Syrian Israeli conflict 1973. The war of the day: victory, forever changed the Middle East. The course of combat operation

assistant chief of the General Staff;
Brigadier General Beni Pelted
commander of the Air Force;
Admiral Benny Temon
commander of the Navy;
General Jona Efrat
Commander of the Central Military District.

South Front

Major General Shmuel Goning
commander of the South Front;
Major General Abraham Adan,
commander of the 162nd Division,
commander of the defense northern sector;
Major General Ariel Sharon,
Commander of the 143rd reserve armored division,
commander of the defense central sector;
Major General Abraham Mandler,
Commander of the 252th Armored Division,
commander of the defense of the southern sector,
And after his death in battle,
General Kalman Magen.

North Front

Major General Izhak Hofi
Commander of the Northern Front;
Brigadier General Abraham Ben-David
commander of artillery;
Brigadier General Rafael Eitan
commander of the 36th tank and motorway division;
Brigadier General Moshe Pelted
commander of the 146th armored division;
Major General Dan Laner,
Commander of the 240th Armored Division.

The sudden blow brought its result, and the first two days success was on the side of the Egyptians and Syrians, but in the second phase of war, the scales began to lean in the favor of Israel - the Syrians were completely ousted from the Golan Heights, the Israeli Front "hit the joint" of the two Egyptian The armies crossed the Suez Canal (old line of ceasefire) and cut off the 3rd Egyptian army from the supply bases. Soon followed the UN resolution on the cease-fire.

The conflict had far-reaching consequences for many nations. So, the Arab world, humiliated by a crushing defeat in the six-day war, despite the new defeat, still felt that his pride to some extent restored due to a number of victories at the beginning of the conflict. The Arab oil suppliers applied to the economic and political impacts on the allies of Israel - OPEC member countries introduced an embargo on the sale of oil to the countries of Western Europe, and also raised the price of crude oil through. Twenty-eight African countries ruined diplomatic relations with Israel.

Description of events

Conflict background

According to the former President of Israel, Himim Duke:

Anyway, the official response to the offer of the Israeli government was the decision, called "three" no "": No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with him, adopted in August 1967 at the Arab Summit in Khartoum (eng.)russian And in October 1967, the Israeli government has canceled its offer.

The Israeli government headed by Golde Meir did not accept. As part of the counteraction, the plan for the first time was mobilized by the manufactured lobby in the United States to put pressure on the Nixon administration. During the public campaign Rogers was accused of anti-Semitism. Already after the adoption by the Menaham Begin in the world with Egypt in 1978, Golda Meir said at a meeting of the center of the party Maara, which she led: "On these conditions, I also offered to conclude the world, but I refused."

In the first postwar years, Israel built a line of fortifications at the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. In 1971, Israel spent $ 500 million to build a powerful line of fortifications in Sinai, called the Bar Lev line in honor of General Haim Bar Lev, who designed it.

The ratio of forces and means

Forces and means Arab states Ratio
Personal composition, man 415 000 * 1 162 000 1:2,7
Brigades: 33 63 1:1,9
infantry 18 25 1:1,4
mechanized 3 15 1:5
armored vehicles 10 20 1:2
air landing 2 3 1:1,5
Tanks 1700 3550 1:2,1
Guns and mortars 2520 5585 1:2,2
PU PTU 240 932 1:3,9
Battle aircraft 561 1011 1:1,8
Helicopters 84 197 1:2,3
SP 20 186 1:9,3
Ships and boats 38 125 1:3,3
* After universal mobilization.

Military actions

After half an hour after the start of the hostilities, Damascus and Cairo's military operations were almost simultaneously announced that it was Israel who began the war, and their armies are only response operations.

Sinai Front, Egypt

After crossing the Suez Canal, Egyptian troops landed on Sinai did not move forward too far, so as not to get out of the zone of the air defense missile batteries, which remained on the other side of the channel, and not to remain, thus defenseless before Israeli Air Force. The Egyptians remembered that in the six-day war of Israel Air Force literally defeated the Arab Army unacquered from the air, and did not want to repeat the same scenario. That is why after 1967 Egypt and began a massive installation of the air defense acquired in the Soviet Union in the territories adjacent to the cease-fire line. The Israeli Air Force was actually powerless against these new installations, since their aircraft had no means to combat this type of air defense.

To reflect the expected Israeli counterattack, the Egyptians equipped the first wave of their advancing troops with an unprecedented number of portable anti-tank plants: anti-tank grenade launchers RPG-7 and more advanced Malytka's fetters, later well-proven themselves in the reflection of Israeli tank counterattacks. Each third Egyptian soldier has one of the anti-tank agents. Historian and journalist Abraham Rabinovich writes: " Never before the anti-tank funds were not used in battle so intense" The firing positions on the Egyptian side were also rebuilt: they were made twice as the Israeli positions on the opposite bank of the canal. This gave the Egyptians an important advantage: from the new position it was very convenient to fire on the positions of Israelis, especially by armored vehicles. The scale and effectiveness of the Egyptian strategy for placing anti-tank funds in combination with the impossibility of the Israeli Air Force to carry out the cover of their troops (due to the set of air defense batteries), the cause of heavy losses incurred by Israel's army on the Sinai front in the first days of the war.

The Egyptian army has made great efforts for the rapid and effective breakthrough of the Israeli defensive strip. On its bank, the Israelis can have built 18-meter barriers made, mainly from the sand. Initially, to overcome this kind of obstacles to the Egyptians used explosives until one of the young officers suggested using powerful waterways for this purpose. The idea liked the command, and several powerful waterways were purchased in Germany. Egyptian troops used these waterways when crossing the Suez Channel, and used them very successfully: the waterways quickly blurred barriers. The first stage of the forcing the Suez Channel was to block the exhaust holes of pipelines leading to the underground tanks with fuel liquid [ specify] .

