Losses of American aircraft in Korea. What aircraft of the ussr and the united states tested in the korean war. Human losses of the ussr

Rusichi in the DPRK (North Korea) 1950-1953. On the morning of June 25, 1950, as a result of an armed clash on the 38th parallel, war broke out. The Northerners begin their offensive and move south towards Seoul. The DPRK troops have 175,000 bayonets, 1,600 guns, 258 tanks, 172 aircraft and 20

For the first time, former World War II allies met in the skies of Korea. It was then that the latest air machines - jet aircraft - were tested. Let's look at the characteristics of technology on both sides of the conflict.

At the beginning of the war, the DPRK Air Force had about 200 aircraft, the main ones were the Soviet Yak-9 and Il-10. On the other hand, only the American Air Force at bases in Japan and aircraft carriers had more than 1,500 aircraft, most of which were jet F-80. Over the course of the hostilities, Chinese volunteers and 64 IAK of the USSR Air Force, armed with MiGs, appeared in the skies of the war. 15 and, later, MiG-15bis. Some of the North Korean pilots were also retrained for MiGs. MiGs met in the sky, on the one hand, and F80, F84, B29 and F86 Saber, on the other. Since the latter was the most advanced American fighter at that time, we will compare the MiG15 with it.

Brief performance characteristics of the MiG15
- wingspan - 10.08 m
- wing area - 20.6 m2
- maximum weight - 5274 kg

- 973 km / h (10670 m)
- cruising 850 km / h (5000 m)
- near the ground 1050 km / h
- practical ceiling - 15200 m
- weapons:
- one 37 mm cannon (40 rounds of ammunition)
- two 23-mm cannons (ammunition for 80 rounds per barrel)

Brief performance characteristics of the F86 "Saber"
- wingspan - 11.31 m
- wing area - 26.75 m2
- maximum weight - 8300-8640 kg
- maximum speed (at height):
- 967-1118 km / h (10670m)
- 587 km / h cruising
- practical ceiling - 14630 m
- weapons:
- six 12.7 mm machine guns (300 rounds of ammunition per barrel)

In general, the characteristics of the aircraft were similar. The MiG had small advantages in vertical speed, height and ceiling, according to many veterans. The F86's vertical speed up to 7000m is equal to the Mig's speed, but the higher - the lower the speed. But on bends, the Saber was more maneuverable - due to better wing mechanization, its turn time was shorter. The critical speed of the "saber" and the flight range were higher. In terms of armament, the MiG was the undisputed leader - cannons against machine guns.

However, technical characteristics do not always decide the matter. According to the recollections of veterans, the MiG had poor glide, which is necessary for a pilot in battle. Aerodynamic "knives" on the wing planes were installed for better lateral stability at low speeds, very much interfered with when sliding. “Saber”, having slats, had good stability and sliding, which is urgently needed to get out of enemy fire. the flight, navigation and electronic equipment of the MiG was inferior to the American one.

According to the veterans, the sighting equipment of the MiG was also bad - a semi-automatic sight. Its use in maneuvering combat was impossible, the pilot "by sight" took a lead in front of the target, the sight reticle could not withstand repeated and abrupt maneuvers, "went beyond the edge of the sight." The magnifying capacity was also low. One of the pilots of the 196 IAP attached half of the binoculars next to the sight for better viewing range. Greater weight and, accordingly, high speed on descent allowed the Sabers to get out of the battle easier and faster. The air brake was very effective on the Americans; it did not perform its functions on MiGs.

American pilots used altitude compensating suits during the flights. VKK facilitated the work of the pilot during overloads (air is supplied to the suit automatically, under pressure, squeezing the stomach, legs, arms, which normalizes blood circulation and facilitates the physical effect of overload). Soviet pilots did not have such suits during the Korean War, they flew in whatever they had to - leather jackets, T-shirts, uniform trousers of Chinese volunteers or the North Korean Air Force ... The commander of the 196th IAP, Colonel Pepelyaev, claimed that after several cases when, after ejection, the pilot was blown off boots, many of the pilots of his regiment began to put on Chinese soldiers' boots with lacing and fur in battle - and their feet were warm, they were holding tightly on their feet!

In the memoirs of veterans, attention is paid to the provision of food. They were fed, say the veterans, at the highest level. Excellent chefs, varied menu, meat, seafood, fruits and sweets. At the end of the day - legalized 100 grams of vodka or brandy. The food standards for ITS and conscripts were much higher than in the homeland. To some extent, according to E. Pepeliaev, this influenced the fact that the technical staff of the regiment remained in Korea for a second term.

Losses of the USSR Air Force:
- pilots killed 120
- lost planes 335
US AF losses:
- pilots killed 1176
- planes lost 1144
Despite the fact that among our pilots there were many who had combat experience and awards for participating in the Second World War, some did not strive for battle (recalls Colonel Pepeliaev). Boris Abakumov, who served as an instructor in the Second World War, and Pepeliaev himself, who fought for only 10 days during his military training, led his subordinates into battle and fought themselves bravely and selflessly. According to the veterans, the Americans reacted very painfully to losses - after the destruction of their aircraft, they immediately left the battle, and it happened that after the losses they did not appear in the battle area for several days. planned the use of aviation and steadily implemented their plans for air battles. American pilots, both fighters and bombers, were highly trained and courageous in battle. Although some veterans claim that the pilots flew in the American Air Force, they were German by origin and with experience of the Second World War. Boris Abakumov does not call them anything other than mercenaries. Although, this statement seems dubious to me personally.
For 10 months of fighting, the pilots of the 196 IAP shot down 108 American aircraft, during the same period they lost 4 of their comrades in killed and 10 MiG aircraft (6 Soviet pilots ejected, some continued to serve in the Air Force). Thus, the ratio of losses of pilots of only one 196 IAP in the Korean War is 10: 1 in our favor. Colonel Pepeliaev explains the high performance of the pilots of his regiment with good flying, high efficiency, organization of enemy search and combat, skill and courage of pilots, correct choice of maneuver and interaction in group battles.
The reliability of both Soviet and American victories is still under the watchful eye of specialists. The battles took place most often at altitudes of 8-9 thousand meters, with the participation of at least 20 vehicles on each side. At such a height, and even during a maneuvering battle, according to veterans, it was difficult to see whether the wounded one fell or not. In addition, one of the means of reliability, the FKP photo-machine gun on the MiG15, was ineffective. Here is how Pepeliaev describes his work:
"Firing range 300 m
projectile speed 600m / s
The rate of fire of the cannon is 400 rpm
It turns out:
the projectile flies 300m - 0.5 sec
queue time - 0.5 sec
shells - 5 pieces
FKP start-up - 0.0 sec
1 projectile hits the target - 0.5 sec
5 shell hits the target - 1 sec
end of line - 0.5 sec
end of FKP work - 0.5 sec.
Thus, the FKP photographs the target before all the shells of the queue reach it. To increase the efficiency of the FKP, it is necessary to increase the frame rate and work by 1-1.5 seconds after the queue. "
Thus, I can safely say that our pilots in the Korean War showed personal courage and flying skills, ours were aces. The best pilot of the USSR Air Force in this war, Nikolai Sutyagin, shot down 22 Americans, America's best ace McConnell 16 planes. The result of the best ten pilots: USSR - 147, USA -122

My sources:
- the book of memoirs of the Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel E. Pepelyaev "MiGs" against "Sabers"
- a book of memoirs by the Knight of the Order of Lenin Captain B. Abakumov “Unknown War. In the sky of North Korea "
- information and photos of the Internet

Over its fifty-year history, the MiG-15 has gained wide world fame and needs no special introduction. It became the first mass-produced jet fighter in service with both the USSR Air Force and many other countries of the world. Much has been written about the MiG-15, but, unfortunately, mainly about its service outside the Soviet Union. We think it is not worth bothering the reader with retelling foreign publications about the work on the production, improvement and operation of the aircraft in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, there are already enough materials about this. Therefore, we will focus on the little-known pages of the biography of the "fifteenth" in the USSR, as well as his combat work in the skies of the Korean Peninsula in 1950-53.

