Despite the fact that Great Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, and the United States in 1941, they were in no hurry to open the Second Front, which was so necessary for the USSR. Let's single out the most popular versions of the reasons for the delay of the allies.

unpreparedness for war

Many experts see the unpreparedness of the Allies for a full-scale war as the main reason for such a late opening of the Second Front - June 6, 1944. What could, for example, oppose Germany to Great Britain? As of September 1939, the British Army numbered 1,270,000 men, 640 tanks and 1,500 aircraft. In Germany, these figures were much more impressive: 4 million 600 thousand soldiers and officers, 3195 tanks and 4093 aircraft. [S-BLOCK]

Moreover, during the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk in 1940, a significant number of tanks, artillery and ammunition were abandoned. According to Churchill, "in fact, in the whole country there were hardly 500 field guns of all types and 200 medium and heavy tanks."

Even more deplorable was the state of the United States Army. By 1939, the number of regular troops was slightly more than 500 thousand people, with 89 combat divisions, of which only 16 were armored. For comparison: the Wehrmacht army had 170 fully equipped and combat-ready divisions. [С-BLOCK] However, in a couple of years, both the USA and Great Britain significantly strengthened their military capabilities and in 1942, according to experts, they could already provide real assistance to the USSR, pulling significant forces of the German army from East to West. When requesting the opening of the Second Front, Stalin relied primarily on the British government, but Churchill, under various pretexts, repeatedly refused the Soviet leader.

Fight for the Suez Canal

The Middle East continued to be a priority for Great Britain at the height of the war. In British military circles, an amphibious landing on the coast of France was considered unpromising, which would only divert the main forces from solving strategic tasks.

The situation by the spring of 1941 was such that the UK was no longer enough food. Importing food products from the main suppliers - the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Norway, for obvious reasons, turned out to be impossible. [C-BLOCK] Churchill was well aware of the need to maintain communications with the Near and Middle East, as well as India, which would provide Great Britain with much-needed goods, and therefore he threw all his forces into the defense of the Suez Canal. The German threat to this region was quite large.

Allied divisions

An important reason for delaying the opening of the Second Front was the disagreement of the allies. They were observed between Great Britain and the United States, which were solving their geopolitical problems, but even more contradictions emerged between Great Britain and France. [C-BLOCK] Even before the surrender of France, Churchill visited the government of the country, which was evacuated to Tours, trying to inspire the French to continue resistance. But at the same time, the Prime Minister did not hide his fear that the French navy might fall into the hands of the German army and therefore offered to send it to British ports. From the government of France followed by a decisive refusal. [C-BLOCK] On June 16, 1940, Churchill proposed to the government of the Third Republic an even more daring project, which practically meant the merging of Great Britain and France into one state on enslaving terms for the latter. The French regarded this as an undisguised desire to take over the country's colonies. The last step that upset the relationship between the two allies was Operation Catapult, which involved the capture by England of the entire available French fleet or its destruction in order to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy.

Japanese threat and Moroccan interest

The attack of the Japanese Air Force on the American military base at Pearl Harbor, carried out at the end of 1941, on the one hand, finally placed the United States in the ranks of the allies of the Soviet Union, but on the other hand, it postponed the opening of the Second Front, as it forced the country to concentrate its efforts on the war with Japan. For a whole year, the Pacific theater of operations for the American army became the main arena of battles. [С-BLOCK] In November 1942, the United States began to implement the Torch plan to capture Morocco, which at that time was of the greatest interest to American military and political circles. It was assumed that the Vichy regime, with which the United States continued to maintain diplomatic relations, would not resist. And so it happened. In a matter of days, the Americans captured the major cities of Morocco, and later, having united with their allies - Britain and the Free French, continued successful offensive operations in Algeria and Tunisia.

Personal goals

Soviet historiography almost unanimously expressed the opinion that the Anglo-American coalition deliberately delayed the opening of the Second Front, expecting that the USSR, exhausted by a long war, would lose its status as a great power. Churchill, even while promising military assistance to the Soviet Union, continued to call it a "sinister Bolshevik state". [C-BLOCK] In a message to Stalin, Churchill very vaguely writes that "the chiefs of staff do not see the possibility of doing something on such a scale that it could bring you even the smallest benefit." This answer is most likely due to the fact that the prime minister shared the opinion of the military-political circles of Britain, who argued: "the defeat of the USSR by the Wehrmacht troops is a matter of several weeks." After the turning point in the war, when a certain status quo was observed on the fronts of the USSR, the Allies were still in no hurry to open the Second Front. They were occupied with completely different thoughts: would the Soviet government agree to a separate peace with Germany? The Allied intelligence report contained the following words: "A state of affairs in which neither side can count on a quick complete victory will in all likelihood lead to a Russo-German agreement." [C-BLOCK] The wait-and-see attitude of Great Britain and the United States meant one thing: the allies were interested in weakening both Germany and the USSR. Only when the fall of the Third Reich became inevitable did certain shifts take place in the process of opening the Second Front.

War is big business

Many historians are perplexed by one circumstance: why the German army allowed the British landing force to retreat almost unhindered during the so-called "Dunkirk operation" in May-June 1940. The answer most often sounds like this: "Hitler received instructions from the British not to touch." Doctor of Political Sciences Vladimir Pavlenko believes that the situation around the entry of the US and Great Britain into the European arena of war was influenced by big business represented by the Rockefeller financial clan. The tycoon's main goal is the Eurasian oil market. It was Rockefeller, according to the political scientist, who created the "American-British-German octopus - the Schroeder Bank in the status of an agent of the Nazi government" is responsible for the growth of the German military machine. For the time being, until the time Hitler's Germany was needed by Rockefeller. British and American intelligence agencies have repeatedly reported on the possibility of removing Hitler, but each time they received a go-ahead from the leadership. As soon as the end of the Third Reich became obvious, nothing prevented Britain and the United States from entering the European theater of operations.

Wrote:

"The military situation of the Soviet Union, as well as Great Britain, would be greatly improved if a front against Hitler were established in the west (Northern France) and in the north (Arctic)."

However, the United States and Britain, having announced on June 22-24, 1941, their readiness to assist the Soviet Union, were in no hurry to take practical steps in this direction. In a reply message to Stalin dated July 21, 1941, Churchill stated that "the chiefs of staff do not see the possibility of doing anything on such a scale that it could bring you even the smallest benefit."

This answer is explained by the fact that in the summer of 1941 influential circles in England, whose views were shared by both Churchill and the top military leaders, believed that the defeat of the USSR by Wehrmacht troops was a matter of several weeks. They believed that the German-Soviet war only temporarily diverted Germany's forces from her main enemy - England. Therefore, the calculation was based on “keeping Russia in the war” for as long as possible, supporting it morally in every possible way, but not binding itself with any military obligations and material assistance, since all the military equipment sent to it would still get to the Germans and only strengthen them. At the same time, according to British strategists, England should have used the time of the Reich's war with the Russians to strengthen its position in the Middle East and prepare for future battles against the German invasion of the British Isles.

Back in 1940, when the British troops left the European continent, Churchill was enthusiastic to continue the actions of the British in France.

