Heavy artillery of the First World War. Artillery in the First World War. mm anti-aircraft gun
6. RUSSIAN ARTILLERY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THE CRISIS THAT DECIDED THE WAR (CRISIS #4)
"Our first failures in East Prussia - the catastrophe of the army of General Samsonov and the defeat suffered by General Rennenkampf - were entirely due to the overwhelming advantage of the Germans in the number of batteries" - with these words, General Golovin begins his analysis of the state of Russian artillery during the First World War. And this, unfortunately, is not an exaggeration. If we analyze the balance of forces in the battles in which the Russian army had to take part in 1914, then this state of affairs becomes quite obvious. Moreover, which is typical, with equality in artillery, the outcome of the battle, as a rule, was a draw (with rare exceptions). But whoever had an advantage in artillery (several times) and infantry (but this is not necessary), he won the battle. For example, consider several such battles in 1914.
1. The battle at Gumbinen (August 7-20) on the front of the Russian 28th Infantry Division: Russians ( 12 infantry battalions and 6 batteries), Germans ( 25 infantry battalions and 28 batteries
2. Battle at Bischofsburg ( August 13-26). Russians ( 14 infantry battalions and 8 batteries), Germans ( 40 infantry battalions and 40 batteries). The result is a decisive and swift German success.
3. Battle of Hohenstein - Soldau(August 13/26-15/28) in the area between vil. Muhlen and s. Uzdau. Russians ( 15.5 infantry battalions and 8 batteries), Germans ( 24 infantry battalions and 28 batteries). The result is a decisive and swift German success.
4. Battle of Hohenstein - Soldau(August 13/26-15/28). Uzdau region. Russians ( 24 infantry battalions and 11 batteries), Germans ( 29-35 infantry battalions and 40 batteries
5. Battle of Hohenstein - Soldau(August 13/26-15/28). Soldau area. Russians ( 20 infantry battalions and 6 batteries), Germans ( 20 infantry battalions and 39 batteries). The result is a decisive and swift German success.
The last example is especially significant. At the same time, I would like to note that the Russian artillery (in these battles) did not have heavy artillery at all, and the Germans had 25% of all artillery of just such artillery.
Looking ahead, I want to note that during the entire war by number of guns the Russian army was inferior to the Austro-Hungarians by 1.35 times (its main enemy!), And the Germans in general by 5.47 times! But that's not all! In terms of heavy guns, by the beginning of the war, Russia was 2.1 times inferior to the Austro-Hungarians, and 8.65 times to the Germans (!).
What this led to, the commander of the 29th Corps, General D.P. Zuev, wrote in the summer of 1915 to the Minister of War, General A.A. Polivanov:
“The Germans plow the battlefields with a hail of metal and level all sorts of trenches and structures with the ground, often flooding their defenders with earth. They waste metal, we waste human life. They go forward, inspired by success and therefore dare; we, at the cost of heavy losses and shed blood, only fight back and retreat ”(Golovin also cites this quote in his book)
About the reasons for such a depressing state of affairs with artillery, General Golovin writes: “Our Headquarters was made up of officers of the General Staff who still believed in the outdated Suvorov formula:“ A bullet is a fool, a bayonet is well done.
………………….
... the leaders of the Stavka did not want to understand the weakness of the Russian army in artillery. This stubbornness was, unfortunately, the result of one negative trait characteristic of the Russian military leaders: disbelief in technology. Figures like Sukhomlinov played a kind of demagogic game on this negative property, which was loved by everyone in whom the routine of thought, ignorance and simply laziness were strong.
That is why, in our highest General Staff, the realization of a shortage in artillery required a very long time. It was necessary to remove the Chief of Staff, General Yanushkevich and the Quartermaster General, General Danilov, from the Headquarters, and the removal of General Sukhomlinov from the post of Minister of War, so that at last a correct understanding of the supply of our army with artillery was born in our military leaders. But even after the change of these persons, a year passed until all the demands in this matter finally took shape. Only by the beginning of 1917, by the time of the meeting in Petrograd of the Inter-Allied Conference, the needs of the Russian army for artillery were finally formalized and brought into the system. Thus, for this clarification, it took almost 2.5 years of difficult events on the front of the war.
And what, before 1917, could the industry of the Russian Empire do to provide the army with artillery? Yes, in general, a lot when compared with pre-war production, but extremely small when compared with the actual needs of the army during the war years. I gave figures for comparison with the artillery of the Austro-Hungarians and Germans. Now let us dwell in more detail on the number of guns produced by Russian industry, and the number of guns purchased by the tsarist government abroad.
And I'll start with the needs of the Russian army in light 3-inch guns. Initially, according to the mobilization plan the productivity of artillery factories was planned to be only 75 guns of this caliber per month (which is 900 per year) . Their production (per year), indeed, grew at an accelerated pace (until 1917). Compare for yourself:
1914
. - 285
guns;
1915
. - 1654
guns;
1916
. - 7238
guns;
1917
. - 3538 guns.
In addition to this number of domestic guns, an additional 586 guns of this caliber were purchased from foreign factories. In this way, TOTAL during the years of the First World War, the Russian army received 13,301 3-inch caliber guns.
Is it a lot or a little? - you ask. The answer is simple - everything is determined by the needs of the army for each year of the war. What was this need? - again you ask. This question, as noted earlier, in the Russian army was able to get an answer only by 1917! Here are the numbers:
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 3-inch guns - 14620 units.