The course of combat operation

14.00 200 aircraft rises in the air. Artillery begins mounted fire on mineral fields and wire barriers.
14.05 The first waves of the Egyptian infantry are recreated through the channel. Integrates of engineering troops are convinced that the outlet of the combustible fluid is blocked. At the same time, the first detachments of Commandos are moved through the mound, heading behind the enemy front line to capture sandy shelters intended for tank fire. In the south begins crossing floating armored vehicles.
14.20. The main forces of the Egyptian artillery open fire to the straight tip of the Forts of the Bar Lev line.
14.30-14.45 The first wave of Egyptian infantry is planted. Israeli tanks start moving to the canal, but some of their positions are already engaged in the Egyptians armed with anti-tank guns.
14.45 The second wave is planted on the east shore of the canal. In the future, they will disembark every 15 minutes.
15.00 take the first Fort Bar Lev line. The first prisoners are taken. The Israeli Air Force applies the first aircraft.
15.30 Egyptian Engineering Troops begin to wash the passes in the sand barrier.
16.30 The construction of bridges and ferries begins.
17.30 The twelfth wave crossed through the canal and overcame the mound. Captured by a bridgehead of 8 km long and 3.5-4 km in width.
17.50 In the depths of blue, 4 Commando battalion are reset.
18.30 Opened first passage in the sand barrier.
20.30 Begins the movement of armored vehicles on the first bridge.
01.00 780 Tanks and 300 units other technology forced the channel.

During the scrupulously reheated operation, the joint efforts of the two of its armies, Egyptian troops advanced 15 km deep in the Sinai Desert. The Israeli battalion, which was in the position of the Bar Lev line, faced forces surpassing him several times. The battalion was quickly broken, only one fortified point under the codenate name "Budapest" survived, he was never taken to the end of the war.

To eliminate the Egyptian bridgehead, the Israelis involved the 252rd regular armored division of Abraham (Alberta) Mendler. The first brigade of Amnon Rehef joined the battle, after sunset, the 401th Brigade was joined to her and the 460 Brigade Gabi Amir. However, the tactic that was so successful in 1967 turned out to be ineffective in 1973. Tank attacks, without sufficient support for infantry, stumbled upon the disguised positions of Egyptian infantry, saturated with anti-tank teams with RPG and Baby's missiles. Israeli tanks were discarded with heavy losses.

On the morning of October 7, in 252, the division remained 103 serviceable tanks from 268. By this time, Egypt sent 90,000 people to the eastern bank, 850 tanks and 11,000 BTR, BRDM and cars. At the same time, the first part of the 162nd reserve division of Abraham Adana and the 143th reserve division of Ariel Sharon began to arrive. By evening, in the Sinai front, Israel had 480 tanks in the composition of three divisions.

The Commander of the Israeli South Front of Shmuel Goning, who has long been in office only 3 months after the resignation of General Ariel Sharon, ordered the Brigade of Gabi Amir to counteratactics in the area of \u200b\u200bChizayon Egyptians. The counterattack in the district of Khisaion did not add anything good to the Israelis, since there the approaching tanks could be easily destroyed by the fire of Egyptian ptti installed on comfortable firing positions. Despite the unwillingness of Amir, the order was executed. The result of the counterattack was deplorable for Israelis. After noon, the Israelis again attacked the Hazayon with two battalions of the Brigade of Natu Nira. During this attack, the battalion Asaph Yaguri lost 16 tanks from 25, Jaguri himself was captured. Using the losses of Israelis, closer to the nights of the Egyptians organized their own offensive, which was hard to stop the Amir and Nat's teams with the support of the 143rd of the Ariel Sharon Tank Division, Mobilized to the South Front - Sharon remained before the end of the war. After that, there was a pause. For several days, none of the parties undertake serious and decisive action. The Egyptians stopped by completing the initial task - the forcing the Suez Canal, and entrusted to the Sinai shore. The Israelis occupied flexible defense and expected reserves approach.

The Head of the Israeli General Staff David Elazar changed the commander of the South Front: instead of the Gonna, which hesized his incompetence, he returned the post of newly mobilized Haima Bar-leva. Meanwhile, fearing that the change of the commander during the war will affect the moral spirit of the troops, Elazar left the heon on the southern front as headquarters headquarters at Bar Leve.

After several days of the expectation of Sadat, wanting to improve the position of the Syrians, gave an order to his generals (including Saad El Shazley and the Minister of Defense Akhmad Ismail Ali) to prepare an offensive. General Saad El Shazley wrote in his memoirs that he opposed this decision and even told Sadatu that this decision was a dangerous strategic mistake. According to the general version, it was the upholding of this position that led to the fact that it was practically removed from the command. Egyptian offensive began on October 14. "The onset of the Egyptians, the most massive since the first occurrence on the day of Yom Kippur, turned out to be completely unsuccessful, it was the first Egyptian promach from the beginning of the war. Instead of maneuvering, smoking battle power, she, with the exception of throwing through Wadi, was spent on the frontal attack against the Israeli brigades ready for it. The losses of the Egyptians were approximately 150-250 tanks. "

For four days of battles, the 7th Israeli tank brigade under the command of Janusha Ben-Galya held the chain of the hills in the north of Golan. These hills covered the division headquarters from the north. According to some, still not established reasons, the Syrians who were close to the seizure of Nafach suspended their offensive in the direction, thereby allowing the Israelites to strengthen their defense line. The most likely explanation of this fact may be the fact that all the plans of the offensive in the Syrians were calculated initially, and they simply did not want to move away from the initial action plan. In the south, Golan The position of the Israelis was much worse: the 188th Tank Brigade "Barak", which occupies the position on the terrain, deprived of natural covers, carried heavy losses. The commander of the brigade, Colonel Itzhak Ben-Shoham, died on the second day of the battle together with his deputy and head of the operational department (each - in his tank), when the Syrians were desperately rummaged to the Tiberiage Lake and Nafah. By this time, the brigade stopped functioning as a single compound, however, despite this, the surviving crews on their tanks continued to fight alone.