The main and most striking event in the combat career of the MiG-15 was the Korean War. MiGs began combat operations from the beginning of November 1950. The 151 GvIAD fighters, which included 28 and 72 GvIAP, and 28 IAD, consisting of 139 GvIAP and 67 IAP, were the first to appear in the skies over North Korea. The regiments of these divisions, armed with the MiG-15 with the RD-45F engine (hereinafter simply the MiG-15), were based at the airfields of Northeastern China, Mukden, Anshan and Liaoyang. On November 1, the MiG 151 GvIAD and 28 IAD flew several group sorties to the Sinuiju area and conducted two air battles with F-51 and F-80 fighters, the pilots of the 72 GvIAP Lieutenants Chiju and Khominich were credited with two victories, the first for Soviet pilots in the Korean War: one over the Mustang and one over the Shooting Star.

The very first battles with UN aircraft showed that the MiG significantly outperforms its "opponents" F-51, F-80 and F9F in almost all parameters, with the exception of horizontal maneuverability. The MiG-15 also proved to be a deadly enemy for the B-29, the main strike force of the US Far Eastern Air Force. The US Air Force and Navy, which formed the backbone of the United Nations aviation, lost the undivided air supremacy that they had enjoyed almost from the very beginning of the Korean War. For them, the appearance over Korea of ​​a new Soviet fighter with excellent flight and tactical characteristics was an unpleasant surprise, which is why the Americans called the MiG-15 a "Korean surprise."

At the end of November 1950, out of 151 Guards, 28 and 50 IADs, 64 IAKs were formed, specially designed for military operations over North Korea. However, after the formation of corps 28, the IAD did not participate in battles, in December it relocated to the area of ​​Qingdao, where it began to train pilots of the Chinese Air Force to fly jet technology. 151 GvIAD also took up "pedagogy", temporarily shutting down from hostilities. The entire burden of the air war fell on the shoulders of the pilots of the 29th GvIAP and 177th IAP of the 50th division.

50 IAD was the first to come to the Korean War on the MiG-15bis. The first sorties of the "bisy" were carried out on November 30 from the Anshan airfield to intercept bombers in the Sinuiju area, but they did not meet with the enemy. The next day, the departure of the group of 29 GvIAP to the same area and with the same mission ended in an air battle, the first for the MiG-15bis in the Korean War. On the evening of December 3, 29th Guards IAP relocated to the forward airfield Andong, 177 IAPs began to operate from Andong on December 15 with one AE, and from December 25 - with the whole composition.

The very first battles with American fighters revealed a serious design and production defect - a weak elevator design in the area of ​​the weight balancer and the external attachment point to the stabilizer. High speeds and overloads, common in air combat, repeatedly led to deformation of the elevator. In two cases, the deformation of the rudders, and possibly their destruction, led to the loss of two aircraft and the death of two pilots.

After the arrival of the summoned brigade of reworkers from the serial plant, the engineering and technical staff of the 50th IAD and factory specialists jointly cured all the MiG-15bis of the division from the ill-fated defect - reinforcing pads were riveted to the stabilizers and elevators in the area of ​​the outer bracket for mounting the rudder and the weight balancer. In total, 5 stabilizers and 15 weight balancers were repaired, the elevators were completely replaced on 35 MiGs. And although several cases of rudder deformation later occurred in the 50th division, there were no more disasters due to the weak design of the horizontal tail, either in the 50th IAD, or in other units and formations of the 64th Corps that fought in Korea later.

In the December battles, the pilots of the 50th IAD encountered a whole bunch of very unpleasant phenomena arising at high speeds and Mach numbers. Division documents report that: "... at a speed of 1050-1100 km / h, the MiG-15 is poorly controlled and unstable, which makes it difficult to aim and fire at enemy aircraft." What exactly is meant by this, the archival document does not explain, but we are unlikely to be mistaken, arguing that the pilots of the 50th IAD, and possibly the entire 64th Corps, first met with a "dead", and with a decrease in the effectiveness of the rudders, and with roll feedback when the rudder is deflected, and with a heavier control at transonic speeds, which were described above.

In December 1950, the Americans, worried about the situation in the skies over North Korea, brought into battle the F-84 Thunderjet and F-86 Saber fighters. The F-84, which surpassed the Shooting Star, but nevertheless, was an enemy of the same class for the MiG as the F-80, could not seriously affect the course of air battles, but the Saber, which first met the MiG-15bis December 17, 1950, significantly changed the picture of the air war. In the month and a half preceding the appearance of the F-86, the Soviet regiments lost 3 aircraft from enemy fighter fire and the same number lost from December 17 to December 31, in less than a dozen battles with the Sabers. The first meeting of the "fifteenth" and "eighty-sixth" ended with the victory of the American pilot: Major Efromeenko's MiG-15bis was shot down in an air battle. Our pilot, for the first time in combat conditions, successfully ejected. On December 21, the first victory over the F-86 was counted, it was won by Captain Yurkevich from the 29th GvIAP, however, according to American data, the first Saber was lost only the next day, it was shot down by Captain Vorobyov from the 177th IAP.

Our pilots highly appreciated the new enemy. In their opinion, as recorded in the 50 IAD documents, the MiG-15bis and F-86 turned out to be approximately equal, and the main advantage of the MiG was its more powerful weapon - three cannons against six 12.7-mm machine guns, while the Saber had superiority in horizontal maneuver ... And surprisingly, the documents of the 50th IAD state that the F-86 and MiG-15bis "have equal qualities on the verticals"! But now it is generally known that until the end of the war not a single UN aircraft, including the new modifications of the Saber that appeared later, surpassed the MiG-15bis in vertical maneuver! In our opinion, the secret here is simple - in the same documents it is reported that our fighters searched for the enemy at a speed of 750-800 km / h, thus excluding falling into the speed range, starting from 950 km / h, where stability problems arose and controllability of the MiG. The Sabers pilots, on the other hand, while patrolling kept their speed close to the maximum and its excess when meeting with MiGs could easily "exchange" for altitude. In addition, our pilots were probably afraid to maneuver with large G-forces at high speeds - the disasters due to the destruction of the elevator attachment were too fresh in the memory. Air combat without energetic maneuvers is nonsense. Only when the fighters of the divisions that fought in Korea after the 50th increased the search speed to 900-950 km / h, everything fell into place - on the vertical, the MiG-15bis easily overtook the Saber and just as easily left it.

The battles also revealed the shortcomings of the ASP-ZN sight and the S-13 photo-machine gun. At target speeds of more than 600 km / h and an angle of more than 2/4, the sight did not develop the correct lead angle, and at target speeds over 800 km / h, it could provide accurate shooting only at angles of no more than 1/4. If the target's speed exceeded 600 km / h, then the photo-machine gun did not register it already at an angle of 2/4.

In early February 1951, the 151st GvIAD replaced the 50th division in Andong, which had returned to the Union. By this time, 28 and 72 GvIAP transferred their MiG-15s to the 3rd IAD of the NO-AK Air Force and took the MiG-15bis from the regiments of the 50th IAD. On February 8, the 28th GvIAP began hostilities from Andong, on March 2, squadron 72 of the GvIAP joined it, another AE of this regiment appeared on March 14. Another two months of active combat with the F-80, F-86 and B-29 allowed the 64 IAK pilots to formulate the requirements for improving the MiG-15bis, which first appeared in the Corps documents. Mainly the pilots demanded from the creators of the aircraft:

Increase the efficiency of the brake flaps;

Increase the flight duration;

Improve the view of the rear hemisphere;

Give the opportunity to fly at M> 0.92 (limitation of the Chief Designer);

Eliminate deadwood;

Increase ammunition;

To equip 64 IAK aircraft with an SRO-1 “Bariy-M” aircraft radio responder (identification “friend or foe”);

Improve handling at high speeds and altitudes;

Install a minimum fuel pressure automaton on the engine to prevent the engine from stopping when the throttle is abruptly operating at high altitudes (according to modern terminology, an automatic throttle response and gas release);

Equip the aircraft with an anti-overload suit;

Improve your booking;

To reduce the visibility of aircraft in the air, replace the "white" shiny color of the aircraft with a matte varnish.

