Peace of Brest 1918

peace treaty between Russia, on the one hand, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the other, concluded in Brest-Litovsk (now Brest) on March 3, 1918, ratified by the Extraordinary 4th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on March 15, approved by the German Reichstag March 22 and ratified on March 26, 1918 by German Emperor Wilhelm II. On the Soviet side, the treaty was signed by G. Ya. Sokolnikov (chairman of the delegation), G. V. Chicherin, G. I. Petrovsky, and the secretary of the delegation, L. M. Karakhan; on the other hand, the treaty was signed by delegations headed by: from Germany - Secretary of State of the Foreign Office R. Kuhlmann, Chief of the General Staff, Supreme Commander on the Eastern Front M. Hoffmann; from Austria-Hungary - Minister of Foreign Affairs O. Chernin; from Bulgaria - A. Toshev, envoy and minister plenipotentiary in Vienna; from Turkey - Ambassador to Berlin I. Hakki Pasha.

On October 26 (November 8), 1917, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the Decree on Peace, in which the Soviet government proposed that all belligerent states immediately conclude an armistice and begin peace negotiations. The refusal of the Entente countries from this proposal forced the Soviet government on November 20 (December 3) to enter into separate peace negotiations with Germany.

The internal and external situation of Soviet Russia demanded the signing of peace. The country was in a state of extreme economic ruin, the old army collapsed, and a new efficient worker-peasant army had not yet been created. The people demanded peace. On December 2 (15) an armistice agreement was signed in Brest-Litovsk, and on December 9 (22) peace negotiations began. The Soviet delegation put forward the principle of a democratic peace without annexations and indemnities as the basis for negotiations. On December 12 (25), Kuhlmann, on behalf of the German-Austrian bloc, demagogically announced that he would join the main provisions of the Soviet declaration of peace without annexations and indemnities, provided that the governments of the Entente countries join the Soviet formula for peace. The Soviet government again turned to the Entente countries with an invitation to take part in peace negotiations. On December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918), after a 10-day break in meetings, Kühlmann stated that because The Entente did not join the peace negotiations, the German bloc considers itself free from the Soviet peace formula. The German imperialists considered the difficult situation in Russia convenient for achieving their predatory goals. On January 5 (18), the German delegation demanded that over 150,000 sq. km 2, including Poland, Lithuania, parts of Estonia and Latvia, as well as large areas inhabited by Ukrainians and Belarusians. At the suggestion of the Soviet government, the negotiations were temporarily interrupted.

Despite the severity of the conditions of the German bloc, V. I. Lenin considered it necessary to accept them and conclude peace in order to give the country a respite: to preserve the gains of the October Revolution, strengthen Soviet power, and create the Red Army.

The need to sign the B. m. caused sharp intra-party disagreements. At that time, a significant part of the party workers, ignoring the objective factors in the development of the revolutionary movement, counted (in connection with the growing revolutionary crisis in the belligerent countries) for a pan-European socialist revolution and therefore did not understand the stern necessity of signing peace with Germany. A group of "left communists" was formed in the party, headed by N. I. Bukharin, whose main assertion was that without an immediate Western European revolution, the socialist revolution in Russia would perish. They did not allow any agreements with the imperialist states and demanded that a revolutionary war be declared on international imperialism. The "left communists" were even ready to "go for the possibility of losing Soviet power" allegedly in the name of "the interests of the international revolution." It was a demagogic adventurist policy. No less adventurous and demagogic was the position of L. D. Trotsky (at that time People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR), who proposed: declare the war ended, demobilize the army, but do not sign peace.

A stubborn struggle against the adventurist policy of the "left communists" and Trotsky was led by V. I. Lenin, proving to the party the necessity and inevitability of signing peace.

On January 17 (30) negotiations in Brest resumed. When the head of the Soviet delegation, Trotsky, left for Brest, it was agreed between him and the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR Lenin: to delay the negotiations in every possible way until Germany presented an ultimatum, and then immediately sign peace. The atmosphere in the peace talks was heating up.

Germany rejected a proposal to allow a delegation of the Soviet Ukraine to negotiate, and on January 27 (February 9) signed a separate treaty with representatives of the nationalist Ukrainian Central Rada (See Tsentralnaya Rada) under which the latter undertook to put Germany behind military aid Rada in the fight against Soviet power a large number of bread and livestock. This treaty made it possible for German troops to occupy Ukraine.

On January 27-28 (February 9-10), the German side negotiated in an ultimatum tone. However, no official ultimatum has yet been issued. Therefore, in accordance with the decision [of January 11 (24), 1918] of the Central Committee of the Party, the tactic of dragging out negotiations has not yet been exhausted. Nevertheless, on January 28, Trotsky issued an adventurist declaration that Soviet Russia was ending the war, demobilizing the army, but not signing peace. Kuhlmann, in response to this, stated that "not signing a peace treaty by Russia automatically entails the termination of the truce." Trotsky refused further negotiations, and the Soviet delegation left Brest-Litovsk.

Taking advantage of the break in negotiations, the Austro-German troops on February 18 at 12 h day began an offensive along the entire Eastern Front. On the evening of February 18, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the party, after a sharp struggle with the "left communists", the majority (7 - for, 5 - against, 1 - abstained) spoke in favor of signing the peace. On the morning of February 19, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, V. I. Lenin, sent a telegram to the German government in Berlin expressing protest against the perfidious offensive and the consent of the Soviet government to sign the German conditions. However, the German troops continued their offensive. On February 21, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted a decree - "The socialist fatherland is in danger!". The active formation of the Red Army began, which blocked the enemy's path to Petrograd. It was only on February 23 that a response was received from the German government, which contained even more difficult peace conditions. 48 were given to accept the ultimatum h. On February 23, a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) was held, at which 7 members of the Central Committee voted for the immediate signing of the German peace conditions, 4 against, 4 abstained. fatherland. On the same day, Lenin spoke at a joint meeting of the Bolshevik and Left Socialist-Revolutionary factions (See Left Socialist-Revolutionaries) All-Russian Central Executive Committee, at the Bolshevik faction, and then at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In a fierce struggle against the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (on February 23, 1918, at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, they voted against the Bolsheviks), the Mensheviks, the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the “Left Communists,” he secured the approval of the decision of the Central Committee of the party by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

On the night of February 24, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR accepted the German terms of peace and immediately informed the German government about this and about the departure of the Soviet delegation to Brest-Litovsk. On March 3, the Soviet delegation signed the Brest Treaty. The 7th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), urgently convened on March 6-8, approved Lenin's policy on the question of peace.

The treaty consisted of 14 articles and various appendices. Article 1 established the termination of the state of war between the Soviet Republic and the countries Quadruple union. Significant territories were torn away from Russia (Poland, Lithuania, part of Belarus and Latvia). At the same time, Soviet Russia was supposed to withdraw troops from Latvia and Estonia, where German troops were being introduced. Germany retained the Gulf of Riga, the Moonsund Islands. Soviet troops had to leave Ukraine, Finland, the Aland Islands, as well as the districts of Ardagan, Kars and Batum, which were transferred to Turkey. In total, Soviet Russia lost about 1 million people. km 2 (including Ukraine). Under Article 5, Russia undertook to carry out the complete demobilization of the army and navy, including parts of the Red Army, under Article 6 - to recognize the peace treaty of the Central Rada with Germany and its allies and, in turn, conclude a peace treaty with the Rada and determine the border between Russia and Ukraine. The BM restored the customs tariffs of 1904, which were extremely unfavorable for Soviet Russia, in favor of Germany. On August 27, 1918, a Russian-German financial agreement was signed in Berlin, according to which Soviet Russia was obliged to pay Germany various forms an indemnity of 6 billion marks.

B. m., which was a complex of political, economic, financial, and legal conditions, was a heavy burden for the Soviet Republic. However, he did not touch upon the fundamental gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The Soviet Republic retained its independence, emerged from the imperialist war, receiving a peaceful respite necessary to restore the ruined economy, create a regular Red Army, and strengthen the Soviet state. The November Revolution of 1918 in Germany overthrew the power of Emperor Wilhelm II, and on November 13, 1918, the Soviet government annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Lit.: Lenin V.I., On the history of the question of an unhappy world, Poln. coll. soch., 5th ed., v. 35; his, On the revolutionary phrase, ibid.; his socialist fatherland is in danger!, ibid.; his, Peace or War?, ibid.; his own. Report at the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 23, 1918, ibid.; his, Unfortunate world, ibid.; his own. A hard but necessary lesson, ibid.; his own, the Seventh Emergency Congress of the RCP (b). March 6-8, 1918, ibid., vol. 36; his, The main task of our days, ibid.; his, IV Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets, March 14-16, 1918, ibid.: Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 1, M., 1957; History of Diplomacy, 2nd ed., vol. 3, M., 1965, p. 74-106; Chubaryan A. O., Brest Peace, M., 1964; Nikolnikov G. L., An outstanding victory for Lenin's strategy and tactics (Brest peace: from conclusion to break), M., 1968; Magnes J. Z., Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk. A documentary history of the peace negotiations, N. - Y., 1919.

A. O. Chubaryan.

Peace of Brest-Litovsk 1918


Great Soviet Encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .

