The main foreign policy tasks of this period were: stabilization of relations with European states (continuation of the policy of peaceful coexistence), elimination of the threat of the collapse of the socialist camp, support and propaganda of the socialist system in the third world countries.

The most important strategic task was to strengthen the shaken positions of the USSR in the socialist camp and among the communist parties of the Third World. In relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership was guided by the provision of somewhat greater economic and political freedom. The main emphasis was placed on strengthening economic cooperation (for example, supplying energy resources) and political consultations within the framework of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), which contributed to an increase in economic and political independence. In 1968, the Dubcek government in Czechoslovakia, trying to reduce dependence on the USSR and overcome the economic crisis, began a broad democratic transformation. The response was the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops (Soviet, German, Polish and Bulgarian) and the military suppression of the Czech social movement. In Romania, the government under the leadership of N. Ceausescu tried to pursue an independent foreign policy course.

Relations with China have worsened. In 1969, armed clashes broke out on the Soviet-Chinese border in the area of ​​Damansky Island (in the Far East) and Semipalatinsk (Central Asia), when more than a thousand people died. Relations with leading European countries (France, England) have improved.

1972 was a turning point in Soviet-American relations. In the same year, during the visit of American President Nixon to Moscow, an agreement was signed on strategic reductions ?; armaments (OSV-1), which imposed restrictions on the creation of anti-missile defense and intercontinental missiles. The introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 to support the communist movement triggered a new round of the Cold War. In 1979, NATO decided to deploy American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. In the early 80s. contacts with Western countries have practically ceased.

Ticket number 25/1

Political parties in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century: Classification, programs (the question of the state structure, agrarian, labor and national issues)

In the social and political movement in Russia at the beginning of the XX century. Various forces participated, which in different ways imagined ways of further development of the country. Three political camps were defined: the government camps, headed by K.P. Pobedonostsev and V.K. rights of the zemstvos, etc.) and revolutionary (for the violent overthrow of the autocracy, radical transformations). The revolutionary forces were the first to create their organizations. Their activities were based on socialist ideas (at the beginning of the century, Marxism was widespread in Russia, especially among the intelligentsia, students, etc.), which were understood and interpreted in different ways. “Legal Marxists” (PB Struve, MI Tugan-Baranovsky, NA Berdyaev, and others) developed the idea of ​​a gradual, evolutionary development of society and a natural change in the social order. Russian Marxists (G.V. Plekhanov, V.I. Lenin, P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Zasulich, L. Martov, A. N. Potresov and others) shared K. Marx's ideas about the historical mission of the working class , the violent overthrow of the existing system through a socialist revolution. Radical Social Democrats called a congress of their organizations to try to unite them into a party (Minsk, 1898). Its creation was completed at the Second Congress of the RSDLP (London, 1903) during fierce discussions (economists, “soft” and “hard” Iskra-ists, etc.). The congress adopted the party's charter and program, which consisted of two parts: a minimum program (overthrow of the autocracy, establishment of a democratic republic, improvement of the workers' position, solution of agrarian and national issues, etc.) and a maximum program (socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat) ... Lenin's supporters, the Bolsheviks, prevailed on most of the controversial issues. From the populist circles in 1902 arose the party of socialist-revolutionaries (SRs), who defended the interests of the working people - the peasantry, the proletariat, students, etc. Their program provided for the organization of society on communal-socialist principles, the "socialization" of the land. The methods of achieving goals are revolution and revolutionary dictatorship, tactics are individual terror. The leaders are V. M. Chernov and others. During the years of the revolution, after the publication of the Manifesto on October 17, liberal parties took shape. In October 1905 g. was created by the Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadets), or the party of "people's freedom". Its program, based on the ideas of Western European liberalism, included provisions on the introduction in the country of a constitution guaranteeing basic democratic rights and freedoms, giving the parliament (State Duma) legislative functions, transferring communal lands to peasants, etc. the Cadets assumed through a peaceful, parliamentary struggle. The leaders are P.N. Milyukov, P. B. Struve, G. E. Lvov, V. I. Vernadsky and others. financial bourgeoisie and landlords. Its program was aimed at establishing a strong government in the country enjoying the support of the people: preserving “one and indivisible Russia,” adopting a democratic constitution, etc. The Octobrists considered private property to be the basis of the economy. The mode of action is a dialogue with the authorities in the hope of transferring some of the functions of government administration into their hands. The leaders are A.I. Guchkov, D.N. “Russian People's Union named after Archangel Mikhail” (V.M. Purishkevich). The ideological basis is the theory of the official nationality ("Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality"): preserving the autocratic form of government, protecting the interests of the Great Russians, etc. In the struggle to implement their program, the Black Hundreds not only used the Duma tribune, but also resorted to violent methods (Jewish pogroms, etc.). Thus, a multi-party system developed in Russia, and various political forces were operating.

