USSR Finland war 1939 1940 Forgotten War

On the eve of the World War, both Europe and Asia were already blazing with many local conflicts. International tension was due to the high probability of a new big war, and all the most powerful political players on the world map before it began tried to secure favorable starting positions for themselves, while not neglecting any means. The USSR was no exception. In 1939-1940. the Soviet-Finnish war began. The reasons for the inevitable military conflict lay in the same impending threat of a major European war. The USSR, more and more aware of its inevitability, was forced to look for an opportunity to push back state border as far as possible from one of the most strategically important cities - Leningrad. With this in mind, the Soviet leadership entered into negotiations with the Finns, offering their neighbors an exchange of territories. At the same time, the Finns were offered a territory almost twice as large as the USSR planned to receive in return. One of the demands that the Finns did not want to accept in any case was the request of the USSR to deploy military bases in Finland. Even the admonitions of Germany (Helsinki's ally), including Hermann Goering, who hinted to the Finns that Berlin's help could not be counted on, did not force Finland to move away from its positions. Thus, the parties that did not come to a compromise came to the beginning of the conflict.

The course of hostilities

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939. Obviously, the Soviet command was counting on a quick and victorious war with minimal losses. However, the Finns themselves were also not going to surrender to the mercy of their big neighbor. The President of the country, the military Mannerheim, who, by the way, was educated in the Russian Empire, planned to delay the Soviet troops with a massive defense for as long as possible, until the start of assistance from Europe. The complete quantitative advantage of the country of the Soviets was obvious both in human resources and in equipment. The war for the USSR began with heavy fighting. Its first stage in historiography is usually dated from 11/30/1939 to 02/10/1940 - the time that became the most bloody for the advancing Soviet troops. The line of defense, called the Mannerheim Line, became an insurmountable obstacle for the soldiers of the Red Army. Fortified pillboxes and bunkers, Molotov cocktails, later called "Molotov cocktails", severe frosts, reaching up to 40 degrees - all this is considered to be the main reasons for the failures of the USSR in the Finnish campaign.

Turning point in the war and its end

The second stage of the war begins on February 11, the moment of the general offensive of the Red Army. At that time, a significant amount of manpower and equipment was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. For several days before the attack, the Soviet army carried out artillery preparation, subjecting the entire surrounding area to heavy bombardment.

As a result of the successful preparation of the operation and the further assault, the first line of defense was broken through within three days, and by February 17, the Finns completely switched to the second line. During February 21-28, the second line was also broken. On March 13, the Soviet-Finnish war ended. On this day, the USSR stormed Vyborg. The leaders of Suomi realized that there was no longer any chance to defend themselves after breaking through the defense, and the Soviet-Finnish war itself was doomed to remain a local conflict, without outside support, which Mannerheim counted on so much. Given this, the request for negotiations was the logical end.

The results of the war

As a result of protracted bloody battles, the USSR achieved the satisfaction of all its claims. In particular, the country has become the sole owner of the waters of Lake Ladoga. In total, the Soviet-Finnish war guaranteed the USSR an increase in territory by 40 thousand square meters. km. As for losses, this war cost the country of the Soviets dearly. According to some estimates, about 150 thousand people left their lives in the snows of Finland. Was this company necessary? Given the fact that Leningrad was the target of the German troops almost from the very beginning of the attack, it is worth recognizing that yes. However, heavy losses seriously called into question the combat capability of the Soviet army. By the way, the end of hostilities was not the end of the conflict. Soviet-Finnish war 1941-1944 became a continuation of the epic, during which the Finns, trying to return the lost, again failed.

The Soviet-Finnish war and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through the minefields, in tight ranks and holding hands. Any Russian person who has recognized the incommensurability of losses, it turns out, must simultaneously admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

Again I will quote the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim:
« It happened that the Russians in the battles of early December marched with songs in dense rows - and even holding hands - on minefields Finns, ignoring the explosions and accurate fire of the defenders.

Do you represent these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures named by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24923 people killed and died from wounds of the Finns. Russian, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why pity these Russes?

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book "Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940". with reference to Nikita Khrushchev, they give the following data:

"Out of a total of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR's losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment ... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with "meat".
About the reasons for the defeat, Mannerheim writes as follows:
"At the final stage of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower."

Stop!

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such meager losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and write about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in The Great Slandered War claims:
« Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded. The primary source of this figure is the translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä, published in the newspaper “Za rubezhom” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish edition “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost in the “winter war” more than 23,000 people killed; over 43,000 people were wounded. During the bombing, including of merchant ships, 25,243 people were killed.

The last figure - 25,243 killed in the bombing - is in doubt. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to read the Finnish original of Seppälä's article.

Mannerheim, as you know, estimated the losses from the bombing:
"More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice as many were injured."

The largest numbers of Finnish losses are given by the Military History Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army in it amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official figures, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
By Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 captured

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Losses. In the number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet, even those with whom relatives cut off contact in 1939-1940 are taken into account.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers ranked these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Who and how considered the Finnish losses is absolutely incomprehensible. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the strength of the Armed Forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war, Finland experienced a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even insignificant losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the vanquished ”Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to the calculation of Aritz, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 increased by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves up to the age of 45, which did not happen in any of the countries, even in Germany.”

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. In Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses in the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
In total, 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish site http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died in the period 1939-1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not converge.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR claims that hot Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army casualties. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as shutskor, were not included in the general statistics of losses. And they had a lot of paramilitaries.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

Whatever the case, two explanations arise:
The first - if the Finnish data on their losses are correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they "raised their paws" almost without suffering losses.
The second - if we consider that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply underestimated their own losses on a large scale.

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, known in Finland as winter war- armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940. According to some historians of the Western school - the offensive operation of the USSR against Finland during the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict that is not part of the world war, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol.

The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, which fixed the rejection from Finland of a significant part of its territory, captured by it during the Civil War in Russia.

War objectives

Officially, the Soviet Union pursued the goal of achieving by military means what could not be done peacefully: to get the Karelian Isthmus, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, bases on the islands and the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland.

At the very beginning of the war, a puppet Terijoki government was created on the territory of the USSR, headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen. On December 2, the Soviet government signed an agreement on mutual assistance with the government of Kuusinen and refused any contacts with the legal government of Finland, headed by R. Ryti.

There is an opinion that Stalin planned, as a result of a victorious war, to include Finland in the USSR.

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of hostilities in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was supposed to conduct a direct breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of troops from the western allies of Finland from the Barents Sea. The plan was based on an incorrect, as it turned out, idea of ​​the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. It was assumed that the war would be conducted on the model of a campaign in Poland in September 1939. The main fighting was to be completed within two weeks.

Cause for war

The official reason for the war was the “Mainil Incident”: on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the government of Finland with an official note, which stated that as a result of an artillery shelling allegedly carried out from the territory of Finland, four were killed and nine Soviet soldiers were wounded. The Finnish border guards did record cannon shots that day from several observation points - as it should be in this case, the fact of the shots and the direction from which they were heard were recorded, a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government has proposed the creation of an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish agreement on mutual non-aggression. On November 29, the USSR severed diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 am, Soviet troops received an order to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities. Officially, the war was never declared.

On February 11, 1940, after ten days of artillery preparation, a new offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.

During three days of intense fighting, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.

By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops withdrew.

The Finns offered fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat. Trying to stop the advance on Vyborg, they opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of the city, but this also did not help. March 13 troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite the demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete seizure of the country, followed by either joining the USSR or changing the government to a pro-Soviet one.

Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was signed, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, retreated to the USSR, Soviet troops stormed the city on the morning of March 13.

The terms of the peace treaty were as follows:

The Karelian Isthmus, Vyborg, Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR.

The region of Petsamo (Pechenga) was returned to Finland.

The USSR leased part of the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

The border, which was established under this agreement, basically repeated the border of 1791 (before Finland joined the Russian Empire).

It should be noted that during this period, intelligence of the USSR worked extremely poorly: the Soviet command did not have information about the combat reserves (in particular, about the amount of ammunition) of the Finnish side. They were practically at zero, but without this information, the Soviet government concluded a peace treaty.

The results of the war

Karelian isthmus. Borders between the USSR and Finland before and after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. "Mannerheim Line"

Acquisitions of the USSR

The border from Leningrad was pushed back from 32 to 150 km.

Karelian Isthmus, islands of the Gulf of Finland, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, lease of the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula.

Full control of Lake Ladoga.

Murmansk, which was located near the Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula), is safe.

The Soviet Union gained experience in winter warfare. If we take the officially declared goals of the war, the USSR fulfilled all the tasks set.

These territories were occupied by the USSR until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In the first two months of the Great Patriotic War, Finland again occupied these territories; they were released in 1944.

The negative result for the USSR was the increased confidence of Germany that militarily the USSR was much weaker than it seemed before. This strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR.

The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one (although far from the only) of the factors that determined the subsequent rapprochement between Finland and Germany. For the Finns, it became a means of containing the growing pressure from the USSR. Participation in the Great Patriotic War on the side of the Axis countries is called the "Continuation War" by the Finns themselves, meaning that they continued to wage the war of 1939-1940.

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940
	Eastern Finland, Karelia, Murmansk region
	Soviet victory, Moscow Peace Treaty (1940)
Opponents
Finland
Swedish Volunteer Corps
Volunteers from Denmark, Norway, Hungary, etc.
Estonia (Intelligence Transfer)
Commanders
C. G. E. Mannerheim	K. E. Voroshilov
Hjalmar Siilasvuo	S. K. Timoshenko
Side forces
According to Finnish data as of November 30, 1939: Regular troops: 265 thousand people, 194 reinforced concrete bunkers and 805 wood-stone-earth firing points. 534 guns (excluding coastal batteries), 64 tanks, 270 aircraft, 29 ships.	On November 30, 1939: 425,640 soldiers, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, 2,446 aircraft. At the beginning of March 1940: 760,578 soldiers
According to Finnish data as of November 30, 1939: 250 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks, 130 aircraft. According to Russian sources on November 30, 1939: Regular troops: 265 thousand people, 194 reinforced concrete bunkers and 805 wood-stone-earth firing points. 534 guns (excluding coastal batteries), 64 tanks, 270 aircraft, 29 ships	Finnish data: 25,904 killed, 43,557 wounded, 1,000 captured. According to Russian sources: up to 95 thousand soldiers killed, 45 thousand wounded, 806 captured

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 (Finnish campaign, fin. Talvisota - winter war) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940. The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The USSR included 11% of the territory of Finland with the second largest city of Vyborg. 430 thousand Finnish inhabitants lost their homes and moved deep into Finland, which led to a number of social problems.

According to a number of historians, this offensive operation of the USSR against Finland belongs to the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict that is not part of the Second World War, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. The declaration of war led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR, as a military aggressor, was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the mass protests of the international community about the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aircraft, including with the use of incendiary bombs. US President Roosevelt also joined the protests.

background

Events 1917-1937

On December 6, 1917, the Finnish Senate declared Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR addressed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) with a proposal to recognize the independence of the Republic of Finland. On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to recognize the independence of Finland. In January 1918, a civil war began in Finland, in which the “Reds” (Finnish socialists), with the support of the RSFSR, opposed the “Whites”, supported by Germany and Sweden. The war ended with the victory of the "whites". After the victory in Finland, the troops of the Finnish "whites" supported the separatist movement in East Karelia. The first Soviet-Finnish war that began during the already civil war in Russia lasted until 1920, when the Tartu (Yurievsky) peace treaty was concluded. Some Finnish politicians, such as Juho Paasikivi, viewed the treaty as "too good a peace", believing that the great powers would only compromise when absolutely necessary. K. Mannerheim, former activists and separatist leaders in Karelia, on the contrary, considered this world a shame and a betrayal of their compatriots, and the representative of Rebol, Hans Haakon (Bobi) Siven (fin. H. H.(Bobi) Siven) shot himself in protest. Mannerheim, in his “sword oath”, publicly spoke out in favor of the conquest of Eastern Karelia, which had not previously been part of the Principality of Finland.

Nevertheless, relations between Finland and the USSR after the Soviet-Finnish wars of 1918-1922, as a result of which the Pechenga region (Petsamo), as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most of the Sredny Peninsula, were ceded to Finland in the Arctic, were not friendly, however, openly hostile too.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the idea of ​​general disarmament and security, embodied in the creation of the League of Nations, dominated government circles. Western Europe especially in Scandinavia. Denmark disarmed completely, and Sweden and Norway significantly reduced their armaments. In Finland, the government and the majority of parliamentarians have consistently cut spending on defense and armaments. Starting from 1927, military exercises were not carried out at all to save money. The allocated money was barely enough to support the army. Parliament did not consider the costs of providing weapons. There were no tanks or military aircraft.

Nevertheless, the Defense Council was created, which on July 10, 1931 was headed by Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. He was firmly convinced that while the Bolshevik government was in power in the USSR, the situation in it was fraught with the most serious consequences for the whole world, primarily for Finland: “A plague coming from the east may be contagious.” In a conversation that same year with Risto Ryti, then governor of the Bank of Finland and a well-known figure in the Progressive Party of Finland, Mannerheim outlined his thoughts on the need for the speedy creation of military program and its funding. However, Ryti, after listening to the argument, asked the question: “But what is the use of providing the military department with such large sums if war is not expected?”

In August 1931, after inspecting the fortifications of the Enckel Line, established in the 1920s, Mannerheim became convinced of its unsuitability for the conditions of modern warfare, both due to its unfortunate location and destruction by time.

In 1932, the Tartu Peace Treaty was supplemented by a non-aggression pact and extended until 1945.

In the Finnish budget of 1934, adopted after the signing of the non-aggression pact with the USSR in August 1932, the article on the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus was deleted.

V. Tanner noted that the Social Democratic faction of the parliament "... still believes that a prerequisite for maintaining the independence of the country is such progress in the well-being of the people and the general conditions of their life, in which every citizen understands that this is worth all the costs of defense."

Mannerheim described his efforts as "a futile attempt to pull a rope through a narrow and pitch-filled pipe." It seemed to him that all his initiatives to rally the Finnish people in order to take care of their home and ensure their future meet a blank wall of misunderstanding and indifference. And he filed a petition for removal from his post.

Negotiations 1938-1939

Yartsev's negotiations in 1938-1939.

The negotiations were launched on the initiative of the USSR, initially they were conducted in a secret mode, which suited both sides: the Soviet Union preferred to officially maintain "freedom of hands" in the face of an unclear prospect in relations with Western countries, and for Finnish officials, the announcement of the fact of negotiations was inconvenient from the point of view of domestic politics, since the population of Finland generally had a negative attitude towards the USSR.