At the beginning of April 1951, the 151st GvIAD ended the hostilities and relocated to Anshan - to the second echelon of the 64th IAK. On Andong it was replaced by 176 GvIAP and 196 IAP 324 IAD. The flight echelon of the 176th regiment flew to the forward airfield on April 1, the next day the planes of the 196th regiment arrived in Antong. The division was armed with 62 MiG-15s. On these machines, the pilots of the 324th IAD fought intense battles from April 3 to the end of the month. On the MiG-15, they conducted one of the most famous and successful battles of 64 IAK, repelling the raid of 48 B-29 (under the cover of a large number of fighters) on bridges across the river. Yalujiang near the city of Andong on April 12. However, it was difficult to fight the Sabers on the MiG-15, and as a result of the insistent demands of the flight personnel and the command of the 324th IAD, at the end of April the division exchanged materiel with the 151st GvIAD, receiving 47 encores. From that moment on, regiments and divisions of the 64th IAK fought only on the MiG-15bis. At the end of May, 324 IAD received 16 new "encores" of the 13th series of the plant # 153.

On May 8, he began combat operations from the Andong airfield of the 18th GvIAP 303 IAD, with the commissioning of the new forward Miaogou airfield, two other regiments of the 303 divisions, the 17th and 523 IAPs, were relocated to it in late May - early June. entered the battle. At the beginning of the next month, the 18th Guards Regiment was also relocated to Miaogou. The 303rd division was armed with the MiG-15bis. The losses of the 303 and 324 IAD were replenished by aircraft received from the MAP factories and transferred from other parts.

The 11 months of the 303 and 324 IADs in the Korean War were the 64th Corps' greatest successes. Having mastered the skies over the Korean Peninsula, well-trained pilots of these divisions fought successful battles with Sabers and repelled attacks by UN strike aircraft, performing the main and only task of the 64th IAK - covering bridges, ferries and airfields from air strikes in the area of ​​Mt. Andong, Suphun hydroelectric power station, industrial enterprises, administrative centers, rear facilities of the KPA and CPV troops and transport communications of Northeast China and North Korea north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan border. From the beginning of autumn 1951, American fighter-bombers did not risk appearing in the "MiG Alley" - an area bounded from the north and west by the r. Yalujiang and the West Korean Gulf, and from the south and east, by the border - Anju-Hichkhon-Jian, - without a powerful cover of the Sabers. The Bomber Command of the US Far Eastern Air Force generally abandoned the use of B-29s north of Pyongyang in the daytime, transferring them to night operations. The reason for this was the large losses of bomber groups incurred in battles with MiGs of the 303rd IAD from October 22 to October 27, 1951. Of these battles, the air battle on October 23, nicknamed in the West as "Black Tuesday," "Superfortress" 307 BAG, under the powerful cover of fighters that attacked the Namsi airfield, the Americans lost 10 bombers. All the damage to the fighters of the 303th division inflicted by the B-29 riflemen in the October battles amounted to only a few holes - the counters of the Superfortress sighting systems were not designed for the speed with which the MiGs were breaking through to the bombers through the fighter cover.

Many first-class pilots fought in the 303 and 324 IAD. Unfortunately, due to lack of space, we can not only tell about all of them, but even just list their names. Let us name only those who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for successful combat work in the Korean sky. Of the 22 "Korean" Heroes, 18 fought in 303 and 324 IAD. Here they are (after the surname, the number of official victories in Korea is given in brackets): E.G. Pepelyaev (19), N.V. Sutyagin (22), D.P. Oskin (15), L.K. Shchukin (15), CM. Kramarenko (13), A.P. Smorchkov (12), M.S. Ponomarev (12), S.A. Bakhaev (11), G.U. Ojai (11), D.A. Samoilov (10), SP. Subbotin (9), N.G. Dokashenko (9), G.I. Ges (8), G.I. Pulov (8), F.A. Shebanov (6), G.A. Lobov (4), B.A. Obraztsov (4), E.M. Stelmakh (2). B.S. Abakumov (5), V.N. Alfeev (7), B.V. Bokach (6), I.M. Zaplavnev (7), L.N. Ivanov (7), A.I. Mitusov (7).

The richest combat experience of the pilots of the 303 and 324 IADs, gained in intense battles with almost all types of enemy aircraft in service with the US Air Force Far East, allowed the most complete and accurate assessment of all the main advantages and disadvantages of the MiG-15bis and develop recommendations for its further improvement. Naturally, first of all, the MiG-15bis was compared with the Saber, an aircraft of the same purpose as the MiG, created almost simultaneously.

The main advantages of the MiG-15bis in the battle with the F-86 were a significantly higher practical ceiling, a decisive superiority in maximum climb rate and vertical maneuver at all altitudes, especially at high altitudes. About how these advantages of the MiG manifested themselves in battle, says D.A. Samoilov, who fought in Korea as part of the 523 IAP:

“On September 9th, 1951, I made my first flight as lead pair and shot down one F-86 on the same flight. It turned out as follows. We flew in six in the Anju region, where, basically, all air battles were tied up - there were crossings, the Americans often stormed them. And here we are told from the ground observation point: “Who is the six? 24 Sabers are attacking you! " We looked, and they - now, close. What to do? Ojai led the six. He immediately went to the loop, I was on the left and went with a left combat turn, and the right pair went with a right combat turn. So, like a fan, they seemed to disperse. The eight Sabers immediately followed me. They attacked us from above, they had an advantage in speed, and at the first stage they even seemed to get close. Already they began to shoot from a distance of 1000 m. I shouted to Mishka Zykov, the wingman, “Hold on!” - he was inside me at the turn. And I did not twist anything else, but began a left upward spiral. The Sabers attacked us at an altitude of about 6-6.5 thousand meters and drove thousands, probably up to 11. But already at about 10.5 I saw that one four Sabers rolled away and went down. And my speed, too, was almost at the limit, I could barely walk. But, I see, after that four, another pair fell off, and somewhere in the thousands of over 11, the last pair could not stand it - it fell off and went down. I looked around - the sky was clear, there was no one, I made a half-turn - and beyond her. They might not have expected me to pursue them. In short, I caught up with this pair and shot down one plane. "

In battles, it turned out that the MiG-15bis, in comparison with the F-86 at all altitudes, has a slightly higher maximum horizontal flight speed and better acceleration characteristics. However, the pilots of the 64th IAK expressed a desire to increase the maximum level flight speed by 100-150 km / h, since the superiority of the MiG-15bis was small. The increase in speed data would be facilitated by an increase in engine thrust, as an option - with the help of afterburner. Such an event "killed" several "birds with one stone" at once: an increase in thrust would give a significant improvement in throttle response in speed, and success in battle often depended on how quickly the plane picks up maximum speed when it is lost on aerobatics, quickly accelerates when catching up with the enemy or avoiding him. In addition, an increase in thrust would improve vertical maneuver as well. The advantage of the MiG on verticals, which ensured success in the battle with the Saber, was well known to the enemy and it was expected that the Americans would try to eliminate it by improving the vertical maneuver of the F-86. Another "hare": quick acceleration to maximum speed after dropping the PTB would allow flying into the battle area at the most advantageous engine operating mode, thereby increasing the range.

At first glance, claims to the range and duration of the MiG-15bis flight may seem strange, because it cannot be said that in these parameters the MiG was radically inferior to the Saber, especially since the American fighters were based much farther from the main combat zone of the Anju region (MiG - 120 km, F-86 - 260-295 km), however, real combat the situation turned everything upside down. The MiGs flew to intercept in large groups and the flight duration was determined by the aircraft that took off first, averaging 40-50 minutes. For quick interception, the flight to the battle area was carried out at increased speeds, while the speed differed from the maximum only by a margin to keep the wingmen in line. Accordingly, the engines for most of the flight, sometimes up to 80% of the flight time, worked in combat mode, which significantly increased fuel consumption. The flight profile was based not on the conditions of maximum range and duration, but on the basis of maximum safety against enemy attacks. The climb along the route was not used, the gathering of groups in battle formations and the occupation of the combat altitude were carried out over the airfields. The exit from the battle and the return to the base were carried out at maximum speeds, the descent to landing was carried out over the airfield. In addition, for attacks on American fighter-bombers, MiGs had to descend to low altitudes, which also significantly increased fuel consumption. Suspended tanks did not help much, since they were usually discarded when there was still 30-40% of the fuel in them, and sometimes even full. The Sabers were in a much better position. Taking advantage of the restrictions of the MiG area of ​​operation (the coast of the West Korean Gulf and the Pyongyang-Wonsan line), caused by purely political reasons, the F-86 flight to the combat area, patrolling in it and returning to their bases was carried out according to the most advantageous profile at the most advantageous engine operating mode, fully using the fuel from the PTB. As a result, the eight Sabers could stay in the Anju area for up to 30-40 minutes, and the MiG squadron - 15bis - a maximum of 20.