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Eve of negotiations in Brest-Litovsk

100 years ago, on March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk, documenting the loss of Russia's territory, where a third of its population lived. From the time of Tatar-Mongol yoke Russia has not experienced catastrophes comparable in scale. Our country managed to surpass the territorial losses dictated by the enemy in Brest only at the end of the 20th century. The peace of Brest-Litovsk was not a surprise: Russia was doomed to catastrophe by the events that exactly a year preceded Brest - the betrayal of the highest military leaders who forced the holy Emperor Nicholas II to abdicate, which at that unfortunate time became an occasion for all-class rejoicing. With the fall of the autocracy, the process of decomposition of the army inevitably began, and the country lost the ability to defend itself.

With the fall of the autocracy, the process of decomposition of the army began

And so, when the anemic Provisional Government fell and the Bolsheviks seized power, on October 26 (November 8) the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets issued a "Decree on Peace" with a proposal addressed to all the belligerent states to conclude a truce and start peace negotiations without annexations and indemnities. On November 8 (21), the Council of People's Commissars sent a telegram to I. about. the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army, General N. N. Dukhonin, with the order to enter into negotiations with the command of the enemy troops on a truce. The next day, the Commander-in-Chief had a telephone conversation with V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and a member of the Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs N.V. Krylenko on the same topic. Dukhonin refused the demand to start negotiations immediately, referring to the fact that the headquarters could not conduct such negotiations, which were within the competence of the central government, after which it was announced to him that he was resigning from his post and. about. Commander-in-Chief and that Ensign Krylenko is appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief, but he, Dukhonin, must continue to fulfill his former duties until the new Commander-in-Chief arrives at the Headquarters.

N. V. Krylenko arrived in Mogilev, at headquarters, with a retinue and an armed detachment on November 20 (December 3). The day before, General Dukhonin ordered the release of generals L. G. Kornilov, A. I. Denikin, A. S. Lukomsky and their accomplices, arrested by order of A. F. Kerensky, from the Bykhov prison located near the headquarters of the Bykhov prison. Krylenko announced to Dukhonin that he would be delivered to Petrograd, at the disposal of the government, after which the general was taken to the carriage of the new commander-in-chief. But after the release of the Bykhov prisoners, a rumor spread among the soldiers guarding the headquarters that L. G. Kornilov was already leading a regiment loyal to him to Mogilev in order to seize the headquarters and continue the war. Spurred on by provocative rumors, the brutalized soldiers burst into Krylenko’s car, took out his predecessor, while Krylenko himself either tried or did not try to interfere with them, and committed brutal reprisals against his yesterday’s commander-in-chief: first they shot him, and then finished him off with his bayonets - the mere suspicion that attempts were being made to keep the army from collapsing and continue the war infuriated the soldiers. Krylenko reported the massacre of Dukhonin to Trotsky, who found it inexpedient to initiate an investigation into this incident so as not to irritate the revolutionary soldiers and sailors.

11 days before the assassination of General Dukhonin, on November 9 (22), V. I. Lenin, catering to the “pacifist” moods of the front masses, sent a telegram to the troops: truce with the enemy. It was an unprecedented case in the history of diplomacy - it was proposed to negotiate the conclusion of peace in the order of amateur soldiers. A parallel with this action was only the order of another leader of the revolution - L. D. Trotsky - to publish secret treaties and secret diplomatic correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim of compromising both the Russian and other governments in the eyes of the public - Russian and foreign.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, headed by Trotsky, sent a note to the embassies of neutral countries proposing mediation in peace negotiations. In response, the embassies of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland only informed about the receipt of the note, and the Spanish ambassador informed the Soviet People's Commissariat of the transfer of the note to Madrid. The proposal to start negotiations on the conclusion of peace was all the more ignored by the governments of the Entente countries allied with Russia, who firmly counted on victory and had already previously divided the skin of the beast they were going to finish off, it seems, anticipating the sharing of the skin of the bear that was allied to them yesterday. Naturally, a positive response to the proposal to start peace talks came only from Berlin and Germany's allies or satellites. The corresponding telegram arrived in Petrograd on 14 (27) November. On the same day, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars telegraphed the governments of the Entente countries - France, Great Britain, Italy, the USA, Japan, China, Belgium, Serbia and Romania - about the start of negotiations, offering to join them. Otherwise, the corresponding note said, "we will negotiate with the Germans alone." There was no reply to this note.

The first phase of negotiations in Brest

Separate negotiations began on the day of the assassination of General N. N. Dukhonin. A Soviet delegation headed by A. A. Ioffe arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where the headquarters of the German command on the Eastern Front was located. It included L. B. Kamenev, the most influential political figure among the participants in the negotiations, as well as G. Ya. Sokolnikov, the Left Social Revolutionaries A. A. Bitsenko and S. D. Maslovsky-Mstislavsky and, as consultants, representatives of the army: Quartermaster General under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief General V. E. Skalon, Generals Yu. M. Karakhan, who was responsible for translators and technical staff. The original feature in the formation of this delegation was that it included representatives of the lower ranks - soldiers and sailors, as well as the peasant R. I. Stashkov and the worker P. A. Obukhov. Delegations of Germany's allies were already in Brest-Litovsk: Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. The German delegation was headed by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R. von Kuhlmann; Austria-Hungary - Foreign Minister Count O. Chernin; Bulgaria - Minister of Justice Popov; Turkey - Grand Vizier Talaat Bey.

At the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviet side proposed to conclude a truce for 6 months, so that hostilities would be suspended on all fronts, German troops would be withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands, and so that the German command, taking advantage of the truce, would not transfer troops to the Western Front. These proposals were rejected. As a result of the negotiations, they agreed to conclude a truce for a short period, from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17), with the possibility of its extension; during this period, the troops of the opposing sides had to remain in their positions, so there was no longer any talk of leaving Riga by the Germans, and as for the ban on the transfer of troops to the Western Front, Germany agreed to stop only those transfers that had not yet been started . In view of the collapse of the Russian army, this transfer was already underway, and the Soviet side did not have the means to control the movement of enemy units and formations.

A truce was declared and put into effect. During ongoing negotiations, the parties agreed to extend it for 28 days, starting from 4 (17) December. Negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty were tentatively decided to be held in the capital of a neutral country - in Stockholm. But on December 5 (18), Trotsky reported to Commander-in-Chief Krylenko: “Lenin defends the following plan: during the first two or three days of negotiations, fix the annexationist claims of the German imperialists on paper as clearly and sharply as possible and break off the negotiations on this for a week and resume them either on Russian soil in Pskov, or in a hut in no man's land between the trenches. I join this opinion. There is no need to travel to a neutral country.” Through Commander-in-Chief Krylenko, Trotsky gave instructions to the head of the delegation, A. A. Ioffe: “The most convenient thing would be not to transfer the negotiations to Stockholm at all. This would alienate the delegation very much from the local base and would make relations extremely difficult, especially in view of the policy of the Finnish bourgeoisie. Germany did not object to the continuation of negotiations on the territory of its headquarters in Brest.

The resumption of negotiations was, however, postponed due to the fact that upon the return of the delegation to Brest on November 29 (December 12), during a private meeting of the Russian delegation, the chief military consultant, Major General V. E. Skalon, a descendant of the great mathematician Euler by his mother, committed suicide . According to the characterization of General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, the brother of a Bolshevik, who then held the position of the manager of the Council of People's Commissars, “Skalon, an officer of the Life Guards of the Semenovsky Regiment, was known at headquarters as an ardent monarchist. But he worked in the intelligence department, was a serious and well-versed officer, and from this point of view he had an impeccable reputation. In addition ... his irreconcilable attitude towards everything that was at least a little bit to the left absolute monarchy, should have forced him to treat the negotiations with particular urgency ... - to inform the headquarters in detail and carefully about the progress of the negotiations.

General Scalon, being an extreme monarchist in his views, continued to serve in the General Staff when it submitted to the Council of People's Commissars. A characteristic and typical detail of that era: liberal generals, supporters of a constitutional monarchy or a direct republic, like the Bykhov prisoners, then considered it their duty to remain faithful to the allies who contributed to the overthrow of the tsarist government, therefore the white struggle, which they led, was guided by the help of the Entente, in while successive monarchists from military circles, unwilling to attach importance to the differences in political concepts of the Cadets, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, subsequently either avoided participation in the Civil War or continued to serve in the army that became Red, in the hope that Lenin and Trotsky , for all their commitment to utopian projects, the hand will be stronger than that of worthless temporary ministers, and that they will create a regime in which it will be possible to restore controllability of the armed forces, or the monarchist-minded generals fought with the Reds, relying on the support not of the Entente, but of the occupying German authorities like P.N Krasnov.

General V. E. Skalon, having agreed to the role of consultant to the Soviet delegation, could not stand this role to the end and shot himself. Different opinions were expressed about the reasons for his suicide, the most convincing are the words spoken by a member of the German delegation, General Hoffmann, with which he addressed General Samoilo, who replaced Skalon: “Ah! So, you have been appointed to replace poor Skalon, whom your Bolsheviks left! Could not bear, poor fellow, the shame of his country! Brace yourself too!” This arrogant tirade is not contradicted by the version from the memoirs of General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, who believed that Skalon committed suicide, struck by the arrogant demands and arrogance of the German generals. General Skalon was buried at St. Nicholas Garrison Cathedral in Brest. The German command ordered to put up a guard of honor at the burial and fire a volley befitting a military leader. The funeral speech was delivered by Prince Leopold of Bavaria, who arrived at the opening of the second phase of the negotiations.