"It's extremely important he wrote in June 1940, to chain as many German troops as possible to the coastline of the countries they have captured, and we must begin to organize special troops to carry out raids on these coasts, where the population is friendly to us ... "

“It is necessary to prepare a series of operations, carried out by specially trained troops of the type of hunters, capable of creating an atmosphere of terror along this coast ... But later ... we could launch a surprise attack on Calais or Boulogne ... and hold this area ... The war of passive resistance, which we are so good at, must end."

Then, in the 40th year, these plans were never realized. Now, when the Wehrmacht with its main forces acted against the USSR, Churchill perked up again:

"Now,- he wrote in the first days of the invasion of the German armies into our country, - when the enemy is busy in Russia, it's time to "strike while the iron is hot"..."

But soon this idea ceased to excite him. The main strategic direction for England continued to be the Middle East. There, on a narrow coastal strip in the border areas between Egypt, where the British troops were located, and Libya, from where the Italian divisions were advancing, from June 1940 hostilities were conducted. Since the beginning of 1941, several German formations have joined the Italian troops. The German General Rommel, the hero of the Wehrmacht's French campaign, commanded the Italo-German grouping.

The attack of the Third Reich on the USSR could change the situation in the Near and Middle East in favor of the British. This, at least, was hoped in London. In the United States, the entry into the war of the USSR was perceived somewhat differently. Skeptical of Churchill's Middle Eastern strategy, Roosevelt's entourage—J. Marshall, G. Hopkins, and others—considered it morally necessary to provide assistance to the USSR at the expense of American resources. But in the first weeks of the war, the US government was not sure that the USSR would withstand the onslaught of Nazi Germany. Only the military were more optimistic. The British ambassador in Washington reported to London:

"American top military leaders believe that, although defeat cannot be ruled out, the situation at the moment and in the near future looks good, and the Russians are holding up just fine."

Therefore, in early July 1941, Chief of Staff of the US Army J. Marshall managed to convince Roosevelt that Churchill's Middle East strategy was not effective enough in the war with Germany and Italy. And when the US leadership received from the USSR a list of military materials needed for the Soviet Union, Roosevelt decided to redistribute the supply of weapons and equipment so that some of them were sent to the USSR. Churchill, having learned about the position of the American president and taking into account the frequent messages of the British ambassador in Moscow S. Cripps and the hints of the USSR ambassador in London I. Maisky about the possibility of a separate peace between the USSR and Germany, decided that some practical measures of assistance to the USSR were now simply necessary. Despite the resistance of the Admiralty, which stood for the maximum increase in naval forces in the Middle East, he ordered a small squadron of ships to be sent to the Arctic in order to "establish interaction and act together with the naval forces of Russia." This was in the interests of the USSR. As Stalin wrote to Churchill on July 18, “it is easier to create a front in the north: here only the actions of naval and air forces will be required without the landing of troops and artillery.”

The Soviet government then saw its main military-political goal in ensuring more reliable maritime communications between the USSR, Britain and the USA as the basis of their military-economic cooperation. This was seen as urgent because in the United States, for all their desire to help the Soviet Union, many believed that our country would be defeated very soon. But after the visit to Moscow at the end of July by US presidential adviser Hopkins and the optimistic report of the British Joint Intelligence Committee that the USSR was capable of continuing the war, it became clear in the West: "The Soviets will stand."

In the most difficult situation of the first weeks of the war, the task of Soviet foreign policy was to establish military cooperation with the allies, and primarily with England (the United States did not participate in the war), in order to fight together against a common enemy. Stalin, in his messages to Churchill, developed and clarified the idea of ​​the need for the Allies to open a second front in Europe. On September 3, in a letter to the British Prime Minister, describing the situation in which the USSR was, he wrote:

“I think that there is only one way out of this situation: to create already this year a second front somewhere in the Balkans or in France, which could draw 30 —40 German divisions ... "

It was then that the idea of ​​creating a powerful front in France was established. Ten days later, in a letter to London, Stalin somewhat changed the way the question was phrased:

“If the creation of a second front in the West at the present moment, in the opinion of the British Government, seems impossible, he wrote, then perhaps another means of actively helping the Soviet Union against the common enemy could be found? It seems to me that England could safely land 25-30 divisions in Arkhangelsk or transport them through Iran to the southern regions of the USSR for military cooperation with Soviet troops on the territory of the USSR.

Although, of course, this proposal was not feasible - England could not land 25-30 divisions not only in Arkhangelsk, but in any other place at that time - it contained Stalin's idea of ​​\u200b\u200ba coalition strategy: to use large forces together on vital for Germany in directions, threatening, for example, from the north, the delivery of Swedish ore to Germany or the supply of oil from the countries of the Middle East.

Churchill, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in London Maisky, dismissed the idea of ​​landing British troops in France as unrealistic:

“The strait that prevents the Germans from jumping into England also prevents the British from jumping into France. There is no point in making landing attempts so that it fails.

Such are now the arguments of the head of the British government, although a year ago his views on this matter were completely different. He did not answer Stalin's second proposal at all, apparently believing that Stalin himself was clear that it was unfeasible at that time.

Indeed, the second front, with the tasks of a broad strategic offensive deep into Germany, as it would be in 1944-1945, was impossible in 1941. However, real help could be provided. The Allies could carry out at least small, diverting operations of the Reich forces on the European continent. One of the most influential members of the British government, Minister of Supply, Lord Beaverbrook, knowing the true possibilities of Great Britain, said in those days:

“The resistance of the Russians gives us new opportunities ... It has created almost 2 thousand miles of coastline for the landing of British troops. However, the Germans can transfer their divisions to the east with almost impunity precisely because our generals still consider the continent a no-go zone for British troops ... "

The British Ambassador to the USSR, S. Cripps, thought the same way. He ardently urged the British government to provide military assistance to the USSR:

“If we give Russia all the support we can, then, in my opinion, there is every chance that by this time, in a year, Germany will be defeated.”

But the leaders of England and the USA in 1941 did not even think about the rapid defeat of Germany. They were thinking about something completely different: would the Soviet Union hold out? What if the Soviet government agrees to a separate peace with Germany? (Memories of the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact were still fresh.)

The defeat of the Germans near Moscow buried the idea of ​​a blitzkrieg. It became clear that Germany had entered into a protracted war in the east. The governments of the United States and Britain no longer doubted the combat capabilities of the Soviets. But another question arose: would the Soviet Union stand if the Wehrmacht in 1942 launched the same powerful onslaught on the Red Army as a year ago? Allied intelligence provided disappointing information on this score:

“A state of affairs in which neither side can count on a quick and complete victory will in all probability lead to a Russo-German agreement as a result of negotiations. Such a situation can arise under various circumstances, ranging from the balance of power to the undeniable superiority of the Germans.

Such an assessment of the situation led the leadership of the United States and Britain to the conclusion that the main thing in 1942 was to keep the Soviet Union on its side in the war. How to achieve this? Urgent and decisive measures were needed, especially since after the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor (Hawaiian Islands), the United States entered the war with Japan and Germany. Therefore, in the spring of 1942, the US military command raised the issue of landing allied troops on the French coast. “Not opening a strong western front in France in time meant shifting the entire burden of the war onto Russia,”- wrote US Secretary of War G. Stimson. The strategic importance of the Allied invasion of Western Europe and the opening of a second front, where large ground forces could operate, was best understood by the command of the US Army. It was aware that in a continental war, which, in fact, was the Second World War, the final victory would be won on the land fronts leading to the vital areas of Germany. The Chief of Staff of the American Army, General J. Marshall, was in favor of American ground forces entering the battle as soon as possible in the most critical areas and in the largest possible numbers.

