The names of the famous marshals and generals who became the direct blacksmiths of the Great Victory are known to many. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky ... There is hardly anyone in Russia who is not familiar with these names. The merits of these and many other Soviet military leaders have been repeatedly described in historical and memoir literature. Much less fortunate in this regard were those Soviet military leaders (as well as ordinary officers and soldiers) who fell in the first days, weeks and months of the war, never knowing the joy of victory over the Nazis. But we all owe them no less than those who made it to Berlin. After all, it was these people, real heroes and patriots of their homeland, who fought to the last, trying to hold back the onslaught of the enemy superior in weapons and technical equipment on the borders of the Soviet country. In this article, we will talk about one of these heroes.


The Kiev Special Military District in the period preceding the start of the Great Patriotic War was considered by the high command as one of the key military districts of the country. The Kiev military district was created on May 17, 1935 - as a result of the division of the Ukrainian military district into the Kiev and Kharkov military districts. In 1938, it was decided to transform the Kiev Military District into the Kiev Special Military District (hereinafter - KOVO). In the western direction, its role was decisive, since it covered the strategically important territory of the Ukrainian SSR. By 1941, it covered the Kiev, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Kamenets-Podolsk, Stanislavsk, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Volyn, Lvov and Drohobych regions of the Ukrainian SSR.

The district was borderline, and this determined its strategic importance for the defense of the Soviet state. The largest group of Soviet troops in the western direction was deployed on the territory of the okrug. Naturally, a worthy and trustworthy person from Moscow should have been in command of such an important district. Since the formation of the Kiev Special Military District, the post of commander was held by such famous Soviet commanders as the commander of the 2nd rank Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (in 1938-1940) and General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1940-1941).
On February 28, 1941, Georgy Zhukov, who won two major military games that practiced the Soviet offensive in the western direction and, accordingly, the defense in the western direction, was nominated by Joseph Stalin to the post of chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. The question arose of who would replace Georgy Konstantinovich as commander of the Kiev Special Military District. This should have been an equally worthy and talented military leader. Ultimately, Stalin opted for Lieutenant General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos. Forty-nine-year-old Lieutenant General Kirponos commanded the Leningrad Military District before being appointed commander of the Kiev Special Military District. He was a military leader with extensive combat experience, who received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Soviet-Finnish war.

From a peasant son to a red commander

Like many Soviet military leaders, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was, as they say, a man of the people. He was born on January 22 (January 9, old style), 1892 in the town of Vertievka, Nezhinsky district, Chernigov province - into a poor peasant family. His education was reduced in adolescence to the year of the parish and three years of the zemstvo school. Since the family did not have much money, they had to stop studying and, like many peers from the village, went to work. Since 1909, Kirponos worked as a watchman, forester in the forestry of the Chernigov province. In 1911 he married the daughter of a saddler, Olympiada Polyakova (he later divorced her in 1919, leaving two daughters for himself, and in the same 1919 he married Sophia Piotrovskaya). When the First World War began, Mikhail Kirponos was already 22 years old.

In 1915, the young man was drafted into military service. He graduated from instructor courses at the Oranienbaum officer rifle school, after which he was assigned to the 216th reserve infantry regiment stationed in Kozlov (now the city of Michurinsk in the Tambov region). In 1917, Kirponos changed his military specialty - he graduated from the military paramedic school, and in August of the same year he was sent to the Romanian front as part of the 258th Olgopol infantry regiment. Twenty-five-year-old Mikhail Kirponos became the chairman of the soldiers 'regimental committee, in November of the same year - the chairman of the soldiers' council of the 26th Army Corps.

Apparently, during these years young Kirponos not only sympathized with the revolutionary movement, but also tried to take an active part in it. So, he organized fraternization with Austro-Hungarian soldiers, for which he was arrested and in February 1918 demobilized from the Russian army. Then he became a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Returning to his homeland, where German and Austro-Hungarian troops ruled, Mikhail Kirponos joined the partisan struggle and created a small detachment that fought both against the Germans and Austrians, and against the troops of the Central Rada. Having joined the Red Army in August 1918, Kirponos almost immediately (next month in September), as an experienced military man, was appointed company commander in the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Rifle Division. The division, by the way, was commanded by the legendary divisional commander Nikolai Shchors.

In the Red Army, Kirponos's career went rapidly - in December, having commanded a company two months earlier, he became a battalion commander, and then - chief of staff and commander of the 22nd Ukrainian Rifle Regiment as part of the 44th Infantry Division. In this capacity, the regiment commander Kirponos took part in the battles for the capture of Berdichev, Zhitomir and Kiev. In July 1919, a new appointment came - assistant chief of the divisional school for red-colored foremen (red commanders) of the same 44th rifle division. Here begins the temporary lowering of Kirponos, apparently connected with his lack of military education. So, in May 1920, he became an assistant to the head of the economic team of the 2nd Kiev school of red elders, and in June 1921, a year later, he became the head of the economic unit, then - assistant commissar of the same school. In 1922, Kirponos graduated from the 2nd Kiev school of red elders, thus receiving a military education without interrupting his service at the school.

After receiving a military education, Kirponos continued his service for a year in the Kharkov school of red elders (October 1922 - September 1923), where he held the position of assistant chief for political affairs. This was followed by studies at the Military Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze, which Kirponos graduated from in 1927 and was assigned by the battalion commander to the 130th Bogunsky Rifle Regiment. However, already in December 1928, he again returned to the system of military educational institutions - this time as an assistant to the chief - chief of the training unit of the Kharkov military school of chervonny starshin them. All-Russian Central Executive Committee. April 1929 to March 1934 Kirponos served in the 51st Perekop Rifle Division - first, until January 1931, as an assistant, and then as chief of staff of the division.
In March 1934, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed head and military commissar of the Tatar-Bashkir joint military school named after I. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR. Kirponos headed this military educational institution for more than five years - from March 1934 to December 1939. During this time, the school underwent several renames - in December 1935 it was renamed into the Tatar-Bashkir Military Infantry School named after the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, in April 1936 - into the Kazan Infantry School named after I. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in March 1937 - to the Kazan Infantry Military School named after V.I. The Central Executive Committee of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and, finally, in March 1939 - to the Kazan Infantry School named after V.I. Of the Supreme Council of the Tatar ASSR. Since March 1937, the military school became an all-union school and young people from all union republics of the USSR were able to enter it. During the five years that Kirponos headed the Kazan School, many worthy commanders received training and were released into the army, some of them were awarded high awards, including the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Kirponos himself, during the leadership of the school and college, grew in ranks. On October 26, 1935, he was awarded the rank of brigade commander, and four years later, on November 4, 1939 - the rank of division commander.

The cadets of the school recalled Kirponos as an excellent commander and educator - military pedagogical activity was his real vocation. In addition, Kirponos, being the head of the school, was also engaged in administrative and economic work - after all, at that time the organization of the normal supply of the school also seemed to be quite difficult and, at the same time, very necessary business. Party and political activities remained the most important for Kirponos - since the end of the First World War, when he was elected chairman of the regimental soldiers' committee, Kirponos was actively involved in public activities. A convinced communist, he took an active part in all party meetings of the school and college. Naturally, in the spirit of the times, he had to participate in exposing the "enemies of the people." At the same time, it should be noted that Kirponos always, as they say, “knew when to stop” - where there were real oppositionists to the Soviet course, and where there were accidentally suspected people. For some cadets, commanders and teachers of the school, he played the role of an intercessor. The fact that Kirponos was an active communist and unconditionally supported Stalinist policies, of course, also played a role in his subsequent rapid military career. Especially considering that at the end of the 1930s. many commanders of the Red Army were repressed and their positions had to be replaced by someone.