2. Actually received - 3538 units.
3. Shortage - 11082 units.
So, despite the truly titanic efforts of Russian industry, by 1917 the need of the Russian army for 3-inch guns was satisfied only by 24.2%!
Let's move on to the needs of the Russian army in light howitzers (4-5 inch caliber). Initially,according to mobilization assumptions, the productivity of gun factories was calculated at 6 howitzers per month (which is 72 per year).
Their production (per year):
1914
. - 70
howitzers;
1915
. - 361
howitzer;
1916
. - 818
howitzers;
1917
. - 445 howitzers.
In addition to this number of domestic light howitzers, an additional 400 such howitzers were purchased from foreign factories. In this way, TOTAL during the years of the First World War, the Russian army received 2094 light howitzers.
About the needs of the Russian army in these howitzers by 1917
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in light howitzers - 2300 units.
2. Received in reality - 445 units.
3. Shortage - 1855 units.
So, despite the truly titanic efforts of the Russian industry, by 1917 the need of the Russian army for light howitzers was satisfied only by 19.3%!
The situation was difficult for the Russian army in terms of its provision with heavy field artillery (4-inch long-range guns (4.2) and 6-inch howitzers). According to mobilization assumptions, the productivity of domestic enterprises in this category of artillery should have been equal to only 2 guns per month (!) (which is 24 per year). The possibilities of domestic industry here were generally extremely limited and could not even hypothetically satisfy the needs of the army in this type of artillery. The main role here was played by purchases made at foreign factories.
The statistics for 4-inch long-range guns of domestic production are as follows:
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 0
guns;
1916
. - 69
guns;
1917
. - 155
guns.
TOTAL: 224 guns.
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 12
guns;
1916
. - 206
guns;
1917
. - 181
a gun.
TOTAL: 399 guns.
The statistics are more than revealing! The main role here was played by foreign deliveries (64%). The domestic share of the production of these tools is about 36%.
The statistics for 6-inch howitzers of domestic production are as follows:
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 28
guns;
1916
. - 83
guns;
1917
. - 120
guns.
TOTAL: 231 guns.
At the same time, the same guns were purchased abroad:
1914
. - 0
guns;
1915
. - 0
guns;
1916
. - 8
guns;
1917
. - 104
guns.
TOTAL: 112 guns.
The share of foreign deliveries is 32%.
The total amount of all field heavy artillery guns received by the troops was 966 units. Of these, about 53% of the guns were purchased abroad.
On the needs of the Russian army in field heavy artillery by 1917in Petrograd at the Inter-Union Conference the following data were given:
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 4-inch guns - 384 units.
2. Actually received - 336 units.
3. Shortage - 48 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 4-inch guns was satisfied by 87.5%. At the same time, keep in mind that foreign deliveries of these guns accounted for 64%!
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 6-inch howitzers - 516 units.
2. Actually received - 224 units.
3. Shortage - 292 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 6-inch howitzers was satisfied by 43.4%. At the same time, keep in mind that foreign deliveries of these guns amounted to 32% .
We now turn to the consideration of the situation with the provision of the Russian army with heavy siege-type artillery (from 6 to 12 inches).
On this occasion, General Golovin writes: “... our mobilization assumptions did not at all foresee the needs of the army for special-purpose heavy artillery, all these requirements for large-caliber guns, while the requirements were extremely belated, turned out to be completely unexpected for our factories.”
That is why the main role in providing the Russian army was played by the purchase of this type of artillery from foreign factories.
The statistics (from 1914 to 1917) are as follows:
1. 5 and 6 inch long-range guns. Russian factories produced 102 such guns, 272 such guns were purchased from foreign factories!
6-inch long-range guns - 812 units.
2. Received in reality - 116 units.
3. Shortage - 696 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 6-inch long-range guns was satisfied by 14.3%. At the same time, 72.4% here are foreign purchases.
2. 8-inch howitzers. Russian factories did not produce a single such howitzer; 85 such guns were purchased from foreign factories!
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 8-inch howitzers - 211 units.
2. Received in reality - 51 units.
3. Shortage - 160 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 8-inch howitzers was satisfied by 24.2% and only through foreign purchases!
3. 9-inch howitzers. Russian factories did not produce a single such howitzer; 4 such guns were purchased from foreign factories.
4. 9 and 10 inch long-range guns. Russian factories did not produce a single such gun; 10 such guns were purchased from foreign factories (1915).
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 9-inch guns - 168 units.
2. Received in reality - 0 units.
3. Shortage - 168 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for 9-inch long-range guns was not satisfied at all!
5. 11-inch howitzers. Russian factories did not produce a single such howitzer; 26 such guns were purchased from foreign factories.
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 11-inch howitzers - 156 units.
2. Actually received - 6 units.
3. Shortage - 150 units.
So, by 1917, the need for the Russian army in 11-inch howitzers was satisfied by 3.8% and only through foreign purchases! Fantastic result!
6. 12-inch howitzers. Russian factories produced 45 howitzers, 9 such guns were purchased from foreign factories.
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in 12-inch howitzers - 67 units.
2. Actually received - 12 units.
3. Shortage - 55 units.
So, by 1917, the need for the Russian army in 12-inch howitzers was satisfied by 17.9%!
At the end of the consideration of the issue of artillery support for the Russian army during the First World War, it remains only to consider the issue of bomb throwers and mortars in the Russian army. This new (for that time) weapon was of great importance when the time came for a long trench warfare and the front line stabilized.
