Aerial reconnaissance

Perhaps it should be considered logical that in the post-war period, in almost all cases when questions of military aviation were discussed, the main attention was paid to strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, jet fighters, rocket-propelled and unguided projectiles and anti-submarine warfare. Events such as the 1953 Korean War and the Dutch and British floods have shown that helicopters are gaining importance. The question of transport aircraft came to the fore during the supply of Berlin by air and in the first tense days of the Korean War, when vital necessary items supplies were to be airlifted to the small patch of South Korea that was still in the hands of the United Nations troops. But not a single significant work on air force written after the end of the Second World War, no information about reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance operations can be found, with the exception of individual remarks.

It is difficult to understand why reconnaissance aviation began to play a secondary role in most air fleets between the two world wars, and why, despite the experience of the Second World War, no changes occurred in this matter. During the first two years of World War I, aircraft and airships were used primarily for surveillance. Their main task was to be the eyes of the army and navy: to detect guns and troop movements on land and enemy ships at sea. Naturally, with the advent of new methods of bombing and conducting air battles, the issues of conducting aerial reconnaissance began to be given correspondingly less attention. But every stage of the Second World War convinces us more and more that good or bad air patrols or reconnaissance must be the main factor in the air, land and sea situation.

The most striking example of the development and activity of reconnaissance aviation was shown by the German Air Force. In 1939, at the very beginning of the Second World War, 20 percent of the total, approximately 3,750 combat aircraft, were long-range and short-range reconnaissance aircraft, seaplanes and flying boats designed for aerial reconnaissance and patrol. This large percentage of reconnaissance aircraft continued until about 1943, when the deployment of fighter aircraft began on a large scale. In the entire history of military aviation, no other country has devoted such a large proportion of its aviation resources to aerial reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol missions. During the first nine or ten months of the war, German reconnaissance aircraft successfully completed their mission of obtaining information necessary for the efficient and economical use of German air power. Seaplanes of the coast guard successfully carried out the tasks of monitoring the coasts of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea. over the North Sea and Western Europe meteorological and general reconnaissance was carried out daily; these tasks were carried out by qualified crews of Heinkel twin-engine bombers assigned to each major aviation formation. During the campaign in Norway, they were assisted in these tasks by four-engine long-range flying boats and Focke-Wulf-200 aircraft. Aircraft "Henschel" performed important tasks of tactical reconnaissance in the interests of the ground forces operating in Poland, the Scandinavian countries, France and Flanders. They quickly reported accurate information about the movements of enemy troops, making it possible to quickly use dive bombers on the most advantageous targets. Almost every German tank division had a squadron of Henschel tactical reconnaissance aircraft, which performed the tasks of detecting tanks, as well as a flight of Fieseler aircraft, which provided communications in combat areas. Each unit of medium or dive bombers had a well-trained flight of reconnaissance aircraft, which performed special tasks of observation and aerial reconnaissance in the interests of its unit. Never before in the history of aviation has the air force had such first-class aerial reconnaissance that would be able to ensure the use of minimum quantity bombers with maximum efficiency.

But by the summer of 1940, even this number of German reconnaissance units was not enough. In the Battle of England and during the fighting in the Atlantic, the German reconnaissance aircraft passed the first severe tests and found the first signs of weakness. air force Germany for aerial reconnaissance. During the Battle of England, it soon became clear that 300 Henschel aircraft, which had low speed, should be a good target for Spitfire and Hurricane fighters armed with eight machine guns and exceeding them in speed by almost 160 km / h, so that these machines had to be excluded from active operations, although they were partly used for patrols in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe coast of the Bay of Biscay. The remaining long-range reconnaissance aircraft Dornier, Heinkel and Junkers were also vulnerable to Hurricane and Spitfire fighters when they attempted to conduct reconnaissance missions over land. As a result, the Germans failed to conduct reconnaissance of many airfields and factories, which were important targets for Goering's bomber aircraft. German reconnaissance aircraft failed to obtain reliable information about the results of their raids on airfields, radar installations and factories. During the Battle of England, reconnaissance naval aviation The Germans also began to experience difficulties in the new Atlantic theatre. During operations against ships, mainly in the North Sea or in ports on the east coast of England, the German reconnaissance aircraft carried out the tasks of meteorological reconnaissance, aerial photographic reconnaissance and observation. When fighting aviation spread further to the West and to the Bay of Biscay, the German reconnaissance aviation was not up to the mark of their tasks. From the end of 1940 it became more and more of a secondary role, and its operations became less effective. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, long-range reconnaissance in the interests of the German air force was often carried out by Italian aircraft. The position of German reconnaissance aircraft continued to deteriorate on all three main fronts, because the Germans knew that they had the means to carry out only the most minimal tasks. In the West, during the period from January 1941 to September 1944, the Germans could not conduct a single sortie on aerial photographs of London. In the decisive period before the Allied invasion of France, a lot of information could be obtained about the invasion plans by aerial reconnaissance of the ports of the south coast of England, but British patrol fighters drove off most of the German reconnaissance aircraft, and the aerial photographs they received were of poor quality and provided very little information. In the East, the situation was even worse, since after 1943 reconnaissance aviation units were often involved in bombing missions. Of course, the German troops acting against Soviet army, received little information from air reconnaissance, which made it possible to judge the direction and strength of the strikes of the Soviet troops from the end of 1942. At that time, the air support for the Suez Canal zone and the central region of the Mediterranean Sea from the Germans and Italians was also insufficient. The position of the German reconnaissance aviation deteriorated at a time when it was especially necessary to strengthen the reconnaissance activities of the German Air Force. When the enemy is weak, the movements of his troops do not play a big role; but when it is strong, the value of aerial reconnaissance increases.

Air reconnaissance issues have not yet been adequately reflected in modern doctrines of air strategy and air power. Well-organized aerial reconnaissance (or information) is the "first line" of air defense and the first important condition for successful air operations. If guided missiles and bombers are used as means of attack, then first of all it is necessary to know where the enemy is, what his means and strength are. To ensure the protection of ships from attack by submarines, it is necessary to detect them in a timely manner. In order to evaluate the results of bombing during the war, it is necessary to have the latest information about the destruction caused, the dispersal of industry, restoration work and the construction of new factories. Aerial reconnaissance can completely change the outcome of military operations of ground forces. The German offensive in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944/45 began during the period of fogs, as a result of which Allied air reconnaissance was not carried out. Hardly throughout the Pacific theater of operations - from Pearl Harbor to about. Okinawa - there were naval battles in which air reconnaissance would not play an important role.

Yet the value of aerial reconnaissance is always underestimated. During a war it is impossible to economically distribute forces and resources and use them to the maximum without knowledge of the situation. What Clausewitz wrote about the war a hundred years ago is still being studied and has not lost its force: "Many reports received in the war contradict one another; there are even more false reports, and most of them are not very reliable." It is difficult for a non-specialist to understand that the information available to the high command, which serves as the basis for decision-making, is often insufficient and incomplete. Troop commanders can lead combat operations for months without any information about how many planes, ships, tanks or submarines the enemy is producing. True, there are many sources of intelligence information: prisoners of war, documents captured from the enemy, agents and radio interception. But how to find out what information this or that prisoner of war has? Since it is possible to determine in advance which radiograms can be decrypted and what information they contain, it is not always possible to capture enemy documents containing important information. You can rarely rely on the fact that agents will deliver the necessary intelligence in the form required. Aerial photographic reconnaissance is the only source of reliable and up-to-date information of a military nature. Air reconnaissance activities can be planned and controlled. Almost always, aircraft performing aerial reconnaissance missions bring photographs that provide valuable information, since the objects, time and date of photographing are known. Even visual reconnaissance, despite the fact that its results are influenced by human errors, provides the ability to quickly obtain information that can satisfy operational requirements. Moreover, to know exactly the time and place of receiving intelligence information is already half of being sure of its reliability.

