more detail on the main differences between this edition and the book that was published five years ago.

The main part of the changes is due to the need to bring the content of the textbook more in line with the current state of research practice. The material characterizing the leading paradigms at the present stage of development of comparative political science - the theory of rational choice and neoinstitutionalism - has been expanded somewhat. When describing political regimes, much more than before, attention is paid to the problems of democratization. Added chapters on political culture and interest groups. Separate chapters on electoral systems and electoral behavior have been singled out from the chapter "Political Parties and Elections". It is these important and rapidly developing research areas in the previous edition of the textbook that an unforgivably little space was given. The chapters on the executive branch, parliaments and non-elected governments have changed less significantly, but there are also changes there. Expanded and updated statistical material illustrating certain provisions of the textbook.

As in the previous edition, I considered it possible to refrain from citing bibliographic references in the text. The bibliography at the end of the book serves a different purpose. The fact is that when working on the textbook, a large number of research works were used. Links to each of them are not

Foreword 1

rarely in a textbook text would make it unreadable. But it would be incorrect and, perhaps, unethical to completely do without a reference and bibliographic apparatus. The bibliography lists those books and articles that are mentioned - and sometimes even cited - in the textbook. It is clear that such a list cannot claim to be an exhaustive bibliography on comparative political science. Some of the works included in it are only indirectly related to this discipline. And vice versa, it did not include many works in Russian, which I would strongly recommend to use in the educational process. But in the end, working with literature is a task that I cannot complete for each individual teacher or student. In addition, the list contains corrections of some inaccuracies that crept into the previous edition of the textbook.

Basically, however, the concept of the textbook has remained unchanged. It is intended for people studying comparative political science, both for teachers and for undergraduate and graduate students, as well as for all those who, for civic reasons or because of their occupation, feel the need to join modern political knowledge. As a textbook, the book breaks with the bad tradition of Soviet social science, which demanded from such publications exhaustive and final answers to all questions. On the contrary, the main focus in the presentation of theoretical material is on the competing concepts and discussions in which the scientific community develops. For readers hungry for absolute truths, this tutorial is unlikely to help. Paying due attention to the theory, I attached special importance to "squeezing" into the text of the textbook as much empirical data, illustrations, examples from the life of individual states as possible. Hopefully the book can be used as a reference on a wide range of policy issues.

This publication was made possible within the framework of cooperation between the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology of the European University at St. Petersburg and the Department of Sociology, Political Science and Management of the Sociological Faculty of Samara State University, carried out under the support program for the departments of the Megaproject "Development of Education in Russia" of the Open Society Institute. I express to the Institute my deep

8 Foreword

side, sincere gratitude. It is important to note that the role of the department support program was not only and not so much in financing the publication (although there is no need to say that without this it most likely would not have taken place), but in the opportunity given to me to correlate the content of the textbook with the demands of modern teaching practice in university. An important role in the work on the textbook was played by my communication with my Samara project colleagues, as well as with teachers, graduate students and alumni of the European University at St. Petersburg. I would like to express special gratitude to V.Ya. Gelman and Yu.D. Shevchenko, whose advice and comments contributed a lot to the content of my work, as well as M.Yu. Kondratyeva, who kindly took on a significant part of the organizational burdens associated with the reprint of the book.