The end of the 19th - the beginning of the 20th century is one of the most intense and difficult periods in national and world history. The era of reforms, which became the main content of this historical period, reflected the main economic interests and contradictions of various social groups and strata of Russian society. However, the period itself ended, unfortunately, not with a successful reform of the economy, but with revolutionary upheavals (the revolution of 1905-1907), which caused irreparable damage to the development of productive forces and the entire system of economic relations in our country. Let's try to understand this issue.

The task of solving the urgent problems of the country's development during this period fell to the lot of S.Yu. Witte (1849-1915), who believed that it was necessary to reform the Russian industry and, relying on its potential, get out of economic backwardness and firmly take its place among the advanced, civilized states.

The career of the future reformer developed quite successfully. On February 15, 1892, he was appointed manager of the Ministry of Railways, and in 1893 he became the Minister of Finance of Russia.

Considering that the reform of Russian industry is generally very sluggish, with failures, he drew attention to the growing social tension in the country. But S. Yu. Witte failed to prevent the revolution of 1905-1907, since for this it was necessary to solve the main economic issue - agrarian. And for the reformer, the main issue was the development of Russian industry and the financial system. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was the peasant masses that became the main driving force of the revolution of 1905-1907. They wanted to own the land. And this task was not solved either by S.Yu. Witte's predecessors or by him. Over time, S.Yu. Witte realized the need for an immediate solution to the agrarian issue. But time has been lost. This is perhaps the most important miscalculation of the reformer.

But let us turn, first of all, to the assessment of the reformer's activity by his contemporaries and descendants, and to the very ideology of S.Yu. Witte's economic and social reforms. Almost all of these activities were perceived as positive light. Even during the Stalin period and during the years of stagnation, the attitude of the Soviet leaders towards the reformer was quite benevolent. The works of S. Yu. Witte were published, his name was mentioned in historical and economic works, his activities, although interpreted in a strictly class spirit, nevertheless received a fairly high assessment.

Such a benevolent attitude towards S.Yu. Witte can be explained by a number of reasons . Firstly, almost all historians used the analysis of the reformer's activities as a means of belittling the role of Emperor Nicholas II in the development of the Russian economy. Secondly, the idea of ​​industrialization, put forward by S.Yu. Witte, in some ways turned out to be very consonant with the ideas of the Bolsheviks about the ways of industrializing the country. In particular, the electrification plan (GOELRO) of V.I. Lenin and the industrialization program of I.V. Stalin. Third Focusing on the merits of S.Yu. Witte, historians of past years obscured or even denied the contribution to the development of the national economy of another outstanding reformer, his successor as head of government, P.A. Stolypin. V.I. Lenin, for example, openly opposed " progressive» S.Yu. Witte « conservative»To P.A. Stolypin. This far-fetched approach began to be overcome in our science only in the 1990s. 20th century



The difference between the two major reformers of Russia at the beginning of the late 19th and early 20th centuries lies, in essence, in the fact that for this they chose different priorities: for S.Yu. Witte, industry and finance became such a priority, for P.A. Stolypin - agriculture economy.

One of the major economic and political events of S.Yu. Witte was the conclusion of a customs agreement with Germany. On this issue between Russia and Germany in the 90s of the nineteenth century there was a real "customs war". In response to the high customs import duties on Russian bread, established by the German side, S. Yu. Witte passed through the State Council a law declaring the minimum tariff rates that existed in Russia for countries that adhered to the most favored nation practice. Since Germany did not belong to the category of such countries, import rates on German exports were increased. Objectively, Germany was interested in good economic relations with Russia. German capital actively penetrated the developing Russian market. Among the most active businessmen who mastered the Russian industry were such magnates as A. Krupp and E.V. Siemens It is known that A. Krupp turned to the Russian government for help, and his son Alfred offered his cannons to the tsar. The entire history of Siemens und Halske was also inextricably linked with Russia.

Under these conditions, Germany made concessions, and the "firm" policy of S. Yu. Witte won. Under the new customs treaty, concessions to Germany were fixed in 1894. In the practice of interstate economic relations, even a new word has appeared - retortion, which means taking retaliatory measures to protect their interests. True, later, again returning to the customs tariff, S.Yu. Witte made concessions to Germany and concluded an agreement unfavorable for our economy. Whether it was dictated by political necessity or was it a miscalculation of the minister - one can judge in different ways.

But the following should be noted. Under S.Yu. Witte, corruption increased noticeably in the “corridors of power”. S.Yu. Witte himself and a number of members of his cabinet were shareholders of many foreign companies, for example, the English gold mining corporation Lena Goldfields. Therefore, decisions on duties, quotas and other issues of foreign economic policy were often decided taking into account the personal interests of the reformer himself and his entourage.

Another important event, organized and carried out with the direct participation of S. Yu. Witte, was the introduction in 1895 of the state wine monopoly. The world practice of those years knew only two forms of organizing the "drinking business": excise And ransom. For Russia, the presence of the latter system was historically characteristic. The gradual transition to an excise system was slow and inefficient. S. Yu. Witte decided to accelerate this process. Taking on the solution of this problem and introducing a wine monopoly in the country, S. Yu. Witte formally wanted to streamline both the production and sale of alcohol in the domestic Russian market, make exports more rational, provide reliable sources of budget replenishment, and limit drunkenness in the country. But, in practice, drunkenness became more and more widespread, and the budget became more and more “drunk”. Between 1893 and 1899, "a quarter of the state budget revenue came from vodka."