1. Requirements of the Headquarters for 1917 in mortars and bombers - 13900 units.
2. Actually received - 1997 units.
3. Shortage - 11903 units.
So, by 1917, the need of the Russian army for bombers and mortars was satisfied by 14.3% .
Summing up all the needs of the Russian army in artillery weapons by the beginning of 1917, i.e. by the time the Headquarters finally realized this need and brought it into a systematic form, one can draw an unambiguous conclusion, “... that the question was not so much about increasing the number of combat units of the army, but mainly about re-equipping the army, which went to war with insufficient artillery weapons "(quote by General Golovin).
And now I want you to clearly see how such a blatant provision of artillery to the Russian army was reflected in the ratios in the artillery of the opponents on the fronts by October 1, 1917.
1. Northern front. The length is 265 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.7, the enemy had 1.4; heavy guns: we have 1.1, the enemy has 2.4 (!)
2. Western front. The length is 415 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.4, the enemy had 0.6; heavy guns: we have 0.5, the enemy has 1.5 (!)
3. Southwestern front. The length is 480 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.5, the enemy had 1.2; heavy guns: we have 0.4, the enemy has 0.7.
4. Romanian front. The length is 600 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.9, the enemy had 0.8; heavy guns: we have 0.5, the enemy has 1.1.
5. Caucasian front. The length is 1000 versts.There were howitzers per one verst of the front: we had 0.07, the enemy had 0.04; heavy guns: we have 0.1, the enemy has 0.1.
From these data, we see that in October 1917, the Russian army, in terms of supplying it with heavy and heavy field artillery, was sufficiently equipped only on the Caucasian front, i.e. to fight the Turks.
For the rest of the fronts, General Golovin draws the following conclusion:
“Compared to the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, we were twice as weak. At the same time, the superiority of the enemy on the Northern and Western fronts, where we were opposed exclusively by German troops, was especially clearly noticeable. It is not without interest to note how richer the Romanian army was equipped with howitzer artillery than the Russian one.
And another quote from him:
“... The Russian army received in 1917 only some of the artillery weapons that were needed in order to reach at least the level of 1914 requirements. But since in 1917 the level of the requirements of life increased significantly, then, in comparison with its enemies and its allies, the Russian army turned out to be worse armed by the autumn of 1917 than in 1914 ».
That's it! Who else is ready to prove that the Russian army should have continued the First World War? Only one who does not know the deplorable state of her army in 1917, and her artillery support in particular. And this is a fact.
(To be continued...)
15" gun Mk. I
Classification
Production history
Operation history
Weapon characteristics
Projectile characteristics
381 mm gun Mk I- British 15-inch naval gun, developed in 1912. The Mk.I was the most common and arguably the most effective large caliber gun in the British Navy. It was installed on ships serving from 1915 to 1959 and was the main gun of the Royal Navy during both World Wars.
HMS Warspite shelling the coast of Sicily, 1943
general information
The battle path of 15 "guns began in 1915 during the Dardanelles operation, in which the newly built battleship Queen Elizabeth took part. Then there was the Battle of Jutland, a record hit by the Worspite on the Giulio Cesare from a distance of 24 kilometers in the battle near Calabria , the sinking of three Italian cruisers at Cape Matapan and many other battles.The last shot at the enemy was fired 30 years later, in 1945, when the same Queen Elizabeth fired at Japanese fortifications in the Andaman Islands.
Tool design and production
The design of the gun was developed on the basis of the successful 13.5 "/45 gun (created to arm Orion-type superdreadnoughts). The "dreadnought race" that went before the First World War increased the requirements for the performance characteristics of ships very quickly and the developers of the 15 "gun went for a very risky step, reducing the test program to a minimum before launching into production. The risk was justified: the battleships of the Queen Elizabeth type were in time for the Battle of Jutland, and their immediate opponents, the German battleships of the Baden type, were "late".
The barrel of the gun had a "wire" design, traditional for British guns of the early 20th century: a layer of steel wire was wound between the inner (tube A) and outer (tube B) gun-carrying tubes to increase the tensile strength of the barrel. The gun was equipped with a piston-type breechblock. The barrel length of the gun was 630 inches (16 meters - 42 calibers), the length of the rifled part of the barrel: 516 inches (13.1 m). The barrel resource was approximately 335 shots with an armor-piercing projectile when fully charged. The gun was lined, the inner part of tube A was replaced in the factory for a worn gun. An interesting fact is that a gun was considered completely "shot" if its caliber increased by 0.74 inches (1.9 cm) at the beginning of barrel cutting.
Between 1912 and 1918, 186 15-inch barrels were produced. Production was carried out at several factories at once:
- Elswick Ordnance Company, Elswick, Newcastle: 34;
- Armstrong Whitworth, Openshaw, Manchester: 12;
- William Beardmore & Company, Parkhead, Glasgow: 37;
- Coventry Ordnance Works, Coventry: 19;
- Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich: 33;
- Vickers, Son and Maxim , Sheffield: 49 units
When repairing ships, worn barrels were removed and immediately replaced with new ones stored in arsenals. And the removed guns were sent for repair and then for storage. Therefore, the gun barrel for half a century of service, as a rule, ended up on several ships. For example: as you know, the towers of the last British battleship HMS vanguard were taken from the battlecruisers HMS Courageous and HMS converted into aircraft carriers Glorious, but of the eight main caliber guns, only one began its service on these ships, and then its "previous duty station" was HMS Warspite .
