The segment of my life associated with the command of the communications warhead of the KRU "Zhdanov", a ship with unique means of control and communication, I refer to the most interesting years of service. And the point is not only in the uniqueness of the equipment, but also in the fact that during this period remarkable people served in the communications unit: officers, warrant officers, foremen and sailors.

I must say that throughout my service on the cruiser, I often heard arguments, rather rhetorical, about what is more important to the ship: an artillery warhead with its main caliber 152 mm, or a communications warhead, which is a medium-sized communications center. I am not inclined to underestimate the role of artillery; any ship needs it. At the same time, because of it, the quality of communication really suffered, and communications workers who were fighting for this quality suffered. And the reason lay in only one thing: barrels of various calibers, artillery installations, powerful vibrations during their rotation and volleys, the work of artillery radars - all this led to strong sparks and interference. Therefore, I am an advocate of a clean upper deck for control ships. I know perfectly well that the same problems arise on any ship that has more than three radio transmitters. Well, what can we say about the control cruiser with its 17 radio transmitters, of which one is a five-kilowatt one.

About the main caliber BCH-2 and BCH-4

Terrible power is the cruiser's main caliber. In order to understand this, you just need to look at the heavy heavy projectile, at the charge (a kind of endless bag of gunpowder), listen to the unique rumble emitted by the firing of guns. Any firing with the main caliber required thorough preparation of the entire ship from bow to stern. It began with the fact that the officer of the watch gave the command along all lines of the ship's broadcast: "Prepare the ship for firing of the main caliber." On this command, the managers of the premises removed all the plafonds from the lamps, unscrewed the electric bulbs, leaving only the emergency lighting. The colossal vibrations that occur during the salvo have always led to all sorts of problems. These are failures of the material part, malfunctions of electronics, communications, even fires due to a short circuit in electrical cables. The emergency parties had enough work.

In the communications command post, located next to the first turret of the main battery, the most unpleasant thing was a blow to the heels during a volley. Therefore, the entire personnel of the forward communications posts sat with their legs tucked in. If in the post there was something hidden on the ceiling, then it must fall on someone's head, be it a cigarette butt or an ashtray from a tin can. There were cases when bolts and rivets flew out of the bulkheads, whistling past the delicate backs of the heads.

It is interesting that the artillerymen of the main caliber towers themselves were in the thickness of the armor when firing and did not experience any sensations. The officer in charge of the navigational watch suffered the most. In preparation for shooting, all plexiglass fences were dismantled. That is, the officer of the watch remained on the bridge without glazing. There was about ten meters of free space before the cutoff of the guns of the second turret of the main battery. I can describe my feelings. A few minutes before the start of the shooting, the commander and the first mate went to the conning tower, not forgetting to instruct the watch officer about the safety of navigation. On the bridge, in addition to the watch, remained a radio operator, a radio operator and a messenger. The first volley of both turrets with all barrels (burning of lubricant) shocked the most. It resembled something like a knockout blow with a very soft glove. The eyes suffered the most, since it took some time for the lens to take its original shape and vision to recover. Despite some unpleasant sensations, the radio operator and I could not stop the laughter, seeing how, with each volley, not only debris fell from somewhere from above, but also rats fell. Tumbling, they flew straight overboard from the wings of the bridge. After burning the lubricant, volleys of practical shells began, and the rapper was zeroed in. The noise grew even more. When the shooting was over, the commander appeared cheerfully from the conning tower.

At that time I did not yet know about the tragic fate of the cruiser Senyavin of the Pacific Fleet. He was the twin of our cruiser. Performing shooting, during filming due to violation of safety measures, one of the bow towers of the main caliber caught fire and detonated on it, many people died, the entire crew of the tower. (Naturally, all this was an absolute secret and was indulged by the sailors by word of mouth). Of course, such a powerful technique was served by very colorful people. I especially remember the commander of the first tower of the main caliber Stanislav Eduardovich Zmachinsky. Possessing a huge, under two meters, height, weighing more than 120 kilograms, excellent bass, he literally thrilled the sailors. In 1973, during the autumn gathering of the Black Sea Fleet ships, there was such an episode. The ship was at anchor in the Belbek roadstead. It was afternoon and sailors (about 200 people) were smoking on the tank. Fleet commander Vice-Admiral Sysoev, together with the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Proskuryakov, were on the navigating bridge and were talking about something. Suddenly Sysoev noticed that something was happening on the tank. The personnel very energetically, almost at a run, moved from the tank to the left waist. In a few moments, the tank was empty. Sysoev asked the commander of the ship: "Commander, what happened on the tank?" Robert Proskuryakov scraped his lips out of habit and replied: "Comrade commander, this is the tank commander of the first main-caliber turret, senior lieutenant Zmachinsky ..." The commander did not understand why the commander of the tower caused such fear among the sailors. Many unique officers - artillerymen, high professionals and excellent sailors - served in BC-2 of KRU "Zhdanov". These are, first of all, the commanders of the BC-2 V. Chegrinets, Yu. Siluanov. Divisional and group commanders: I. Gelumbovsky, E. Glushchenko, V. Kutin, V. Izotov, V. Bortnik, V. Slobodyanik, N. Voevodkin and many others.

Yet the real main caliber of the cruiser was the Kristall-K space communications complex (after modernization at the Ordzhonikidze plant in 1980). Why the main one? Yes, because after the modernization, most of the tasks assigned to the cruiser began to relate exclusively to the performance of communication functions, which is understandable, because the Crystal provided high-quality communication simultaneously via two government telephone channels, two direct-printing telegraph channels, and one phototelegraph channel. Space communication did not depend on the state of the ionosphere, the passage of waves, solar activity and other factors. That is, it was absolutely reliable. It was intended that way. However, during operation, it turned out that there were significant flaws in the design of the complex. The most important flaw was that the Shilka army air defense system was chosen as the basis for the vertical and horizontal antenna guidance system. The stumbling block was the magnetic powder clutch of the complex, designed to work in the field, and, moreover, in a short-term mode. The designers have forgotten that there is always excitement at sea, and the clutch must constantly work 24 hours a day. In combat service, the couplings broke down every month. Suppliers of the Black Sea Fleet communications department sent new couplings in boxes, emptying the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense. But there were still not enough couplings. Finally, the moment came when clutches began to arrive very rarely. Apparently, the warehouses were empty. And then the time for an official visit to the port of Piraeus arrived. Before the visit, a list of 10 operating frequencies was received through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were allowed to operate in the Greek port. How would Crystal help here! But it was defective. Meanwhile, it was necessary to transmit a report on the progress of the visit every day.