The situation on the Golan Plateau began to change the fundamentally after the reservists began to arrive. Arriving troops were able to slow down, and then, starting from October 8, stop the Syrian offensive. Small in size, the Golan heights could not serve as a territorial buffer as the Sinai Peninsula in the south, but they showed themselves a serious strategic fortification that did not allow the Syrians to subjected to the bombardment of Israeli settlements below. By Wednesday, on October 10, the last Syrian combat unit was supplanted for a "purple line", that is, for the pre-war line of ceasefire.

Now the Israelis had to decide whether to move forward, that is, to go to the offensive in the Syrian territory, or stop at the border of 1967. All day 10 October, the Israeli command discussed this issue. Many military stood for the cessation of the offensive, as this, in their opinion, would allow to transfer many fighting parts for Sinai (two days earlier there was a defeat of Shmuel Goning in the Khisaion district). Others supported the offensive in the Syrian territory in the direction of Damascus: this step would knocked out Syria from the war and strengthened the status of Israel as a regional superpower. Opponents of the offensive objected that in Syrian territory there are many powerful defensive fortifications - anti-tank pvs, minefields and bobs. Therefore, they said, in case the Syrians resume attacks, it will be more convenient to defend themselves, using the advantages of Golan heights than on the flat Syrian area. The dot in the dispute was delivered by Prime Minister Gold Meir: "Division's transfer to Sinai would take four days. If the war ended at this time, then she would end with the territorial losses of Israel on Sinai and without any advantage in the north - that is, with a complete defeat. This decision was a political measure, and her decision was solid - go "Purple Line" ... The offensive was scheduled the next day, Thursday, October 11. "

From October 11 to October 14, the Israeli troops advanced to the depths of the Syrian territory, capturing the territory of 32 square kilometers. From the new positions, heavy artillery could already fake Damascus, located 40 km from the front.

As the situation of the Arabs became worse, more and more pressure was on the king Jordan Hussein so that he entered into war. He found the original way to give way to pressure, not exposed, however, the air attack of the Israelis. Instead of attacking the Israelis on a common border, he sent the Expeditionary Corps to Syria. Through intermediaries in the UN, he also gave to the Israelis about these intentions in the hope that Israel would not accept this as a reason for the war, justifying the attack on Jordan ... Dyan did not give any assurances, however, no one wanted to open a new front in Israel.

Forged by Iraq, troops (these divisions turned out to be an unpleasant strategic surprise for the Israelis, who expected that they would be notified with intelligence about such movements up to day) attacked the speakers of the Southern Flaring of the Israelis, forcing the latter to retreat several kilometers to avoid the environment. On October 12, during a tank combat, 50 Iraqi tanks were destroyed, the rest under the cover of artillery retreated in disarray to the east. On the same day, a column of the Iraqi army was destroyed in the Syrian rear of the northeastern Damascus.

The counterattacks of Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian troops suspend the promotion of the Israeli army, but could not knock out Israelis from the captured district of the Basan.

The battle also stressed the prestige of the Navy of Israel, for a long time considered a "dark horse" of the Israeli army, and allocated their importance as an independent and effective force. Because of this, some other battles, the Syrian and Egyptian fleets during the entire war did not leave their Mediterranean bases, thus leaving the Israeli sea communications open.

A few times during the war, the Israeli fleet made small raids in the Egyptian ports, Commandos of the 13th flotilla participated in these operations. The purpose of the raids was the destruction of boats used by the Egyptians to transfer their own Commandos to the rear of Israel. In general, these actions had a small effect and had little reflected during the war.

Participation of other states

In addition to Egypt, Syria and Iraq, some other Arab countries participated in the war, providing financing and supplying weapons. The full amount in which this support broke out is still not installed.

Then, a group of Soviet warships with a landing on board was sent to the shores of Egypt. He was supposed to land in Port Said, organize the defenses of this city and prevent his seizure by Israeli troops before the airborne division arrives from the USSR. However, at the entrance of the Squadron in Port Said, he received an order to cancel the operation.

In addition, a group of Soviet pilots was sent to Egypt, which at MiG-25 were conducted by aerial phony.

After that, the Israeli troops stopped the offensive and on October 25, the state of increased combat readiness in Soviet divisions and American nuclear powers was canceled.

Consequences of conflict

Losses of Party

Israel's losses in the technique: 109 aircraft and helicopters, 810 tanks and armored vehicles. For the war of the Juduary Day, Israel lost about 2200-2500 killed, 5500-7500 wounded, 290-530 people were captured [ specify]. By agreement on the exchange of prisoners, Israel managed to return the captives, but not all prisoners returned, but who returned remained disabled due to bullying them were subjected to in the Egiepte captivity.

The Army of the Arab side lost 368 aircraft and helicopters in the technique, 1775 tanks and armored vehicles. Losses in people amounted to 18,500 dead, 51,000 wounded and 9370 prisoners.

Political crisis in Israel

Four months after the end of the war, anti-government protests began in Israel. He headed the protest of the Moth Ashkenazi, the commander of the fortified item "Budapest" - the only fortification on Sinai, which was not captured by the Egyptians at the beginning of the war. Dissatisfaction with the government (and, especially, Moshe Danyan) was great in the country. Shimon Agrant, Chairman of the Supreme Court, was appointed head of commission to investigate the causes of military failures at the beginning of war and unpreparedness to it.

The chief of the General Staff of Aoya David Elazar was recommended to remove from office after the Commission recognized him by "supporting personal responsibility for assessing the situation and the willingness of the army to war."