List of ships
The guns were used on several types of British warships up to HMS vanguard, the last British battleship built.
Ships armed with 15" Mark I guns:
- Queen Elizabeth class ships of the line
- Rivenge-class battleships - 5 ships with eight guns each
- Rinaun-class battlecruisers - 2 ships with six guns each
- Battlecruiser HMS Hood- 8 guns
- Glories-class battlecruisers - 2 ships with four guns each
- Erebus type monitors
- Monitors like "Marshal Ney" - 2 ships with two guns each
- Roberts-type monitors - 2 ships with two guns each
- HMS ship of the line vanguard- 8 guns (in turrets intended for battlecruisers Coreyjes and Glories)
The gun was also used in coastal defense.
shells
What, in fact, can be seen from the following tables? The range of shells for the guns was quite wide. At the same time, the mass of projectiles for various purposes was approximately the same, to simplify the operation of aiming systems. If during the First World War the shells were often modified, because they suffered from "childhood diseases" (see the replacement of explosives in armor-piercing shells) on the one hand and were created "for the task" (long high-explosive shells for monitors, shrapnel shells to fight torpedo boats) on the other hand, the fleet approached the Second War with ammunition of an established design, with which it went through the entire war.
Shells of the First World War
| projectile type | Designation | Projectile length 1) | Weight | Explosive | starting speed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| armor-piercing | APC Mark II | 138.4 cm (4klb) | 871 kg | 27.4 kg (liddit 2)) | 752 m/s |
| armor-piercing | APC Mark IIIa | 142.0 cm (4klb) | 866.4 kg | 20.5 kg (shellite) | 752 m/s |
| [Semi-armor-piercing] | CPC | 160.8 cm (4klb) | 871 kg | 58.6 kg (black powder, later TNT) | - |
| high explosive | HE | 162.3 cm (4klb) | 871 kg | 98.2 kg (liddite) | - |
| High explosive 3) | HE | - (8klb) | 891 kg | 101.2 kg (liddite) | - |
| Shrapnel | Shrapnel | 162.3 cm (4klb) | 871 kg | 13,700 50g lead bullets | - |
Shells of the interwar period and the period of the Second World War
Device armor-piercing projectile APC Mk.XXIIb
Notes.
- What does "N klb" mean? The British gunners tried to increase the range of the projectile by sharpening its head and thereby improving the flow around it. The parameter "N klb" is the radius of curvature of the head of the projectile in calibers.
- The battle of Jutland revealed that English armor-piercing shells do not penetrate armor, as their equipment, lyddite, is prone to breaking "on the armor" from a strong blow. A new explosive, "shellite", was developed, but shells with it appeared in the cellars only by 1918.
- "Long" 8-caliber high-explosive shells were used only on monitors; on battleships, their dimensions did not match the feeding mechanisms.
- Extended 6-caliber shells were developed in 1938 and could initially only be used on battleships that were modernized in the mid-1930s ( Warspite, Renown, Valiant and queen elizabeth). By the middle of the war (1943) feed mechanisms had been adapted to use these shells on all surviving ships with 15" guns.
- From the previous note, in particular, it follows that HMS Hood never had elongated shells in the ammunition load.
Ammunition
About 100 shells per barrel were placed in the cellars of battleships. Battlecruisers of the Koreydzhes type were designed with 80 shells per barrel, but after the battle at the Falklands it turned out that the consumption of shells was much higher than planned and the capacity of the cellars of the "white elephants" was increased to 120 shells.
The ammunition load of the ships varied greatly depending on the current combat mission. Battleships entered service with only armor-piercing shells. By the end of the First World War, for example, "Rinaun" carried 72 APCs, 24 CPCs (for "insurance" APCs that did not penetrate armor) and 24 HEs (for shooting along the coast). During the Second World War, the "standard" ammunition load consisted mainly of armor-piercing shells (in the cellars there were 5 high-explosive shells per barrel), for the tasks of shelling the coast, armor-piercing shells were unloaded and received high-explosives. According to the project, the Vanguard carried 95 armor-piercing, 5 high-explosives and 9 practical shells, but after the battleship was in the role of the "royal yacht" in 1947, it passed most of its further service with empty cellars.
The ammunition load of monitors in the First World War consisted mainly of high-explosive shells and "several" semi-armor-piercing ones. In World War II, they carried 25% of armor-piercing and 75% of land mines.
Charges
The standard charge was (approximately) 200 kg of cordite. Each charge consisted of four "quarter-charges" of equal mass, and it was allowed to fire a reduced (3/4) charge to increase the steepness of the trajectory or simply to reduce gun wear.
Between the wars, a "reinforced" 222 kg charge was developed to increase the firing range of the guns. This charge, as expected, sharply increased barrel wear and was used only on ships that did not have increased gun elevation angles.
Armor penetration table
The frontal sheet of the turret of the battleship "Baden", pierced by a 15 "shell during a test shelling, 1921
There are many variants of armor penetration tables according to different data and for different projectiles. This table was compiled by the British Admiralty in 1935 according to calculated data, without full-scale tests. The figures are given for the vertical side (and obviously the deck)
| Distance | armor belt | deck armor |
|---|---|---|
| 0 m | 18.0" (457mm) | - |
| 15 730 m | 14.0" (356mm) | - |
| 16 460 m | - | 2.0" (51mm) |
| 17,740 m | 13.0" (330mm) | - |
| 19 840 m | 12.0" (305mm) | - |
| 21,950 m | - | 3.0" (76mm) |
| 22,400 m | 11.0" (279mm) | - |
| 25,600 m | 10.0" (254mm) | - |
| 26,970 m | - | 5.0" (127mm) |
| 29,720 m 1) | - | 6.0" (152mm) |
1) This distance is outside the range of the guns mounted on the ships.