Not so long ago, 10-12 years ago, the situation in the world seemed to have taken place "forever". Leadership, as it seemed, was entrenched for the foreseeable future for highly developed countries (countries of the "golden billion"), armed with a liberal doctrine; the rest fell on the fate of dangling in the tail. The catch-up development model was portrayed as unfairly assessed and also "forever".

Nowadays, apparently, changes on a planetary scale, including those associated with a change in the leading countries, are not only ripe, but promise to be rapid. And the "leaders" are no longer the bearers of the liberal doctrine, but those whose ideology and with themselves, it would seem, have forever said goodbye - as unsuccessful, and in some cases unacceptable.

Very often they turn to Francis Fukuyama, who in 1990 declared the irrevocable world victory of the liberal model over the doctrines of socialism and statehood, which failed to prove their principles and essence. And at this time, in the vast world space, the liberals-market-makers are being supplanted by a fresh ideology and socio-economic practice, which unites the market with statehood, and democracy - with elements of authoritarianism. And these are not only the countries of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, China) that are overtaking the development, but also the growing signs of descent from the leader's pedestal yesterday, which were still unattainable to the United States and other countries of the liberal West.

The United States, like the countries of Western Europe, has always been based on the liberal model. Nevertheless, the West also helped the deliberately authoritarian, including bloody regimes, if it needed it.

At the same time, the West spread in non-Western countries the idea of ​​destructive authoritarianism. It was in the West that the ideas of the desirability of authoritarianism in states with transitional economies arose. G. Kissinger, J. Soros, Zb. At the initial stage of the collapse of the USSR, Brzezinski argued that authoritarianism could not be avoided in the "transitional period", because the backward market itself does not work effectively, hiding the threat of chaos, criminalization, and structural degradation.

These Western authors declared that in the post-Soviet economies, a market should first form and only then - after achieving social and economic well-being - democracy should gradually oust authoritarianism. However, the official West insisted on its own - it imposed a model of effective liberalism on countries that were not prepared for this.

The point is that it was easier for the West to take over the post-Soviet economy with the help of explosive liberalization.

Life has confirmed the exceptional benefits for the West from the "conquest" of the post-Soviet countries on the basis of the liberal model. However, those transition economies that have been able to resist liberal temptations have been successful. And the most powerful of them even began to constrain the previously unattainable West. Moreover, to constrain on a planetary scale.

Note that this kind of planned shift in the balance of power to the benefit of the asiatic is not at all a misunderstanding, not an accidental turn of history.

The Western world, which has achieved considerable success, is now "weakened"; he is experiencing social degradation. And this had a negative impact on economic growth, while the gigantic countries of Asia, being previously “thrown out” and humiliated, entered a phase of revival of values ​​and energy takeoff. It was the revival of values, and then a model of formation suitable for these values, that Asians opposed to the hype-consumer, emotional liberalism of the West.