And for England, as Churchill and his entourage understood it, the main task at that time was to preserve the Mediterranean communications of Britain with the Near and Middle East and with India. The German and Japanese threat to these regions created a great danger to British interests.

The second front in Western Europe, of course, shortened the time of the war and met the interests of the peoples of all allied countries. The second front, like air, was necessary for the USSR, which fought the fascist bloc on a front 6,000 km long. But the British were convinced that the Red Army alone was able to resist the Wehrmacht in 1942, and therefore it would be more important to strengthen the military-political position of the allies, and above all England in the Mediterranean. And so Churchill, during his visit to Washington in December 1941, expressed the idea of ​​an Allied landing in North Africa, knowing in advance that "the idea of ​​American intervention in Morocco" was of interest to the US President. However, his proposal was rejected as untimely. The leaders of the US Department of Defense, the American Army and the Air Force (G. Stimson, J. Marshall, D. Eisenhower and G. Arnold) believed that "primacy should be given to the speedy invasion across the English Channel" into Western Europe. So did the Strategic Planning Committee of England. On March 8, 1942, he presented a report to the British Chiefs of Staff with convincing arguments in favor of an Allied landing on the Continent. The scarcity of ships, the report stressed, precludes such a strategic intervention anywhere but the English Channel. In connection with the likely aggravation of the situation on the Soviet-German front in 1942, the Chief of Staff of the US Army J. Marshall and the head of the strategic planning department, Major General D. Eisenhower, prepared in February 1942 a memorandum on the expediency of the Allied invasion of France through La Manche. This memorandum formed the basis of the American plan for the landing of allied forces in France in the spring of 1943 with 34 infantry and 14 tank divisions (Operation Roundup). However, according to Marshall, “in case (a) if an extremely unfavorable situation develops on the Russian front, i.e. if the success of the German troops is so great that there is a threat of defeat for Russia ... (b) if the position of Germany in Western Europe deteriorates sharply ...”, then it would become necessary to carry out a limited operation to land forces in France in September-October 1942 (operation “ Sledgehammer). Thus, emphasis was placed on purposeful preparations for the opening of a second front in 1943 in order to make this plan a priority over other operations. And in the extreme situation on the Soviet-German front, an additional limited landing operation was planned in France, and earlier - already in 1942, with the aim of capturing a bridgehead and holding it until Operation Roundup began.

Roosevelt, after some hesitation, agreed to this option. When the war with Japan began, he had to convince the American public that the European theater of war was more important than the Pacific one and that the US troops were by no means passive, but were active against the enemy. "I propose to send you in a few days a definite plan for a joint performance in Europe itself," he wrote to Churchill on 18 March.

But Churchill and the chief of the imperial general staff, Field Marshal A. Brook, considered this plan unprofitable for England, although they outwardly supported the idea of ​​​​invading Europe across the English Channel. At the same time, they urged the Americans to undertake in 1942 the landing of Anglo-American units in North Africa, where there were many units of Vichy France that did not participate in the war.

Churchill, after all the failures of the British armed forces, both in North Africa (the offensive operation in the winter of 1941/42 was not completed) and in the Far East (the fall of Singapore) needed an easy and convincing victory that would raise the morale of the British people and ensure communications with the colonies and countries associated with the British Empire, would strengthen the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and personally, Churchill, influence in the world of politics.

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1942, the American point of view seemed to be triumphant. On April 8, 1942, Churchill agreed with the Americans that a quick invasion of Western Europe was expedient and necessary. Then the concept of "second front" clearly meant the invasion of the Anglo-American troops into France across the English Channel. Therefore, when in May - June 1942 the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov led negotiations in London and Washington on the opening of a second front in 1942, he was promised to open such a front. This was required by the prevailing situation at the time. The defeat of the Soviet troops in the Crimea and especially near Kharkov could, according to Western military experts, pose a threat to the defeat of the USSR.

“... I seriously believe that the position of the Russians is precarious and may steadily worsen over the coming weeks. Therefore, more than ever, I want, in connection with Operation Bolero,

certain actions were taken already in 1942. We all understand that due to weather conditions this operation cannot be postponed until the end of the year ... The Joint Staff is now working on a proposal to increase the number of transport ships for the use of Operation Bolero by reducing a significant part materials to send to Russia, except for military equipment that can be used in battles this year ... This should make the task of your home fleet, especially destroyers, easier. I am especially concerned that he (Molotov. - A. O.) take with him some of the real results of his mission and now give Stalin a favorable report. I'm inclined to think that the Russians are a little despondent now.

However, the important thing is that we may find ourselves and probably already face real troubles on the Russian front and must take this into account in our plans.

In a communiqué issued on June 11-12, 1942 in Moscow, Washington and London after Soviet-British and Soviet-American negotiations, it was stated that "full agreement has been reached regarding the urgent tasks of creating a second front in 1942."

But at the signing of this very important document in London, Churchill handed Molotov a "memorandum", which stated:

“... It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such as to make this operation feasible when the time comes. Therefore, we cannot make a promise in this regard, but if it turns out to be sound and reasonable, we will not hesitate to put this plan into practice.

Churchill's idea was already visible in this note to prevent an operation to invade Western Europe. And there was something to replace it - a landing in North Africa.

In June, Admiral Mountbatten, head of British amphibious operations, and then Churchill himself went to Washington to convince Roosevelt of the advantage of the North African operation. By this time, the situation in the Mediterranean had changed for the worse for Great Britain. During Churchill's stay in the USA, the Germans defeated the British troops in Africa and captured the important fortress and port of Tobruk.

The fall of Tobruk and the capitulation of the English garrison (33 thousand people) in it caused a wave of indignation in England. The press openly expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the government. A resolution was passed in Parliament expressing a vote of no confidence in the "central leadership of the war" and personally in Churchill.

“No English general, admiral or air marshal can recommend the Sledgehammer as a feasible operation in 1942. And I'm sure that "Gymnast" (landing in North Africa, later - "Torch". — A. O.) — this is a much more reliable chance for effectively facilitating operations on the Russian front in 1942. It has always been in line with your intentions. In fact, this is your dominant idea. This is a real second front in 1942. I consulted with the cabinet and the defense committee, and we all agreed with this. This is the safest and most useful strike that can be made this fall."

Churchill's position in the summer of 1942, unfortunately, became decisive. Roosevelt already in June began to incline more and more in favor of a landing operation in North Africa: after all, he, like Churchill, needed a quick and convincing victory for American weapons after a series of setbacks in the war with Japan. Battles with the Germans in France, apart from difficulties and losses, at first promised nothing, and the capture of an entire region of Africa in the war with the German-Italian coalition was more significant than the battles with Japan and promised quick and easy success. And this raised the authority of the president in the eyes of the people on the eve of the congressional elections in November 1942 and - which, of course, is more important - allowed the United States to strengthen its influence in such an important region as Northwest Africa. Therefore, in July, Roosevelt, despite the sharp objections of Marshall and his staff, a number of major military and political figures (Minister of War G. Stimson, adviser to the president G. Hopkins, etc.) supported Churchill's idea. The American military leaders were also supported by the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it was no longer possible to convince the president. Marshall wrote that with the adoption of the plan for Operation Gymnast, any invasion of the European continent in 1943 would have been canceled altogether.