In the course of the renewed negotiations, the Soviet delegation insisted on the conclusion of peace "without annexations and indemnities." The representatives of Germany and its allies agreed with this formula, but on a condition that made its implementation impossible - if the Entente countries were ready to accept such a peace, and they just waged war for the sake of annexations and indemnities and at the end of 1917 firmly hoped to win. The Soviet delegation proposed: “In full agreement with ... the statement of both contracting parties that they have no conquest plans and that they desire to make peace without annexations, Russia withdraws its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia occupied by it, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance - from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. The German side insisted that Russia recognize the independence of not only Poland, Lithuania and Courland occupied by German troops, where puppet governments were created, but also Livonia, part of which had not yet been occupied by the German army, as well as participation in peace negotiations delegation of the separatist Kyiv Central Rada.

At first, the demands for the surrender of Russia by the Soviet delegation were rejected

At first, these demands, in essence, for the surrender of Russia by the Soviet delegation were rejected. December 15 (28) agreed to extend the truce. At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, a 10-day break was announced, under the pretext of an attempt to seat the Entente states at the negotiating table, although both sides thereby only demonstrated their peacefulness, fully understanding the futility of such hopes.

The Soviet delegation left Brest for Petrograd, and the question of the course of the peace talks was discussed there at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). It was decided to drag out the negotiations in the hope of a revolution in Germany. The delegation was supposed to continue the negotiations in a new composition, headed by the people's commissar for foreign affairs, L. D. Trotsky himself. Showing off, Trotsky subsequently called his participation in the negotiations "visits to the torture chamber." He was not interested in diplomacy at all. He commented on his very activities as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs as follows: “What kind of diplomatic work will we have? Here I will issue a few leaflets and close the shop. The impression he made on the head of the German delegation, Richard von Kuhlmann, is quite consistent with this remark of his: “Not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses of glasses looked at his counterpart with a boring and critical look. The expression on his face clearly indicated that he… would have been better off ending the unsympathetic negotiations with a couple of grenades, throwing them across the green table, if it was somehow in line with the overall political line… sometimes I wondered if he generally intends to make peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagate Bolshevik views.

K. Radek, a native of Austro-Hungarian Galicia, was included in the Soviet delegation; at the negotiations he represented the Polish workers, with whom he really had nothing to do. According to the plan of Lenin and Trotsky, Radek, with his assertive temperament and aggressiveness, had to maintain the revolutionary tone of the delegation, balancing the other participants in the negotiations, Kamenev and Ioffe, who were too calm and restrained, as it seemed to Lenin and Trotsky.

Under Trotsky, the renewed negotiations often took on the character of verbal battles between the head of the Soviet delegation and General Hoffmann, who also did not hesitate in expressions, demonstrating to the negotiating partners the impotence of the country they represent. According to Trotsky, “General Hoffmann ... brought a fresh note to the conference. He showed that he did not like the behind-the-scenes tricks of diplomacy, and several times put his soldier's boot on the negotiating table. We immediately realized that the only reality that should really be taken seriously in these useless conversations is Hoffmann's boot."

On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), at the invitation of the German side, a delegation of the Central Rada headed by V. A. Golubovich arrived from Kyiv in Brest, who immediately declared that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia did not extend to Ukraine. Trotsky agreed to the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the negotiations, stating that Ukraine was actually at war with Russia, although formally the independence of the UNR was proclaimed later, by the “universal” of January 9 (22), 1918.

The German side was interested in the speedy completion of the negotiations, because, not without reason, they feared the threat of the decomposition of their own army, and even more - the troops of the allied Austria-Hungary - the "patchwork empire" of the Habsburgs. In addition, in these two countries, the food supply of the population deteriorated sharply - both empires were on the verge of starvation. The mobilization potential of these powers was exhausted, while the Entente countries at war with them had unlimited possibilities in this regard, due to the large population in their colonies. In both empires, anti-war sentiment grew, strikes were organized, councils were formed in some cities, modeled on Russian councils; and these councils demanded an early conclusion of peace with Russia, so that the Soviet delegation at the talks in Brest had a well-known resource for putting pressure on partners.

But after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on January 6 (19), 1918, the German delegation began to act more assertively. The fact is that until then there was still, at least virtually, the possibility that the government formed by the Constituent Assembly would stop peace negotiations and resume allied relations with the Entente countries, broken by the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars. Therefore, the failure of the Constituent Assembly gave the German side confidence that in the end the Soviet delegation would agree to conclude peace at any cost.

Presentation of the German ultimatum and reaction to it

Russia's lack of a combat-ready army was, as they say today, a medical fact. It became absolutely impossible to convince the soldiers, who had turned into potential deserters, if they had not yet fled from the front, to remain in the trenches. Once, when overthrowing the tsar, the conspirators hoped that the soldiers would fight for a democratic and liberal Russia, their calculations turned out to be beaten. The socialist government of A.F. Kerensky called on the soldiers to defend the revolution - the soldiers were not tempted by this propaganda. From the very beginning of the war, the Bolsheviks campaigned for an end to the war of peoples, and their leaders understood that soldiers could not be kept at the front by calls to defend the power of the Soviets. On January 18, 1918, the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General M. D. Bonch-Bruevich, sent a note to the Council of People's Commissars with the following content: “Desertion is progressively growing ... Entire regiments and artillery go to the rear, exposing the front for significant stretches, the Germans walk in crowds along an abandoned position ... Constant visits enemy soldiers of our positions, especially artillery, and their destruction of our fortifications in abandoned positions are undoubtedly of an organized nature.

After the formal ultimatum presented to the Soviet delegation in Brest by General Hoffmann, demanding consent to the German occupation of Ukraine, Poland, half of Belarus and the Baltic states, an intra-party struggle flared up at the top of the Bolshevik Party. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), held on January 11 (24), 1918, a bloc of "left communists" was formed, headed by N. I. Bukharin, who opposed Lenin's capitulatory position. “Our only salvation,” he declared, “is that the masses will learn by experience, in the course of the struggle itself, what a German invasion is, when cows and boots will be taken from the peasants, when workers will be forced to work 14 hours, when they will take them to Germany, when the iron ring is inserted into the nostrils, then, believe me, comrades, then we will get a real holy war. Bukharin's side was taken by other influential members of the Central Committee - F. E. Dzerzhinsky, who attacked Lenin for betraying them - not the interests of Russia, but the German and Austro-Hungarian proletariat, whom, as he feared, the peace treaty would keep from the revolution. Objecting to his opponents, Lenin formulated his position as follows: “For a revolutionary war, an army is needed, but we have no army. Undoubtedly, the peace that we are forced to make now is an obscene peace, but if a war breaks out, our government will be swept away and peace will be made by another government. In the Central Committee, he was supported by Stalin, Zinoviev, Sokolnikov and Sergeev (Artem). A compromise proposal was put forward by Trotsky. It sounded like this: "no peace, no war." Its essence was that in response to the German ultimatum, the Soviet delegation in Brest would declare that Russia was ending the war, demobilizing the army, but would not sign a shameful, humiliating peace treaty. This proposal received the support of the majority of the members of the Central Committee during the voting: 9 votes against 7.

Before the delegation returned to Brest to resume negotiations, its head, Trotsky, was instructed by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars to delay the negotiations, but if an ultimatum was presented, sign a peace treaty at any cost. On January 27 (February 9), 1918, representatives of the Central Rada in Brest-Litovsk signed a peace treaty with Germany - its consequence was the occupation of Ukraine by the troops of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who, having occupied Kyiv, eliminated the Rada.

On February 27 (February 9), the head of the German delegation, R. von Kuhlmann, presented the Soviet side at the talks in Brest with an ultimatum demanding an immediate renunciation of any influence on the political life of the territories torn away from the Russian state, including Ukraine, part of Belarus and the Baltic states. The signal to toughen the tone during the talks came from the capital of Germany. Emperor Wilhelm II said then in Berlin: “Today the Bolshevik government directly addressed my troops with an open radio message calling for rebellion and disobedience to their top commanders. Neither I nor Field Marshal von Hindenburg can tolerate this state of affairs any longer. Trotsky must by tomorrow evening ... sign a peace with the return of the Baltic states up to the Narva - Pleskau - Dunaburg line inclusive ... The Supreme High Command of the armies of the Eastern Front must withdraw troops to the indicated line.

Trotsky at the talks in Brest rejected the ultimatum: “The peoples are looking forward to the results of the peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. The peoples are asking when will this unparalleled self-destruction of mankind, caused by the selfishness and lust for power of the ruling classes of all countries, end? If ever a war was waged in self-defense, then it has long ceased to be such for both camps. If Great Britain takes possession of the African colonies, Baghdad and Jerusalem, then this is not yet a defensive war; if Germany occupies Serbia, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania and Rumania and seizes the Moonsund Islands, then this is also not a defensive war. This is a struggle for the division of the world. Now it's clearer than ever... We're getting out of the war. We inform all peoples and their governments about this. We give the order for the complete demobilization of our armies ... At the same time, we declare that the conditions offered to us by the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary are fundamentally contrary to the interests of all peoples. This statement of his was made public, which was regarded by all parties involved in the hostilities as a propaganda action. On the part of the German delegation at the talks in Brest, an explanation followed that the refusal to sign a peace treaty meant a breakdown in the truce and would entail the resumption of hostilities. The Soviet delegation left Brest.

