Democracies can be divided into 3 categories:

    State-va with significant cultural diversity, expressed territorially (the presence of autonomies, etc.) and politically (there are groups that appeal to nationalism, self-determination and even independence). Examples: Canada (Quebec), Spain (Basque Country and Catalonia), Belgium (Flanders), India (Kashmir, Punjab, northeast (Miso movement) and south of the country (Dravidian tribal movements)).

    State-va, characterized by a certain cultural diversity, not expressed territorially and politically. Examples: USA, Switzerland.

    State-va, culturally homogeneous. Examples: Japan, Scandinavian countries, Portugal.

It is easier for the countries of the third group to carry out state building and the establishment of democracy in parallel. In the presence of a serious cultural diversity, these processes contradict each other - unification (ie, state construction) threatens to infringe on the rights of minorities (and this is contrary to the principles of democracy). Question: how to ensure peace and unity, as well as the preservation of the foundations of democracy, for the countries of the first group?

The concept of "nation-state" and "nation-state" (Stepan, Linz, Yadav), three types of state devices:

    "Nation-state"- the presence of only one politically active, territorially concentrated socio-cultural community, the device - both a unitary state (France, Japan) and a symmetrical federation (Australia at the beginning of the 20th century). Weak Subjects. One state language, the imposition of one identity, the policy of assimilation. The creation of regional parties is not welcome, secessionist parties are outlawed.

    "Nation State"- several significant socio-cultural communities, the creation of a democratic state is difficult, but perhaps the best type of device is an asymmetric federation with the provision of special cultural privileges to the subjects (Canada, India, Belgium, Spain). strong subjects. Several states are allowed. languages, different national and cultural identities are recognized within a single political system. Activity

regional parties, with peaceful secessionist parties being watered. dialog.

    "Purely multinational» type - extreme decentralization, the predominance of local identities, low loyalty to the center, conflict (Yugoslavia, 1980s). Building a democratic state is practically impossible. The state either breaks up as a result of secessions, or carries out forceful centralization.

For the state in the first category, the author considers the type of "nation-state" the most appropriate. His Main characteristics : (1) an asymmetric federation, not a unitary state, and not even a symmetrical federation; (2) individual rights and collective recognition; (3) a parliamentary, not a presidential or semi-presidential republic; (4) parties and organizations both at the national and regional levels; "regional-centrist parties" and "careers"; (5) a politically integrated but not culturally assimilated community; (6) cultural nationalism as opposed to secessionist sentiments; (7) complementarity (complementarity) under diversity.

A federal structure is necessary because allows for a certain degree of autonomy. units created on an ethno-cultural basis. An asymmetric federation will help preserve local customs, traditions, and management features.

Individual special rights requiring collective recognition include rights such as the use of one's own language.

The parliamentary form of government will provide the necessary representativeness and distribution of power.

The regional party level also increases representativeness, in addition, by creating blocs with reg. parties, public parties are turning them into "regional centrist" parties that will no longer seek secession. In addition, every politician, regardless of affiliation, will be able to build a career in the general public. level - this is necessary so that the subjects do not "fall out" of the general watered. the life of the state. The same principle will help maintain political unity while refusing cultural assimilation.

Cultural nationalism, provided there is an adequate dialogue with the center, contributes to the eradication of secessionist sentiments.

All these principles help to ensure the coexistence and complementarity of both common, state, and ethno-cultural identities.

Proponents of the "nation-state" (i.e., "nation-state") model believe that an alternative model will inevitably lead to the fragmentation and disintegration of the country. However, surveys conducted in countries adhering to the “nation-state” model (India, Switzerland, Spain, Canada, Belgium) and “nation-state” (Japan, Germany, Australia, Argentina, USA) showed a higher level of trust in power structures among representatives of the first group and an equal degree of civic patriotism.

Further, the author gives an example of India as a state adhering to the “nation-state” model. Despite economic problems, serious secessionist actions in Kashmir, Punjab, Mizoram, in southern India, the presence of acute religious conflicts, public opinion polls show a high level of Indian confidence in government, the predominance of national identity, civic patriotism. The author compares the Indian experience with the “nation-state” model that the government of Sri Lanka tried to adopt, which, despite initially favorable conditions, led to a 25-year civil war.

Thus, A. Stepan argues that it is the “nation-state” model that is optimal for countries with significant ethno-cultural heterogeneity.

1 If before it was considered the norm that the executive power in a democratic country should be headed by a nationally oriented (at least formally) politician, now it has become optional (recall the “technical prime ministers” Papadimas and Monti, who headed the governments of Greece and Italy at the end of 2011, who "abandoned" economic sovereignty in favor of supranational financial structures).

2 Today, both of these "extremes" converge in a certain sense. TNCs and financial conglomerates claim global resource control over society and the pre-emptive right to shape the agenda for its development. They effectively destroy local and traditional forms of existence and self-identification, but, unlike in previous times, they do not allow reliably identifying this invading alien destructive force with any other social, ethnic or confessional group. At the same time, they effectively block the formation of institutions and practices of a “global civil society” (in essence and by intention, they are instruments of universal and supra-civilizational control of the global community over the activities of these players in the global market). In turn, this blocking generates a characteristic “asymmetric response” in the form of a growing anti-globalization reaction of numerous and heterogeneous local communities (often manifested as xenophobia). However, the specificity of anti-globalism lies in the fact that this bright, but strategically inconsistent and by nature disparate social movement, generated by xenophobia, intensifies only to the extent that it itself acquires the scale of a “global integration project”.

A nation state is a state formed by an ethnos (nation) on the basis of an ethnic territory and embodying the political independence and independence of the people. The theoretical and ideological basis of such a state was the principle of nationality, under the flag of which the economically and politically strengthened bourgeoisie fought against obsolete feudalism. The desire to create a nation state is largely due to the fact that the preservation of the socio-economic (or ultimately ethnic) integrity of the nation is possible only if it is within the framework of one state. The formation of a nation state best of all satisfies these requirements of social development and is therefore the tendency of every national movement.