In justifying their refusal to open a second front in Europe, Roosevelt and Churchill cited military-technical reasons. Roosevelt spoke of the shortage of transoceanic transports for the transfer of troops to England. Churchill unwittingly refuted Roosevelt, saying in a conversation with Molotov on June 9 that "the limiting moment in such an operation is not large ships that are used for convoys, but flat landing craft."

The leaders of the Western powers replaced specific negotiations on the date of opening a second front with all sorts of diplomatic tricks and meaningless promises, in words.

Did the Soviet government count on the opening of a second front in 1942? Did Stalin believe the promises of Roosevelt and Churchill? As the facts, documents and memoirs of participants in those events testify, Moscow understood that the leaders of England and the United States were unlikely to take such a disinterested step. But Stalin, and Roosevelt, and Churchill at that moment needed, first of all, political results. This was politically necessary in order to cheer up the peoples of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition after the failures of 1941 and the first half of 1942, to give them hope for an early turn in the war.

In addition, Roosevelt and Churchill had to "keep Russia in the war", promising help soon. It is not accidental that Roosevelt said that he was especially concerned that Molotov "give Stalin a favorable report."

Churchill, evading responsibility to the USSR for the unfulfilled promise with his "memorandum", hoped, however, that one threat of an invasion of France in 1942 would force the Germans to keep significant forces there and not to strengthen their grouping in Africa.

Stalin, according to Molotov, was sure that the allies would not keep their promise, but the very fact that they had declared a commitment of paramount importance to the whole world gave the Soviet Union a political gain. The public around the world, impatiently awaiting the opening of a second front, saw with indignation that the Western powers were breaking their promises. In addition, this document - a communiqué on the opening of a second front in 1942 - gave Moscow the opportunity to exert political pressure on the allies, as well as to explain the failures of the Red Army on the fronts by the absence of the promised second front.

But in addition to the private propaganda benefits of the members of the Big Three, it should be noted that then - in the spring and summer of 1942 - the most important common military-political problem was being solved: whether the strategy of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition would be coordinated between the USA, the USSR and England, subordinated to the common interests of the fastest defeat of the enemy and liberation of the peoples and countries occupied by the fascist regime, or it will be carried out for the sake of selfishly understood national interests, when each great power that is part of the coalition will pursue its own line, seeking to extract its own benefit to the detriment of the common cause: the destruction of fascism, the reduction of victims and destruction, saving millions of people from death and deprivation.

The Soviet Union (and until July 1942, the United States, too), advocating a coalition strategy from the first days of the Great Patriotic War, of course, also proceeded from its national interests: after all, the war was on its territory; but the desire of our government to hasten the opening of a second front and thus alleviate the conditions for the struggle of the Red Army on the main front of that world war - the Soviet-German - objectively coincided with the real interests of the entire coalition and with the vital interests of the peoples of the occupied countries. The moral obligations of the anti-Hitler coalition, and above all the achievement of victory in a shorter time, were fulfilled to the fullest extent of forces only by the USSR.

And the events of the war and research after the war speak for sure: in 1942, the Allies had everything necessary to make an invasion of North-West France in 1943.

By opening a second front in 1943, the Allies would force the fascist bloc to disperse its armed forces and enormous resources between the two fronts and thereby deprive Germany of the temporary but serious advantages that made her invincible in the first years of the war. This would create the prerequisites for the defeat of the main enemy forces and significantly shorten the path to a great victory over fascism!

But the Western Allies, instead of preparing for the landing in 1943 of a powerful grouping of forces in France, separated by a 30-kilometer strait, in November 1942 sent very large forces to distant North Africa. They preferred a national strategy to the interests of the coalition strategy in order to achieve narrowly pragmatic results.

Yes, the North African operation, of course, led to the dispersal of the Allied forces: on the one hand, the concentration of American troops in England ("Bolero"), and on the other, the sending of large forces to Africa. This was especially evident in the dispersal of amphibious assault vehicles, the absence of which was referred to as a reason for the forced abandonment of the invasion of France in 1943. Back in March 1942, Churchill told Maisky that at present the problem of a second front “is technically easier to solve, than last year, as the British are now much stronger than they were then in the air, and have a much larger number of special landing craft.

Churchill spoke of this not in vain. He knew well that the production of landing transport ships for crossing the English Channel had been debugged two years ago. On July 1, 1940, a separate command for landing operations was created by order of the Prime Minister. And for these operations, they began to build landing transports of all types, and above all tank landing flat-bottomed barges capable of transporting tank units across the English Channel and landing tank units on the coast. By October 1940, about 30 tank landing ships had been built. And they were built not at state shipyards, already busy shipyards, but at machine-building enterprises, so as not to interfere with the construction and repair of ships of the fleet.

But those tank landing barges were suitable only for crossing the strait and were not at all suitable for long sea crossings. Therefore, landing operations in North Africa required the creation of large transports to transport tanks across the ocean. Then an improved vessel was developed for transporting tanks and infantry across the ocean. But the technology for the release of small landing craft was not forgotten. For their mass production in 1942-1943. all that was required was a decision by the Churchill government, but no such decision was forthcoming. The construction of "Atlantic" tank landing ships (LST) and the so-called "infantry barges" (LSI), as well as collapsible landing craft, began. in the USA in 1941. and by the end of 1942, more than 4,800 transport ships and landing craft for various purposes were built. All vessels in one flight could deliver 2,900 tanks or 180,000 infantry to the landing site. Only with these means, the Allies in the very first echelon could land 9 tank or 12 infantry divisions in France.

From the end of 1942 until May 1943, the US built 314 more infantry transports and 341 tank transports. This would make it possible to transfer another 6 tank and 7.5 infantry divisions across the English Channel. It should not be forgotten that the construction of ships was then carried out at a pace that was strikingly ahead of the estimated 6 months. According to the technology of shipbuilding engineer Henry Kaiser, this period was reduced to 12 days!

There were also well-trained troops. After all, the British had already three years of experience in combat operations. And speaking of the American army, Marshall on May 29, 1942 stated that. America has ammunition, aircraft, armored forces and well-trained infantry. Churchill, while in the United States in June 1942, made an inspection trip to Fort Johnson (South Carolina) and later praised the training of American troops.

Thus, the forces and means for the second front were or could be accumulated in sufficient numbers by the spring of 1943. The Allies simply preferred a landing in Western Europe, where it was necessary to fight very hard battles with the main enemy, a landing in Africa, which guaranteed an easy and quick success in capturing a strategically and economically important region. And here they were not mistaken: their North African operation, launched in November 1942, developed successfully.

Moreover, the landing in Africa “showed,” wrote A. Harriman, a well-known US politician who participated in the negotiations on the opening of a second front, “that the Western allies could launch a similar offensive on the coast of Normandy or Brittany. All they lacked was the desire to strike in the west.”