The Chief of Military Intelligence "Aman" General Eli Zeira and his deputy general Azeria Shaleva was recommended to remove from office.

Lieutenant Colonel Bandman, Head of the Egyptian Department in Military Intelligence, and Lieutenant Colonel Gedalya, Chief of Intelligence of the Southern District, was recommended to remove from reconnaissance posts.

Shmuel Goning, the former commander of the South Front, was recommended to send to the reserve. Later, after the full publication of the report of the Agrarian Commission, which followed January 30, 1975, the general had to leave the army, since the Commission recognized that he " it turned out to be unable to adequately fulfill his official duties and is largely responsible for the dangerous situation in which our troops fell».

Instead of taking people's discontent, the report only strengthened it. Despite the fact that the names of Gold Meir and Moshe Danyan in the report were not mentioned, and they were as if cleared of charges, the resignation requirements of the premiere were distributed increasingly louder, and especially Moshe Danyan.

see also

Literature

Avigdor Kahalani. The Heights of Courage: A Tank Leader "S War On The Golan. - Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. - 236 p. - ISBN 0275942694, 9780275942694

Avigdor Kahalani. The Yom Kippur War // A Warrior "S Way. - 1993. - P. 160+. - 423 p. - ISBN 1561712396, 9781561712397

Shif, Zeev. Earthquake in October. Ed. "Our library", 1975, 278 p.

Notes

Losses of Israel Air Force Air Force in the War of the Judgment Day

"1973 - War without winning, war without defeated", Lieutenant Colonel K.I.N. Belo-Voludtsev O. A., Plotkin G. L., Military Historical Journal "Sergeant"

During the Autumn of 2003, following the declassification of key Aman documents, the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth released a series of controversial articles which revealed that key Israeli figures were aware of considerable danger that an attack was likely, including Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, but had Decided Not to Act. The Two Journalists Leading The Investigation, Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltzer, Later Went On to Publish YOM KIPPUR WAR, REAL TIME: THE UPDATED EDITION, Yediot Ahronoth / Hemed Books, 2004. ISBN 965-511-597-6

Valery Serdyuk of the War of the Judgment Day in the Middle East // During Show (1954-1991). Year 1973

Herzog, Chaim (1989). Heroes of Israel: Profiles of Jewish Courage. Little Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-35901-7, p. 253.

Shlaim, AVI (2000, 2001). The Iron Wall: Israel and The Arab WORLD. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-32112-6. ISBN 0-393-04816-0, p. 254.

REUVEN PEDATZUR SEEDS OF PEACE, 09.22.10 Haaretz.com

Abba Solomon Eban. Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes. - Putnam, 1992. - P. 446. - 691 p. - ISBN 0399135898.

performed at the time at the same time the functions of the UN Messenger and the ambassador of Sweden in the USSR

Egypt. EXTERNAL RELATIONS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS /

Surround lessons. Dan Michael.

Shif Zeev, 1975, p.45

Saad El-Shasli "Forcing Suez Canal". - M.: Biblos-Consulting, 2008. p.228-243

October 9, 1973, Damascus, Ontario14, October 10, 2011

שי לוי | פז"ם | פורסס 06/10/11 10:28:59 (Hebrew)

Shif Zeev, 1975, p.173-175

Alexander Rosin. War of "Judgment Day" of 1973, the confrontation of the USSR - the United States to the sea. Part I.

Alexander Rosin. War of "Judgment Day" of 1973, the confrontation of the USSR - the United States to the sea. Part II.

Cuban Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Cuba in the Middle East A Brief Chronology

Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution

Links

External video files
Movie time: 1973. War of worlds, Russia, TV Center (2009).
War of the Judgment Day Part 2 The Consequences of the War.
Crossing the Israeli troops through the Suez Canal
XIII. The Yom Kippur War and Aftermath // Israel's Foreign Relations // Selected Documents //
Volumes 1-2 - 1947-1974, Israel Foreign Ministry (English)

DisenGagement Agreements Following The 1973 YOM Kippur War, 10 Feb 1999, Israel Foreign Ministry (English)

War of the Day of the Day at Waronline

War of the Judgment Day - article from the E-Jewish Encyclopedia

Lieutenant Colonel K.I.N. Belousludese O. A., Plotkin G. L. "1973 - War without winning, war without defeated."

V.Yaremenko. Judgment day without winners. For the anniversary of the 1973 war, Polit.ru, October 8, 2008

Alexander Rosin. War of "Judgment Day" of 1973, the confrontation of the USSR - the United States to the sea.

The Yom Kippur War (1973), 11.11.08, Ynetnews (English)

סודות יום כיפור - חדשות היום (selection of articles and documents, including meetings' protocols at Gold Meir 6-8.10.73) (Hebrew) Ynet

Forces and means	Arab states	Ratio
Personal composition, man	415 000 *	1 162 000	1:2,7
Brigades:	33	63	1:1,9
infantry	18	25	1:1,4
mechanized	3	15	1:5
armored vehicles	10	20	1:2
air landing	2	3	1:1,5
Tanks	1700	3550	1:2,1
Guns and mortars	2520	5585	1:2,2
PU PTU	240	932	1:3,9
Battle aircraft	561	1011	1:1,8
Helicopters	84	197	1:2,3
SP	20	186	1:9,3
Ships and boats	38	125	1:3,3

External video files
	Movie time: 1973. War of worlds, Russia, TV Center (2009).
	War of the Judgment Day Part 2 The Consequences of the War.
	Crossing the Israeli troops through the Suez Canal

The vessel war began for the Israelis suddenly, although the willingness of the Syrians to the attack was not a secret for them. Shortly before the attack, on October 2, 1973, Syrian tanks and infantry once again entered the demilitarized zone, which Israeli military did not attach much importance. They believed that Egypt was not ready for war, and alone Syria will not dare to war. War began in the afternoon on October 6, 1973, in the sacred holiday for Jews Yom-Kipur (Jewish Day). At 13:45, the artillery shelling began, which lasted 50 minutes. Aviation also hit in Israeli positions. Syrian tanks went to the attack almost simultaneously.