Breakdown of the truce and resumption of hostilities

On February 18, German troops resumed fighting along the entire line of their Eastern Front and began to rapidly move deep into Russia. Within a few days, the enemy advanced about 300 kilometers, capturing Revel (Tallinn), Narva, Minsk, Polotsk, Mogilev, Gomel, Chernigov. Only near Pskov on February 23 was there real resistance to the enemy. Together with the officers and soldiers of the not completely decomposed Russian army, the Red Guards who arrived from Petrograd fought. In the battles near the city, the Germans lost several hundred soldiers killed and wounded. February 23 was subsequently celebrated as the birthday of the Red Army, and now as the day of the Defender of the Fatherland. And yet Pskov was taken by the Germans.

There was a real threat of capturing the capital. On February 21, the Petrograd Revolutionary Defense Committee was formed. A state of siege was declared in the city. But it was not possible to organize an effective defense of the capital. Only regiments of Latvian riflemen reached the line of defense. A mobilization was carried out among the St. Petersburg workers, but its results were scanty. Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who voted in the majority for the Bolsheviks in the elections to the Soviets and to the Constituent Assembly, a little more than one percent were ready to shed blood: a little more than 10 thousand people signed up as volunteers. The fact is that the Bolsheviks were voted for because they promised immediate peace. To spread propaganda in the direction of revolutionary defencism, as the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries had done in their time, was a hopeless affair. The head of the metropolitan party organization of the Bolsheviks, G. E. Zinoviev, was already preparing to go underground: he demanded that funds be allocated from the party treasury to support the underground activities of the Bolshevik party committee in Petrograd. In view of the failure of the negotiations in Brest, on February 22, Trotsky resigned from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. A few days later, G. V. Chicherin was appointed to this position.

The Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) held continuous meetings these days. Lenin insisted on resuming peace talks and accepting the demands of the German ultimatum. Most members of the Central Committee took a different position, offering as an alternative a guerrilla war with the occupation regime in the hope of a revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary. At a meeting of the Central Committee on February 23, 1918, Lenin demanded consent to the conclusion of peace on the terms dictated by the German ultimatum, otherwise threatening to resign. In response to Lenin's ultimatum, Trotsky declared: “We cannot wage a revolutionary war with a split in the party ... Under the conditions that have arisen, our party is not able to lead the war ... maximum unanimity would be needed; since it is not there, I will not take the responsibility of voting for the war.” This time, Lenin's proposal was supported by 7 members of the Central Committee, four headed by Bukharin voted against, Trotsky and three more abstained from voting. Bukharin then announced his withdrawal from the Central Committee. Then the party decision to accept the German ultimatum was carried through the state body - the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. At a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 24, the decision to conclude peace on German terms was adopted by 126 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions. The majority of the Left SRs voted against, although their leader M. A. Spiridonova voted for peace; the Mensheviks headed by Yu. O. Martov and from the Bolsheviks N. I. Bukharin and D. B. Ryazanov voted against peace. A number of "left communists", including F.E. Dzerzhinsky, did not appear at the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in protest against agreeing to the German ultimatum.

Conclusion of a peace treaty and its contents

On March 1, 1918, the Soviet delegation, this time headed by G. Ya. Sokolnikov, returned to Brest for negotiations. The negotiating partners, representing the governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, categorically refused to discuss the draft developed by the German side, insisting on its adoption in the form in which it was presented. On March 3, the German ultimatum was accepted by the Soviet side, and a peace treaty was signed.

In accordance with this agreement, Russia took upon itself the obligation to stop the war with the UNR and recognize the independence of Ukraine, in fact transferring it to the protectorate of Germany and Austria-Hungary - the signing of the agreement was followed by the occupation of Kyiv, the overthrow of the government of the UNR and the establishment of a puppet regime headed by Hetman Skoropadsky . Russia recognized the independence of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Courland and Livonia. Some of these territories were directly included in Germany, others passed under the German or joint protectorate with Austria-Hungary. Russia also transferred Kars, Ardagan and Batum with their regions to the Ottoman Empire. The territory torn away from Russia under the Brest Treaty amounted to about a million square kilometers, and up to 60 million people lived on it - a third of the population of the former Russian Empire. The Russian army and navy were subject to radical reductions. The Baltic Fleet was leaving its bases located in Finland and the Ostsee region. An indemnity in the amount of 6.5 billion gold rubles was assigned to Russia. And the annex to the agreement included a provision stating that the property of citizens of Germany and its allies was not subject to Soviet nationalization laws, those of the citizens of these states who lost at least part of their property had to be returned or compensated. The refusal of the Soviet government to pay foreign debts could no longer apply to Germany and its allies, and Russia undertook to immediately resume payments on these debts. Citizens of these states were allowed to engage in entrepreneurial activities on the territory of the Russian Soviet Republic. The Soviet government undertook to ban all subversive anti-war propaganda against the states of the Quadruple Alliance.

The peace treaty concluded in Brest was ratified on March 15 by the Extraordinary IV All-Russian Congress of Soviets, despite the fact that a third of the deputies, mainly from the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, voted against its ratification. On March 26, the treaty was ratified by Emperor Wilhelm II, and then similar acts were adopted in the states allied with Germany.

The consequences of the peace treaty and the reaction to it

The cessation of the war on the Eastern Front allowed Germany to transfer about half a million of its soldiers to the Western Front and launch an offensive against the armies of the Entente, which, however, soon bogged down. For the occupation of the western territories torn from Russia, mainly Ukraine, it took 43 divisions, against which a guerrilla war unfolded under various political slogans, which cost Germany and Austria-Hungary more than 20 thousand lives of soldiers and officers; Hetman Skoropadsky's troops, who supported the regime of German occupation, lost more than 30 thousand people in this war.

After the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a full-scale civil war began in Russia.

In response to Russia's withdrawal from the war, the Entente states undertook interventionist actions: on March 6, British troops landed in Murmansk. This was followed by the landing of the British in Arkhangelsk. The Japanese units occupied Vladivostok. The dismemberment of Russia under the terms of the Brest peace treaty provided the anti-Bolshevik forces of non-separatist orientation with a wonderful slogan for organizing military operations aimed at overthrowing the Soviet regime - the slogan of the struggle for "a united and indivisible Russia." So after the signing of the Brest Peace in Russia, a full-scale Civil War began. The call put forward by Lenin at the beginning of the World War "to turn the war of the peoples into a civil war" was carried out, however, at the moment when the Bolsheviks least of all wanted it, because by that time they had already seized power in the country.

His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon could not remain an indifferent spectator of the tragic events taking place. On March 5 (18), 1918, he addressed the All-Russian flock with a message in which he assessed the peace treaty concluded in Brest: “Blessed is the peace between peoples, for all brothers, the Lord calls everyone to work peacefully on earth, He has prepared His incalculable blessings for everyone . And the Holy Church unceasingly lifts up prayers for the peace of the whole world... The unfortunate Russian people, involved in a fratricidal bloody war, unbearably thirsted for peace, just as the people of God once thirsted for water in the scorching heat of the desert. But we did not have Moses, who would give his people to drink miraculous water, and it was not to the Lord, his Benefactor, that the people called for help - people who renounced the faith, persecutors of the Church of God, appeared, and they gave peace to the people. But is this the peace for which the Church prays, for which the people yearn? The peace now concluded, according to which entire regions inhabited by Orthodox people, and surrender to the will of an enemy alien in faith, and tens of millions of Orthodox people fall into conditions of great spiritual temptation for their faith, a world according to which even the primordially Orthodox Ukraine is separated from fraternal Russia and the capital city of Kyiv, the mother of Russian cities, the cradle of our baptism, a repository of shrines, ceases to be a city of the Russian state, a world that gives our people and Russian land into heavy bondage - such a world will not give the people the desired rest and tranquility. The Orthodox Church will bring great damage and grief, and incalculable losses to the Fatherland. And meanwhile, the same strife that is destroying our Fatherland continues in our country... Will the declared peace eliminate these discords crying to heaven? Will it bring even greater sorrows and misfortunes? Alas, the words of the prophet are justified: They say: peace, peace, but there is no peace(Jer. 8, 11). The Holy Orthodox Church, which from time immemorial has helped the Russian people to gather and glorify the Russian state, cannot remain indifferent at the sight of its death and decay... As the duty of the successor of the ancient collectors and builders of the Russian land, Peter, Alexy, Jonah, Philip and Hermogenes, We call... Raise your voice in these terrible days and loudly declare before the whole world that the Church cannot bless the shameful peace now concluded on behalf of Russia. This peace, forcibly signed on behalf of the Russian people, will not lead to fraternal cohabitation of peoples. There are no pledges of calm and reconciliation in it, the seeds of malice and misanthropy are sown in it. It contains the germs of new wars and evils for all mankind. Can the Russian people come to terms with their humiliation? Can he forget his brothers separated from him by blood and faith?.. The Orthodox Church... can now only look with the deepest sorrow at this appearance of peace, which is no better than war... Do not rejoice and triumph over peace We call you, Orthodox people, but it is bitter to repent and pray before the Lord... Brothers! The time has come for repentance, the holy days of Great Lent have come. Cleanse yourself from your sins, come to your senses, stop looking at each other as enemies, and stop dividing your native land into warring camps. We are all brothers, and we all have one mother - our native Russian land, and we are all children of one Heavenly Father... In the face of the Terrible Judgment of God that is taking place over us, let us all gather around Christ and His Holy Church. Let us pray to the Lord that He soften our hearts with brotherly love and strengthen them with courage, so that He Himself will grant us men of understanding and counsel, faithful to the commandments of God, who would correct the evil deed done, return the rejected and gather the squandered. ... Convince everyone to pray fervently to the Lord, that He turn away His righteous wrath, our sin for our sake, driven by us, and strengthen our relaxed spirit and raise us from heavy despondency and extreme fall. And the merciful Lord will take pity on the sinful Russian land ... ".