Indeed, in the summer of 1942, England and the USA came to the conclusion that it would be more advantageous to apply to Germany the strategy of "indirect actions", calculated on the gradual encirclement of continental Europe, providing direct actions against the main forces of the fascist bloc at the most difficult time of the war of our Red Army. This allowed the allies to avoid a noticeable decline in the standard of living in their states, and significant losses inevitable during the invasion of Europe.

The national interests of England and the United States, as they were then understood by the leaders of these countries, crushed the interests of the common cause of the coalition - the faster defeat of the Nazis.

Churchill, in order to make his arguments in favor of the Allied landing in North Africa in 1942 sound more convincing to American politicians and the military - supporters of the landing in France, in every possible way emphasized his ardent interest in the invasion of Western Europe in 1943. Thus, recalling his first meeting in June 1942, with Generals D. Eisenhower and M. Clark, participants in the development of the American plan for a landing operation in Western Europe, Churchill wrote:

“We talked almost all the time about the main invasion of the English Channel in 1943, about Operation Roundup, as it was then called, on which their thoughts were clearly focused ... To convince them of my personal interest in this project, I gave them a copy of a document I wrote for the Chiefs of Staff on June 15... In this document I set out my first thoughts on the method and scale of such an operation. In any case, they seemed to be very pleased with the spirit of this document. At the time, I believed that the date for this attempt should be the spring or summer of 1943."

Churchill then had to persuade the Americans at any cost to accept his plan to seize North Africa. Knowing that Eisenhower and Chief of Staff of the US Army Marshall are in favor of an early invasion of France, Churchill convinces them that he is also a supporter of this operation, but not in 1942, but in 1943. He really needs the main grouping of the US armed forces was quickly sent to the Mediterranean, which was required by British (but to a much lesser extent American) interests. When 1943 approaches, he will come up with a completely different idea.

"Undoubtedly, reported the Soviet ambassador M.M. Litvinov from Washington, referring to the problem of the second front, - that the military calculations of both states(USA and England. — A. O.) are built on the desire for maximum exhaustion and wear out of the forces of the Soviet Union in order to reduce its role in resolving the problems posed. They will wait for the development of hostilities on our front.

The Anglo-American conference in Casablanca (Morocco, January 1943) clearly showed that the Allies were not going to launch any serious offensive against Germany in 1943. In fact - this was not explicitly stated in the decisions of the conference - the invasion of northern France was already planned for 1944.

The joint message of Churchill and Roosevelt on the results of the conference, sent on January 27 to the head of the Soviet government, was drawn up in vague terms and did not contain any information about specific operations, let alone their timing, but only expressed the ardent hope that "these operations together with your powerful offensive, they can certainly force Germany to kneel in 1943.

Moscow clearly saw the background of this policy, as evidenced by the request of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated January 30, 1943, sent to Churchill and Roosevelt:

“Understanding the decisions you have taken regarding Germany as the task of defeating it by opening a second front in Europe in 1943, I would be grateful for a report on the concretely planned operations in this area and the scheduled dates for their implementation.”

In February 1943, after a conversation with Roosevelt, the British Prime Minister wrote to Stalin:

“We are also vigorously preparing, to the extent of our resources, for an operation to cross the Canal.(La Channel. - A.O.) in August, which will involve British units and parts of the United States. Tonnage and offensive landing craft will also be the limiting factor here. If the operation is delayed due to weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with a larger force in September."

But even the assurances of the allies at the beginning of 1943 turned out to be a deliberate deception. They delayed the opening of a second front in order to shift the brunt of the war onto the USSR and undermine the military and economic power of Germany with the help of the Red Army, and at the same time weaken the Soviet Union to the utmost. “I want to see Germany in the grave, and Russia on the operating table,” Churchill joked wickedly. This is how the Western ruling circles saved the forces of the United States and Britain almost until the end of the war, so that, speaking at the last moment, they would appropriate the laurels of the winners and dictate their conditions for arranging the post-war world.

It is now well known that by the end of 1942 the United States already had 10,000 combat aircraft and 400 ships; the ground forces of the Western Allies numbered 138 divisions, while Germany at that time held only 35 divisions in France, Belgium and Holland. The Allies had even greater opportunities in 1943. Literally all the military-technical conditions for the second front were either already there or could be quickly provided. Continuing to declare their intention to open a second front against Germany as early as 1943, the US and British governments were actually preparing to continue hostilities in the Mediterranean theater, which was very remote from Germany.

"The vast majority of the English army is in North Africa, the Middle East and India, and there is no physical possibility of transferring it by sea back to the British Isles."

This is how the decision of the Allies to land in Africa in 1942 affected the course of the Second World War. Now there were not enough forces and means to create a powerful grouping of troops and naval forces for the invasion of France.

And what, the second front in 1943 could not be opened? Historical research of recent years, the facts show that, theoretically, the Western powers had the strength and means for this. To do this, they seemed to have everything: both a significant superiority in forces in the air and at sea, and a sufficient number of troops to create a bridgehead in Western Europe and the subsequent build-up of forces and means, and the required number of transport and landing vehicles, and the ability to prevent the enemy concentrate the necessary troops in the landing area to counter the allies. By the beginning of 1943, the strength of the US armed forces was 5.4 million people. The American army had 73 divisions and 167 air groups, the British had 65 divisions. (In June 1944, the Allied invasion forces had only 39 divisions and special forces.) At the same time, Germany in 1943 was no longer able to adequately resist, apart from the Red Army, another powerful enemy on another land front.

“1943 showed- German historians admitted - that Germany no longer had the strength to win a decisive military success in any theater of operations.

But all these forces and means of the anti-Hitler coalition had to be gathered into a single fist, and such a concentration should begin as early as 1942. Now these forces and means were scattered over vast areas, and the main grouping of troops ended up in North Africa. Instead of 1 million soldiers, only 500 thousand were sent from the USA to England.

"American resources, previously intended for the implementation of the Bolero plan, - wrote the English historian M. Howard, - were sent to the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and even the Middle East, and therefore suggesting an invasion) of Europe in 1943 was unrealistic ... Now, on the ruins of the old strategy, a new one had to be created.

But the "new strategy" in Casablanca was not created. According to a number of Western historians, at the beginning of 1943, the Allies should, were obliged to drastically change the goals of their strategy and do everything possible to open a second front already in 1943, to finally understand "the ineffectiveness of delay tactics with the opening of a second front." Even from the point of view of the egocentric national interests of the West, it was worth hurrying: distracted by the continuation of the Mediterranean policy, England and the United States made Russia, in the future, the dominant power on the European continent, deprived themselves of the opportunity to accelerate their influence on the course of the struggle between the USSR and Germany and carefully choose the moment when it would be possible to land in France.

The opening of a second front in 1943 gave the Allies a last chance to stop the Red Army "on the Vistula, not on the Elbe."

But that did not happen. On May 18-25, 1943, a regular conference of the leaders of the United States and Britain was held in Washington.

The British side insisted that the main goal for the autumn of 1943 be the withdrawal of Italy from the war, because, according to Churchill, this would be "the best way to alleviate the situation on the Russian front" this year. Roosevelt was in favor of "using all manpower and military equipment against the enemy." He believed that regardless of further operations in the Mediterranean, the Allies would have a surplus of military assets and manpower there, which should be used to prepare for an invasion of the European continent. At the same time, the president stressed that the best means of fighting against Germany was to conduct an operation across the English Channel.