Literally, on the second day of the visit, the ship was left without communication at night - all operating frequencies were clogged with interference, and, it seems, aimed. This was reported to the senior signalman on the ship to the deputy chief of communications of the Black Sea Fleet Cap. 1st rank to O. Sviridov. Not trusting anyone, Sviridov personally studied the situation at the post of the ionosphere-wave service and decided to work at all frequencies without restrictions. After 20 minutes, the connection was established and the telegrams were transmitted. In the morning report, the officers were concerned about the problems of uninterrupted communication. Unexpectedly, the space communication mechanics themselves took the initiative. They suggested using the Kristall complex in the "no clutch" mode. Indeed, the ship was securely moored by the side, stood in a closed bay, and there was absolutely no excitement on board. Just in case, the mechanics built a certain rope block for small turns of the antenna, in case the ship wobbles, because being in the antenna post was mortally dangerous due to the influence of microwave frequencies. First, they caught the satellite for reception, pointing the antenna at the maximum signal, and this was not easy, because the antenna beamwidth was 1 degree. Then the personnel went downstairs, leaving the antenna post. Then the radio transmitter was turned on. After a while, the communications center responded. Further control of the antenna was carried out through a system of rope blocks. Until the end of the visit, the ship had high-quality communications on all channels. The command was completely satisfied. However, when there is a connection, no one notices it - this is an old axiom. And one more conclusion. You should never throw away the old rope, maybe it will come in handy in difficult times.

Receiving cases

I took over the affairs and duties of the commander of the BCh-4 KRU "Zhdanov" in 1982 from the captain of the 2nd rank Ye.B. Arzhannikov. I did not experience any difficulties in accepting cases, since since February 1981 I have already served as a senior engineer of the BCh-4 on this ship. When I was a senior engineer, I was charged with the commissioning of communications equipment when the ship was overhauled. During my joint work with the employees of the Era enterprise, I have established good relations with all the specialists of this organization. With special warmth I remember V. Voskresensky, V. Klimenko, communication with whom played a big role in my development as a specialist.

After the overhaul of the “Zhdanov” switchgear, part of the equipment was replaced with more advanced models. Telephone and radiotelephone special equipment, telegraph direct-printing and ultra-high-speed communication equipment were partially renewed. The fleet of radio transmitters was updated: R-641, R-642 were removed and replaced with R-654. Armed with new radio relay and wire communication stations. An advanced space communications station A-60 ("Kristall-K") has been installed. The MVU-300 equipment was installed at the flagship command post, and on the signal bridge of the Kit station. In the post of the ionosphere-wave service - the equipment for oblique sounding of the ionosphere P-494. Unfortunately, the switching system of radio transmitting devices was not improved, the switching was still carried out manually through the checkpoint system, into which three radio transmitting centers were connected (complete anachronism). There were other minor remarks, for example, the STA-35 devices were left in the telegraph room, which I operated here when I was the commander of the BCh-4 group in 1971-1976, although the Navy's communications service was everywhere switching to roll printers.

Service

It so happened that by the time the ship left the overhaul in 1981, I was appointed a senior engineer, having served before that on the "Krasny Kavkaz" BOD for 5 years. Therefore, in addition to my direct duties, I also had to take on the training of communications officers, because Having been in the plant for so many years, the personnel have completely lost their professional skills. In a short time, three capable officers were trained. I would especially like to highlight the most competent communications officers: the commander of the radio relay and wire communications group, Lieutenant N. Talipov, and the radio communications commander, Lieutenant Moroz I. To train communications specialists, it was practiced to send personnel for training at the Black Sea Fleet communications center. This was the requirement of the chief of communications of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank V. Averin. In the future, I tried to use any break in the voyage of the ship for more than a month to organize an internship at the Black Sea Fleet Communication Center. It must be said that the chief of communications of the Black Sea Fleet, Captain 1st Rank V. Averin (and later - Admiral), was very attentive to the state of affairs in the BCh-4 KRU "Zhdanov". He regularly visited the ship, bypassed the communications posts, talked with the personnel, told the officers about the prospects for the development of the fleet communications system. Since the KRU "Zhdanov" carried the radio watch of the KPU of the fleet (readiness to be stationed on board the operational and headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet), I always had the most comprehensive situation for communication between the fleet and the Navy. At workings and exercises on communications of the warhead, discounts were never made for the fact that the work was carried out from the ship. We worked on an equal footing with communication centers.

Lighthouse

Once, literally a day before entering combat service in 1984, the Black Sea Fleet's communications chief gave the order to receive and install the MPZM-300 device on the ship. When the next day a pile of iron was unloaded onto the deck by a crane, I was quite surprised. From the documentation, I understood that the equipment is an underwater sound beacon designed to transmit information to submarines in an auditory mode. To install the post of the radio operator and the aggregate, the ship's commander allocated a ventilation baffle in the aft superstructure. Works on the repair of the MPZM and its installation began on the same day and were carried out around the clock. Management and installation was carried out by: senior engineer of the warhead-4, captain 3rd rank Khanov Robert Nikolaevich and senior technician of the warhead-4, senior warrant officer Kovalenko Yaroslav Grigorievich. The chief of communications of the Black Sea Fleet attached great importance to the tests of the MPZM-300. Every day I reported to him on the progress of work on the installation of the lighthouse. Three days later, already in the Mediterranean Sea, the work was completed. In fact, a new combat post was created, which housed the aggregate, amplifier, DKM-60. To lower the lighthouse, a hand winch and a cargo beam of the Osa anti-aircraft missile system were used. Since the submersible beacon emitter weighed more than one hundred kilograms, the load beam was working at a dangerous overload, and I expected it to break. And this threatened with big troubles, since the Osa air defense system would have been put out of action.
However, in two combat services, more than 900 descents of the lighthouse were made, and the beam survived. A feature of the MPZM-300 was that its directional pattern was not circular, but had the form of an eight. At the same time, when immersed, the emitter could rotate freely with the current, which introduced a random character to the reception results. For two combat services, the MPZM-300 was repeatedly used in various special and combat exercises. At the same time, impressive results have been achieved. So, for example, from February 24 to March 20, 1984, a special exercise was carried out to test the issuance of target designation to the enemy's OBK in the interests of attacking a submarine using the MPZM-300. KRU "Zhdanov" was in the southern part of the Mediterranean Sea, and the information was received by the submarine "B-515", which was moving from the north-west. At the same time, the range of confident reception was achieved - 420 km and the maximum reception range - 500 km.

Co-workers

With great pleasure I remember my subordinates and colleagues: the commander of the 1st communications division - captain 3rd rank Romanenko Nikolai Ivanovich, the commander of the 2nd communication divisions-division of the ZAS captain 3rd rank Trofimov Vladimir Vasilyevich, the commander of the 3rd communications battalion - captain 3rd rank Biletskiy Valery Ivanovich, senior engineer of warhead-4 captain 3rd rank Khanov Robert Nikolaevich, deputy commanders of warhead-4 for political affairs, lieutenant-commander Yevgeny Dubovik, Dudkin Mikhail. It was a strong team of like-minded people who could handle any task. Signal officers influenced all ship affairs. Suffice it to say that I and all the division commanders were admitted by the officers of the watch on duty. It meant something if out of 12 cruiser's watch officers - 6 were signalmen! In total, 16 officers served in BCH-4, which was more than a quarter of the entire officer corps of the cruiser. This made it possible to influence the results of election events. So, for example, during the election of the head of the wardroom, the division commanders and I, as a rule, nominated a candidate, usually from BC-2, and then voted in unison. The BC-4 had its own primary party organization, which included the BC-1 and the ship's commander. Therefore, very often the meetings were attended by inspectors - the command of the fleet, squadrons.