Authorship in the introduction of the wine monopoly, according to S. Yu. Witte, belonged to Alexander III. The real meaning of the whole undertaking was, first of all, to ensure that additional revenues from the introduction of excise taxes on wine products go to the budget, and not into the pockets of private individuals (farmers). fiscal the direction of S.Yu. Witte's anti-alcohol campaign was obvious. The multi-million peasant masses gained nothing from such a "solution" of the alcohol question. Not only did they not join a healthy lifestyle, but they also lost an affordable way to replenish their meager family budget through moonshining. Declaring the growth of expenses for the production of state-owned alcohol, S. Yu. Witte himself, and then his successors, repeatedly raised the price of alcohol.

The introduction of the wine monopoly was accompanied by an increase in the number of popular unrest, an increase in the number of "hot spots" in the country. Nevertheless, in 1897 the profit from the wine monopoly to the budget amounted to 52 million rubles. And by 1905 it had increased to 365 million rubles. Subsequently, it increased to 543 million rubles.

An important undertaking of the reformer was the implementation monetary reform 1987. It is often identified with the introduction of the gold ruble into circulation. Many scientists considered and consider S. Yu. Witte to be perhaps the most outstanding merit. However, it had both positive and negative sides. The contemporaries of the reformer drew attention to the negative aspects of the monetary reform of 1897 and its socio-economic consequences. Among them were such prominent scientists-economists as A. A. Lopukhin, P. Migulin, P. Kh.

The introduction of the gold currency was also accompanied by certain miscalculations and did not give the effect that S.Yu. Witte. This can be explained in different ways. One of the explanations can be that the gold currency did not fully fulfill the functions of a medium of exchange and a means of payment, since part of it settled in personal savings boxes and bank safes, was a means of accumulation (formation of treasures), a means of insuring the population against possible economic turmoil during the post-reform period. The lost Russo-Japanese War also played a significant role here.

Another explanation for why the monetary reform did not give the desired effect, although it contributed to the improvement of the sphere of circulation, can be the fact that the mass of gold currency issued into circulation channels did not at all correspond to the mass of securities and paper money circulating on an extremely disorganized and weakly developed Russian market. In this case, too, gold was, in accordance with the canons of political economy, simply forced out of circulation.

S. Yu. Witte recklessly believed that by manipulating the price of gold it was possible to solve the problems of the economy. What has this led to in practice? Monetary reform contributed to the fact that paper money received public status second rate money. And this further contributed to the unwinding of the inflationary spiral. There was a public distrust of paper money, there were inflationary expectations. Instead of strengthening paper notes, the gold currency weakened them. The main holders of paper money were the masses of ordinary peasants. It was they who were the least socially protected.

The very mechanism for implementing the monetary reform turned out to be absurdly simple. The old gold coins were simply overvalued. The price of gold in them was increased by 1.5 times. Former coin denomination of 10 rubles. was renamed in gold imperial and began to cost 15 rubles. Accordingly, a coin of half a gold piece with a denomination of 5 rubles. became known as semi-imperial and cost 7.5 rubles. The content of precious metals in the new Russian monetary unit has repeatedly decreased, and the sample has also changed. This phenomenon is called devaluation.

The colossal damage that this reform inflicted on the peasants can be judged at least by this fact: only for the period from 1897 to 1904. 670 peasant uprisings took place in Russia. For some reason, no one has paid any attention to these weaknesses of S.Yu. Witte's monetary reform.

It should be noted that Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century just entered into monopoly stage of economic development. Historically, it fell to S.Yu. Witte to carry out the reorganization (modernization) of the Russian financial system. Realizing the role of the financial system in such modernization, he actively encouraged the development of a system of commercial banks and commercial credit, and contributed to attracting foreign capital to Russia. In the 1900s he actively carried out banking reform and contributed to the creation of the stock market in Russia by encouraging the organization of stock departments on commodity exchanges. But this undertaking was controversial: the stock departments created at the commodity exchanges had to report through the Ministry of Finance, while the exchanges themselves reported through the Ministry of Trade. It is known that "seven nannies have a child without an eye." And so it happened.

The government of S.Yu. Witte considered the development of domestic industry to be the most important issue of its domestic policy. During the years of S.Yu. Witte's government leadership, more than 205 large foreign companies appeared in the country, and their total number was 241 companies. The most favorable conditions were created for them. In general, out of 1292 Russian joint-stock companies operating in the country by 1903, 794 appeared precisely in the period 1892-1902.

Trying to expand the investment base of Russian industry, S. Yu. Witte stepped up the practice of attracting foreign investment to an unprecedented scale. It was under S.Yu. Witte that Russia received up to 3 billion gold rubles. external loans. The gold reserves of the country in 1897 amounted to 1 billion.95 million rubles. It was the world's largest concentration of gold. For example, in terms of the Russian currency, France had only 478.7 million rubles. gold, and the UK - 202.6 million rubles. It also contributed to the expansion of foreign capital into Russian industry and the takeover of Russian enterprises by foreign companies.