On the issue of the timing of the opening of the second front, the disagreements boiled down to the following: the British wanted to postpone the operation to invade Western Europe for an indefinite period, and the Americans proposed to set a specific time for it, but not earlier than the spring of 1944. Therefore, it was decided to continue the concentration of forces and means in England, in order to "start the operation on May 1, 1944 from a bridgehead on the continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out." The operation was supposed to involve 29 divisions. It was planned to transfer 7 divisions to the territory of Great Britain after November 1, 1943 from the Mediterranean Sea, as well as 3-5 divisions from the USA every month.

On June 4, Roosevelt's message was received in Moscow, in which, on his own behalf and on behalf of Churchill, he informed the Soviet government of the decisions taken in Washington. It was also reported about the measures taken in the Far East and Africa, about their desire to withdraw Italy from the war in the near future. Regarding the new date for the opening of the second front, in 1944, Roosevelt wrote:

"According to the present plans, a large number of men and materials should be concentrated in the British Isles in the spring of 1944 in order to enable a comprehensive invasion of the Continent to be undertaken at this time."

On June 11, the head of the Soviet government sent the US President a response to his report on the decisions taken in Washington. The text of this reply was also sent to Churchill. It pointed out that the new postponement of the Anglo-American invasion of Europe "creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which has been waging war with the main forces of Germany and its satellites for two years with the utmost exertion of all its forces, and represents the Soviet Army, fighting not only for its own country, but also for their allies, their own forces, almost in single combat with a still very strong and dangerous enemy.

"Is it necessary to talk about what a heavy and negative impression in the Soviet Union - both among the people and in the army —will produce this new postponement of the second front and the abandonment of our army, which has brought so many victims, without the expected serious support from the Anglo-American armies ...

As for the Soviet Government, it does not find it possible to join such a decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without an attempt to jointly discuss this most important issue and which could have grave consequences for the further course of the war.

The British Prime Minister, in a reply message dated June 19, argued that the withdrawal of Italy from the war would allow pulling "many more Germans" from the Soviet-German front than by any other available means.

This exchange of messages heated up the situation even more: the Western allies had no convincing arguments to justify their violation of the promise to open a second front in 1943. On June 24, Stalin wrote to W. Churchill (the text of the message was also sent to F. Roosevelt):

“I must tell you that what is at stake here is not only the disappointment of the Soviet government, but the preservation of its confidence in the allies, which is being severely tested. We must not forget that we are talking about saving millions of lives in the occupied areas of Western Europe and Russia and about reducing the colossal losses of the Soviet armies, in comparison with which the victims of the Anglo-American troops are a small amount.

Thus, in the summer of 1943, the question of opening a second front marked a crisis in relations between the USSR and the Western allies. Meanwhile, on the eastern front, the Red Army and the Wehrmacht were preparing for the decisive battle of 1943. Moscow understood that only a major military success of the Soviet troops could, by forcing the allies to reckon with the interests of the USSR, create the prerequisites for the speedy opening of a second front and for the implementation of a coordinated coalition strategy.

The Battle of Kursk became such a grandiose strategic event. The victory of the Red Army near Kursk and access to the Dnieper dramatically changed the strategic situation in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition, completed a radical turning point in the course of World War II. An important contribution to this process was the capture of the island of Sicily by the Allies and the invasion of the Anglo-American troops on the Apennine Peninsula in August-September 1943.

The further non-stop advance of Soviet troops to the western borders of the USSR left no doubt among the world community that the entry of the Red Army into the countries of Eastern Europe was a matter of the near future.

The strategic initiative was finally assigned to the Soviet armed forces. Favorable conditions have developed for the development of the general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk Bulge shook the Third Reich to its foundations. Faith in the victory of German weapons was buried. Anti-fascist sentiments intensified in the country. The international prestige of Germany has fallen. On July 25, Mussolini was overthrown in Italy. Other satellites of Nazi Germany began feverishly looking for a way out of the war, or at least weakening ties with the Third Reich. The Spanish dictator Franco hastily withdrew the remnants of the defeated Blue Division from the eastern front. Mannerheim rejected Hitler's offer of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish and German forces in Finland. The Hungarian government, through its representatives in Switzerland, began to seek contacts with Britain and the United States.

The victorious offensive of the Red Army in the summer of 1943 made a great impression on the neutral countries, in particular, on Turkey, Sweden and Portugal. The ruling circles of Turkey were finally convinced that it was dangerous to link their fate with Germany. The Swedish government in August announced a ban on the transport of German military materials through Sweden. Portugal hastened to transfer its military bases to. Azores England.

The results of the Battle of Kursk, of course, changed the attitude of the allies towards the USSR. The ruling circles of the United States and Britain were seized with panic: it became clear that "the Soviet troops will be able on their own ... to defeat Fascism and liberate Europe." But the anxiety about this began even earlier ...

And only now, fearing the exit of the Soviet armies into Central and Western Europe before their troops, the Western allies began active preparations for the invasion of Northern France across the English Channel.

On August 14-24, 1943, a conference of heads of government and representatives of the high command of the United States and Britain met in Quebec (Canada). It was necessary to choose a new strategic course for the Western powers. Reuters noted in those days:

"It is noteworthy that the summer victories of the Red Army, rather than the Anglo-American successes in Tunisia and Sicily, necessitated a quick revision of the plans of the Allies, only ten weeks after the Washington Conference."

The main issue at the conference was the time of the opening of the second front. Churchill did not dare to directly oppose the American opinion known to him about the expediency of the invasion of France in May 1944. But he formulated three main conditions, without which, as he argued, this operation was impossible:

1) significantly reduce the power of German fighter aircraft in North-Western Europe before the start of the offensive;

2) start the operation only if there are no more than 12 Wehrmacht mobile divisions in Northern France and the Germans will not be able to form another 15 divisions in the next two months;

3) to ensure supplies across the English Channel, to have at least two floating harbors at the beginning of the operation.

These conditions essentially torpedoed the idea of ​​opening a second front on schedule. The American leadership came to the conclusion that it was necessary to take over the strategic planning of upcoming operations.

“Given the experience of 1942, when decisions agreed in April were annulled in July,- wrote the famous American historian K.R. Sherwood - American chiefs of staff feared that the Quebec Conference would end with a new revision of an already adopted decision in favor of a subversive, "eccentric operation" in the Mediterranean against the "soft underbelly" of Europe"(as Churchill called the Balkans. — A.O.).

The question was also raised about the preparation of an action plan for the allies in the event of a sharp weakening of Germany's resistance in the east or its complete collapse. This plan (codenamed "Rankin"), developed by the Allied military headquarters, was reported to the heads of government at a conference in Quebec on August 13, 1943. It provided several options for the immediate landing of Allied troops in Western Europe and its rapid occupation in the event of a major strategic success of the Germans or on the contrary, their sharp weakening on the eastern front.

The Chief of Staff of the US Army J. Marshall then put the question even more broadly:

"In the event that the Russians achieve overwhelming success, will the Germans assist our entry into Germany in order to repulse the Russians?"