I am very grateful to fate for bringing me together during my service on the Zhdanov cruiser in 1980-1986, along with the above-listed officers, and group commanders (unfortunately, I can’t remember all the names and patronymics). These are Baishukanov, Kovalenko, Darymov, Zhezdyuk, Kutsepalov, Moroz, Talipov, Prikhodko, Metun, Lisovsky, Bezrukov, Novikov, Berezhnaya, Kondrashov. With warrant officers - Gumarov, Kulaga, Y. Kovalenko, D. Kovalenko, Kravchenko, Bessaraba, Bolgov, Ryabokon, Ilyushin, Bolshakov, Malofeev, Kozichev, Voloshin, Kolesnik, Chumachenko, Paramonov, Kezin, Myasnikov, Stepanov, Esik, Golovan, Melnik and many others.

Checks

Actually, there were enough checks and checks on the cruiser. A kind of record comes to mind. In May 1984. On board the ship, which is in combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, command posts from five instances were simultaneously located: the group of the military department of the Central Committee, the marching headquarters of the Main Committee of the Navy, the headquarters of the Mediterranean squadron of the Navy, the marching headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, the marching headquarters of the 150th separate missile brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. The task of providing communications was extremely difficult. The ZAS expedition, headed by the group commander, Senior Lieutenant V. Metun, worked in full force without sleep or rest. Each of the five operational duty officers had a government communication telephone, remote communication posts, and intercom equipment. For three days, while the test and exercises were going on, the connection worked practically without interruption, which cost the enormous efforts of the entire warhead team. After the end of the exercises, BCh-4 thanked the Deputy Chief of Communications of the Navy Rear Admiral Orlov.

Becoming

The combat unit of the communications KRU "Zhdanov" in terms of technical equipment and the number of personnel corresponded to the average size of the communications center. However, problems constantly arose to ensure the functioning of the warhead. For example, the issue of resting the night shift was resolved with great difficulty. A ship is a ship, alarms were played 2-3 times daily and every night. Another problem is the divorce of the special wards, which should be carried out by the ship's officer on duty, while I was seeking divorces for the liaison officer. I solved all these problems by a strong-willed way, that is, I did as I saw fit, for which I received a lot of complaints and reprimands from the commander and senior assistant.

I recall the case when a new commander, Alexei Alekseevich Ryzhenko, arrived on the ship directly to the Mediterranean Sea. He immediately began to lead the crew in the same way as it was done on a destroyer, that is, all the formations were made on the poop, which is about 600 people. Mostly the commander spoke. In these conditions, literally in a crush, it was impossible to conduct briefing, or an elementary analysis of actions. All warhead commanders were modestly silent. I was the first to break down, went to the commander and asked for permission to build a large collection in a regular place - a forecastle on the left side. Good was received, and from that moment on we were built separately from the entire crew of the ship.

I understood that the assessment of the combat unit would be based on the final results of combat activities. After a while, the captain of the ship, seeing my firm position on the issues of rest for the night shift, somewhat softened his requirements and began to better understand the needs of the signalmen. As a result, in spite of everything, the BCH-4 following the results of combat and political training in 1983, 1984, 1985. has always been excellent, and shared the first places with the BCH-1.

Time program

I have already mentioned the improved Kristall-K space communications complex, which was installed during the overhaul of the ship in 1981. During the first year after the start of its operation, no repair problems arose. The operation of the space communication channel has greatly facilitated the maintenance of stable direct-printing and radiotelephony communications, especially when in the Mediterranean Sea. Signalers were also instructed to broadcast the first channel of Central Television, while on board the headquarters of the Mediterranean squadron. The broadcast of the television program "Time" was to be carried out daily under the supervision of the head of the political department of the squadron, Rear Admiral Akchurin. Every evening, 30 minutes before the start of the broadcast, the BP and TF communication channels from KKS "Kristall-K" were switched to decameter means. For this, the combat unit was issued a combat alert. As a rule, there were no interruptions in communication. After the transfer of the channels, the personnel dismantled the LNA antenna from the mirror of the "Crystal", and installed an amplifier for receiving television programs ("Moscow" stand). The broadcast was carried out in the officers' wardroom, although initially it was planned to carry it out to the ship's club (cockpit 18), however, during the installation, there was not enough television feeder. After the end of the viewing, everything was repeated in the reverse order. I was very concerned about the daily disassembly and reassembly of the antenna system devices, but the demands for broadcasting TV programs were relentless. When there were several failures of the antenna device, the TV broadcast was stopped.

Conclusion

For 5 years, from 1981 to 1986, KRU Zhdanov participated in all exercises of the Black Sea Fleet, both in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Black Sea. All these years, the ship was responsible for the readiness to receive and place the ship's control center of the Black Sea Fleet. From the last in its history of combat service, the ship arrived in September 1985 (from May 12, 1985 to September 29, 1985). The communications warhead received a good assessment, providing communications to the headquarters of the Mediterranean squadron during this period. The entire materiel was in service, although 27% of it was overhauled. The average operational efficiency in all radio directions, taking into account the space communication channel, was 96%. During the military service, new for that time channels and means of communication were actively used, such as "Chaika" (Dragonfly), MVU-300, R-069, MPZM-300, "Tsunami BM2" and others.

Now it is difficult to characterize the activities of each member of the team, but it is pleasant to realize that thanks to the selfless work of officers, warrant officers, foremen and sailors in the 80s there was a strong combat unit, and it was called the combat unit of communications of the command cruiser "Zhdanov".

Captain 1st Rank Yarosevich Sergey Viktorovich - brief information.

  • 1966-1971 cadet of VVMURE named after A.S. Popov
  • 1971-1972 commander of the group ZAS BCh-4 KRU "Zhdanov"
  • 1972-1975 commander of the BP ZAS division of the ZAS BCh-4 KRU "Zhdanov"
  • 1975-1980 commander of the warhead-4 of the Guards BOD "Krasny Kavkaz"
  • 1981-1982 senior engineer of BCh-4 KRU "Zhdanov"
  • 1982-1886 commander of BCh-4 KRU "Zhdanov"
  • 1986-1996 Head of the Cycle for the Use of Communication Means of the Naval Department of the SSTU (SPI)

The article uses photographs from the personal photo albums of the author, Captain 2nd Rank Dubovik, as well as Anofriev, Vorobyov, Kurdanin, Kononchuk and Patosin.

In order to make better use of weapons and technical means, as well as the convenience of navigation, combat units and services are created on the ship, headed by their commanders and chiefs.

Warhead (service) - This is an organizational subdivision of a ship, which unites types of weapons or technical means of the same purpose and specialization, and service personnel.

Combat units include:

BCh-1 - navigational warhead;

BCh-2 - missile (missile-artillery, artillery) warhead;

BCh-3 - mine-torpedo warhead;

BCh-4 - communications warhead;

BCh-5 - electromechanical warhead;

BCh-6 - aviation warhead;

BCh-7 - radio-technical warhead.

Services include:

Sl. X - service of radiation, chemical and biological protection;

Sl. M - medical service;

Sl. С - supply service.

Warhead-1: provides navigational safety of navigation and makes calculations

on the combat maneuvering of the ship for the combat use of weapons.

Warheads-1 unites: helmsmen, navigational electricians, navigational radiometric observers.

Warhead-2: designed to deliver missile (artillery) strikes against enemy ships and coastal targets, as well as to repel enemy strikes from the sea, coast and air.