On April 14, 1938, second secretary Boris Yartsev arrived at the USSR Embassy in Finland in Helsinki. He immediately met with Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti and outlined the position of the USSR: the USSR government is confident that Germany is planning an attack on the USSR and these plans include a side strike through Finland. Therefore, the attitude of Finland to the landing of German troops is so important for the USSR. The Red Army will not wait at the border if Finland allows a landing. On the other hand, if Finland resists the Germans, the USSR will provide her with military and economic assistance, since Finland is not capable of repelling a German landing on her own. Over the next five months, he held numerous conversations, including with Prime Minister Cajander and Finance Minister Väinö Tanner. The guarantees of the Finnish side that Finland would not allow violating its territorial integrity and invading Soviet Russia through its territory were not enough for the USSR. The USSR demanded a secret agreement, obligatory in the event of a German attack, to participate in the defense of the Finnish coast, the construction of fortifications on the Åland Islands and the deployment of Soviet military bases for the fleet and aviation on the island of Gogland (Fin. Suursaari). Territorial requirements were not put forward. Finland rejected Yartsev's proposals at the end of August 1938.

In March 1939, the USSR officially announced that it wanted to lease the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tytyarsaari and Seskar for 30 years. Later, as compensation, Finland was offered territories in Eastern Karelia. Mannerheim was ready to give up the islands, since they were still practically impossible to defend or use to protect the Karelian Isthmus. Negotiations ended without results on April 6, 1939.

On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a non-aggression pact. According to the secret additional protocol to the Treaty, Finland was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR. Thus, the contracting parties - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - provided each other with guarantees of non-intervention in case of war. Germany started World War II with an attack on Poland a week later, on September 1, 1939. Soviet troops entered Poland on September 17.

From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases.

On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Government of Finland stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany has already eliminated the main reason for the demands Soviet Union to Finland - the danger of a German attack through the territory of Finland.

Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for talks "on specific political issues." The negotiations were held in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9.

For the first time, Finland was represented by an envoy, State Councilor J.K. Paasikivi, Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen. On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added on the third trip.

At these talks for the first time there was talk about the proximity of the border to Leningrad. Joseph Stalin remarked: We cannot do anything with geography, just like you ... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border away from it».

The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked as follows:

• Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.
• Finland agrees to lease the Hanko peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a 4,000-strong military contingent there for its defense.
• The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohya
• Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tyutyarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.
• The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.
• Both states are disarming their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
• The USSR transfers to Finland the territory in Karelia with a total area twice the amount received by Finland (5,529 km²).
• The USSR undertakes not to object to the arming of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.

The USSR proposed an exchange of territories, in which Finland would receive more extensive territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboly and Porajärvi. These were the territories that declared independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but under the Tartu Peace Treaty remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted and Germany's help should not be hoped for.

The State Council did not comply with all the requirements of the USSR, as public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Powerful), Bolshoi Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Birch) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main navigable fairway in the Gulf of Finland, and closest to Leningrad territories in Terioki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deepened into Soviet territory. The Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939.

Earlier, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland, on the other hand, chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers were called up from the reserve for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.

Sweden made clear its position of neutrality, and there were no serious assurances of assistance from other states.

From the middle of 1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the operational plan for an attack on Finland was discussed at the Main Military Council of the USSR, and from mid-September, the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.

In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, which practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attachés were invited, except for the Soviet one.

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept the Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the consent of the USSR to arm the Aland Islands, whose demilitarized status was regulated by the Aland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - a strip of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the "Mannerheim Line".

The Finns insisted on their own, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the alleged garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Are you trying to provoke a conflict?” /IN. Molotov/. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to press before his parliament on the need to find a compromise, saying that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.

On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of outside states. The Finnish public, having learned about the demands of the Soviet side for the first time, categorically opposed any concessions.

The talks resumed in Moscow on November 3, immediately reached an impasse. From the Soviet side followed the statement: " We, civilian people have made no progress. Now the word will be given to the soldiers».

However, Stalin made concessions the next day, offering instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula to buy it or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, who was then Minister of Finance and part of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals opened the way to an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground.

On November 3, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote: We will cast aside any game of political gamblers to hell and go our own way, no matter what, we will ensure the security of the USSR, regardless of anything, breaking all and sundry obstacles on the way to the goal". On the same day, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Baltic Fleet received directives on the preparation of military operations against Finland. At the last meeting, Stalin, at least outwardly, showed a sincere desire to reach a compromise on the issue of military bases. But the Finns refused to discuss it, and on November 13 they departed for Helsinki.

There was a temporary lull, which the Finnish government considered confirmation of the correctness of its position.

On November 26, Pravda published an article entitled “Jester Gorokhovy as Prime Minister”, which became the signal for the start of an anti-Finnish propaganda campaign. On the same day, artillery shelling of the territory of the USSR took place near the village of Mainila, staged by the Soviet side - which is also confirmed by the relevant orders of Mannerheim, who was confident in the inevitability of a Soviet provocation and therefore previously withdrew the troops from the border at a distance excluding the occurrence of misunderstandings. The leadership of the USSR blamed this incident on Finland. IN Soviet organs information to the terms widely used for naming hostile elements "White Guard", "White Pole", "White Emigrant" a new one was added - "White Finn".

On November 28, the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland was announced, and on November 30, the Soviet troops were ordered to go on the offensive.

Causes of the war

According to the statements of the Soviet side, the goal of the USSR was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border and in the event of a war (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinated to the Leningrad City Council was at the same time the border between the USSR and Finland.

Were the Government and the Party correct in declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army. Could the war have been avoided? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country. Speech by I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the commanding staff 04/17/1940

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require the transfer of the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. Only the following was constant in the demands: to receive military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and to oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.

Already during the war, there were two concepts that are still being discussed: one, that the USSR pursued the stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second - that the Sovietization of Finland was the true goal of the USSR.

However, today there is a different division of concepts, namely, according to the principle of classifying a military conflict as a separate war or part of the Second World War. Which, in turn, represent the USSR as a peace-loving country or as an aggressor and ally of Germany. At the same time, the Sovietization of Finland was only a cover for the USSR to prepare for a lightning-fast invasion and liberation of Europe from German occupation, followed by the Sovietization of all of Europe and the part of African countries occupied by Germany.

M. I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war in both countries there were claims to each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians at the end of the 30s, the closure of Finnish schools, etc. In the USSR, in turn, they knew about the activities of ultranationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to "return" the Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland's unilateral rapprochement with Western countries, and above all with Germany, which Finland, in turn, went for because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhufvud declared in Berlin in 1937 that "the enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland." In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated the preparation of a force solutions.