But, already at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia occupied a modest fourth place in the world in terms of gold mining. In fact, gold mining was not enough for such a huge country as ours. Compare: gold mining in Russia in 1913 reached 49 tons. Whereas in South Africa, 274 tons of gold were mined per year. From this it is clear that the monetary reform of S.Yu. Witte significantly reduced the country's gold reserves and was not supported by the necessary rates of gold mining. The result was an increase in the country's external debt and further devaluation of the national currency.

Many circumstances (the beginning of the gradual loss of their monetary functions by precious metals, gold mining, which is rather modest in physical terms, etc.) did not contribute to the successful implementation of the monetary reform. In the context of the processes of social differentiation that intensified in our country at the beginning of the 20th century, this reform turned out to be socially unoriented and was carried out without the necessary set of preventive measures.

The introduction of gold circulation in Russia was accompanied by a series of conversion loans abroad. The purpose of these loans was to exchange old 5- and 6-percent bonds that were in circulation on foreign markets for loans with lower interest and longer maturities. The implementation of these loans made it possible to stabilize the ruble, the metal content of which was reduced by one third. The credit ruble was equated to 66 2/3 kopecks in gold. The issuing activity of the State Bank was also limited, which could issue credit notes not backed by gold in the amount of not more than 300 million rubles. These measures made it possible to strengthen the convertibility of the Russian currency on world markets and facilitate the inflow of foreign capital into the country.

However, on the whole, the monetary reform could not prevent not only a decline in agriculture, but also the onset of a crisis in 1900 in industry. Nor did it prevent Russia from becoming the world's largest debtor. It was under S.Yu. Witte that Russia received 3 billion gold rubles of external loans. To pay for them, additional revenues were needed, which the cabinet of S.Yu. Witte tried to get by introducing new (indirect) taxes. Excises were introduced on consumer goods: matches, kerosene, tobacco, sugar, vodka, cotton fabrics, etc. The overall growth of indirect taxes during the 90s of the nineteenth century. amounted to more than 40%.

As for the solution of the agrarian issue, in this area the government decided to create a "Special Conference" (1902-1905) in order to study this issue. The main problem here was the fate of the peasant community. S.Yu. Witte's attempts to revise the peasant legislation ran into resistance from the head of the editorial commission V.K. Pleve (former Minister of the Interior) and essentially failed. Nevertheless, the reformer outlined the main provisions of his program for the revision of peasant legislation in his “Note on the Peasant Case” (1904). In it, the author argued that the main obstacle to the development of the countryside is the legal "disorganization" of the peasants, their property and social "incompleteness". At the same time, S.Yu. Witte considers the community as a factor that fetters the entrepreneurial spirit and initiative of the peasants. But, taking into account the instructions given by Emperor Nicholas II in the Manifesto of February 26, 1903 and in the decree to the Senate of February 8, 1904, the reformer actually agreed with the principle of the inviolability of the community and the inviolability of allotment agriculture.

However, the fate of the peasant communities remained one of the main topics for discussion. At the beginning of the twentieth century, all of Russia was covered with a network of local provincial and noble county committees chaired by governors and marshals of the nobility. In total, 82 provincial and regional and 536 county and district committees were created. To all appearances, the composition of the committees in the vast majority of cases ruled out raising the question of eliminating land shortages and debt bondage of the peasants. And this nullified the work of the "Special Meeting". In this situation, S.Yu. Witte sharply opposes the development of the Zemstvo movement in the country, seeing in it not only the development of local self-government, but also a threat to the monarchy. In a confidential note to the Minister of the Interior, I.L. Goremykin, he directly stated: “The Zemstvo is essentially a constitutional, people-governing institution and in a monarchical system - it is a poor tool in management.” Comments, as they say, are unnecessary.

On the other hand, the question of reforming the zemstvos as a primordially Russian form of local self-government is ripe. Zemstvo theme has taken a special place in the domestic policy of the government. S.Yu. Witte opposed the development of the zemstvo movement and the expansion of its competencies. He prepared a special note "Explanation of the Minister of Finance on the note of the Minister of the Interior on the political significance of zemstvo institutions" (1898). In it, the author proved the thesis about the incompatibility of local self-government and autocracy. Strongly objecting to the introduction of new zemstvo institutions and expanding the range of issues within their competence, the reformer tried to absolve himself of the accusations of persecuting the zemstvos and stated that he did not propose to abolish the zemstvo institutions, but only intended to improve them.

After a short resignation (October 1905), S.Yu. Witte became the head of the government for the second time. rules". Sending troops to suppress "unrest", he demanded from both the army and the police "to deal with the rebels in the most merciless way." His former fascination with the ideas of freedom, equality, civil rights was gradually lost in the general negative and pessimistic attitude towards the events.

An important milestone in the history of Russia was the Russo-Japanese War. On the night of January 27 (February 8), 1904, ten Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian squadron in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. The next day, six Japanese cruisers and eight destroyers attacked the Varyag cruiser in the Korean port of Chemupolio. Only on January 28, Japan officially declared war on Russia. During this war, several major battles took place on land. In August - the battle of Lyaoliang, where the Russian army lost 17 thousand soldiers, and the Japanese - 24 thousand. A month later - on the Shahe River, where the losses were even greater, respectively 42 thousand and 30 thousand. The battle of Mukden became the bloodiest in February - March 1905, in which the Russian army lost 80 thousand people. and Japanese - 70 thousand people. The total losses of Russia in the war amounted to about 400 thousand people, and Japan - about 300 thousand people. The Battle of Tsushima at sea was also unsuccessful.