Soviet-Finnish war and career growth

Meanwhile, the military-political situation on the Soviet borders has deteriorated significantly. In the northwest direction, the Soviet Union came into conflict with Finland. On November 28, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact was denounced, and on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops stationed on the Soviet-Finnish border were ordered to go on the offensive. The official reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the shelling of Soviet territory from Finland. An impressive Soviet group of forces was concentrated against Finland, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. From the first days of the beginning of the war, the need for competent and talented commanders began to be felt, in connection with which the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR turned to the practice of transferring senior commanders from other military formations and military educational institutions to the active army. In December 1939, the then head of the Kazan Infantry School, Divisional Commander Mikhail Kirponos received a new appointment - the commander of the 70th Infantry Division, which was part of the 7th Army of the Red Army. Thus, the head of the school, who, apart from a short-term participation in the Civil War, had no real experience in commanding military formations, was given high confidence and, as it were, opened up opportunities for further career advancement in the event of a successful command of the entrusted rifle division.

The Seventh Army was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. By November 1939, its structure included, in addition to the army headquarters, the 19th and 50th rifle corps and in their composition the 24th, 43rd, 49th, 70th, 90th, 123rd , 138th, 142nd and 150th rifle divisions, three tank brigades, six artillery regiments of the RGK, three high-power artillery battalions of the RGK. The air force of the army included the 1st and 68th light bomber, 16th high-speed bomber and 59th fighter aviation brigades, consisting of 12 aviation regiments and 644 aircraft.

The 70th Infantry Division, which was to command the Divisional Commander Kirponos, was part of the 19th Infantry Corps of the 7th Army and included three rifle regiments (68th, 252nd and 329th regiments), two artillery regiments (221 light artillery regiment and 227th howitzer artillery regiment), 361st tank battalion, 204th chemical tank battalion. In February 1940, the 28th Tank Regiment on the T-26 was included in the division. On November 30, 1939, the division entered the territory of Finland. Kirponos, who took over the division on December 25, 1939, replaced its previous commander, Colonel Fyodor Aleksandrovich Prokhorov. To the honor of the latter, we can say that he prepared his fighters excellently and the division was considered one of the best in the army. Under the command of Kirponos, on February 11, 1940, she began participating in the breakthrough of the famous "Mannerheim Line". From 11 to 14 February, divisions of the division occupied part of the field fortifications of the Karhul region, on February 17 they participated in the "battle for the islands", on February 21-23 - in the capture of the island of Liisaari (Northern Berezovy). On February 26, the division was transferred from the 19th Rifle Corps to the 10th Rifle Corps. Its fighters managed to occupy part of the Koivisto Peninsula (Kiperort), the islands of Pukinsaari (Kozliny) and Hannukkalansaari (Maisky).

On February 29, the division was transferred to the 28th Rifle Corps, in which it participated in the battles for the city of Trongzund (Vysotsk), then for the island of Ravansaari (Maly Vysotsky). The most famous feat of the division was the crossing at night on the ice of the Vyborg Bay. Having made a six-day raid behind enemy lines, in March 1940 the division occupied a bridgehead on the northern coast of the bay and took control of the Vyborg-Hamina road. This division's throw played a crucial role in the assault on Vyborg, which could not but remain without the attention of the higher command. The division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 252nd Rifle and 227th Howitzer Artillery Regiments were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The division commander, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos, was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union on March 21, 1940, and received the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

The successful command of the 70th Infantry Division, which showed its valor and combat skills in the Soviet-Finnish war, became the "finest hour" of Divisional Commander Kirponos in the literal and figurative sense. It was from this time that he began his rapid, but, unfortunately, short-term, ascent up the steps of the command posts of the Red Army. Prior to that, Kirponos headed a military school for five years, during four years he had only one rank. But the feat of the 70th Infantry Division contributed to the fact that the division commander was noticed. In April 1940, a month after the crossing of the Vybor Bay, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the 49th Rifle Corps, which was part of the Kiev Special Military District. However, already in June of the same year, two months after being appointed commander of the corps, Kirponos was waiting for the next colossal promotion - he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District. On June 4, 1940, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the military rank of "Lieutenant General" (in connection with the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army).

Kiev Special Military District

However, as commander of the Leningrad Military District, Mikhail Kirponos also did not stay long. Already in February 1941, less than a year after his appointment to the LVO, Kirponos was appointed commander of the Kiev Special Military District. On February 22, 1941, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the next military rank "Colonel General". The appointment to the Kiev Special Military District shows that the high command trusted Mikhail Kirponos and, apparently, it was after his successful leadership of the 70th Infantry Division during the Soviet-Finnish war that they saw him as a promising commander who could well prepare troops of strategically important districts and command them effectively.

Apparently, Stalin, appointing Kirponos the commander of the most important military district in the western direction of the defense, hoped that Kirponos would be able to prepare the district for the coming war without arousing suspicion from the enemy. Indeed, during the Civil War, Kirponos had a rich experience of participating in the partisan movement - first commanding his own rebel detachment, and then serving in the Shchors division. Commanding a partisan formation requires that creativity of thinking, versatility, and the ability to make decisions independently, which the commanders of regular army units sometimes lack. Moreover, Kirponos had to combine not only military and political leadership, but also the functions of an administrator and a supplier. In general, it should be noted that there was no mistake in choosing Kirponos for the post of district commander - the colonel-general really, in his personal and professional qualities, corresponded to the hopes placed on him. Although, nevertheless, there was one drawback in the new commander - too little time experience in commanding active combat units.

In fact, if you do not take into account the time of participation in the Civil War in the Shchors division, and later in the Soviet-Finnish war, most of Mikhail Petrovich's military service fell on military pedagogical activities - he held various positions in military educational institutions. General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, from whom Kirponos took command of the Kiev Special Military District, also drew attention to this shortcoming: “I was glad that such a worthy commander got the Kiev Special Military District. Of course, he, like many others, did not yet have the necessary knowledge and experience to lead such a large border district, but life experience, hard work and natural intelligence ensured that Mikhail Petrovich would become a first-class commander of the troops ”(Quoted from: Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people.SPb., 2003). That is, despite the lack of experience, Zhukov, nevertheless, recognized Kirponos as a promising commander and was convinced that the colonel-general would be able to fully reveal his military talent, having delved into the nuances of commanding the district.
Ivan Khristoforovich Baghramyan, who at that time served as the head of the operations department - deputy chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District with the rank of colonel, recalls the appointment of Kirponos as the district commander: “Soon after his arrival, the new commander bypassed the headquarters. Apparently, he wanted to quickly familiarize himself with the state of affairs, with people. He also visited us, in the operational department. His thin, well-knit figure was tightly fitted by a carefully ironed tunic. The Hero's golden star gleamed on his chest. Pale, clean-shaven face with almost no wrinkles. Black eyebrows loomed over large blue eyes. The dark, thick hair is carefully parted. Only light gray hair on the temples and deep folds in the corners of the lips betrayed that this youthful man was already under fifty ”(Quoted from: I.Kh.Bagramyan. This is how the war began. Moscow, 1971).

Commander Kirponos paid great attention to the issues of combat training of troops. Understanding perfectly well that the most likely enemy of the Soviet Union is Germany, the command of the Red Army paid great attention to the training of military units and formations of the Kiev Special Military District. First of all, the task was set to practice actions in the event of an enemy tank attack. On the other hand, emphasis was placed on improving the training of its own tank units. So, the most frequent guest of the district commander, Colonel-General Kirponos, was in the mechanized corps, where he tested the ability of the crews to control tanks, and tank units - to act harmoniously in battle.