Tower installations
Making a tower for the HMS monitor Abercrombie
Note. 1) It is indicated that on the battleship HMS Ramillies(1916) two of the four towers were of the Mk.I * type, and on the battlecruiser HMS Renown(1916) two of the three turrets were Mk.I. The Mk.I turrets originally ordered for the Ramillis were installed on HMS monitors that were being urgently built. Marshall Ney(1915) and HMS Marshall Soult(1915). The reasons for the appearance of Mk.I towers on the Rinaun are still unclear.
Differences in plant types
Mark I* different from Mark I the presence in the reloading compartment of the so-called. "Kenyon doors" - a rotating partition that separated the under-tower space from the cellars and prevented the fire from breaking through down in case of a fire in the tower.
Installation Mark II for the cruiser "Hood" was significantly redesigned. The main external difference is the increased height of the tower, which made it possible to increase the elevation angles of the guns.
Indices Mark I/N and Mark I*/N received towers that were modernized during the overhaul of four ships in the mid-1930s. The guns received increased elevation angles due to the expansion of gun ports and changes in lifting mechanisms. The embrasures of the sights were also moved from the roof to the front sheet, and thus the problem with firing one turret over the other was solved (see "horizontal aiming angles" below).
Tower Mark I/N RP 12 was created on the basis of the Mark I * turret and absorbed all the experience of finalizing the turrets of 15 "guns over a third of a century. Enlarged gun embrasures received armor caps on top, a remote control system for turning the turrets was introduced, etc. (see the description of the HMS ship vanguard).
Monitor towers are beyond the scope of this article.
Tactical and technical characteristics
Model of the gun turret of the battleship Queen Elizabeth
- elevation/declination angles: see table above;
- elevation speed: 5 degrees / sec;
- traverse angles: -150 / +150 degrees 1) ;
- horizontal aiming speed: 2 degrees / sec;
- loading angles: from -5 to +20 degrees 2) ;
- rate of fire: 2 rounds per minute 3) .
Notes.
- On the Mk.I turrets, the embrasures of the sights were placed very poorly, in front of the turret roof. Therefore, on ships that had a linearly elevated arrangement of towers (that is, on almost all ships), the upper towers could not fire on top of the lower ones, in a sector from -30 to +30 degrees from the diametrical plane. This shortcoming was eliminated only on the Mark I / N, Mark I * / N, Mark II and Mark I / N RP 12 installations - that is, on only six ships from all that used 15 "guns.
- Formally, the mechanisms made it possible to load the gun up to an elevation angle of +20 degrees. In practice, due to the insufficient power of the hydraulic drive of the rammer, there was a risk of "not biting" the leading belt of the projectile at the beginning of the rifling and ... falling back. Therefore, they preferred to lower the barrels for loading to an angle of +5 degrees.
- The rate of fire "2 rounds per minute" was achieved once on one ship. The standard for the fleet was one shot in 36 seconds.
The armor protection of the turrets varied considerably from ship to ship. Therefore, for information on armoring turret mounts and turret barbettes, the reader should refer to the descriptions of individual ships.
Notes
Links
- NavWeaps.com - Britain 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I
- https://sergey-ilyin.livejournal.com/158698.html - "British 15" towers, determinant".
- https://sergey-ilyin.livejournal.com/164551.html - "Migrations of British 15" towers".
I decided to study the equipment of German heavy artillery. I have a suspicion that there are people who many of us confuse the regular number, the actual number and the number of guns in combat-ready units. And there are also problems with taking into account departmental affiliation.
It is very often mentioned that the Germans have either 168 guns, or 216. One has to come across references to 264 guns and 144 guns.
Where did these weapons come from?
The experience of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, where the Turks resisted, showed the need to allocate heavy artillery to the corps. Before the advent of shoe belts, the maximum caliber was de facto limited to 150-155 mm mortars. Therefore, the corps of the imperial and royal armies received 150 mm M80 mortars. A very mediocre artillery system, but it can shoot from the ground. With the advent of shoe corps, the 15 cm sFH M94 was re-equipped with heavy howitzers. The Russians had 152 mm field mortars and suffered with a 152 mm cannon of 70 pounds. It was proposed to give each corps a three-battery division of these guns when it was put into service. Total 18 guns, eight horses, firing range 33 kg projectile (ammunition unified with mortars) 6 miles. But the system was brought up only by 1910. At Shirokorad in the "History of Russian Artillery" it is mentioned as a 152 mm cannon of 80 pounds. The experience of the Spanish-American showed the complete ineffectiveness of field artillery against entrenched infantry. American shrapnel did not even take blockhouses.
It was decided to give each corps an artillery regiment of 16 guns, so as not to call in siege artillery to help. In 1903, they adopted the 15 cm sFH 02, with which the units were gradually equipped.
The experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the use by the Japanese of 120 and 150 mm howitzers under the supervision of German specialists showed the effectiveness of heavy artillery. The Japanese came to the conclusion that each division should be given a howitzer battery. This rested on the actual availability of materiel, but the conclusions were correct. Moreover, the theoretical calculations and the Austrian experience were confirmed. The Russians used much more heavy guns, only 6 dm cannons in 120 pounds were 128 pieces, but this did not help. The Japanese howitzer artillery was superior to the Russian in mobility. The Russians normally fought only 6 dm field mortars and 107 mm battery guns. Everything turned out to be expected. The Russian concept of using siege artillery to combat field fortification seemed wrong to the Germans. If the Japanese had not lost their only battery of 105 mm guns at the very beginning, the history of German artillery might have gone differently. Based on combat experience, emphasis was placed on howitzers, and only before the war the opinion changed, but 10 cm K 14 began to arrive only from May 1915.
A separate moment was the use of 203 mm light siege guns of 190 pounds, of which there were 16 pieces in the Siberian siege regiment. In fact, this is a heavy howitzer. The use of guns of this caliber in field battles was considered impossible. General Schlieffen came up with a rationalization proposal: the corps are reinforced with 150 mm howitzers, the armies with 210 mm. So that the army command does not call in siege artillery to fight against the numerous old Belgian fortresses. They were mainly designed to fire 150 mm guns of the 1860-80s. The regular number was determined in 21 divisions of a two-battery composition, four-gun batteries. A total of 168 guns.
In addition to the artillery attached to the army, there was siege artillery armed with 21 cm mörser 99. The new mortar was a howitzer, but for a number of reasons it was called a mortar. To storm the Belgian fortresses, according to the calculations of the command, it was necessary to have 30 batteries.
On August 1, 1914, 14 divisions were formed for the needs of the field armies, and 4 more were in the process of formation. Some of the guns were produced, accepted, but were at the factory. All 4 divisions came into combat-ready condition from October 1914 to February 1915. That is, in fact, 14 divisions with 112 guns.
The siege artillery had 30 batteries with 120 210 mm guns, of which 72 21 cm Mörser 10 and 48 21 cm Mörser 99.
By the end of 1915, all 288 21 cm Mörser 10s were to be produced.
The situation was worse in other European countries.
The French in each army were given a regiment consisting of 3-5 battalions of guns with a caliber of 120-155 mm. A total of 308 guns, of which 84 were very mediocre 120 mm C mle 1890 howitzers for the First World War. They fired shells of 18-20 kg at a distance of up to 5.8 km. But they had to pull up territorial troops for field battles, where they also had 120-155 mm guns. It must be understood that the main problem of the French is confusion and vacillation. By 1913 they finally adopted the 105 mm cannon, which was almost an exact copy of the 107 mm cannon adopted by the Russian army. The French, after problems with the 155 mm howitzer CTR mle 1904, were against guns other than 75 mm guns. 155 mm howitzers were to show that the funds were not spent in vain. 155 gun 1877/14 and 105 mm gun were intended for siege artillery. Although according to the state they have a battalion of 12 155 mm howitzers in the corps artillery regiment. Usually in the presence of one battery, the other two were armed with 75 mm guns.
In 1913, they carried out maneuvers, as a result of which they decided to accept 105 and 155 howitzers, but everything drowned in chatter there. Fortunately for the French, they had a lot of systems suitable for military operations. Only 155 mm guns of the order of 2200 pieces, to this were added 2500 long 120 mm guns and 330 220 mm mortars. Before the First World War, they thought about new guns 193, 220 and 274 mm, but almost nothing was done. There was a sample of 340 mm mortars during the tests, 370 mm siege guns were ordered, but these guns cannot be used as field guns. Fortunately for the French, they designed a 280 mm mortar for the Russians and received an order, and in 1913 they began work on a 229 mm mortar. This allowed in 1915 to launch the production of 220 mm mortars.
Austria-Hungary turned out to be a model of disintegration. Due to chronic problems and a peculiar cost structure, there was not enough money to purchase guns. Added to this were the problems of lobbying.
Theoretically, each corps should have 8 150 mm howitzers, if necessary, fortress artillery was involved. It was represented by 120 and 150 mm guns, 150, 240 and 305 mm howitzer mortars and 150 and 180 mm howitzers.
If necessary, 50 batteries (200) of 15 cm SFH M94 guns were allocated, that is, the same with which the army corps were armed, but only 240 guns were produced, of which 112 were used as corps artillery, 128 were transferred to the fortress. The disadvantage was covered by the 12 cm Kanone M80, an analogue of the Russian 107 mm siege gun, higher projectile weight, but less firing range. These 200 guns formed the backbone of the army's artillery in the first year of the war, the 120 mm gun becoming the heaviest system used by Austria-Hungary in field battles at that time.
I must say, Skoda presented prototypes of new heavy guns several times, but they were not accepted. The Austrians had 7 batteries (14 guns) of 240 mm 98/07 mortars on a mechanized thrust and 12 batteries (48 guns) of 240 mm 98 mortars, but they did not dare to throw them into field battles.
It should be noted that the money for the purchase of new 195 and 150 mm howitzers and 104 mm guns was allocated, but the lobbyists did not agree. But with these funds they bought 25,305 mm mortars. But the imperial and royal armies were left without modern heavy field guns.
The British had army artillery of 6 dm guns of 30 centners and 240 mm mortars bought in the Czech Republic. It is very similar to the Austrian 240 mm 98 mortars. Only four pieces, two of them in China. A prototype 234 mm howitzer was made.