According to A. Shubin, before the signing of the Soviet-German pact, the USSR undoubtedly sought only to ensure the security of Leningrad. Stalin was not satisfied with Helsinki’s assurances of its neutrality, since, firstly, he considered the Finnish government to be hostile and ready to join any external aggression against the USSR, and secondly (and this was confirmed by subsequent events), the neutrality of small countries in itself did not guarantee that they could not be used as a springboard for an attack (as a result of the occupation). After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the demands of the USSR became tougher, and here the question already arises of what Stalin really aspired to at this stage. Theoretically, presenting his demands in the autumn of 1939, Stalin could plan to carry out in the coming year in Finland: a) Sovietization and inclusion in the USSR (as happened with other Baltic countries in 1940), or b) a radical social reorganization with the preservation of formal signs of independence and political pluralism (as was done after the war in the so-called Eastern European "countries of people's democracy", or c) Stalin could only plan for the time being to strengthen his positions on the northern flank of a potential theater of operations, without risking interfering in internal affairs for the time being Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. M. Semiryaga believes that in order to determine the nature of the war against Finland, “it is not necessary to analyze the negotiations in the autumn of 1939. To do this, you just need to know the general concept of the world communist movement of the Comintern and the Stalinist concept - great-power claims to those regions that used to be part of the Russian Empire ... And the goals were - to annex the whole of Finland as a whole. And there is no point in talking about 35 kilometers to Leningrad, 25 kilometers to Leningrad ... ". The Finnish historian O. Manninen believes that Stalin sought to deal with Finland according to the same scenario that was eventually implemented with the Baltic countries. “Stalin's desire to 'solve problems in a peaceful way' was a desire to peacefully create a socialist regime in Finland. And at the end of November, starting the war, he wanted to achieve the same with the help of the occupation. “The workers themselves” had to decide whether to join the USSR or establish their own socialist state.” However, notes O. Manninen, since these plans of Stalin were not formally fixed, this view will always remain in the status of an assumption, not a provable fact. There is also a version that, putting forward claims to border lands and a military base, Stalin, like Hitler in Czechoslovakia, sought to first disarm his neighbor, taking away his fortified territory, and then capture him.

An important argument in favor of the theory of the Sovietization of Finland as the goal of the war is the fact that on the second day of the war a puppet Terijoki government headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen was created on the territory of the USSR. On December 2, the Soviet government signed an agreement on mutual assistance with the government of Kuusinen and, according to Ryti, refused any contact with the legal government of Finland, headed by Risto Ryti.

With a high degree of certainty, we can assume: if things at the front went according to the operational plan, then this "government" would arrive in Helsinki with a specific political goal - to unleash in the country civil war. After all, the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Finland directly called […] to overthrow the “government of executioners”. In Kuusinen's appeal to the soldiers of the "Finnish People's Army" it was directly stated that they were entrusted with the honor of hoisting the banner of the "Democratic Republic of Finland" on the building of the President's Palace in Helsinki. However, in reality, this "government" was used only as a means, although not very effective, for political pressure on the legitimate government of Finland. It fulfilled this modest role, which, in particular, is confirmed by Molotov's statement to the Swedish envoy in Moscow, Assarsson, on March 4, 1940, that if the Finnish government continues to object to the transfer of Vyborg and Sortavala to the Soviet Union, then subsequent Soviet peace conditions will be even tougher and the USSR will then go to a final agreement with the "government" of Kuusinen M. I. Semiryaga. “Secrets of Stalinist diplomacy. 1941-1945"

A number of other measures were taken, in particular, among the Soviet documents on the eve of the war there are detailed instructions on the organization of the "People's Front" in the occupied territories. M. Meltyukhov, on this basis, sees in the Soviet actions the desire to Sovietize Finland through an intermediate stage of the left "people's government". S. Belyaev believes that the decision to Sovietize Finland is not evidence of the original plan to capture Finland, but was made only on the eve of the war due to the failure of attempts to agree on changing the border.

According to A. Shubin, Stalin's position in the autumn of 1939 was situational, and he maneuvered between the minimum program - ensuring the security of Leningrad, and the maximum program - establishing control over Finland. At that moment, Stalin did not aspire directly to the Sovietization of Finland, as well as the Baltic countries, since he did not know how the war in the West would end (indeed, in the Baltics, decisive steps towards Sovietization were taken only in June 1940, that is, immediately after the defeat of France was indicated). Finland's resistance to Soviet demands forced him to go for a hard power option at a disadvantageous moment for him (in winter). In the end, he secured at least the completion of the minimum program.

Strategic plans of the parties

USSR plan

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of hostilities in three directions. The first of these was on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was supposed to lead a direct breakthrough of the Finnish defense line (which during the war was called the "Mannerheim Line") in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga.

The second direction was central Karelia, adjacent to that part of Finland, where its latitudinal extent was the smallest. It was supposed here, in the Suomussalmi-Raate Region, to cut the country's territory in two and enter the city of Oulu on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. The selected and well-equipped 44th division was intended for the parade in the city.

Finally, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of troops from the western allies of Finland from the Barents Sea, it was supposed to conduct military operations in Lapland.

The main direction was considered to be the direction to Vyborg - between Vuoksa and the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here after successful breakthrough the line of defense (or bypassing the line from the north), the Red Army got the opportunity to wage war on a territory convenient for the operation of tanks, which did not have serious long-term fortifications. Under such conditions, a significant advantage in manpower and an overwhelming advantage in technology could manifest itself to the maximum fully. It was supposed, after breaking through the fortifications, to carry out an offensive on Helsinki and achieve a complete cessation of resistance. In parallel, the actions of the Baltic Fleet and access to the border of Norway in the Arctic were planned. This would make it possible to secure a quick capture of Norway in the future and to stop the supply of iron ore to Germany.

The plan was based on a misconception about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. The assessment of the number of Finnish troops also turned out to be incorrect: “ it was believed that the Finnish army in wartime would have up to 10 infantry divisions and a dozen and a half separate battalions". In addition, the Soviet command did not have information about the line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, having only "fragmentary intelligence data" about them by the beginning of the war. So, even at the height of the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus, Meretskov doubted that the Finns had long-term structures, although he was informed about the existence of the Poppius (Sj4) and Millionaire (Sj5) pillboxes.

Plan of Finland

On the direction of the main attack correctly determined by Mannerheim, it was supposed to delay the enemy for as long as possible.

The Finns' defense plan north of Lake Ladoga was to stop the enemy on the Kitel line (Pitkyaranta region) - Lemetti (near Lake Siskijärvi). If necessary, the Russians were to be stopped north of Lake Suojärvi in ​​echeloned positions. Before the war, a railway line was built here from the Leningrad-Murmansk railway line and large stocks of ammunition and fuel were created. Therefore, a surprise for the Finns was the introduction of seven divisions into battles on the northern coast of Ladoga, the number of which was increased to 10.

The Finnish command hoped that all the measures taken would guarantee a quick stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern section of the border. It was believed that the Finnish army would be able to independently contain the enemy for up to six months. According to the strategic plan, it was supposed to wait for help from the West, and then conduct a counteroffensive in Karelia.

The armed forces of the opponents

The Finnish army entered the war poorly armed - the list below shows how many days of the war the stocks available in the warehouses were enough for:

• cartridges for rifles, machine guns and machine guns - for 2.5 months;
• shells for mortars, field guns and howitzers - for 1 month;
• fuels and lubricants - for 2 months;
• aviation gasoline - for 1 month.

The military industry of Finland was represented by one state cartridge factory, one gunpowder factory and one artillery factory. The overwhelming superiority of the USSR in aviation made it possible to quickly disable or significantly complicate the work of all three.

The Finnish division included: headquarters, three infantry regiments, one light brigade, one field artillery regiment, two engineering companies, one signal company, one sapper company, one quartermaster company.

The Soviet division included: three infantry regiments, one field artillery regiment, one howitzer artillery regiment, one anti-tank gun battery, one reconnaissance battalion, one communications battalion, one engineering battalion.