In addition to combat training, the most important area of ​​activity for the troops of the Kiev Special Military District was the construction and equipment of defensive structures in the border areas. However, despite all the efforts of the commander, the district experienced a lot of problems typical for the entire Red Army in the pre-war period. First of all, we are talking about weak weapons and a shortage of personnel in units and formations. According to the memoirs of I.Kh. Baghramyan, only the Kiev Special Military District lacked 30 thousand servicemen. And this despite the fact that the military schools were transferred from a three-year to a two-year period of study, courses for junior lieutenants were created to accelerate the training of command personnel. As for the provision of troops with weapons and equipment, there was a widespread lack of communications and special equipment, vehicles. It was not possible to fill all this overnight - the national economy of the country was already working at the limit.

War

On June 22, 1941, Hitlerite Germany and its satellites attacked the Soviet Union. Among the first to take their blow were the military units and formations that were part of the Kiev Special Military District. On the day the war began, the Kiev Special Military District was transformed into the South-Western Front. Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front. The troops of the Southwestern Front numbered 957 thousand soldiers and officers. The district was armed with 12.6 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 4783 tanks and 1759 aircraft. Hitler's Army Group South, numbering 730,000 soldiers and officers, 9,700 artillery pieces and mortars, 799 tanks and 772 aircraft, was concentrated against the Southwestern Front. That is, at first glance, the Soviet troops had a significant superiority not only in manpower, but also in weapons. However, in reality, the situation looked different. First, almost immediately after the start of the war, Army Group South received reinforcements from 19 divisions, and Hungarian, Romanian, Italian and Slovak troops also joined it. The Southwestern Front did not receive such numbers of reinforcements, and the state of its technical fleet, although at first glance surpassing the German one in terms of the number of tanks, aircraft and artillery pieces, left much to be desired. Secondly, only a few Soviet divisions were deployed in the immediate vicinity of the border, while the enemy struck with the whole "fist" of Army Group "South" at once, securing a numerical superiority over the Soviet troops in the border area and leveling the capabilities of the troops of the Southwestern Front for more later stages of hostilities, since they entered the hostilities one by one and, accordingly, could not use their advantages in a larger number of personnel.

On June 22, 1941, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave an order to Colonel-General Kirponos to ensure the counter-offensive of Soviet troops with the forces of the 5th and 6th armies and take Lublin. By itself, this task seemed difficult, but Kirponos had no choice but to try to complete it. Opposite points of view were outlined in the front command. A member of the Front's Military Council, corps commissar Nikolai Nikolaevich Vashugin spoke in favor of the immediate execution of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters on the counteroffensive. The front chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev, adhered to the opposite position. He understood that the front troops simply would not have time to concentrate to deliver a retaliatory strike and suggested organizing a defense, holding back the enemy as long as possible in order to create fortified areas in the inner territories of the district.

Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos came up with a slightly different idea - he proposed to strike at the base of the German grouping directed at Kiev by the forces of three mechanized corps and rifle divisions of the 5th and 6th armies. The task of the counterattack would be the complete destruction of the enemy's vanguard and the maximum deterrence of the 1st Panzer Army, which was commanded by General Ewald von Kleist (the tank army consisted of five Wehrmacht tank divisions). However, the offensive strike of the Soviet troops was unsuccessful. There was no interaction between the mechanized corps. Organizational miscalculations led to the depletion of the resource part of the old armored vehicles, which were mainly equipped with the mechanized corps of the front. Finally, the 34th Panzer Division was surrounded and was able to break through to its own, only losing all its tanks. Speaking about the reasons for organizational miscalculations, P.V. Burkin draws attention to the insufficient practical experience of General Kirponos in leading large military formations. Indeed, in fact, before becoming the commander of a district, he commanded only a rifle division, which, moreover, did not have any tank units in its composition. Accordingly, Kirponos had no experience in organizing the interaction of mechanized formations (See: P.V. Burkin, General Kirponos: an experience of historical and anthropological research).

However, to a certain extent, the troops of the Southwestern Front still managed to significantly complicate the enemy's advance towards Kiev. Although the counter-offensive plan failed, Soviet troops stopped Wehrmacht units 20 km away. west of Kiev. This forced the Nazis to change their offensive tactics. The Wehrmacht command temporarily refused to storm Kiev and sent all its forces to the left flank of the front. The enemy pushed back the 6th and 12th Soviet armies to the south of Ukraine, gradually cutting them off from the main forces of the Southwestern Front. In the Tarashchi region, a retaliatory offensive by the 26th Army was planned, but in the end it was suppressed by the enemy. The Wehrmacht threw the 26th Army back to the northeast, after which the position of the Southwestern Front worsened even more. Enemy formations came close to Kiev. The high command demanded the immediate retention of the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On August 8, Kirponos organized a counteroffensive against enemy positions, throwing at him all the forces at his disposal - the 175th, 147th rifle divisions that participated in the defense of Kiev, the reserve 206th and 284th divisions, the 2nd and 6th divisions. yu airborne brigades. On August 9, the 5th Airborne Brigade and the Kiev People's Militia entered the battle. As a result, the Wehrmacht began a gradual retreat from Kiev. By August 16, the enemy was pushed back to their original positions by the heroic efforts of the Soviet troops. The defense of Kiev played a crucial role in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, significantly slowing down the advance of enemy troops deep into Soviet territory and forcing the Nazi command to change the trajectory of the main forces of the Wehrmacht. Thus, for a whole month, which in the conditions of the war was of great importance, the Hitlerite offensive towards Moscow was delayed.

Since Hitler's troops were redirected from Moscow to the southern direction, the main task was to retreat from Kiev. Kirponos himself and Marshals Budyonny and Shaposhnikov insisted on this. However, Stalin did not give permission for the withdrawal of troops. As a result, by September 14, the 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th armies were surrounded. Tens of thousands of Soviet servicemen died in the encirclement or during attempts to break it out. The troops of the Southwestern Front were disunited and surrounded by the enemy. September 20 to the farm Dryukovshchina, which is 15 km. southwest of Lokhvitsa, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Army approached with escort forces. Here they were attacked by units of Hitler's 3rd Panzer Division. The commander of the 5th Army's artillery, Major General Sotensky, and his staff officers were captured. The total number of the headquarters column at this time was about a thousand people, including about 800 commanders - generals and staff officers, as well as a commandant company.

The column retreated to the Shumeikovo grove. The column included the front commander, General Kirponos, the front chief of staff Tupikov, members of the Front Military Council Burmistenko and Rykov, the 5th Army commander Potapov and other senior front commanders. Wehrmacht units attacked the Shumeikovo grove in three directions. The fight lasted five hours. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was wounded in the leg, then mine fragments hit his chest, which is why he died. The subordinates buried the front commander here, on the territory of the grove. The chief of staff, Tupikov, a member of the Military Council Burmistenko, and many other commanders were also killed in the battle. The commander of the 5th Army, General Potapov, was captured.