Nation-states usually took shape in conditions where the formation of nations and the formation of the state took place simultaneously, in connection with which political boundaries most often coincided with ethnic ones. Thus, the states of Western Europe and Latin America arose. This was typical, normal for the capitalist period of development. Since in the countries of Western Europe, where the formation of nations began for the first time in history, this process coincided with the emergence and centralization of states that developed in territories with a predominantly ethnically homogeneous population, the term “nation” itself acquired a political meaning here - the belonging of people to one, “national ", to the state. The principle of "one nation - one state" began to be promoted in Europe during the French Revolution. In Europe, for a long time there was a point of view that the nation-state is the optimal model for organizing society. nation states
formed here in the form of a monarchy, parliamentary and presidential republics.

After World War I, at the instigation of US President Woodrow Wilson, the principle of "one nation, one state" is applied in Central and Eastern Europe. The borders of new countries are cut along national lines. This helped to remove many of the old contradictions, but gave rise to new ones. The fundamental difficulty of successfully applying such an approach is that even if one tries to objectively determine the dividing lines between nations, it is impossible to do so consistently. There are almost no ethnically homogeneous massifs that would not mix in a significant part of their border or deep territories with other national borders, which, being enclosed within the borders of another national state, would not turn into national minorities. Thus, the division of the Ottoman Empire and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in Europe were marked by the creation of small states, the process of fragmentation into which was called "Balkanization", and with a negative meaning.

The states of Europe and other continents within the boundaries that we know were formed over several centuries. Most of them have become mononational. In this regard, the term "nation" itself acquired a political meaning - the belonging of people to one "national" state. In this case, the term "nation" is used in a statist sense and refers to states that have arisen on the principle of "one nation - one state." Consequently, the concept of "nation-state" is valid only for mono-national states.

The national state creates the necessary conditions for the economic, social, cultural progress of the people, for the preservation of the national language, traditions, customs, etc. Therefore, the creation of their own statehood is the desired goal of each ethnic group. However, all ethnic groups cannot achieve this goal. This requires at least two conditions: compactness of residence and small number.

In this regard, the question of whether statehood is an obligatory, necessary sign of a nation has been discussed more than once in the scientific literature. Most researchers think not. In practice, when attributing one or another ethnic community to a nation, special importance is often attached to the presence of its own state. This is largely due to the fact that the preservation of the socio-economic (and ultimately ethnic) integrity of the nation is possible only if it is within the framework of one state. However, "one's own" state is by no means an obligatory sign of a nation. History knows many examples of the presence of several nations in the composition of one state. The Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian empires included various nations that did not have their own statehood. It is also known that the Polish nation was deprived of its statehood for a long time, but did not cease to be a nation.

In modern conditions, the concept of "nation state" is used in two meanings.. First, to designate states with an absolute majority of an ethnically homogeneous population. These national states include Japan, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greece, Poland, Hungary, France, most Arab and Latin American countries, where representatives of the titular nation make up 90 or more percent of the population of these states. Secondly, the concept of a nation-state is also used in relation to those states where, in addition to the titular nation, significant groups of other ethnic entities live. However, historically, a state was formed in this territory, bearing the name of the largest ethnic group settled in this territory. Among these states are Romania, Sweden, Finland, Syria, Iraq, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, etc. Due to the growth of interstate migrations and the multi-ethnic population, the number of such nation-states will gradually increase.

It should be noted that, although in the Russian Federation the state-forming nation - Russians - makes up 82% of the population, it does not belong to the category of nation-states, but is a multinational state. This is due to the fact that, in addition to Russians, dozens of indigenous peoples live on the territory of Russia, many of which have formed here into a nation and have their own national statehood, being part of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia is the ethnic territory of many non-Russian peoples, who, together with the Russians, constitute a multinational people.

After the October Revolution, most of the peoples living on the territory of the Russian Empire created various forms of national-state formations and national states. Moreover, the forms of national statehood chosen by ethnic groups did not remain unchanged: they improved and developed. Most peoples have passed from the original lower form to a higher form of national statehood. For example, the Kyrgyz ethnos in a short period has gone from an autonomous region to a union republic within the USSR.

According to the Constitution of 1977, the USSR had 53 nation-states and national-state formations: 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous regions and 10 autonomous districts. In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993, the Russian Federation includes 21 republics (nation states), some of them are binational, for example, Kabardino-Balkaria, and even multinational (Dagestan); one autonomous region and 10 autonomous regions. In fact, all republics and national-state formations are multi-ethnic. Therefore, the republics within the Russian Federation are the statehood not only of the “titular” nation, but of the entire multi-ethnic people of this republic, citizens of all nationalities living on their territory.

On this day:

Days of Death 1979 He died - a Soviet archaeologist, a specialist in the archeology of Moldova, the main works are devoted to the Slavic settlement of the territory of Moldova. 1996 Died Yakov Ivanovich Sunchugashev- Specialist in the history of ancient mining and metalworking, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Honored Scientist of the Republic of Khakassia.

A special type of state, characteristic of the modern world, in which the government has power over a certain territory, the majority of the population are citizens who feel themselves part of a single nation. Nation-states originated in Europe, but in the modern world they are global.

Great Definition

Incomplete definition ↓

nation state

nation-state), public.territ. an education that has the status of a state with appropriately drawn up borders (self-determination), and the people living in it are united in self-identification based on a common culture, history, race, religion and language and consider themselves a nation. N.g. forms a single and sovereign polit, community, authorities to-rogo majority of us. recognized as legitimate (legitimacy). Almost all state-va in order to nurture a sense of nat. participation use, although not always successfully, symbolism, rituals, shrines, the education system, the media and weapons. strength. N.g. are a subject of international law on the basis of mutual recognition and membership in the international. org-tions, for example. UN. However, after the collapse of the columns, the system of borders pl. state-in were carried out artificially, without regard to ethnic. and religions, idiosyncrasies, which led to the inevitable division of us. on the basis and minorities. In such formations, the likelihood of conflicts is very high.

Great Definition

Incomplete definition ↓

", read in the summer of 2013.

The original text of the lecture was posted on April 19, 2014 on the site NEOKONOMICS or World Crisis.

Lecture 3

Oleg Grigoriev: At the beginning of the lecture, we will say a few more words about, and then we will move on to the question of what went wrong in Western Europe.

If we look at history, we will see a rather monotonous cyclical process: empires arise, exist for a while, then something is sure to happen to them - they collapse, are captured, etc., then on the same, as a rule , the place new empires arise, and everything repeats.

For the first time this process was noticed not today, but back in the XIV century: a prominent Arab scientist, perhaps even the founder of political sociology, Ibn Khaldun described the rise and fall of empires, and today historians make extensive use of the so-called Khaldun cycle- the cycle of the existence of the empire.