Germany could not avoid the fate of the lost Russian Empire

This was the first epistle of Patriarch Tikhon devoted to a political topic, while it did not touch upon issues of domestic politics, it does not mention political parties and political figures, but, faithful to the tradition of patriotic service of the Russian Primates, the holy Patriarch expressed in this epistle his grief over the experience Russia of the catastrophe, called on the flock to repentance and an end to pernicious fratricidal strife, and, in essence, predicted the course of further events in Russia and in the world. Anyone who carefully reads this epistle can be convinced that, composed on the occasion of an event a hundred years ago, it has not lost its relevance in our day.

Meanwhile, Germany, which forced Russia to capitulate in March 1918, could not avoid the fate of the lost Russian Empire. In April 1918, diplomatic relations were resumed between Russia and Germany. The Soviet ambassador A. A. Ioffe arrived in Berlin, and the German ambassador Count Wilhelm von Mirbach arrived in Moscow, where the residence of the government was moved. Count Mirbach was killed in Moscow, and the peace treaty did not prevent A. A. Ioffe and the staff of the Soviet embassy from conducting anti-war propaganda in the heart of Germany itself. Pacifist and revolutionary sentiments spread from Russia to the armies and peoples of her former opponents. And when the imperial thrones of the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns shook, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk turned into a piece of paper that did not bind anyone to anything. On November 13, 1918, it was officially denounced by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR. But at that time, Russia was already thrown into the abyss of fratricidal slaughter - the Civil War, the signal for the beginning of which was the conclusion of the Brest Treaty.

On March 3, 1918, 95 years ago, a peace treaty was concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

A number of events preceded the signing of the treaty.
On November 19 (December 2), the delegation of the Soviet government, headed by A. A. Ioffe, arrived in the neutral zone and proceeded to Brest-Litovsk, where the Headquarters of the German command on the Eastern Front was located, where they met with the delegation of the Austro-German bloc, which included also included representatives from Bulgaria and Turkey.

Peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. Arrival of Russian delegates. In the middle is A. A. Ioffe, next to him is secretary L. Karakhan, A. A. Bitsenko, on the right is L. B. Kamenev


Arrival of the German delegation to Brest-Litovsk

On November 21 (December 4), the Soviet delegation laid out its terms:
the truce is concluded for 6 months;
hostilities are suspended on all fronts;
German troops are being withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands;
any transfer of German troops to the Western Front is prohibited.

In Brest, Soviet diplomats were in for an unpleasant surprise. They expected that Germany and her allies would gladly seize every opportunity to reconcile. But it was not there. It turned out that the Germans and Austrians were not going to leave the occupied territories, and by the right of nations to self-determination, Russia would lose Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Transcaucasia. A dispute arose over this right. The Bolsheviks argued that the will of the peoples under occupation would be undemocratic, while the Germans objected that under the Bolshevik terror it would be even less democratic.

As a result of the negotiations, an interim agreement was reached:
the truce is concluded for the period from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17);
troops remain in their positions;
all transfers of troops are stopped, except for those that have already begun.


The officers of the Hindenburg headquarters meet the arriving delegation of the RSFSR on the platform of Brest in early 1918

Proceeding from the general principles of the Decree on Peace, the Soviet delegation already at one of the first meetings proposed to adopt the following program as the basis for negotiations:
No forced annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.
The full political independence of the peoples who were deprived of this independence during the war is being restored.

National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide the question of belonging to any state or their state independence through a free referendum.

Noting that the German bloc had joined the Soviet formula of peace “without annexations and indemnities,” the Soviet delegation proposed a ten-day break during which an attempt could be made to bring the Entente countries to the negotiating table.



Trotsky L.D., Ioffe A. and Rear Admiral V. Altvater are going to the meeting. Brest-Litovsk.

During the break, however, it turned out that Germany understands a world without annexations differently than the Soviet delegation - for Germany, we are not talking about the withdrawal of troops to the borders of 1914 and the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories of the former Russian Empire, especially since, according to the statement Germany, Poland, Lithuania and Courland have already declared themselves in favor of secession from Russia, so that if these three countries now enter into negotiations with Germany about their future fate, this will by no means be considered an annexation by Germany.

On December 14 (27), the Soviet delegation at the second meeting of the political commission made a proposal: “In full agreement with the open statement of both contracting parties that they have no conquest plans and that they want to make peace without annexations. Russia is withdrawing its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia occupied by it, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. Soviet Russia promised, in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations, to provide the population of these regions with the opportunity to decide for themselves the question of their state existence - in the absence of any troops other than national or local militia.

The German and Austro-Hungarian delegation, however, made a counterproposal - the Russian state was invited to "take note of the statements expressing the will of the peoples inhabiting Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estland and Livonia, about their desire for complete state independence and for the allocation of from the Russian Federation" and acknowledge that "these statements under the present conditions must be regarded as an expression of the people's will." R. von Kuhlmann asked if the Soviet government would agree to withdraw its troops from all of Livonia and from Estland in order to give the local population the opportunity to connect with their fellow tribesmen living in the areas occupied by the Germans. The Soviet delegation was also informed that the Ukrainian Central Rada was sending its own delegation to Brest-Litovsk.

On December 15 (28) the Soviet delegation left for Petrograd. The current state of affairs was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), where by a majority of votes it was decided to drag out peace negotiations as long as possible, in the hope of an early revolution in Germany itself. In the future, the formula is refined and takes the following form: "We hold on until the German ultimatum, then we surrender." Lenin also invites the People's Commissariat Trotsky to go to Brest-Litovsk and personally lead the Soviet delegation. According to Trotsky's memoirs, "the prospect of negotiations with Baron Kuhlmann and General Hoffmann was not very attractive in itself, but "to drag out negotiations, you need a delayer," as Lenin put it.


Further negotiations with the Germans hung in the air. The Soviet government could not accept the German conditions, fearing that it would be immediately overthrown. Not only the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, but also the majority of the Communists were in favor of a "revolutionary war." After all, there was no one to fight! The army has already fled to their homes. The Bolsheviks proposed to move the negotiations to Stockholm. But this was refused by the Germans and their allies. Although they were desperately afraid - what if the Bolsheviks break off the negotiations? For them, it would be a disaster. They were already starving, and food could only be obtained in the East.

At the union meeting, it sounded in panic: “Germany and Hungary do not give anything more. Without supplies from outside, a wholesale pestilence will begin in Austria in a few weeks.


At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet side was represented by L. D. Trotsky (leader), A. A. Ioffe, L. M. Karakhan, K. B. Radek, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, E. G. Medvedev, V. M. Shakhrai, St. Bobinsky, V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, V. Terian, V. M. Altvater, A. A. Samoilo, V. V. Lipsky.

The head of the Austrian delegation, Ottokar von Chernin, wrote when the Bolsheviks returned to Brest: “It was curious to see what joy seized the Germans, and this unexpected and so violently manifested cheerfulness proved how hard the thought was for them that the Russians might not come.”



The second composition of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk. Sitting, from left to right: Kamenev, Ioffe, Bitsenko. Standing, from left to right: Lipsky V.V., Stuchka, Trotsky L.D., Karakhan L.M.



During negotiations in Brest-Litovsk

The impressions of the head of the German delegation, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry Richard von Kühlmann, about Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation, have been preserved: “not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses of glasses looked at his counterpart with a boring and critical look. The expression on his face clearly indicated that he [Trotsky] would have been better off ending the unsympathetic negotiations for him with a couple of grenades, throwing them over the green table, if this was in any way consistent with the general political line ... sometimes I wondered if he generally intends to make peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagate Bolshevik views.


A member of the German delegation, General Max Hoffmann, ironically described the composition of the Soviet delegation: “I will never forget the first dinner with the Russians. I was sitting between Joffe and Sokolnikov, then Commissar of Finance. Opposite me sat a worker, who, apparently, a lot of appliances and utensils caused great inconvenience. He clutched at one thing after another, but he used the fork exclusively for brushing his teeth. Diagonally from me, next to Prince Hoenloe, sat the terrorist Bizenko [sic], on the other side of her was a peasant, a real Russian phenomenon with long gray curls and a beard overgrown like a forest. He caused a certain smile in the staff when, when asked whether he prefers red or white wine for dinner, he answered: “Stronger” ”


On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), German Chancellor H. von Gertling announced in his speech at the Reichstag that a delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada had arrived in Brest-Litovsk. Germany agreed to negotiate with the Ukrainian delegation, hoping to use this as leverage both against Soviet Russia and against its ally, Austria-Hungary.



The Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk, from left to right: Nikolay Lyubinsky, Vsevolod Golubovich, Nikolay Levitsky, Lussenty, Mikhail Polozov and Alexander Sevryuk.


The arriving Ukrainian delegation from the Central Rada behaved scandalously and arrogantly. The Ukrainians had bread, and they began to blackmail Germany and Austria-Hungary, demanding for food to recognize their independence and give Ukraine Galicia and Bukovina, which belonged to the Austrians.

The Central Rada did not want to know Trotsky. The Germans were very good at it. They hung around like this, and like that, around the separatists. There were other factors involved as well. A strike broke out in Vienna because of the famine, followed by a strike in Berlin. 500 thousand workers were on strike. The Ukrainians demanded more and more concessions for their bread. And Trotsky cheered up. It seemed that the Germans and Austrians were about to start a revolution, and we just had to wait for it.