In December 1943, the remains of Colonel-General, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos were reburied in Kiev in the Botanical Garden. A.V. Fomin, and in 1957 they were moved to the Park of Eternal Glory. General Kirponos did not manage to fully reveal his undoubtedly present military leadership talent. He died at the very beginning of the war, finding its most tragic moments - the retreat of Soviet troops, the occupation of a huge part of the territory of Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, we can say with confidence that General Kirponos made a colossal contribution to the country's defense against the aggression of Nazi Germany. Having detained German troops near Kiev, he postponed the offensive on Moscow, making it possible to consolidate the forces of the Red Army in the defense of the Soviet capital. Despite all those mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the troops, to which many modern historians pay attention, General Kirponos honorably walked his way as a Soviet soldier and died on the battlefield, in battle, without surrendering to the enemy. It remains only to cite at the end of the article the words from the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko about Colonel-General Kirponos: “he was a brave man in military terms and proved himself to be a brave and strong-willed commander ... a brave, courageous general died in the days of difficult trials, leaving kind and bright memory in the hearts of those who knew him ... "(Moskalenko KS In the southwest direction. M., 1975).

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The catastrophe on the Western Front, created on the basis of the Western Special Military District, became one of the most tragic pages in the early days of the war. Already on June 28, Minsk and Bobruisk were captured, west of the Belarusian capital, they were surrounded by the 3rd and 10th armies, and the remnants of the 4th army retreated beyond the Berezina. There was a threat of a quick exit of the enemy's mobile formations to the Dnieper and a breakthrough to Smolensk. The leaders of the Western Front are Commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov, Chief of Staff Major General V.E. Klimovskikh, Chief of Communications Major General A.T. Grigoriev, commander of the 4th Army, Major General A.A. Korobkov and a number of other military leaders in the first days of July, they were removed from their posts. And then they were brought to trial by the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and shot. A little later, in September 1941, the commander of the front artillery, Lieutenant General N.A. Klich.

Stalin's fatal mistake

There is no disagreement among historians that this measure was nothing more than an attempt by Stalin to shift the blame for the defeats at the beginning of the war onto the military leaders and thereby preserve his own reputation intact. The complex of documents at the disposal of specialists makes it possible to assign the main responsibility to the leader for the fact that the troops of the Red Army met an enemy attack in a peacetime situation.

Fearing to give the Germans even the slightest pretext for aggression (although their purposeful preparation for war left no doubt), Stalin prohibited the military leadership from the most elementary actions to bring troops to the required degree of combat readiness. All attempts by the commanders of the troops of the districts, including the Western Special, to advance at least some additional forces to combat positions to the border were harshly suppressed.

The miscalculation in determining the probable timing of the German attack became the most fatal of the tragic mistakes of the USSR leadership. As a result, the main thing was not done - the covering troops, intended to repel the first attack of the enemy and gain time for the deployment of the second echelon of the defense, did not bring them into full combat readiness in time.

Political reprisals

The very procedure for establishing the circle of the guilty looked like a political order. On June 30, Pavlov was removed from office and summoned by Stalin to Moscow. The general stayed in the capital for several days, meeting only with the chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov. Stalin did not accept him and ordered him to return "where he came from," knowing full well that the former commander would not make it to the front headquarters.

On July 4, on the way to Gomel, where by that time the headquarters of the Western Front was located, Pavlov was arrested. The arrest procedure was supervised by the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, Army Commissar of the 1st rank Mehlis, who was also appointed a member of the military council of the front. He was also instructed to determine the circle of persons from the command staff of the front, who, together with the former commander, were to appear before the court, and to formulate a plausible justification for the reprisal against them.

On July 6, 1941, Mehlis personally drew up a telegram addressed to Stalin with the following content, which, in addition to him, was signed by the front commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, and another member of the military council of the front, Ponomarenko:

“The Military Council established the criminal activities of a number of officials, as a result of which the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat. The military council decided:

1. Arrest the former chief of staff of the Klimovskys front, the former deputy commander of the air force of the front, Tayurskiy, and the chief of artillery at the front, Klich [a].

2. To bring to trial the military tribune [al] the commander of the 4th army Korobkov, the commander of the 9th air division of Chernykh, the commander of the 42nd rifle division Lazarenko, the commander of the tank corps Oborin.

3. We have arrested - the head of communications of the front Grigoriev, head of the topographic department of the front Dorofeev ...

We ask you to approve the arrest and trial of the listed persons ... "

On the same day, the leader responded, on behalf of the State Defense Committee, who approved the arrests and hailed "these measures as one of the surest ways to improve the front's health."

Judging by the materials of the investigation, Pavlov and his former subordinates were severely tortured. The former front commander was forced to confess that he was a promoted "enemy of the people" Uborevich, who was shot in 1937 together with Tukhachevsky. To the question: "As a conspirator, did you deliberately open the front to the enemy?" Pavlov essentially gave an affirmative answer.

On July 22, during a brief trial chaired by Ulrich, he found the courage to deny the charges of hostile activity, pleading guilty only to the fact that the troops in the district had not been put on full alert beforehand.

By the verdict of the court, Pavlov, Klimovskikh, Grigoriev and Korobkov were found guilty of showing cowardice, inaction, and indiscretion, allowing the collapse of command and control, surrendering weapons and ammunition to the enemy without a fight and unauthorized abandonment of combat positions by units of the front, thereby disorganizing the country's defense and created an opportunity for the enemy to break through the front of the Soviet troops. They were sentenced to death, and on the same day the sentence was carried out.

It was a reprisal, covered by a staged trial, because the verdict was based only on the testimony of the defendants, no operational documents were involved in the proceedings, and the testimony of witnesses was not heard.

General Sandalov's note

The first to officially raise the question of the innocence of the executed generals was Colonel General L.M. Sandalov. His daughter Tatyana Leonidovna gave the editorial board his memorandum and letter, which are being published for the first time.

OFFICE NOTE OF COLONEL GENERAL L. M. SANDALOV TO THE HEAD OF THE MILITARY SCIENTIFIC DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR TO THE GENERAL OF THE ARMY V.V. KURASOV

The troops of the Western Special Military District, including 4 A, were almost completely defeated during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. At that time, I was the chief of staff of the 4th Army.

Is the command of the troops of the ZOVO (renamed from the first days of the war to the command of the troops of the Western Front) and command 4 A to blame for the defeat of the troops in the initial period of the war?

In order to answer this important and complex question, it is necessary, in my opinion, to first answer another question: could any other command of the district and army troops have prevented this defeat?

Hardly anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the troops of the district with a different, more talented composition of the command of the troops of the district.

After all, the troops of the Baltic and Kiev military districts adjacent to the ZOVO were also defeated in the initial period of the war, although the main attack of the enemy was not aimed against the troops of these districts.

Consequently, the defeat of the troops of our western border military districts depended, in the final analysis, not on the quality of command and control, but what happened:

- firstly, due to weaker technical equipment and weaker training of the troops and headquarters of the Red Army in comparison with the army of Hitlerite Germany

- secondly, due to the surprise attack of the fascist army, fully mobilized and concentrated to our borders, against our troops that are not on alert.

In these main reasons for the defeat of the troops of the border military districts, the share of the fault of the command of the troops of the districts and armies is small, which, in my opinion, does not require special proof.

The main attack was directed against the troops of the ZOVO, and, in particular, of the four tank groups that played the main role in the offensive operation of the Germans, two tank groups advanced against the troops of the ZOVO. On the other hand, the speed of the defeat of the troops of the Western District undoubtedly depended in some way on the weak command and control of the troops by the command of the ZOVO troops and the armies.

The reason for the weak command and control of the troops of the ZOVO is largely the more than unsuccessful composition of the command of the troops of the ZOVO and, first of all, the inadequacy of the position of the commander of the district troops himself.