Why do empires collapse? Because they stop growing, and when they stop growing, then the internal mechanism of the empire - what we now call social elevators - stops working. While the empire is growing, while it is capturing new territories, while it is expanding, social elevators work both for itself and for proto-elites: for those who wish to become an elite, there are always opportunities to rise to the top.

As the empire grows, the elite always have two interests:

  1. keep your position and your place,
  2. improve your position. And during the growth of the empire, it is often the interest to improve the place that prevails. When an empire stops growing, there is an interest in securing one's place. More precisely, interest to privatize one's place in the power hierarchy.

When the empire ceases to expand, a period of internal crisis sets in, and it is immediately diverse.

As the empire expands, I get my elite position depending on how effectively I serve some general process of empire growth. As soon as the empire stops growing, I can no longer serve anything by occupying some place, and my position in this status becomes suspended. I would even like to serve, but there is nothing. The position of any dignitary can be called into question: he himself does not understand why he is a dignitary, he cannot confirm his status. His only desire is, in modern terms, the privatization of his status.

This is a very important point for understanding many processes. .

The Western model is based on sacred right of private property. Only in Europe did the elite at one time manage to completely privatize their elite place and create the sacred right of private property. But this is the dream of any elite at all times - to privatize their place and create the sacred right of private ownership of the place occupied and the benefits associated with it.

Again: succeeded only after a long history and only in Europe . AND the principle of sacred private property is not an economic principle, as Marx and many others thought, this is an elite principle that worked only at a certain stage and only under certain conditions in intra-elite showdowns.

The first to achieve it was the English elite, it is the elite. But the elite fought for this not in order to develop the economy and capitalism. These are purely elite showdowns that indirectly influenced the development of capitalism. The basis of capitalism is, first of all, a way out of those political intra-elite squabbles that are ripe and would not be allowed to develop further.

The way in which the Europeans destroyed other empires - they proposed to introduce the sacred right of private property - this is one of the slogans. This happened with the USSR: introduce the principle of private property, and everything will be fine with you. Look at us: we are developed, and you are undeveloped simply because you do not have the principle of private property. The principle of private property is introduced - and the empire falls apart. This slogan is a propaganda tool. And it works because the imperial elite in the era of stagnation dreams about it. The elite is fighting for the privatization of its place, and as soon as it begins to separate, this is a sign of the crisis of the empire.

Secondly, during the stagnation in the empire, pressure on the lower classes begins. If earlier the elite had the opportunity to earn more, participate in the campaign, rob, get money, now it has the only opportunity to earn income - to put pressure on the lower classes and thus begin to rob the population. As a result, not class contradictions, of course, but inter-class contradictions begin to grow, and the normal mechanism of the internal social world is disrupted. At the same time, the central government loses its authority. The central government is essentially the leader of the gang, he leads the raids, he provides the elite with everything they get, he leads it, and during the stagnation he stands at the top and provides nothing and leads nothing. From a leader and a warrior, he turns into a swindler who is trying to somehow regulate elite relations, to act as an arbiter - relatively speaking, he becomes the first among equals.

Ibn Khaldun called the totality of these processes the loss of asabiyyah, some original energy and motivation inherent in the gang, which creates the empire. The loss of this energy causes the weakening of all social mechanisms that hold the empire.

The reasons for breaking the empire can be very different. This may be the arrival of what Khaldun called nomads, that is, far better structured third-party gangs that roam around the empire and who, with their small numbers, but very highly motivated, outplay the empire.

The second reason may be riots and uprisings of outlying rulers. Very often, by the way, the arrival of nomads and the revolts of outlying rulers are one and the same. Either the outlying rulers enter into an alliance with the nomads and with their more motivated army and with the help they seize the central government and destroy it, or they themselves, on their own initiative, oppose the empire, but at the same time they simply hire an outside military force.

The third reason, although possible, is rare. I can say that historically this happened in China: these are internal uprisings, which in modern terms are called civil wars, although in fact they are not civil, but are a manifestation of strife between elites. These are not civil wars, but rather an analogue of feudal fragmentation. The initial reason is the fragmentation of the elites and their attempts to privatize their places within the hierarchy, and as soon as everyone starts thinking about privatization, we can assume that the empire has already collapsed mentally, it is no longer in their heads.

At the same time, the empire is usually restored, because when it collapsed (it usually falls apart into a bunch of mini-empires), and when people come from outside, they always use the services of a part of the former imperial elite, usually retaining the mechanisms for the formation and functioning of the empire.

And these cycles of the creation and death of empires happen all the time. And if there hadn't been an incident in Western Europe, it probably would have continued. So let's now look at what happened in Europe.

According to official history, the vector of European development began to change from the 6th century AD. Let me explain: the fact is that now I will begin to tell the story, and we will understand that there are actually very big problems in historical descriptions - somewhere there are riddles, but there are just holes. I will identify them along the way. I believe that they are important, that without them we would not have a real history of what happened, and perhaps, in order to shut them up, we need to revise this history greatly, I will not go in this direction now. Let's label these holes.

According to official history, the Roman Empire existed, including on the territory of Europe, which logistically formed very rationally, because it had a powerful logistical core inside it - the Mediterranean Sea.

But the Mediterranean is very large, so the outward detour was very large, and, of course, one can say in any case that an empire of this size under those conditions could not hold its outskirts for quite a long time. And the last centuries of the existence of the Roman Empire are constant attempts to fight off raids from all sides, the loss of territories, their return, because territories were lost, but new empires did not arise there, until a whole wave began, a chain of waves of invasions that destroyed empire: Vandals, Lombards, Gauls and other Germanic tribes.

This all fits Khaldun's scheme, if we consider the Germanic tribes as nomads who are destroying the empire. Again, we know that the Germanic tribes were hired to serve the empire, interacted with the imperial elite, and probably there were some joint decisions.

Mystery number one. Let's try to disassemble it. Historians say that in the Roman Empire, apparently, money circulation was developed, and there was a powerful market. Question: where did the money go? When the barbarians came, there was no money in Europe. The money is gone. This is a big difference from the history of other empires that collapsed.

We will not consider pre-monetary times, because then there were no large empires. What is a moneyless empire? By our standards, this is a small kingdom, for example, Kievan Rus as it is described, this is the initial stage, where there is the main city - Kiev, which is a warehouse and where the prince brings the collected tribute in kind. At the same time, the prince, collecting tribute, can personally go around only a limited area, logistically connected with the center.