In Soviet military circles, the words "tactical (military) intelligence" (reconnaissance) and "strategic intelligence" (intelligence) are synonymous. Yet the USSR never attached as much importance to tactical intelligence as the Germans did in the period between the two world wars. The Soviet air force has always had (and still has) reconnaissance aviation regiments of 30-40 aircraft, but they were never enough to meet the needs of the army in reconnaissance information. Has anyone ever heard of the existence of an air reconnaissance command in the air forces of the Western powers, equal in position to the bomber and fighter air commands and the coastal aviation command of the British air forces? Position, dignity and popularity are as important in military life as they are in civilian life. It is rare to hear that a pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft became national hero. At the time of the announcement of the Bruneval raid, few had heard of the valuable low-level perspective aerial photographs taken by Air Major Hill. Reconnaissance information obtained from aerial photographs served as the initial data for the raid on Bruneval. Subsequently, he took many aerial photographs of radar stations during flights that required skill, courage and enterprise; but, as was the case with many other reconnaissance pilots who delivered valuable information both during the first and second world wars, his feat was soon forgotten. Apparently, fighter and bomber pilots are considered the aristocrats of the air and the monopoly bearers of the Victoria Cross and the Order of Honor of Congress. This opinion is erroneous, since every pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft must be a first-class specialist in order to cope with his tasks. With modern radio and radar equipment on bombers and fighters, an average crew can often achieve good results. It is indicative that in the British Air Force the navigator wears only half of the wing on his military uniform and rarely rises to the rank of colonel. Those who fly know how often the navigator is the most important and authoritative member of the aircraft crew. And yet, did at least one navigator, a participant in the First World War, become an air general or an air marshal during the second world war?

A modern air force must consider organizing aerial reconnaissance on an entirely new basis. At the start of World War II, only the German Air Force was able to provide intelligence for bombing operations. In the US Air Force! the lenses of many aerial cameras met only the requirements of cartographic aerial photography in peacetime. In many cases, their size was insufficient to obtain aerial photographs at the scale necessary for detailed interpretation. There were very few trained codebreakers and reconnaissance pilots.

During the Second World War, aerial reconnaissance of all kinds was widely developed, but the war did not give the main strategic lesson that the conduct of multi-purpose air operations of a large scale required the conduct of multi-purpose aerial reconnaissance of an appropriate scale. In modern warfare, the tasks of aerial reconnaissance are very diverse. Coastal aviation conducts reconnaissance on sea lanes, meteorological reconnaissance is carried out over land and sea, radar reconnaissance is carried out in order to detect enemy radar stations, and strategic aviation reconnaissance is carried out in order to determine the results of bombing and obtain reconnaissance data on targets. In addition, there is tactical reconnaissance, which includes the adjustment of artillery fire, the identification of camouflaged objects and targets, and the observation of the movement of enemy troops along highways and railways. During the Second World War, reconnaissance activities for the solution of each of the above tasks hardly lasted several months. During the first two years of the war, there was no aerial survey of the factories of Japan's growing aviation industry in the Pacific theater. The British conducted insufficient meteorological reconnaissance over German territory. From the captured war logs, it became known that the days of bad weather in important cities such as Berlin and Leipzig, which were considered by the Allies, were in fact clear, sunny days. Winston Churchill wrote of the British air raids on Berlin that began in November 1943: "We had to wait until March 1944 to obtain sufficiently clear aerial photographs to evaluate the results of the bombing. This was partly due to poor meteorological conditions, as well as insufficient number of reconnaissance aircraft "Mosquito" American aircraft, which carried out raids on oil refineries in Romania in 1943 and subsequently did not have aerial reconnaissance data, both during the planning period of operations and during the evaluation of the results of the bombing.Effective air patrols in coastal zones and good radio communications could have thwarted a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor.The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, during their breakthrough across the English Channel, were accidentally detected from a Spitfire aircraft performing a combat air patrol mission, and not by reconnaissance aircraft Many examples can be given when, at the decisive stages of the Second World War, the organization of aerial reconnaissance was poorly organized.

The tactical lessons of World War II are well learned. It is now clear that reconnaissance aircraft must be the best and their crews the most qualified. Bombers and fighters intended for reconnaissance should be stripped of weapons and replaced with additional fuel tanks in order to increase their range and flight speed. All the most the best planes during the Second World War: Mosquito, Mustang, Lightning, LaG and Messerschmitt jets were used for aerial reconnaissance. "and other jet fighters, as well as B-36 and B-52 strategic bombers - all were specially adapted for aerial reconnaissance missions. A heavy bomber variant may also appear, from which, when approaching enemy territory, a supersonic reconnaissance fighter will be released. Completely it is clear that in aerial photography, accurate heading, altitude, and airspeed are of great importance - which can be done by only a few pilots, the choice of the flight route and the accurate maintenance of time over the target are also important. having focal lengths from 150 to more than 1500 mm; they provide a large photographic area with large overlap, allowing detailed interpretation of aerial photographs taken from altitudes of more than 9000 m. All modern air forces use machines that provide fast and efficient interpretation. As soon as the plane lands, the 16- or 35-mm film is quickly delivered to the local mobile interpretation center, where the first stage of processing is carried out within several hours: development, washing, drying, printing and initial interpretation. Using these images, you can quickly estimate the damage caused by the bombing, or calculate the approximate number of vehicles, trains and troops on the move. In order to make maximum use of the aerial photographs obtained after the first processing for operational purposes, it is necessary to have a good file of intelligence information and military maps of the latest editions. In itself, information about the number of ships in the port, aircraft at the airfield or trains at the marshalling yard is of dubious value. It is necessary to know for what purpose certain funds are concentrated. This position can be illustrated by one example from the Second World War. At an airfield in central Norway, photographic reconnaissance discovered a large number of four-engine bombers designed to fight ships. This indicated that the Germans were preparing an attack on ships located off the coast of Scotland or Ireland. The ships were in turmoil. It was decided to take them to a safe place or take other measures. In fact, it turned out that the concentration a large number aircraft at one airfield was caused by bad weather around air bases in southwestern France and southwestern Norway, and a lack of spare parts at bases in central Norway, which caused several aircraft to fail. It is very often not taken into account that the aircraft photographed at the airfield may turn out to be out of order. A lot of information can be gleaned from each image, but in order to accept this information as facts, it must be supplemented with other data.

At the second and third stages of interpretation of aerial photographs, a more thorough study of them is carried out. The use of a stereoscope increases the accuracy of interpretation. The vague shadows on the hills and in the valleys become clear. Viewing aerial photographs through a stereoscope helps identify parked aircraft, camouflaged bridges and buildings by detecting differences in the height of an object compared to surrounding objects. The stereoscope allows you to see the relief of an object by its shadow, which is often the last key to recognizing objects when deciphering. By studying the details of aerial photographs, a large amount of intelligence data can be obtained, for example, comparative data on the development of a network of radar stations and firing positions. anti-aircraft artillery, information on the construction and expansion of airfields with a significant lengthening of the runways. With the help of data obtained by aerial photographic reconnaissance, the preparation of the Axis countries for the failed airborne landing on the island was revealed. Malta with about. Sicily, where airfields and runways were specially built for this purpose. It was with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance that it was discovered that the Germans were developing new weapons in Peenemünde, which in the future could play a decisive role in the war. The role of aerial reconnaissance of strategic targets cannot be overestimated. Accurate and reliable basic intelligence data can be obtained from other intelligence sources. But only with the help of aerial reconnaissance can reliable information be obtained about the best flight route to the target, taking into account air defense in a given area, enemy camouflage, and important target areas that have recently been reconstructed or rehabilitated.

