The headquarters of the supreme command is the extraordinary highest state. The beginning of the war and the creation of the headquarters of the supreme commander in chief

Formation of the State Defense Committee

On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany grossly violated the terms of the treaty with the USSR and attacked the Soviet country. 153 German divisions, mobilized in advance, armed with the latest military equipment, were thrown against the USSR.

Together with Hitler's Germany, Romania, Hungary and Finland entered the war against the Soviet Union, which in the very first days put forward 37 divisions.

Fascist Italy also opposed the USSR. Germany was assisted by Bulgaria and Spain. Imperialist Japan was biding its time to attack the USSR. To this end, she kept the millionth Kwantung Army on alert near the Soviet Far Eastern borders.

The enemy invasion began at 4 am on June 22nd. Large formations of infantry and tank forces on a wide front crossed the Soviet border. At the same time, German planes brutally bombarded border points, airfields, railway stations, and large cities. An hour and a half after the start of the invasion, the German ambassador in Moscow made a statement to the Soviet government about Germany's entry into the war with the Soviet Union.

Mortal danger loomed over the Soviet country. In its statement, made on the radio on June 22 at 12 o'clock, the Soviet government called on the entire Soviet people and its Armed Forces for the Patriotic War against the German fascist invaders, for the holy war for the Motherland, for honor and freedom. “Our cause is just. The gate will be broken. Victory will be ours ”- these words of the government statement expressed the deep confidence of all Soviet people in victory over the enemy.

On the same day, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, mobilization of persons liable for military service in 14 military districts was announced, martial law was introduced in the European part of the USSR.

The treacherous attack of Hitlerite Germany on the USSR interrupted peaceful construction in our country. The Soviet Union entered the period of the war of liberation.

The Soviet people, as one, rose to defend their Motherland, to the sacred war of the whole people. The workers, peasants and intelligentsia were seized by an enormous patriotic enthusiasm; they expressed their unshakable determination to defend every inch of their native land, to fight to the last drop of blood, until the complete defeat of Nazi Germany. The Soviet people rallied even more closely around the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

Fascist Germany unleashed a predatory war, designed to seize our lands and conquer the peoples of the USSR. The Nazis set themselves the goal of destroying the Soviet state, restoring the capitalist system in the USSR, exterminating millions of Soviet people, and turning the survivors into slaves of the German landowners and capitalists.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany and her accomplices was a just war of liberation.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union merged with the struggle of the freedom-loving peoples of other countries against the fascist aggressors. It was conducted in the interests of all progressive humanity.

The armed forces of fascist Germany acted according to a previously developed plan, which was called the "Barbarossa plan". The German command counted on the complete defeat of the Soviet Union during a short campaign. The main strategic task was to defeat the Soviet armed forces, to seize the territory of the USSR up to the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line. At the same time, the German command intended to destroy the Ural industrial region with aviation forces after the exit of the Nazi troops to the Volga.

In accordance with the "Barbarossa plan," the German command previously concentrated its forces on our borders. The group of enemy troops, which bore the name "Norway", was intended to strike at Murmansk and Kandalaksha. Army Group North was advancing on the Baltic and Leningrad. Finnish troops acted in cooperation with this group and deployed their actions in the area of Lake Ladoga. The most powerful group of the German fascist armies "Center" was operating in the central direction, with the task of capturing Minsk and then advancing on Smolensk and Moscow. In the southern direction, on the front from Kholm to the Black Sea, Army Group South operated, the left wing of which was attacking in the direction of Kiev.

The German command intended to make a deep breakthrough with surprise strikes into the areas where the troops of our border military districts were stationed, to prevent them from retreating into the interior of the country and to destroy them in the western regions. If this plan was completely successful, the enemy would have the opportunity to seize the most important vital centers of the USSR - Moscow, Leningrad and the southern industrial regions.

Hitlerite Germany, even before the start of the war against the USSR, put the country's economy on a war footing, mobilized its troops and carefully prepared a strong invading army. This army had almost two years of experience in conducting major military operations in Europe. It was equipped with all types of the latest military equipment, consisted of selected soldiers and officers, brought up in the spirit of predatory, fascist ideology, national and racial hatred of the Slavic and other peoples.

Despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, the situation at the front at the beginning of the war was extremely unfavorable for our army.

Numerous, technically well-equipped and experienced in modern warfare, fascist German divisions, taking advantage of the treacherous attack, put the Soviet troops of the border districts, where significant forces of the regular army were located, in an extremely difficult situation. Not being sufficiently concentrated and deployed for combat operations, the Soviet troops were unable to withstand the numerically superior enemy forces that were operating in the main directions. Enemy strike groups (tank and motorized divisions) cut through the battle formations of the Soviet troops and advanced deep into our territory. As a result, the control of Soviet military units was extremely difficult. Strong strikes by enemy aviation against troops and strategically important targets inflicted heavy losses on Soviet troops and inflicted tremendous damage on the rear and communications. The enemy quickly achieved a change in the balance of forces in their favor. Soviet troops were forced to retreat, waging heavy battles and suffering heavy losses.

By the beginning of July 1941, the enemy managed to capture Lithuania, a significant part of Latvia, the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine, and reach the Western Dvina.

The failure of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war was due to a number of reasons. Among these reasons, first of all, it should be noted the belated conversion of industry to a military mode.