The warhead-2 unites: missilemen, gunners, artillery electricians.

Warhead-3: ensures the use of mine, torpedo, sweeping weapons and the production of work with them.

The warhead-3 unites: torpedoists, miners, torpedo electricians.

Warhead-4: provides external and internal communication of the ship (visually and by radio) with the command and interacting ships and internal communication with the command posts and combat posts of the ship.

In warhead-4 unite: radio operators, telephonists, signalmen.

Warhead-5: provides the ship with a given course, the survivability of the ship, weapons and technical equipment, and supplies all consumers with electricity.

BC-5 unites: machinists, bilge operators, turbinists, electricians of strong and weak current and other specialists.

Warhead-6: provides observation, search and destruction of enemy submarines, as well as reconnaissance and cover of ships from the air. The personnel of the BCh-6 service the aircraft of the ship (helicopters, airplanes), provide their flights and control them.

Warhead-7: is designed to monitor underwater, surface and air conditions. It collects, processes and analyzes the results of all types of observation, gives out data about the enemy, necessary for the use of weapons.



BC-7 (Fig. 1.3.1) combines: hydroacoustics, radiometrists, television operators, etc.

Radio technical service - is designed to monitor underwater, surface and air conditions. It collects, processes and analyzes the results of all types of observation, provides data on the enemy, necessary for the use of weapons, data on the navigation situation.

In SL-R, the material part is served by: hydroacoustics, radiometrists, television operators, etc.

Chemical service - designed to protect personnel from radioactive and toxic substances. SL-X technical means (radiation reconnaissance devices, radiation monitoring devices, etc.) are maintained by chemists.

Medical service - is designed to preserve the health of personnel, provide timely medical care to the wounded, injured and sick. SL-M unites: doctors, paramedics, orderlies.

Supply Service - is designed to provide personnel with food and supply ship units with property and materials in accordance with established standards. SL-S unites: battaliers, coca, scribes, etc.

The procedure for entering a combat organization on a ship. Diagrams of the ship's combat organization, what information is placed on these diagrams? What information is in the combat instructions? What document are the combat instructions in?

The combat organization on the ship is introduced when a combat (training) alert is declared (see Appendix 2 of the Navy's Code of Administration to Art. 34).

On a warship of all ranks there are:

- scheme of the ship's combat organization;

- naval combat scheme.

On the scheme of the combat organization of the ship command posts and combat posts are shown with an indication of their subordination to the combat alert.

On the ship's battle scheme the longitudinal section of the ship shows the location of all command posts, combat posts, compartments and other premises of the ship.



The combat instructions detail duties of foremen of contract service, foremen and sailors of urgent service on alert, on the use of weapons and the use of technical means in battle and in the fight for their survivability, on urgent immersion, as well as additional responsibilities for sealing the ship's hull, activating diesel engine operation systems, and replenishment of air under water, by setting on the depth stabilizer, by signals "Chemical alarm" and "Radiation hazard", by

special treatment of the ship and sanitary treatment of personnel, to provide medical assistance to the wounded and injured, to sail in difficult conditions.

Combat instructions are summarized in the Combat Instructions Book personnel of the ship, which is an appendix to the Book of ship schedules.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

8. The main combat purpose of the ship is to defeat the forces and means of the enemy by combat action.

The organization of the ship is built in accordance with its combat mission on the basis of the tasks solved by the given class (subclass) of ships. The organizational and staff structure of the ship is established by its staff.

9. At the head of the ship is ship commander... To assist the ship commander, the following are appointed:

- senior assistant (assistant), being the first deputy commander of the ship,

- alternates and assistants, determined by the ship's staff.

The entire personnel of the ship is its crew.

10. In order to better use weapons and the use of technical means in combat, combat units and services are created on ships:

On individual ships, depending on their specialization and design features, other services can be created.

11. Combat units and services, depending on the rank of the ship, are subdivided into divisions, groups, batteries and teams (squads) in accordance with the ship's staff.

Combat units, divisions (groups, batteries) are headed by their commanders, and the services are headed by chiefs.

12. On ships of rank 2, 3 and 4, one officer can be assigned command of two or more combat units or services.

13. The primary regular structural units of the ship's personnel are branches. They are headed by squad leaders. Squads can be organized into teams led by team leaders.

14. To ensure the daily activities of surface ships of rank 1, 2 and 3, subunits are created that are not part of combat units (services).

The functions of the boatswain's crew on submarines are performed by a team of helmsmen-signaling officers.

15. For battle, the ship's personnel are distributed among command posts and combat posts.

Personnel who are not on alert at the combat posts of their combat units (services) shall sign for combat posts of other combat units (services). From the moment a combat alert (training alert) is declared, he enters the subordination of the chiefs according to the schedule for the combat alert, and after its release, he returns to the subordination of the chiefs, under whose leadership he carries out day-to-day service.

COMMAND POINTS AND BATTLE POSTS

16. Command post (CP) is called a place equipped with the necessary control means, from where the commander directs the actions of the personnel of subordinate units, the use of weapons, the use of technical means and the fight for survivability, and also maintains communication with the senior commander and interacting subunits.

The command post of the ship commander is main command point of the ship and called GKP, and on ships of rank 4, where there is only one command post - KP.

In case of failure of the GKP, a reserve command post (ZKP) is created, which is equipped with duplicate control facilities for the ship and communication facilities. For the same purposes, combat units (services) can be equipped with spare points (ZP).

On certain ship projects, central command item (CKP), intended for collecting, processing and analyzing data of the situation and headed by the chief assistant to the ship commander.

17. Battle post (BP) is called a place on a ship with weapons or technical means on board that have a specific combat purpose, where the personnel uses and maintains them.

The battle post is headed by outpost commander.

18. All command posts and combat posts on ships must have names, designations and serial numbers, which are determined by Appendix 1 to this Charter.

On submarines, command posts are numbered in each combat unit (service) in numerical order from bow to stern. The numbers of the combat posts of the submarine consist of two or three characters (numbers or letters). The first digits (one or two) indicate the compartment number, the last character (the second or third digit or letter) - the combat post belongs to the combat unit (service).

The combat posts of the missile warhead are assigned numbers regardless of their location in the compartments: 20, 30, 40, etc., starting from the bow of the submarine. The numbers of the combat posts of the auxiliary mechanisms correspond to the numbers of the compartments.

On surface ships command posts and combat posts are numbered in each combat unit (service, division) in numerical order from the bow of the ship to the stern and from top to bottom along the superstructures, decks and platforms.

On rank 4 surface ships, where the state does not provide for combat units and services, combat posts are numbered in the general order of increasing numbers by ship.

BATTLE NUMBER

19. In accordance with the combat organization of the ship, midshipmen, foremen and sailors are assigned combat numbers, which are entered in personnel numbering sheet.

The battle number consists of three parts:

The first part (number or letter) indicates in which combat unit (service) the midshipman, foreman or sailor is located according to the combat alert schedule;

The second part (one, two or three digits) indicates the number of the combat post where the midshipman, foreman or sailor is located according to the combat alert schedule;

The third part (two digits) determines the belonging of the midshipman, foreman or sailor to the combat shift; the first digit indicates the number of the combat shift, the second digit is the ordinal number of the midshipman, foreman or sailor in the shift.