However, one important issue of aerial reconnaissance is often misunderstood. At the present time, it is still argued that, using aerial photographs, it is possible to determine how long a particular object has been disabled. During the Second World War, based on aerial photographs, the following conclusions were made: "It is assumed that the production capacity of the facility has decreased by 50 percent for a period of two to three months." No one can calculate the percentage of destruction based on aerial photographs with such accuracy. The pace of restoration work depends on many factors: the morale of the population, the sequence of work, the supply of electricity, the availability of labor and raw materials. In 1944, the assessment of the destruction of the German aircraft industry, based on aerial photographs, was optimistic because the enemy dispersed industrial enterprises and used production facilities in unknown factories. Estimation of the destruction of Japanese aircraft factories in 1944-1945 was often pessimistic, as the pace of reconstruction in Japan was slow, and the reassessment of the destruction of German factories in 1944 is probably only too well remembered.

One of the sad lessons of the air war in Korea is that the experience of conducting aerial reconnaissance during the second world war was confused. First, there was a great shortage of qualified codebreakers. The work of deciphering aerial photographs requires a lot of preparation and skill. Many good codebreakers lost their skills while working in civilian institutions. In 1950, the US Air Force had only two air reconnaissance squadrons in Japan and Korea, one of which was engaged in mapping. The second squadron could not be used effectively, as it suffered greatly from a lack of materiel and personnel. When these squadrons began their missions, the tactical lessons of the forties had already been forgotten. They received too many impracticable requests for large-scale aerial photographs, which had to be taken from low altitudes and at high speed. There were various bodies which, despite limited resources, used aerial reconnaissance facilities to meet their own needs; it happened that on the same day, at the request of various organizations, reconnaissance flights were made twice along the same route. Worst of all, there were no decryption specialists. But these difficulties of the initial period were soon overcome. By the beginning of 1952, mobile photo laboratories were organized, equipped with vans, trailers with power plants and water tanks. There were vans for printing pictures and developing photographic films, workshops for repairing photographic equipment, a film library - that is, everything necessary for processing aerial photographs in field conditions. The number of equipment, personnel and aircraft gradually increased. Applications for aerial reconnaissance were coordinated in the US Air Force Intelligence Directorate in the Far East, and the actions of the United Nations troops in Korea became more economical and expedient.

Of the lessons of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War, one lesson, perhaps, remained unlearned - this is the inadmissibility of underestimating the use of seaplanes and flying boats. During the war, American Catalina flying boats, British Sunderland, Soviet MPs, and German Heinkel and Dornier seaplanes and flying boats carried out coastal and meteorological reconnaissance, carried out anti-submarine patrols, and performed other tasks in the interests of naval forces. forces. But after the war, seaplanes and flying boats fell out of fashion in the air forces of the Western powers, although a few such squadrons remained in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Communists in Korea had a small bomber force; if the few airfields that the United Nations air force had at the initial period of the Korean War had been attacked even lightly from the air, their aircraft would have had to operate from air bases in Japan, having lost great advantages. In many cases, only seaplanes and flying boats, dispersed at anchorages in case of air attack, can provide important information about enemy movements and changing meteorological conditions. The Germans valued flying boats and seaplanes in 1940 during the campaign in Norway, when there were few airfields at their disposal and meteorological and other information was needed for the rapid success of the campaign. Undoubtedly, conditions similar to those in the Pacific theater may occur in the future, in which flying boats will play an important role. Flying boats are a convenient and economical means of passenger transportation on civil airlines; they are capable of carrying a large payload and can be quickly adapted for military purposes. Flying boats are more valuable than many people think.

The need for global weather forecasts is now greater than ever before, but the role of aerial reconnaissance in this regard is difficult to define. Should it become necessary to move air squadrons across large areas of water at speeds in excess of 1,100 km/h, as was the case in early 1954, the meteorological service must provide a worldwide weather forecast. At present, thousands of ground and sea meteorological stations have been established in all countries, delivering basic weather data. There are countless previously collected data on meteorological conditions and climate that can help establish the relationship between current local meteorological data and possible long-term weather trends. Electronic equipment is increasingly being used to predict the weather. VHF radios are used to warn of an approaching storm that poses a danger to aircraft flight. With the help of radar stations determine the nature of the winds in the upper atmosphere. It would be impractical to employ a large number of weather reconnaissance aircraft when these aircraft are needed to carry out more important tasks. It would be more expedient to increase the number of terrestrial mobile meteorological stations and ships for reconnaissance of weather at sea, improve meteorological instruments and ensure reliable communication with central bodies that summarize information on the state of the weather.

Of course, there is still a need to use a certain number of aircraft for meteorological reconnaissance, especially with the increasing range of all types of aircraft, when bombers during the flight to the target may encounter a variety of meteorological conditions. It is difficult to foresee the full range of operational requirements in the field of meteorological reconnaissance, as well as in the field of military reconnaissance. As the ability to use expensive nuclear weapons for close air support grows, tactical military intelligence becomes more and more important. Nuclear weapons should not be allowed to be spent on secondary purposes. In the era of atomic projectiles and tactical atomic bombs, which can be used from fighter-bombers, timely and reliable information is extremely important. Expensive tactical guided missiles also cannot be used against small targets. If ground forces operate in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East, where many areas have not yet been mapped, then the need for aerial photography will be significant. This is evidenced by the experience of military operations in Malaya. The available maps of Malaya proved useless for military purposes. It was necessary to draw up new military maps, for which it was necessary to make aerial photographs of an area of ​​​​more than 10 thousand square meters. km. Much of this work has been done with helicopters. These machines also proved to be extremely valuable for aerial reconnaissance during the Korean War. But the territories of Korea and Malaya cannot be compared, for example, with the vast expanses of Asia, where there are also no modern large-scale military maps and the compilation of which will require colossal efforts of aerial reconnaissance. It is safe to say that any conflict in the future, during which aerial reconnaissance will be required, will almost certainly cover the whole world. The number of reconnaissance aircraft will be very limited. What can be done in a relatively calm peacetime environment in order to prepare for war as much as possible, with limited resources? The first and most important condition is the conduct of general training of the personnel of the armed forces in visual observation. Part of the time spent on physical training and lectures on current issues, it is useful to use for the study of meteorology, camouflage, aerial observation techniques, geography, terrain features - that is, all issues that develop theoretical and practical reconnaissance skills in personnel of all branches of the armed forces. Activities such as showing all personnel special documentaries, post-flight practical checks for the assignment of a special observer badge, which entitles them to a salary allowance, will increase general level reconnaissance training. All bomber fighter and transport units of the Air Force must have more pilots specially trained for reconnaissance missions. If the initial training of observers is organized on a large scale in the armed forces, then it will not be difficult to create reconnaissance detachments in combat aviation units and equip them with personnel. In addition, conditions must be created for more flexible switching of aircraft to aerial reconnaissance. Why not, for example, use an entire aviation wing of bombers and fighters to survey an entire area and thus obtain visual reconnaissance data on this area. But all too often only two or three aircraft are allocated for aerial reconnaissance. Just as a good boxer saves his signature punch until he knows his opponent's strengths and weaknesses, successful offensive operations in the air require detailed knowledge of the enemy's territory, and it is often advisable to delay the start of operations until necessary. information will not be received. Saving manpower and resources for aerial reconnaissance only leads to a waste of resources in bombardment.