The monetary empire is different. It collects tribute in cash. And the central government pays money with its dignitaries, troops and others. When the nomads come, the old elite helps them to collect tribute in the first place, and the vast empire continues to function. Markets are not destroyed, money circulation and the monetary mechanism of the functioning of power continue.

The barbarians came, seized the Roman Empire with a developed market and developed money circulation, and suddenly it turns out that there is no money there. Until the XII century, there was no money in Europe: old money got there - Byzantine or Arab, there is no money of its own. Venice is a trading colony of Byzantium, it then broke away from Byzantium into an independent city-state. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the market was supposed to survive. The barbarians came, the mechanism of the functioning of the empire did not fall apart: the church mechanism for maintaining the empire remained almost completely intact, and many administrative mechanisms of the Roman elite were preserved. Question: why did the old elite not help the barbarians to establish the functioning of the imperial mechanism? Markets work, we take tribute with money and pay with money.

According to documents, Charles I never spent the night twice in the same city. Although he had the official capital of Aachen, he rarely went there. He was constantly engaged in polyude throughout Western Europe. All his letters and decrees were written in different cities.

Question: where did the money go? It's a mystery, but it's a fact. Historians say, and let's believe them, that before the 12th century there was no money in Europe. This means that from the 6th century to the 12th, that is, six centuries, the power mechanism was different (again, according to the descriptions, Charlemagne, apparently, committed polyudie all the time), but we also understand that on this basis arose in Europe feudalism: because if it is impossible to collect tribute in money from the territories and pay money as a reward, then how can you reward those who helped to capture all these territories? I must somehow give them the occupied lands in kind. This is also an important point, maybe a side one, or maybe not. Okay, I distributed the land in kind. But how can I ensure their participation in my affairs? There was a money mechanism in the empire, now there is no money mechanism: I gave away all the lands - the feudal lords each settled on their own land and got the opportunity to privatize it all.

The consequence of this situation was an important feature of Europe, associated with the strong influence of law in regulating the mechanism of power. Since there was no monetary mechanism, it had to be replaced by law. Law arises when political forces come into conflict, none of which has a decisive advantage - then you have to negotiate and bargain. There are cases when the lord went to besiege the city with his vassals, and the vassals stand and look at the clock and say: oh, 12 hours, the contract has expired, we went home. This required strong regulation. A very high role of law is characteristic of Western Europe, in contrast to the eastern territorial empires, and indeed other forms of organization.

Thus, the conditions and opportunities for privatization created by the institution of feudalism led to the disintegration of the empire of Charlemagne into many mini-empires, which immediately began to fight with each other. The same can be seen in our history - the princely strife in Ancient Russia - although all the princes were Rurik, this did not prevent them from fighting to the death with each other. Western Europe is the same mini-empires that aspired to become big. Sometimes it worked for a short time, but then they still broke up.

The second problem, or essential feature of Western Europe. Here come the barbarians with fire and sword, they have strength on their side. They, of course, greatly thinned out the old administrative and military elite of the Roman Empire, but at the same time, the very mechanism of the Roman Empire was based not on two hierarchies, but on three - managerial, military and ecclesiastical. However, the church hierarchy remained intact. Well, if only because the majority of the barbarians were Christians, although of the Arian persuasion (this is also a question, there was a whole bunch - mostly heretics, but there were also adherents of the then orthodox church, because missionary activities were carried out among the barbarians). The mystery is what happened to the Arians. We do not know, there are certainly no documents preserved about how much Arianism is in the modern Catholic Church, and what kind of compromise was reached on this matter. Nobody made ends meet here, at least I did not meet.

In a territory where there are many mini-empires that aspire to a big empire, and where there is already a recognized religion permeating the entire territory, an unexpected and very unusual situation arises. It turns out that the one who claims to collect the entire empire must negotiate with the church.

I jumped a little here. A feature of European history is the presence in a relatively small area of ​​a large number of mini-empires that are at war or are in a strange relationship with each other. If such a situation had turned out somewhere in the east, then dashing people would have come quickly and seized this territory. And we know from history that dashing people came to the territory of Western Europe, and the historical line that Europe followed was threatened several times.

The first threat is the Arabs, the Arab Caliphate. The battle of Poitiers is widely known, when Charles Martell defeated the Arab army, and the Arabs did not move further than the Pyrenees, being satisfied with Spain, Southern Italy, Sicily. An important point. If we look at the map, we will see that the great empires are located either on the highlands or on the plains. If there are mountains on the territory, then they are natural borders between empires. The Arabs captured the steppe, that is, the plane, but, colliding with the mountains, they could not cross them.

The second threat is the Ugric, today known as the Hungarians. The Hungarian Plain is a continuation of the Great Steppe, which runs from China across the entire continent. A nomadic tribe came, boldly all in the steppe, began to raid the whole of Western Europe, and if you look at the chronicles and annals, it became a giant threat. Again, if we look at the chronicles with regard to both the Arab invasion and the Ugric invasion, we very often see cases when some archbishop called for protection from a raid, and the population took up arms and went to war. This is the actual control mechanism. The abbot of some monastery (with regard to the Arab invasion) called, and the population went to fight with the infidels - these are the forerunners of the crusades, such mini-crusades that began at the initiative of the church. That is, the church was directly involved in administration, including participating in military administration, in particular, in defense. The Ugrians did not go beyond certain boundaries: apparently, the steppe ended, and they could not fight in the forests.

The Austrian Eastern Mark was created against the Hungarians, which then became a county, then a duchy, then the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself was formed from it, well, the Austro-Ugric Empire - to the question of where everything takes its roots. At the same time, all of Europe supported her, because she was a bastion against the terrible Hungarians.

This is the second threat that was real.

The third threat, about which, on the one hand, it is clear why it was not realized, on the other hand, is not clear. These are the Vikings, who are known as the Varangians. These are the same nomads, only waterfowl. Their technique was simple. They walked along the sea, then went up the rivers (cities were built on the rivers) and robbed anything (for example, Paris was plundered). The Vikings captured many territories in Europe: Normandy, Sicily, part of Southern Italy. The lands captured by the Normans retained their independence for a long time. It is not very clear why, but it is believed that this was not a centralized invasion, but separate detachments went: there was simply no general power in Sweden, and therefore separate detachments captured separate pieces, but could not capture everything. When the demographic pressure decreased, when their own colonies and territories appeared and it became possible to settle quietly, then the invasion itself came to naught. However, Europe has been under threat for a long time.