Russia found itself virtually isolated in the international arena. She lost the Russo-Japanese War not only because of her economic backwardness, but also because of the actual support of her enemy by Britain and the United States. Characteristically, US President T. Roosevelt warned France and Germany that if they tried to oppose Japan, he would "immediately take her side and go as far as necessary." In May 1905, Nicholas II accepted the proposal of US President T. Roosevelt to mediate peace between Russia and Japan. Under the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Russia ceded lease rights in Manchuria to Japan, gave away half of Sakhalin Island, and recognized the Korean Peninsula as a "sphere of Japanese interests."

Thus, Russia's "Far Eastern policy" turned out to be untenable. And one of its ideologists was S.Yu. Witte. It was on his initiative that in the summer of 1895, surveys began for laying a railway through Manchuria to Chinese ports. But already by 1900-1901, the railway and engineering structures were badly damaged due to chronic underfunding for its maintenance. In the future, the government essentially ignored the need to strengthen the Far Eastern borders of the country. It is interesting that instead of organizing their own shipyards in the Far East, the cabinet of S.Yu. Witte bought used military ships from other countries and "distilled" them across the entire oceans. Thus, the very worn-out cruisers Nissin and Kassuga, which by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War were still in the southern hemisphere, were bought from Argentina, through the mediation of Italy. This is a vivid example of S.Yu. Witte's "economical military strategy".

The results of the war could not but affect the domestic political situation. In September-October 1905, a general strike swept Russia. In this situation, S.Yu. Witte, who by that time was nicknamed “Count Polusakhalinsky” in society, began to persuade the tsar to make political concessions. The manifesto "On the improvement of the state order" of October 17, 1905 really became a turning point in the history of Russia. In accordance with the Manifesto, the people were "granted" some civil liberties, and part of the power was transferred to the State Duma. On February 20, 1906, another tsarist manifesto appeared, which stipulated that some of the members of the Duma were appointed by the tsar, and some were recruited by representatives of the clergy, nobility, zemstvos and from “other organizations”. April 23, 1906 Nicholas II approved a new version of the Basic Laws of the Russian Empire. In accordance with this edition, "no new law could follow without the approval of the State Council and the State Duma." The autocracy that formally remained in Russia ceased to be such in essence. Elections to the First State Duma were held in February - March 1906. However, its activities were not supported by the government and on July 9, 1906 it was dissolved. Elections to the Second State Duma were held in January-February 1907. But it, due to the polarization of political forces in it, turned out to be incapacitated.

Thus, the political reforms initiated by S.Yu. Witte did not give the expected result.

In this regard, the attitude of Emperor Nicholas II towards him noticeably changed. Many things were blamed on the prime minister: both his “constitutional aspirations” and pressure on the tsar on the issue of publishing the Manifesto on October 17, 1905, and his flirting with anti-monarchist political leaders in the State Duma, and his concessions to the demands of the Japanese delegation on the issue of Sakhalin, and his duplicity and intrigue. Characteristic in this sense is the position of Nicholas II, which he outlined in a letter to Empress Maria Feodorovna (the emperor’s mother) on January 2, 1906: “No, never, as long as I am alive, I will not entrust this person with the smallest business. I have never seen such a chameleon."

A few months later, on April 14, 1906, S.Yu. Witte, feeling that clouds were gathering over him and he could simply be fired from service, was forced to submit his resignation. In retirement, he tried to be active in politics, but he succeeded less and less. On the night of February 25, 1915, he died, a little before reaching the age of 65. The ashes of the "great" reformer were buried in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra.

Of course, the very figure of S.Yu. Witte, and his reforms are ambiguous, contradictory, somewhat incomplete. There are different opinions about them to this day. But, as the wise saying goes, a person should be judged not for what he did not do or what he did not have time to do, but for what he did, what he managed to do. And in this sense, the reforms of S.Yu. Witte became an important milestone in the history of Russia. They completed its development in the nineteenth century. and paved the way for the 20th century.

Control questions

1. What were the strengths and weaknesses of S.Yu. Witte's economic reforms?

2. How do you assess the political activity of S.Yu. Witte?

3. What are the reasons and what are the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War?

4. What was the essence of the "agrarian question", and what was the role of S.Yu. Witte in its solution?

Literature

Witte S.Yu. Memories. In 3 vols. M., 1960.

Glazunov I.S., Bolshakov V.I. The role of S.Yu. Witte in the destruction of imperial Russia // Proceedings of the VI International Ilyinsky Scientific and Theological Readings. Ekaterinburg. 2008

Litvak V.G. The coup of 1861 in Russia: why the reformist alternative was not realized. M. 1991. P. 276.

Lednev V.P., Stozhko K.P. The fate of Russia. In 3 volumes. V.2. Yekaterinburg: Publishing House “Stag. 2011.

Oldenburg S.S. Reign of Emperor Nicholas II. Rostov n / a .: "Phoenix". 1998.

Ferro N. Nicholas II. M., 1991. P.83.