Ukrainian diplomats, who held preliminary negotiations with the German General M. Hoffmann, the chief of staff of the German armies on the Eastern Front, first announced claims to join the Kholmshchyna (which was part of Poland) to Ukraine, as well as the Austro-Hungarian territories - Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. Hoffmann, however, insisted that they reduce their demands and limit themselves to one Kholm region, agreeing that Bukovina and Eastern Galicia form an independent Austro-Hungarian crown territory under the rule of the Habsburgs. It was these demands that they defended in their further negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian delegation. Negotiations with the Ukrainians dragged on so much that the opening of the conference had to be postponed to December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918).

Ukrainian delegates communicate with German officers in Brest-Litovsk


The Germans invited a Ukrainian delegation to the next meeting, which took place on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918). Its chairman, V. A. Golubovich, announced the declaration of the Central Rada stating that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia does not extend to Ukraine, and therefore the Central Rada intends to independently conduct peace negotiations. R. von Kuhlmann turned to L. D. Trotsky with the question of whether he and his delegation intended to continue to be the only diplomatic representatives of all of Russia in Brest-Litovsk, and also whether the Ukrainian delegation should be considered part of the Russian delegation or whether it represents an independent state. Trotsky knew that the Rada was actually at war with the RSFSR. Therefore, by agreeing to consider the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada as independent, he actually played into the hands of the representatives of the Central Powers and provided Germany and Austria-Hungary with the opportunity to continue contacts with the Ukrainian Central Rada, while negotiations with Soviet Russia were marking time for another two days.

Signing of documents on a truce in Brest-Litovsk


The January uprising in Kyiv put Germany in a difficult position, and now the German delegation demanded a break in the meetings of the peace conference. On January 21 (February 3), von Kuhlmann and Chernin went to Berlin for a meeting with General Ludendorff, where they discussed the possibility of signing peace with the government of the Central Rada, which does not control the situation in Ukraine. The decisive role was played by the dire food situation in Austria-Hungary, which was threatened with starvation without Ukrainian grain.

In Brest, at the third round of negotiations, the situation changed again. In Ukraine, the Reds smashed the Rada. Now Trotsky refused to recognize the Ukrainians as an independent delegation, calling Ukraine an integral part of Russia. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were clearly betting on an imminent revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary, trying to gain time. One day in Berlin they intercepted a radio message from Petrograd to German soldiers, where they were called to kill the emperor, the generals, and to fraternize. Kaiser Wilhelm II became furious and ordered the negotiations to be interrupted.


Signing of a peace treaty with Ukraine. Sitting in the middle, from left to right: Count Ottokar Czernin von und zu Khudenitz, General Max von Hoffmann, Richard von Kühlmann, Prime Minister V. Rodoslavov, Grand Vizier Mehmet Talaat Pasha


The Ukrainians, as the successes of the Red troops, sharply reduced their arrogance and, flirting with the Germans, agreed to everything. On February 9, when the Bolsheviks entered Kyiv, the Central Rada concluded a separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary, saving them from the threat of famine and riots ...

In exchange for military assistance against the Soviet troops, the UNR undertook to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary by July 31, 1918 with one million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, up to 50 thousand tons of cattle meat, lard, sugar, hemp, manganese ore, etc. Austria-Hungary also undertook to create an autonomous Ukrainian region in Eastern Galicia.



Signing of a peace treaty between the UNR and the Central Powers on January 27 (February 9), 1918

On January 27 (February 9), at a meeting of the political commission, Chernin informed the Russian delegation about the signing of peace with Ukraine represented by the delegation of the government of the Central Rada.

Now the position of the Bolsheviks has become desperate. The Germans spoke to them in the language of ultimatums. The Reds were “asked” to get out of Ukraine, as from the territory of a state friendly to Germany. And new demands were added to the previous ones - to give up the unoccupied parts of Latvia and Estonia, to pay a huge indemnity.

At the insistence of General Ludendorff (even at a meeting in Berlin, he demanded that the head of the German delegation stop negotiations with the Russian delegation within 24 hours after the signing of peace with Ukraine) and by direct order of Emperor Wilhelm II, von Kühlmann presented Soviet Russia in an ultimatum form with a demand to accept the German peace conditions.

On January 28, 1918 (February 10, 1918), at the request of the Soviet delegation how to resolve the issue, Lenin confirmed the previous instructions. Nevertheless, Trotsky, violating these instructions, rejected the German terms of peace, putting forward the slogan "Neither peace, nor war: we do not sign peace, we stop the war, and we demobilize the army." The German side stated in response that Russia's failure to sign a peace treaty automatically entails the termination of the truce.

In general, the Germans and Austrians received extremely clear advice. Take what you want - but on your own, without my signature and consent. After this statement, the Soviet delegation defiantly left the negotiations. On the same day, Trotsky gives the Supreme Commander Krylenko an order demanding that he immediately issue an order for the army to end the state of war with Germany and general demobilization(although he had no right to do so, since he was not yet the people's commissar for military, but for foreign affairs). Lenin this order was canceled after 6 hours. Nevertheless, the order was received by all fronts on February 11 andfor some reason was accepted. The last units, still sitting in positions, flowed to the rear ...


On February 13, 1918, at a meeting in Homburg with the participation of Wilhelm II, the Imperial Chancellor Gertling, the head of the German Foreign Office von Kühlmann, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Vice Chancellor, it was decided to break the truce and launch an offensive on the Eastern Front.

On the morning of February 19, the offensive of the German troops rapidly unfolded on the entire Northern Front. Through Livonia and Estonia to Revel, Pskov and Narva (the ultimate goal is Petrograd), the troops of the 8th German Army (6 divisions), a separate Northern Corps stationed on the Moonsund Islands, as well as a special army formation operating from the south, from Dvinsk . For 5 days, German and Austrian troops advanced inland Russian territory for 200-300 km. “I have never seen such an absurd war,” Hoffmann wrote. - We conducted it practically on trains and cars. You put a handful of infantry with machine guns and one cannon on the train and you go to the next station. You take the station, arrest the Bolsheviks, put more soldiers on the train and go on.” Zinoviev was forced to admit that "there is evidence that in some cases unarmed German soldiers dispersed hundreds of our soldiers." “The army rushed to run, leaving everything, sweeping away in its path,” N.V. Krylenko, the first Soviet commander-in-chief of the Russian front-line army, wrote about these events in the same 1918.


On February 21, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree "The socialist fatherland is in danger", but at the same time notified Germany that it was ready to resume negotiations. And the Germans decided to bang their fists on the table in such a way that in the future they would discourage the Bolsheviks from being stubborn. On February 22, an ultimatum was dictated with a response time of 48 hours, and the conditions were even more severe than before. Since the Red Guard showed absolute incompetence, on February 23 a decree was adopted on the creation of a regular Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. But on the same day, a stormy meeting of the Central Committee took place. Lenin persuaded his comrades-in-arms to peace, threatening his resignation. Many did not stop. Lomov declared: “If Lenin threatens to resign, then they are afraid in vain. We must take power without Lenin. Nevertheless, some were embarrassed by the demarche of Vladimir Ilyich, others were sobered by the easy march of the Germans to Petrograd. 7 members of the Central Committee voted for peace, 4 members voted against and 4 abstained.

But the Central Committee was only a party organ. The decision was to be taken by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. It was still multi-party, and the factions of the Left SRs, Right SRs, Mensheviks, anarchists, a significant part of the Bolsheviks, stood for the war. The acceptance of peace was provided by Yakov Sverdlov. He knew how to preside at meetings like no one else. He used very clearly, for example, such a tool as regulations. He cut off the unwanted speaker - the regulations came out (and who is watching there, is there still a minute left?). He knew how to play on casuistry, procedural subtleties, manipulated whom to give the floor to and whom to “not notice”.

At a meeting of the Bolshevik faction, Sverdlov emphasized "party discipline." He pointed out that the Central Committee had already made a decision, the whole faction must comply with it, and if someone thinks otherwise, he is obliged to submit to the "majority". At 3 o'clock in the morning the factions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee came together. If we counted all the opponents of peace - the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, the "Left Communists", they would have a clear majority. Knowing this, the Left SR leaders demanded a roll call. But… the "Left Communists" were already bound by the decision of their faction. Vote only for peace. By 116 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee accepted the German ultimatum.

After the decision to accept peace on German terms was made by the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), and then passed through the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the question arose of the new composition of the delegation. As Richard Pipes notes, none of the Bolshevik leaders was eager to go down in history by putting his signature on a treaty shameful for Russia. Trotsky by this time had already resigned from the post of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Sokolnikov G. Ya. proposed the candidacy of Zinoviev G. E. However, Zinoviev refused such an “honor”, ​​proposing in response the candidacy of Sokolnikov himself; Sokolnikov also refuses, promising to leave the Central Committee in the event of such an appointment. Ioffe A. A. also flatly refused. After long negotiations, Sokolnikov nevertheless agreed to head the Soviet delegation, the new composition of which took the following form: Sokolnikov G. Ya., Petrovsky L. M., Chicherin G. V., Karakhan G. I. and a group of 8 consultants (among them, Ioffe A. A., former chairman of the delegation). The delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk on March 1, and two days later signed the contract without any discussion.