The industry of our country, which was at a high level of development, at which it could fully provide the Soviet Army with everything necessary, was not on time and was really mobilized in order to produce the maximum amount of all types of weapons and combat supplies. This did not allow the timely completion of the rearmament of Soviet troops with new equipment before the war, to replenish the losses and provide new formations with weapons at the beginning of the war. Major mistakes were made in the construction of mechanized troops. In 1937 the mechanized corps of the Soviet Army were disbanded. The tank brigade was adopted as the highest organizational unit, which did not meet the requirements of modern warfare. Only in 1940, taking into account the experience of the Second World War, mechanized corps began to form in the Soviet Army again. However, before the start of the war, their formation was not fully completed.

The lack of mechanized troops was exacerbated by the fact that, while obsolete tank systems were being phased out, mass production of new T-34 tanks and KV heavy tanks had not yet been deployed. As a result, a large shortage of tanks was formed. The mechanized corps deployed in the border areas were not fully equipped with materiel.

Many artillery units had not yet been transferred to mechanized traction, there was a lack of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery.

The situation was approximately the same in the development of our air force. Although by the beginning of the war, Soviet aviation was armed with no fewer aircraft than the enemy, but these aircraft for the most part were outdated systems and were inferior to the German ones in their combat qualities. True, at that time Soviet designers gave new images of aircraft that were superior to the German ones.

But the rearmament of the air force was proceeding slowly. By the beginning of the war, new aircraft in the aviation fleet accounted for only an insignificant part. In addition, the pilots have not yet had time to really master the new material part.

The preparation of new defensive lines was not completed, and the weapons were removed from the old permanent structures. The network of airfields in the border areas was insufficiently developed. Highways and dirt roads for the movement of troops were in poor condition.

One of the reasons for the insufficient preparedness of the Soviet Army to repulse the enemy was JV Stalin's incorrect assessment of the military-political situation immediately on the eve of the war. Stalin believed that Germany would not dare to attack the USSR in the near future. Therefore, he hesitated to carry out defensive measures, believing that these actions could give the Nazis a pretext for attacking our country. JV Stalin also underestimated the military capabilities of Hitlerite Germany.

The underestimation of the threat of a fascist attack on the USSR was reflected, in particular, in the TASS report of June 14, 1941. This statement pointed out the groundlessness of rumors about Germany's mobilization of troops and her preparation for a war against the USSR. The message said that “according to the USSR. Germany adheres to the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as unswervingly as the Soviet Union, which is why, in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are groundless. "

In the border military districts, the creation and concentration of sufficient forces on threatening areas that could be opposed to large strategic enemy groupings was not completed in time. It should also be borne in mind that in the pre-war years, a significant number of experienced commanders and political workers, especially at the highest level, were repressed as a result of the actions of hostile elements that broke into the state security organs. Young cadres who came to the leadership of units and formations often did not yet have sufficient knowledge and experience. It also negatively influenced the course of military operations of the Soviet troops in the first period of the war.

As a result of all these mistakes and shortcomings, the Soviet troops, being taken by surprise, suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment in the very first days of the war.

Soviet aviation, which suffered heavy losses from surprise attacks by the enemy on the very first day of the war, was unable to properly fulfill its tasks in order to interfere with the operations of enemy ground forces. Due to the rapid advance of enemy troops into the interior of the country.

The Soviet Union lost the opportunity to use industrial enterprises in the western regions for the production of military products. Some of the enterprises were evacuated, and some remained in the occupied territory. This further aggravated the difficulties of the war for the Soviet state.

The retreat of the Soviet troops was forced. The temporary loss of a number of territories of the USSR was an acute pain in the hearts of all Soviet people. The actions of the enemy inflicted great damage on the Soviet state. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that the Soviet troops acted according to a pre-developed plan of "active strategic defense", that the retreat of the Soviet troops in the first period of the war was supposedly calculated to wear down the enemy and then launch a counteroffensive.

The enormous difficulties and setbacks of the initial period of the war did not break the fighting spirit of the Soviet Army. The formations of the Soviet troops, despite the extremely difficult and difficult situation, withdrew with stubborn battles. In dozens of major battles and hundreds of battles, Soviet soldiers fought with unparalleled courage. For a whole month after the German invasion, the heroic struggle of the small garrison of the Brest Fortress with the advancing enemy forces lasted.

The defense of the fortress was led by people of remarkable courage, selflessly devoted to the Soviet Motherland — captain I. N. Zubachev, regimental commissar E. M. Fomin, major P. M. Gavrilov and others. The resistance ended only when not a single defender of the fortress remained in the ranks. On the Bug, the outpost of Lieutenant Monin fought for a whole day against the battalion of the Nazis. Having received information that the Nazis crossed the Prut, occupied a railway bridge and began to make a flooring on it for the passage of tanks, the border guards of the fifth outpost A.K. Konstantinov, V.F. guards and blew up the bridge. The advance of German tanks in this direction was delayed. For this feat A. K. Konstantinov, V. F. Mikhalkov and I. D. Buzytskoz were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. An unforgettable feat was accomplished on June 26, 1941 by Captain N.F. Gastello and the crew of his plane consisting of A.A. Burdenyuk, G.N. When an enemy shell hit the gasoline tank of their plane, Captain N. F, Gastello led the burning car to a column (of enemy tanks and tanks. German tanks and tanks exploded together with the plane of the heroic crew.