There, in Quebec, the Allies first began to look for ways "to establish an Anglo-American monopoly on atomic weapons, which in the future should be directed against the USSR." But there they themselves raised the question of opening a second front in northern France (if the Russians did not win "on their own a complete victory earlier") in May 1944. Operations in Italy were also envisaged in order to withdraw it from the war. The question of opening a second front was at the center of attention of the conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held in Moscow in October 1943. The Soviet representatives insisted that the first item on the agenda should be “consideration of measures to reduce the duration of the war against Germany and her satellites". But the Western allies stubbornly evaded making any firm commitments to the USSR, including the opening of a second front in Europe in the spring of 1944.

The invasion of Western Europe in the area extending to the borders of Germany, of course, required a strategy coordinated with the Soviet Union in the offensive operations of the Red Army and allied forces. Operations had to be carried out in accordance with a single strategic concept and according to agreed, at least in general terms, plans. All this could be finally decided only by a meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain.

Thanks to the perseverance of the Soviet representatives, the conference nevertheless ended with the signing of a “highly secret protocol”, in which the United States and Great Britain confirmed their intention to launch an offensive into Northern France in the spring of 1944.

However, the possibility of a new delay or any changes in the already agreed position remained. This was due to the desire of the British side, and above all Churchill, to maintain freedom of action without binding itself to any specific promises. According to its strategy of "indirect action", the British government still intended to make the Balkans the main direction for the spring and summer of 1944, from where it planned to go to the southern borders of Germany. At the same time, according to the British Prime Minister, the brunt of the battles with the German troops were to be borne by the partisan formations of Yugoslavia and Greece, armed with American weapons and fighting under the guidance of British military instructors. The calculation was that the dominance of the British Navy in the Mediterranean Sea and the Anglo-American aviation would make it possible to supply the Yugoslav and Greek partisan forces with weapons and equipment and provide rear services from the Mediterranean Sea. Churchill thus sought to establish British control over the Balkans.

But not only about the expansion of the influence of the empire, the English ruling circles baked. They had another goal: ahead of the Red Army, weaken the growing ties between the peoples of South-Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and establish regimes in these countries with an Anglo-American orientation.

The British were especially worried about the events in Yugoslavia and Greece: there the liberation struggle against the fascists merged with the struggle against the monarchical regimes, which, in the status of émigré governments, were still in London.

But the US government believed that Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, which it supported until mid-1943, had exhausted its effectiveness. Washington believed that the troops of the Western allies could get stuck in the Balkans, while the Red Army would liberate almost all of Europe. And the second front in the West, wrote the American historian T. Higgins, just made it possible "to prevent the Red Army from entering the vital regions of the Ruhr and the Rhine, which an offensive from the Mediterranean would never achieve."

Finally, the question of the time of the opening of the second front was to be decided at a conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and England.

But where to hold the conference? The opinions of the heads of government were divided. Churchill suggested holding it in Cyprus or North Africa, Roosevelt called Alaska. Stalin agreed only to Moscow, in extreme cases - to Tehran. Now he could insist, not ask. During the summer-autumn campaign, the Soviet-German front moved westward by 500-1300 km. Two-thirds of the Soviet territory captured by the Nazis was liberated. Strengthened the Soviet rear. The Red Army began to receive everything necessary for the victorious conduct of the war. She firmly held the strategic initiative, carried out more and more offensive operations.

It was now important for Stalin to turn military success into political success. Then, it was necessary to finally realize what Soviet diplomacy had been struggling with for two years already: to force the allies to open a second front in Europe and recognize the borders of the Soviet Union in 1941. The victorious march of the Red Army made it possible no longer to ask, not to express wishes, as in previous years , but require. It was necessary to show both allies and opponents that the USSR had become a world power that could not be ignored.

US President Roosevelt understood this too. Motivating the urgent need to open a second front, he noted that the Soviet troops were only “60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they cross the river But, which they can do in the next two weeks, they will be on the threshold of Romania.

The Soviet government knew that the swords of interests would cross at the meeting of the Big Three. That is why it was necessary to choose such a favorable place for the USSR for negotiations, which would not interfere with the success of Soviet policy. Stalin chose Tehran as such a place. The Iranian capital was a few hours' flight from Baku, and a fairly large group of Soviet troops was stationed in Iran. The Soviet embassy in Tehran, well-maintained and located next to the British embassy, ​​created ideal conditions for negotiations. Well, in the event of a change in the military situation, one could quickly return to the USSR. Despite the objections of Roosevelt and Churchill, who were least satisfied with Tehran, Stalin insisted on his own.

The meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, the US and Great Britain took place in Tehran from November 28 to December 1, 1943. Churchill continued to extol the "peripheral" strategy. Roosevelt, being primarily for the landing in the north of France and the occupation together with England of most of Europe, did not rule out the possibility of carrying out a private operation before this in the Adriatic Sea. Stalin stood firmly on the fact that "the best result would give a blow to the enemy in Northern or North-Western France", which is "Germany's weakest point".

At the Tehran Conference, the Soviet delegation achieved a lot. The most important issue of opening a second front in Western Europe in May 1944 was resolved, and Churchill's "Mediterranean strategy" failed: Roosevelt supported Stalin. Mutual understanding was reached on Soviet proposals for the post-war borders of the USSR. Here the main problem was the border with Poland. The Soviet delegation managed to achieve the desired result. The Allies agreed that the Soviet-Polish border should run along the "Curzon Line", and the western border of Poland along the Oder, as Stalin proposed.

The most important final document, the Military Decisions of the Tehran Conference, which was not to be published, stated that “Operation Overlord will be undertaken during May 1944, together with the operation against Southern France. This document also recorded Stalin's statement that "the Soviet troops will launch an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the eastern to the western front."

The convening of the conference and its results are evidence of the recognition by the US and British governments of the enormous contribution that the Soviet Union made to the cause of defeating the aggressor bloc, and recognition of the unprecedentedly increased role of the USSR in solving international problems.

The establishment of a firm date for the opening of a second front in Western Europe was a significant achievement of Soviet diplomacy. For the first time during the war years, the main plans for the actions of the armed forces of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in the war against a common enemy were agreed upon.

The Tehran Conference showed that the Western Allies fully realized the primary role of the Soviet Union in the overall actions of the anti-Hitler coalition. It became clear that a power of world significance had come to the forefront of history. It became clear that Moscow could no longer dictate its terms, as it had been in previous years. It is impossible because the Red Army proved in practice on the battlefields its decisive role in the fight against the Wehrmacht, and the Soviet Union as a state showed its enormous capabilities, became one of the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. It became clear that the early opening of a second front was the last chance for the United States and Great Britain "to meet the Red Army on the Vistula, not on the Elbe." It was also quite obvious that the front in Western Europe would no longer be able to become the first, main, decisive one. He will be able to play only a second, auxiliary role, accelerating the victory over German fascism.