Combat shifts are assigned the following numbers:

The first combat shift - 1, 5, 7;

The second combat shift - 2, 4, 8;

The third combat shift - 3, 6, 9.

20. A combat number for wearing on the work clothes of foremen and sailors is made of white durable fabric and sewn onto the left outer pocket, the inscription is applied in black paint.

For foremen and sailors not admitted to the performance of duties according to the position held, as well as for cadets and trainees doing practical training on the ship, the figure "0" (zero) is put in front of the first number (letter) of the combat number.

On the special uniforms of all officers and warrant officers, an inscription is made indicating the short name of the position.

The height of the numbers and letters of the combat number (inscription) must be 30 millimeters.

21. Warrant officers, foremen and sailors receive a "Battle number" book, which indicates their place and duties for all ship schedules, as well as the numbers of the personal weapons assigned to them, gas masks, etc.

The "Battle Number" books are strictly registered. Upon leaving the bank, the books are handed over to the persons on duty and are returned upon the delivery of the leave note.

SHIP SCHEDULES

22. Ship schedules are drawn up in order to distribute personnel to command posts and combat posts for the use of weapons and the use of the ship's technical means, as well as for the implementation of other systematically repeated ship activities and work.

Ship schedules are divided into combat and everyday.

23.The main document that determines the organization of the ship in battle is alert schedule... This timetable is the basis for all other ship timetables.

24. The personnel of the ship are distributed according to command posts and combat posts, taking into account their specialty, level of training, and physical qualities. The purpose of the distribution is to ensure the most effective use of weapons and the use of technical means of the ship in battle, the fight for the survivability of the ship and the interchangeability of personnel.

25. Each ship officer in battle must have two deputies. This provision applies equally to warrant officers and foremen performing particularly responsible duties.

The rest of the warrant officers, foremen and sailors must have one deputy each. Deputies are indicated in the combat alert schedule and are prepared accordingly.

The ship's commander in battle, after the senior assistant (assistant) of the commander, is replaced by the ship's officers in the order determined by the order of the ship's commander.

26. The draft of the initial combat alert schedule for the lead ship of each series is drawn up by the Main Headquarters of the Navy.

For non-serial ships, the initial combat alert schedule is developed by the ship's officers under the direction of the formation headquarters on the basis of the personnel list included in the ship's technical documentation.

During the construction (modernization) of the ship, the commanders of combat units and chiefs of services, under the leadership of the senior assistant (assistant) of the ship commander and with the participation of flagship specialists and the deputy commander for the electromechanical part of their unit, finalize the combat alert schedule. At the same time, they take into account the changes that have occurred in weapons, technical equipment and in their location on the ship.

The modified combat alert schedule is approved by the unit commander.

On the basis of the approved combat alert schedule on the ship, all other ship schedules provided for and . of this charter, and combat instructions.

27. Corrections in ship schedules and combat instructions are made as the organization of the ships is developed and experience is accumulated, as well as in case of structural and standard changes in the amount determined for ships of the same type by the formation commander, and for non-serial ships - by the ship commander.

28. Combat schedules include:

Combat Alarm Schedule ( combat readiness number 1) with diagrams of technical and visual observation of the underwater, surface and air situation, with tables of command posts, combat posts and numbering of the ship's personnel;

Schedule by combat readiness number 2 with diagrams of technical and visual observation of the underwater, surface and air conditions.

On submarines two combat alert schedules are drawn up - separately for the underwater and surface positions and two combat readiness schedules No. 2 - also for the underwater and surface positions (schedules for the underwater position are the main ones);

Schedule for preparing the ship for battle and campaign (for submarines - for battle, campaign and dive);

Schedule for preparation, input and output of the main power plant (for ships with nuclear power plants);

Schedule for damage control of the ship;

Schedule for abandoning the ship in case of threat of its death;

Schedule for the fight against submarine sabotage forces and means (PDSS) for combat readiness No. 1 and No. 2 with a scheme of visual observation by armed watchmen to combat PDSS (and technical supervision on anti-sabotage GAS - for surface ships);

Schedule for the reception (delivery) of weapons and ammunition;

Schedule of the ship's demolition team;

Schedule for special treatment of the ship with schemes for the location of areas for special treatment and movement of personnel, which determines the duties of the personnel for decontamination, degassing, disinfection of the ship, dosimetric and chemical control and sanitary treatment of the crew, as well as when quarantine (observation) is introduced on the ship.

a) on submarines:

Schedule for the use of systems for the operation of a diesel engine or air replenishment under water;

Watch schedule when the diesel submarine is on the ground;

b) on surface ships:

Schedule for the provision of assistance to a ship or aircraft in distress and the removal of emergency rescue teams from the ship;

Schedule for the preparation of the ship for the reception of shipborne aircraft, flight support and control;

Schedule for setting and lifting outboard hydroacoustic devices;

Schedule for setting and hauling trawls and seekers;

Schedule for the preparation and setting of mines with a personnel deployment scheme;

Schedule for the reception and disembarkation of the assault force and the delivery of the shipborne assault subunit with the layout of the personnel and equipment of the assault force.

On special-purpose ships and support ships, depending on their specialization, other schedules can also be drawn up, the list of which is determined by the commander of the formation.

29. TO daily schedules relate:

Schedule for administration, inspection and testing of weapons and technical equipment;

Schedule for anchoring (barrels, mooring lines) and anchoring (barrels, mooring lines);

Towing schedule with towing schemes;

Schedule for the reception and transfer of solid, liquid and explosive goods on the go;

Schedule for cabins and cockpits for accommodation;

Schedule by tidy.

In addition to these schedules, the following are compiled:

a) on submarines:

Battery charging schedule;

Schedule for the work of personnel on the upper deck (superstructure, overboard);

b) on surface ships:

Schedule for the blackout of the ship;

Schedule for the descent and ascent of the floating craft.

30. The timetables indicate the place of action (command post, combat post, compartment, room, etc.), duties of personnel, positions of officers, positions and combat numbers of warrant officers, foremen, sailors. The names of the personnel are included in the numbering table of the ship's personnel.

In the combat alert schedule, as additional duties, the actions of the personnel of the combat posts to seal the ship's hull are indicated, according to signals "Radiation hazard" and "Chemical alarm", to provide assistance to the wounded and injured, when sailing in difficult conditions, as well as other duties that are performed by personnel on a combat alert, but different from the main combat functions.

31. All schedules are entered in book of ship schedules .

In addition, the book should include:

Scheme of the ship's combat organization;

Scheme of the daily organization of the ship;

Ship combat scheme;

Numbering of fire horns, fire extinguishers, water protection system valves;

List of water and gas tight doors, hatches, necks and ventilation closures with their markings.

The book must be accompanied by Collection of combat instructions of the ship's personnel .

32. On the scheme of the combat organization of the ship command posts and combat posts are shown with an indication of their subordination to the combat alert.

On the ship's battle scheme the longitudinal section of the ship shows the location of all command posts, combat posts, compartments and other premises of the ship.