General of the Army PAVLOV, having no experience in commanding military formations (excluding commanding a tank brigade for a short time), after participating in the war in Spain, was appointed head of the ABTU of the Red Army, and a year before the war as commander of the ZOVO troops. Having neither experience in command and control, nor sufficient military education and a broad operational outlook, General of the Army PAVLOV was at a loss in the difficult situation of the initial period of the war and let go of command and control. The same accidental and not corresponding to their posts were the commander of the Air Force ZOVO KOPETS and the commander of the artillery of the district KLICH.

Both the one and the other, just like PAVLOV himself, were participants in the war in Spain and did not have experience in managing military formations: KLICH was a teacher and head of the artillery department at the Academy for a very long time before the trip to Spain, and KOPETS before the war in Spain commanded an air squadron (in the early days of the war, KOPETS shot himself).

Was it possible to appoint PAVLOV, KOPETS and KLICH with their light military-scientific background and experience to such high positions in the most important military district of the Red Army? The answer is obvious.

I summarize the above:

1. The main fault in the defeat of the ZOVO troops in the initial period of the war should be removed from the command of the ZOVO troops.

2. A heavier share of the fault of the command of the ZOVO troops in the defeat of the district's troops in comparison with the command of neighboring military districts stems from the unsuccessful composition of the command of the ZOVO of the pre-war period, and part of this blame therefore falls on those who approved such a composition of the district command.

3. There was no pre-planned intent to defeat the troops of the district or to facilitate the defeat of the troops on the part of the entire command of the district and its individuals.

4. The convictions of representatives of the command of the troops of the ZOVO should be removed.

A fragment of a letter from Major General I.I. Semenova

Colonel General L.M. Sandalov:

“I personally from beginning to end was a direct participant in these events. I can say with full responsibility that there was no panic or confusion on their part (Pavlov and his deputies - Yu.R.). Everything that could be done in those difficult conditions was done, but it was too late, we paid for the lost time and for the fact that we were reassured and believed, or rather, we were forced to believe that the Germans were almost our friends, remember the TASS statement and pictures in newspapers.

Personally, I suggested to Klimovskys and Pavlov two or three weeks before the start of the war to raise troops according to the cover plan, but they did not agree to this, there was a direct instruction not to do this.

Eh, Leonid Mikhailovich! If we had done this even a week before the war, would we have allowed the Germans to advance so quickly, even in spite of their superiority? "

By the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of July 31, 1957, the verdict of July 22, 1941 against D.G. Pavlova, V.E. Klimovskikh, A.T. Grigoriev and A.A. Korobkov and the verdict of September 17, 1941 against N.A. The cry was canceled, and the proceedings against them were terminated due to the absence of corpus delicti in their actions.

Yuri Rubtsov - Colonel, member of the Russian Association of World War II Historians



The encirclement of the main forces of the Western Front in the summer of 1941 is one of the greatest tragedies in the history of Russian arms, standing on a par with the Battle of the Kalka River in 1223 or the death of Samsonov's army in East Prussia in the summer of 1914. Yes, during the years of the Great Patriotic War we also had large losses, but this tragedy happened first, and it was she who largely determined the further unfavorable development of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front ...

It is recognized that the main fault that the German attack turned out to be unexpected for the covering troops of the western border districts and for the entire Red Army lies with the country's top leadership. But questions remain. The main one, in my opinion, is the following: where does the responsibility of Stalin and his inner circle end and the responsibility of the lower level - the front command begins? The relevance of the issue is determined by the highest price paid for the mistakes made.

The country's leadership reacted to the growing flow of reports about the pulling together of German troops to the western borders of the USSR with a partial conscription of reserve servicemen. About 800 thousand people - out of the 5 million planned in case of full mobilization - were replenished in May-June in the divisions of the western districts. June 12, People's Commissar for Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko signed directives on the advance to the border of rifle divisions located in the rear areas of border districts. However, due to the lack of vehicles, they moved extremely slowly. By a decree of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, the armies of the second strategic echelon, moving from the depths of the country to the Dnieper-Western Dvina line, were united into a reserve group of the High Command - the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies.

However, the advancing troops were not manned in sufficient numbers of people and equipment, and arrived to the west in parts. The worst was the readiness of the covering troops to repel sudden aggression. At the direction of I.V. Stalin, the commanders of the troops of the districts were warned by G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Tymoshenko both on the need to increase vigilance and on the prevention of reasons for provocation. Any measures that could be interpreted by the command of the Wehrmacht as bringing Soviet troops to full combat readiness were suppressed by the Kremlin in the strictest manner.

The result is known. The troops of the Wehrmacht and its allies brought to full combat readiness - about 4.4 million people, 4 thousand tanks, 4.4 thousand aircraft - were opposed in the west, although it was large in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft - 11 thousand and 9.1 thousand, but not ready. the three-million-strong Soviet group, which was at the stage of formation and did not have a plan for a deep defensive operation. Defense was presented to the Soviet command as a short-term phase of the initial period of hostilities ...

Could the commanders of the troops of the border districts in any way influence the situation and thereby mitigate the tragic consequences of reinsurance and indecision of the top leadership?

By the beginning of the war, the commander of the Western Special Military District, Army General D.G. Pavlov obeyed the command of the 3rd, 10th, 4th armies, located in the immediate vicinity of the border, and the 13th - in the rear area of ​​the district. 678 thousand people, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2,200 tanks and more than 1,5 thousand aircraft. With approximate equality in aircraft, the district was inferior to Army Group Center in men and artillery, but outnumbered in tanks by one and a half times. The 6th mechanized corps of General M. Khatskilevich was considered the most equipped armored unit in the Red Army - 1,022 tanks, of which 352 KV and T-34. However, most of the tanks were obsolete T-26 and BT.

Information about the deployment of the Wehrmacht offensive grouping on the other side of the border began to arrive at the headquarters of the Western Military District from the beginning of 1941. On June 4, Colonel Blokhin, the chief of the district headquarters intelligence department, presented General Pavlov with a special message "On Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR." As noted, in the second half of May, the Germans strengthened their grouping by 2-3 infantry, two armored divisions and an SS division. At the border, the deployment of air defense and anti-tank equipment was noticed. The Germans established the unloading of a large number of trains with bombs, gunpowder, landing at the airfields of large aviation units. The movement of the local population in the border zone was reduced to a minimum, and from many areas they were evicted to the "hinterland". All civilian medical institutions in large cities and towns were used as hospitals. Intelligence reported that "the hidden mobilization of officials for future positions in western regions of the USSR ... In Czech Prague, there are courses of parachutists, for which members of the Belarusian committee from Warsaw are mobilized. At the beginning of hostilities, they will be thrown into the rear of Soviet Belarus to carry out sabotage missions ... "

The following point of the special message attracted attention: "On May 24, 1941, the branch of German intelligence in

The city of Tsekhanów sent five agents to the territory of the USSR with the intention to return no later than June 5, 1941. One of the agents said that he would not have time to return from Bialystok and Grodno by that time. The head of the reconnaissance point replied: after June 5, hostilities with the USSR may start, so he cannot guarantee the life of the agent ... "All agents received, among other things, the following tasks: to establish the percentage of former tsarist officers who are in the Red Army, and the mood of the population living in the border areas.

Undercover data confirmed that "the Polish population, according to the experience of preparing the war between Germany and Poland in 1939, and the German soldiers, according to the existing experience of waging war, also consider the inevitable start of hostilities with the USSR in the near future."

The head of the intelligence department came to the conclusion: "Information about the forced preparation of the theater and about the strengthening of the grouping of troops in the zone against the Western Military District is trustworthy."

