The military operation to liberate Belarus was called. Belarusian strategic offensive operation ('Bagration'). Polish Committee of National Liberation

The main operation of the summer campaign of 1944 unfolded in Belarus. The Belarusian offensive operation, which was carried out on June 23 - August 29, 1944, became one of the largest military operations in all of mankind. She was named after the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812, P. I. Bagration. During the “fifth Stalinist strike”, Soviet troops liberated the territory of Belarus, most of the Lithuanian SSR, as well as eastern Poland. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, German troops were defeated in the area of ​​Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha. In total, the Wehrmacht lost 30 divisions east of Minsk, about half a million soldiers and officers killed, missing, wounded and captured. The German army group "Center" was defeated, and the army group "North" in the Baltic was cut in two.

The situation at the front

By June 1944, the line of the Soviet-German front in the northeast reached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. At the same time, in the southern direction, the Red Army achieved tremendous success - the entire Right-Bank Ukraine, Crimea, Nikolaev, and Odessa were liberated. Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR, began the liberation of Romania. Conditions were created for the liberation of all of Central and South-Eastern Europe. However, by the end of the spring of 1944, the offensive of the Soviet troops in the south slowed down.

As a result of successes in the southern strategic direction, a huge ledge was formed - a wedge facing deep into the Soviet Union (the so-called "Belarusian balcony"). The northern end of the ledge rested on Polotsk and Vitebsk, and the southern end on the basin of the Pripyat River. It was necessary to eliminate the "balcony" in order to exclude the possibility of a flank attack by the Wehrmacht. In addition, the German command transferred significant forces to the south, the fighting took on a protracted character. The Headquarters and the General Staff decided to change the direction of the main attack. In the south, the troops had to regroup their forces, replenish the units with manpower and equipment, and prepare for a new offensive.

The defeat of Army Group Center and the liberation of the BSSR, through which the shortest and most important routes to Poland and major political, military-industrial centers and food bases (Pomerania and East Prussia) of Germany passed, were of great military-strategic and political importance. The situation in the entire theater of operations changed radically in favor of the Soviet Union. Success in Belorussia was the best way to ensure our subsequent offensive operations in Poland, the Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Romania.

Su-85 column on Lenin Square in liberated Minsk

Operation plan

In March 1944, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief invited Rokossovsky and announced the planned major operation, invited the commander to express his opinion. The operation was called "Bagration", this name was proposed by Joseph Stalin. According to the plan of the Headquarters, the main actions of the summer campaign of 1944 were to unfold in Belarus. For the operation, it was supposed to involve the forces of four fronts: the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The Dnieper military flotilla, long-range aviation and partisan detachments were also involved in the Belarusian operation.

At the end of April, Stalin made the final decision about the summer campaign and the Belorussian operation. Alexei Antonov, Chief of the Operational Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was instructed to organize work on planning front-line operations and begin the concentration of troops and material resources. So, the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Ivan Bagramyan received the 1st Tank Corps, the 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky - the 11th Guards Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. In addition, the 5th Guards Tank Army (Stavka reserve) was concentrated in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. On the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 28th Army, the 9th Tank and 1st Guards Tank Corps, the 1st Mechanized Corps and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps were concentrated.

In addition to Antonov, only a few people were involved in the direct development of the plan for Operation Bagration, including Vasilevsky and Zhukov. Substantive correspondence, telephone conversations or telegraph were strictly prohibited. One of the priorities in the preparation of the Belarusian operation was its secrecy and misinformation of the enemy regarding the planned direction of the main attack. In particular, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, General of the Army Rodion Malinovsky, was instructed to conduct a demonstrative concentration of troops behind the right flank of the front. A similar order was received by the commander of the 3rd Baltic Front, Colonel-General Ivan Maslennikov.

Aleksey Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, leading developer of the plan for the Belarusian operation

On May 20, Vasilevsky, Zhukov and Antonov were summoned to Headquarters. The plan for the summer campaign was finally approved. First, the Leningrad Front () was supposed to strike in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Then, in the second half of June, they planned to launch an offensive in Belarus. Vasilevsky and Zhukov were responsible for coordinating the actions of the four fronts. Vasilevsky was entrusted with the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Zhukov - the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. In early June, they left for the location of the troops.

According to the memoirs of K.K. Rokossovsky, the offensive plan was finally worked out at Headquarters on May 22-23. The considerations of the command of the 1st Belorussian Front on the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Lublin direction were approved. However, the idea that the troops of the right flank of the front should deliver two main blows at once was criticized. The members of the Headquarters believed that it was necessary to deliver one main blow in the direction of Rogachev - Osipovichi, so as not to scatter forces. Rokossovsky continued to stand his ground. According to the commander, one blow had to be delivered from Rogachev, the other from the Ozarichs to Slutsk. At the same time, the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy fell into the "boiler". Rokossovsky knew the area well and understood that the movement of the armies of the left flank in one direction in the heavily swampy Polesie would lead to the offensive stalling, the roads would be clogged, the front troops would not be able to use all their capabilities, as they would be introduced into battle in parts. Convinced that Rokossovsky continued to defend his point of view, Stalin approved the plan of operation in the form proposed by the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. I must say that Zhukov refutes this story of Rokossovsky. According to him, the decision on two strikes of the 1st Belorussian Front was made by the Headquarters on May 20.

On May 31, the front commanders received a directive from the Headquarters. The purpose of the operation was to cover two flank strikes and destroy the enemy grouping in the Minsk area. Particular importance was attached to the defeat of the most powerful enemy flank groupings, which held the defense in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. This provided the possibility of a rapid offensive of large forces in converging directions to Minsk. The remaining enemy troops were supposed to be thrown back to an unfavorable area of ​​operations near Minsk, cut off their communications, surrounded and destroyed. The plan of the Headquarters provided for the application of three strong blows:

The troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts attacked in the general direction of Vilnius;
- forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, advanced in the direction of Mogilev - Minsk;
- formations of the 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Bobruisk - Baranovichi.

At the first stage of the operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts were to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping. Then introduce mobile units into the gap and develop an offensive to the west on Vilnius-Kaunas, covering the left flank of the Borisov-Minsk group of the Wehrmacht. The 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to destroy the enemy's Mogilev grouping and advance in the Minsk direction.

The 1st Belorussian Front at the first stage of the offensive was supposed to destroy the enemy's Zhlobin-Bobruisk grouping with the forces of its right flank. Then introduce tank-mechanized formations into the gap and develop an offensive on Slutsk-Baranovichi. Part of the forces of the front were to cover the enemy's Minsk grouping from the south and south-west. The left flank of the 1st Belorussian Front struck in the Lublin direction.

It should be noted that initially the Soviet command planned to strike to a depth of 300 km, defeat three German armies and reach the line of Utena, Vilnius, Lida, Baranovichi. The tasks for the further offensive were set by the Headquarters in mid-July, based on the results of the identified successes. At the same time, at the second stage of the Belarusian operation, the results were no longer so brilliant.