The growing dominance of Asia over the losing position of the West is indicated, first of all, by countless forecasts and, what is even more significant, by the reality of today. At first, as expected, the rating agencies announced this. Then there was the final resolution of the UN World Conference on Demography (2004, Rio de Janeiro), where it was concluded that the Euro-Atlantic race had exhausted itself and was leaving the arena. And, in the end, the content of the report of the US National Intelligence Council to the US Congress "Report 2020" became shocking. The Report says that the United States and Western Europe will be ousted by the Asian giants (China and India) in the foreseeable future, that the 21st century will become the century of Asia led by China; that globalization itself is increasingly acquiring features of the Asian rather than Euro-Atlantic ones.

However, the explosive entry into the arena of Asians is not the success of China and India. Already in due time the leading positions were taken by Japan and the new industrial countries, or as they are also called "the countries of economic miracle" (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore). Even then, the world center of economic success moved to the East. Nevertheless, the West skillfully took advantage of the institutional vulnerability of these countries, and significantly "dumped" them with the help of the arranged world financial crisis of 1997-1998 and 2008.

For the cultures of the East, their values ​​are important from the point of view of identity; because it is precisely this that opposes the creative power of globalization. However, a Western man who is focused on consumer expansion is devoid of self-identification motives. The altered Western culture lacks arguments for upholding identity. The weakening of the spiritual and energy potential of the United States as the leader of the Euro-Atlantic culture is very often compensated for by the capture and imperial expansion of this country outside.

And it's no secret how all these aggressive methods of "revitalizing the spirit" end. The results of the experience of the USSR, which, on the basis of the same arguments, started the war with Afghanistan, are known to everyone. And the United States, which regarded September 11, 2001 as a "new Pearl Harbor", has already lost the remnants of its prestige both internally and externally. The desire of the US government to do away with not only Iraq, but also two other "axes of evil" has brought nothing but world embarrassment.

Secondly, the results of the East-West rivalry of values ​​now go beyond the framework of individual countries and even large regions. Moreover, it is the “supra-country”, general planetary consequences of value competition that are now the most important for the fate of mankind. In the current situation, since the civilizations of the East are leading, the Earth, as it were, makes a choice in favor of the bearers of values ​​that do not have a destructive effect on the planet. Just the Asian East, unlike the West, in its traditions treats nature with awe, adding itself to it from a cosmic standpoint. And if modern China, breaking out of poverty, is comparable to the United States in terms of damage to the planet's ecology, there is still a considerable difference between them.

Market, i.e. capital, in the USA (in contrast to China) is the main owner of the ongoing and the main engine of development, insofar as it does not have to wait for a voluntary slowdown in its turnover. For the market to be contained, it must be curbed. And this is impermissible for Western civilization. Therefore, when comparing the influences on the ecology of the two worlds - the West and the East - the proverb is applicable "if two do the same thing, it is not the same thing."

States claiming the title of leading countries need to form the appropriate institutions, the formation of which took the leading Western countries more than one century. In Asian countries, including Russia, such institutions are significantly undeveloped, and to some extent powerless. At the same time, lagging behind in innovations is like losing a leading position. The compensation for the institutional vacuum in such a situation is the art of administrative problem solving, including, if required, administrative pressure.

The full force of innovations often has to be used when contradictions arise in the interests of the population. That is, the essential diversion of funds from consumption needs for innovative accumulation can cause discontent among the broad masses. Going against the will of the people in this case is authoritarianism, but it can be salutary if the alternative is backwardness.

Countries claiming world domination cannot do without a balanced symbiosis of the market and democracy with elements of authoritarianism. This synthesis is not easy: it requires the high art of building institutions for regulating the system, as well as a gradual reduction in the share of authoritarianism. The main thing is that the success of such a synthesis is ensured by the revival of values ​​and a surge in spirituality.

The mechanism for selecting outstanding personalities, which is an inevitable companion of spiritual and moral uplift, also contributes to success. It is one thing if the will is imposed by Deng Xiaoping or De Gaulle, and another thing is Berlusconi. A leader who is authoritative in the eyes of the people, a leader-standard-bearer (M. Hermann), who, while modernizing the country, is able to change even centuries-old traditions.