The main advantages of the Saber were the high maximum allowable dive speed and the best horizontal maneuver.

The chief designer for the MiG-15bis set a limit of M = 0.92. Strict adherence to this limitation would make it difficult to conduct a successful battle with the F-86. The battles with the Sabers took place at speeds often exceeding M = 0.92, because both the enemy and our fighters pressed close to the sound barrier. In the combat mode of engine operation, the maximum speed of the MiG-15bis on the horizon at altitudes of 5000-12000 m corresponded to M = 0.89-0.92 and there was no speed reserve for descent with the engine running. With a sharp decline with the engine operating at maximum revs, the Saber left the MiG even if the pilot of the latter exceeded the Mach number allowed by the Chief Designer. The experience of the battles showed that the success of the MiG-15bis in the confrontation with the F-86 was explained primarily by the fact that the flight personnel of the 64th IAK had perfectly mastered piloting at M> 0.92. Usually battles were fought at Mach numbers up to 0.95-0.96, however, there were also large M numbers - often during a dive behind the Saber at a high altitude, the arrow of the mahmeter reached the stop corresponding to M = 0.98. Therefore, in battle, if there was an opportunity to follow the instruments, the pilots looked not at the mahmeter, but at the true speed indicator. The MiG-15bis Uist max = 1050-1070 km / h (for altitudes 5000-10000 m M = 0.91-0.99) and was approximately the same for all altitudes and all aircraft. Many pilots reached Uist = 1100 km / h, incl. and at an altitude of 9000-10000 m (M-1.0). The main obstacle to achieving high speeds was the deterioration of stability and controllability of the MiG, manifested in such phenomena as "windfall", roll feedback and excessive efforts on the control stick.

"Valezhka" was the main factor limiting the maximum speed of the MiG-15bis, and, subject to the constraint of the Chief Designer M = 0.92, it manifested itself only at low altitudes. It began at approximately the same true speed for all altitudes, different for different aircraft, but an average of 1050 km / h, which for heights of 5000-10000 m corresponded to M = 0.91-0.97. Above 3000 m, the "windfall" was parried by ailerons and rudder to Uist = 1070-1100 km / h. Below 3000 m the ailerons were ineffective and rudder actions were dangerous due to roll feedback. Therefore, when a "windfall" occurs at a low altitude, the pilots immediately released the air brakes and slowed down. All modifications of the MiG-15bis, undertaken to eliminate the "dead fall", were directed against the type that arose at low altitudes due to wing deformation. However, no measures were taken to combat high-altitude "windfall" associated with the peculiarities of the flow around the MiG-15 wing at M> 0.92.

Rollback reaction occurred at M = 0.86-0.87, some pilots noted its termination at M> 0.95. The pilots mastered this phenomenon and got used to it. All maneuvers at high speeds were performed with one handle or with a rudder deviation in the direction opposite to the generally accepted one. In this case, the pedals had to act very small, "dosed" movements, checking the reaction of the aircraft "to the touch." Roll feedback was not one of the most serious defects, but the pilots noted that it distracts from the combat mission.

The pilots of the MiG-15bis demanded an increase in the maximum permissible dive speed and asked the limit on the number of M to be replaced by the limit on Uist. At the same time, it was noted that an increase in the maximum permissible speed would require a decrease in efforts on the control handle, because when approaching M = 1, the control became difficult in the literal sense - the efforts that had to be applied to the RSS to increase the overload by one increased sharply and reached 25 kg. Fighting was likened to weightlifting - in a maneuver with a threefold, for example, overload, the pilot had to pull the handle with an effort of half a centner. According to the pilots of the 64th IAK, a power steering was needed.

MiGs, having an advantage in verticals, tried to fight in this type of maneuver, so there was no sufficiently complete data to compare the horizontal maneuverability of the MiG-15bis and F-86. However, the experience of battles has clearly shown that the initial, unsteady part of the turn, which begins at high speed, is better for the F-86 due to the greater efficiency of the air brakes, which makes it possible to lose speed faster, reduce the radius of the turn and "cut" the MiG-15bis. higher aileron efficiency than that of the MiG, which makes entering the turn more energetic, less effort on the control stick per unit of overload and better wing bearing properties. The MiG, at speeds close to maximum, could not create the overload necessary to perform a sufficiently energetic maneuver. The characteristics of the steady turn of both aircraft, according to the estimates of the 64 IAK flight personnel, were similar, and the outcome of the battle was determined by the level of the enemy's piloting technique. The Corps pilots concluded that it was necessary to study in detail the maneuverability of the MiG-15bis, primarily at high speeds, including at M> 0.92. in battle, going out at the speed of the most advantageous bend was not practiced.

The pilots asked for more effective air brakes. This would increase the capabilities of the MiG-15bis and in the battle on bends, and when diving behind the Saber. Having brake flaps of a large area, the F-86 performed a coup at any height and speed, including the maximum one, and could perform turns on the steep dive section. On the MiG-15bis, which has air brakes with an area two times smaller than that of the Saber, this was impossible.

Our pilots considered the cannon armament of the MiG-15bis to be excellent, in their opinion the cannons were one of the main "trump cards" of the MiG, but the ASP-ZN sight and the S-13 photo-machine gun caused a lot of criticism. In addition to the disadvantages mentioned above, the pilots noted that during vigorous maneuvers, the movable reticle “leaves” the pilot's field of view or is blurred, making aiming impossible. This disadvantage was aggravated by the fact that the pilot saw either a fixed or a movable reticle on the reflector, and if the sight switch was set to "gyro", and in a maneuvering battle, the movable reticle "went" behind the hood of the aircraft or blurred, then it was necessary to switch the sight to "not . ”, As a result, time was wasted, and sometimes the very opportunity to open fire. The pilots expressed the desire to have both nets on the reflector at the same time. In addition, the pilots reasonably demanded to replace the optical rangefinder with a radar one, since could not control in battle the range to the target on the range drum of the ASP-ZN due to the fact that for this it was necessary to shift the gaze from the target to the drum. The radio rangefinder would also improve the quality of fire, freeing the pilot from framing the target with a rangefinder ring. The main disadvantages of the S-13 were the low "rate of fire", which needed to be increased at least twice, and the absence of a time delay after releasing the combat buttons of the cannons, as a result of which the photo-machine gun stopped working when there was another 20-30 shells between the gunner and the target.

In addition to the above, the Corps pilots demanded (note that some of these requirements were put forward even during the state tests of the experimental C-2 and C-3 and the military tests of the first serial MiG-15):

Install the "tail guard" device. The main reason for our losses was surprise attacks by the enemy from the rear hemisphere. The review back on the MiG-15bis was hampered by the thick bindings of the canopy, the armored headrest and the deep landing of the pilot in the cockpit. The visibility needed to be improved;

Install an aircraft-to-aircraft identification system; at ranges exceeding 2 km, it was impossible to distinguish the MiG from the Saber;

Install a multi-channel VHF radio station;

Establish an attitude indicator that allows aerobatics. Available on the MiG-15bis AGK-47B with a roll of more than 30 ° gave incorrect readings;

Equip the MiG-15bis with an autonomous engine start;

Equip the pilot with an anti-overload suit;

Significantly improve the pilot's armor protection;

Duplicate elevator control wiring;

Install a second ejection and canopy release control kit on the right side of the ejection seat. If the pilot was wounded in his left arm lying on the throttle and not covered by armor, it was very difficult to leave the plane;

Equip the ejection seat and parachute with automatic harness and parachute opening. The absence of these devices repeatedly led to the fact that the wounded pilot, who lost consciousness during the ejection, died, falling to the ground along with the seat.

Some of the wishes previously expressed by the pilots of the corps have already been satisfied. Instead of the automatic fuel regulator ART-1K on the engines of the MiG 64 IAK, the ART-8V appeared, the same "automatic minimum fuel pressure" that the 151 GvIAD pilots asked for, the Corps began to receive aircraft equipped with "Barium-M" - the defendant of the state recognition system. On January 3, 1952, the Ministry of Aviation Industry issued order No. 10 "On the MiG-15bis aircraft", which ordered to paint 64 IAK fighters with matte paint, equip the MiG-15bis with enlarged brake flaps, establish a duplicate catapult control and oblige the plant No. 153 until February 15 1952 to equip 60 encores with three-channel VHF radio stations RSIU-ZM "Klen" and send them to 64 Corps.