Fights for Belarus

Operation preparation

As Zhukov noted in his memoirs, in order to ensure the Bagration operation, up to 400 thousand tons of ammunition, 300 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants, up to 500 thousand tons of food and fodder had to be sent to the troops. It was necessary to concentrate in the given areas 5 combined arms armies, 2 tank and one air armies, as well as parts of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. In addition, 6 tank and mechanized corps, more than 50 rifle and cavalry divisions, more than 210 thousand march reinforcements and over 2.8 thousand guns and mortars were transferred to the fronts from the Stavka reserve. It is clear that all this had to be transferred and transported with great care so as not to reveal to the enemy the plan of a grandiose operation.

Particular attention was paid to camouflage and secrecy during the immediate preparation of the operation. The fronts switched to radio silence. At the forefront, earthworks were carried out, which imitated the strengthening of the defense. The concentration of troops, their transfer was carried out mainly at night. Soviet planes even patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, etc.

Rokossovsky in his memoirs pointed out the great role of intelligence at the forefront and behind enemy lines. The command paid special attention to air, military of all types and radio intelligence. Only in the armies of the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front more than 400 searches were carried out, Soviet intelligence officers captured more than 80 "languages" and important documents of the enemy.

On June 14-15, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front conducted exercises on drawing the upcoming operation at the headquarters of the 65th and 28th armies (the right wing of the front). Representatives of the Headquarters were present at the headquarters game. Commanders of corps and divisions, commanders of artillery and chiefs of military branches of the armies were involved in the draw. During the classes, the issues of the upcoming offensive were worked out in detail. Particular attention was paid to the nature of the terrain in the zone of the offensive of the armies, the organization of the enemy's defense and the methods of an early breakthrough on the Slutsk-Bobruisk road. This made it possible to close the escape routes of the Bobruisk grouping of the 9th army of the enemy. In the following days, similar exercises were held in the 3rd, 48th and 49th armies.

At the same time, a large educational and political training of the Soviet troops was carried out. Fire missions, tactics and technique of attacks, offensive in cooperation with tank, artillery units, with the support of aviation were worked out in the classroom. The headquarters of units, formations and armies worked out the issues of control and communications. Command and observation posts were moved forward, a system of observation and communications was created, the order of movement and command and control of troops during the pursuit of the enemy was specified, etc.

Soviet tanks "Valentine IX" move into combat positions. 5th Guards Tank Army. Summer 1944

Great assistance in the preparation of the offensive operation was provided by the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement. A close connection was established between the partisan detachments and the Soviet troops. The partisans received instructions from the "mainland" with specific tasks, where and when to attack the enemy, what communications to destroy.

It should be noted that by the middle of 1944, partisan detachments were operating in most of the BSSR. Belarus was a real partisan region. There were 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments operating in the republic, with a total strength of the whole army - 143 thousand bayonets (already during the Belarusian operation, almost 200 thousand partisans joined the Red Army units). The partisans controlled vast territories, especially in the wooded and swampy areas. Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote that the 4th Army, which he commanded from the beginning of June 1944, ended up in a huge wooded and swampy area that stretched to Minsk and this area was controlled by large partisan formations. German troops have never been able to completely clear this territory in all three years. All crossings and bridges in this remote area, covered with dense forests, were destroyed. As a result, although German troops controlled all major cities and railway junctions, up to 60% of the territory of Belarus was under the control of Soviet partisans. Soviet power still existed here, the regional committees and district committees of the Communist Party and the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union) worked. It is clear that the partisan movement could only hold out with the support of the “mainland”, from where experienced personnel and ammunition were transferred.

The offensive of the Soviet armies was preceded by an unprecedented scale attack by partisan formations. On the night of June 19-20, the partisans began massive operations to defeat the German rear. The partisans destroyed the enemy's railway communications, blew up bridges, set up ambushes on the roads, and disabled communication lines. Only on the night of June 20, 40 thousand enemy rails were blown up. Eike Middeldorf noted: “In the central sector of the Eastern Front, Russian partisans carried out 10,500 explosions” (Middeldorf Eike. Russian campaign: tactics and weapons. - St. Petersburg, M., 2000). The partisans were able to carry out only part of their plans, but even this was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. As a result, the transfer of German operational reserves was delayed for several days. Communication on many highways became possible only during the day and only accompanied by strong convoys.

Side forces. Soviet Union

Four fronts connected 20 combined arms and 2 tank armies. A total of 166 divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 7 fortified areas and 21 separate brigades. About one-fifth of these forces were included in the operation at its second stage, about three weeks after the start of the offensive. At the start of the operation, Soviet troops numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and commanders, 36 thousand guns and mortars, more than 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and over 5.3 thousand aircraft.

The 1st Baltic Front of Ivan Bagramyan included in its composition: the 4th shock army under the command of P.F. Malyshev, the 6th guards army of I.M. Chistyakov, the 43rd army of A.P. Beloborodov, the 1st tank building V. V. Butkov. From the air, the front was supported by N. F. Papivin's 3rd Air Army.

The 3rd Belorussian Front of Ivan Chernyakhovsky included: the 39th Army of I.I. Lyudnikov, the 5th Army of N.I. Krylov, the 11th Guards Army of K.N. Galitsky, the 31st Army of V.V. Glagolev, the 5th Guards Tank Army P.A. Rotmistrov, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps A.S. guards mechanized corps). From the air, the troops of the front were supported by the 1st Air Army of M. M. Gromov.

The 2nd Belorussian Front of Georgy Zakharov included: the 33rd Army of V.D. Kryuchenkin, the 49th Army of I.T. Grishin, the 50th Army of I.V. Boldin, the 4th Air Army of K.A. Vershinin.

1st Belorussian Front of Konstantin Rokossovsky: 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, 48th Army of P.L. Romanenko, 65th Army of P.I. Batov, 28th Army of A.A. Luchinsky, 61- the army of P. A. Belov, the 70th army of V. S. Popov, the 47th army of N. I. Gusev, the 8th guards army of V. I. Chuikov, the 69th army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi, 2 -I tank army of S. I. Bogdanov. The front also included the 2nd, 4th and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, the 9th and 11th Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Tank Corps, and the 1st Mechanized Corps. In addition, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Z. Berling and the Dnieper military flotilla of Rear Admiral V. V. Grigoriev were subordinate to Rokossovsky. The front was supported by the 6th and 16th air armies of F.P. Polynin and S.I. Rudenko.

Member of the military council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Konstantin Fedorovich Telegin (left) and front commander General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky at the map at the front command post

German forces

The Soviet troops were opposed by the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Ernst Busch (since June 28, Walter Model). The army group included: the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of Colonel General Georg Reinhardt, the 4th Army of Kurt von Tippelskirch, the 9th Army of Hans Jordan (on June 27 he was replaced by Nikolaus von Forman), the 2nd Army of Walter Weiss (Weiss ). Army Group Center was supported by aviation from the 6th Air Fleet and partly from the 1st and 4th Air Fleets. In addition, in the north, the forces of the 16th Army of the North Army Group adjoined the Center Army Group, and in the south - the 4th Panzer Army of the Northern Ukraine Army Group.