It is clear that the Kremlin and the General Staff were informed. But how did Pavlov himself react to detailed information about German preparations for war? The materials prepared after the war help us to answer this question, when the cases against generals Pavlov, Klimovsky, Korobkov and others began to be reviewed for the purpose of rehabilitation.

Here is what, for example, the former chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the Western Military District, Major General B. Fomin, wrote:

"Pavlov carefully monitored the preparation of the theater of military operations ... All along the border were created field defensive zones with bunkers. As for the level, they were not built and armed by the beginning of the war. Carefully monitoring the deployment of enemy troops, Pavlov repeatedly raised a question before the People's Commissar of Defense about the redeployment of district troops from the depths to the border area ... However, the 113th, 121st, 143rd and 50th rifle divisions did not manage to get out to the areas they planned, and the war found them on the march .. ...

By the beginning of the war, the troops of the district were at the stage of organizational measures. Five tank corps, an airborne corps were formed ... The supply of materiel was slow ... The aviation of the district was at the stage of training flight personnel on the incoming new materiel, but there were few retrained crews.

Pavlov knew about the preparation of a surprise attack by the Germans (italics are ours. - MM) and asked to occupy the field fortifications along the state border. June 20, 1941 in a cipher program signed by the deputy. Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff Vasilevsky Pavlov was informed that his request was reported to the People's Commissar and the latter did not allow him to occupy the field fortifications, as this could cause provocation from the Germans ... "

In the actions and deeds of Pavlov, General Fomin did not see sabotage, let alone betrayal. In his opinion, the front suffered a setback for the following reasons: the numerical superiority of the enemy; suddenness of the attack; insufficient provision of air defense means; the front's absence of reserves and a defensive line along the Shchara River and the withdrawal of troops from it on the night of the first to the second day of the war, "as a result of which the enemy, having freely occupied it, created conditions for encircling the troops of the 3rd and 10th armies"; belated occupation of the level lines along the old state border by troops

Of the 13th Army, the illiterate intervention of Marshal G.I. Kulik at the disposal of the Deputy Front Commander I.V. Boldin and the commander of the 10th Army K.D. Golubev, "which led to the inglorious end of the front's mobile group."

In the note, Fomin also mentioned the former chief of staff of the front, Major General Klimovskikh, who, in his opinion, was distinguished by "great efficiency and honesty." However, he noted the chief of staff's lack of "a sober assessment of the enemy and his capabilities. Klimovskikh did not believe that the enemy was able to plan his initial operation so far and deliver massive air strikes far into the depths."

In conclusion, Fomin wrote that all the generals listed by him, arrested and executed in the summer of 1941, "were cut off from command and control at a time when, through their efforts, the pace of the enemy's operation began to fade, and command and control of troops was getting better."

Fomin's opinion is worthy of attention, but, unfortunately, it leaves out the question: if Pavlov knew that the Germans were preparing a "sudden" attack, what did he really do - not in words, but in deeds - in order not to to lose all their strength in the very first days of the war?

Preserved a note and the former commander of the 3rd Army, Colonel-General V.I. Kuznetsov. It said:

“All the commanders of the armies, including myself, reported to Pavlov about the completely open preparation of the Germans for war. For example, we accurately established the concentration of large German forces in the Augustow forests southeast of Suwalki.

We also had anonymous letters in our hands, which indicated the approximate time of the Germans' transition to the offensive - June 21, 22, 23. Nevertheless, Pavlov, a few days before the start of the war, ordered all the artillery to be sent for artillery firing several hundred kilometers from the front line ... "

Further, Kuznetsov said that he considered it wrong to instruct Marshal Kulik to organize a counterattack by army units in the general direction of Grodno - Suwalki on June 24 in order to provide the flank of the front shock group as part of the 10th Army and the Khatskilevich mechanized corps from the north. The fact is that the corps had only one and a half refueling points at that time, the aviation of the front was defeated, and the flanks of the front were open. According to Kuznetsov, the most reasonable would be a transition to "mobile defense" and a counterstrike against the rear of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, which was rapidly advancing towards Baranovichi from the southwest.

Kuznetsov did not see anything treacherous in the actions of Pavlov or the Klimovskys, but noted that they "simply did not manage to master and did not cope with the situation of the initial period of the war."

Indeed, the opinion that Pavlov and his staff "did not master and did not cope with the situation" in the initial period of the war seems to be correct. But hardly anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the troops of the Western Front even with a different, more strong-willed or more experienced commander. However, it is obvious that the origins of the tragedy of the Western Front were laid in the pre-war period, and General Pavlov did not do everything possible to prevent the worst development of the scenario of hostilities. One example of this is the case of the artillery of the front, which was brought out to the rear for firing just before the war. It can be assumed that Pavlova let down his instincts here, but one can also think of a certain negligence shown by the employees of the headquarters of the Western Military District.

The absence of the command of the Western Military District - as well as of the command of the Central Military District - of proper exactingness can be seen from the example of the construction of operational airfields in these districts. After all, precisely because of the lack of a sufficient number of landing sites, the aviation of the Western Front on the first day of the war lost about 750 combat vehicles, which amounted to about 60 percent of all our aircraft destroyed on June 22 ...

June 18 1941 the People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. 0039 "On the state of construction of operational airfields according to the main construction plan of 1941". It said: "The situation with the construction of operational airfields is amazingly bad. As of June 1 of this year, only 50 percent of the plan approved by me is covered by construction ... Construction is especially bad in the KVO and ZAPVO. The main reason is the lack of exactingness on the part of the military councils of the districts. , failure to take decisive and comprehensive measures to use all opportunities on the ground. "

It is possible to challenge the accusations made in this document, signed, by the way, by S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov. It is interesting that his last point read: "additional limits on fuel will not be given," so it is necessary "to involve more horse transport and grabbers in the construction." It is known that the commanders were sorely lacking either the strength or the funds to build airfields, but it should be admitted that they were not responsible for peaceful construction and were not simple administrators. They were responsible for the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. It was about the combat effectiveness of aviation, which, in the event of a war, was supposed to cover their subordinate personnel and equipment ... It is no coincidence, apparently, that General Pavlov's aviation losses turned out to be much higher than on neighboring fronts. Most of his aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

Nevertheless, it is hardly productive to compare the degree of competence of this or that commander in the pre-war period or at the beginning of the war. It is very difficult to determine whose mistakes were more difficult and who behaved more competently. The KVO - the Southwestern Front - met the enemy's invasion in a somewhat more organized manner than other districts, but it was the most powerful district in the Red Army. The PribVO - the North-Western Front - also managed to retreat without such severe losses as were on the Western Front, but a smaller group of Wehrmacht forces operated in the Baltic states. At the same time, two tank groups were aimed at the defeat of our troops in Belarus by the German command, which objectively created the preconditions for the encirclement of our large forces near Bialystok and Minsk.

First of all, you need to look for common mistakes made by the command of the districts. The military councils could take more intensive measures aimed at reducing losses in the event of a sudden aggression. These include the creation of minefields in the directions of the alleged enemy strikes, preparation for the explosion of bridges across border rivers, more active construction of airfields and the dispersal of aviation on them, the organization of reliable protection of communication lines - all these measures are purely defensive and could not give rise to a German provocation. ... Everything turned out differently: German tanks captured the bridges across the Bug intact, and the communication lines cut in the first hours of the war brought chaos to the organization of command and control. The high rate of German advance to the east was predetermined from the very beginning.