In the second half of the XX century, the stroke of the political situation in the Middle East constantly grew. The six-day Arab-Israeli war started by Israel and allowed him for 5 – On July 10, 1967, the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, from Jordan - East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan River, and from Syria - the Golan heights, brought to the limit of the political confrontation in the region.

On the eve

The Arabs were humiliated with rapid and defeat, applied immediately to several large countries of the Islamic world. Almost immediately after the end of the six-day war, the so-called war on exhaustion began - military actions without declaring war, mainly the territory and airlinople and the economic and political blockade of Israel, the Islamic world, and the economic and political blockade of Israel, in parallel with which Arabs were enhanced by the preparation for the new war revenge.

Political map of Israel to the six-day war of 1967 (lemon color), before (pink)
And after (red, brown) Wars of the Day of the Day of 1973
Source - Turkcebilgi.com.

Israeli politicians and command of the Israel Defense Army (hereinafter - AOI) soberly assessed the current situation, and therefore could have strengthened new boundaries and prepared the country to operational mobilization in the event of danger.

Syria was perhaps the most dangerous and most consistent opponent of Israel by the beginning of 1973. Together with Egypt, this country amounted to the backbone of the military anti-Israeli alliance, to which Jordan and Iraq joined. Many other countries, such as Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Tunisia, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, USSR and Cuba, provided an alliance of military military and financial assistance in preparation for a new war.

Golan heights selected by Israel in Syria are a hilly plateau with scattered hills, while strategically important hills are located in their northern and southern part. The southern part, located near the freshwater lake Kineret, dominates the northern part of Galilee. With its vertices, you can successfully fill a significant part of Israel. Hosting the northern part (that is, the southern slope of Mount Hermon) allows Israel to ensure that the water of the Jordan River, the main source of water in the region will not be allocated by the Syrians to the side (such plans existed in Syria in 1950 – 60s).

Kibbutz is a measure of Golan, located on the Golan heights. At the top of the hill - the former support point.
An abandoned city of El Cunera is visible
Source - Forum.guns.ru (LOS photo)

When preparing a Golan to defense, Israeli engineering services dug up anti-tank mits depth 4 and 6 meters wide for the entire length of the Syrian-Israeli border (75 km). Mine fields were prepared along the border, in addition to mining, which was carried out by Syrians until 1967. The basis of defense of the Golan heights was 11 reference points (hereinafter referred to as OP) located on the hill along the border, consisting of fighters, trenches, blockages, concreted NP and three-four prepared firing positions for tanks. These positions were the so-called "ramps" - the hull of the tank who caught the tank was covered by an earthen shaft of a two-meter thickness, which tank was almost invulnerable to the enemy artillery. For one such "ramp" simultaneously could call 3-4 tanks. The approaches to the OP were covered with minefields, wire bodies and anti-tank engineering structures. Behind the movements of the enemy, 5 observational posts located between the OP followed.

Support point on Mount Bental (Golan Heights)
Source - Deafpress.LiveJournal.com

The armament of Israel's tank troops in the 70s was pretty plenty. The basis of the tank fleet, the total number of which barely exceeded 2000 units was the tanks "Shot" and "Shot Cal" (translated from Hebrew - "Lyky Knut") - Modifications of the British Tank A41 "Centurion" armed with 105 mm British guns Royal Ordnance L7. Their number was 1009 cars.

The remaining Israeli tanks were the following models:

345 (according to other data - 390) Magaz-3 tanks - modernized American M-48 "Patton-III", also armed with 105-mm tank guns;
341 M-51HV "Super Sherman" or "ISherman" - Israeli modification of American Tanks M-50 "Sherman" armed with 105 mm implements CN-105-F1;
150 "Magazes-6" and "Magas-6 Alef" - modifications of more modern American tanks M60 and M60A1 (unofficially called "Patton-IV"), with a standard 105-mm gun M68;
146 "Tiran 4/5" - modified trophy Soviet tanks T-54 and T-55, which went to Israel during the six-day war.

"Shot Cal" - the most massive tank of the aoa. Golan heights, October 1973
Source - gallery.military.ir.

However, the Golan heights covered only 180 tanks of the 188th and 7th armored brigades of the 36th division "Gaash" (Commander - Major General Rafael Eitan), most of which were tanks "Shot Cal". The main part of the Aoya armored forces was concentrated in the south, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Sinai Peninsula, where the main blow to the Egyptian army was expected and where the terrain was less than hilly. In addition to tanks, the height was defended by 600 infantry and about 60 guns.

In addition to the team of constant readiness in the event of the beginning of the war, the Aoy could mobilize reservoir armored brigades. Since the preparation of the Syrian army to attack Israel was not a big secret for the Israeli command, the warehouses of equipment and weapons of the Northern Military District (hereinafter - its) a few months before the start of the war were moved closer to the border, to the North-West Galilean area.

Command Meeting. In the center - Izhak Hofi
Source - Waronline.org.

The General Staff of the Syrian Army began preparations for the attack 9 months before the start of the attack. Syrians expected that the mobilization of reservists and the nomination of reserve divisions to the border will take at least a day at the Israelites. During this time, they planned to break through three armored columns to the Jordan River and the Galilee Sea, defeating the regular troops of the AOI, defeated Golan, and capture strategically important crossings on the river.

The exact date of the attack of the Israelis was not known, although the willingness of the Syrians to the attack was not a secret for them. However, the Syrian army managed to put the vigilance of his opponents - she regularly conducted military provocations on the border, as well as artillery shelling (including, with the participation of armored vehicles). Shortly before the attack, on October 2, 1973, Syrian tanks and infantry once again entered the demilitarized zone, which Israeli military did not attach much importance. They believed that Egypt was not ready for war (which turned out to be a big mistake), and alone Syria will not be solved on the war.