Thus, the German troops numbered 63 divisions and three brigades; 1.2 million soldiers and officers, 9.6 thousand guns and mortars, over 900 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources 1330), 1350 combat aircraft. The German armies had a well-developed system of railways and highways, which made it possible to widely maneuver troops.

The plans of the German command and the defense system

"Belarusian Balcony" closed the road to Warsaw and further to Berlin. During the transition of the Red Army to the offensive in the northern and southern directions, the German grouping could inflict powerful flank attacks on the Soviet troops from this "balcony". The German military command made a mistake about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign. If at Headquarters the enemy forces in the area of ​​the proposed offensive were quite well represented, then the German command believed that the Red Army could only deliver an auxiliary strike in Belarus. Hitler and the Supreme High Command believed that the Red Army would again go on a decisive offensive in the south, in Ukraine. The main blow was expected from the Kovel region. From there, Soviet troops could cut off the "balcony", reaching the Baltic Sea and surrounding the main forces of the Army Group "Center" and "North" and pushing the Army Group "Northern Ukraine" to the Carpathians. In addition, Adolf Hitler feared for Romania - the oil region of Ploiesti, which was the main source of "black gold" for the Third Reich." Kurt Tippelskirch noted: "Army Groups" Center "and" North "predicted" calm summer ".

Therefore, in total, there were 11 divisions in the reserves of Army Group Center and army reserves. Of the 34 tank and motorized divisions that were on the Eastern Front, 24 were concentrated south of Pripyat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were 7 tank and 2 tank-grenadier divisions. In addition, they were reinforced by 4 separate battalions of heavy Tiger tanks.

In April 1944, the command of Army Group Center proposed to shorten the front line and withdraw the armies to more convenient positions across the Berezina River. However, the high command, as before, when it was proposed to withdraw troops to more convenient positions in Ukraine or withdraw them from the Crimea, rejected this plan. The army group was left in its original positions.

German troops occupied a well-prepared and deeply echeloned (up to 250-270 km) defense. The construction of defensive lines began as early as 1942-1943, and the front line finally took shape during stubborn battles in the spring of 1944. It consisted of two lanes and relied on a developed system of field fortifications, nodes of resistance - "fortresses", numerous natural frontiers. So, defensive positions usually passed along the western banks of numerous rivers. Their forcing was hampered by wide swampy floodplains. The wooded and swampy nature of the terrain, many reservoirs seriously worsened the ability to use heavy weapons. Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha Mogilev, Bobruisk were turned into "fortresses", the defense of which was built taking into account the possibility of all-round defense. The rear lines passed along the rivers Dnieper, Drut, Berezina, along the line Minsk, Slutsk and further to the west. Local residents were widely involved in the construction of field fortifications. The weakness of the German defense was that the construction of defensive lines in the depths was not completed.

In general, Army Group Center covered the strategic East Prussian and Warsaw directions. The Vitebsk direction was covered by the 3rd Panzer Army, the Orsha and Mogilev direction by the 3rd Army, and the Bobruisk direction by the 9th Army. The front of the 2nd Army passed along the Pripyat. The German command paid serious attention to replenishing the divisions with manpower and equipment, trying to bring them up to full strength. Each German division had about 14 km of front. On average, there were 450 soldiers, 32 machine guns, 10 guns and mortars, 1 tank or assault gun per 1 km of the front. But these are average numbers. They differed greatly in various sectors of the front. So, on the Orsha and Rogachev-Bobruisk directions, the defense was stronger and more densely saturated with troops. In a number of other areas that the German command considered less important, the defensive formations were much less dense.

The 3rd tank army of Reinhardt occupied the line east of Polotsk, Bogushevskoye (about 40 km south of Vitebsk), with a front length of 150 km. The army consisted of 11 divisions (8 infantry, two airfield, one security), three assault gun brigades, the von Gottberg combat group, 12 separate regiments (police, security, etc.) and other formations. All divisions and two regiments were in the first line of defense. There were 10 regiments in the reserve, they were mainly engaged in the protection of communications and counterguerrilla warfare. The main forces defended the Vitebsk direction. On June 22, the army numbered more than 165 thousand people, 160 tanks and assault guns, more than 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns.

The 4th Army of Tippelskirch occupied the defense from Bogushevsk to Bykhov, with a front length of 225 km. It consisted of 10 divisions (7 infantry, one assault, 2 tank-grenadier divisions - the 25th and 18th), an assault guns brigade, the 501st heavy tank battalion, 8 separate regiments and other units. Already during the Soviet offensive, the Feldherrnhalle Panzer-Grenadier Division arrived. There were 8 regiments in the reserve, which performed the tasks of protecting the rear, communications and fighting partisans. The most powerful defense was in the Orsha and Mogilev directions. On June 22, the 4th Army had more than 168 thousand soldiers and officers, about 1700 field and anti-aircraft guns, 376 tanks and assault guns.

The 9th Army of Jordan defended itself in the zone south of Bykhov to the Pripyat River, with a front of 220 km. The army consisted of 12 divisions (11 infantry and one tank - the 20th), three separate regiments, 9 battalions (security, engineer, construction). In the first line were all divisions, the Brandenburg regiment and 9 battalions. The main forces were located in the Bobruisk area. There were two regiments in the army reserve. By the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the army had more than 175 thousand people, about 2 thousand field and anti-aircraft guns, 140 tanks and assault guns.

The 2nd Army took up defense along the line of the Pripyat River. It consisted of 4 divisions (2 infantry, one jaeger and one guard), a corps group, a tank-grenadier brigade, and two cavalry brigades. In addition, the Hungarian 3 reserve divisions and one cavalry division were subordinate to the 2nd Army. There were several divisions in the army group command reserve, including security and training divisions.

The Soviet command was able to keep the preparation of a major offensive operation in Belarus until its very beginning. German aviation and radio intelligence usually noticed large transfers of forces and concluded that an offensive was approaching. However, this time the preparation of the Red Army for the offensive missed. The secrecy and disguise did their job.

Destroyed tanks of the 20th division near Bobruisk (1944)

To be continued…

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A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front is forcing the Luchesa River.
June 1944

This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War - Operation Bagration. In the course of it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from occupation, but also significantly undermined the forces of the enemy, brought the collapse of fascism closer - our Victory.

Unparalleled in terms of spatial scope, the Belarusian offensive operation is rightfully considered the greatest achievement of the national military art. As a result, the most powerful grouping of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a heroic death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.

Map of the Belarusian operation

After the offensive in the winter of 1943-1944. the front line formed in Belarus a huge ledge with an area of ​​\u200b\u200babout 250 thousand square meters. km, facing east. It penetrated deeply into the location of the Soviet troops and was of great operational and strategic importance for both sides. The elimination of this ledge and the liberation of Belarus opened the Red Army the shortest route to Poland and Germany, endangered flank attacks by the enemy army groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".