Troops were not mentally prepared for an enemy attack. They waited for the war, and at the same time did not want to say goodbye to a peaceful life. Yes, there was a TASS report of June 14, but there was also a lack of strict discipline in the troops themselves. Demandingness was replaced by complacency, which was not slow to show itself on the first day of the war. The soldiers and commanders then experienced the greatest shock, which can be judged from the text of the encrypted code of the military council of the Western Front to subordinate troops, sent on the evening of June 22, 1941.

"The experience of the first day of the war," it said, "shows the disorganization and carelessness of many commanders, including big bosses. They start thinking about providing fuel, shells, cartridges only when cartridges are running out, while a huge mass of machines is busy evacuating the families of the commanding staff, who are also accompanied by the Red Army, that is, the people of the combat crew. The wounded are not evacuated from the battlefield, the soldiers and commanders are not provided with rest, when the cattle withdraws, food is left to the enemy ... "

The encryption program was signed by D. Pavlov, A. Fominykh (a member of the military council of the front), V. Klimovskikh.

Unfortunately, the blame for the panic, confusion, deviations from the rules of the charter that began on the first day of the war largely lies with the generals themselves who signed this document. But can the punishment that befell them be considered fair? Was not their condemnation to execution an attempt at self-justification by the country's top leadership?

Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In the pictures: General of the Army D.G. Pavlov; they fought to the end.

The new appointment quite suited Ivan Stepanovich Konev (27). Commanding the forces of the Kalinin Front was a rewarding job, and the return to command of the illustrious forces of the Western Front could not fail to cause jubilation. Konev had previously served on the Western Front and commanded it, but he preferred not to remember these difficult times. However, his memories of the tragedies of the summer of 1941 were still too fresh. At that time, he commanded the renowned 19th Army, which was transferred to the North Caucasian Military District on the eve of the war. An invincible army of two rifle and one mechanized corps was to become the strategic reserve of the Southwestern Front in critical periods of wartime. But in the chaos wrought by Operation Barbarossa, Konev's once proud army was hastily flown into the central sector and partly thrown into battle west of Smolensk. Exhausted by the advancing German tank forces, the army dispersed; some of the divisions were destroyed in Smolensk, the rest, in confusion, went on the defensive east of Smolensk, where they helped temporarily halt the indomitable German offensive.

After Stalin sent Zhukov to Leningrad in September 1941, Konev assumed command of the Western Front - only to see his front almost completely collapse during the German offensive in Moscow in October. After the death of two-thirds of his troops in the encircled Vyazma, Konev was entrusted with command of the remnants of the right-flank formations of the Western Front, regrouped and renamed the Kalinin Front. Konev commanded the Kalinin Front during the defense of Moscow and led it during the partially successful Soviet winter counteroffensive near Moscow. At the height of winter, Konev's troops (most of the army) entered into a fierce duel with counterattacking German formations under the command of General Model. Once again, Konev and Model crossed swords in August 1942, when Model was already in command of the 9th Army. Konev was looking for a new meeting with the sworn enemy, this time in the role of commander of the Western Front.

On August 26, having taken command of the Western Front from Zhukov, Konev immediately began to prepare for the resumption of the battle for life and death. After carefully re-equipping his tank forces, with the directive of September 11, he reorganized the mobile forces, turned them into a single powerful weapon capable of continuing offensive operations along the entire depth of the enemy's defense line (28). From the battle-hardened 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps, he formed a mobile mechanized cavalry group and placed it under the command of an experienced cavalry corps commander, Major General V.V. Kryukov. At the same time, during September and early October, Konev's front headquarters issued a stream of directives and orders in order to eliminate the mistakes that caused such damage to the front during the August operation. The most important component of these orders was the introduction of new interaction procedures in order to make the actions of mobile groups coherent, to ensure constant communication between them and the infantry, artillery and aviation operating together (29).

Konev was proud of his combined forces. He believed that never before had such troops been so powerful and under the leadership of a more experienced command staff. By October 15, they included 11 combined armies (30th, 29th, 31st, 20th, 5th, 33rd, 49th, 50th, 10th, 16th and 61 -yu) deployed along the front line from Rzhev to! north to Bryansk in the south. It was one of the strongest Soviet fronts. It included two elite Guards rifle corps (5th and 8th), the armored core consisted of six tank corps (3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th), as well as the well-equipped 3rd Tank Army of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko (30). The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General Kryukov and the famous 1st Guards Cavalry Corps completed the list, along with an impressive arsenal of covering artillery and engineering units allocated by the Stavka (see the exact order of battle of the Western Front in the Appendices).

The initial directive of the Stavka to start Operation Mars on October 12 reached the headquarters of the Western Front on October 1, 1942, but bad weather prevented the plan from being carried out. Therefore, the Headquarters prepared a new directive, postponing the offensive until October 28, and sent it to Konev on October 10. With difficulty restraining the growing impatience, Konev shared his hopes with the officers of his headquarters and ordered them to immediately begin the difficult and time-consuming process of developing a plan for a new offensive. Since the Stavki ordered detailed preparations for only the first stage of the offensive, the headquarters officers focused all their attention on Operation Mars, while Konev single-handedly pondered in general terms the subsequent Operation Jupiter. He knew all too well from experience the dangers of awakening high hopes in people. But he could not get rid of the thoughts of "Jupiter" in any way, despite the fact that Operation Mars was to begin on October 28, just a few weeks later.

Five days later, Konev's headquarters transformed the general concept of Operation Mars, developed by Stavka, into a detailed front-line plan. Having received it from the head of the front headquarters, Colonel-General V.D. Sokolovsky, and having familiarized himself with him, Konev was pleased:

“The main blow was delivered by units of the 20th army in the general direction of Gredyakino, Kateryushki. After breaking through the tactical depth of the enemy's defense, it was planned to introduce a mechanized cavalry group into the breakthrough. This group, in cooperation with the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, was to play a decisive role in encircling and destroying the enemy's Rzhev-Sychevsk grouping.

To ensure success in the direction of the main attack in the breakthrough sector of the 20th Army, the superiority of forces and means over the enemy in manpower and equipment was created almost two to three times. The outline of the front line as a whole favored the offensive of the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin and the right wing of the Western fronts, despite strong fortifications and unfavorable terrain conditions for the advancing conditions.

The 20th Army delivered the main blow with its right flank with the task of breaking through the enemy's defenses on the Vasilki, Gredyakino, Prudy front, and seizing the first and second lines of defense on the Mal line. Petrakovo, Bol. and Mal. Kropotovo, Podosinovka, Zherebtsovo. In the future, the army was to leave west of the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. On the first day of the operation, it was planned to transport the mechanized cavalry group to the western bank of the river. Vazuza.

On the second day of the operation, the 326, 42, 251, 247th rifle divisions were to capture the railway line, after which the first three divisions turned the offensive front to the northwest, and the last to the southwest. Such a maneuver of the troops was supposed to provide a corridor 15-18 km wide for the entry of a mechanized cavalry group into the breakthrough.

The further task of the mechanized cavalry group by the front commander was determined as follows (Scheme 24):

6th Panzer Corps to deliver a concentrated attack in the direction of Sychevka and capture this settlement in cooperation with units of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps advancing from the northeast;

20th Cavalry Division to advance on Andreevskoye, preventing the enemy's reserves from approaching from the south-west, and to smash enemy units retreating from Sychevka;

The 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (without the 20th Cavalry Division) to advance on Chertolino in order to cut the Rzhev-Olenin railway and subsequently, in cooperation with units advancing from the front, to destroy the enemy's Rzhev grouping ”(31).