The fourth threat is the Tatar-Mongols. Again, no one knows why Batu's invasion of Europe ended, here historians are also silent: it is usually said that since the khan died, Batu decided to return to Sarai and did not capture Europe. Other historians, usually ours, say that the Tatars did not capture Europe because Russia defended it with itself.

In other words, Europe could die many times, but did not die, it is still not very clear why, what happened there, since the Mongols won the battles with the elite troops of Western Europe, and, in general, there was nothing to oppose the Europeans.

Well, the last threat came already at a different time, and was not so sharply perceived - these are the Ottomans, the 17th century. The peak of the Ottoman invasion is the siege of Vienna, this is the time of King Louis XIV. At that time, Europe was already a little different. The same Louis XIV would be glad if the historical opponents of France, the Austrians, were destroyed by the Turks: Europe was ambivalent about these wars. The papal throne, by the way, was not against the capture of Vienna, because he continued the war with the emperor, who then belonged to the Habsburg dynasty, that is, he was the Austrian emperor. However, thanks to the Poles, this threat was not realized.

Although the Ottoman threat was no longer perceived as acutely as the previous four, but, nevertheless, it was real. That is, faced with the imperial mechanism of the Turks, Western Europe showed good results even in the 17th century. Why all this did not lead to the restoration of normal imperial cycles, we will not discuss now. Arabs don't know how to fight in the mountains, the steppes don't know how to fight in the forests, demographic pressure has ended in Sweden, and so on. The fact that all these threats did not materialize is also an accident. In any other geographical location, the structure of disparate mini-empires that has developed in Europe would not have lasted for long. Europe faced several threats, but it was lucky that they did not materialize. And not because the Europeans were especially valiant or something else. Why do Arabs need forests? They don't even know what to do with them. And there were no special riches in Europe at that time. The Arabs dominated the Mediterranean for a long time, and they could get whatever they wanted. It was the Vikings who confused them greatly, Sicily and Southern Italy were theirs. All this is pure luck, a chain of accidents.

I showed a little the role of the church, which unites and organizes the population for some common cause. Why? Because the church is essentially the only remaining imperial mechanism. And here we see a paradox: whoever wants to unite the empire must get the approval of the church (or create his own church, which is difficult, although later this is exactly what happened - I'm talking about the Reformation).

Here another important difference between Europe and the classical empires is revealed. Historians say that in the Eastern empires there is Caesaropapism, that is, the secular ruler is at the same time the high priest. The Muscovite kingdom is also caesaropapism, where the patriarch is the tsar's deputy for religious affairs. In this sense, the head of the spiritual authorities is in a completely clear subordination to the secular. And in Europe it happened like this: there is church authority, there is also a church hierarchy as such, but there is no emperor yet. And if someone wants to become an emperor, he must agree on something with the church authorities. This is the first very important point.

The church has worked out a scheme by which it would like to interact with a potential future emperor. This scheme was formulated as follows: the church is the legislative power, and the emperor is the executive. That is, the concept of separation of legislative and executive power was formulated. A completely new, again, scheme in comparison with all the eastern empires. (There were brahmins and kshatriyas in India, but there was no empire there - we know very little about this.)

So, from the dualism of secular and ecclesiastical power, the idea of ​​separation of powers emerged, which still exists. It is clear that not a single normal contender for the imperial throne would agree to such conditions, but at the same time there was a desire to build an empire. Therefore, when the empire nevertheless arose, it entered into a sharp conflict with the church. This conflict was twofold. On the one hand, he was about abstract power - who is higher - the pope or the emperor, but, on the other hand, he also had a pragmatic side, since the church at that time was the largest landowner in Europe. With the important role of religion in public life, feudal lords often bequeathed land to the church. As a result, it became difficult for the secular authorities to reward their supporters, and the church, on the contrary, only multiplied the lands in this process. The history of the struggle for church property is a running thread throughout European history. This struggle was waged all the time, and depending on its outcome, the destinies of various states were formed.

I have already said that the chronic confrontation between the imperial and papal authorities lasted not a year, not two, not a century, but about 800 years. The acute phase of the confrontation, called the High Middle Ages, is two centuries when constant wars were fought. A more diplomatic and less pronounced phase - the remaining 600 years - continued until the last idea of ​​a pan-European empire, the traditional empire of the German nation, was liquidated in connection with the liquidation of the very institution of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which was abolished after Napoleon forced the Austrian emperor to renounce the title of Holy Roman Emperor.

The conflict between the pope and the emperor lasted for a long time - both military methods and diplomatic ones.

The first important consequence follows from this conflict, which consists in a strong change in a person, first of all, a representative of the elites. For a long time, representatives of the elite were in an extremely contradictory situation, consisting in the uncertainty - whom to serve? Your overlord or the Pope? Duty tells him to serve his overlord, but if this raises the threat of excommunication from the church, which has often been realized (contradicting the church means risking eternal salvation), then uncertainty arises.

This situation had another side: serving one's overlord was ecclesiastical justified, in a milder form - there was also such a ecclesiastical dogma. Its violation also entails the risk of eternal salvation. People are always faced with a choice. First of all, there was freedom of choice, the ability to walk between chairs. It was a forced situation. In contrast, in a traditional empire, all places are scheduled, there is a clear hierarchy and clear rules - what you can do, what you cannot do, what you are rewarded for, what you will be punished for and how.

In Europe, the fragmentation of elites has been institutionalized over the course of eight centuries. Let us remember that the pope was glad and helped the Turks when they besieged Vienna. Because Vienna at that time was the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. And before that, the Habsburgs owned almost all of Europe: Austria, Spain, Hungary, etc.

For a long period, this intra-elite war had to be somehow resisted. People learned freedom of choice and independence in decision making. They constantly had to choose between two evils. This is an upbringing that changed a person, and in this sense, a Western person is not like a person of a traditional empire, and traditional empires do not perceive a Western person in this capacity until now.

The second consequence is the following. Historians have given much thought to the question of why things went wrong in Western Europe. They point out that in Western Europe, unlike elsewhere, there were free cities. This is a very interesting moment. Where did free cities come from in Europe?