In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by the Army Group Center (3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by aviation of the 6th and partly of the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy grouping included 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, in which there were 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1300 combat aircraft. The reserve of the Army Group "Center" had 11 divisions, most of which were involved in the fight against the partisans.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which the troops of 4 fronts were to act in concert. Troops of the 1st Baltic (commander General of the Army), 3rd (commander Colonel General), 2nd (commander Colonel General G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian Fronts (commander General of the Army) were involved in the operation. , long-range aviation, the Dnieper military flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front General of the Army
THEIR. Baghramyan and Chief of Staff of the Front Lieutenant General
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation

The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the grouping consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. 5 air armies provided air support and cover for the troops of the fronts.

The idea of ​​the operation was to break through the enemy defenses in 6 directions with deep strikes from 4 fronts, surround and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian ledge - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, after which, advancing in converging directions on Minsk, surround and liquidate east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the force of the strike, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.

When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of ​​​​concentrating forces in the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of the enemy's forces, making it difficult for him to use reserves in repelling the offensive of our troops.

To strengthen the grouping, in the spring and summer of 1944, the Stavka replenished the fronts with four combined arms, two tank armies, four breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and four engineering and engineer brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the numerical strength of the grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.

The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, expected to repel a private offensive of the Soviet troops with the forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive lanes with a depth of 8 to 12 km . At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-lane, defense in depth, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.

By the beginning of the operation, the advancing troops included 1.2 million people, 34,000 guns and mortars, 4,070 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and about 5,000 combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of manpower by 1.5 times, guns and mortars by 4.4 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts by 4.5 times, and aircraft by 3.6 times.

In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a quantity of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belorussian one.

By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the tasks for the fronts were determined as follows:

Troops of the 1st Baltic Front to break through the enemy defenses northwest of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi area, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk area. Subsequently, develop an offensive on Lepel;

Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies in each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway on Borisov, and part of the forces on Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;

Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Fronts, to defeat the Mogilev grouping, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;

Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to defeat the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy. To this end, the front was to deliver two blows: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second - from the area of ​​​​the lower reaches of the Berezina to Starye Dorogi, Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Mogilev grouping;

The troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, after the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, were to develop an offensive in converging directions to Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.

The partisans were also given the task of disorganizing the work of the enemy's rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, crossings and bridgeheads on the rivers, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first undermining of the rails should be carried out on the night of June 20.

Much attention was paid to the concentration of aviation efforts on directing the main attacks of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Only on the eve of the offensive, aviation made 2,700 sorties and carried out powerful aviation training in areas of front breakthrough.

The duration of artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours and 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned by methods of barrage, sequential concentration of fire, as well as a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 2 armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, operating in the direction of the main attack, support for the attack of infantry and tanks was carried out for the first time using the double barrage method.

At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The chief of staff, Colonel General M.S., is on the phone. Malinin, far left - Front Commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk region. Summer 1944

The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Headquarters - the Chief of the General Staff of the Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union. For the same purpose, the head of the operational department of the General Staff, General, was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front. The actions of the air armies were coordinated by Chief Air Marshal A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Marshal of Artillery N.D. arrived from Moscow to help the artillery commanders and headquarters. Yakovlev and Colonel-General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.

The operation required 400,000 tons of ammunition, about 300,000 tons of fuel, over 500,000 tons of food and fodder, which were delivered on time.

According to the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks, the operation "Bagration" is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.

The 1st stage of the Bagration operation included breaking through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth, expanding the breakthrough towards the flanks and defeating the nearest operational reserves and capturing a number of cities, incl. the liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; Stage 2 - development of success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, defeating the main operational reserves of the enemy, capturing important lines and bridgeheads on the river. Wisla. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined to a depth of up to 160 km.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on June 23. A day later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.

The actions of the troops during the operation "Bagration", as in no other operation of the Soviet troops before that, almost exactly corresponded to its plan and the tasks received. During 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.

German captured soldiers of the Army Group "Center" are being escorted through Moscow.
July 17, 1944

The troops, advancing 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for the subsequent offensive in the Siauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Fighter, liberate your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944

The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The success of the Belorussian operation was timely used by the Headquarters for decisive actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The general offensive front expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. Soviet troops on July 17-18 crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with Poland. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narew and Vistula rivers.

Vistula river. Crossing tanks. 1944

Further development of the offensive with an acute shortage of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have been successful, and by order of the Stavka they went on the defensive.

2nd Belorussian Front: Front Commander General of the Army
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin are discussing a plan to strike the enemy from the air. August 1944

As a result of the Belorussian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for inflicting new powerful strikes against enemy groupings operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic States, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for deploying offensive operations of the Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.

The Belarusian offensive operation of the group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. Its distinguishing feature is its huge spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.

Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Chief of Staff of the Front, Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, a member of the Military Council of the Front, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944

The troops of the Red Army, having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, by the end of August advanced 550-600 km to the west, expanding the front of hostilities to 1,100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of the German occupiers. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, on the outskirts of Warsaw and the border with East Prussia.

Battalion commander of the 297th Infantry Regiment of the 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia

During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht, then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions, having lost more than 50% of their personnel, lost their combat capability. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.

Operation "Bagration" showed vivid examples of the high skill of Soviet generals and military leaders. She made a significant contribution to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched the art of war with the experience of encircling and destroying large enemy groupings in a short time and in a variety of situational conditions. The task of breaking through the powerful defense of the enemy, as well as the rapid development of success in the operational depth through the skillful use of large tank formations and formations, was successfully solved.

In the struggle for the liberation of Belorussia, Soviet soldiers displayed mass heroism and high combat skills. 1500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.

Partisan formations played an exceptionally important role in the liberation of Belarus.

Parade of partisan brigades after liberation
the capital of Belarus - Minsk

Solving tasks in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who especially distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of hostilities, the advance transition of the enemy to the defensive, the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to heavy losses in people. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is almost 50% of their total strength at the start of the operation. And irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also had heavy losses in armament.

The world community appreciated the events on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Political and military figures of the West, diplomats and journalists noted their significant influence on the further course of the Second World War. “The swiftness of the offensive of your armies is amazing,” wrote President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944 to I.V. Stalin. In a telegram to the head of the Soviet government dated July 24, British Prime Minister W. Churchill called the events in Belarus "victories of great importance." One of the Turkish newspapers on July 9 stated: "If the advance of the Russians continues to develop at the same pace, the Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the allied troops will finish operations in Normandy."

Professor of the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English specialist in military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book “The Road to Berlin” emphasized: “The defeat of the Army Group Center by the Soviet troops was their biggest success achieved ... as a result of one operation. For the German army... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, bigger than Stalingrad."

Operation Bagration was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out at a time when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began hostilities in Western Europe. However, 70% of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The catastrophe in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for the offensive operations of the Allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the conduct of a coalition war in Europe.

The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, led to a sharp weakening of the combat potential of the Wehrmacht. By liquidating the Belarusian ledge, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were advancing in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads by the Soviet troops on the Vistula in the areas of Pulawy and Magnuszew opened up prospects for conducting new operations to defeat the enemy in order to completely liberate Poland and advance on the German capital.

Memorial complex "Mound of Glory".

Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mitskevich, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. An earthen hill 35 m high is crowned by a sculptural composition of four bayonets lined with titanium, each 35.6 m high. The bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On the inside of the ring, made in the mosaic technique, the text is beaten off: "Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!"