Already in the first battles on the fronts of the Patriotic War, many thousands of Soviet soldiers performed unparalleled feats, not sparing their lives to defend the Motherland.

The headquarters of the High Command was established on June 23, 1941. Its composition was somewhat different from the project proposed by the People's Commissariat of Defense. It included: People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, N. G. Kuznetsov. It was also proposed to include the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff NF Vatutin in the General Headquarters. But JV Stalin did not agree.

A group of advisers on various issues was formed at the Headquarters. In practice, the group played a nominal role, since all advisers soon received other appointments, and their replacement did not take place.

Throughout the war, the Headquarters was in Moscow. This was of great moral importance. In connection with the threat of enemy air strikes at the beginning of July, she was transferred from the Kremlin to the Kirov Gate area in a small mansion with a reliable working space and communications, and a month later, the operators of the General Staff - the working body of the Headquarters - were located nearby, on the platform of the Kirovskaya metro station. ...

On June 30, 1941, on the model of the Leninist Council of Workers in the Peasant Defense during the period of foreign military intervention and civil war, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), an extraordinary body was created - the State Defense Committee, headed by J.V. Stalin.

The State Defense Committee became an authoritative body of the country's defense leadership, concentrating all power in its hands. Civil, party, and Soviet organizations were obliged to comply with all of his decrees and orders. To control their execution in the territories and regions, military-industrial people's commissariats, at the main enterprises and lines of the State Defense Committee, he had his representatives.

At the meetings of the State Defense Committee, which took place at any time of the day, as a rule, in the Kremlin or at JV Stalin's dacha, the most important issues were discussed and resolved. Military plans were considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. People's commissars were invited to the meeting, who were to take part in supporting the operations. This made it possible, when an opportunity arose, to concentrate enormous material forces in the most important areas, to pursue a single line in the field of strategic leadership and backing it up with an organized rear, to link the combat activities of troops with the efforts of the entire country.

Very often at the meetings of the State Defense Committee, heated disputes broke out, while opinions were expressed definitely and sharply. If they did not come to a common opinion, a commission and representatives of the extreme parties were immediately created, which was instructed to report the agreed proposals at the next meeting.

In total, during the war, the State Defense Committee adopted about ten thousand decisions and resolutions of a military and economic nature. These decrees and orders were strictly and energetically executed, and work began to boil around them, ensuring the implementation of a single party line in the leadership of the country at that difficult and difficult time.

On July 10, 1941, in order to improve the leadership of the armed forces, by the decision of the State Defense Committee, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and on 8 August it was reorganized into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. From then until the end of the war, I. V. Stalin was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

With the formation of the State Defense Committee and the creation of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, which were headed by the same person - the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the creation of a structure for state and military leadership of the war was completed. The Central Committee of the Party ensured the unity of action of all Party, state, military and economic bodies.

On July 19, 1941, by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, JV Stalin was also appointed People's Commissar of Defense.

It must be said that with the appointment of J.V. Stalin as Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Supreme Commander and People's Commissar of Defense in the General Staff, central directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the USSR State Planning Committee and in other government bodies and the national economy, his firm hand was immediately felt.

Each member of the GKO received a specific assignment and was strictly responsible for the implementation of the plans of the national economy. One of them was responsible for the production of tanks, the other - artillery weapons, the third - aircraft, the fourth - the supply of ammunition, food and uniforms, etc. Stalin personally obliged the commanders of the armed forces to join the members of the State Defense Committee and help them in their work on the implementation of the program for the production of certain military products exactly at the appointed time and of the required quality.

Under the influence of party political work, an increase in the art of command and control, and the accumulated experience of armed struggle, the resistance to the enemy intensified. Warriors of all types and types of weapons acted heroically and selflessly in battles. Military discipline has risen noticeably among the troops.

However, despite the energetic measures taken by the General Headquarters and the front command, the situation on the fronts continued to deteriorate. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our troops retreated into the interior of the country. Under the conditions of the unfavorable development of military events for us, the strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces also took shape. She was distinguished by very active forms and perseverance of the struggle.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the State Defense Committee showed serious concern about the state of the country's air defense, since the Nazi aviation was very active. The enemy had high hopes for the Luftwaffe. He hoped to disrupt mobilization in the western regions of our country by striking a mass of aircraft, disorganize the work of the nearest rear, transport and the state apparatus, and undermine the will of the people to resist. Hitler showered the air robbers and their leader Goering with favors and awards,

Analyzing the current situation and taking into account the unfavorable forecasts regarding the air defense of the main objects of the state, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with his characteristic energy, set about strengthening the combat effectiveness of the air defense. He invited a group of leading air defense workers to his place and strictly demanded, within two days, to submit fundamental considerations for strengthening the air defense forces and means, improving their organizational structure and control. General NN Voronov, chief of the Red Army artillery, generals MS Gromadin, DA Zhuravlev, PF Zhigarev, ND Yakovlev and others provided him with great and useful advice.

The main task of the air defense then was to cover Moscow, Leningrad and other large industrial centers, where tanks, aircraft, artillery weapons were produced, oil was extracted and the most important railway communications, energy and communications facilities were located.

The most powerful grouping of air defense forces and means was created for the defense of Moscow. In July, it already numbered over 600 fighter aircraft prepared for night flights, over 1,000 anti-aircraft guns, 370 anti-aircraft machine guns, up to 1,000 searchlights and a large number of barrage balloons.