Konev was well aware of how much work it took to turn this sleek scenario into a detailed work plan for the operation. The developers of the headquarters faced serious problems. It is difficult to deliver powerful blows simultaneously with the crossing of a large river, even if, as Konev hoped, this river freezes over. In addition, after the first blow, the river should have become a serious obstacle to advancement and a bottleneck for transport transporting ammunition. On the right flank of the 20th Army, the Osuga River limited freedom of action and forced an offensive in a narrow "corridor". It was also necessary to cross it so that the offensive developed at the required speed. Drawing a dividing line between the 20th and 31st armies along the Osuga River partly eliminated this difficulty, but the terrain was still far from ideal for an offensive.

Konev also thought about the enemy. Although the German infantry divisions had not yet recovered from the August battles, they had already entrenched themselves on a carefully prepared, solid line of defense. When intelligence reported to Konev that the German 5th Panzer Division was still covering the front line of the defense, he shuddered, recalling the damage this division had inflicted on the advancing Soviet troops in August. Moreover, somewhere in the rear, other tank formations were hiding, but the scouts were unable to find out either their numbers or their exact location. Konev sincerely hoped that with a coordinated Soviet offensive against all sectors of the Rzhev salient, these dangerous enemy reserves would be thrown into other places, but deep down he knew that there would be enough of them for his share.

Driving away terrible thoughts, Konev left the headquarters, leaving the officers to do their work.

WESTERN FRONT,

1) the operational-strategic formation of the Russian army in the western strategic direction in the 1st World War. It was formed on 4 (17) .8.1915 as a result of the division of the North-Western Front into two - the North and the Western. The Western Front at various times included the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 10th armies. In August - October 1915, the front's troops fought heavy defensive battles for Vilna (now Vilnius), eliminating the breakthrough of the 1st and 6th cavalry corps of the German troops in the area of ​​the city of Sventsiany. In the spring of 1916, the troops of the Western Front carried out an offensive operation in the area of ​​Dvinsk and Lake Naroch. During the June offensive of 1917, the troops of the Western Front, taking the first position of the German troops in the Vilna area, under the influence of the Bolsheviks [by October 1917 there were about 21.4 thousand members of the RSDLP (b) and over 27 thousand sympathizers in the front forces] refused to continue the offensive and returned into their trenches. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRK) of the western regions and the front was established on the Western Front. The Military Revolutionary Committee removed the front commander, general from infantry, PS Baluev, who was loyal to the Provisional Government, and appointed Lieutenant Colonel V.V. Kamenshchikov in his place. The congress of representatives of the front forces on November 20 (December 12) .1917 elected the Bolshevik A.F. Myasnikov as commander of the Western Front. In early December 1917, the demobilization of the troops of the Western Front began. Despite this, in February 1918 his troops (about 250 thousand people) took part in repelling the offensive of the German troops on the RSFSR. From 29/03/1918, the command of the Western Front was operatively subordinate to the Western section of the veil detachments, formed by the RVSR to defend the demarcation line in the western direction from a possible invasion of German troops. Disbanded on 04/18/1918, about 15 thousand people from the front joined the ranks of the Red Army.

Commanders: General of Infantry A.E. Evert (August 1915 - March 1917), General of Cavalry V.I. Gurko (March - May 1917), Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin (May - June 1917), General Lieutenant P. N. Lomnovsky (June - August 1917), General of Infantry P. S. Baluev (August - November 1917), Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamenshchikov (November 1917), A. F. Myasnikov (November 1917 - April 1918 ).

2) The operational-strategic association of the Red Army in the western and north-western strategic directions in the Civil War of 1917-1922 in Russia. It was formed in accordance with the directive of the commander-in-chief of the Red Army I.I.Vatsetis on 02.19.1919 on the basis of the field administration of the Northern Front. The Western Front at different times included the 3rd, 4th, 7th and 12th, 1st Cavalry, Western (1Z.3-9.6.1919 - Belarusian-Lithuanian, from 9.6.1919 - 16th) and the Estland army, Mozyr group of troops, the army of Soviet Latvia (from 7/6/1919 - the 15th army) and the Dnieper military flotilla. The troops of the Western Front fought on a front with a length of more than 2 thousand km: against the armed formations of the White movement and the Entente troops in the Murmansk direction; against the Finnish troops - in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions and the Karelian Isthmus; against the troops of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian bourgeois governments, white armies, German and Polish troops in the Baltic States and Belarus. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the troops of the Western Front were forced to retreat from the Baltic by July 1919. In the July operation of 1920, the troops of the Western Front defeated the main forces of the Polish North-Eastern Front. During the Warsaw operation of 1920, the front troops reached Warsaw, but were defeated and were forced to withdraw from Poland. The troops of the Western Front took part in the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising of 1921.

8.4.1924 The Western Front was transformed into the Western Military District.

Commanders: D.N. Nadezhny (February - July 1919), V.M. Gittis (July 1919 - April 1920), M.N. Tukhachevsky (April 1920 - March 1921, January 1922 - March 1924), I.N. Zakharov (March - September 1921), A. I. Egorov (September 1921 - January 1922), A. I. Kork (March - April 1924), A. I. Cook (April 1924).

3) The operational-strategic formation of Soviet troops in the western strategic direction during the Great Patriotic War. It was formed on 22.6.1941 on the basis of the Western Special Military District as part of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th combined-arms armies. Subsequently, the 5, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 43, 49, 50, 61, 68th combined-arms , 1st shock, 10th and 11th guards, 3rd and 4th tank, as well as 1st air armies. Front troops in 1941 took part in a strategic defensive operation in Belarus, in the Battle of Smolensk in 1941, in the Moscow battle in 1941-42.

During the Rzhev operations of 1942-43, the troops of the Western Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin Front, eliminated the enemy's bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region (July-August 1942) and the Rzhev-Vyazma salient in the defense of the German troops (March 1943). In July - August 1943, the troops of the left wing of the front, during the Battle of Kursk in 1943, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, participated in the Oryol strategic operation to eliminate the enemy's Oryol grouping. At the same time, the main forces of the Western Front, using an advantageous enveloping position, in August-September, together with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, conducted the Smolensk operation 194Z. In late 1943 - early 1944, the front's troops, advancing on the Vitebsk and Orsha directions, reached the eastern regions of Belarus. On April 24, 1944, the Western Front was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front on the basis of a directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of 12/4/1944, and its 2 armies were transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Commanders: General of the Army D. G. Pavlov (June 1941); Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko (June - July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko (July - September 1941); Lieutenant General, from 11.9.1941 Colonel General I.S.Konev (September - October 1941 and August 1942 - February 1943); General of the Army G.K. Zhukov (October 1941 - August 1942); Colonel General, from 27.8.1943 General of the Army V.D.Sokolovsky (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944).

In German military history literature, the Western Front refers to the areas of combat operations of German troops in Western Europe against British, French and American troops in the 1st and 2nd world wars.

Lit .: Military personnel of the Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. (Reference and statistical materials). M., 1963; Directives of the High Command of the Red Army (1917-1920): Sat. documents. M., 1969; Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922): Sat. documents: In 4 volumes. M., 1971-1978; Strokov A.A.Armed forces and military art in the First World War. M., 1974; History of the First World War. 1914-1918: In 2 volumes. M., 1975; History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975-1977. T. 4-8; Rostunov I. I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976; Civil War in the USSR: In 2 volumes. M., 1980-1986; Red Banner Belorussian Military District. 2nd ed. M., 1983; Zhukov G.K. Memories and Reflections: In 2 volumes. 13th ed. M., 2002; Fronts, fleets, armies, flotillas of the period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Handbook. M., 200Z.