The Finnish division was inferior to the Soviet one both in numbers (14,200 versus 17,500) and in firepower, as can be seen from the following comparative table:

Statistics
	Finnish division	Soviet division
Rifles
submachine gun
Automatic and semi-automatic rifles
Machine guns 7.62 mm
Machine guns 12.7 mm
Anti-aircraft machine guns (four-barreled)
Dyakonov rifle grenade launchers
Mortars 81-82 mm
Mortars 120 mm
Field artillery (guns caliber 37-45 mm)
Field artillery (75-90 mm guns)
Field artillery (guns caliber 105-152 mm)
armored vehicles

The Soviet division in terms of the combined firepower of machine guns and mortars was two times superior to the Finnish one, and in terms of firepower of artillery - three times. The Red Army did not have machine guns in service, but this was partially offset by the presence of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Artillery support for Soviet divisions was carried out at the request of the high command; they had at their disposal numerous tank brigades, as well as an unlimited amount of ammunition.

On the Karelian Isthmus, Finland's defense line was the "Mannerheim Line", consisting of several fortified defensive lines with concrete and wood-and-earth firing points, communications, and anti-tank barriers. In a state of combat readiness there were 74 old (since 1924) single-machine-gun pillboxes of frontal fire, 48 new and modernized pillboxes, which had from one to four machine-gun embrasures of flanking fire, 7 artillery pillboxes and one machine gun-artillery caponier. In total - 130 long-term firing structures were located along a line about 140 km long from the coast of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. In 1939, the most modern fortifications were created. However, their number did not exceed 10, since their construction was at the limit of the financial capabilities of the state, and the people called them “millionaires” because of their high cost.

The northern coast of the Gulf of Finland was fortified by numerous artillery batteries on the coast and on the coastal islands. A secret agreement was concluded between Finland and Estonia on military cooperation. One of the elements was to be the coordination of the fire of the Finnish and Estonian batteries in order to completely block the Soviet fleet. This plan did not work: by the beginning of the war, Estonia provided its territories for the military bases of the USSR, which were used by Soviet aircraft for air strikes on Finland.

On Lake Ladoga, the Finns also had coastal artillery and warships. The section of the border north of Lake Ladoga was not fortified. Here, preparations were made in advance for partisan actions, for which there were all the conditions: a wooded and swampy area where the normal use of military equipment is impossible, narrow dirt roads and ice-covered lakes, on which enemy troops are very vulnerable. At the end of the 30s, many airfields were built in Finland to receive aircraft from the Western Allies.

Finland began the construction of the navy with the laying of coastal defense ironclads (sometimes incorrectly called "battleships"), adapted for maneuvering and fighting in skerries. Their main measurements are: displacement - 4000 tons, speed - 15.5 knots, armament - 4 × 254 mm, 8x105 mm. The battleships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen were laid down in August 1929 and accepted into the Finnish Navy in December 1932.

Cause for war and rupture of relations

The official reason for the war was the “Mainil incident”: on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the government of Finland with an official note stating that “On November 26, at 15:45, our troops, located on the Karelian Isthmus near the border of Finland, near the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon from Finnish territory by artillery fire. In total, seven gunshots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, seven privates and two from the command staff were wounded. Soviet troops, having strict orders not to succumb to provocation, refrained from firing back.. The note was drafted in moderate terms and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops 20-25 km from the border in order to avoid a repetition of incidents. In the meantime, the Finnish border guards hastily conducted an investigation into the incident, especially since the border posts were witnesses of the shelling. In response, the Finns stated that the shelling was recorded by Finnish posts, the shots were fired from the Soviet side, according to the observations and estimates of the Finns from a distance of about 1.5-2 km southeast of the place where the shells fell, that the Finns have only border guards on the border troops and no guns, especially long-range ones, but that Helsinki is ready to start negotiations on a mutual withdrawal of troops and start a joint investigation into the incident. The response note of the USSR read: “The denial on the part of the Finnish government of the fact of the outrageous artillery shelling of the Soviet troops by the Finnish troops, which resulted in casualties, cannot be explained otherwise than by the desire to mislead public opinion and mock the victims of the shelling.<…>The refusal of the Government of Finland to withdraw the troops that committed the villainous shelling of the Soviet troops, and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops, proceeding formally from the principle of equality of arms, reveal the hostile desire of the Government of Finland to keep Leningrad under threat.. The USSR announced its withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland, arguing that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad poses a threat to the city and is a violation of the pact.

On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow, Aarno Yrjö-Koskinen (Fin. Aarno Yrjo-Koskinen) was summoned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin handed him a new note. It stated that, in view of the current situation, the responsibility for which lies with the Government of Finland, the Government of the USSR recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland. This meant a break in diplomatic relations. On the same day, the Finns noted an attack on their border guards near Petsamo.

On the morning of November 30, the last step was taken. As stated in the official announcement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations by the Finnish military, the troops of the Leningrad Military District at 8 am on November 30 crossed the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas”. On the same day Soviet aviation bombed and machine-gunned Helsinki; at the same time, as a result of the mistake of the pilots, mainly residential working quarters suffered. In response to the protests of European diplomats, Molotov stated that Soviet aircraft dropped bread on Helsinki for the starving population (after which the Soviet bombs began to be called in Finland “Molotov bread baskets”). However, there was no official declaration of war.

In Soviet propaganda, and then historiography, the responsibility for the start of the war was assigned to Finland and the countries of the West: “ The imperialists were able to achieve some temporary success in Finland. They managed at the end of 1939 to provoke the Finnish reactionaries to war against the USSR».

Mannerheim, who, as commander in chief, had the most reliable data on the incident near Mainila, reports:

Nikita Khrushchev says that in late autumn (November 26, by the way) he dined at Stalin's apartment with Molotov and Kuusinen. Between the latter there was a conversation about the implementation of the already adopted decision - the presentation of an ultimatum to Finland; at the same time, Stalin announced that Kuusinen would lead the new Karelian-Finnish SSR with the annexation of the "liberated" Finnish regions. Stalin believed "that after Finland is presented with ultimatum demands of a territorial nature and if she rejects them, military operations will have to be started", noticing: "today this will start". Khrushchev himself believed (in agreement with Stalin's mood, as he claims) that "it's enough to tell them loudly<финнам>, if they don’t hear, then shoot from the cannon once, and the Finns will raise their hands up, agree with the demands ”. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G. I. Kulik (artilleryman) was sent to Leningrad in advance to organize a provocation. Khrushchev, Molotov and Kuusinen sat for a long time at Stalin's, waiting for the Finns' answer; everyone was sure that Finland would get scared and agree to the Soviet terms.

At the same time, it should be noted that internal Soviet propaganda did not advertise the Mainilsky incident, which served as an openly formal pretext: it emphasized that the Soviet Union was making a liberation campaign in Finland in order to help the Finnish workers and peasants overthrow the oppression of the capitalists. A striking example is the song "Accept us, Suomi-beauty":

We're here to help you get it right

Pay back the shame.

Accept us, Suomi is a beauty,

In a necklace of transparent lakes!

At the same time, the mention in the text of the “low sun autumn” gives rise to the assumption that the text was written ahead of time, counting on an earlier start of the war.

War

After the rupture of diplomatic relations, the Finnish government began the evacuation of the population from the border areas, mainly from the Karelian Isthmus and the Northern Ladoga region. The bulk of the population gathered in the period November 29 - December 4.

The beginning of the battles

The period from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 is usually considered the first stage of the war. At this stage, the offensive of the Red Army units was carried out on the territory from the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Barents Sea.

The grouping of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in northern and central Karelia, the 14th - in Petsamo.

The offensive of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Isthmus Army (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman. For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only "fragmentary intelligence data on the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus." As a result, the forces allocated to break through the "Mannerheim Line" turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy pillboxes. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the line support strip and reach leading edge the main line of defense, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations near Lake Tolvajärvi. Until the end of December, attempts to break through continued, which did not bring success.