If the vast expanses covered by modern warfare necessitate aerial reconnaissance on a large scale, then they also require special attention to questions of communications and centralized control. In the USA, Great Britain and the USSR, central intelligence directorates have been created, but they mainly carry out the tasks of strategic intelligence. It is necessary to organize a unified intelligence service of the armed forces, which would include a unit of photo decoders who process all intelligence materials coming through all channels: this department should include both military and civilian specialists. Of course, in this department there should be specialized units: technical, scientific, industrial, etc., but these units should be general, without any preference for one of the branches of the armed forces. Intelligence information is of value to all branches of the armed forces: intelligence on the state of the weather, on radar stations, enemy ships, and almost everything else is rarely of interest to any one branch of the armed forces.

Likewise, reconnaissance air units and additionally created reconnaissance observer detachments should also serve all armed forces, and not just air force. Air reconnaissance, like strategic bombing, must be carried out in accordance with state military policy determined by the Ministries of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The control of Soviet long-range bomber aviation during the Second World War was carried out by the State Defense Committee, and reconnaissance aviation units were dispersed, being at the disposal of the commanders of the ground army and navy. The Anglo-American strategic bomber force was temporarily under the control of the joint chiefs of staff, but it never won the air reconnaissance, which was often the eyes of the strategic bomber force and the evaluator of the results of its actions, to itself. Of course, at the present time tendencies are intensifying towards the unification of the branches of the armed forces. Joint intelligence directorates and joint committees have already been organized, and many staff documents are being jointly developed. The time has come for the abolition of various forms of dress certain types armed forces and to draw up detailed plans for the closest possible unification of the army, navy and air force at all levels where possible. However, this is a large independent issue, which is dealt with in more detail in Chapter IX. Chapter 3. Reconnaissance It is more difficult to conduct reconnaissance in the mountains than on flat terrain. Mountainous rugged terrain, the presence of mountain spurs and ridges, gorges and valleys between them contribute to the secrecy of enemy movements and the location of his units. In addition, folds

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Reconnaissance aviation is the main means of operational and one of the means of tactical reconnaissance.

The military aviation conducts reconnaissance and surveillance, corrects artillery fire, and provides communications between headquarters. However, during decisive periods of hostilities, all types of aviation, including military aviation, must concentrate their efforts on the battlefield to destroy enemy manpower and combat assets in the main direction.

The place of aviation intelligence in the general system of the intelligence service

Aerial reconnaissance does not replace other types of reconnaissance, but to a large extent supplements them, establishing with them an uninterrupted chain of reconnaissance and surveillance. In some cases, aviation may be the only possible means of obtaining the necessary data about the enemy.

Possessing the ability to quickly penetrate the enemy's disposition to great depths, quickly explore vast areas and quickly deliver the obtained data to the command, aviation has become an indispensable means of reconnaissance of large groups of troops, such as armies, corps and divisions.

Air reconnaissance occupies, as it were, an intermediate place between agents operating on enemy territory and military reconnaissance of ground forces. In the process of combat work, the actions of all types of reconnaissance in collecting data on the enemy are closely intertwined, creating conditions for a consistent succession of types of reconnaissance.

The discovered object, having fallen into the sphere of observation of reconnaissance ortans, cannot and must not disappear from their field of vision. Undercover, air and ground reconnaissance sequentially intercept by observation the detected object when it enters their zone of action, passing it on to each other.

Types of aerial reconnaissance

According to the combat value, aerial reconnaissance is divided into:

  • a) operational
  • b) tactical.

Operational aerial reconnaissance is carried out in the interests of front and army commands to ascertain the enemy's operational plans (grouping and redeployment of enemy forces and assets, preparation of probable areas of operations within the front or army theater).

The tasks performed by reconnaissance aviation are determined by the nature of the operation being carried out.

Operational aerial reconnaissance, carried out in the interests of the front command, must penetrate into the depth of enemy territory by 200-500 km (the zone of the rear area of ​​the front and the depth reached by a series of successive operations).

Aerial reconnaissance, carried out in the interests of the army command, is conducted at the enemy's location to a depth of 100-200 km, covering the army's rear zone with surveillance.

Operational aerial reconnaissance is carried out by order of the army and front commands.

Tactical aerial reconnaissance is carried out in the interests of the troops and the command of corps and divisions (where the division is the highest tactical formation) to ascertain the size, position and actions of the enemy grouping in front of the front of a given military formation.

The tasks of tactical aerial reconnaissance are determined by the nature of combat operations.

Reconnaissance in the interests of the Corps Command is carried out to a depth of 60 km in order to timely detect suitable reserves, especially fiercely mechanized formations.

Reconnaissance in the interests of the division command is carried out to a depth of 30-40 km, which ensures that the command makes the necessary decision in a timely manner and puts it into practice (oncoming combat with an open flank, combat in the presence of enemy mechanized formations).

Reconnaissance in the interests of independently operating large motorized mechanized formations and cavalry is carried out to a depth that ensures their fulfillment of tasks.

Tactical aerial reconnaissance is conducted by order of the command of the corresponding formation, which includes, is attached to or serves the aviation reconnaissance unit.

A special type of tactical reconnaissance is the observation of the battlefield, maintenance of artillery and escort of tanks.

Characteristics of aerial reconnaissance and its various types

1. Positive properties of aerial reconnaissance

  • 1) rapid penetration into the depths of the enemy location;
  • 2) rapid survey (for one purpose or another) of large areas;
  • 3) fast delivery of the obtained data to the command;
  • 4) documentary reliability of photographic reconnaissance data;
  • 5) objective impartiality of photographic reconnaissance.

2. Negative properties of aerial reconnaissance

  • 1) difficulty in recognizing camouflaged enemy targets;
  • 2) the impossibility of obtaining other data in excess of those that can be detected by the eye or a camera (documents, interviewing prisoners, studying the mood of residents, etc.);
  • 3) the impossibility of long-term and continuous observation of the same object (technical conditions: limited stay in the air, dependence on atmospheric and meteorological conditions).

However, the planned and systematic conduct of aerial reconnaissance, supplemented by other types of reconnaissance, makes it possible for the command to accumulate certain data on the position of the enemy at a certain moment and reveal the dynamics of the situation over a certain period of time.

Characteristics of various types of aerial reconnaissance. reconnaissance aviation

I. Subordination of reconnaissance aviation units

Reconnaissance aviation units are subordinate to the chief of staff of the army and receive tasks from him.

2. Tasks of aerial reconnaissance in the most characteristic operations

Counter operation:

  • a) determination of the intensity of transportation and areas of concentration of the main mass of enemy troops;
  • b) search for the main groupings of enemy troops, as well as its fast-moving units, establishing the mode of their actions (standing, concentrating, advancing, deploying);
  • c) determination of the deployment line;
  • d) determining the location of the army reserve, its strength and composition;
  • e) observation of the flanks;
  • f) monitoring the activities of control stations, supply stations and railways and ordinary roads;
  • g) reconnaissance of the airfield network and the enemy air force.

Offensive:

  • a) reconnaissance of the main defensive line;
  • b) determining the location of the enemy's operational reserves and the direction of their movement;
  • c) monitoring the movement on railways ah and ordinary ways;
  • d) reconnaissance of rear defensive lines;
  • e) reconnaissance of the enemy's airfield network.