Postcard depicting the signing of the ceasefire agreement by the German representative, Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Russian delegation: A.A. Bitsenko, next to her A. A. Ioffe, as well as L. B. Kamenev. Behind Kamenev in the form of captain A. Lipsky, secretary of the Russian delegation L. Karakhan

The German-Austrian offensive, which began in February 1918, continued even when the Soviet delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk: on February 28, the Austrians occupied Berdichev, on March 1, the Germans occupied Gomel, Chernigov and Mogilev, and on March 2, Petrograd was bombed. On March 4, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, German troops occupied Narva and stopped only on the Narova River and the western shore of Lake Peipus, 170 km from Petrograd.




A photocopy of the first two pages of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, March 1918



Postcard showing the last page of signatures on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

The appendix to the treaty guaranteed a special economic status for Germany in Soviet Russia. Citizens and corporations of the Central Powers were removed from the scope of the Bolshevik decrees on nationalization, and those who had already lost their property were restored to their rights. Thus, German citizens were allowed to engage in private business in Russia against the background of the general nationalization of the economy that was taking place at that time. This state of affairs created, for a time, the opportunity for Russian owners of enterprises or securities to evade nationalization by selling their assets to the Germans. Fears of Dzerzhinsky F. E. that “By signing the conditions, we do not guarantee ourselves against new ultimatums”, are partially confirmed: the advance of the German army was not limited to the boundaries of the zone of occupation defined by the peace treaty.

A struggle for the ratification of the peace treaty unfolded. At the 7th Congress of the Bolshevik Party on March 6-8, the positions of Lenin and Bukharin clashed. The outcome of the congress was decided by the authority of Lenin - his resolution was adopted by 30 votes against 12, with 4 abstentions. Trotsky's compromise proposals to make peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance as a last concession and forbid the Central Committee to make peace with the Central Rada of Ukraine were rejected. The controversy continued at the Fourth Congress of Soviets, where the Left SRs and anarchists opposed the ratification, while the Left Communists abstained. But thanks to the existing system of representation, the Bolsheviks had a clear majority at the Congress of Soviets. If the left communists had agreed to split the party, the peace treaty would have failed, but Bukharin did not dare to do this. On the night of March 16, peace was ratified.

Austro-Hungarian troops enter the city of Kamenetz-Podolsk after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk



German troops under the command of General Eichhorn occupied Kyiv. March 1918.



Germans in Kyiv



Odessa after the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian troops. Dredging in Odessa port German troops captured Simferopol on April 22, 1918, Taganrog on May 1, and Rostov-on-Don on May 8, causing the fall of Soviet power on the Don. In April 1918, diplomatic relations were established between the RSFSR and Germany. On the whole, however, Germany's relations with the Bolsheviks were not ideal from the outset. In the words of Sukhanov N. N., “the German government was quite thoroughly afraid of its“ friends ”and“ agents ”: it knew very well that these people were the same“ friends ”to it, as well as to Russian imperialism, to which the German authorities tried to“ palm them off " keeping them at a respectful distance from their own loyal subjects." From April 1918, the Soviet ambassador Ioffe A.A. engaged in active revolutionary propaganda already in Germany itself, which ends with the November Revolution. The Germans, for their part, are consistently liquidating Soviet power in the Baltics and Ukraine, providing assistance to the "White Finns" and actively contributing to the formation of a center of the White movement on the Don. In March 1918, the Bolsheviks, fearing a German attack on Petrograd, transferred the capital to Moscow; after the signing of the Brest Peace, they, not trusting the Germans, did not begin to cancel this decision.

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While the German General Staff came to the conclusion that the defeat of the Second Reich was inevitable, Germany managed to impose on the Soviet government, in the context of the growing civil war and the beginning of the intervention of the Entente, additional agreements to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. On August 27, 1918, in Berlin, in the strictest secrecy, a Russian-German supplementary treaty to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and a Russian-German financial agreement were concluded, which were signed on behalf of the government of the RSFSR by Plenipotentiary A. A. Ioffe, and on behalf of Germany - von P. Ginze and I. Krige. Under this agreement, Soviet Russia was obliged to pay Germany, as compensation for damage and expenses for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war, a huge indemnity - 6 billion marks - in the form of "pure gold" and credit obligations. In September 1918, two "gold echelons" were sent to Germany, which contained 93.5 tons of "pure gold" worth over 120 million gold rubles. It didn't make it to the next shipment.

extracts

Article I

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand, and Russia on the other, declare that the state of war between them has ended; they decided to continue to live. among themselves in peace and harmony.

Article II

The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the governments or state and military institutions of the other side. Since this obligation concerns Russia, it also extends to the areas occupied by the powers of the quadruple alliance.

Article III

The regions lying to the west of the line established by the contracting parties and formerly belonging to Russia will no longer be under her supreme authority ...

For the aforementioned regions, their former belonging to Russia will not entail any obligations in relation to Russia. Russia refuses any interference in the internal affairs of these regions. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to determine the future fate of these areas in agreement with their population.

Article IV

Germany is ready, as soon as a general peace is concluded and a complete Russian demobilization is carried out, to clear the areas lying to the east of the line indicated in paragraph 1 of Article III, insofar as Article IV does not decide otherwise. Russia will do everything, the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and their legitimate return to Turkey. The districts of Ardagan, Kars and Batum will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the new organization of state-legal and international legal relations in these districts, but will allow their population to establish a new system in agreement with neighboring states, especially with Turkey.

Article V

Russia will immediately carry out the complete demobilization of its army, including the military units newly formed by its present government. In addition, Russia will either transfer its warships to Russian ports and leave there until the conclusion of a general peace, or immediately disarm. The military courts of states that are still at war with the powers of the quadruple alliance, since these ships are in the sphere of Russian power, are equated with Russian military courts. ... In the Baltic Sea and in the parts of the Black Sea subject to Russia, the removal of minefields. Merchant shipping in these maritime regions is freely and immediately resumed ...

Article VI

Russia undertakes to immediately conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize the peace treaty between this state and the powers of the quadruple alliance. The territory of Ukraine is immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia ceases all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Estonia and Livonia are also immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern border of Estonia runs generally along the Narva River. The eastern border of Livonia generally runs through Lake Peipus and Lake Pskov to its southwestern corner, then through Lake Luban in the direction of Livenhof on the Western Dvina. Estland and Livonia will be occupied by the German police authorities until public security is ensured there by the country's own institutions and until there is public order restored. Russia will immediately release all arrested or taken away inhabitants of Estonia and Livonia and ensure the safe return of all taken away Estonians and Livonians.

Finland and the Aland Islands will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard, and Finnish ports - of the Russian fleet and Russian naval forces... government or public institutions in Finland. The fortifications erected on the Åland Islands must be demolished as soon as possible.

Article VII

Based on the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent states, the contracting parties undertake to respect the political and economic independence and territorial integrity Persia and Afghanistan.

Article VIII

Prisoners of war of both sides will be released to their homeland

Article IX

The contracting parties mutually renounce the reimbursement of their military expenses, that is, the state costs of waging war, as well as the reimbursement of military losses, that is, those losses that were inflicted on them and their citizens in the war zone by military measures, including and all the requisitions made in the enemy country...

ORIGINAL

Signing of the Brest Peace

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk meant the defeat and withdrawal of Russia from the First World War.

A separate international peace treaty was signed on March 3, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk by representatives of Soviet Russia (on the one hand) and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) on the other. Separate peace- a peace treaty concluded by one of the participants in the warring coalition without the knowledge and consent of the allies. Such a peace is usually concluded before the general cessation of the war.

The signing of the Brest Peace Treaty was prepared in 3 stages.

The history of the signing of the Brest Peace

First stage

Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk met by German officers

The Soviet delegation at the first stage included 5 commissioners - members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee: A. A. Ioffe - chairman of the delegation, L. B. Kamenev (Rozenfeld) and G. Ya. Sokolnikov (Brilliant), SRs A. A. Bitsenko and S. D Maslovsky-Mstislavsky, 8 members of the military delegation, 3 translators, 6 technical officers and 5 ordinary members of the delegation (sailor, soldier, Kaluga peasant, worker, ensign of the fleet).

The armistice negotiations were overshadowed by a tragedy in the Russian delegation: during a private meeting of the Soviet delegation, a representative of the Headquarters in a group of military consultants, Major General V. E. Skalon, shot himself. Many Russian officers believed that he was crushed because of the humiliating defeat, the collapse of the army and the fall of the country.

Based on the general principles of the Decree on Peace, the Soviet delegation immediately proposed that the following program be adopted as the basis for negotiations:

  1. No forced annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.
  2. The full political independence of the peoples who were deprived of this independence during the war is being restored.
  3. National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide the question of belonging to any state or their state independence by means of a free referendum.
  4. Cultural-national and, under certain conditions, administrative autonomy of national minorities is ensured.
  5. Refusal of contributions.
  6. Solution of colonial issues on the basis of the above principles.
  7. Prevention of indirect restrictions on the freedom of weaker nations by stronger nations.

On December 28, the Soviet delegation left for Petrograd. The current state of affairs was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). By a majority of votes, it was decided to drag out the peace negotiations as long as possible, in the hope of an early revolution in Germany itself.

The Entente governments did not respond to an invitation to take part in peace negotiations.

Second phase

At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet Delegation was headed by L.D. Trotsky. The German high command expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the delay in peace negotiations, fearing the disintegration of the army. The Soviet delegation demanded that the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary confirm their lack of intentions to annex any territories of the former Russian Empire - according to the Soviet delegation, the decision on the future fate of self-determining territories should be carried out by a popular referendum, after the withdrawal of foreign troops and return refugees and displaced persons. General Hoffmann in his response speech stated that the German government refuses to clear the occupied territories of Courland, Lithuania, Riga and the islands of the Gulf of Riga.