For a long time, the point of view was widespread that European free cities are a legacy of the Roman Empire. That there were some Roman cities that, having survived the empire, became free: well, because there was Roman law and something else that allowed them to become the embryos of free cities. Previously, this was written in all seriousness, recently historians seem to have understood the contradiction.

After all, what is a traditional Roman city? Firstly, it is a fortress, or an administrative center. According to its economic model, the Roman city is very similar to our today's cities - regional centers. In these cities, in fact, there is no production. These are administrative centers that are supported by salaries received by officials, pensioners and other state employees. This cash flow creates some kind of economic life, but mostly the money comes from the center.

A typical Roman city also consisted of officials and pensioners. Retired legionnaires settled there, who received a pension in money from the government. As soon as the source of money dried up, no Roman cities as an economic and social phenomenon should have remained, ruins with an incomprehensible legal status should have remained. Today, many Western historians are finally writing openly about this, although they meet some resistance.

Another common point of view on free cities (again, there is a lot of racism in modern history) is that the inhabitants of Western Europe were not like everyone else, they were free, and therefore they were able to create free cities.

Let's see what a city is in its evolution. We have already said that initially the city is a central warehouse where tribute is brought, where the ruler of a given territory lives, where his army is stationed, and where, in case of danger, the surrounding population can run. There is a castle in the center, the neighborhood around the castle is protected by a wall, the walls are constantly being completed (look at our Kremlin, Kitay-Gorod - this is also a wall). This infrastructure is being expanded as needed. Who lives in the city? Artisans who serve the feudal lord’s court, both his own serfs and free artisans, whom he invites, if it comes to an important skill - making weapons, jewelry, etc. Petty feudal lords, or vassals, live in the city, who do not have the opportunity build their own castle, but can build a house next to the castle of a large feudal lord. Merchants also live in the city. Here, however, the question again arises: if there is no money, then where do the merchants come from? As long as distribution is in kind, merchants are not needed. And there is no need to remember here what the neoclassicists say about the origin of money, that they are from needs and all that. We all know that the origin of money is different.

Let's build a hypothesis. Until the 12th century, there was no money in Europe and no special trade. Since the 12th century, money has appeared in Europe in large quantities, fairs begin to function, free cities appear - and all these processes take place very quickly. We said about the Venetians: Venice is a colony of Byzantium and the merchants there are Byzantine. But if we look at Byzantium at that time, we will see that in Galata, on the outskirts of Constantinople, there was a colony of Genoese merchants who intercepted a significant part of the Byzantine trade.

That is, in literally less than a hundred years, the situation in Europe is changing radically, which cannot happen through evolution, since everything changes too quickly. This is also a mystery.

Let's look more broadly. Let's look at the Eastern merchants. Who is an oriental merchant? There is a big difference between Eastern and Western merchants, which everyone also pays attention to. In Eastern society, imperial society, money and power are merged into one, where if a person loses his elite status, then he loses money as well. The same applies to merchants. If necessary, the authorities could take money from the merchants to finance the interests of the empire, because this is not personal money, but money given for use, since the merchant occupies a certain class position. In other words, a person has money only if he occupies a place in the hierarchy, and this money does not belong to him. He cannot privatize them.

And suddenly it became clear, probably during the Crusades, that there is a territory where money is not included in the concept of hierarchy, where the hierarchy is built on the ownership of land and natural resources. Money is excluded from the hierarchy. And if you take your money to this territory - offshore - then this money will become personal, no one will encroach on it, because they simply do not know in essence what money is and how to work with it. Further trade with Western Europe is being established. This territory, of course, is very poor compared to the rich east, and you won’t earn much here, but everything that you earn is all your own.

That is, Europe served as an offshore zone into which Eastern merchants turned it, and we even know which Eastern merchants are Jews (for a very simple reason: you need to deal with money transfers with co-religionists, and there were Jews in Europe). This monetary offshoreness has been preserved; it is at the heart of Europe.

Merchants brought money to Europe, and the feudal lords also made money on this, which ensured the safety of trade. If the feudal lord owns the city, then it is beneficial for him to attract merchants who ensure the development of trade, and, consequently, the flow of money into the city. And most importantly, the feudal lords understood why money was needed, because when the market appeared, they regularly and intensively begin to fight each other. But it is one thing to fight only with the forces that we have, and another thing is to take a loan, hire additional troops, and win the war with the help of money.

Then the situation develops. There are merchants who have money, and there are feudal lords who need money. The process of redemption of cities begins. Cities became free as a result of several operations, often as a result of a ransom. For example, one feudal lord wants to capture a neighboring feudal lord and capture the city - merchants give him money on the condition that the city comes under their control. Cities were often redeemed, usually by clubbing. And those who usually redeemed and then made up the magistrate of the city.

There were other cases that were represented by the war between the pope and the emperor. The local feudal lord could take the wrong side in this war, in the sense of the loser. If at the same time the citizens of the city (in this situation they could take the right side, and they had a choice) could agree with the right side that if they support this right side (open the gates, provide supplies), then the city will be their .

Historians describe the situation: after the city has been liberated, a liberties race begins, when the city bargains for itself additional privileges from both sides for support or neutrality in the war. And in an attempt to buy the city on their side, these privileges were granted.

It was in this situation that free cities appeared, which was nowhere else. Moreover, free cities usually possessed money that was in the hands of merchants. That is, free cities are money centers, completely independent. It was the cities that began to massively introduce mercenary armies. This, in particular, was opposed by Machiavelli when he said that a mercenary army is the worst thing that can be.

I will continue this story later, and now I will end with an important judgment.

Pragmatics and idealism. The dispute between the two hierarchies was pragmatic, but could only be carried on in idealistic terms. The ecclesiastical and secular hierarchies could only appeal to a higher abstract force capable of resolving it. In other words, the dispute had a pragmatic character, but it was conducted in the field of ideologies, in the ideal field. This is a very important feature of Europe, which we, the majority of the inhabitants of the territorial empire, do not understand.

Why don't we understand? Because the traditional territorial empire is based on pragmatics. We also have ideal considerations. But we do not quite understand where we get them from, and most importantly, when it comes to the actual case, it turns out that, in essence, these considerations do not exist.