Sergei Yulievich Witte was one of the main supporters of Russia's modernization policy at the turn of the century. Having an excellent education, Witte had a chance to work with railways for about 20 years of his life, where he gained considerable experience. Therefore, his appointment to the post of Minister of Railways in 1892 was not surprising. In the same year, Witte was appointed to the post of Minister of Finance.

Industrial modernization required huge expenditures. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance, headed by Witte, had to show remarkable ingenuity. Indirect taxes (ie taxation on sugar, matches, tobacco, kerosene, registration of any documents, etc.) increased by 42.7%.

At the initiative of Witte in 1895 was introduced wine monopoly. The bulk of the produced and sold alcohol and alcoholic products was concentrated in the hands of the state. The time and place of alcohol trade (tents-"kazenki") were regulated. However, private individuals could also engage in distillery and vodka production, but only by order of the state and under the supervision of excise supervision. The state monopoly did not extend to the production of beer, mash and grape wine.

Thanks to this reform, a lot of money began to flow into the treasury: at least a million rubles a day. Thus, on average, the treasury received 530-540 million rubles a year, providing up to ¼ of the budget. Contemporaries rightly called the then treasury a "drunken budget." Witte himself wrote that he was carrying out a reform "in order to reduce public drunkenness."

The next stage of Witte's activity when he was Minister of Finance was monetary reform. The paper ruble was denominated by a third, but now it could be exchanged for gold. According to the law of 1895, all transactions were to be paid either in gold or in paper rubles at their exchange rate to gold on the day of payment. Old gold coins were exchanged at the rate of 10 old rubles = 15 new and 5 old = 7.5 new. The final stage of the reform was the law of 1897, according to which the State Bank had the right to issue money in the amount of no more than 300 million rubles. Thus, the devaluation of the ruble by 1/3 and the restriction of money supply provided all paper banknotes in circulation with the country's gold reserves. Russia has received a stable stable currency of the European level. This caused a real boom in banking. The introduction of the gold standard contributed to the influx of foreign capital, which contributed to the development of industry. Over the past five years of the nineteenth century, the amount of foreign capital in Russia has increased from 200 to 900 million rubles. At their expense, about 40% of investments in industry were covered, and the ruble itself turned into a convertible currency. S.Yu. Witte gained fame as a defender of the Russian ruble.

Thanks to the activities of Witte, an active railway construction. The Ministry of Finance used such a method of raising funds for the construction of railways and enterprises of relevant industries as government loans from banks and the public. The receipt of income from this was guaranteed by the state. Under Witte, the length of railways increased from 29,000 to 59,000 versts.

Witte also conducted protectionism. Customs duties protected domestic producers, encouraging healthy competition and the competitiveness of Russian producers. By introducing incentive premiums for the export of products, changing the rates of customs duties and creating favorable conditions in various industries, the state achieved an active trade balance.

The treasury benefited greatly from the increase in prices for consumer goods. And in 1898, a law was approved, according to which the amount of taxation was determined by the production capacity of the enterprise, and not by the belonging of its owner to a particular guild. At the same time, Russia takes large foreign loans, becoming a debtor country. The debt to the Western states has reached more than 1 billion rubles.

Thanks to Witte's activity, there was a sharp jump in industry, an industrial boom began, and the Russian market gradually integrated into the global one. However, the economic crisis of 1900-1903, closely related to the European monetary crisis of 1899, greatly reduced the rate of industrial growth. The crisis manifested itself in a fall in prices for the main types of manufactured products, because of which they lost profitability and 4 thousand enterprises were closed, and tens and hundreds of thousands of workers found themselves on the street. Witte was accused of destroying Russian economic foundations and selling out Russia to foreign banks, and then dismissed in August 1903.

What are the results of the reforms carried out by Witte? They should be divided into positive and negative.

to the positive First of all, we should attribute the huge industrial and competitive (due to the policy of protectionism) potential that Russia received. Thanks to him, Russia turned into a huge industrial power, where agriculture ceased to play its fundamental role. New and modern branches of production arose. The railway construction was also the most important positive achievement. In addition, Russia has finally managed to get a stable European-class currency thanks to monetary reform, which has made it attractive for foreign investment. It is impossible not to note the positive result of the introduced wine monopoly, which gave the treasury a lot of money.

But at the same time, all these reforms had a downside. Negative Consequences here are the following.

If we take the introduced wine monopoly, then because of it, mass drinking of the population began. The state was interested in large incomes from the sale of alcoholic beverages, and therefore the “breech” tents worked seven days a week and holidays from 7 am to 10 pm. And the prices were relatively affordable.

If we take Witte's desire to support Russian modernization, then we must also remember the external debt that Russia received. In addition, the integration of Russia into the world market eventually became one of the reasons for the protracted crisis of 1900-1903.

A certain dependence of the industry on foreign capital, as well as the dependence of Russian exports and, accordingly, incomes, on foreign markets has also become a negative consequence.