In combat instructions sets out in detail the duties of warrant officers, foremen and sailors on alert, on the use of weapons and the use of technical means in battle and in the fight for their survivability, on urgent immersion, as well as additional responsibilities for sealing the ship's hull, activating the diesel engine and air replenishment systems under water, by setting to the depth stabilizer, by signals "Chemical alarm"

For fighting;

With an actual increase in combat readiness;

b) « A drill":

To practice the actions of the ship's crew on a combat alert;

When carrying out naval combat exercises with the practical use of weapons;

For carrying out naval combat exercises and trainings at combat posts, including for damage control, with the participation of the entire personnel of the ship;

When loading (unloading) ammunition;

When leaving (entering) the ship from the base (into the base), passing narrows, sailing in difficult conditions;

For emergency preparation of the ship for battle and campaign.

In other cases- by the decision of the commander of the ship. In wartime, the exit (entrance) from the base (into the base), the passage of narrowness, sailing in difficult conditions, as well as emergency preparation of the ship for battle and a campaign are carried out on a combat alert.

Simultaneously with the announcement of a combat or training alert, its purpose is announced by the ship broadcast;

v) « Emergency alarm " - when water enters the ship, a fire breaks out, explosions, dangerous concentrations of gases (harmful substances) and other emergencies outside the battle;

G) « Chemical alarm " - in case of threat or detection of chemical or bacteriological contamination;

e) « Radiation hazard " - in the event of an imminent threat or detection of radioactive contamination.

Sound signals for announcing an alarm are given in Appendix 2 to this Charter.

Alexander Sergeevich Suvorov ("Alexander Suvory")

Book-photo chronicle: "The legendary BOD" Ferocious "DKBF 1971-1974".

Chapter 760. Naval base Baltiysk. BOD "Ferocious". Warhead communications (BCH-4). 11/15/1972.

Photo illustration from the archive of Yuri Vasilyevich Kazyonnov (radiotelegraph operator of the warhead-ch BOD "Ferocious", service period 11/16/1970 - November 1973):

Early spring 1972. Excursion of the personnel of BCH-1 and BCH-4 to Kaliningrad, to the destroyed Cathedral to the grave of E. Kant.

Top row from left to right: Alexander Suvorov - helmsman BCH-1, Yuri Kazyonnov - radiotelegraph operator BCH-4, Ivan Kryuchkov - signalman BCH-4, Boris Anosov - radiotelegraph operator BCH-4; bottom row from left to right: Nikolay Surusov - radiotelegraph operator BCh-4, Alexander Turko (Vladimir Timoshenko?) - to / about signalmen BCh-4, Lieutenant Andrey Stepanovich Drobot - commander of BCh-4, Alexander Chervyakov - radiotelegraph operator BCh-4, Alexander Pribylov - mechanic of TF ZAS, Grigory Bulat - Art. sailor, c / o electricians of navigational warheads BCH-1, Viktor Petchenko - radiotelegraph operator BCH-4, Alevtin Klykov - radiotelegraph operator BCH-4.

In the previous:

The author was familiar with almost all warrant officers of BCh-3, communicated in service and on topics of political studies, but friendly communication developed only with some of the warrant officers-Romanians - Anatoly Dvorsky (formally replaced me as the ship's Komsomol organizer), Vladimir Sechko and Mikhail Lyubonko, with which we had a chance to organize again the "baptism" of the "Ferocious" BPK ...

However, due to the natural connection of the signalmen-observers with the helmsmen-navigators (BCH-1) and in this connection we "lodged" in the same cockpit with the signalmen, the author, of course, was more friends with the sailors and foremen of the communications combat unit (BCH-4) ...

The communications warhead (BCH-4) is "an organizational unit of the ship's crew, in charge of which are concentrated the technical means of communication, designed to ensure the uninterrupted transmission and receipt of information." Previously, the BCh-4 had a different name - "the observation and communications warhead."

The communications warhead (BCH-4) is designed to provide the ship with uninterrupted external communications with the command, interacting ships and units, to receive alerts and transmit reports, as well as to interfere with the operation of enemy communications equipment. The personnel of the BCh-4 (radiotelegraph operators, signalmen, radio masters, etc.) serve the means of radio and radio relay communications, wired, visual and other communications.

Best of all, professionally and thoroughly accurately about the combat unit of communications of the BOD "Ferocious" was told in the book "Fierce" on guard of the Fatherland "by its first commander, captain of the 2nd rank in reserve Andrei Stepanovich Drobot (period of service on the BOD" Ferocious "- February 1972 - August 1977).

BPK "Ferocious", like all ships of the 1135 project of the "Burevestnik" type, was equipped with the most modern means of communication, among which were:
four radio transmitters - HF range R-652 "Pike", R-654 "Okun" - 2 and MW range R-653 "Shkval";
nine radio receivers - HF band R-678 "Brusnika" - 5, R-675 "Onyx" - 1, all-wave - R-677 "Whirlwind" - 1 and "Volna-K" - 1;
radio stations: VHF range - R-619 "Graphite" - 4, R-105 - 2, R-770 "Triton" - 1, decimeter range R-618 - 1;
signalman's radio station R-622 "Kit";
underwater communication station MG-26;
special communication equipment - 9 units (SLH-2, BP-2, TF-4, SBD-1);
ultra-high-speed communication equipment (SBD) - 2 units (R-062 "Bystrota", R-758 "Shark"); fax communication equipment "Ladoga" - 1;
switch of means of communication of the relay type "Distance";
loud-speaking ship communication "Larch";
two searchlights of visual (light) communication PMS-45, light-signaling devices - MSNP-125 and MSNP-250 (total number of 4 pieces);
signal and klotikovy lights, a set of signal flags, signal flags, lanterns and signal flares.

To monitor the surface and air situation on the "Ferocious" submarine, there were sets of marine binoculars, as well as two VBP-451M binocular periscopic sighting devices installed in the ship's wheelhouse on the left and right side.

These sighting devices had a complex device saturated with light filters, devices and mechanisms, which made it possible to observe the situation at any time of the day. I used our VBP-451M sighting devices to photograph the ships of the "potential enemy" through their eyepieces and once I was lucky to photograph a NATO destroyer that went out for an exercise in the coastal waters of the North Sea, which, in violation of the USSR and NATO international treaties on the Baltic Sea, had anti-ship missile weapons ...

BPK "Ferocious" had 5 combat posts of radio communication: a receiving radio center, transmitting a radio center, a post of direct-printing secret telegraph communication, a post of classified telephone communication and a broadcast radio room. In addition, the ship was equipped with a post of auditory classified communication and a post of radio relay communication.

One of the combat posts of the radio communication BCH-4 of the BOD "Ferocious" was located next to the navigator's cabin in the GKP (main command post), and I often communicated with the radio operators who were on duty here, listened and recorded weather data, messages, just listened to music in quiet minutes. Sometimes we listened furtively to the "enemy voices" of Radio Liberty and the Voice of America to get alternative news ...

Once in the summer of 1973 (after the arrival of a new replenishment), our ubiquitous political commander, Captain 3rd Rank D.V. Wartkin, found on the table in the radio center a thick multi-page notebook forgotten by someone, in which the radio frequencies of all "enemy" radio stations broadcasting news and propaganda against the USSR were written in small beaded and neat handwriting ...