This organizational structure of the air defense has fully justified itself. Fascist aviation, undertaking massive actions, suffered huge losses, but still could not break through with large forces to Moscow. In total, many thousands of bombers took part in the raids, but only a few of them (two to three percent) managed to penetrate the city, and even those were forced to drop their deadly cargo anywhere.

Of course, the process of creating the organs of Soviet strategic leadership took some time and underwent a number of fundamental changes dictated by the course of the war and the nature of the military-strategic situation. But gradually Soviet military science, guided by the experience of armed struggle accumulated even before the Great Patriotic War, achieved significant successes in troop command and control.

However, the absence of a supreme body of military leadership in the USSR, which was supposed to be the Headquarters at the time of the attack by Nazi Germany, naturally, could not at first but affect the command and control of the troops, the results of the first operations and the general operational-strategic situation. Moreover, the enemy has already gained considerable experience in Europe in organizing war and surprise invasions by striking forces. It must be admitted that at the beginning of the war, the commanders-in-chief of directions and front command made significant shortcomings in troop command and control. It also negatively affected the results of the armed struggle.

It must also be admitted that a certain share of responsibility for shortcomings in the preparation of the armed forces for the outbreak of hostilities is borne by the People's Commissar of Defense and the responsible employees of the People's Commissariat of Defense. As the former chief of the General Staff and the closest assistant to the People's Commissar, I cannot absolve myself of the guilt for these shortcomings.

Finally, an important role was played by the fact that JV Stalin, until the last moment - the beginning of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union - did not abandon the hope that the war could be delayed. This, to some extent, connected the People's Commissar of Defense, who did not dare to go to I.V. Stalin with the project to create the Headquarters until the spring of 1941.

At the end of spring, GK Zhukov had to once again, in an urgent form, ask the People's Commissar to report to JV Stalin about the need to consider the draft plan for organizing the Headquarters of the High Command developed by the General Staff and allow it to be practically tested at large command and staff exercises. This time, the report took place and JV Stalin agreed to conduct such an exercise, but further from the border, somewhere on the line Valdai-Orsha-Gomel-r. Psel, and then submit to him a draft of the organization of the Headquarters, its functional duties and working bodies.

A reconnaissance of the line for the exercise was carried out in May 1941, but it was not possible to carry out the exercise. Due to lack of time and other circumstances, measures for the practical training of the Headquarters of the High Command and its bodies were not considered.

Above, at Headquarters, it was especially clearly seen that in war, mistakes and mistakes are different: some of them are correctable, others are difficult to correct. It all depends on the nature of the errors and their scale. Tactical mistakes, as experience showed, the higher command could quickly eliminate. Operational miscalculations are immeasurably more difficult to rectify, especially if the command does not have the necessary forces, means, or time to bring these forces into action where and when it is needed.

To correct the operational and strategic mistakes made by the Headquarters and the command of some fronts in the summer of 1942 (which made it possible for Hitler's troops to reach the Stalingrad region and the North Caucasus), extraordinary efforts of the entire country were required.

As you know, strategy is completely dependent on politics, and mistakes of a military-political nature on a national scale are difficult to correct. Only a country that is waging a just war and has the necessary military material capabilities can cope with them. Conversely, when the goals of the war do not meet the vital interests of the people, mistakes of this kind usually lead to catastrophic consequences.

But there are also incorrigible miscalculations. Such a miscalculation was made by the fascist leadership of Hitlerite Germany, risking an attack on the Soviet Union. This miscalculation stemmed from an incredible overestimation of its forces and means and an underestimation of the potential capabilities of the USSR - a country where a socialist system exists, where the armed forces, people, party and government are united.

Intoxicated by previous easy victories, Hitler and his political and military entourage believed that their troops would march victoriously across the Land of the Soviets, just as they did in Western Europe. It turned out the other way around. Guided by the adventurous, nationalist ideology of fascism, the Nazis were unable to correctly understand the decisive outcome of the war, which in preparation for war must be known and resolved without emotion on the basis of the science of society and war.

Having soberly cordoned off the causes of our unsuccessful 1942 operations, the Communist Party. The Soviet government, relying on the indisputable advantages of the socialist social and state system, was able to mobilize all the forces of the country for new efforts to repulse the enemy. Thanks to the selfless support of the people, the Soviet Supreme High Command found the most acceptable methods and forms of struggle in the given situation, ultimately snatched the initiative from the enemy, and then turned the course of the war in its favor.

During the war, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government paid great attention to the leadership of the armed forces. During the war years, more than 200 meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party took place. The decisions made on foreign policy, economics and strategy were carried out, respectively, through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars, the State Defense Committee, or the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The work of the Headquarters was based on the Leninist principles of centralized command and control of troops. The headquarters directed all military actions of the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, and increased strategic efforts in the course of the struggle at the expense of reserves and the use of the forces of the partisan movement. Its working body, as already mentioned, was the General Staff.

As a result of the reorganization, the General Staff became a more efficient, operational body and was able to perform much more efficiently the tasks assigned to it throughout the entire war. Of course, there were some shortcomings after the reorganization, but only in individual cases and on some difficult issues.

To improve front management on July 10, 1941, the State Defense Committee formed three High Commands in the following areas:

North-West (commander-in-chief - Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, member of the Military Council - A. A. Zhdanov, chief of staff - General M. V. Zakharov);

Western (commander-in-chief - Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, member of the Military Council - N. A. Bulganin, chief of staff - General G. K. Malandin);

South-West (commander-in-chief - Marshal S.M.Budyonny, member of the Military Council - N. S. Khrushchev (from August 5, 1941), chief of staff - A.P. Pokrovsky.