Again, where do we get ideal considerations from? They come about because the territorial empire and its inhabitants think they live in a nation-state, or can live in a nation-state, are capable of building one. When we take the point of view of the West, we declare ideal considerations, but when it comes to concrete actions, then everyone remembers his home, his allotment, and sheer pragmatics begins. This is the very big misunderstanding of the West by us.

In the West, in turn, a whole tradition has developed: although in reality we are talking about pragmatic issues, they are discussed and resolved only in an ideal world. When the pragmatic task changes, the ideal field also changes. They themselves understand it.

When our intelligentsia looks from their territorial empire at their ideal field, they take it as the ultimate truth, and when the ideal changes, they are greatly surprised and begin to resent.

I will give an example to illustrate our misunderstanding. Let's look at V.V. Putin. He is a very imperial person both in upbringing and in spirit. He carefully looks at the West and says: guys, you are solving pragmatic problems, and I am solving pragmatic problems, why do you constantly turn to your ideals, let's agree on pragmatics. But they cannot do this, they must appeal to the ideal, such is their peculiarity.

But such a feature gives a lot of useful things: from here begins scholasticism, science and, in general, the ability to think abstractly, which is not the case in empires. In Russia, idealism is often superficial, since Russia is an empire that thinks in terms that are not characteristic of empires (that is, the intelligentsia thinks in such a way that it infected everyone). Therefore, in Russia there is some idealism, but some incomprehensible one, we do not keep up with the curves of Western idealism. In the West, they understand that they are solving pragmatic problems, but the way to solve them is in an ideal field, they don’t know any other way. The problem needs to be translated into an ideal plane, to formulate a system of concepts there, and on their basis to formulate pragmatics - this is an approach. We do not understand this approach. Moreover, they approach this process flexibly, they insist on ideals, and at any given moment they broadcast these ideals. We take some ideal system, perceiving it as the ultimate truth, and totally translate it down the vertical. And then we are surprised when this ideal system changes.

Our Russian belief in conspiracies also arises from the opposition between pragmatism and idealism. We all understand that marginalism in the 70s. XIX century was invented solely for the purpose of taking away from Russia the then undiscovered Tyumen oil fields. Well, we know that the West, with the help of marginalism and neoclassical theory, destroyed the Soviet Union and is now pumping our oil. We are pragmatists, we understand that they invented all this on purpose to offend us. "All this was thought up by Churchill in the eighteenth year." We think so for the reason that we are also inclined to this idealism. At the same time, our idealism is their idealism, only yesterday.

I will illustrate. In the 90s. I read the memoirs of one of our intelligence officers about Churchill's visit to Moscow - this intelligence officer eavesdropped on the negotiations. He writes that on his return from Stalin to the hotel, the British Foreign Secretary scolded Churchill, the Prime Minister, right to the point of shouting, for the fact that his statements on some issue did not correspond to the adopted cabinet policy on this issue. That is, the subordinate scolded the commander. At the same time, the commander justified himself by saying that he could change this policy. To which the minister replied that when you think it over, write a document, formulate a new ideal, then we will all adhere to it. But as long as you don't change the old policy, I'll stick to it, and you should too. This story really impressed me.

In the course of the confrontation between ecclesiastical and secular authorities, several more important things happened that were of a pragmatic nature, but were formulated in an ideal field.

  • Firstly, as I said, this is the concept of separation of the legislative and executive powers, developed by the church.
  • Secondly, the second idea that supported the first is the system of law and the rule of law. This is also a new idea, idealistic but designed to solve pragmatic problems.
  • Thirdly, the idea of ​​a nation-state was formulated. In fact, this was a revolution in dogma, because the Christian religion itself was built on universality, on the fact that there is a single Christian people, where there is neither Greek nor Jew.

Hence the idea of ​​a universal empire, with a single people and a single church. But when it became clear that it was not possible to create a unified imperial power in accordance with the wishes of the church, that as soon as it was built, a terrible conflict arose between the church and secular power, threatening to seize Rome and overthrow the pope, another scenario had to be developed.

Charlemagne left a legacy of a France outside of imperial influence. And then the question arose: on the one hand, the pope would have to persuade France to become part of a single empire, but then the empire would be even stronger, and it is impossible to agree with the empire. On the other hand, in case of war with the empire, the pope could resort to the help of France. But then it was necessary to explain why France is outside the empire. To do this, it was necessary to change the dogmatics. That is, it was necessary to develop the idea that God created different nations. Although they are Christian, the diversity and richness of God's creation lies in the fact that the nations are still different, and they may have different authorities. That is, the idea of ​​a national state is a very strong revolution in church dogma.

Like any global decision, it hit hard on the church itself. Because as soon as it became possible to say that there are different nations, the idea of ​​the Italian nation immediately arose, which raised the question of the place of the pope himself in it. After all, it all ended with the Vatican, a small patch, but which is an independent papal state. That is, the idea turned out to be about two ends. She helped in the fight against the emperor, but in the end it also affected the church.

  • Fourth, the idea of ​​democracy was formulated. The scheme was very simple. If there are different nations that have their own secular authorities, then the people must also have their own rights. After all, the Christian people go to church every day, which means that the church should rule this people. Secular authorities will rule, and the people should act as legislators.

That is, the church no longer directly interacts with the emperor according to the scheme the church is the legislative power, and the emperor is the executive, and the kings, as leaders of national states, act as the executive power, and the church through the people acts as the legislative power for them. In this context, another ideologeme arose: the power of the people is power from God

.

All these ideas are pragmatic, they grew up in the framework of the struggle between church and secular authorities, but they were framed in the form of some abstract principles. These principles, in fact, set the direction for the development of thought and movement in Western Europe.

Kemerovo State University

5th year student

Supervisor: Aleksandr Mikhailovich Barsukov, Candidate of Political Sciences, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology, Kemerovo State University

Annotation:

This article is devoted to the problems of correlation between the concepts of "state" and "nation".

This article focuses on the problems of relationship between the concepts of "state" and "nation."

Keywords:

State, nation, nation-state, national identity

State, nation, nation-state, national identity

UDC 321.01

The relationship between the concepts of "state" and "nation" has worried many researchers for many years. As a rule, the state and the nation are perceived as interdependent phenomena, which at the same time have a number of differences. Some theories consider the state and the nation as elements necessary for each other, others - as complete synonyms.