Alexander Orlov
BEHIND THE SECOND FRONT

SECOND FRONT, against Nazi Germany (June 1944 - May 1945) in Western Europe in World War II 1939-1945. It was opened on 6/6/1944 as a result of the Allied Expeditionary Force landing in Normandy under the command of US Army General D. D. Eisenhower (see "Overlord" operation). The problem of the Second Front has existed since the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR on June 22, 1941 (see the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45). At the talks in Washington between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in May - June 1942, an agreement was reached on the opening of the Second Front in Western Europe in the same year, which would ease the situation of the USSR, which bore the brunt of the war, and accelerate the defeat of the enemy. However, the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain delayed the opening of the Second Front and limited themselves to the landing of troops in North Africa (November 1942; see North African landing operation of 1942), and then in Sicily (see Sicilian landing operation of 1943) and Southern Italy (July 1943). The actions of the allies diverted only small enemy forces (6-7%). The major victories of the Soviet army in 1943-1944 showed that the USSR was capable of independently defeating Nazi Germany and its allies and freeing the peoples of Europe from German occupation. At the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Western Allies pledged to open a Second Front in May 1944.

By the beginning of June 1944, 58 German divisions were stationed in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, of which 33 were "stationary" (almost had no vehicles), and 18 were being formed or restored. German aviation consisted of 160 combat aircraft. Involving during the landing about 10.9 thousand combat and over 2.3 thousand transport aircraft, about 2.6 thousand gliders, over 1.2 thousand combat and over 4.1 thousand landing ships, about 1.6 thousand auxiliary and merchant ships , Allied troops landed on the northwestern coast of France, broke through the "Atlantic Wall" and, using favorable conditions (by the beginning of July 1944, 235 divisions of Germany and its allies were operating on the Soviet-German front, and only 65 divisions in Western Europe), in August 1944 carried out the Falaise operation; then, with the support of the Resistance Movement, they liberated all of northwestern France and Paris. On August 15, 1944, American-French troops landed in the south of France and by September 10, 1944 they joined forces advancing from the north. However, the command of the Wehrmacht managed to avoid defeat and withdraw its main forces from France. During the Ardennes operation of 1944-45, German troops managed to seriously push back the American-British forces, which were saved from defeat by the Soviet offensive launched at the request of the allies ahead of schedule (see the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945 and the East Prussian operation of 1945). Beginning in February 1945, the US-British troops carried out a number of successful operations and by the beginning of May 1945 reached the Elbe River and the western regions of Austria and Czechoslovakia, where they met with Soviet units. The liberation of Italy was completed. The troops of Canada, France and other countries of the anti-Hitler coalition also participated in the operations.

The Second Front played an important role in the armed struggle against Germany and its satellites. However, even after its opening, the Soviet-German front continued to be the decisive front of the war, on which in 1945 more than 70% of the German troops operated. Soviet troops during the offensive of 1944-1945 not only defeated the main forces of the Wehrmacht, but also provided great assistance to the allies.

Publication: Tehran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sat. documents. 3rd ed. M., 1971; Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945: In 2 vols. 2nd ed. M., 1989.

Lit .: Kulish V. M. History of the second front. M., 1971; Falin V. M. Second front. M., 2000; Orlov A.S. Behind the Scenes of the Second Front. M., 2001; Zolotarev V.A. Second front against the Third Reich. M., 2005.

The political and strategic situation during the Second World War changed significantly due to the events in the second half of 1944. The strengthening of the union of states and peoples, which rallied in opposition to a common enemy, continued.

The leading role in the anti-Hitler coalition belonged to the Soviet Union. The USSR made a decisive contribution to the opposition to the Nazi troops.

The government of the Soviet Union hoped for the opening of the second front of the Second World War. But the allied armies limited their actions to air rear attacks, offensive operations in Italy. The participating countries, of course, understood that the opening of a second front in the West would soon be required. In this regard, Britain and America soon launched large-scale preparations for this.

The accelerated opening of the second front was greatly influenced by the heads of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR, who considered the main political and strategic issues of continuing allied actions. The problem of opening a second front was also solved.

Successful offensive operations The landing of allied troops in Europe contributed to the deterioration of the situation. The opening of a second front became the main event of the summer of 1944. From that moment on, Germany had to wage war on two fronts. At the same time, according to a number of historians, the opening of the second front (due to its belatedness) had to some extent limited significance in the issue of the outcome of the war as a whole. The US and the UK, according to the researchers, pursued mainly political goals - to strengthen their positions.

However, on June 6, Anglo-American forces began landings from the British Isles into Northern France. The operation was code-named "Overlord" (its naval part was called "Neptune").

The expeditionary forces of the allied armies, having landed on the Norman coast, were to seize a bridgehead, after which, having accumulated the necessary forces, move further eastward, occupying the northeastern territory of France.

Simultaneously with the movement of the amphibious assault, Allied aviation began bombarding artillery batteries, individual resistance centers, enemy rear areas, headquarters, and also concentrations of troops. The blows in the regions of Boulogne and Calais were strong enough. Thus, the enemy's attention was diverted from the actual landing area.

As a result, by July 24, the Allied expeditionary forces, having landed in Normandy, occupied almost a hundred-kilometer bridgehead along the front. However, the operation plan provided for a size twice as large. The complete dominance of the allied forces at sea and in the air ensured a high concentration of resources and forces.

The landing of the Allies on the Norman coast was the largest-scale amphibious operation that had a strategic purpose. In the process of preparation, the allied forces were able to solve many problems. As a result, the suddenness of the offensive, the clarity of interaction between aviation and ground forces, the Navy and the Airborne Forces were ensured.

The summer hostilities of the Soviet troops also contributed to the rather successful implementation of the operation. The offensive of the Red Army forced the German command to transfer the main reserves to the eastern part of the front.

In the second half of 1944, military cooperation noticeably intensified, and strategic interaction between Soviet and Anglo-American troops in Europe expanded.

As a result of joint actions, by the end of 1944, the German army was completely expelled from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, from some Italian regions and regions of Holland. Thus, the actions of the combined forces made it possible to clear an area of ​​about 600,000 kilometers from the invaders.

SECOND FRONT against fascist Germany, its allies and satellites in Western Europe during World War II .

Opened 6/6/1944 by the landing of the Anglo-American expeditionary forces in North-West France. The main goal of the second front was formulated in the speech of the British Prime Minister W. Churchill already on June 22, 1941, on the day of the perfidious invasion of the German Wehrmacht into the USSR and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War: to destroy Hitler and the Nazi regime, to help Russia and the Russian people because the Nazi regime is a danger to both England and America, and the struggle of every Russian person for his home and hearth is the struggle of every free person in every corner of the globe.

The decision to create a second front was made by representatives of the USSR, the USA and England (see. Anti-Hitler coalition) in connection with the difficult development of events on Soviet-German front, on which the owl. people fought alone Wehrmacht and the armies of Germany's European allies. The joint communiqué, adopted on 12/6/1942, stated that "complete agreement has been reached on the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."

The timely implementation of this decision could not only provide significant assistance to the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the struggle against fascist Germany and its allies, but also significantly accelerate the defeat of the fascist bloc, reduce the duration of the war and the number of its victims.

However, instead of creating a second front in Europe, Anglo-American troops landed in North Africa and carried out the North African landing operation of 1942. The opening of the second front was postponed (without agreement with the USSR) to 1943. But even that year the second front was not opened. The allied forces, having carried out the Sicilian landing operation of 1943 and started the Italian campaign, diverted only no more than 6-7% of the Wehrmacht forces from the main for Germany - the Soviet-German front (eastern front). Owls. The Union continued to bear the brunt of the war.