On January 18, 1918, General Hoffmann, at a meeting of the political commission, presented the conditions of the Central Powers: Poland, Lithuania, part of Belarus and Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia, the Moonsund Islands and the Gulf of Riga retreated in favor of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This allowed Germany to control the sea routes to the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, as well as to develop an offensive against Petrograd. The Russian Baltic ports passed into the hands of Germany. The proposed border was extremely unfavorable for Russia: the lack of natural boundaries and the preservation of Germany's foothold on the coast Western Dvina at Riga, in case of war, it threatened the occupation of all Latvia and Estonia, threatened Petrograd. The Soviet delegation demanded a new interruption of the peace conference for another ten days in order to familiarize their government with the German demands. The self-confidence of the German delegation increased after the Bolsheviks dispersed the Constituent Assembly on January 19, 1918.

By mid-January 1918, a split was taking shape in the RSDLP(b): a group of "left communists" headed by N. I. Bukharin insisted on rejecting the German demands, and Lenin insisted on their acceptance, publishing the Theses on Peace on January 20. The main argument of the "left communists": without an immediate revolution in the countries Western Europe the socialist revolution in Russia will perish. They did not allow any agreements with the imperialist states and demanded that "revolutionary war" be declared on international imperialism. They declared their readiness "to accept the possibility of losing Soviet power" in the name of "the interests of the international revolution." The conditions proposed by the Germans, shameful for Russia, were opposed by: N. I. Bukharin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. S. Uritsky, A. S. Bubnov, K. B. Radek, A. A. Ioffe, N. N. Krestinsky , N. V. Krylenko, N. I. Podvoisky and others. The views of the "left communists" were supported by a number of party organizations in Moscow, Petrograd, the Urals, etc. Trotsky preferred to maneuver between the two factions, putting forward an "intermediate" platform "neither peace, nor war "-" We stop the war, we do not conclude peace, we demobilize the army.

On January 21, Lenin gives a detailed justification for the need to sign peace, announcing his "Theses on the immediate conclusion of a separate and annexationist peace" (they were published only on February 24). 15 participants of the meeting voted for Lenin's theses, 32 people supported the position of the "Left Communists" and 16 - the position of Trotsky.

Before the departure of the Soviet delegation to Brest-Litovsk to continue negotiations, Lenin instructed Trotsky to drag out the negotiations in every possible way, but in the event that the Germans presented an ultimatum, peace would be signed.

IN AND. Lenin

On March 6-8, 1918, at the 7th emergency congress of the RSDLP (b), Lenin managed to persuade everyone to ratify the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Voting: 30 for ratification, 12 against, 4 abstentions. Following the results of the congress, the party was, at the suggestion of Lenin, renamed the RCP (b). The congress delegates were not acquainted with the text of the treaty. Nevertheless, on March 14-16, 1918, the IV Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets finally ratified the peace treaty, which was adopted by a majority of 784 votes against 261 with 115 abstentions and decided to transfer the capital from Petrograd to Moscow in connection with the danger of a German offensive. As a result, representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party left the Council of People's Commissars. Trotsky resigned.

L.D. Trotsky

Third stage

None of the Bolshevik leaders wanted to put their signature on the shameful treaty for Russia: Trotsky resigned at the time of signing, Ioffe refused to go as part of a delegation to Brest-Litovsk. Sokolnikov and Zinoviev proposed each other's candidacies, Sokolnikov also refused the appointment, threatening to resign. But after long negotiations, Sokolnikov nevertheless agreed to lead the Soviet delegation. The new composition of the delegation: G. Ya. The delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk on March 1 and two days later, without any discussion, signed the contract. The official ceremony of signing the agreement took place in the White Palace (the house of the Nemtsevichs in the village of Skokie, Brest region) and ended at 5 p.m. on March 3, 1918. And the German-Austrian offensive that began in February 1918 continued until March 4, 1918.

The signing of the Brest peace treaty took place in this palace

Terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

Richard Pipes, American scientist, doctor historical sciences, a professor of Russian history at Harvard University, described the terms of this agreement as follows: “The terms of the agreement were extremely burdensome. They made it possible to imagine what kind of peace the countries of the Quadruple Accord would have to sign if they lost the war ". According to this treaty, Russia was obliged to make many territorial concessions by demobilizing its army and navy.

  • The Vistula provinces, Ukraine, provinces with a predominantly Belarusian population, Estland, Courland and Livonia provinces, the Grand Duchy of Finland were torn away from Russia. Most of these territories were to become German protectorates or become part of Germany. Russia pledged to recognize the independence of Ukraine represented by the government of the UNR.
  • In the Caucasus, Russia conceded the Kars region and the Batumi region.
  • The Soviet government ended the war with the Ukrainian Central Council (Rada) of the Ukrainian People's Republic and made peace with it.
  • The army and navy were demobilized.
  • The Baltic Fleet was withdrawn from its bases in Finland and the Baltic.
  • Black Sea Fleet with all the infrastructure was transferred to the Central Powers.
  • Russia paid 6 billion marks in reparations plus the payment of losses incurred by Germany during the Russian revolution - 500 million gold rubles.
  • The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central Powers and allied states formed on the territory of the Russian Empire.

If the results of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk are translated into the language of numbers, it will look like this: a territory of 780,000 square meters was torn away from Russia. km with a population of 56 million people (a third of the population of the Russian Empire), on which before the revolution there were 27% of cultivated agricultural land, 26% of the entire railway network, 33% of the textile industry, 73% of iron and steel were smelted, 89% of coal was mined and 90% sugar; there were 918 textile factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco factories, 1685 distilleries, 244 chemical plants, 615 pulp mills, 1073 machine-building plants and 40% of industrial workers lived.

Russia was withdrawing all its troops from these territories, while Germany, on the contrary, was introducing them there.

Consequences of the Brest Peace

German troops occupied Kyiv

The advance of the German army was not limited to the zone of occupation defined by the peace treaty. Under the pretext of ensuring the power of the "legitimate government" of Ukraine, the Germans continued their offensive. On March 12, the Austrians occupied Odessa, on March 17 - Nikolaev, on March 20 - Kherson, then Kharkov, Crimea and the southern part of the Don region, Taganrog, Rostov-on-Don. A “democratic counter-revolution” movement began, proclaiming Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik governments in Siberia and the Volga region, an uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in July 1918 in Moscow and the transition of the civil war to large-scale battles.

The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, as well as the faction of “Left Communists” that had formed within the RCP(b), spoke of the “betrayal of the world revolution,” since the conclusion of peace on the Eastern Front objectively strengthened the conservative Kaiser regime in Germany. The Left SRs resigned from the Council of People's Commissars in protest. The opposition rejected Lenin's arguments that Russia could not but accept the German conditions in connection with the collapse of its army, putting forward a plan for the transition to a mass popular uprising against the German-Austrian invaders.

Patriarch Tikhon

The Entente powers took the concluded separate peace with hostility. On March 6, British troops landed in Murmansk. On March 15, the Entente announced the non-recognition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, on April 5, Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok, and on August 2, British troops landed in Arkhangelsk.

But on August 27, 1918, in Berlin, in the strictest secrecy, a Russian-German supplementary treaty to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and a Russian-German financial agreement were concluded, which were signed on behalf of the government of the RSFSR by Plenipotentiary A. A. Ioffe, and on behalf of Germany - von P. Ginze and I. Krige.

Soviet Russia pledged to pay Germany, as compensation for damages and expenses for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war, a huge indemnity of 6 billion marks (2.75 billion rubles), including 1.5 billion in gold (245.5 tons of pure gold) and credit obligations, 1 billion deliveries of goods. In September 1918, two "gold echelons" (93.5 tons of "pure gold" worth over 120 million gold rubles) were sent to Germany. Almost all Russian gold that arrived in Germany was subsequently transferred to France as an indemnity under the Versailles Peace Treaty.

Under the supplementary agreement, Russia recognized the independence of Ukraine and Georgia, renounced Estonia and Livonia, which, under the original agreement, were formally recognized as part of the Russian state, bargaining for itself the right to access the Baltic ports (Revel, Riga and Windau) and retaining Crimea, control over Baku , giving Germany a quarter of the products produced there. Germany agreed to withdraw its troops from Belarus, with Black Sea coast, from Rostov and part of the Don basin, as well as not to occupy any more Russian territory and not to support separatist movements on Russian soil.

On November 13, after the Allied victory in the war, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was annulled by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. But Russia could no longer take advantage of the fruits of the common victory and take a place among the winners.

Soon the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories of the former Russian Empire began. After the annulment of the Brest Treaty among the Bolshevik leaders, Lenin's authority became indisputable: “By perspicaciously accepting a humiliating peace that gave him the necessary time, and then collapsed under the influence of his own gravity, Lenin earned the broad confidence of the Bolsheviks. When, on November 13, 1918, they tore up the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, following which Germany capitulated to the Western Allies, Lenin's authority in the Bolshevik movement was raised to an unprecedented height. Nothing better served his reputation as a man who made no political mistakes; never again did he have to threaten to resign in order to insist on his own,” R. Pipes wrote in his work “The Bolsheviks in the Struggle for Power”.

The civil war in Russia continued until 1922 and ended with the establishment of Soviet power in most of the territory of the former Russia, with the exception of Finland, Bessarabia, the Baltic States, Poland (including the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus that became part of it).