By creating the High Commands of the directions, the State Defense Committee hoped to help the Headquarters to ensure the possibility of better command and control of troops, to organize the interaction of the fronts, air and naval forces. It was assumed that the military councils of the directions, to a greater extent than the front commands, would be able to use local forces and means in the interests of armed struggle.

However, the first months of the existence of the High Commands showed that they did not live up to expectations. The headquarters, as before, directly led the fronts. According to the practice that existed at that time, the commander-in-chief of the directions did not have at their disposal reserves of troops and material resources to influence the course of hostilities. They could not carry out any fundamental decisions without the consent of the Supreme High Command and, thus, turned into simple transitional authorities. As a result, in 1942, the High Commands of the directions were eliminated.

The headquarters had to once again lead the actions of a large number of fronts deployed over a vast area. This was inevitably associated with significant difficulties, especially in the field of coordinating the efforts of the troops of several fronts operating side by side. A search began for new methods of management, which ultimately led to the emergence of an effective form of direct influence of strategic leadership on the activities of the fronts. This is how a very peculiar institute of strategic leadership appeared - representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, who were sent to the most important areas.

The role of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the Second World War

From the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party launched a gigantic work on organizing a nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders, on rebuilding the entire life of the string in a warlike manner. The Central Committee of the Communist Party has developed measures to mobilize all the forces of the country to fight the enemy. They were set out in the directive letter of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions of June 29, 1941.The letter emphasized that our country had entered a mortal battle with a dangerous and insidious enemy, German fascism. "In the war imposed on us with fascist Germany, the question of the life and death of the Soviet state is being decided, about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement."

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR pointed out that in order to eliminate the greatest danger hanging over the country, it was necessary to mobilize all the forces of the people, reorganize all work on a war footing, organize all-round assistance to the front, in every possible way increase the production of weapons, ammunition, tanks, aircraft, etc. e. It was necessary to renounce the mood of peacetime and direct all forces to repulse the enemy, to defeat him. The Red Army and the Red Fleet had to fight to the last drop of blood for our cities and villages. The party called on Soviet patriots to deploy partisan warfare behind enemy lines. To lead the struggle of the people in the rear of the enemy, underground, party organizations were created.

In order to quickly mobilize the material, spiritual and human forces of the Soviet state, on June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee was created, in whose hands all power in the state was concentrated. JV Stalin was the chairman of the GKO. As soon as the war began, prominent party and state leaders were sent to military work - N. A. Bulganin, A. A. Zhdanov, N. S. Khrushchev, A. S. Shcherbakov and other members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), many secretaries Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, Territorial and Regional Committees. In addition, tens of thousands of Responsible Party workers went to the front, who played an important role in strengthening discipline and fighting spirit in the army. During the war, important areas of work in the rear and at the front were taken over by members of the Central Committee, as well as by Soviet military leaders, who, with their organizational, political, economic and military work, together with local party and Soviet organizations, ensured the victory of the Soviet people in the war. In total, more than one and a half million communists joined the ranks of the Soviet Army.

With a fiery word and personal example, the Communists instilled courage and courage in the hearts of the soldiers. Komsomol youth fought bravely side by side as communists.

On July 3, 1941, the head of the Soviet government, JV Stalin, spoke on the radio. He emphasized the profoundly just, liberating nature of the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, outlined to the people the program developed by the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars for rebuilding the country's life on a war footing and mobilizing forces to fight the enemy. JV Stalin, recalling the formidable danger hanging over the Soviet country, appealed to the entire Soviet people to show courage and selflessness in defending the Motherland. “Our forces are innumerable,” he said. Together with the Red Army, many thousands of workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are rising up to fight the attacked enemy. "

The Soviet people, driven by a feeling of ardent love for the Motherland, expressed their determination and readiness to defend every inch of their native land, to fight the enemy until it is completely defeated. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers joined the ranks of the army and the militia. 100 thousand people immediately joined the people's militia in Moscow, about 160 thousand people in Leningrad, 32 thousand girls and women of Leningrad voluntarily went to the front as soldiers and nurses. Often whole families joined the people's militia.

During the first five months of the war, 100 thousand communists and 260 thousand Komsomol members went to the front from the Moscow party and Komsomol organizations.

Those who remained in the rear sought through labor affairs to contribute to the defeat of the enemy. Women housewives and students went to work in production. Many retired old workers returned to enterprises at their own request.

Raising the Soviet people to the Patriotic War, the Communist Party put forward battle slogans: “Everything for the front. Everything for the defeat of the enemy! "

In the very first days of the war, the Soviet government identified areas for the evacuation of industrial enterprises and the population; measures were outlined for the distribution of the country's material resources, as well as budgetary allocations to more fully meet the needs of the front and the military industry.

On August 16, 1941, the military-economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 was approved; in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. This plan provided for the widespread deployment of industrial construction in the East, the relocation of enterprises from the front line and putting them into operation in new places, an increase in the production of weapons, ammunition, metal, coal, gasoline, etc. In order to create trained reserves for the Soviet Army and the Navy, the State Defense Committee on July 16, 1941 made a special decision "On the preparation of reserves in the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Navy." In addition, the State Defense Committee introduced, from October 1, 1941, compulsory military training for male citizens aged 16 to 50 years.