Natural disasters fell upon Russian artillery: either the epic conflict between the Generalisparte and the Minister of War, the infantry and the General Staff, or the State Duma, which cut spending to show that they had power, or the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty.
Most of the systems considered necessary were adopted. The Russo-Japanese War showed the unsuitability of the systems in service. There were two opinions: most of the members of the party committee and the Generalispart of V.Kn. Sergei Mikhailovich. With corps artillery, there were two different options: most of the authorities believed that it was necessary that the corps division consisted of three 6-or batteries of 122 mm howitzers, v.kn. believed that a division was needed consisting of 8,152 howitzers and 4,107 mm guns. However, the allocated money was enough to form 20 heavy divisions for 37 corps, mortar divisions were of two-battery composition. However, in 1912-14, the necessary funds were knocked out that would allow each corps by April 1 (13), 1915 to have 8 152 mm howitzers mod. 1910, 4 107 mm guns and 24 122 mm howitzers mod. 1909. According to our generals, the Russian corps artillery would be superior to the German one with its 16 150 mm howitzers. Some corps, during mobilization in 1914, were able to receive 24,122 howitzers.
Army artillery in European Russia was to be represented by six brigades, each having three divisions of three batteries (36 152 mm howitzers mod. 1909). The Caucasian and Siberian brigades of the same composition were also formed. It was assumed that the Siberian brigade would be in Harbin a month after the start of mobilization.
Finally allowed to order 280 mm mortars in France. There were two consecutive orders for a total of 32 guns, all to be delivered up to and including March 1915. This made it possible to form 7 divisions of 2 two-gun batteries and have 4 guns in reserve. Siege brigades could be added to this if necessary. So, the North-Western Front was supposed to receive 120 152 mm guns of 120 and 200 pounds, but the General Staff, referring to the experience of the Russian-Japanese, refused to deploy them at the front, but they were mobilized. When V.Kn. Claims were brought against Sergei Mikhailovich, he shifted the blame on the General Staff. The first siege brigade was sent to the front and arrived at the beginning of 1915. The difference from the original version was the replacement of 24 152 mm 120 pood guns with 8 152 mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 16 107 mm guns. There was a similar situation on the Southwestern Front.
In general, the main problem of the Russian army is not in materiel, but that the ruling elites have forgotten the simple truth: they must serve the Motherland with "feather and sword" ©, and the majority had "balls, lackeys, junkers and the crunch of French rolls" © . The exterminatus of the nobility and other elites was inevitable.
Speaking about the artillery of the First World War, it is briefly worth noting that all states, in preparation for the conflict, paid special attention to it, taking into account the experience of previous local armed conflicts. In numerical terms, this preparation was expressed as follows: more than 9 thousand different artillery pieces from Germany; a little over 4 thousand - from Austria-Hungary, 7 thousand - from Russia, - 4300 - from France, a little more than a thousand - from Great Britain, and about 900 - from Belgium.
At the same time, all artillery guns used on the fronts of World War I were divided into several categories: light and heavy field, mountain and siege.
In support of the infantry
Light field and mountain artillery in those years were part of the infantry divisions. In most armies, they were represented by 75 mm guns and 105 mm howitzers. The exception was the French troops, in which howitzers were completely absent. The French believed that their guns were suitable for any conditions of a mobile war (before the start of the conflict, no one expected that it would become protracted and positional, and not fleeting and maneuverable).
The range of the guns varied within 7-8 kilometers, although most of them were used at a much closer (up to 6 kilometers) distance. It is worth noting that the ammunition of each gun included both grenades and shrapnel. And the latter was the most popular.
Artillery "heavyweights"
In short, the heavy field artillery of the First World War, like the light artillery, consisted of cannons and howitzers. Only their caliber was much larger. For guns, the most common caliber was 105 mm, but the caliber of howitzer shells reached 150 mm. At the same time, such guns fired not much further and better than infantry light ones. Their ammunition also included grenades (in Russia they were called bombs) and shrapnel.
Despite the fact that the French made heavy field guns for the Russian army, they themselves did not have similar weapons.
The German army was best provided with this type of artillery. Moreover, its advantage was both in quantity and quality.
Siege (heavy) artillery
In a brief review of this type of artillery of the First World War, it is worth noting that it was at the complete disposal of the command. Its guns were concentrated in areas where decisive operations were being prepared.
The composition of such artillery included guns (guns, howitzers and mortars) whose caliber ranged from 120 to 420 mm. At the same time, almost all countries used old-style weapons.
The exception was Germany, which, in preparation for the war, paid quite a lot of attention to this type of artillery. At the same time, the German command made sure that the quality of the guns did not suffer at the expense of quantity.
The same views on the heavy type of artillery were held by Germany's allies - the Austro-Hungarian command.
France, on the contrary, considered this type of artillery guns practically unnecessary and too burdensome. Russia, in turn, shared the opinion of the French, but at the same time, taking into account the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, it also looked closely at the German point of view (though not very boldly).
By the way, the outbreak of the war showed that the Germans were right here. It was their heavy artillery that contributed to the fact that they were able to capture all the border French and Belgian fortresses in a short time.
Flak
This type of artillery during the First World War was only in its infancy, since before that there was simply no need for it. During the years of the conflict of 1914-18, only a few prototypes were tested. At the same time, Germany managed to achieve good results in this.
Artillery shooting methods
Before the war and during its battles, gunners fired, focusing solely on visual observations. Shooting was just beginning to emerge, the observation of which was carried out from a tethered balloon. Observation from the aircraft was not carried out at all.