It is logical to start the discussion of this issue with definitions. So, to the question of what the state is, the German sociologist M. Weber succinctly and succinctly answers: “The state is the only organization that has the right to legitimate violence and needs support from the controlled masses. This organization is distinguished by its high centralization, which allows it to successfully maintain the established order. This organization or set of organizations is the state. For the reason that the state presupposes the existence of both a ruling class (elite) and a subordinate mass (population), the problem arises of the relationship of these communities to a particular nation.

A nation is a stable socio-ethnic community of people that has developed historically and has some common features (language, customs, cultural characteristics). At the same time, the commonality of the territory and the economy is also characteristic of this formation.

Thus, the state and the nation intersect where we begin to worry about the question of the national identity of the two groups (the elite and the masses). Belonging to the same nation of the elite and the main population means the observance of the main principle of nationalism. However, it should be understood that the origins of the birth of a nation are not some separate ethnic group, but, most likely, within the framework of a certain state formation, a nation is being formed.

Here we are faced with a special category of "nation-states". It is worth noting that this category is globally recognized by the United Nations and is officially considered the definition of all states with sovereignty. But is it possible to put an equal sign between a nation - a state in the understanding of the UN and a nation state? Some of the researchers prefer to distinguish between the two concepts of "nation-state" and "nation-state". So, A. M. Salmin suggested paying attention to the ideology of the state - the nation, which should fully correspond to the national state. However, in reality, according to him, these concepts cannot be synonymous. For example, he notes, in France the entire population considers themselves French, while in Russia there are constant disputes about who is “Russian” and who is “Russian”? Therefore, the title of nation-state belongs to France. Also, A. M. Salmin called for the identification of the concepts of the nation - the state and the national state, since ideally there can be no differences in them.

Consider the characteristics of the nation in more detail.

First, a common language. As a rule, national languages ​​were born on the basis of the language of the nationality, which was of greater importance for the development and life of the nation. Secondly, the general area. V. Lenin noted that in the presence of territorial heterogeneity and centralized control of the territory, the population could not become a single national community. Also, an important feature is the common mental structure of the representatives of the nation, which is a direct consequence of the commonality of their culture. Finally, the general economic life is also an important factor for the vitality of the nation.

The signs of a nation are one and inseparable from each other. Only taken together, they express the essence of the nation, distinguish it from the previous forms of community of people. Therefore, ignoring one of the signs of a nation means a perversion of the concept of a nation.

Despite the fact that these signs are essentially universal for different periods in the development of political thought, it is still possible to trace the evolution in the understanding of the nation as a category of political science. Researchers identify four theoretical models of nations.

The first model reflects the essence of the anthropological approach and means understanding the nation as a tribe. The second model is based on the ideas of the period of the French Revolution and in it the nation is equated to a civil community in the form of a state. The third model involves the use of an ethno-cultural approach: a nation as a cultural-historical community. It is characteristic of German classical philosophy. Then, the fourth model is a combination of all of the above. The nation in it is perceived as a complex multi-component phenomenon, including political, ethnic, cultural, anthropological and other aspects. In our opinion, this model is the most successful and rational. Often it is also called ethnosocial. But it is necessary to understand that a nation will not exist if people do not recognize each other's belonging to it. We are talking about the so-called national identity.

In the theory of the state by M. Weber, national identity is described as a support for any modern state. What a state can achieve by force alone, without the voluntary support of the population, is very limited, especially in time of war.

It should be noted that M. Weber closely links the concepts of nation and state, but does not equate them to each other. Their dependence is expressed in the fact that the state exists only with the support of power from the national community, while the state does its best to preserve national identity. In his opinion, culture and power are objects of different spheres - national and state, respectively.

According to E. Pozdnyakov, Weber's concept cannot but leave a feeling of some dissatisfaction with its ambiguity. He believes that Weber is trying to balance on a very narrow space between the concepts of "nation" and "state". Leaning here and there, not knowing which of the concepts to give priority and even deliberately avoiding certainty.

Thus, the problem of correlation between the categories "nation" and "state" is of deep scientific interest. If we take as a norm the definition of a “nation-state” by the UN as any sovereign state, then we will inevitably face the problem of identifying the common features of such a state. So, the Russian Federation is a multinational country. But in this case, it also falls under the definition of “nation-state”. Due to the fact that today there are serious contradictions in the definition of "Russians" and "Russians", many scientists are not ready to agree with the understanding of "nation-state" and "national state" as equivalent.

The ethno-social model of the nation, adequate in relation to modern conditions, gives us the opportunity to appreciate the complexity and versatility of the nation as a category of political science. Many nations fall under this definition, most of which, of course, do not have their own states. A clear correspondence "one nation - one state" would be physically impossible. Therefore, we can conclude that in reality, nations and the state are forced to exist together within the framework of one entity, but it would be wrong to replace one concept with another. A state that unites several nations, most likely, will not be considered national until its citizens begin to associate themselves with such a general definition that would include the totality of nationalities represented in the country. "French" in France is a single set of citizens who identify themselves on the basis of, first of all, their country of residence. The state, therefore, will represent a kind of common shell, a "hard" structure around which ethnically heterogeneous citizens will be able to build their national, but at the same time, state identity.

Bibliographic list:


1. Weber, M. Selected Works: Per. with him. - M.: Progress, 1990. - 808 p. 2. Butenko A. P., Mironov A. V. Comparative political science in terms and concepts - [Electronic resource]. – URL: http://www.politike.ru/dictionary/276/word/nacija. 3. Pozdnyakov E. A. Nation. Nationalism. national interests. - M .: A. O. Publishing house. Group "Progress" - "Culture", 1994. - 125 p. 4. Salmin A. M. Six portraits - [Electronic resource]. – URL: http://historyclub.by/index.php?Itemid=65&id=137&option=com_content&task=view.

Reviews:

13.02.2014, 18:53 Polyakov Evgeny Mikhailovich
Review: A very interesting article on a topical topic, well-written. I recommend to print in the next issue. Let me give a recommendation to the author: consider also the relationship between the concepts of "nation" and "citizenship". For example, in modern Ukraine. Ukrainian - who is this? Ukrainian by ethnicity and/or citizenship? Are there Russian (Greek, Bulgarian, etc.) Ukrainians? This is not just a question of terms (like "Russian" and "Russian"), but also of content!


02/16/2014, 22:39 Shargorodskaya Natalya Leonidovna
Review: The article can be recommended for publication. However, it is necessary to make changes to the list of references, namely, to place the authors of the works in alphabetical order.