The scandal and "showdowns", the investigation and the "scam" on the ship because of this "spy notebook" were grandiose. Dmitry Vasilievich Borodavkin was very proud of the fact that he was able to "uncover the enemy anti-Soviet activities on a warship." Perhaps that is why, before the first BS (military service), a wonderful, handsome and strong sailor of German origin with an unusual surname Rhys was decommissioned from the ship ...

Yes, communication on a warship has always and at all times been the most important and secret matter, because: "He who knows wins", "He who is warned is armed", "Loss of communication - loss of control", "Without communication and control there is no victory "," If you know, then you win. " That is why it is very important on a ship and on a naval military campaign to receive and transmit a message in time, as well as prevent the enemy from intercepting and decrypting your message, information ...

Of all the combat posts of the BCH-4 BPK "Ferocious" I had a chance to visit only two - at the radio center in the GKP and in the broadcasting radio room. Other sailors, midshipmen and officers, except for the sailors and the commander of the BCh-4, as well as the ship commander, the political officer and SPS specialists in general, during the entire service period, it was impossible and impossible to glimpse at least a glimpse at the combat posts of the combat communications unit (BCh-4), and this right…

A ship without communication with command posts, with other warships, submarines and our aircraft on the high seas becomes blind, deaf, dumb and ... helpless. A ship without communication and control can only fulfill its combat mission with honor, independently detect the enemy, engage in battle with him, inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible, and, having exhausted its combat resources, survive, returning to its native shore. It was so often during the Great Patriotic War with submariners ...

Ships of the project 1135 of the "Burevestnik" type were equipped with several communication systems, providing reliable communication simultaneously over several radio channels. At the same time, the connection was protected from interference and eavesdropping, ultra-fast or normal (in real time). So we never, under any environmental conditions, were left without communication, and therefore without control.

True, the connection is not always clear, because the transmission of messages by any type and form of communication is always a game of "misunderstanding" (interpretation of messages). Here are the classic anecdotes of the BCH-4 signalmen:

Radio operators! Request wiring from Port of Toros, - asks the officer of the watch.
- Toros is in touch; knows nothing about vodka, drinks only port! - the radio operators report.

Signalers' mottos: “The louder you shout, the further you hear”, “Avoid casual communication”, “For communication without marriage!”.

What may be due to distortion of information when receiving and transmitting messages via communication is well illustrated by such a case from the combat practice of the crew of the "Ferocious" BOD ...

Once in the summer of 1973, while working out course tasks "K-1" and "K-2", one of the combat posts of the BCh-2 air defense missile system "Osa-M" received a message by phone, because of which we were unable to complete the training combat mission in time ... The midshipman, who received this message by phone, swore and swore that they had called from the GKP, but did not introduce themselves, and he did not recognize the speaker by his voice ...

The "showdown" of this unusual case was very serious, thorough and long. Practically everyone was interviewed directly or indirectly, or possibly (probably) involved in this intra-ship telephone message, the fact of which was confirmed by all the sailors and foremen who were with that unfortunate midshipman at the combat post.

As a result, an order was issued not only for the commander of the ship, but also for the commander of the battalion of missile ships, prohibiting henceforth to speak by phone or on the GKS (loudspeaker communication) without preliminary presentation of the interlocutors, and also obliging to record on a multi-channel tape recorder all messages on intra-ship communications during training and combat alarms.

Since then, each of the sailors, foremen, midshipmen and officers of the BOD "Ferocious" during negotiations by means of communication always said, for example, like this: "This is the sailor Suvorov" or "I listen, the sailor Suvorov" (some message followed).

Recording on a tape recorder of negotiations on intra-ship communication means guaranteed the accuracy and fairness of subsequent "showdowns" or investigation, in the event of any "emergency". Such a system of intra-ship negotiations taught the entire crew of the "Ferocious" BODC brevity and clarity, accuracy and severity of transmitting information and messages to each other, helped to improve military discipline, ensure the safety of the ship and its combat effectiveness.

The only person on the ferocious submarine ship who did not introduce himself in intra-ship telephone conversations, but immediately said what he needed, was the ship's commander, Captain 3rd Rank Yevgeny Petrovich Nazarov. He used to call me in "Lencauta" and briefly say: "Come to me" and I always angrily doubted whether the commander was calling or one of my friends was joking like that ...

Replacing D.V. Borodavkin as a political commander, senior lieutenant A.V. Merzlyakov also tried to call me in Lenkayut and not introduce himself, but I invariably asked him on the phone: "Who is calling?" and if he did not answer, as it was supposed to be on the order of the ship commander, then I hung up the telephone receiver. Aleksandr Vasilyevich was furious, ran himself into the "leccauta", yelled at me, but I showed him the order and he, gritting his teeth, was forced to obey. What is due to Jupiter is not due to other "bulls" ...

I was categorically a supporter of strictness in matters of ensuring the reliability and accuracy of communication, because all the troubles in life are from misunderstanding, from misinterpretation of messages, signs, information. Therefore, it is correct when communications with naval ships are a branch of military service that is closed to the uninitiated and who do not have special permission.

Even in the BCH-4 itself, every sailor, foreman or midshipman has the right to access only to his combat post, to his secret journals and documents. Only the commander of the ship and the deputy commander of the ship for political affairs have the right to visit all combat posts of the communications combat unit (BCH-4) (and then only in cases specified by the charter). The rest communicate with the signalmen at their combat posts only through special windows in waterproof and armored doors, which are locked with special complex cipher locks.

Due to the closed nature of the service and the official activities of seamen-signalmen, they are often called "neat", hinting that they, as intellectuals, do nothing except listen to the air, chat on microphones and, like woodpeckers, knock with their telegraph keys or encryption keys. typewriters.

The only signalmen BCH-4, whose work is visible to everyone, are signalmen, who, on the contrary, enjoy everyone's respect and recognition, because they really, in full view of everyone, wave flags, "knock" lights, signal flags and are not in cozy warm combat posts, and outside, always on its signal bridge of the central superstructure on the sides of the ship.

In fact, the BCH-4 BOD "Ferocious" provided reliable auditory telephone, telegraph, direct-printing and ultra-high-speed communication in an open and secret mode, communication "with the coast" from anywhere in the World Ocean in all ranges.

The receiving radio center was located in the central superstructure (GKP); the transmitting communications post is on the main deck. Portable radio stations with autonomous power sources provided communication from the ship's boat and lifeboat.

The means of physical transmission of communication signals were short-wave whip antennas of the AR-6 and AR-10 types, VHF antennas and an oblique Luch antenna, small and large signal searchlights, signal and klotik lights, and a set of signal flags and flags.

I really hope that my brother-friends, signalmen and radio operators, radiotelegraph operators and SPS specialists will complement me and tell me a lot of interesting things about the communications warhead, share details and tell stories about signalmen and signalmen-observers.

Lieutenant Andrey Stepanovich Drobot (February 1972 - August 1977), the author and compiler of the book "The Ferocious" on guard of the Fatherland, was the first commander of the BCH-4 BPK "Ferocious".

The first foreman of the BCH-4 radiotelegraph team was Warrant Officer Vladimir Nikolaevich Sergeev (September 1972 - August 1977). He will once again return to the crew of the "Ferocious" BOD in the period November 1981 - February 1982.