The geopolitical situation in Europe and in the world after the First World War has undergone significant changes. The system of world equilibrium in the post-war period was disturbed by two factors: the Versailles Peace, which placed Germany in the most humiliating conditions, and the 1917 revolution in Russia. Both factors will become a source of new social upheavals and World War II: first, because such humiliation of an entire nation could not but push it towards revanchist sentiments; the second - because of the policy of the Bolsheviks, which led Russia to international isolation (due to the refusal to pay the debts of the tsarist government and a separate withdrawal from the war) and proclaimed a course towards the world proletarian revolution.

The Versailles Treaty put Germany in an extremely difficult position, in fact, in international isolation. This was facilitated both by the policy of the victorious powers, who placed it in an unequal position in the European community, and by the policy of Soviet Russia, which was in a similar position and therefore became a kind of “natural ally” of Germany, which took advantage of the situation and blackmailing the victor countries with the possibility of folding German -the Soviet Union, forced them to make certain concessions. Another reason for France, England and the United States to wish for an economic revival of Germany was that the impoverished country that Germany had turned into simply could not pay the huge reparations imposed on it.

France found itself in the most difficult condition: having lost its natural continental ally - Russia, it got next to a potentially more dangerous enemy than before the war - Germany. In addition, the French were worried about the Soviet-German rapprochement. During the 20s - 30s. France will try to rectify the situation by creating a system of alliances with the "small" countries of Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania). All this, together with the position of England, which had more moderate views on the position of Germany (caused by the reluctance on the part of Great Britain of French dominance on the continent), made it very difficult to achieve the main goal of French foreign policy - to preserve the situation in Europe in the form in which it was formed after world war.

The only country to benefit from the war was the United States of America, which went from a European debtor to a major creditor. Two directions have emerged in American foreign policy: the traditional, isolationist, and the new, internationalist. The supporters of the first insisted on the refusal of "automatic" participation in European affairs and extreme caution in matters of assuming international obligations. Supporters of the second spoke about the "historical mission" of the United States, calling it the world's first free country and a stronghold of democracy, whose mission is to bring the light of the liberal idea to all countries and peoples. The struggle of these directions ended with the victory of the internationalists. As a result, the interwar world turned out to be arranged in such a way that practically not a single serious problem of European politics could be solved without American participation. The United States continued to invest in Europe in peacetime, which, combined with the protectionist policy of European goods, which closed their access to the US domestic market, also adversely affected the European situation.

Naturally, the United States could not but offer its own version of the solution of the German question. Such a plan was the Dawes reparations plan, which was supposed to ensure the continued payment of reparations by Germany (and at the same time to open the German market to America as much as possible). His most important task was to stabilize the Deutsche Mark by providing Germany with a loan of 200 million dollars (of which more than half came from American banks). This plan established the size of payments to Germany and the control of the Allies over the German state budget, finances and railways. In 1929, due to the slow recovery of the German economy, this plan was revised. The new plan (Young's plan) provided for some reduction in the size of annual payments and the elimination of foreign control bodies. The adoption of Jung's plan had one distant, but very important consequence: it was during its approval that an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of allied forces from the Rhineland. This happened in the summer of 1930 and allowed Hitler to send German troops there in March 1936.

The First World War brought Japan to the number of active players in the world political arena, which has become a powerful dominant in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. For decades, lagging behind Western countries in terms of technology, it needed colonies where it could export its products without fear of competition from Western goods. Clash of interests with the United States and Great Britain led to the breakdown of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921; as for the United States, Japan has never ceased to be a potential enemy for them. All this led to a rapprochement between Japan and Germany, which resulted in their union in World War II.

All the 1920s were marked by the problem of the allies' debts to each other and the reparation payments that they were to receive from Germany. The main creditor was the United States, and the main debtors were France, Italy, Belgium and the United Kingdom. And when the United States demanded the return of debts, the Allies offered to write off their debt in whole or in part, arguing that the provision of loans was an American contribution to the victory over Germany. And although the United States understood a certain fairness of such statements, such a solution to the problem did not suit them in any way. Negotiations on this issue lasted four years (from 1922 to 1926) and ended with an agreement providing for the return of $ 2.6 billion, that is, just over a quarter of the originally requested amount.