Sergey Lipatov,
Research Fellow at the Research
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation .

By the summer of 1944, a favorable situation had developed on the Soviet-German front for the offensive operations of the Red Army, which firmly held the strategic initiative. The Soviet troops were tasked with defeating the central grouping of German troops - the Army Group "Center", liberating Belarus and reaching the state border of the USSR.

The Belarusian offensive operation in terms of its scale, the number of forces participating in it is one of the largest not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Second World War. This operation was codenamed "Bagration". At its first stage - from June 23 to July 4, 1944- the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Polotsk operations were successfully carried out, the Minsk group of the enemy was surrounded. At the second stage - from July 5 to August 29, 1944- Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest operations were carried out.

Taking into account the additional reserves received during the battles, more than 4 million people participated in the Bagration operation from both sides, about 62 thousand guns, over 7100 aircraft were involved.

The front line in the Belarusian sector at the beginning of Operation Bagration ran east of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin, west of Mozyr and further along the Pripyat River to Kovel. It went around Belarus from the north and south almost throughout its entire territory.
This gigantic ledge was of exceptionally important strategic importance in the defense system of the German troops. He defended their main strategic directions (East Prussian and Warsaw-Berlin) and ensured the stable position of the army group in the Baltic.

On the territory of Belarus, the German aggressors created a powerful deep (up to 270 km) line of defense "Vaterland" ("Fatherland"). The self-name of this line emphasized that the fate of Germany depended on its power. By special order of A. Hitler, the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were declared fortresses. The commanders of these fortresses gave the Fuhrer written commitments to hold them to the last soldier. Army Group Center was concentrated here, part of the right-flank formations of the North Army Group and the left-flank formations of the Northern Ukraine Army Group - a total of 63 divisions and 3 brigades, in which there were more than 1200 thousand people, 9500 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, about 1300 aircraft.

Four fronts attacked the enemy's central grouping on a 700 km front line: the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan. 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian Fronts under the command of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky, Colonel Generals G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky. Their combined forces numbered in line with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. On June 25-27, 1944, they surrounded and defeated the Vitebsk group of the Nazis, consisting of 5 divisions. June 26, 1944 Vitebsk was liberated, June 28 - Lepel. The enemy suffered significant losses (20 thousand soldiers and officers were killed and more than 10 thousand were taken prisoner).

On June 26, 1944, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front liquidated a powerful enemy defense center near Orsha, liberated Dubrovno, Senno, Tolochin. At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front launched operations in the Mogilev direction. They broke through the powerful defenses of the enemy and captured Mogilev, Shklov, Bykhov, Klichev. On this site, the main forces of the 4th German Bobruisk operation were stationed, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front by June 29, 1944 liquidated the enemy grouping of six divisions. On the battlefield, the Nazis left 50 thousand people killed. 23,680 soldiers and officers were captured.

Thus, during the six days of the offensive under the blows of the Soviet troops on four fronts, the powerful enemy defenses in the space between the Western Dvina and Pripyat fell. Hundreds of settlements were liberated, including the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, and Bobruisk.

The lightning-fast conduct of the Belarusian operation, code-named "Bagration", came as a surprise even to the Soviet leadership. In 2 months, the whole of Belarus was liberated, the Army Group Center was completely defeated. The skill of the military leaders and the heroism of the Soviet soldiers were the basis for the success of the brilliant operation. The miscalculations of the German command also played their role.

The Belarusian operation is the biggest German defeat in history.

The military operations of 1944 to liberate the occupied territories went down in history as "Stalin's Ten Strikes". During the winter and spring campaigns, the Red Army managed to lift the blockade of Leningrad, clear Karelia, Crimea and Ukraine of the Germans. The fifth blow was the Belarusian offensive operation "Bagration" against the German army group "Center".

In 1941, from the first months of the Great Patriotic War, a powerful fascist group firmly established itself in Belarus and hoped to maintain its position in 1944. The blows of the Soviet troops in Belarus turned out to be so stunning for the Germans that their armies did not have time to retreat to new lines of defense, they were surrounded and destroyed - the Army Group Center practically ceased to exist.

"Belarusian balcony": strategic plans of opponents

On the front line, by the beginning of 1944, a "Belarusian balcony" was formed - a ledge to the east along the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev. The troops of the GA "Center" were here only 500 km from Moscow, while in the north and south of the country the enemy was driven far to the west.

Significance of the operation

From the occupied territory of Belarus, the Germans had the opportunity to conduct a positional war and carry out an attack by strategic aviation on the Soviet capital. Three years of the occupation regime became a real genocide of the Belarusian people. The liberation of Belarus was considered by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to be the primary task of the Red Army after the victory at the Kursk salient. In the autumn of 1943, attempts were made to break the Belorussian balcony on the move, using the offensive impulse of our soldiers - they turned into heavy losses, the Germans were sitting firmly here and were not going to surrender. The strategic task of defeating the GA "Center" and the liberation of Belarus had to be solved in 1944.

Map of the "Belarusian operation of 1944"

Plan "Bagration"

In April, Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov outlined in the Headquarters of the Civil Code the contours of a new offensive in Belarus: the operation was code-named "Bagration" and under this name went down in history. The high command of the spacecraft was able to learn from the unsuccessful offensive in this direction in the autumn-winter of 1943.

1. The fronts were reorganized: on the site of the Central and Western fronts, 4 new fronts were formed: the 1st Baltic (1 PF) and the Belorussian fronts (BF): 1st, 2nd, 3rd. They had a shorter length, which facilitated the operational communication of the commanders with the forward units. Commanders with experience in successful offensive operations were placed at the head of the fronts.

• THEIR. Bagramyan - commander of the 1st PF - led the operation "Kutuzov" on the Kursk Bulge,
• I.D. Chernyakhovsky (3 BF) - took Kursk and crossed the Dnieper;
• G.V. Zakharov (2 BF) - participated in the liberation of the Crimea;
• K.K. Rokossovsky (1 BF) has been a participant in all the grandiose battles of the Patriotic War since 1941.

Coordinated the actions of the fronts A.M. Vasilevsky (to the north) and G.K. Zhukov (in the south, in the location of 1 and 2 BF). In the summer of 1944, the German command faced an enemy far superior to him in experience and level of military thinking.

2. The idea of ​​the operation was not to attack the main enemy fortifications along the main Warsaw-Minsk-Orsha-Moscow highway (as was the case in the autumn of 1943). To break through the front line, the Headquarters planned a series of encirclements: near Vitebsk, Mogilev, Bobruisk. It was planned to introduce tanks into the gaps formed and, with a lightning-fast throw, capture the main enemy forces near Minsk in pincers. Then it was necessary to clear Belarus from the invaders and go to the Baltic states and to the border with Poland.

Operation "Bagration"

3. Some controversy was caused in the Headquarters by the question of the possibility of tank maneuvers in the swampy terrain of Belarus. K.K. Rokossovsky mentions this in his memoirs: several times Stalin asked him to go out and think about whether to throw tanks into the swamps. Seeing the inflexibility of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Supreme Civil Code approved Rokossovsky's proposal to attack Bobruisk from the south (this area was marked on German maps as impassable swamps). During the war years, the Soviet leader learned to value the opinion of his military leaders, even if it did not coincide with his point of view.