Defensive operation:

  • a) establishing the enemy grouping during its operational deployment;
  • b) establishing the location of reserves;
  • c) observation of the rear of the enemy to determine the nature of the offensive (preparation of a defensive line, equipment of crossings, etc.);
  • d) observation of the enemy's railway maneuver;
  • e) reconnaissance of the airfield network.

Retreat operation:

  • a) monitoring the advance of the enemy (forward units and the main grouping);
  • b) observation of the flanks;
  • c) special observation of the motorized troops and cavalry of the enemy;
  • d) reconnaissance of the airfield network.

In all types of operations in intelligence tasks army aviation This includes servicing political agencies by carrying out agitation flights and scattering propaganda literature and leaflets at the disposition of friendly troops and the enemy.

Additional tasks of reconnaissance aviation

In addition to aerial reconnaissance, surveillance and communications, reconnaissance aircraft in some cases may also be involved in solving other tasks inherent in other types of aviation.

In exceptional circumstances, it can be used as ground attack, bomber and fighter aircraft.

During the actions of troops in the mountains, in addition to general tasks, they are responsible for:

  • a) the tasks of maintaining communications between groups of troops operating in isolated directions;
  • b) observation of the routes leading to these directions both from the side of the enemy and from the flanks;
  • c) reconnaissance of valleys, mountain ranges, passes and mountain narrowness;
  • d) delivery of ammunition and other types of supplies to groups of troops cut off from their supply routes both by the enemy and by terrain conditions, as well as establishing communication between them and the Command.

During the actions of troops in the sands on reconnaissance aircraft, in addition to the tasks specified in paragraphs. a, b and d, the search for water sources, easily visible (in the absence of previous sandstorms) along the paths and traces left by caravans, may be entrusted.

Intelligence objects

Railways. On railways, aerial reconnaissance must inspect railway junctions, stations and stages between them.

Intelligence goal:

  • a) determining the schedule of movement and establishing the intensity and nature of enemy transportation;
  • b) study of the structure and operation of the operational rear of the enemy;
  • c) checking the increase in the capacity of railways;
  • d) preparation of a bombing raid on railway junctions, stations, bridges and spans.

The schedule of movement can be determined by observing a railway section 400-500 km long, simultaneously flying over with continuous photographing of it, which will allow lit to take into account the number and nature of the rolling stock following it during the day, since average speed traffic routes per day does not exceed this distance.

Viewing a site in flight

If it is impossible to view a section of this size, one should limit oneself to a section of 250-300 km, viewing it twice a day every 12 hours.

The nature of transportation is determined by the presence of military, supply, passenger and sanitary trains on the examined section, which differ from each other in type of wagons and their distribution in the train.

Military trains differ from supply trains in that they have approximately the same number of cars (about 50); this number includes 1-2 class cars in the middle of the train for command staff, 8-10 platforms and the rest of the covered cars. On the way and in the parking lots, military trains can impersonate the smoke of camp kitchens located in the cars, open doors and the presence of a large number of people near the cars.

Supply trains differ from each other in the number of cars, and trains with ammunition have no more than 25-30 cars, and trains with other goods normally have about 45-50 cars (covered and platforms).

Sanitary trains differ from passenger trains in color and signs of a red cross or crescent.

The device and operation of the operational rear are established by determining the location on the railways of various warehouses, shops and repair bodies, which are unmasked by the unloading and loading of rolling stock, the presence of composed and finished trains on the railway tracks, the presence of automobile and horse transport, the emergence of new unpaved, heavily rutted roads, and sometimes by the presence of goods located on the ground in the form of long and relatively narrow stacks.

The increase in the capacity of the railway and a large hub is determined by: the opening of sidings and the construction of new ones; excavation work on hauls and stations for widening and lengthening of station sites and laying new tracks; construction of new depots and expansion of existing ones; the appearance of cranes, racks, etc. at sorting and freight stations for the mechanization of loading and unloading operations.

The preparation of a bombing raid on a railway junction is carried out by aerial photography, determining the area

bombing and recognition of structures (depot, station building, water tower, water tower, rotary device, building with central control of arrows), bridges, overpasses, etc.

Highways and dirt roads

When reconnaissance of unpaved and highway roads, it is necessary to determine:

  • a) the nature of traffic on the roads (composition, depth of columns, time and place of detection, direction, and, if possible, speed of movement);
  • b) the location of the rear bodies (warehouses, storage facilities, repair shops, medical and transit institutions, exchange offices, etc.);
  • c) areas and settlements occupied by operational and strategic reserves.

The movement of columns is unmasked in summer in dry weather by dust, in summer after rains and in winter - by changing the tone of the road where troops or carts are moving; in the summer after the rains, with alternating areas of dry and wet, the latter, as more sharply protruding, can be easily confused with columns of troops.

Particular attention is drawn to the narrowness of the roads: bridges, gati, crossings, gorges, dams and roads going through swamps, where it is difficult for troops to apply camouflage measures.

Reconnaissance is a major challenge forest roads, roads lined with trees, as well as those near which shrubs and small groups of trees grow.

The location of the rear organs is found by automobile and horse transport, the busy movement of convoys along the roads departing from the settlement, smoke from kitchens and fires, sometimes by herds of large and small lambing.

The areas and settlements occupied by operational and strategic reserves are distinguished by: the presence of shooting ranges, engineering camps (trenchments and fortifications with artificial barriers built for training purposes) and field arenas; the accumulation of a large number of people, horses, carts and cars; significant traffic in and between settlements; laying new roads and widening the rutted part of the old ones; the appearance of trampled places, causing brightening in summer and darkening of the area in winter, and sometimes the appearance of a large number of dugouts and various earthen buildings, and at night fires.

Fortified rear lines. Fortified rear lines are normally located at a distance of 50-100 km from the line of contact with enemy troops, providing

the possibility of organized resistance in the event of a forced withdrawal.

Fortified rear lines consist of fortified lanes and barrier zones

The characteristic features of the border equipment are:

  • a) excavation of trenches of all types and purposes, communications, shelters and shelters;
  • b) laying new roads and widening existing ones due to the movement of vehicles transporting building materials; the appearance of treads from the walking of people working on buildings;
  • c) deforestation and bushes (clearing shelling); the latter is especially characteristic when creating a blockhouse system of defense and notches;
  • d) demolition of various buildings in settlements located both on the territory of the border itself and in its immediate vicinity (clearing shelling);
  • e) the presence and construction of building materials warehouses near the borders;
  • f) the presence of a large amount of delivered building materials (barrels of cement, logs, rails, boards, coils of barbed wire);
  • g) availability of special land management machines (excavators, concrete mixers, stone crushers, etc.);
  • h) the presence in some cases of a narrow-gauge field railway connected with the nearest railway station.

Air reconnaissance must establish:

  • a) the general outline of a fortified or fortified line, its extension along the front and in depth;
  • b) the degree of development of engineering structures in various directions;
  • c) type of natural and artificial obstacles;
  • d) if possible, the nature of the work to prepare the barrier zones.

Airfields and air hubs

Characteristic features of airfields are:

  • a) flat and unobstructed terrain used for airfields;
  • b) traces from the wheels of aircraft, crutches and skis (in winter);
  • c) the presence on the ground of aircraft, tents;
  • d) heavy traffic of personnel, and sometimes cars;
  • e) aircraft takeoffs and landings.

Airfield configuration and terrain cover are not distinguishable; in addition, the widely used natural and artificial camouflage largely eliminates all unmasking signs of airfields. One should also take into account the fact that numerous false airfields will be set up to mislead the air reconnaissance. All this taken together complicates reconnaissance of airfields and requires it to be carried out by means of continuous, systematic observation of the area where, according to a number of signs, the presence of airfields is assumed. While conducting systematic observation of enemy airfields, the main goal should be to establish the time when enemy aircraft will be on the ground, presenting a good object for their destruction by air attack.