Map of hostilities October 6-10, 1973 at the Golan Heights
Source - Eleven.co.il.

Forty years ago, October 6, 1973, a sudden attack of Syria and Egypt to Israel began the fourth Arab-Israeli war, she was the "War of the Judgment Day". As a result, this war has developed successfully for Israel, although the first day of her days could easily bring the Jewish state to a military catastrophe. In fact, the "War of the Day of the Day" sharply dismissed the Israeli elites and made them seriously engage in a peaceful process in the Middle East, which they arrogantly ignored.

Long "on the eve"

The 1973 War was predetermined by the "six-day war" of the 1967th, as well as the second world inevitably followed the results of the first. The sudden blitzkrieg of the Israeli army, separating the Arabs in 1967 and led to the occupation of blue, Golan heights (and, more importantly, the West Bank of the Jordan River with Jerusalem), logically heated Arab Revenches. Which in this case and revenge can be called only if you donate from the negative emotional background of this word. Since there was an desire to restore territorial integrity by force.

Both sides expressed categorical reluctance to negotiate. Israel rejected one after another reconciliation scheme. In response, Arabs signed the so-called "Hartum Declaration", as well known as "Rule of Three No": No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, there is no recognition of Israel. There was a muddy low-intensive conflict, who received the nickname "War of Exposure".

In the autumn of 1970, President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was died, Anwar Sadat came to his place, who raised his goal to returning blue.

In the evening of the Judgment Day

The date of the attack was chosen purposefully: the blow was applied on October 6 - in 1973, the most important religious holiday of Yom-Kipapur, "Day of Atonement" or, which is more familiar, "Judgment Day" fell out on this day. This day is prescribed to conduct in post and prayers for repentance.

In the evening of this day, Israel dies: restrictions on the activity are even more stringent than in traditional Saturdays. Institutions are closed, enterprises stop, stop their broadcasting television and radio stations. Public transport does not work and it is not accepted for the steering wheel, because of which the highways are empty.

So the moment was chosen carefully. However, postfactum some researchers indicated that the Arabs were made a critical error: in Yom-Kipipur Roads are free, and reservists are sitting at home and pray - which allowed Israel to sharply speed up suddenly declared mobilization.

To disguise obvious preparations on September 27-30, Egypt held a call for reservists under the guise of exercises. It did not remain unnoticed by the Israeli leadership, but there was no general consensus to provoke Arabs and not to make a symmetrical increase in the combat readiness of the Israel Defense Army.

During the October 3-5, the accumulation of Egyptian troops along the Suez Canal caused concern about the army intelligence of Israel, but long-term discussions at the level of the command of the Southern Military District did not lead to anything.

In the military leadership of Israel, a group of Alarms, demanding mobilization and even preventive impact, was distinguished, but all their arguments were divided into skepticism of the Minister of Defense Moshe Danyan and the uncertain position of the premiere of Gold Meir.

Literally on the eve of the war, the Egyptian billionaire Ashraf Marvan, the name of the late president of Nasser, contacted Israeli exploration and said that the war would start "at sunset" on October 6. It was the second warning of this kind of Marwan, the first, in May 1973, did not come true.

Danay, when he was reported on the warning, said it was not yet a reason to declare mobilization. At the same time, the US Secretary of State Kissinger called Golde Meir and demanded in no case to resort to preventive measures.

Markhan, whom some are considered a double agent of Egyptian intelligence, and here lurted: the Arabs caused a blow to four hours earlier, about 14 hours local time. Here in such "wonderful" conditions and began the fourth Arab-Israeli war.

Started!

At the Golan heights of the Arabs, strictly speaking, little happened: after the first stupid days, the Israeli command came to feel and by October 8, the beginning began to spit the Syrians quite firmly. By October 14, the Israelis moved forward towards Damascus and secured in order not to stretch the communications.

All the most interesting unfolded on Sinai. The Egyptians easily broke through the defense of the Israelis and moved forward. On October 7-8, an attempt to counterattack from the depth of tanks came across the prepared defense of the Egyptian infantry, saturated with portable anti-tank complexes, which led to unusual heavy losses in vibrant and technique.

By October 10, the front after the hardest battles struggled to stabilized. The situation was shaky, and any meaningful activity of the Egyptians again could overturn the Israelis and open the road to the north.

A new offensive really did not slow down to wait, and in the morning of October 14, the Egyptians rushed forward, but too predictable. Their stretched combat orders carried losses, overlooking the forehead in the nasty-trained anti-tank defense of the Israelis.

On the other side of the Suez

On October 14, the Israeli diversion-intelligence group launched the Egyptian radio operating center in the Jebel-Attack area than complicated the Egyptians to conduct intelligence and managing troops, and without that in a situation of conventional near-crisis chaos of the offensive.

The Israelis decided to take advantage of it, because other chances of applying the Egyptians did not seek the defeat. On October 15, 1973, the north of the Big Gorky Lake, Consturdar of the 143rd armored division was inflicted at the junction of the 2nd and 3rd Egyptian armies. She commanded a hastily pulled out of the reserve Major Ariel Sharon, a fairness of the combat and political preparation of the times of early Arab-Israeli wars and accompanying their stripping of the Arab territories.

Which is characteristic, on October 9, Moshe Dan insisted that the Southern District refrain from any offensive, stabilizing the front on the eve of potential negotiations with the Egyptians on the cease-fire. Further, however, the national features of the Israel Defense Army were included: Sharon fully ignored this instruction.

The Arabs initially did not give the values \u200b\u200bto a small detachment that secured on the West Bank of the Suez Canal. During this time, the Israelites managed to bring a pontoon bridge. Here, the Egyptian command drew attention to what was happening and threw troops there to reset the detachment back into the canal.