In addition, at the newly opened enterprises, the labor of numerous workers was used, which neither the state nor the owners of enterprises cared about. Low wages, terrible living conditions, high mortality and injury rates, a system of fines, and so on - all this led to their discontent, increased revolutionary sentiment and anger against the owners. And any crisis could lead to the closure of the enterprise and, as a result, to the dismissal of workers, because of which the “flame of the revolutionary movement” could easily flare up. But instead of economic methods of dealing with the difficult situation of the workers, it was easier for the state to use its old methods: bureaucratic red tape and armed suppression of strikes and strikes. That is why the revolutions of 1905-1906 were rapidly approaching. and 1917

Nevertheless, the main result of Witte's reforms is a strong industry with a developed industrial infrastructure. It was during the Witte period that Russia received a powerful industrial base. And this conclusion was subsequently confirmed by time: those subsequent finance ministers (E.D. Pleske and V.N. Kokovtsov), who replaced Witte, no longer thought about any further industrial development of Russia, but focused entirely on financing the Russian-Japanese war and averting financial disaster.

The main task of S.Yu. Witte was the creation of an independent national industry, protected at first from foreign competition by a customs barrier, with a strong regulatory role of the state, which, in his opinion, should ultimately strengthen Russia's economic and political position in the international arena.

“The creation of our own industry is the fundamental, not only economic, but also political task, which is the cornerstone of our protection system.”

After becoming finance minister, Witte inherited the Russian budget with a deficit of 74.3 million rubles.

Expenditure items of the budget with an active policy of industrial development grew rapidly: from 1893 to 1903 they almost doubled - from 1040 to 2071 billion rubles. At first, he thought to get additional funds simply by increasing the work of the printing press. This idea caused panic among financiers, and Witte soon realized the fallacy of such a move. Now he associated the elimination of the deficit with an increase in the profitability of industry and transport, and a revision of the taxation system. A significant role in increasing the income item was played by the introduction in 1894 of the state monopoly on the sale of wine and vodka products, which provided up to a quarter of all revenues to the treasury.

At the same time, the preparation of a monetary reform continued, with the aim of introducing gold circulation in Russia. Witte continued with a series of foreign conversion loans, the task of which was to exchange old 5- and 6-percent bonds that were in circulation on foreign markets for loans with lower interest and longer maturities. He managed to do this by expanding the French, English and German money markets to accommodate Russian securities. The most successful were the loans of 1894 and 1896, concluded on the Paris stock exchange, which made it possible to carry out a number of measures to stabilize the ruble exchange rate and, from 1897, switch to gold circulation. The metal content of the ruble was reduced by 1/3 - the credit ruble was equated to 66 1/3 kopecks in gold. The emission activity of the State Bank was limited: it could issue credit notes not backed by gold reserves in the amount of no more than 300 million rubles. These measures made it possible to strengthen the convertibility of the Russian currency on world markets and facilitate the inflow of foreign capital into the country.

The issue of monetary reform (i.e., the introduction of monetary circulation) was one of the most difficult. The fact is that not a single member of the financial committee knew how to carry out a metallic monetary reform. There were also no sensible books in Russian on this subject. Russia has lived on a money system based on credit notes since the Sevastopol war for several decades, all the generations living at that time (late 80s) did not know and did not see metal circulation. Neither universities nor higher schools read the correct theory of money circulation, at least they did not read the basics of metallic money circulation, and they did not read it for the simple reason that this circulation did not exist in reality, and therefore it had, as it were, rather theoretical rather than practical.

As Witte recalls: “Many theoreticians and practitioners, for whom the advantage of metallic circulation over paper circulation was not a question, but an axiom, nevertheless hesitated when it came to whether to introduce a monetary circulation based on gold alone, or a money circulation based on silver, or on the joint circulation of money of two metals, both gold and silver, can be introduced. There was no unanimity among the people who stood for monetary circulation.

Since the second half of the 1990s, Witte's economic program has taken on more and more distinct contours. His course towards the industrialization of the country provoked protests from the local nobility. Both liberals and conservatives were united by the rejection of the methods of implementing this course, which affected the fundamental interests of the agrarians. As for the claims of the landowners, they were both real and far-fetched. Indeed, the protective customs system led to an increase in the prices of manufactured goods, which could not but affect the rural owners. They also saw the infringement of their interests in the transfer of funds to the commercial and industrial sphere, which could not but affect the modernization of agriculture. Even gold circulation turned out to be unprofitable for exporting landowners, since the increase in prices for agricultural products reduced their competitiveness in the world market. But most of all, the reactionary nobility dissatisfied with Witte's views on the future of Russia, in which the upper class was not assigned the former leading role. The minister and his policy were subjected to especially massive attacks during the work of a special meeting on the affairs of the nobility, created by order of Nicholas II (1897-1901) to develop a program of assistance to the upper class. The criticism was so fierce that because of the claims of the reactionary-conservative forces, which demanded the restoration of the former socio-economic and political status of the nobility, which was contrary to the current policy, the question actually became of which direction and which way to go further than Russia.

In his speeches at meetings and his notes to Sovereign Witte, he repeatedly showed that the government cares about the local nobility (the organization of cheap and preferential loans, and the special tariff policy of the government, etc. were transferred to the landlords).

In one of his first meetings, Witte, abandoning the idea of ​​Russia's exclusivity and originality. Witte convinced his opponents that the decisive role in the life of industry is the transition from land ownership, agriculture to industry, banks. He believed that the nobility had one way out - to become bourgeois, to engage in other forms of economy besides agriculture.