Military aviation. Subordination

Troop aviation, organizationally included in the composition of a military formation, in various armies is subordinate either directly to the commander of the formation or to his chief of staff.

Artillery aviation is subordinate to the chief of artillery of the military unit to which it is attached or to which it is a member.

on issues of withdrawal of airfield areas, recruitment, special training and special aviation and technical supply, military aviation is subordinate to the head of the army air force.

Troop aviation units temporarily assigned to military formations are subordinate to the same commanders, respectively, but only in operational terms.

General tasks of military aviation and general reconnaissance and surveillance facilities

  • 1. Intelligence in the interests of the command combined arms formation or parts. Reconnaissance objects: enemy troops, especially motorized mechanized units, located on the move or in place.
  • 2. Intelligence for the chiefs of the armed forces. Reconnaissance objects: enemy troops on the move or in place, but at a depth of no more than 15-20 km, especially artillery and motorized units.
  • 3. Observation of the battlefield. Objects of observation: enemy and friendly troops in combat formations, regimental, divisional and corps reserves.
  • 4. Artillery fire control. Objects: artillery batteries in firing positions, tanks in concentrated formations or columns, enemy reserves, both suitable from the depths and located on the battlefield, headquarters, ammunition supply routes.
  • 5. Air communication, transmission of orders to troops and receipt of reports from them,
  • 6. Checking the camouflage of your troops.
  • 7. Air delivery of ammunition and other items in the following cases:

a) the environment of individual parts,

b) actions with a large separation from the front and c) combat with the crossing of large river barriers. In some cases of a combat situation (fighting an enemy airborne landing, when mechanized units have broken through to the rear of their defense), military aviation assists ground troops in the fight against ground targets, and in rare cases is also involved in the fight against an air enemy.

General reconnaissance objects

The objects of aerial reconnaissance are enemy troops both on the move and located in place (halt, overnight stay, area of ​​concentration).

When deploying troops on the spot:

  • a) when located in settlements: roads suitable for settlements, streets, gardens, kitchen gardens and yards for detecting convoys, artillery pieces, cars, tents, hitching posts, camp kitchens, etc.;
  • b) when bivouacking:

1) groves, forest edges and bushes to detect tents, carts, cars, tanks, artillery pieces, camp kitchens, hitching posts and groups of people;

2) the banks of rivers and lakes and the space between them and the nearest natural shelters (forests, groves) to identify the horse composition at a watering place or while traveling to it.

Unmasking signs of military branches when located on the spot.

Infantry; a large crowd of people with a relatively small number of horses and carts, the latter being separate small groups.

Artillery: A large collection of horses, ammunition boxes, tractors and some vehicles.

Aviation Reference

Motor transport: accumulation of trucks in the parking lot and in motion on adjacent roads; the usual location is settlements near large dirt roads and highways, near railway stations.

Motomechanical parts: accumulation of vehicles, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery on self-propelled units, significant groups of people.

Troops on the move. The object of reconnaissance is unpaved paths in the zone of action of one's military formation, and with open flanks and beyond the boundaries of this zone for at least 60 km, in order to timely detect enemy columns, especially motorized mechanized troops.

When troops are detected on the roads, aerial reconnaissance must determine and record:

  • a) time of observation;
  • b) direction of movement;
  • c) the place of the head of the column;
  • d) the composition of the column (infantry, cavalry, artillery, mixed formation, motorized units);
  • e) the length of the road section occupied by the column;
  • f) the distances between the constituent parts of the columns, if they exceed the normal ones;
  • g) the behavior of troops during a reconnaissance flight (camouflage, air defense).

Unmasking signs of military branches during movement

The infantry looks like points - dark in winter, light or gray in summer. From a height of 1,000 m or more, the points merge and form an elongated rectangle; color - depending on the season; gaps are visible between the individual units.

The infantry column is characterized by a small number of horsemen and carts.

The cavalry unmasks itself thanks to large sizes each individual rider, and partly with different colors of horses (if the cavalry unit is not on horses of the same color). Visibility is better, the more the color of the soil of the road differs from the color of the horse composition.

From a height of 1,000-1,500 m, small groups of horsemen (10-20 people) are easily distinguishable, and with good visibility, individual asa signs; from a height of more than 1,500 meters, the cavalry column presents elongated bands, better or worse observed 8 depending on the color of the road soil, with small gaps between units.

It is difficult to detect cavalry movement in bushes and forest growths. It is impossible to detect cavalry in the forest if there is no dust, which especially unmasks them.

Horse-drawn artillery is detected by the typical appearance of teams, especially in the presence of a shadow.

In some cases, teams of pontoon troops may be mistaken for artillery.

Mechanical-drawn artillery is more difficult to detect than horse-drawn artillery, especially! if she has special covers that mask the guns.

Individual guns differ from a height of 1,200-1,500 m.

The characteristic contours of the gun are preserved even when observed from high altitudes.

intelligence organization

The organization of reconnaissance in a meeting engagement by means of military aviation is in charge of the corps headquarters.

Part of the aircraft should be placed at the disposal of the divisions.

If this is not possible, the corps headquarters must take into account the requirements of air reconnaissance divisions.

The use of military aviation in offensive combat

Air reconnaissance tasks. In offensive combat, military aviation is assigned the following tasks:

  • a) establish the outlines of the forward edge and determine the depth of the enemy's defensive line;
  • b) determine the nature of enemy engineering defense throughout the entire depth of the defensive zone;
  • c) establish a second defensive strip;
  • d) determine the location of the reserves;
  • e) identify communication nodes;
  • e) direct their tanks to the objects of their attacks;
  • g) to ensure the fight against enemy artillery by controlling the fire of their own artillery;
  • h) observe the battlefield, paying special attention to the advancement of friendly troops and the movements of the enemy;
  • i) observe the rear of the enemy.

These tasks are carried out in a certain sequence, partly during the preparation of the offensive (tasks according to paragraphs a, b, c, d, g, h, i), partly in the process of the offensive itself (tasks according to paragraphs c, d, e, f, g , h, i).

In addition, before a decision is made by the corps commander, military aviation must ensure that the corps headquarters check all types of reconnaissance data from the aircraft.

Air reconnaissance objects:

  • a) engineering structures of the defender throughout the entire depth of the defensive zone;
  • b) artillery in firing positions;
  • c) enemy reserves;
  • d) tanks in waiting positions;
  • e) headquarters and communication centers;
  • e) rear roads;
  • g) crossings behind enemy lines.

Unmasking signs

The enemy defense zone is unmasked by trenches. In open areas, solid lines of trenches are perfectly visible from a height of 5,000 m, and in the future

observed at a distance of 7-10 km. In winter, the visibility of the trenches increases.

In a closed area (wooded and mountainous), the trenches are clearly visible from a height of 2,000-3,000 m.

Separate details in the system of trenches are observed only from a height of 800-1,200 m; the presence of people can be determined only in the event of significant movement in the trenches.

The main method of reconnaissance is photography.

Photographing the enemy's defensive line is especially important. Photo schemes are being multiplied in such a way as to, if possible, supply them first of all with artillery, battalions and tank companies operating in the direction of the main attack.

Photo schemes should have a scale of 1: 5,000.

Reconnaissance of well-camouflaged reserves can be carried out not only by observation from the air, but also by the use of bombs and machine-gun fire in order to force the enemy who has taken cover to reveal himself.