At the same time, the army of each country developed its own shooting rules. They were the least developed in the German troops, so the training of their shooters was the weakest.
What was the organization of Russian, German and French artillery at the beginning of the First World War?
By 1914, it was assumed that the coming war would be of a fleeting nature - both Russia and France built the organization of their artillery, based on the principle of the transience of armed confrontation. Accordingly, the nature of the future war was qualified as maneuverable - and the artillery of the warring armies, first of all, had to have such a quality as tactical mobility.
In a mobile battle, the main goal of artillery is the manpower of the enemy, while there are no serious fortified positions. That is why the core of field artillery was represented by light field guns of 75-77 mm caliber. And the main ammunition is shrapnel. It was believed that the field gun, with its significant, both among the French and, especially, among the Russians, initial projectile velocity, would fulfill all the tasks assigned to artillery in a field battle.
Indeed, in the conditions of a fleeting maneuver war, the French 75-mm cannon of the 1897 model occupied the first place in terms of its tactical and technical characteristics. Although the initial speed of her projectile was inferior to the Russian three-inch, but this was compensated by a more profitable projectile, which spent its speed more economically in flight. In addition, the gun had greater stability (that is, the indestructibility of aiming) after firing, and, consequently, the rate of fire. The device of the carriage of the French gun allowed it to automatically conduct lateral horizontal shelling, which from a distance of 2.5-3 thousand meters made it possible to fire at a 400-500-meter front within a minute.
Il. 1. French 75 mm gun. Photo: Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W-wa, 1975.
For the Russian three-inch, the same was possible only by five or six turns of the entire battery, spending at least five minutes of time. But during flank shelling, in some one and a half minutes, the Russian light battery, firing with shrapnel, covered with its fire an area up to 800 m deep and more than 100 m wide.
In the struggle to destroy the manpower of the French and Russian field guns, there were no equals.
As a result, the 32-battalion Russian army corps was equipped with 108 guns - including 96 field 76-mm (three-inch) guns and 12 light 122-mm (48-line) howitzers. There was no heavy artillery in the corps. True, before the war there was a tendency to create heavy field artillery, but heavy field three-battery battalions (2 batteries of 152-mm (six-inch) howitzers and one - 107-mm (42-line) guns) existed, as it were, as an exception and an organic connection with did not have hulls.
Il. 2. Russian 122-mm light field howitzer model 1910. Catalog of the materiel of domestic artillery. - L., 1961.
The situation was little better in France, which had 120 75-mm field guns per 24-battalion army corps. Heavy artillery was absent in divisions and corps and was only in armies - a total of only 308 guns (120-mm long and short guns, 155-mm howitzers and the latest 105-mm long Schneider gun of the 1913 model).
Il. 3. French 120-mm short field howitzer model 1890. Photo: Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W-wa, 1975.
Thus, the organization of the artillery of Russia and France was, first of all, the result of an underestimation of the power of rifle and machine-gun fire, as well as the fortification of the enemy. The charters of these powers at the beginning of the war required artillery not to prepare, but only to support an infantry attack.
In contrast to their opponents, the organization of the German artillery was based on a correct foresight of the nature of the coming military conflict. For the 24-battalion army corps, the Germans had 108 light 77-mm cannons, 36 light field 105-mm howitzers (divisional artillery) and 16 heavy field 150-mm howitzers (corps artillery). Accordingly, already in 1914, heavy artillery was present at the corps level. With the beginning of the positional war, the Germans also created divisional heavy artillery, equipping each division with two howitzer and one heavy cannon batteries.
From this ratio it is clear that the Germans saw the main means for achieving tactical success even in field maneuvering combat in the power of their artillery (almost a third of all available guns were howitzers). In addition, the Germans reasonably took into account the increased muzzle velocity of the projectile, which was not always necessary during flat firing (in this regard, their 77-mm gun was inferior to the French and Russian guns) and adopted as a caliber for a light field howitzer not 122-120-mm, like their own. opponents, and 105 mm - that is, the optimal (in combination of relative power and mobility) caliber.
If the 77-mm German, 75-mm French, 76-mm Russian light field guns approximately corresponded to each other (as well as the 105-107-mm heavy field guns of the opponents), then the Russian and French armies have no analogues of the German 105-mm divisional howitzer had.
Thus, by the beginning of the World War, the basis for organizing the artillery assets of the leading military powers was the task of supporting the offensive of their infantry on the battlefield. The main qualities required for field guns are mobility in conditions of mobile warfare. This trend also determined the organization of the artillery of the major powers, its quantitative ratio with the infantry, as well as the proportionality of light and heavy artillery in relation to each other.
Thus, the ratio of the number of artillery that was part of the military units was expressed by the following number of guns per thousand bayonets: for Russia - about 3.5, for France - 5 and for Germany - 6.5.
The ratio of the number of heavy guns to the number of light artillery guns was as follows: by the beginning of the war, Russia had about 6.9 thousand light guns and howitzers and only 240 heavy guns (that is, the ratio of heavy to light artillery was 1 to 29); France possessed almost 8,000 light and 308 heavy guns (a ratio of 1 to 24); Germany had 6.5 thousand light guns and howitzers and almost 2 thousand heavy guns (ratio 1 to 3.75).
These figures clearly illustrate both the views on the use of artillery in 1914, and the resources with which each great power entered the world war. Obviously, the German armed forces were closest to the requirements of the First World War even before it began.
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