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. She was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeijakunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen. Part of the Soviet troops was surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.

The offensive of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland Task Force (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhmä) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army was advancing from the White Sea Karelia. She wedged into the enemy defenses for 35-45 km, but was stopped. The forces of the 14th Army, advancing on the Petsamo region, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Some researchers and memoirists are trying to explain the Soviet failures, including the weather: severe frosts (down to −40 ° C) and deep snow - up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observations and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, on On the Karelian Isthmus, the temperature ranged from +1 to -23.4 °C. Further, until the New Year, the temperature did not fall below -23 ° C. Frosts down to -40 ° C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts prevented not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim wrote about. There was also no deep snow until January 1940. Thus, the operational reports of the Soviet divisions of December 15, 1939 testify to the depth of the snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Significant problems for the Soviet troops were caused by the use by Finland of mine-explosive devices, including improvised ones, which were installed not only on the front line, but also in the rear of the Red Army, on the routes of movement of troops. On January 10, 1940, in the report of the authorized people's commissariat of defense, commander of the II rank Kovalev to the people's commissariat of defense, it was noted that, along with enemy snipers, mines cause the main losses to infantry. Later, at a meeting of the commanding staff of the Red Army to collect experience in combat operations against Finland on April 14, 1940, the chief of engineers of the North-Western Front, brigade commander A.F. Khrenov noted that in the front action zone (130 km) the total length of minefields was 386 km In this case, mines were used in combination with non-explosive engineering barriers.

An unpleasant surprise was the massive use by the Finns against Soviet tanks of Molotov cocktails, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail”. During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

During the war, the Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Terijoki government

On December 1, 1939, the Pravda newspaper published a message stating that the so-called "People's Government" had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, the government of Kuusinen is usually referred to as "Terijoki", since it was, after the outbreak of war, in the village of Terijoki (now the city of Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.

On December 2, negotiations were held in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.

The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to the Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, significant territories in Soviet Karelia were transferred to Finland and monetary compensation was provided. The USSR also undertook to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The contract was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if none of the parties announced its termination a year before the expiration of the contract, it was automatically extended for another 25 years. The Treaty came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned "as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki."

In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which the recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.

It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and therefore was no longer in charge of the country. The USSR declared in the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

RECEPTION TOV. MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENvoy Mr. WINTER Accepted Com. Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy, Mr. Winter, announced the desire of the so-called "Finnish government" to start new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Tov. Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called "Finnish government", which had already left the city of Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could be no question of any negotiations with this "government" now. The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

The "People's Government" was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that the use in propaganda of the fact of the creation of a "people's government" and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would make it possible to influence the Finnish population, increasing the decay in the army and in the rear.

Finnish People's Army

On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the "Finnish People's Army" (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called "Ingermanland", which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District, began.

By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform(it was sewn from khaki cloth and looked like the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; statements that it was a trophy uniform of the Polish army are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).

This "people's" army was to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military backbone of the "people's" government. "Finns" in confederates held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to start the political and organizational work of the communists (note: the word „ communists“crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from the power of the whites”, which indicated practical measures to create a popular front in the occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.

Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to solve combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts of the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd FNA SD carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of the Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units participated in the battles for Lunkulansaari and in the capture of Vyborg.

When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, the Kuusinen government faded into the background and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When the Soviet-Finnish consultations began in January on the issue of concluding peace, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legal government of Finland.

Foreign military assistance to Finland

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. In total, more than 11 thousand volunteers arrived in Finland, including 8 thousand from Sweden (“Swedish Volunteer Corps”), 1 thousand from Norway, 600 from Denmark, 400 from Hungary, 300 from the USA, as well as British citizens , Estonia and a number of other states. A Finnish source gives a figure of 12,000 foreigners who arrived in Finland to take part in the war.

Also among them was a small number of Russian white emigrants from the Russian General Military Union (ROVS), who were used as officers of the "Russian People's Detachments", formed by the Finns from among the captured Red Army soldiers. Since the work on the formation of such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities, only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in hostilities.

Great Britain delivered to Finland 75 aircraft (24 Blenheim bombers, 30 Gladiator fighters, 11 Hurricane fighters and 11 Lysander reconnaissance aircraft), 114 field guns, 200 anti-tank guns, 124 automatic small arms, 185 thousand artillery shells, 17,700 air bombs, 10 thousand anti-tank mines.

France decided to supply 179 aircraft to Finland (donate 49 fighters and sell another 130 aircraft). various types), however, in fact, during the war, 30 Moran fighters were donated and another six Caudron C.714 arrived after the end of hostilities and did not participate in the war; 160 field guns, 500 machine guns, 795 thousand artillery shells, 200 thousand hand grenades and several thousand sets of ammunition were also transferred to Finland. Also, France became the first country to officially allow the registration of volunteers to participate in Finnish war.

Sweden supplied Finland with 29 aircraft, 112 field guns, 85 anti-tank guns, 104 anti-aircraft guns, 500 automatic small arms, 80,000 rifles, as well as other military equipment and raw materials.

The Danish government sent a medical convoy and skilled workers to Finland, and allowed a fundraising campaign for Finland.

Italy sent 35 Fiat G.50 fighters to Finland, but five aircraft were destroyed during their transfer and development by personnel.

The Union of South Africa donated 22 Gloster Gauntlet II fighters to Finland.

A representative of the US government issued a statement that the entry of American citizens into the Finnish army does not contradict the US neutrality law, a group of American pilots was sent to Helsinki, and in January 1940 the US Congress approved the sale of 10 thousand rifles to Finland. Also, the United States sold 44 Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters to Finland, but they arrived too late and did not have time to take part in the hostilities.

Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano in his diary mentions the assistance to Finland from the Third Reich: in December 1939, the Finnish envoy to Italy reported that Germany "unofficially" sent to Finland a batch of captured weapons captured during the Polish campaign.

In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles and other weapons, as well as 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million rounds of ammunition were delivered to Finland.

Fighting in December - January

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control of the Red Army troops, the poor preparedness of command personnel, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary for waging war in the winter in Finland. By the end of December, it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was a relative calm at the front. Throughout January and the beginning of February, the troops were strengthened, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Subdivisions of skiers were created, methods were developed for overcoming mined terrain, obstacles, methods for dealing with defensive structures, and personnel were trained. To storm the Mannerheim Line, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and a member of the military council of the LenVO Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies. Enormous work was carried out in the border regions to hastily build and re-equip communication lines for the uninterrupted supply of the army in the field. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.

To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the divisions of the first echelon were assigned groups of destruction artillery (AR) consisting of one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, in which there were 81 guns with a caliber of 203, 234, 280 mm.

The Finnish side during this period also continued to replenish the troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. Formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along the roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, then in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used the tactics of guerrilla warfare: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly at night, and after the attacks went into the forest, where bases were equipped. Snipers inflicted heavy losses. According to the firm opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish), the greatest danger was represented by “cuckoo” snipers, who allegedly fired from trees. The formations of the Red Army that had broken through forward were constantly surrounded and broke through backwards, often abandoning equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi was widely known in Finland and beyond. The village of Suomussalmi was occupied on December 7 by the forces of the Soviet 163rd Infantry Division of the 9th Army, which was given the responsible task of striking at Oulu, reaching the Gulf of Bothnia and, as a result, cutting Finland in half. However, thereafter the division was surrounded by (smaller) Finnish forces and cut off from supplies. To help her, the 44th Infantry Division was advanced, which, however, was blocked on the road to Suomussalmi, in a defile between two lakes near the village of Raate, by the forces of two companies of the 27th Finnish regiment (350 people).