All over the country, a general military training of Soviet citizens was launched on a broad front. Communists and Komsomol members were in the forefront of universal education. A large role in the organization of military training of the population was played by the voluntary society of workers - OSOAVIAKHIM.

Headquarters of the Supreme Command (SVGK)

an extraordinary body of the highest military command, which exercised strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. It was created by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on June 23, 1941 and was originally called the Headquarters of the Main Command of the USSR Armed Forces. It consisted of: S. K. Timoshenko (chairman), G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, N. G. Kuznetsov. Subsequently, the name and composition of the SVGK have undergone some changes. On July 10, 1941, in connection with the formation of the High Commands of the directions (North-West, West and South-West), the Headquarters of the High Command was renamed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and on August 8, 1941, into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On July 10, 1941, J.V. Stalin became its chairman, and B.M.Shaposhnikov became a member. On February 17, 1945, by a resolution of the State Defense Committee (See State Defense Committee), the SVGK was determined as follows: I.V. Stalin (chairman), G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov, N.A. Bulganin, N. G. Kuznetsov. At the Headquarters there was an institute of permanent advisers, which at different times were N.F. Vatutin, N.A. Voznesensky, N.N. Voronov, A.A. Zhdanov, P.F.Zhigarev, K.A. I. Mikoyan, B. M. Shaposhnikov and other military, party and state leaders.

The SVGK introduced changes and clarifications to the structure and organization of the Armed Forces, planned campaigns and strategic operations, set tasks for the fronts and fleets and directed their combat activities, coordinated the efforts of the Sov. Of the Armed Forces and armies of the allied states, organized interaction between strategic groupings and operational formations of various branches of the Armed Forces and partisans, distributed between the fronts the reserve units and materiel at its disposal, monitored the progress of the assigned tasks, supervised the study and generalization of war experience. The working bodies of the SVGK were the General Staff, directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy. The most expedient methods of strategic leadership were developed by the SVGK gradually, with the accumulation of combat experience and the growth of military art among the higher echelons of the command and staff. In the course of the war, the existing two-stage control system fully justified itself: SVGK - front (fleet). In certain periods of the war, especially at its beginning, this system was replaced by a three-stage system: intermediate links of strategic leadership were created between the SVGK and the fronts in the form of High Commands of directions, but they did not exist for long (North-West direction from July 10 to August 29, 1941, West direction from 10 July to September 11, 1941 and from February 1 to May 3, 1942, the Southwestern direction from July 10, 1941 to June 21, 1942; North Caucasian directions from April 21 to May 19, 1942) and were abolished as the front stabilized and the leadership of the troops improved from the front commanders. In 1945, at the final stage of the war, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the Far East was established, in charge of actions against militaristic Japan. The commander-in-chief had broad powers to direct the fronts, the fleet and flotilla, and in the specific conditions of military operations in the Far East, the experience of creating a three-level system of strategic leadership was justified.

During the war, the methods of strategic leadership of the SVGK were continuously developed and improved. The most important issues of strategic plans and plans of operations were discussed at its meetings, which in a number of cases were attended by the commanders and members of the military councils of the fronts, the commanders of the branches of the armed forces and combat arms. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief formulated the final decision on the issues under discussion personally. An important role in guiding the combat activities of the fronts and fleets was played by the directives of the SVGK, which usually indicated the goals and objectives of the troops in operations, the main areas where it was required to concentrate the main efforts, the methods of using mobile troops, the necessary density of artillery and tanks in the areas of breakthrough, etc. ... The presence of large reserves at the disposal of SVGK allowed it to actively influence the course of operations. During the war, the institution of representatives of the SVGK became widespread. Knowing the designs and plans of the SVGK and having the authority to resolve operational and tactical issues, they provided great assistance to the commanders of the operational formations in the preparation and conduct of operations, coordinated the actions of the fronts, coordinated their efforts in terms of purpose, place and time. Representatives of the SVGK on the fronts at different times were: Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, S.K. Timoshenko, K.E. Voroshilov, Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov, Generals A.I. Antonov, S.M. Shtemenko and others.

I. G. Pavlenko.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia. - M .: Soviet encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .

See what the "Headquarters of the Supreme Command" is in other dictionaries:

Headquarters VGK, SVGK Emblem of the Armed Forces Years of existence June 23, 1941 August 3, 1945 Country ... Wikipedia

- (SVGK) was created on 23/06/1941 as the supreme body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War; originally it was called the Headquarters of the High Command (chaired by S.K. Timoshenko), from 10/07/1941 ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

- (SVGK), the supreme body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Created on 23.6.1941, originally called the Headquarters of the High Command (chaired by S.K. Timoshenko), from 10.7.1941 Headquarters ... ... Russian history

SVGK was created on 23 June 1941 as the supreme body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War; it was originally called the Headquarters of the High Command (chaired by S.K. Timoshenko), from 10/07/1941 Headquarters ... ... Political science. Dictionary.