Artillery positions are recognized by a number of signs, such as the road traffic leading to firing positions, paths, muzzle cones (white in summer, black in winter), clearings in the forest (clearing shelling).

In the general complex of measures aimed at preparing the armed forces for new aggressive wars, the army commands of the main capitalist states give a large place to the organization of tactical aerial reconnaissance in the theater of operations, on the results of which, in their opinion, the success of military operations of the troops will largely depend. Aerial reconnaissance is conducted in the interests of all branches of the armed forces. In particular, it is designed to provide the Air Force command with the necessary data to solve the tasks of gaining air superiority, isolating the combat area and providing close air support to ground forces.

The efforts of tactical aerial reconnaissance in order to gain air superiority are to be directed primarily to identifying the airfield network, especially airfields and dispersal sites, as well as positions of missiles and command posts.

When isolating a combat area, the main objects of aerial reconnaissance include reserves in areas of concentration and on the march, highway junctions and railway stations, bridges, crossings, command posts and communication centers of formations and associations, warehouses and supply bases.

According to foreign military experts, especially great stress will be required from the crews of reconnaissance aircraft when providing close air support to ground forces, since ground combat operations will be characterized by transience and be conducted over large spaces under any meteorological conditions. In this case, aviation must first of all identify the positions of troops, their areas of concentration, launchers tactical missiles, command posts and radio control facilities located in the combat formations of the troops.

The main task of aerial reconnaissance in the theater, as noted by foreign military experts, is the timely detection of the location of nuclear weapons carriers and nuclear ammunition depots.

It is believed that the data obtained by aerial reconnaissance must be reliable and fully reflect the rapidly changing situation on the battlefield. Therefore, not only specially equipped, but also all combat aircraft are used for its maintenance.

Tactical reconnaissance forces carry a large load of opening objects in the tactical depth of the enemy. For example, in last years aggressive war in Vietnam, out of the total number of sorties made by American aircraft for the purpose of reconnaissance of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 97% were tactical reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4C, RF-101 and others), 1%. - for unmanned aircraft and 2% - for strategic aircraft (U-2, ). The reconnaissance crews had to not only find the object, identify it and set the coordinates, but also determine how and from what directions it is safer and more convenient to approach it.

Depending on the tasks and in whose interests aerial reconnaissance is conducted, its depth will be different. IN foreign press it was reported that the depth of tactical reconnaissance for the field army is 300-100 km, army corps- 100 km and divisions - 40 km.

To conduct tactical air reconnaissance, the US and French Air Forces also have reconnaissance aviation wings (squadrons), consisting of two or three aviation squadrons of 15-18 aircraft, and in other countries - reconnaissance squadrons. The US Air Force has formed a squadron of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and jammers launched from the DC-130 mother aircraft. Reconnaissance aviation squadrons can independently solve the tasks of aerial reconnaissance in the theater.

Organization of air reconnaissance control in the theater

The management of reconnaissance aviation in the theater of operations in the US Air Force is carried out through the tactical aviation control system, the main bodies of which are the tactical aviation control center, which is part of the command post of the air force commander in the theater, and the close air support center created at the combat operations control center of the army corps or field army. Air reconnaissance operations are carried out on the basis of planned or urgent requests.

In the tactical aviation control center there are officers who plan the action and organize the flights of reconnaissance aircraft. Here, on the basis of approved applications, detailed planning of reconnaissance aviation sorties for the next day takes place according to planned applications that come from ground forces battalions through intelligence officers of divisions, corps and field armies. Each subsequent supervisor can approve or cancel the application. According to foreign press reports, in the Vietnam War, planned requests were implemented 4 hours or more after they were received. They accounted for 3/4 of all applications.

The air intelligence officers in the close air support center are busy summarizing urgent requests. The latter, without the consent of higher authorities, are transmitted over tactical aviation control radio networks by Air Force communications officers who are in tactical aviation control teams, or advanced aviation gunners. Having considered the application, the close air support center reports this to the tactical aviation control center, and then calls reconnaissance aircraft through the command post of aviation units and subunits. According to the experience of military operations in Southeast Asia, urgent requests were fulfilled after 2-2.5 hours when aircraft took off from airfields and after 15 minutes. when a scout is called from a duty position in the zone.

According to the foreign press, the following aircraft can conduct reconnaissance: single ones, which are part of strike groups, specially covered from the air. The first, as a rule, are sent to areas with weak air defense. They photograph the area from medium and high altitudes. The latter are intended for shooting objects after bombing them. Reconnaissance aircraft, specially covered from the air, aim at objects with strong air defense.

Aircraft crews on routes are guided through control and warning centers, observation and warning posts, as well as through advanced aviation gunners. The pilots are given information about the air defense system of the object, attacks by enemy fighters, weather changes, the location of the drop point for the footage, the actions of their aircraft in the reconnaissance area, etc.

Preparation for air reconnaissance in the theater

Preparation for conducting aerial reconnaissance in a squadron begins with the receipt of an order from the command post of the aviation wing. On its basis, the squadron commander gives appropriate instructions to the operational officer and the photographic reconnaissance officer.

The operational officer, who controls the calculation of the required fuel supply and the time of transmission of reconnaissance reports, determines the order of following to the target, routes and time to reach the target, the conditions of radio exchange responsible for communication by flight stages, if necessary, indicates the methods of interaction between reconnaissance aircraft and cover fighters.

Assigned crews to complete the mission begin to prepare a flight plan. The route to the reconnaissance object is chosen taking into account the covert access to it and bypassing areas covered by air defense systems. It is applied to the map, on which control landmarks are clearly visible. If necessary, the plan indicates the area for in-flight refueling of aircraft on the way back. If the reconnaissance aircraft must go on a mission together with the strike group, then the place, time and height of their meeting is recorded. When reconnaissance of objects with strong system Air defense, the plan reflects the issues of interaction with the cover group.

The photo reconnaissance officer, together with specialists in electronic equipment, in accordance with the task and the weather, selects the type of AFA, the amount of film, filters and shooting intervals.

During the pre-flight preparation, which can last up to 1.5 hours, the crews are instructed. The squadron commander clarifies the task and explains it. The intelligence officer acquaints the crews with the credentials of the targets (if they were not studied by them during pre-training), then informs the pilots about the enemy's air defense systems on the route and in the target area, recommends tactics overcoming them, names particularly noticeable visual landmarks and explains the camouflage of enemy objects. He also brings to the attention of the crews (in case they find themselves on enemy territory for any reason) the possible attitude of the population towards them, how to avoid capture and how to act during rescue.

The photographic reconnaissance officer instructs the crews on the procedure for using the AFA, indicating the number of photographs that can be taken by each device, and reference points for photographing.

The radio intelligence officer from the maintenance squadron recalls the modes of operation of the equipment, the moments of its switching on and off, the features of identifying radiation sources on the on-board indicators.

The meteorological officer acquaints the crew with the weather forecast along the route and in the target area.

Crews who previously flew to a given area are specially invited to the briefing.

At the end of the briefing, the crews clarify the flight routes to and from the targets, the time of flight of reference points and the approach to targets, alternate routes in case of weather changes or unexpectedly strong opposition from enemy air defense forces.

After completing the mission, the plane is met by the duty team, which removes the film cassettes and delivers them to the photo lab. Here, the still wet film is viewed by codebreakers for a preliminary assessment and preparation of an urgent report. In addition, the crew commander submits a report on the results of visual observation. When the specified objects are detected on the film, it is sent to the photo-reconnaissance technical squadron of the reconnaissance aviation wing. If no objects are found, then the issue of a re-flight is decided. In the photo-reconnaissance technical squadron, the film is deciphered more carefully.