Without waiting for her approach, the 163rd division at the end of December, under the constant attacks of the Finns, was forced to break out of the encirclement, while losing 30% of the personnel and most of the equipment and heavy weapons. After that, the Finns transferred the released forces to encircle and eliminate the 44th division, which by January 8 was completely destroyed in the battle on the Raat road. Almost the entire division was killed or captured, and only a small part of the military managed to get out of the encirclement, leaving all the equipment and convoy (the Finns got 37 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 350 machine guns, 97 guns (including 17 howitzers), several thousand rifles, 160 vehicles , all radio stations). The Finns won this double victory with forces several times smaller than those of the enemy (11 thousand (according to other sources - 17 thousand) people with 11 guns versus 45-55 thousand with 335 guns, more than 100 tanks and 50 armored vehicles. The command of both divisions The commander and commissar of the 163rd division were removed from command, one regimental commander was shot, before the formation of his division, the command of the 44th division was shot (brigade commander A. I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov).

The victory at Suomussalmi had enormous moral significance for the Finns; strategically, it buried plans for a breakthrough to the Gulf of Bothnia, which were extremely dangerous for the Finns, and so paralyzed the Soviet troops in this sector that they did not take active actions until the very end of the war.

At the same time, south of Soumusalmi, in the Kuhmo area, the Soviet 54th rifle division was surrounded. The winner at Suomusalmi, Colonel Hjalmar Siilsavuo, who was promoted to major general, was sent to this sector, but he was never able to liquidate the division, which remained encircled until the end of the war. At Lake Ladoga, the 168th Infantry Division, which was advancing on Sortavala, was also surrounded until the end of the war. In the same place, in South Lemetti, in late December and early January, the 18th Infantry Division of General Kondrashov, along with the 34th Tank Brigade of Brigade Commander Kondratiev, were surrounded. Already at the end of the war, on February 28, they tried to break out of the encirclement, but at the exit they were defeated in the so-called "valley of death" near the city of Pitkyaranta, where one of the two outgoing columns completely perished. As a result, out of 15,000 people, 1,237 people left the encirclement, half of them wounded and frostbitten. The brigade commander Kondratiev shot himself, Kondrashov managed to get out, but was soon shot, and the division was disbanded due to the loss of the banner. The death toll in the "valley of death" was 10 percent of the total number of deaths in the entire Soviet-Finnish war. These episodes were vivid manifestations of the tactics of the Finns, called mottitaktiikka, the tactics of motti - “ticks” (literally, motti is a log of firewood that is placed in the forest in groups, but at a certain distance from each other). Taking advantage of the advantage in mobility, detachments of Finnish skiers blocked the roads clogged with sprawling Soviet columns, cut off the advancing groups and then exhausted them with unexpected attacks from all sides, trying to destroy them. At the same time, the encircled groups, unable, unlike the Finns, to fight off the roads, usually huddled together and occupied a passive all-round defense, without making any attempts to actively resist the attacks of the Finnish partisan detachments. Only the lack of mortars and heavy weapons in general made it difficult for the Finns to completely destroy them.

On the Karelian Isthmus, the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began thorough preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses.

On January 3, 1940, at the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov sank (probably hit a mine). S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

On the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the regions of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the zone of combat operations of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Interposyolka of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goimay of the Kondopoga region, in the village of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and without fail worked in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus along the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was inflicted in the direction of the Sum. Art preparations also began. From that day on, daily for several days, the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko brought down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but could not succeed.

On February 6, the offensive began on the Summa strip. In the following days, the front of the offensive expanded both to the west and to the east.

On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops, according to which, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front were to go on the offensive.

On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, created in October 1939, operated together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.

Since the attacks of the Soviet troops on the Summa region did not bring success, the main blow was moved to the east, to the Lyakhde direction. In this place, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery preparation and the Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.

During three days of intense fighting, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.

On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam, and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.

By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line of defense north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.

At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th - to Vyborg. The Finns offered fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.

England and France: plans for military operations against the USSR

Great Britain has provided assistance to Finland from the very beginning. On the one hand, the British government tried to avoid turning the USSR into an enemy, on the other hand, it was widely believed that because of the conflict in the Balkans with the USSR, "you would have to fight one way or another." The Finnish representative in London, Georg Achates Gripenberg, approached Halifax on December 1, 1939, with a request to allow war materials to be shipped to Finland, on the condition that they not be re-exported to Nazi Germany (with which Britain was at war). The head of the North Department (en: Northern Department) Laurence Collier (en: Laurence Collier) at the same time believed that British and German goals in Finland could be compatible and wanted to involve Germany and Italy in the war against the USSR, while speaking, however, against the proposed Finland used the Polish fleet (then under British control) to destroy Soviet ships. Thomas Snow (English) ThomasSnow), the British representative in Helsinki, continued to support the idea of ​​​​an anti-Soviet alliance (with Italy and Japan), which he expressed before the war.

Against the backdrop of government disagreements, the British Army began supplying armaments in December 1939, including artillery and tanks (while Germany refrained from supplying heavy weapons to Finland).

When Finland requested the supply of bombers for attacks on Moscow and Leningrad, as well as for the destruction railway to Murmansk, the latter idea received support from Fitzroy MacLean in the Department of the North: helping the Finns to destroy the road would allow the UK to "avoid carrying out the same operation later, independently and under less favorable conditions." McLean's superiors, Collier and Cadogan, agreed with McLean's reasoning and requested additional delivery of Blenheim aircraft to Finland.

According to Craig Gerrard, the plans for intervention in the war against the USSR, which were then being born in Great Britain, illustrated the ease with which British politicians forgot about the war they were currently waging with Germany. By the beginning of 1940, the view prevailed in the Department of the North that the use of force against the USSR was inevitable. Collier, as before, continued to insist that it was wrong to appease the aggressors; now the enemy, in contrast to his previous position, was not Germany, but the USSR. Gerrard explains the position of MacLean and Collier not with ideological, but with humanitarian considerations.

The Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris reported that there was a desire in "circles close to the government" to support Finland in order to reconcile with Germany and send Hitler to the East. Nick Smart believes, however, that on a conscious level, the arguments for intervention did not come from an attempt to trade one war for another, but from the assumption that German and Soviet plans were closely linked.

From the French point of view, the anti-Soviet orientation also made sense because of the collapse of plans to prevent the strengthening of Germany with the help of a blockade. Soviet deliveries of raw materials caused the German economy to continue to grow, and the French began to realize that after a while, as a result of this growth, winning the war against Germany would become impossible. In such a situation, although the transfer of the war to Scandinavia presented a certain risk, inaction was an even worse alternative. The chief of the French General Staff, Gamelin, gave instructions for planning an operation against the USSR with the aim of waging war outside French territory; plans were soon prepared.

Britain did not support some French plans: for example, an attack on the oil fields in Baku, an attack on Petsamo using Polish troops (the Polish government in exile in London was formally at war with the USSR). However, Great Britain was also approaching the opening of a second front against the USSR. On February 5, 1940, at a joint war council (at which Churchill was present but not speaking - which was unusual) it was decided to seek the consent of Norway and Sweden for a British-led operation in which the expeditionary force was to land in Norway and move east .