The first to begin to solve the most simple problem - the problem of coloring. To do this, a team of painters from factory # 21 and a representative of GIPI-4 were sent to North-East China. However, the paint options offered by GIPI-4 did not satisfy the Corps pilots. Therefore, 64 IAK developed several of their own camouflage options that reduce the visibility of the MiG in the air and, having tested them and choosing the most suitable, in February 1952 began to repaint the entire fleet of fighters.

In January and February 1952, 324 and 303 IADs completed combat operations in the Korean skies and, having transferred their aircraft and technical personnel to the 97 and 190 IADs that replaced them, left for the Soviet Union. 16 IAP and 148 GvIAP of the 97th division received all MiGs - 15bis of the 324th IAD and 6 "encores" of the 303rd division. 256, 494 and 821 IAP 190 IAD received new "bisy" of the 20th series and the remaining vehicles of the regiments of the 303rd IAD from plant No. 153. In March 1952, the 97th division handed over its aircraft to the 190 IAD and the night 351 IAP, receiving in return new MiG-15bis of plant No. 153, equipped with RSIU-ZM radio stations. Later, the 97th IAD was replenished with the aircraft of the 27th and 28th series of the Novosibirsk plant, and the 190 IAD was replenished with the 26th.

The regiments of the 97th and 190th divisions operated from the airfields of Andong, Miaogou, Anshan, Mukden-Zapadny and Dapu (put into operation at the end of June 1952). The beginning of the combat work of these formations cannot be called successful. In terms of training, their pilots were noticeably inferior to their predecessors, the entry into battle was short-lived and the pilots of the 303 and 324 IAD did not have time to transfer their experience to the fullest. At the same time, at the end of 1951 - beginning of 1952, there was a sharp qualitative and quantitative improvement in the UN aviation group, especially its fighter component - from December 1951, the second Sabers air wing, armed with new F-86Es, entered the battle, by February 52- he who managed to gain the necessary combat experience. Since February, the intensity of hostilities in the air has continuously increased and what should have happened - the 64th IAK lost the initiative, the UN aviation gained freedom of action over almost the entire territory of North Korea. But the pilots of the 97 and 190 IAD succeeded in the seemingly impossible - after going through the hardest unsuccessful battles in March-April, in May they began to return the initiative to their own hands. Of course, this did not come without a trace. By July 1952, the flight personnel of the 97th and 190th IAD were exhausted to the limit. Further participation of divisions in the war could lead to very high and unjustified losses.

Since September 1951, the 351st IAP, the 64th Corps night regiment, armed with piston La-11, began combat operations with sorties from Anshan. On these machines, night fighters quite successfully fought the B-26, but the Lavochkin could not resist the B-29, which since November 51 had switched to operations in the MiG Alley in the dark. It was decided to connect the MiG-15bis to night operations. Of all the serial Soviet fighters of that time, it most fully met the requirements for an interceptor for aircraft like the B-29, which was clearly demonstrated in the daytime battles with "fortresses". In addition, the MiG-15bis, which had the OSP-48 blind landing equipment, was better than the La-11 adapted for flights at night and in adverse weather conditions (SMU). The presence of the SRO on board the "bis" was also very valuable. His mark on the indicator of the circular view of the ground radar greatly facilitated the guidance officer in the process of controlling his fighters and aiming them at the target. Thanks to the installation of an onboard transponder code on each of the MiGs in the air, the targeting officer could not only distinguish his aircraft from enemy aircraft, but also distinguish our fighters from each other.

Above: Major Kultyshev on a stepladder, in the middle: Captain Karelin on a stepladder, below: in the cockpit of st. Lieutenant Ikhsangaliev.

The MiG's weapons were also more powerful, but the biggest advantage of the MiG-15's weapons was its layout. The MiG cannons were located under the nose of the fuselage, which hid their muzzles from the pilot's eyes. Unlike the "fifteenth", the La-11 weapon was located in the upper part of the fuselage under the engine hood - right in front of the cockpit. As a result, after the first round, the muzzle flame of the cannons, especially bright in the night darkness, blinded the Lavochkin pilot for some time and he, as a rule, lost his target. Therefore, a second night attack on La-11 was only possible against a well-lit target. The MiG-15 was devoid of this drawback.

The first "night lights" on MiGs were the pilots of the 324 IAD, one flight of which began night interceptions in December 1951. After the departure of the 324th IAD, the night AE of the 97th division took over the baton, in addition, one squadron of the 351th IAP, which received 12 aircraft from the 16th and 148th regiments, began retraining on the MiG-15bis. The retraining was completed by mid-May and from the 16th, having relocated to Andong, the MiG 351 IAP entered the battle. At the same time, from the Miaogou airfield, Squadron 133 of the IAD, which arrived at the KTVD in early April, began fighting in the dark. On June 10, night MiGs achieved their first success, destroying 2 B-29s in one battle and seriously damaging another one, the last one crashed during an emergency landing in South Korea. In the West, this fight is ranked on a par with Black Tuesday. In the course of hostilities, the fundamental flaw of the MiG - 15bis as a night interceptor was revealed - the absence of a surveillance and sighting radar on it. Corps pilots demanded to equip the MiG with an on-board radar.

In the summer of 1952, another change of divisions of the 64th IAK took place. In the first half of July, 147 GvIAP, 415 and 726 IAP 133 IAD were redeployed to the forward airfields of Andong and Dapu, in August 32 and 216 IAD replaced the 97th and 190th divisions. The 518th, 676th and 878th regiments of the 216th IAD began sorties from Miaogou and Dapu, 224, 535 and 913 IAPs of the 32nd division in 1952 operated from the airfields of the 2nd line Mukden-Zapadny and Anshan, for with the exception of the night AE 535 IAP, which has operated from Andong since the end of November. In September, the 578th IAP of the Air Force of the 5th Navy (as the Pacific Fleet was called at that time) began hostilities. The regiment arrived at the KTVD without aircraft and technical personnel and was in the operational subordination of the 133 division, replacing the pilots of the 726 IAP on Andun.

In the second half of January 1953, the regiments of the 133rd IAD were relocated to the airfields of the 2nd line, in Andong and Dapu they were replaced by the regiments of the 32nd IAD, which operated from these airfields until the end of the Korean War. In March-April, one squadron of the 913th IAP was based at the new Kuandian airfield.

In February, 351 and 578 IAP departed to the Soviet Union, they were replaced by 298 IAP and 781 IAP of the Air Force of the 5th Navy. The 298th regiment fought at night from the Andong and Miaogou airfields, and the 781st, which did not have its own aircraft, was operatively subordinate to the 216th IAD, replacing its pilots at the Dapu and Miaogou airfields. This composition - 32, 216 IAD, 298 and 352 IAP at the forward airfields of Andong, Miaogou, Dapu and regiments of the 133rd IAD at the airfields of the 2nd echelon Mukden-West and Anshan - survived until the end of the Korean War.

From the second half of 1952, the tension of combat operations in the air during daylight hours continued to increase. Battles, in which more than a hundred aircraft participated from each side, became commonplace. Such air battles, consisting of many battles of flights and squadrons, covered almost the entire territory of North Korea. Especially fierce battles were fought in the "MiG Alley" and over the adjacent areas of Northeast China. The fighting did not subside even as the weather worsened. Departures to intercept at SMU became common, especially since the spring of 1953. Sometimes the battles were fought in the rain, with 10-point cloud cover, when horizontal visibility barely exceeded a kilometer, and sometimes in such conditions 64 IAK pilots had to chase fighter-bombers at low altitude , between the hills.

The intensity of hostilities at night also steadily increased, reaching a climax in late 1952 - early 1953. In the air battles of December-January, the Bomber Command of the Far East Air Force lost 8 B-29s, which was comparable to losses in October 1951. As a result, the Americans abandoned and from the night use of the B-29 north of Pyongyang under simple weather conditions, since February the Superfortresses have invaded the MiG Alley only in bad, and more often very bad, weather at the darkest time of the day. However, the use of the B-29 in the SMU had little effect on their effectiveness, because the bombing was carried out by the Americans with the help of the Shoran radio system, which did not depend on the weather. At the same time, the effectiveness of MiGs' actions dropped to almost zero - in the absence of an on-board radar, a successful interception of the Superfortress in the clouds at night was an impossible task.