A column of T-34-85 tanks of the 195th moves along a forest road during Operation Bagration

Wehrmacht: hope for a calm summer

The German command did not expect that Belarus would become the main object of the Soviet offensive. Hitler was sure that the Soviet troops would develop success in Ukraine: from Kovel to the north, towards East Prussia, where Army Group North was located. In this area, the Northern Ukraine group had 7 tank divisions, 4 heavy Tiger battalions, while the Center GA had 1 tank division and the Tiger battalion. In addition, Hitler assumed that Soviet troops would continue to move south: to Romania, to the Balkans, to the zone of traditional interests of Russia and the USSR. The Soviet command was in no hurry to remove 4 tank armies from the Ukrainian front: in the swamps of Belarus, they would be superfluous. Only 5 TA Rotmistrov was redeployed from Western Ukraine, but the Germans did not notice this or did not attach any importance to it.

Against the GA "Center", the Germans expected a series of small attacks in the style of 1943. They were going to parry them, relying on defense in depth (270-280 km deep) and a system of fortresses - "festungs". Transport hubs: Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk - Hitler ordered that they be declared fortresses, strengthened for all-round defense and not surrender under any circumstances. The Fuhrer's order played a fatal role in the death of the armies of the Center group: they could not retreat in a timely manner, they were surrounded and died under Soviet air strikes. But at the beginning of June 1944, the Nazis could not dream of such an outcome of events even in a nightmare: on this sector of the front, the Nazi General Staff promised a "calm summer." And the commander of the GA "Center" Ernst Busch calmly went on vacation - two weeks before the Soviet offensive.

Operation preparation

The basis for the success of the Belarusian operation in 1944 is its thorough preparation.

• The scouts collected data on the exact location of enemy combat points. More than 1000 firing points and 300 artillery batteries were recorded in the area of ​​the Baltic Front alone. Based on intelligence, the pilots bombed not on the front line, but on the location of artillery points and pillboxes, thereby facilitating the advance of our troops.
• To ensure surprise, the troops were carefully camouflaged: the cars moved only at night, in columns, their rear sides were painted white. During the day, units hid in the forests.
• All the fronts participating in the operation switched to radio silence, and it was forbidden to talk on the phone about the upcoming offensive.
• Troops on mock-ups and in open areas practiced techniques for coordinating the actions of all branches of the military at the crossings, learned to overcome swamps.
• The troops received vehicles, tractors, self-propelled guns, and other types of equipment. A significant preponderance of military guns was created in the directions of the main attacks: 150-200 firing positions for each kilometer of the breakthrough.

The Stavka planned to start the operation on June 19-20, this date was postponed due to a delay in the delivery of ammunition. The Headquarters did not focus on the symbolic meaning of the date (June 22 - the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II).

balance of power

Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the forces of the advancing parties in 1941 and in 1944. The 1st part of the table contains data as of 06/22/1941. Army Group Center is the attacking side, the troops of the Western Military District of the USSR are defending. In the 2nd part of the table - the balance of power on 23.06. 1944, when the opponents switched places.

military forces	Plan "Barbarossa" 1941		Plan "Bagration" 1944
	GA "Center"	ZapOVO	1st PF; 1-3 BF	GA "Center"
Personnel (million people)	1,45	0,8	2,4	1,2
Artillery (thousand)	15	16	36	9,5
Tanks (thousand)	2,3	4,4	over 5	0,9
Aircraft (Thousand)	1,7	2,1	over 5	1,35

The comparison shows that in 1941 the Germans did not have an overwhelming superiority in military force and equipment - they were counting on surprise and new blitzkrieg tactics. By 1944, the Soviet commanders had mastered the use of tank pincers, appreciated the importance of the surprise factor, and used overwhelming superiority in military equipment. During the Belarusian operation, German teachers received a worthy lesson from their students.

The course of hostilities

The offensive operation, codenamed "Bagration", lasted 68 days - from June 23 to August 29, 1944. It can be conditionally divided into several stages.

“Minsk is ours, forward to the west!”

Breakthrough of the front line

At the first stage, on June 23-19, there was a breakthrough of the front line in the north and south of the “Belarusian Balcony”. Events developed as planned.

During the fighting on June 23 - June 29, gaps appeared along the enemy defense line from the north and south, into which the tank corps of the 1st and 2nd BF, as well as Rotmistrov's 5th TA, rushed. Their goal is to close the encirclement of German troops east of Minsk and liberate the capital of Belarus. In a hurry, almost at a run, the 4th Army of Tippelskirch retreated to Minsk, hopelessly trying to overtake Soviet tanks and not get surrounded, groups of soldiers flocked here, escaping from boilers near Vitebsk, Orsha, Bobruisk. The retreating Germans could not hide in the forests of Belarus - there they were destroyed by partisan detachments. Moving along highways, they became an easy target for aviation, which ruthlessly destroyed enemy manpower, the crossing of German units across the Berezina was especially catastrophic.

The new commander of the GA "Center" V. Model tried to restrain the advance of Soviet tanks. Dekker’s 5th TD, which arrived from the Ukrainian Front, equipped with Tigers, stood in the way of Rotmistrov’s 5th TD, imposed a series of bloody battles. But one division of heavy tanks could not stop the advance of other formations: on July 3, the 2nd guards tank corps of Chernyakhovsky broke into Minsk from the north, troops of K.K. Rokossovsky, and at noon on July 4, the capital of Belarus was liberated from the Nazis. Around 100,000 German soldiers, mostly from the 4th Army, were surrounded near Minsk. The last radiogram of those surrounded by the "Center" was something like this: "Give us at least maps of the area, did you write us off?" Model left the encircled army to its fate - it capitulated on July 8, 1944.

Operation "Great Waltz"

The number of prisoners in the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau caused distrust of the allies of the USSR in World War II. The actions of England and the United States on the Western Front (opened on June 6, 1944) were far from being as successful as in Belarus. The Soviet leadership organized a parade of captured Germans so that the world community would be convinced of the size of the catastrophe of the German army. On the morning of July 17, 57 thousand captured soldiers marched through the streets of Moscow. At the head of the columns were the highest ranks - shaved, in uniform and with orders. The parade was attended by 19 army generals and 6 colonels. The bulk of the columns were unshaven, poorly dressed lower ranks and privates. The parade was completed by watering trucks that washed away fascist dirt from the pavements of the Soviet capital.

Final stage

Having solved the main task of defeating the GA "Center", the Soviet troops entered the operational space. Each of the 4 fronts developed the offensive in its own direction, the offensive impulse lasted from July 5 to August 29.