Foreign experts believe that the time spent on deciphering the tape is still large. Therefore, abroad they seek to learn information about the enemy from the aircraft. The value of such information lies in its timeliness and reliability, since the aircraft crew can transmit it within 3-5 minutes after the object is detected. All authorities interested in receiving them can simultaneously receive data on the target. In the Vietnam War, as the foreign press reported, the American command received by radio from reconnaissance aircraft more than two-thirds of the data on moving objects.

Rice. 1. Reconnaissance aircraft RF-4C 2

The capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft in surveying the terrain are determined by the eye by the tactical and technical characteristics of the onboard equipment.

Judging by reports in the foreign press, the main tactical reconnaissance aircraft in the air forces of the main capitalist countries is the RF-4C Phantom 2 (Fig. 1). The crew is two people. It is equipped with modern reconnaissance equipment. Its capabilities when surveying terrain from a height of 100 m are shown in fig. 2. As the altitude increases, the area covered by photography increases.


Rice. Fig. 2. Strips of terrain captured by the reconnaissance equipment of the RF-4C aircraft during its flight at an altitude of 100 m: 1, 2 and 3 - AFA of forward, perspective and planned surveys; 4, 5 - IR and laser equipment; 6 - side-looking radar, which takes pictures of the terrain on both sides of the aircraft; 7 - range of electronic intelligence equipment

Television reconnaissance equipment is not installed on Phantom aircraft. This is due to its weak noise immunity. However, it is used on unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. It was reported that it is planned to be used in conjunction with infrared surveillance equipment.

Thus, as can be judged from the data published in the foreign press, tactical aerial reconnaissance in the theater of operations in the armed forces of NATO countries is of paramount importance. It is organized taking into account the use of all combat aircraft and the fastest transfer of data about the enemy to commanders.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, one of the types of military intelligence. Conducted by parts of reconnaissance. aviation, reconnaissance aviation divisions. formations, all crews performing combat missions, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (airplanes, automatic balloons, etc.) in order to obtain data on the project (objects, forces and means, terrain, etc.) necessary for successful conduct military operations with all types of weapons. forces and branches of the military. They fly first. devices (LA), to-ryo in con. 50s 19th century were used for conducting aerostats, there were balloons. In the beginning. 20th century for V. r. airplanes began to be widely used.

In Russia 1st experience B. R. received from aircraft during the maneuvers of the St. Petersburg, Warsaw and Kiev military. districts in 1911. In 1912-13, in the 1st Balkan War, Rus. aviation a detachment under the command of Captain Shchetinin, acting on the side of Bulgaria, performed the tasks of V. p. with photographing fortifications and field structures.

As independent, type of intelligence (see. Military intelligence) V. p. took shape during World War I. During the years of the Great Fatherland, the war, 12% of the sorties of owls. aviation committed for the purpose of V. p. With the increase in the scope of the military. actions V.'s intensity of river. increased. In 1941, the number of sorties on the Eastern river. was 9.2%, in 1944 it increased to 15%. V. r. not only obtained data on the pr-ke, but supplemented and documented the data of other types of intelligence.

In a rapidly changing environment. R. often was a unity, a means of obtaining data on the pr-ke for combined arms and aviation. command. For example, in the winter of 1942/43, only V. p. was able to timely open the transfer from the North. Caucasus 2 German. -fash. tank divisions in the Kotelnikovo district to unblock the troops surrounded near Stalingrad. In preparation for the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, V. p. found for the river Wisla 7 prepared. will defend, lanes of pr-ka, echeloned to a depth of 500 km, and 6 anti-tank ditches.

In armed the forces of most countries osn. V.'s means of river. are manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. They are able to quickly reach reconnaissance targets located at a considerable distance, scan vast areas in a short time, and obtain reliable reconnaissance. data on the pr-ke and promptly deliver them to the command (including by transfer from the aircraft). In order to ensure the most complete and timely provision of military operations, V. p. must constantly interact with other types of intelligence.

IN . R. subdivided into strategic, operational and tactical. Strategic V. p. conducted in order to provide the high command with the necessary reconnaissance. data on the strategist, the objects of the pr-ka, located in his deep rear. Operational V. r. carried out in the interests of the command of associations (formations) of types of weapons. forces and branches of the armed forces in order to obtain reconnaissance. data necessary for the preparation and conduct of front-line and army operations, as well as operations conducted by fleets and air forces.

Tact. V. r. conducted in the interests of the command of formations and units of types of weapons. forces and branches of the armed forces in order to provide them with reconnaissance. data necessary for the organization and conduct of combat. Main effort tact. V. r. focus on objects located on the battlefield and in time, depth.

Main . ways of conducting V. r. are: visual observation, aerial photographic reconnaissance and reconnaissance using electronic means. Choice of a way of conducting V. of river. depends on the task being performed, the type of aircraft and its reconnaissance. equipment, countermeasures pr-ka, time of day and meteorological. conditions. Visual observation is carried out by neo-weapons. eye or with the help of optical. appliances.

It allows you to quickly explore large districts, obtain general data on the grouping and actions of the pr-ka, on objects, terrain and weather, immediately summarize and transmit the intelligence obtained. data from the aircraft to the command. Aerial reconnaissance is carried out using day and night aerial cameras (planned, perspective, panoramic). It provides the most complete, reliable and accurate data on the troops of the pr-ka, objects and terrain. V. r. with the help of electronic means is divided into radio, radio engineering, radar. and television.

For radio reconnaissance, aircraft radio receivers are used, which make it possible to reveal the content of the radio broadcasts of the pr-ka, determine the composition and location of its forces, and obtain data on their activities and intentions. At radio engineering. reconnaissance uses reception and direction finding. devices that allow you to determine the main. tech. operating parameters of radar and radio telecontrol equipment, as well as their location.

It can be carried out in any meteorological conditions day and night. radar reconnaissance is carried out using aircraft radars, which allow you to detect objects that are contrasting in radar. relation, receive photographs of the radar. images of objects and terrain, open the activities of the pr-ka by radar. disguise. TV. reconnaissance is carried out with the help of televisions. systems incorporating an aircraft transmitting and ground receiving station, which allow you to observe the objects and actions of the troops of the project and its troops.

In a number of countries, thermal, laser, and other reconnaissance devices are also being introduced. facilities. Intelligence. data obtained by V. r. come in the form of reports by radio from the aircraft, information from the automatic. onboard reconnaissance. equipment, as well as processed documentary data about the objects of the project (decrypted photographs and aerial films, photographs of the screens of indicators of aircraft radars), in the form of oral and written reports of the crews after the landing of the aircraft.

Literature:
Avdeev A.I. Organization and planning of air reconnaissance.

M., 1943; Air reconnaissance of railways. M., 1963; Karpovich N. K., Solovyov E. I., R o d e s t-in and N. II. aerial reconnaissance service. M. ~ L., 1940; Lazarev B. A., Sizov A. II.

Photographic means of aerial reconnaissance. Part 1

Riga, 1973; Makovsky V.P. Systems for processing and transmitting intelligence information. Part 1. Riga, 1973; Sokolov A.N. Reconnaissance aviation.

M., 1939; Sokolov A . N. Tactics of reconnaissance aviation. M. - L., 1933; H o v i k o v A., Yun u-s o v T. Visual search for ground targets at dusk. - "Aviation and Cosmonautics", 1965, No. 12; Scout over the battlefield. - "Aviation and Cosmonautics", 1965, No. 9. M. M. Danilevsky.

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