But Sharon's division beat off the counterattack, and by October 18, the Israeli 252nd and 162th divisions began to transfer to the West Coast of the Suez Canal. The Israelis deviated to the south, in the rear of the main Egyptian group in the face of the 3rd army, which continued to enter the northeast. Both sides seemed to chase each other through the "door-turntable", the axis of which was a big bitter lake.

Heirs of Bonaparte and Manstein

Sharon completely adventurously applied the reception, previously shiny demonstrated at the tactics level by Napoleon in the battle of Austerlice, and on the operational - command of the "Army A" group of Wehrmacht during the invasion of France: a blow to a weakened center of the position of the enemy covering you.

What was inspired by "Arik" Sharon - the overall hopelessness of the situation against the background of the unusualness of the High Command or a specific historical example of the successful operations of the past - now it is already difficult to say. It is only known that in front of the war Sharon sharply criticized the construction of the chains of fortifications ("Bar-Lev lines"), indicating that the "line of Mazhino" did not save France in 1940.

One way or another, but the "Bar Lev" did not play in the fall of 1973. And Sharon's maneuver can be honest to put in one row with the classic operation of Erich Manstein in Ardennes and the capture of the French of the Pratzensky heights under Austerlitz.

One of the main results of the offensive of the Israelis was the complete disorganization and the actual destruction of the power of the Egypt air defense, deployed by the West Canal. This finally opened the sky for Israeli aviation.

The position of the 3rd army from the dominant on the front turned into a threatened one. October 25, the Israeli armored vehicle broke into the outskirts of Suez, completing the full environment of the 3rd Egyptian army, but was thrown away from the city. The situation was hung again in instability: the Egyptians seem to be surrounded by the Egyptians, but the positions of Israel on the West Bank can not be considered sustainable, and temporary tactical success could be refuted by the decisive and correct actions of Cairo.

However, the "international community" has already entered the case. On October 22, the UN Security Council urged to stop the fire, but both parties skillfully used breaks in combat actions for regrouping and new blows. Three days of cumulative pressure on Tel Aviv, who included a demonstrative alignment of the high readiness of Soviet airborne troops, finally stopped the fighting just to the outcome of October 25.

Tel Aviv, just say, got off the fright of the middle gravity: what began to be almost like on June 22, 1941, it ended in a draw "On Points". If not counting, of course, without a small 3,000 killed and over 8,000 wounded Israeli servicemen.

Features of national politics

Israeli policy is a very special discipline. Its main slogan, apparently, can be formulated as "Bay's yours, so that they were afraid of others." That is what began after October 25, when everyone exhausted and began to understand who was to blame for this unexpected victory, which almost became a national catastrophe. A special commission for the investigation was convened led by the Chairman of the Supreme Court Shimon Agranat.

The opposition in the Knesset and the press was raging, the protests and among the reservists. The main goal was Moshe Danyan, who personified in the eyes of the Israeli community, that pretablism, with which the country entered the most serious war in his history. Gold Meir, however, did not want to hand over to brave one-eyed warriors, on all opposition attacks is definitely: "And then Danyan? Require my resignation."

The intermediate conclusions of the Agranta Commission were published on April 1, 1974 and even at the not very quiet background of the winter of 1973-1974, the effect of a broken bomb was made. It turned out that intelligence failed to open the preparations of Arabs under the cover of the exercises, and the military leadership of the country assured that the mobilization of reservists should not be carried out, because It will only provoke Egypt and Syria. Before the reconnaissance and general estimation, the political leadership was assured for many months that Egypt and Syria are absolutely not ready for war, pushing out the delivery schedules from the USSR of modern combat aviation and tactical missiles.

Military heads flew: the commander of the South District Shmuel Goning, the head of the General Staff, David Elazar, Heads of Military Intelligence Departed. It went to the nuts and the "Savior of the Nation", Sharon, who until August 1973 held the post of chapter of the Southern District. Gold Meir and Moshe Danyan in the report were carefully looked around.

Indeed, many are trying to hang all dogs for the "War of the Judgment Day" personally at Gold Meir, but at the same time they forget that, regardless of their real convictions for this expense, in any case would be forced to approve a collegial decision to refuse mobilization and Preventive actions adopted by the Minister of Defense of Danyan, heads of the General Staff and Military Intelligence.

At the commission, she, however, was talking about "bad premonitions", but we can judge this only from her words. In her behavior in front of the war, in any case, there is no influence of any "premonitions".

No normal politician in such cases will translate all the military leadership of the country. For such behavior, it is necessary to be at least Churchill, and he did not abuse voluntarism, even when he saw that the military did everything wrong.

Gold Meir, famous for the sanction on the physical elimination of the leaders of the Palestinian group "Black September", Churchill was still not. On April 11, 1974, on the crest spilled on the protest street, she resigned, throwing up for goodbye, "Enough from me five years, my forces are no longer taking this burden."

Introduced Her Yitzhak Rabin, the future author of the peace agreements of 1993 in Oslo with the Palestinians, could not debug the government's government block and gave way to one of the leaders of Likud to Menachem Begin in 1977, putting an end to the 30th anniversary of the board of Israeli left. By the way, in the right office of Begin, Moshe Dyan will arise again, but in the chair of the head of the Foreign Ministry (for which he is thrown out of the rows of parliamentary Social Democrats).

And already Begin will have to carry out an inevitable reconciliation policy with Egypt, rejected by the Cabinet of Meir. She will end, recall, by the major success of Tel Aviv - by signing the separath-David agreements in 1979, actually broken by the Arab front of the fight against the Jewish state.