- (SVGK) in 1941, the 45th organ of the highest. military management, carried out in the years led. Fatherland. war 1941 45 strategic. the leadership of the Sov. Armed. Forces. A post was created. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 23, 1941 and was originally called the Headquarters of the Chief ... ... Soviet Historical Encyclopedia

Headquarters of the Supreme Command- STATION OF THE SUPREME MAIN COMMUNITY, higher. body is strategic. leadership Arms. The forces of the USSR in the war. Post formed. Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 23, 1941. Was in Moscow and the first. was called the Headquarters. Command. Composition: S. K. ... ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: an encyclopedia

- (SVGK), the supreme body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Created on June 23, 1941. Initially it was called the Headquarters of the High Command (chaired by S. K. Timoshenko), from July 10, 1941 ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

- ... Wikipedia

THE RATE OF THE SUPREME CHIEF COMMAND (SVGK), created on 23 June 1941 as the supreme body of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War; originally called the Headquarters of the High Command (under ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

Books

Visit. Hot winter of 1941/42. Collection of memoirs of veterans of the 54th army, I. A. Ivanov. December 1941. Leningrad is still under siege. The first two attempts in September and October to break the blockade by the forces of the Lening Front from the Nevsky "patch" to join the Sinyavin group did not ...

Headquarters of the Supreme Command(SVGK), an emergency body of the highest military command, exercising strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. It was created by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on June 23, 1941 and was originally called the Headquarters of the Main Command of the USSR Armed Forces. It consisted of: S. K. Timoshenko (chairman), G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Budyonny, N. G. Kuznetsov. Subsequently, the name and composition of the SVGK have undergone some changes. On July 10, 1941, in connection with the formation of the High Commands of the directions (North-West, West and South-West), the Headquarters of the High Command was renamed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, and on August 8, 1941, into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On July 10, 1941, J.V. Stalin became its chairman, and B.M.Shaposhnikov became a member. February 17, 1945 by decree State Defense Committee SVGK was determined to include: I. V. Stalin (chairman), G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov, N. A. Bulganin, N. G. Kuznetsov. At the Headquarters there was an institute of permanent advisers, which at various times were N.F. Vatutin, N.A. Voznesensky, N.N. Voronov, A.A. Zhdanov, P.F. Zhigarev, K.A. I. Mikoyan, B. M. Shaposhnikov and other military, party and state leaders.

The SVGK introduced changes and clarifications to the structure and organization of the Armed Forces, planned campaigns and strategic operations, set tasks for the fronts and fleets and directed their combat activities, coordinated the efforts of the Sov. Of the Armed Forces and armies of the allied states, organized interaction between strategic groupings and operational formations of various branches of the Armed Forces and partisans, distributed the reserve units and materiel at its disposal between the fronts, monitored the progress of the assigned tasks, supervised the study and generalization of war experience. The working bodies of the SVGK were the General Staff, directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy. The most expedient methods of strategic leadership SVGK developed gradually, as the accumulation of combat experience and the growth of military art among the highest levels of command and staffs. In the course of the war, the existing two-stage control system fully justified itself: SVGK - front (fleet). In certain periods of the war, especially at its beginning, this system was replaced by a three-degree system: intermediate links of strategic leadership were created between the SVGK and the fronts in the form of High Commands of directions, but they did not exist for long (North-West direction from July 10 to August 29, 1941, West direction from 10 July to September 11, 1941 and from February 1 to May 3, 1942, the Southwestern direction from July 10, 1941 to June 21, 1942; North Caucasian directions from April 21 to May 19, 1942) and were abolished as the front stabilized and the leadership of the troops improved from the front commanders. In 1945, at the final stage of the war, the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the Far East was established, in charge of actions against militaristic Japan. The commander-in-chief had broad powers to direct the fronts, the fleet and flotilla, and in the specific conditions of military operations in the Far East, the experience of creating a three-stage system of strategic leadership was justified.

I. G. Pavlenko.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia M .: "Soviet Encyclopedia", 1969-1978

SUPREME COMMAND RATE, the supreme body of strategic leadership USSR Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

Formed by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated 23 June 1941. Initially it was called the Headquarters of the High Command, which included: People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Sov. Union S.K. Tymoshenko (chairman), chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, general. army G.K. Zhukov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, his first deputy V.M. Molotov, Marshals of the Sov. Union K.E. Voroshilov and S.M. Budyonny, People's Commissar of the USSR Navy Adm. N.G. Kuznetsov. The same decree established the institute of permanent advisers to the Headquarters, consisting of marshals G.I. Kulik and B.M. Shaposhnikov, gen. army K.A. Meretskov, Chief of the Air Force Kr. army P.F. Zhigareva, deputy. Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin, head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Defense N.N. Voronova, A.I. Mikoyan, L.M. Kaganovich, L.P. Beria, N.A. Voznesensky, A.A. Zhdanova, G.M. Malenkov and L.Z. Mehlis.

On 7/10/1941, by a GKO decree, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, which was headed by the chairman of the GKO Stalin (Timoshenko, Molotov, Zhukov and Budyonny remained in the composition, Shaposhnikov was additionally introduced).

With the appointment of Stalin as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on 8/8/1941, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme Command.

During the war, the composition of the Headquarters changed. The last time it was reorganized on 02/17/1945 by a decree of the State Defense Committee. Then it included: the Supreme Commander and the People's Commissar of Defense Stalin, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Marshals of the Sov. Union Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky and gene. army N.A. Bulganin, Chief of the General Staff, General army A.I. Antonov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Adm. fleet Kuznetsov. Stalin and Zhukov remained permanent members of the Supreme Command Headquarters throughout its activities.