• The troops of the 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk, part of Lithuania and went on the defensive in the Jelgava and Siauliai region, meeting fierce resistance from the Sever GA.
• Front I.D. Chernyakhovsky (3 BF) liberated Vilnius, crossed the Neman, captured Kaunas and went to the borders with East Prussia.
• The 2nd BF pursued the German troops retreating from Minsk, crossed the Neman, participated in the capture of Grodno, Bialystok, and went on the defensive on August 14.
• Front K.K. Rokossovsky advanced west from Minsk in the direction of Warsaw: Brest was liberated with fighting , the Polish city of Lublin, bridgeheads on the Vistula were captured. Rokossovsky's troops failed to take Prague - a suburb of Warsaw. In August, unexpectedly for the Soviet command, an uprising broke out in Warsaw, provoked by the Polish government in exile. Parts of the Soviet troops, exhausted by battles, provided tactical assistance, but they were not ready to take Warsaw on the move and come to the aid of the rebels. B. Model suppressed the Warsaw uprising, with the help of reserves he stabilized the front along the Vistula, the borders of East Prussia, the territory of Lithuania and Latvia - on August 29, Operation Bagration ended.

IL-2 attacking a German convoy

Results and losses

The main result of the operation is the destruction of a large enemy grouping, the liberation of Belarus, parts of Lithuania and Latvia. On a 1,100 km long front line, Soviet troops advanced 500-600 km forward. Bridgeheads were created for new offensive operations: Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Baltic.

The losses of the Red Army in the operation are the largest of all the battles of 1944:

• Irretrievable losses (killed, missing, prisoners) - 178.5 thousand people.
• Wounded and sick - 587.3 thousand people.

Attack during Operation Bagration

The statistical study of German military casualties is based on ten days of field reports. They give this picture:

• Killed - 26.4 thousand people.
• Missing - 263 thousand people.
• Wounded - 110 thousand people.
• Total: about 400 thousand people.

The loss of command staff is the best evidence of the catastrophe that happened to the German army during the Belarusian operation: out of 47 senior officers, 66% died or were captured.

German soldiers at the end of Operation Bagration

What is Operation Bagration? How was it carried out? We will consider these and other questions in the article. It is known that 2014 marked the 70th anniversary of this operation. The Red Army during it was able not only to liberate the Belarusians from the occupation, but also, by destabilizing the enemy, accelerated the collapse of fascism.

This happened thanks to the extraordinary courage, determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet partisans and soldiers of Belarus, many of whom died in the name of victory over the invaders.

Operation

The offensive Belarusian operation "Bagration" is a large-scale campaign of the Great Patriotic War, carried out in 1944, from June 23 to August 29. It was named after the Russian commander of Georgian origin P. I. Bagration, who gained fame during the Patriotic War of 1812.

Campaign value

The liberation of Belarus was not easy for Soviet soldiers. During the aforementioned extensive offensive, the Belarusian lands, part of the Baltic states and eastern Poland were saved, the German group of detachments "Center" was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered impressive losses, partly due to the fact that A. Hitler forbade retreat. Subsequently, Germany was no longer able to restore the troops.

Campaign Background

The liberation of Belarus was carried out in several stages. It is known that by June 1944, in the east, the front line approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, establishing an impressive ledge - a wedge directed deep into the USSR, called the "Belarusian Balcony".

In Ukraine, the Red Army was able to achieve a series of tangible successes (many Wehrmacht soldiers died in the chain of "cauldrons", almost all the lands of the Republic were liberated). If they wanted to break through in the winter of 1943-1944 in the direction of Minsk, the successes, on the contrary, were very modest.

Along with this, by the end of the spring of 1944, the invasion in the south stalled, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to change the course of efforts.

Side forces

The liberation of Belarus was swift and inevitable. Information about the forces of opponents in different sources varies. According to the publication “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War”, 1 million 200 thousand soldiers took part in the campaign from the USSR (not including rear units). On the part of the Germans - as part of the "Center" group of detachments - 850-900 thousand souls (plus about 400 thousand rear soldiers). In addition, in the second phase, the left wing of the Northern Ukraine detachment group and the right wing of the North Ukraine group of troops participated in the battle.

It is known that four regiments of the Wehrmacht resisted four Soviet fronts.

Campaign preparation

Before the liberation of Belarus, the Red Army men were intensively preparing for the operation. At first, the Soviet leadership thought that the Bagration campaign would be identical to the Battle of Kursk - something like the Rumyantsev or Kutuzov, with a huge expenditure of ammunition in the subsequent modest movement of 150-200 km.

Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into the operational depth, with stubborn, long-term battles in the tactical area of ​​\u200b\u200bprotection to exhaustion - required an enormous amount of ammunition and a small amount of fuel for mechanical parts and low capacities for the revival of railway lines, the actual evolution of the campaign turned out to be unexpected for the Soviet leadership.

In April 1944, the General Staff began to develop an operational scheme for the Belarusian operation. The command intended to crush the flanks of the German group "Center", surround its base forces east of Minsk and completely liberate Belarus. The plan was extremely large-scale and ambitious, since during the war the simultaneous defeat of an entire group of troops was planned extremely rarely.

Significant personnel changes have been made. Direct preparations for the Belarusian operation began at the end of May. On May 31, private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, containing specific plans, were delivered to the front commanders.

The Red Army men organized a thorough reconnaissance of the positions and forces of the enemy. Information was obtained in various directions. For example, the reconnaissance teams of the 1st Front of Belarus were able to capture about 80 "languages". Undercover, active acoustic reconnaissance was also carried out, enemy positions were studied by artillery observers, and so on.

The headquarters sought to achieve the utmost surprise. The commanders of the armies personally gave all orders to the commanders of the units. It was forbidden to talk on the phone about preparations for the offensive, even in coded form. The fronts preparing for the operation began to observe radio silence. The troops were concentrated and regrouped mainly at night. It was necessary to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, so officers of the General Staff were specially assigned to patrol the area.

Before the offensive, commanders of all levels, up to companies, carried out reconnaissance. They assigned tasks to subordinates on the spot. To improve interaction, Air Force officers and artillery spotters were sent to the tank units.

It follows that the campaign was prepared very carefully, while the enemy remained in the dark about the coming assault.

Wehrmacht

So, you already know that the Red Army prepared thoroughly for the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. The leadership of the Red Army was perfectly aware of the enemy grouping in the area of ​​​​the future attack. The General Staff of the ground detachments of the Third Reich and the commanders of the "Center" group of troops were in the dark about the plans and forces of the Red Army.

The Supreme High Command and Hitler thought that a major offensive must still be expected in Ukraine. They expected that the Soviet garrisons would strike from the area south of Kovel towards the Baltic Sea, cutting off the groups of troops "Center" and "North".

The General Staff of the Third Reich assumed that the Red Army wanted to mislead the German military leaders about the course of the most important strike and withdraw reserves from the region between Kovel and the Carpathians. The situation in Belarus was so calm that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the campaign.

The course of hostilities

So, the Great Patriotic War was going on. The liberation of Belarus played a decisive role in this tense confrontation. The preliminary phase of the campaign symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union - June 22, 1944. The Berezina River turned out to be the most significant battlefield, as it was during the Patriotic War of 1812.