The meeting made a lot of efforts, completely, as it turned out, fruitless and unsuccessful, to maintain and restore the former position of the upper class. Witte did not give up his goal and repeatedly defended his course towards the industrialization of the country. In his reports, he persistently urged the king to strictly adhere to the program of creating his own national industry. To solve this problem, it was proposed, firstly, to continue the policy of protectionism and, secondly, to attract more foreign capital into industry. Both of these methods required certain sacrifices, but the ultimate goal, according to Witte's deep conviction, justified these means.

However, what became obvious to the Minister of Finance met with almost no sympathy from the meeting participants. In 1899 and 1900, Witte proposed and persuaded the tsar in 1899 and 1900 to solve the program of creating his own industry, firstly, to continue the policy of protectionism and, secondly, to attract more foreign capital into industry. Both of these methods required certain sacrifices, especially on the part of landowners and rural owners. But the ultimate goal, according to Witte, justified these means. By this time, the final folding of his concept of industrialization of the country belongs, the policy of the Ministry of Finance has become purposeful - within about ten years to catch up with the more industrially developed countries, taking a strong position in the markets of the countries of the Near, Middle and Far East.

Witte expected to ensure the accelerated industrial development of the country by attracting foreign capital, domestic savings, with the help of a wine monopoly, strengthening taxation, by increasing the profitability of the national economy and customs protection of industry from foreign competitors, by activating Russian exports.

Witte managed to some extent to achieve the implementation of their plans. Significant shifts have taken place in the Russian economy. During the industrial boom of the 90s, which coincided with its activity, industrial production actually doubled, 40% of all enterprises operating by the beginning of the 20th century were put into operation, and the same number of railways were built, including the great Trans-Siberian Railway, in the construction to which Witte made a considerable personal contribution. As a result, Russia, in terms of the most important economic indicators, approached the leading capitalist countries, taking fifth place in world industrial production, almost equaling France. But the lag behind the West, both in absolute terms and especially in per capita consumption, was still quite significant.

At the same time, it should be noted that Witte's industrial policy was deeply contradictory at its core, for he used the means and conditions generated by the feudal nature of the state administration system that existed in Russia for the industrial development of the country. The conservatism of Witte's system also consisted in the fact that it actually helped to strengthen the economic base of the reactionary absolutist regime.

Witte paid much attention to the training of personnel for industry and trade. Under him, by 1900, 3 polytechnic institutes, 73 commercial schools were established and equipped, several industrial and art institutions were established or reorganized.

Witte's activity was less successful in the sphere of the agrarian sector of the economy, although it is obviously impossible to completely blame him for this. For all his rejection of noble claims to the government, he made a lot of efforts to provide the landowners with the means to reorganize their farms. Witte stepped up the activities of credit institutions.

S.Yu. Witte realized that the difficult economic situation in the countryside led to a decline in the solvency of the peasants and that this, in turn, undermined the state budget and the domestic market of industry. He saw the way out of the aggravated crisis in the elimination of the legal isolation of the peasants, their property and civil inferiority. However, Witte's proposal to create a special commission on this issue was not successful. The reason for this was the illusion of a wonderful position in all areas. The outbreak of the financial and industrial crisis showed that everything was not so good and was the reason for the creation of a number of commissions and committees to revise peasant legislation.

The outbreak of the financial and industrial crisis, crop failures in 1899 and 1901, and major peasant unrest in 1902 forced Nicholas II to create a series of commissions and meetings to revise peasant legislation and develop measures to improve agriculture.

One of the most important of these bodies is the Special Testament on the needs of the agricultural industry (1902-1905) and was headed by Witte. And again, he had to develop and defend his program in a fierce struggle with reactionary-conservative circles. Witte outlined the main provisions of his program in the Note on the Peasant Affairs. In it, he argued that the main brake on the development of the countryside at the present time is the legal "disorganization" of the peasants, their property and social inferiority, this has an extremely negative effect on their personal farming. One of the most important of these depressive factors was, in his opinion, the community, which fettered the peasant entrepreneurial spirit and hindered the rationalization of the economy.

At the same time, when setting out his program, Witte had to proceed from the contradictory guidelines of Nicholas II (1903-1904), according to which, on the one hand, the principle of maintaining the integrity of the community was to be the basis for the work of the commission and the meeting, and on the other hand - "Methods have been found to make it easier for individual peasants to leave the community."

Witte interpreted the inviolability of the community as the prohibition of any means of forcible influence on the exit from the community, as well as the forced retention of its members in it. In the class isolation of allotment landownership, he saw the best way to preserve small landed property. The Minister of Finance considered the prohibition of all attempts to put pressure on the community.

He achieved the abolition of the most difficult articles of peasant legislation. The conditions for the resettlement of peasants on free lands were invested, and the activities of the Peasants' Bank were expanded. Thus, bourgeois principles and feudal remnants intertwined in the agrarian program.

In the history of Russia in the late XIX - early XX centuries. S.Yu. Witte occupies an extremely important place. The head of the Ministry of Railways, the long-term Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, the first head of the Council of Ministers, a member of the State Council - these are the official posts of this political figure, who has become a symbol of the possibility and at the same time the helplessness of the state system.

In 1892, Witte took over as Minister of Finance. Witte's most important task was to encourage the development of domestic industry. He considered industry to be the locomotive of the national economy. In his work, he relied on the concept of Friedrich List - “ theory of national economy”, the essence of which was that “poor countries” need to achieve a balance of imports and exports with the help of customs protection.