In 1952-53. the qualitative improvement of the aviation grouping of the UN forces continued. Since the summer of 1952, fighter air wings began to receive the F-86F, the most advanced of the Saber modifications that fought in Korea. Its main difference from the F-86E was an engine with a 20% increase in thrust, which significantly improved the altitude performance, climb rate and vertical maneuver of the new Saber, making it much more difficult to fight with it. In the spring of 1953, two fighter-bomber wings and one fighter-bomber squadron began operations on the F-86F-25 and F-86F-30, re-equipping from the F-51 and F-80 to the strike variant of the Saber. At the end of 1952, night fighters F3D and F-94, equipped with airborne search and sighting radars, began fighting, and jet fighter-bombers operated in the MiG Alley at night.

In 1952-53. the pilots of the 64th IAK did not have such high-profile successes as in 1951. This is due to the fact that the fighters of the 97, 190, 133, 216 and 32 IAD had to fight in more difficult conditions, in addition, the average level of training of the pilots of these divisions was noticeably lower than from their colleagues from 303 and 324 IAD. However, these divisions also had many excellent air fighters. The fact that their combat accounts look more modest than those of their predecessors does not diminish their merits in the least - the air situation was different, in addition, at the beginning of 1952, another tightening of the confirmation system for downed enemy aircraft took place. Unfortunately, as with the 303 and 324 IAD pilots, we cannot mention all of them. Let us name only a few (after the surname in brackets the number of official victories in Korea is given): V.M. Zabelin (9), M.I. Mikhin (9, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union), S.A. Fedorets (7), A.S. Boytsov (6, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union), N.M. Zamekin (6), A.T. Bashman (5), G.N. Berelidze (5), G.F. Dmitriuk (5), A.A. Olenitsa (5), B.N. Siskov (5), V.I. Belousov (4), V.A. Zhuravel (4), V.P. Lepikov (4), B.C. Mikheev (4), V.A. Utkin (4), M.F. Yudin (4), A.A. Alekseenko (4), A.M. Balabaykin (4), A.I. Krylov (4), G.A. Nikiforov (4), F.G. Afanasyev (3), I.P. Vakhrushev (3), K.N. Degtyarev (3), A.N. Zakharov (3), N.I. Ivanov (3), A.T. Kostenko (3), P.V. Minervin (3), A.R. Prudnikov (3), P.F. Shevelev (3), N.I. Shkodin (3). Of the night fighters, the most popular among Corps pilots were A.M. Karelin (6 V-29, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union) and Yu.N. Dobrovichan (3 B-29).

In 1952-53. on the MiG-15bis 64 IAK, a large number of modifications were carried out, during which the wishes of the Corps pilots, expressed in 1951, were fulfilled.

At the beginning of 1952, all MiG-15bis, which did not have a Bariy-M defendant, were equipped with it, and in February the state identification system was put into operation. In addition to the use of the SRO for its intended purpose, it was non-standard used in night combat operations - its own code was set on the airborne transponders of each of the MiGs in the air.

In March 1952, 16-mm armored backs, more powerful armored heads, and pyrocylinders appeared on the ejection seats of the MiGs. Due to the increased weight of the seat, the squibs were replaced with more powerful ones. In the same spring, the ejection seats were equipped with automatic opening of the AD-3 seat belts, and the parachutes - with automatic opening of the KAP-3. Now, after the ejection, regardless of the state of the pilot, the seat was separated from him and the parachute opened at a certain height. In the second half of the summer, a second catapult bracket appeared on the seats under the right hand.

At the end of August, the installation of enlarged brake flaps on the MiG-15bis 64 IAK began, while their area increased from 0.5 to 0.8 2 m. other "encores" of the Corps. This improvement significantly improved the MiG's maneuverability.

Speaking at a tactical flight conference in the fall of 1952, M.I. Mikhin, who fought in 518 I AP, described one of his battles, carried out on an airplane that was not yet equipped with enlarged brake flaps:

“08/19/52 in the area southwest of Sakushu (now Sakchu - auth.) 25-30 km, I found two F-86s, following on opposite courses at a distance of 2.5-3 km at an altitude of 9300 m with a course of 220 in the extended right "Bearing". Our group, consisting of 6 MiG-15s, followed in the right "bearing" of the pairs at an interval of 500-600 m and a distance of 800-1000 m of a pair from a pair. Having received an order from the commander of the AE, Captain Molchanov: "Attack the enemy!" l-tom Yakovlev made a right combat turn and ended up on the left behind, above the enemy at a distance of 600-700 m. The enemy began to perform a right turn, I switched to the left side and, approaching a distance of 500 m, opened fire, but the track passed from behind. Having specified aiming, I opened fire again from a distance of 250-300 m, as a result of which the F-86 was covered with a track, caught fire and began to fall randomly. The exit from the attack is made to the right upwards.

This battle showed that the F-86 can be shot down on a bend, but only in the first part, since the F-86, after the release of the brake flaps, makes the bend with a smaller radius than the MiG-15. "

How the maneuvering characteristics of the MiG-15bis, which received more effective air brakes, have changed, is well illustrated by the materials of the 32 IAD flight-tactical conference held in August 1953. They still did not recommend chasing the Sabers on a dive and leaving them with a sharp decline , including due to the preservation of the superiority of the F-86 in the effectiveness of air brakes. It was also not recommended to get involved in battles with "Sabers" on a horizontal maneuver. At the same time, it was noted that if the F-86 went to the tail of the MiG at a distance of actual fire, then it was impossible to leave in a straight line or climb, it was necessary to take a fight on a bend. In this case, the MiG pilot, who has mastered his car well, has every chance of success even in a battle with a numerically superior enemy. An experienced pilot could successfully pursue the Saber in a dive. Speaking at the conference, pilot-inspector of the division for piloting techniques and flight theory, Major A.T. Kostenko proved these propositions with examples from his own combat experience:

“On 19.2.53, in the Suphun HPP patrol area, I met a pair of F-86s, which were turning at me. I went on the attack and got closer to a distance of 100-200 m under an angle of 2/4, at this time the leader of the second pair of art. Lieutenant Aleksandrov opened barrage on a collision course. The leader of the F-86 pair makes a sharp turn to the right with a climb, and the follower makes a left turn. I also made a left turn and began to chase the Saber on a dive. When the Saber began withdrawing, I opened fire and shot it down ...

On 17.5.53 I flew in a group with the regiment commander (913 IAP - auth.) - the leader of the 2nd pair. In the patrol area over the Suphun hydroelectric power station, while making a left turn, we were attacked by a pair of F-86s from the left from behind, from a 3/4 angle. I gave the command: "We are under attack, turn to the left," and turned to face the enemy, the leading pair and my wingman climbed in a straight line, and I was left alone and began to fight with a pair of Sabers. The height was 13,000 m.

The battle began on a downward bend. At the beginning of the bend, the F-86 began to go into my tail, I released the air brakes and began to pull sharply. With a decrease in speed, the MiG-15 turns better and sharply reduces the radius of the turn. On the second bend, I went into the tail of the F-86 and began to fire at the wingman at a 2/4 angle, getting close to the enemy. The "Sabers" make a left roll for me, I also make a roll and chase them. The enemy makes a left combat turn. On a dive, my speed reached 1050 km / h, it is very difficult to take the plane to a combat turn at once, I extinguished the speed to 900 km / h, after which I made a combat turn to the left and ended up above the F-86, where I again began a battle on a bend with lead fire on the wingman. The enemy made another coup with a dive turn to the right and stopped fighting, went towards the bay. I gave another queue for a dive and went to the landing airfield, tk. the fuel was running out.

The air battle ended in a draw at an altitude of 3000 M. my lead correction turned out to be less than what was supposed to be when shooting at an angle of 2/4. "

According to the characteristics of the steady turn, the MiG-15bis was still somewhat superior to the Saber, which is well illustrated by the following example. On July 16, 1953, a MiG-15bis flight from 913 IAP under the command of Captain Pushchin covered its airfield during the landing of MiGs that came from a combat mission. The link was above the 3rd turn. At this time, a pair of F-86s jumped out because of the clouds and attacked the MiG from the left from behind. From the command post they gave the command: "Spin to the left." The flight began a left turn, completed 3 turns, during which time the enemy was not able to get into the tail of our fighters and get close to a distance of actual fire. Only on the 4th bend, the pilot of Art. Lieutenant Pavlov reduced the roll, the Sabers took advantage of this, opened fire and shot him down.