For the liberation of Belarus, the commanders used all their skills. The Soviet troops of the 2nd, 1st, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, with the support of the partisans, broke through the defense of the German group of forces "Center" in many sectors. The Red Army surrounded and destroyed impressive enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Vilnius, Bobruisk, Brest and east of Minsk. They also liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and Vilnius (July 13), the eastern regions of Poland. Soviet soldiers were able to reach the boundaries of the Vistula and Narew rivers and to the Rubicons of East Prussia. It is noteworthy that the Soviet troops were commanded by General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, General G.F. Zakharov, General K.K. .Model.

The operation to liberate Belarus was carried out in two steps. The first step was taken from June 23 to July 4 and included the following offensive front-line operations:

• Mogilev operation;
• Vitebsk-Orsha;
• Minsk;
• Polotsk;
• Bobruisk.

• Osovets operation;
• Kaunas;
• Vilnius;
• Bialystok;
• Siauliai;
• Lublin-Brestskaya.

Partisan actions

So, you already know that the liberation of Belarus in the Second World War played a significant role. Before the offensive, a partisan action of unprecedented proportions took place. In Belarus at that time there were many active partisan formations. The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement recorded that 194,708 supporters joined the troops of the Red Army during the summer of 1944.

Soviet commanders successfully linked military operations with the actions of partisan groups. Taking part in the Bagration campaign, the partisans first disabled enemy communications, and later prevented the retreat of the defeated Wehrmacht troops.

They began to destroy the German rear on the night of 19/20 June. Russian partisans in the central region of the eastern front carried out 10,500 explosions. As a result, they were able to delay the transfer of enemy operational reserves for a couple of days.

The partisans planned to produce 40 thousand various explosions, that is, they managed to fulfill only a fourth of their intentions. And yet, they were able to briefly paralyze the rear of the "Center" group of troops.

At the end of June 1944, on the night before the general attack of the Russians in the zone of the "Center" group of troops, the partisans made a powerful raid on all important roads. As a result, they completely deprived the enemy troops of control. During this one night, the partisans managed to install 10.5 thousand mines and charges, of which only 3.5 thousand were discovered and neutralized. Due to the activities of partisan detachments, communication along many routes was carried out during the day and only under the cover of an armed convoy.

Railways and bridges became the basic objects of application of partisan forces. In addition to them, communication lines were also actively disabled. This activity greatly facilitated the offensive of the Red Army at the front.

Operation results

The liberation of Belarus in 1944 turned history back. The success of the Bagration campaign surpassed all the aspirations of the Soviet leaders. Having attacked the enemy for two months, the Red Army completely cleared Belarus, recaptured part of the Baltic states, and liberated the eastern regions of Poland. In general, on a front 1100 km long, Soviet soldiers were able to advance to a depth of 600 km.

The operation also made the North group of troops stationed in the Baltics defenseless. After all, the Panther line, a carefully constructed border, was bypassed. In the future, this fact greatly facilitated the Baltic campaign.

And the Red Army captured two large bridgeheads south of Warsaw beyond the Vistula - Pulawski and Magnushevsky, as well as a bridgehead near Sandomierz (recaptured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Sandomierz-Lviv campaign). By these actions, they created a reserve for the upcoming Vistula-Oder operation. It is known that the offensive of the 1st Front of Belarus, which stopped only on the Oder, began in January 1945 from the Pulavsky and Magnushevsky bridgeheads.

The military believes that the liberation of Soviet Belarus contributed to the large-scale defeat of the German Armed Forces. Many are sure that the Battle of Belarus can be safely called "the largest defeat of the German Armed Forces in World War II."

On the scale of the German-Soviet front, the Bagration campaign was the greatest in a long history of offensives. It is a sensation in the Soviet theory of military prowess thanks to the superbly coordinated movement of all fronts and the operation carried out to deceive the enemy about the location of the fundamental assault that began in the summer of 1944. She destroyed the German reserves, seriously localizing the ability of the invaders to fend off both the Allied advance in Western Europe and other attacks on the Eastern Front.

So, for example, the German command transferred the division "Grossdeutschland" from the Dniester near Siauliai. As a result, she was unable to participate in the reflection of the Yasso-Chisinau campaign. The Hermann Goering division had to leave its positions in mid-July in Italy near Florence, and was thrown into the battles on the Vistula. When Goering units vainly attacked the Magnushevsky sector in mid-August, Florence was liberated.

Losses

The human losses of the Red Army are known quite accurately. In total, 178,507 soldiers died, went missing and were captured, 587,308 people were injured and fell ill. Even by the standards of World War II, these losses are considered high. In absolute numbers, they far outnumber the victims not only in successful, but also in many unsuccessful campaigns.

So, for comparison, the defeat near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943 cost the Red Army a little more than 45 thousand dead, and the Berlin operation - 81 thousand. Such an undermining is associated with the duration and scope of the campaign, which was carried out on intricate terrain against a competent and energetic enemy who occupied superbly prepared defensive lines.

Scientists are still discussing the human losses of the Wehrmacht today. Western professors believe that the Germans had 262,929 captured and missing, 109,776 wounded and 26,397 dead, for a total of 399,102 soldiers. These data were obtained from ten-day reports that were compiled by the fascist troops.

Why, then, in this case, the number of those killed is small? Yes, because many of the dead were recorded as missing, and sometimes this status was received by the personnel of the division in full force.

However, these figures are criticized. For example, D. Glantz, a US historian of the Eastern Front, found that the difference between the number of servicemen of the "Center" group of troops before and after the campaign is much larger. D. Glantz said that the information of the ten-day reports gives the situation a minimal assessment. When the investigator of the Russian Federation A.V. Isaev spoke on the Ekho Moskvy radio, he stated that the losses of the Nazis amounted to about 500 thousand souls. S. Zaloga claims that before the surrender of the 4th Army, 300-500 thousand Germans died.

It is also necessary to emphasize that in all cases the losses of the "Center" group of troops were calculated, without taking into account the victims of the "North" and "Northern Ukraine" regimental groups.

It is known that the Soviet Information Bureau published Soviet information, according to which German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 lost 631 aircraft, 2,735 self-propelled guns and tanks, 57,152 vehicles, 158,480 people were captured, 381,000 soldiers were killed. Perhaps these data are rather overestimated, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses. In any case, the question of the human losses of the Wehrmacht in the "Bagration" is not yet closed.

The Germans, captured near Minsk in the amount of 57,600 people, were marched through Moscow - a column of prisoners of war walked through the streets of the capital for about three hours. In this way, the significance of success was demonstrated to other powers. After the march, every street was cleared and washed.

Memory

The year of the liberation of Belarus is also honored today. In honor of this event, the following commemorative signs were created:

• Memorial "Campaign" Bagration "near the village of Rakovichi (Svetlogorsk district).
• Mound of Glory.
• In 2010, on April 14, the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus issued and put into circulation a series of coins “Bagration Campaign”.

Awards

Subsequently, commemorative awards appeared in Belarus in the form of a medal "For the Liberation of Belarus". In 2004, a commemorative badge "60 years of the liberation of Belarus from Nazi invaders" was introduced. Later, commemorative medals were issued for the 65th and 70th anniversaries of the liberation of Belarus.

There is no repeated awarding of the jubilee medal. If you have lost a medal or a certificate for it, a duplicate will not be issued to you. They can only allow the wearing of the bar of the installed version.