The headquarters of the Supreme Command gave a principled assessment of the military-political and strategic situation prevailing at the fronts; made strategic and operational-strategic decisions on the conduct of military campaigns and operations; the creation of strategic groupings in accordance with the plans of military operations; resolved issues of interaction between groups of fronts, fronts, fleets and individual armies. Her competence also included the creation and preparation of strategic reserves, placement of personnel, material and technical support of troops, and many others.

The preparation of recommendations and proposals for the strategic leadership of the troops and forces of the fleet, which were considered and approved by the Headquarters, was in charge of General Staff of the Red Army, which closely interacted with the directorates of the NCO and the Main Naval Headquarters on the basis of the Regulations on the General Staff, approved by the GKO decree of 07/28/1941.

As a rule, decisions on campaigns and strategic operations were made after discussion at Headquarters, with the invitation of the respective front commanders, as well as large state leaders. leaders and members of the Politburo.

The headquarters, especially at the initial and final stages of the war, exercised direct command over the fronts, fleets and long-range aviation. In order to bring the strategic leadership closer to the troops of the operating fronts, with the beginning of the war, the main commands of the troops of the directions (Western, North-West, South-West and North-Caucasian) were created. However, this intermediate link of management did not fully justify itself and was subsequently abolished.

In the spring of 1942, the institute of strategic management appeared - representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, who were endowed with broad powers and were usually sent to where the main tasks at the moment were being solved. At the end of 1942 Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Voronov were appointed representatives of the Headquarters at Stalingrad. For the longest time Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Timoshenko performed the duties of representatives of the Headquarters. From time to time Budyonny, Voroshilov, S.M. Shtemenko, Kuznetsov, Voronov, A.A. Novikov, Malenkov, Mekhlis. Representatives of the Headquarters were also K.K. Rokossovsky, L.A. Govorov, G.A. Vorozheikin, A.E. Golovanov, I.T. Peresypkin, Ya.N. Fedorenko and others.

Speaking about the work style of the Headquarters, A.M. Vasilevsky recalled: “It is impossible to understand the headquarters as a body that constantly sat in the literal sense of the word under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the composition in which he was approved. After all, most of its members performed simultaneously responsible duties, often being far outside Moscow, mainly at the front ... But here's what happened all the time: each of the members of the Stavka kept in touch with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. "

Since May 1945, the activities of the Supreme Command Headquarters focused on the preparation of military operations against Japan. For direct leadership of the Armed Forces grouping in the Soviet-Japanese. war by the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on 07/30/1945, the High Command of the Sov. troops in the Far East, led by Vasilevsky. The headquarters ceased operations in October. 1945. Thanks to her, the national military art was enriched with valuable experience in the creation and operation of an effective system of strategic leadership, which directly influences the course and outcome of the war.

Research Institute (Military History) VAGSh RF Armed Forces

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, an extraordinary body of higher military administration was established - the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR. It was headed by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko. The Headquarters included members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny, People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral NG Kuznetsov and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army GK Zhukov.

By the same decree, the Institute of Permanent Advisers was established at the Headquarters, which included Marshals of the Soviet Union B.M.Shaposhnikov and G.I. Kulik, Generals K.A. Meretskov, P.F.Zhigarev, N.F. Vatutin, N. N. Voronov, as well as A. I. Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, L. P. Beria, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, L. Z. Mekhlis.

Throughout the war, the Headquarters was in Moscow, but with the start of the bombing it was transferred from the Kremlin to a small mansion in the Kirov Gate area. A month later, an underground center for strategic command and control of the armed forces was prepared on the platform of the Kirovskaya metro station. The offices of I. V. Stalin and B. M. Shaposhnikov were equipped there, as well as the operational group of the General Staff and directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

On July 10, 1941, in order to ensure a centralized and more efficient control of the armed struggle, by the decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 10, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command. It was headed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee (GKO) I. V. Stalin. By the same decree, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M.Shaposhnikov was introduced to the Headquarters.

On August 8, 1941, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Since that time, the Headquarters became known as the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (SVGK).

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of February 17, 1945, the composition of the Supreme Command Headquarters was last changed and determined as follows: Marshals of the Soviet Union I.V. Stalin (chairman - Supreme Commander-in-Chief), G.K. Zhukov (Deputy People's Commissar Defense) and A.M. Vasilevsky (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense), Generals of the Army N.A.Bulganin (member of the State Defense Committee and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense) and A.I. Soviet Navy).

The activities of the Supreme Command Headquarters were large-scale and multifaceted. The headquarters made changes and clarifications to the structure and organization of the Armed Forces; carried out planning of campaigns and strategic operations; set tasks for the fronts and fleets and directed their combat activities; organized interaction between strategic groupings and operational formations of various branches of the Armed Forces and partisans; distributed between the fronts the reserve formations and materiel at its disposal; monitored the progress of the assigned tasks; supervised the study and generalization of the experience of the war.

The main working body of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief personally was the General Staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, which closely interacted with the directorates of the People's Defense Commissariats and the Navy.

Lit .: Danilov V.D. Headquarters of the Supreme Command: Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, 1941-1945. M., 1991; Pavlenko I.D., Headquarters of the Supreme Command // Great Soviet Encyclopedia. T. 24. Book. 1. M., 1976; Headquarters of the Supreme High Command // Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. M., 2002.T. 1. Ch. eleven; The same [Electronic resource]. Url : http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukov1/11.html .

See also in the Presidential Library:

Memory of the Great Victory: collection.