Industrialization required significant capital investments from the budget, which was supposed to ensure the implementation of the developed policy. One of the directions of the reform he carried out was the introduction in 1894 of state wine monopoly, which became the main revenue item of the budget (365 million rubles per year). have been increased taxes, primarily indirect (they increased by 42.7% in the 1990s). Was introduced, i.e. free exchange of the ruble for gold.

The latter made it possible to attract foreign capital into the Russian economy, because foreign investors could now take gold rubles out of Russia. customs tariff protected domestic industry from foreign competition, the government encouraged private enterprise. During the years of the economic crisis of 1900-1903. the government generously subsidized both public and private enterprises. Gets spread concession system, the issuance of government orders to entrepreneurs for a long time at inflated prices. All this was a good stimulus for domestic industry.

However, the process of industrialization in Russia was contradictory. Capitalist methods of management (profit, cost, etc.) did not touch the public sector of the economy - the largest in the world. These were defense factories. And this created a certain imbalance in the capitalist development of the country.

In his reforming activities, Witte had to experience resistance from the aristocracy and higher officials, who had a great influence on the reigning persons. The most active opponent of Witte was the Minister of the Interior VC. Plehve. His course of social policy is opposition to reforms, upholding conservative principle of development, retaining invariably the privileges of the nobility to power, and, consequently, the preservation of feudal remnants. This trend of confrontation between reforms and counter-reforms at the turn of the two centuries ended not in Witte's favor.

Changes in the world economic situation at the turn of the XIX - XX centuries. led to a crisis in industries that developed intensively in the 90s. — metallurgy, mechanical engineering, oil and coal mining industry. The minister's opponents accused him of the decline in Russian production, called his policy adventurous and disastrous for Russia. Dissatisfaction with Witte's policy led to his resignation in 1903.

He returned to the political arena in the autumn 1905 as heads of the Council of Ministers. In August 1905, he managed to conclude the Peace of Portsmouth with Japan, for this diplomatic success, Nicholas II granted him the title of count. The Russian reformer was again in demand in the political life of the country.

Witte Sergey Yulievich was born on June 17, 1849 in a family of Russified Germans. His youth was spent in Tiflis. Witte graduated from the Novorossiysk University in 1870, becoming a candidate of physical and mathematical sciences. But due to lack of funds, he preferred a scientific career to work on the Odessa railway. Starting in low positions, he soon rose to the position of manager of the Southwestern Railways. Having shown himself well in his later career, in 1892 he took the high post of Minister of Finance.

The industrialization of the country, conceived by the Minister of Finance Witte, required serious financial investments, and a generous source of replenishment of the budget was found. In 1894 the state wine monopoly was introduced. Also, taxes have gone up. In 1897, during the monetary reform of S. Yu. Witte, the gold standard was introduced, which allowed the free exchange of the ruble for gold. Witte's financial reform stimulated the inflow of foreign capital into the Russian economy. Now it was possible to export gold rubles from the country, which made Russia more attractive for investing funds of foreign companies. The domestic manufacturer was protected from fierce competition by the customs tariff. Witte's economic policy led to the stabilization of the ruble, making it one of the most stable world currencies.

It is worth noting that Witte had a considerable influence on domestic politics. Witte's domestic policy was aimed at strengthening the autocracy and was quite conservative. Foreign policy focused on counteracting the rise of Japanese influence in the Far East. For the conclusion of the Portsmouth peace with Japan in 1905, Witte received the title of count from Nicholas 2.

A brief biography of S. Yu. Witte would not be complete without mentioning his difficult relationship with Emperor Nicholas 2, who ascended the throne after Alexander 3, who favored his finance minister. He was not popular in high society either. Especially the rejection intensified after Witte's second marriage to Matilda Lisanevich, which was preceded by a loud scandal. However, it was in this marriage that Witte found personal happiness.

27. Features of the political system of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Politics in labor, national, agrarian questions.

28. The first Russian revolution of 1905-1907: causes, character, stages, meanings.

Causes:

    Unresolved agrarian question

    The contradiction between labor and capital, the deterioration of the situation of workers

    Lack of political freedoms

    The crisis of the system of relations between the center and the provinces, national regions

    Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War

Character:

    The first Russian revolution was - bourgeois-democratic. According to the composition of the participants - nationwide.

Goals of the revolution:

    The overthrow of the autocracy

    Convening a Constituent Assembly

    Establishment of a democratic order

    Elimination of landownership, allotment of land to peasants

    Introduction of freedom of speech, assembly, parties

    Elimination of estates

    Reducing the working day to 8 hours

    Achieving equal rights for the peoples of Russia

Stage 1 events:

    "Bloody Sunday" January 9, 1905. Workers peacefully marching to the tsar with a petition in St. Petersburg were shot, compiled under the leadership of G. Gapon.

    Revolutionary performances - a strike of workers in Ivanovo - Voznesensk. The emergence of the Council of Authorized Deputies - a new body of workers' power. May 1905

    Uprising on the battleship "Prince Potemkin - Tauride", June 1905

    Congresses of zemstvo representatives, peasant congress, political demands, May-June 1905.

    Decree of Nicholas II on the establishment of the State Duma ("Bulyginskaya" after the name of the Minister of Internal Affairs).