As for the problem of reparations, here too there were serious contradictions between the allies, and, above all, in the question of the dependence of inter-allied debts on the payment of German reparations: France considered them rigidly interconnected and intended to pay off its debts from what it received from Germany, and the United States and Britain saw German reparations as a separate issue. Moreover, Great Britain believed that it was more important that the ruin of Germany, already badly affected by the war, with the help of reparations impeded the restoration of European industry as a whole and reduced international trade flows. However, France categorically insisted on receiving reparations. Such a tough position of France can be explained by the fact that, in comparison with Great Britain and the United States, it suffered much more from Germany - if only because military operations were directly conducted on its territory.

Numerous attempts to reach a compromise on this issue did not lead to success, and on December 26, 1922, the reparation commission, with three votes to one, stated that Germany had not fulfilled its reparation obligations and, as a result, declared Germany a default, which (according to the Treaty of Versailles) gave France the right to occupy the Rhine zone and Ruhr. Meanwhile, social inequality and unemployment were on the rise in Germany. Anti-Versailles sentiments were superimposed on the social tension usual in such conditions: the Germans accused the great powers of intending to finally ruin the country with reparations. The tendency of the communists to subdue these anti-government and anti-foreign sentiments to themselves and direct them into a revolutionary channel did not contribute to the detente of the situation. All this was accompanied by an increase in anti-Semitism, partly provoked by the influx of wealthy Jewish emigrants from Poland to Germany (where, under the Pilsudski regime, anti-Semitism became almost state policy). Since this emigration coincided with the worsening economic situation in Germany, the newcomers were accused of this.

The occupation of the Rhineland heated the situation to the limit, which resulted in armed uprisings and actions of both left and right forces, which, however, were poorly prepared and suppressed. As a result, a state of emergency was declared in the country. Great Britain and the United States accused France of aggravating the situation in Germany and put it under the threat of isolation, having signed agreements with Germany at the end of 1923 on the provision of loans to it. From now on, in its confrontation with France, Germany could firmly count on the help of London and Washington.

The shocks caused by the aftermath of the First World War subsided by 1924. At this time, important changes began to take place in the world, associated with a change in the role and place of the social democratic movement in the social and political life of states. This was manifested by the "entry into power" of social democratic parties, either included in a number of coalition governments, or even formed them independently, and the strengthening of the influence of reformist ideas in the ranks of social democracy. Both of these moments were both a consequence and a reason that the theory and practice of social democratic parties increasingly acquired a reformist orientation with an emphasis on the gradual peaceful transformation of capitalist society into a socialist one. The leaders of the social democracy considered their main task to be participation in the work of the parliamentary system and the restructuring of the capitalist economy through "equal business cooperation" between workers and entrepreneurs, as well as through the adoption of social legislation.

Representatives of the communist parties absolutized the tendencies of the acute crisis of capitalism, on the basis of which they demanded an immediate armed and uncompromising struggle for power. Most of these parties, united in the Communist International (Comintern), were under the strong influence of the CPSU (b), which served as the reason for such a position.

The change in the role of social democracy in the political life of European states was evidence of the growing crisis of traditional forms of statehood in the post-war process of European development. However, if in countries with established traditions of bourgeois democracy this process was quite peaceful, then in countries where democratic traditions had not yet had time to take root, the liberal-reformist way of changing the political structure of society turned out to be extremely difficult, or even impossible. Here the place of social democracy was often taken by reactionary mass movements, which ultimately led to the elimination of bourgeois democracy and the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship of various kinds (fascism) or other, more traditional forms of authoritarian dictatorial regimes.

In general, we can say that in the 1920s, two trends were outlined in the political development of states: liberal-reformist (based on the further development of parliamentary democracy, implementation of reforms and the attraction of leaders of socialist or social-democratic parties to the highest bodies of power); totalitarian, associated with the establishment of fascist and other dictatorial regimes.