The MiG-15bis retained its superiority over the F-86F in the rate of climb, the vertical maneuver of the MiG also remained better due to significantly less weight with approximately the same engine thrust, which manifested itself in a shorter execution time and a slower speed loss on aerobatics. However, the improved vertical maneuver of the F-86F significantly reduced the gap between the MiG and the Saber, which required more attention in combat with it, accurate piloting and full use of the MiG-15bis' capabilities. From the speech of the commander of flight 224 IAP Captain G.N. Berelidze:

“Having found the enemy in your tail, you must immediately carry out a sharp maneuver in order not to allow aimed fire to be fired ... the maneuver is performed with a climb. In order for the initial trajectory to be steeper, at the first moment it is necessary to release the brake flaps, and then go into a spiral with a climb ...

In most cases, the enemy strives to maintain the ability to fire ahead of time, creating an energetic turn, and loses its initial speed advantage, gradually lagging behind. This lag is aggravated by the fact that with almost the same thrust of the MiG-15 and F-86 engines, the weight of the enemy aircraft is much greater. If at the same time the F-86 pilot does not notice in time the perniciousness of his position and does not give up pursuit, then you and the enemy will find yourself at opposite ends of the circle described by the planes with an advantage in height, which at the right time can be easily converted into speed. Choosing a convenient moment when the enemy weakens the energy of the reversal or goes into a straight line, you can easily switch to the attack on F-86 ...

I will give two typical examples from personal experience:

03/27/53 I paired with my wingman attacked 6 enemy aircraft. The enemy's battle formations were upset by our fire, but one pair managed to get out in my tail. My wingman could not provide me with direct support, since he himself contacted the F-86 in combat. I performed an upward spiral as described above, and after a while I myself ended up in the tail of the enemy aircraft. However, in this case, he could not complete the attack due to lack of fuel.

06.06.53 the group in which I was flying with my wingman was suddenly attacked from above from behind by a six F-86. Fighting off enemy attacks, I found myself without a follower and was attacked by the last pair of Sabers. I switched to an energetic upward spiral, and already on the second spiral turned out to be significantly higher than the opponent. Taking advantage of the large gap in distance between the lead and slave F-86, went on the attack on the lead Saber and shot him down. "

In September 1952, the MiG-15bis 64 IAK began replacing single-channel short-wave radio stations RSI-6K with three-channel VHF stations RSIU-ZM. This significantly improved the quality of radio communications, facilitated the command of large forces of fighters, and eliminated the problem of interaction between aircraft equipped with different radio stations.

The next month, 64 IAK received 18 sets of the Sirena radar warning system (RWO) for testing it in combat conditions. 15 kits were installed on aircraft 133 and 216 IAD. Having tried "Sirena" in battles, the pilots spoke of it with enthusiasm and demanded to equip all MiGs of the Corps with it.

In November 1952, the replacement of the ASP-ZN sights began with its more advanced modification ASP-ZNM. The main difference between the new sight was the presence of an electromagnetic damper, due to which, during sharp and energetic evolutions of the aircraft, the deflection of the gyroscope was limited within a small lead angle, for which the sight was designed, i.e. about 8. The limitation of the deflection of the gyroscope eliminated the blurring of the sight reticle and reduced the time of aiming and the development of the lead angle.

At the end of December, the factory brigades and the technical staff of the 64th IAK began equipping the MiG-15bis with an autonomous engine start.

In April-May 1953, all MiG-15bis of the 64th Corps were equipped with SPO, in June they began to install new ejection seats with improved armor protection. In the last month of the Korean War, MiGs began to be refined for the use of PPK-1 anti-overload suits. Also, by the end of the war, TS-27 periscopes appeared on the moving parts of the lanterns of the aircraft of the corps, which improved the view of the rear hemisphere.

Thus, during the Korean War, many of the requirements of the 64 IAK pilots were fulfilled, mainly those related to equipment and did not require significant alteration of the aircraft. Of this block of requirements, only those related to the sight and the photo-machine gun remained unsatisfied. By the end of the Korean War, sights with a radio range finder were not mass-produced yet, equipping the MiG with an onboard radar also practically did not leave the stage of experimental work. Why the photo-machine gun was not improved is unclear, especially since the technical staff of the 64th IAK offered options for improving the serially produced S-13. Perhaps this was not considered a top priority. Fulfillment of another block of requirements related to improving the stability and controllability of the MiG-15bis, increasing its flight characteristics, installing a forced engine, etc. would entail a radical alteration of the airframe design, which was impractical - in 1952 the serial production of "encores" was completed, in the assembly shops of aircraft factories they were replaced by the MiG-17. Therefore, the requirements put forward by the Korean War were fully taken into account already in the modifications of the "seventeenth".

The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953.During the hostilities, 64 IAK fighters, mainly on MiG-15 and MiG-15bis, performed 63,229 combat sorties, conducted 1,683 group air battles during the day and 107 single battles at night, in which they shot down 1,097 enemy aircraft , including 647 F-86, 186 F-84, 117 F-80, 28 F-51, 26 "Meteor" F.8, 69 B-29. The losses amounted to 120 pilots and 335 aircraft, including combat - 110 pilots and 319 aircraft. There is little accurate and reliable information about the actions of Chinese and Korean pilots. It is known that the first non-Soviet unit on the MiG-15, the 7th IAP of the Chinese Air Force, began to operate in Korea on December 28, 1950. In the summer of 1951, the United Air Force was formed, which included units and formations of the PLA and KPA air forces, including two Chinese divisions armed with MiG-15. A year later, OVA units began to receive MiG-15bis. By the end of the war, the OVA consisted of 7 fighter divisions armed with 892 aircraft, including 635 MiG-15 and MiG-15bis. Our archival documents give the following results of the military operations of the United Air Army: 22,300 combat sorties were carried out, 366 air battles were conducted, in which 271 enemy aircraft were shot down, including 181 F-86, 27 F-84, 30 F-80, 12 F-51, 7 "Meteor" F.8, their losses were 231 aircraft and 126 pilots. Official American data give the following figures for the losses of aircraft of the UN Forces (Air Force, aviation of the Navy and the US Marine Corps, squadrons of the South African and Australian Air Forces): 2837 aircraft, including 78 F-86, 18 F-84, 15 shot down in air battles F-80 and RF-80, 12 F-51, 5 "Meteor" F.8, 17 B-29. It is difficult to say what the real losses of the enemy are. Apparently, as in most similar cases, the true losses lie between ours and the American figures.

During the Korean War, the MiG-15bis proved to be a reliable, unpretentious machine. As the technicians later recalled, there was no such aircraft either before or after the "fifteenth". Many vehicles developed a 200-hour factory warranty and continued to fight further. Some planes have passed the 400-hour mark. It should be borne in mind that the lion's share of these hours was combat raid - operation in extreme conditions, often outside the established limits. The overwhelming majority of MiG-15bis 64 Corps left the combat formation only in one case - death in battle. The same planes that passed a similar fate, inherited from one regiment to another, fought until the end of the war. Some of the encores that entered the battle in December 1950 survived until July 53. The MiG's survivability was legendary. Some of the vehicles that returned from air combat looked like a sieve rather than an airplane. Just a few examples.

In May 1952, MiG-15bis No. 0615388 Art. Lieutenant Veshkin from 821 IAP. The pilot, wounded by flashlight fragments, flew 110 km on the damaged aircraft, when approaching the airfield, the engine stopped and the pilot landed on the fuselage 5 km from the airfield. When examined on the plane, 154 entry holes were counted, 39 large-caliber bullets hit the engine, damaging all the blades of the turbine and nozzle apparatus. The aircraft was restored in 8 days.

September 16, 1952 damaged in an air battle MiG-15bis No. 2915328 Major Karataev from 535 IAP. The plane received 119 entry holes, 24 hits fell on the engine. Two combustion chambers were punctured, 16 turbine blades were knocked off, all blades of the nozzle apparatus were burnt, fuel tank no. 2 exploded, left brake flap burnt out, tank no. 1 got 8 holes, the hydraulic tank was broken and the hydraulic system was out of order. Nevertheless, the pilot managed to get out of the battle, reach the Dagushan airfield and make a normal landing. The plane was restored in 16 days.