The Irony of Stories: Begin will make the most important world with Anvar Sadat practically under the same conditions, which in 1971 during the testing of the soil for the negotiations sharply rejected Golda Meir - and received war on his head, almost worth the Israel of all the conquests for 30 years. And it is in order for Camp David to become possible, a powerful rustling of the "War of the Judgment Day" was required, once again proved that the pride is a bad adviser in Middle Eastern politics.

War of the Judgment Day (Other names - October War, War in the month of Ramadan, Arab-Israeli war 1973) - The struggle of the coalition of Arab States led by Egypt and Syria against Israel, held from October 6 to 25, 1973. Her battles went mainly on Sinai The peninsula and the Golan altitudes are territories that were occupied by Israel after the six-day war 1967. Syrians wanted to return to themselves strategically important Golan, President of Egypt Anwar Sadat. I wanted to return the Suez Canal to his country. Arabs did not plan to completely destroy Israel, although Israeli leaders suspected this.

The war began with a joint unexpected strike of the Arab coalition on the positions of the territories occupied by Israel (Egyptians - according to Sinai, Syrians - on the Golan). This blow was inflicted on the day of Yom Kipur, the most revered holiday judaismwhich coincided in 1973 with the Sacred Muslim Monastery Ramadan. The United States and the USSR began to hastily supply their Middle Eastern allies weapons. America transferred the Israelis 20 tons of military equipment (the Nickel Grass Operation). From the USSR, a group of warships went to Egypt (if necessary, it was assumed to land a landing in Port Said from them). The soldiers from Cuba also arrived in Syria.

Egyptian troops successfully crossed the Suez Canal in three places. Thanks to the surprise of the attack, they advanced in some places by more than 10 kilometers deep into the blue. Protecting the air defense received from the USSR, the Egyptians this time did not allow all the supervision in the air of Jewish aviation, which was the main reason for the loss of the Arabs of the six-day war. But after three days, Israel pulled up to Sinai army replenishment and hastily mobilized reservists, stopping the Egyptian offensive. The Syrians coordinated their attack with the actions of the Egyptians and at first almost beat the Golan heights, reaching the line of the border, which existed to the six-day war. However, soon Israeli troops pushed the Syrians to the initial positions, although several Iraqi units arrived at the help. The Israeli army opened four-day counteroffensive in Syria, and a week later, her artillery began to fire the outskirts of Damascus.

The Israelis began to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, which they then have already possessed. This threat sharply strengthened the danger of engaging in the conflict of the USSR and the USA - and the Global Atomic War. Egyptian President Sadat ordered his army to make his way to two strategic aisles in Sinai, but the attempt of the Egyptian on October 14 to resume the onslaught was quickly reflected - they lost 250 tanks in battle, which became the largest tank battle since battle on Kursk Arc 1943. The Jews themselves hit the free space formed at the Suez Channel between the two Egyptian armies, the channel moved and moved most of their south forces, covered by the city of Suez, threatening and not far from here Cairo. Heavy battles led to great losses on both sides.

The war of the day - great tank battles. Video film

The United Nations with its resolution No. 338 suggested both the warring parties on the cease-fire agreement, which was to enter into force on the evening of October 22. Israel and Egypt adopted this resolution, but Syria rejected it. Then the agreement was violated on the Israeli-Egyptian front, and each of the two countries was responsible for this to another. By October 24, the Israelis significantly strengthened their positions to the west of the Suez Canal, almost completed the surroundings of the city of Suez and the 3rd Egyptian army located near him. It strengthened tensions in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. On October 24, Israel was warned from the Kremlin "On the greatest consequences" in the case of its "aggressive actions against Egypt and Syria". At the same time, Brezhnev sent an urgent telegram to the president Nixonu, where, in the event of the US passivity to resolve the crisis, the USSR will have to "urgently consider to take the necessary unilateral steps." An increased combat readiness of 7 divisions of Soviet airborne troops was announced. In response, the United States led their nuclear powers in a state of complete readiness. It is believed that at that moment the two superpowers were closest to the atomic conflict since the Caribbean crisis of 1962. However, acting together, the USSR and the USA on October 25, they still made the fire and finish the war. According to her results, Israel has somewhat expanded the territories held by him in the district of the Golan heights, and received positions on the West Bank of the Suez Canal. However, the territory of its eastern shore was given under the control of Egyptians.

Results of the War of the Judgment Day: Beige Color - Israel to the Six Day War, Light Pink - His joins on the results of the six-day war, brown - the acquisition of Israel on the basis of the war of 1973, dark-red - territories transferred to Egypt on the basis of the war 1973

The war of the day of the day had the most important consequences. The Arab world, humiliated by the shameful defeat of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian Alliance in the six-day war, took the spirit from the initial success in the fall of 1973. In Israel, despite the impressive victories of the second stage of the war of the Judgment Day, the consciousness arose that the Jews had no unconditional military superiority over the Arab States . All this has prepared the ground for the subsequent Arab-Israeli peace process. Camp David agreements 1978 led to the return of Sinai Egypt, the signing of the world of Jews with Cairo and the first recognition of Israel's state by one of the Arab countries. Some analysts believe that the return of Sinai was the main goal, in the name of which President Sadat began the fight against 1973 - and that, therefore, the victims of military defeats in it, he eventually won her politically. After the war of the Judgment Day, Egypt began to quickly leave the Soviet sphere of influence and soon left her finally.

In the midst of the War of the Judgment Day, the organization of the Arab States - Oil Exporters (OPEC) announced an increase of 70% of oil prices and the suspension of oil exports to countries supporting Israel, in particular in the United States. Oil prices around the world jumped sharply, in many states a normalized gasoline vacation was introduced. Although the embargo against the United States was removed already in March 1974, OPEC clearly demonstrated how depending on the Western society of consumption from the oil-bearing Middle East.

Long "on the eve"

In the autumn of 1970, President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was died, Anwar Sadat came to his place, who raised his goal to returning blue.