Almost the entire personnel of the sailors and foremen of the BCH-4 BOD "Ferocious" period 1972-1974 were my friends in the service -

Observers:

KRYUCHKOV Ivan Mikhailovich Art. signalman 05.19.
TIMOSHENKO Vladimir Grigorievich c / o signallers 05/19/1971
MAKHOVIK Valery Petrovich signalman 06.11.71-12.11.74
SLYUSARENKO Vladimir Fedorovich c / o signallers 14.11.71-12.11.74
ISAENKOV Vitaly Nikolaevich signalman 11.05.72-02.06.75
OPARIN Yury Vitalyevich c / o signallers 13.05.72-11.06.75
PANKOV Vyacheslav Georgievich signalman 09.05.72-3.11.74
SVIRSKY Igor Pavlovich signalman 05/07/72
PODKALNS Karlis Ernestovich signalman 12.05.73-28.12.74
YAKOVLEV Sergey Evgenievich signalman 08.05.73-05.01.74

Radiotelegraphists:

KLYKOV Alevtin Viktorovich Senior radiotelegraph operator 05/15/70
KONYASHIN Nikolay Nikolaevich Art. radiotelegraph operator 05/15/70
PETCHENKO Victor G. radiotelegraph operator 05/15/70
SKIBA Valery Pavlovich c / o radiotelegraph operators 05/14/70
SURUSOV Nikolay Petrovich radiotelegraph operator 05.16.
ANOSOV Boris Alekseevich radiotelegraph operator 11/16/70
KAZENNOV Yuri Vasilievich radiotelegraph operator 11/16/70
CHERVYAKOV Alexander Nikolaevich radiotelegraph operator 11/19/70
MUSATENKO Alexey Alekseevich c / o r / telegraph operators 01.11.71-12.11.74
M. I. MIKHAILENKO St-na k-dy r / telegraph. 02.22.72 - autumn-72
BAVIN Alexander Viktorovich radiotelegraph operator 13.05.72-05.05.75
BIGUN Alexander Vasilievich radiotelegraph operator 06.05.72-02.06.75
DOLGIN Victor Georgievich radiotelegraph operator 09.05.72-9.02.74
DOCHKIN Vladimir Yakovlevich Art. p / telegraph operator 10.05.72-06.05.75
NOSOV Victor Ivanovich radiotelegraph operator 05.11.72-13.11.75
PLATONOV Vyacheslav Vladimirovich radiotelegraph operator 14.11.72-10.11.75
PROKHOROV Evgeniy Gennadievich radiotelegraph operator 11/13/72 - 03/11/75
SMIRNOV Vladimir Nikolaevich c / o radiotelegraph operators 08.11.72-03.11.75
BARDA Sergey Sergeevich Radiotelegraphist 12.05.73-12.05.76
Vitaly KOCHETOV Art. radiotelegraph operator 05/04/73 - 05/12/1976
OSIPOV Victor V.
PROKAEV Vladimir Mikhailovich radiotelegraph operator 08.05.73-12.11.75

Radio mechanics:

BRUSOV Valery Pavlovich Art. radio mechanic 04.05.
MALCHENKOV Nikolay Ivanovich Art. radio mechanic 09.11.
ARESTOV Anatoly Nikolaevich radio mechanic 15.05.
PUDOVKIN Victor Gennadievich radio mechanic 05.11.71-11.07.74
SOLOVYANOV Vasily Andreevich radio mechanic 05.05.72-15.02.74
SHAIKHRAZIV Favoris Latfrokhmanovich radio mechanic 05/09/72
SCHERBAK Yury Vasilievich c / o radio mechanics 10.05.72-28.12.74

ZAS specialists:

MOROZOV Nikolay Nikolaevich to / about mechanics BP ZAS 19.11.
PARINOV Alexander Vasilievich Art. mechanic TF ZAS 16.11.
Pribylov Alexander Ivanovich c / o mechanics TF ZAS 14.11.
DONICH Ivan Savvovich c / o mechanics BP ZAS 13.05.71-08.05.74
ISODA Algerdas Iozo k / o mechanics TF ZAS 14.05.71-03.05.74
MIKHALKEVICH Victor Georgievich to / about fur. TF ZAS 14.05.72-10.06.75
SHIBANOV Vladimir Alexandrovich c / o fur. BP ZAS 12.05.72-10.06.75
YUSOV Sergey Valentinovich mechanic BP ZAS 10.05.72

Warhead of the ship

the main organizational unit of the ship's crew, designed to perform specific tasks. The warhead of the ship includes personnel and assigned weapons and other technical means. Depending on the class, a ship can have up to 7 warheads (CU). navigational (BCH-1); missile or missile-artillery (BCH-2); mine and torpedo (warhead-3); communications (BCh-4); electromechanical (BCh-5); aviation (BCh-6); control (BCh-7).

  • - fibrous capsule; trabecula; ellipsoids; lymphoid nodules; brush arterioles; central artery; periarterial lymphoid clutches; red pulp; gate of the spleen; splenic vein ...

    Human Anatomy Atlas

  • - Pharmacological groups: Detoxifying agents, including antidotes ›› Drugs that prevent the formation and help dissolve calculi ›› Laxatives ›› Stimulants of gastrointestinal motility, including ...

    Medicines

  • - the distribution of personnel to command posts and combat posts with the definition of specific responsibilities of the crew members to maintain a high level of combat readiness of the ship and effective use ...

    Dictionary of military terms

  • - a missile element designed to directly engage a target. It consists of a body, a warhead, an explosive device, a safety-actuating mechanism, etc. The warhead can have a nuclear charge ...

    Dictionary of military terms

  • - numerically equal to the distance traveled by the ship per unit of time; determined by lag. For surface ships are distinguished: the largest; full; economic; the smallest ...

    Dictionary of military terms

  • - missiles - an integral part of unguided and guided missiles of the "air-to-air", "surface-to-air", "air-to-surface" and "surface-to-surface" classes, designed ...

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  • - the aviation subdivision of the aircraft carrier, intended for the logistics of the flights of shipborne aircraft, maintenance in good condition and ...

    Marine vocabulary

  • - the state of the ship, which characterizes the ability to engage in battle with the enemy. Has several states ...

    Marine vocabulary

  • - constructive devices that reduce the possibility of hitting the ship and its combat and technical means in case of combat damage ...

    Marine vocabulary

  • - rational distribution of personnel to command posts and combat posts with the definition of the functional responsibilities of each crew member to maintain a high combat ...

    Marine vocabulary

  • - the main organizational unit of the ship's crew, designed to perform certain tasks ...

    Marine vocabulary

  • - element of the rocket for direct hitting the target. consists of a body, a warhead, an explosive device and a safety-actuating mechanism ...

    Marine vocabulary

  • - part of the rocket intended. for direct. hitting the target. It contains a warhead, a fuse and a safety-executable. mechanism...

    Big Encyclopedic Polytechnic Dictionary

  • - the part of the hull located below the waterline ...

    Marine vocabulary

  • - the axis of the carriage, on which the so-called. battle wheels ...

    Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Euphron

  • - on a warship, a part of the crew in charge of which combat and technical means are concentrated for a certain type of weapons or equipment ...

    Great Soviet Encyclopedia

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From the book Dembel Album the author Mazhartsev Yuri

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