It should be added to the above that the largest number of holes recorded in the documents is 204.

The survivability of the MiG-15bis, as well as the skill of the pilot, is clearly illustrated by the following example: on June 20, 1951, Captain Ges from 176 GvIAP attacked the F-51 from a distance of less than 100 meters. The explosions of shells destroyed the "Mustang", the flying off left plane hit the tail unit of the MiG, severely damaging the stabilizer and elevator and jamming the longitudinal control. At that moment, a couple of Captain Ges attacked 4 F-86s, knocking out the MiG of the slave Senior Lieutenant Nikolaev and wounding him. On an almost uncontrollable plane, Captain Ges dodged the attack and began to cover his comrade. Having allowed the wounded wingman to land, Ges began to experiment and, using the engine, flaps and air brakes, he selected a mode in which the damaged fighter descended with a slight angle, making it possible to land. And Captain Ges did not miss this opportunity, having safely landed the wounded car.

09:00 16.04.2016

The Korean campaign in terms of its impact on modern history is undeservedly forgotten. However, it was precisely as a result of this small but difficult war that the myth that the American "atomic baton" could be delivered anywhere in the world without any problems was dispelled.

The Korean campaign in terms of its impact on modern history is undeservedly forgotten. However, it was precisely as a result of this small but difficult war that the myth that the American “atomic baton” could be delivered anywhere in the world without any problems was dispelled.
Cut through the line The Korean campaign is the first large-scale confrontation between West and East since the end of World War II. The first was this conflict in another - in the course of hostilities, jet aircraft were massively used - maneuverable, fast, capable of striking where they were not expected at all. It was after the Korean War that group and single maneuvers at large overloads appeared in the tactics of combat units. Fighter aircraft, by the way, gained invaluable experience in Korea - the pilots learned how to destroy enemy bombers and developed a whole manual to combat American aircraft.
The tactics of the Americans were simple - a massive raid, bombing according to WWII patterns and a quick retreat back. During the entire period of the Korean campaign, American B-26 bombers flew almost 54 thousand sorties, of which two-thirds were carried out at night. However, Kim Il Sung, who requested military assistance from Stalin, received more than just aces. A real hunt was opened for American aviation, both fighter and bomber. Almost immediately, Soviet pilots, who were not officially in Korea, managed to probe the necessary regime for the most effective destruction of American bombers. The attacking group of Soviet MiG-15s acted on the principle of "cutting through the formation as much as possible" - in 90% of cases, the huge damage to US aviation was inflicted from the first approach, the second was needed only for a "control shot". In destroying American aviation, the Soviet aces regularly used aerobatics - doing a "slide", "oblique loop", made effective maneuvers and turns. After the Soviet MiGs broke up the formation and made an approach to the target, the squadron was divided into pairs and continued well-organized shooting of the enemy. Air confrontation The first meeting between Soviet pilots and Americans took place on November 1, 1950. Two pairs of MiG-15s and three American Mustangs met in the Korean sky. In the course of the fleeting battle, two American aircraft were destroyed. The pilot of the third plane chose to leave the battle than saved his life. By the way, in the Korean War, Soviet aviation for the first time used flights of six aircraft - the so-called three pairs. Thanks to the special tactics and design features of the MiG-15, Soviet pilots found out that the American F-80 Shooting star and F-84 Thunderjet easily fought at any speed and angle of attack, even with superior numbers.
Historians note that the inability of American pilots to resist Soviet aviation was perceived in the United States itself rather strange - they decided not to change the tactics and training of the pilots, but they sent more modern aircraft to the area - the F-86 Saber.However, the transfer of the F-86 to the area did not help much. “The differences between the planes were minimal, the Saber and the MiG-15 had approximately the same thrust-to-weight ratio, however, the Americans had significantly better maneuverability and more predictable piloting in extreme modes. The Saber climbed more confidently and performed aerobatics faster, ”explains military historian Valentin Alushkov. Despite the more sophisticated design, the American pilots did not have time to take advantage of all the abilities that the engineers of North American Aviation gave them. The advantage of the MiG-15 in armament beat American maneuverability and speed to smithereens. American Aviation Black Day The Korean campaign is still presented to American pilots as an aviation horror story. In the training center of American aviation - the school of pilot-aces "Top Gun" (eng. no final conclusion has been reached. The Americans have not seen such losses for a long time - except that during the Second World War there were similar incidents. October 30, 1951 will be remembered by American pilots for a long time - B-29 bombers on this day finally ceased to be a weapon of a crushing blow, turning from a "flying fortress" into a "flaming barn".
Historians note that the well-planned and carefully prepared raid on North Korean airfield Namsi failed exactly as the landing gear of the last US Air Force B-29 bomber broke off the runway. The Americans, being big fans of massive air attacks, this time decided to use the maximum of their capabilities - 21 bombers and almost 200 escort fighters. Everything went according to plan exactly until the moment when 44 Soviet MiG-15s took off into the sky. The 64th Fighter Air Corps of the USSR Air Force created a real aviation miracle in the Korean sky - during the flight, 12 B-29 bombers and several escort fighters were destroyed.It should be noted that the Soviet pilots did not specially prepare to repel a massive attack, but certain adjustments in tactics were all the same were introduced. Much attention was paid to radar and enemy detection - the faster and further you find the target, the more time is left for a reaction. The fatal miscalculation of the Americans also played a role - the escort fighters were seriously late in the bombing area and the Soviet aviation, in fact, the Americans themselves issued a permit to shoot B-29 bombers.
“What is characteristic, the Soviet pilots did not operate in dense large groups, as usual, but were divided into pairs with maximum freedom of action, that is, the primary goal was to destroy all bombers, and only then to fight the support aircraft, if the latter in large numbers were in time to the place "meeting" ", - explains the military historian, candidate of historical sciences Sergei Ayupov. Soviet pilots used a favorite maneuver - at a speed of almost a thousand kilometers per hour in a dive, Soviet MiG-15s began to" weed "the combat formations of the B-29. After the very first call of the Soviet pilots, the B-29 crews realized that they would remember this autumn day for a long time - some of the survivors of the first wave of the B-29 attack sharply changed course and began to go towards the sea. In the same battle, the Soviet aces also destroyed an American photo reconnaissance officer sent to record the results of the bombing. Shock therapy The result of the bombing of the Namsi airfield was zero. Literally. Not a single bomb fell into the area designated by the Americans. The shock therapy of the American Air Force was a success - for a long time the command of the US Air Force tried to understand how many aircraft took part in the attack on B-29 bombers, and also analyzed the causes of the fatal error. Information messages transmitted to the American press contained information that about 50 enemy aircraft were shot down during the attack by B-29 machine-gun fire, however, this was only an attempt to divert the attention of the American public and reduce the resonance from a serious defeat.
Historians and aviation experts note that 44 Soviet MiG-15s involved in a raid on American bombers were not all that the Americans could encounter. the case if some of the bombers break through to the target. Then they would have to be broken, as they say, on the spot. But everything worked out and the pilots left in reserve remained all this time in "readiness number one", - explains military historian Nikolai Nikolayev. "Black Tuesday" seriously frightened the American military - for several days all aviation flights in the combat zone were suspended, and the B-29 after the "Pearl Harbor" was not used for a whole month. Having made certain conclusions regarding the tactics of using their bombers, the Americans calmed down and decided to test the Soviet fighter aircraft for strength again and immediately paid for it. The MiG-15 overtook three American bombers, which were actually sent to slaughter. Along the way, Soviet aviation destroyed a dozen Sabers from the aviation group that accompanied the B-29. After repeated punishment for air-military arrogance, the Americans completely abandoned the use of the B-29 during the day. Experts note that by destroying American B-29s with varying degrees of involvement, tactics and number of fighters, Soviet pilots guaranteed their own country reliable protection against enemy aircraft penetration. 54 people became the aces of the air war. The most productive Soviet pilots - Nikolai Sutyagin, Yevgeny Pepeliaev, Lev Shchukin, Dmitry Oskin, Sergei Kramarenko later made a significant contribution to the actions of Soviet fighter aviation, actually rewriting the laws of air combat. For the entire time of participation in hostilities in Korea, Soviet pilots flew about 65 thousand sorties, destroying almost 1,500 enemy aircraft.