French plans, as the situation in Finland worsened, became more and more one-sided. So, in early March, Daladier, to the surprise of Great Britain, announced his readiness to send 50,000 soldiers and 100 bombers against the USSR if the Finns asked for it. The plans were canceled due to the end of the war, to the relief of many involved in the planning.

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite the demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete seizure of the country, followed by either joining the USSR or changing the government to a pro-Soviet one.

Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was signed, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, retreated to the USSR, Soviet troops stormed the city on the morning of March 13.

According to J. Roberts, Stalin's conclusion of peace on relatively moderate terms could be caused by the realization of the fact that an attempt to forcibly sovietize Finland would run into massive resistance from the Finnish population and the danger of Anglo-French intervention to help the Finns. As a result, the Soviet Union risked being drawn into a war against the Western powers on the side of Germany.

For participation in the Finnish war, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 412 servicemen, over 50 thousand were awarded orders and medals.

The results of the war

All officially declared territorial claims of the USSR were satisfied. According to Stalin, the war ended in

3 months and 12 days, just because our army did a good job, because our political boom in front of Finland turned out to be right.

The USSR gained full control over the waters of Lake Ladoga and secured Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula).

In addition, under the peace treaty, Finland assumed the obligation to build on its territory a railway connecting the Kola Peninsula through Alakurtti with the Gulf of Bothnia (Tornio). But this road was never built.

On October 11, 1940, the Agreement between the USSR and Finland on the Aland Islands was signed in Moscow, according to which the USSR had the right to place its consulate on the islands, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone.

US President Roosevelt declared a "moral embargo" against the Soviet Union, which had little effect on the supply of technology from the United States. On March 29, 1940, Molotov told the Supreme Soviet that Soviet imports from the United States had even increased compared to the previous year, despite the obstacles put in place by the American authorities. In particular, the Soviet side complained about the obstacles to Soviet engineers with admission to aircraft factories. In addition, under various trade agreements in the period 1939-1941. The Soviet Union received 6,430 machine tools from Germany for 85.4 million marks, which compensated for the decline in supplies of equipment from the United States.

Another negative result for the USSR was the formation among the leadership of a number of countries of the idea of ​​the weakness of the Red Army. Information about the course, circumstances and results (a significant excess of Soviet losses over Finnish ones) of the Winter War strengthened the positions of supporters of the war against the USSR in Germany. In early January 1940, the German envoy to Helsinki, Blucher, presented a memorandum to the Foreign Ministry with the following assessments: despite superiority in manpower and equipment, the Red Army suffered one defeat after another, left thousands of people in captivity, lost hundreds of guns, tanks, aircraft and decisively failed to conquer the territory. In this regard, German ideas about Bolshevik Russia should be reconsidered. The Germans were making false assumptions when they thought that Russia was a first-class military factor. But in reality the Red Army has so many shortcomings that it cannot cope even with a small country. In reality, Russia does not pose a danger to such a great power as Germany, the rear in the East is safe, and therefore it will be possible to speak with the gentlemen in the Kremlin in a completely different language than it was in August - September 1939. For his part, Hitler, following the results Winter War, called the USSR a colossus with feet of clay. Disregard for the combat power of the Red Army became widespread. W. Churchill testifies that "failure of the Soviet troops" aroused in public opinion in England "contempt"; “In English circles, many congratulated themselves on the fact that we did not try very zealously to win the Soviets over to our side.<во время переговоров лета 1939 г.>and were proud of their foresight. People too hastily concluded that the purge ruined the Russian army and that all this confirmed the organic rottenness and decline of the state and social system of the Russians..

On the other hand, the Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in the winter, on a wooded and marshy territory, the experience of breaking through long-term fortifications and fighting an enemy using guerrilla warfare tactics. In clashes with Finnish troops equipped with the Suomi submachine gun, the importance of submachine guns that had been removed from service before was clarified: the production of PPD was hastily restored and the terms of reference for the creation new system submachine gun, resulting in the appearance of PPSh.

Germany was bound by an agreement with the USSR and could not publicly support Finland, which she made clear even before the outbreak of hostilities. The situation changed after the major defeats of the Red Army. In February 1940, Toivo Kivimäki (later ambassador) was sent to Berlin to probe possible changes. Relations were cool at first, but changed dramatically when Kivimäki announced Finland's intention to accept help from the Western Allies. On February 22, the Finnish envoy was urgently arranged for a meeting with Hermann Göring, the second man in the Reich. According to the memoirs of R. Nordström at the end of the 1940s, Goering unofficially promised Kivimäki that Germany would attack the USSR in the future: “ Remember that you should make peace on any terms. I guarantee that when in a short time we go to war against Russia, you will get everything back with interest". Kivimäki immediately reported this to Helsinki.

The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one of the factors that determined the rapprochement between Finland and Germany; in addition, they could in a certain way influence the leadership of the Reich in relation to plans to attack the USSR. For Finland, rapprochement with Germany became a means of containing the growing political pressure from the USSR. Finland's participation in World War II on the side of the Axis was called the "Continuation War" in Finnish historiography, in order to show the relationship with the Winter War.

Territorial changes

• Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to build fortifications along the new border line (Salpa Line) at an accelerated pace, thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km.
• Part of Lapland (Old Salla).
• The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland.
• Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island).
• Lease of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for 30 years.

In total, as a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km of Finnish territories. Finland again occupied these territories in 1941, in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War, and in 1944 they again went to the USSR.

Finnish losses

Military

According to modern estimates:

• killed - ok. 26 thousand people (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 85 thousand people);
• wounded - 40 thousand people. (according to Soviet data in 1940 - 250 thousand people);
• prisoners - 1000 people.

Thus, the total losses in the Finnish troops during the war amounted to 67 thousand people. brief information about each of the victims from the Finnish side is published in a number of Finnish publications.

Up-to-date information on the circumstances of the death of Finnish military personnel:

• 16,725 died in action, remains evacuated;
• 3433 died in action, the remains were not evacuated;
• 3671 died in hospitals from wounds;
• 715 died of non-combat causes (including illness);
• 28 died in captivity;
• 1727 missing and declared dead;
• the cause of death of 363 military personnel is unknown.

A total of 26,662 Finnish soldiers died.

Civil

According to official Finnish data, during the air raids and bombing of Finnish cities (including Helsinki), 956 people were killed, 540 were seriously and 1300 slightly injured, 256 stone and about 1800 wooden buildings were destroyed.

Losses of foreign volunteers

During the war, the Swedish Volunteer Corps lost 33 people dead and 185 wounded and frostbite (with frostbite being the vast majority - about 140 people).

In addition, 1 Italian was killed - Sergeant Manzocchi

USSR losses

The first official figures of Soviet losses in the war were made public at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbite.

According to reports from the troops on 03/15/1940:

• wounded, sick, frostbitten - 248,090;
• killed and died at the stages of sanitary evacuation - 65,384;
• died in hospitals - 15,921;
• missing - 14,043;
• total irretrievable losses - 95,348.

name lists

According to the lists of names compiled in 1949-1951 by the Main Directorate of Personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Headquarters of the Ground Forces, the losses of the Red Army in the war were as follows:

• died and died from wounds at the stages of sanitary evacuation - 71,214;
• died in hospitals from wounds and diseases - 16,292;
• missing - 39,369.

In total, according to these lists, irretrievable losses amounted to 126,875 military personnel.

Other loss estimates

In the period from 1990 to 1995, new, often contradictory data on the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies appeared in Russian historical literature and in journal publications, moreover general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses from 1990 to 1995 and a decrease in Finnish ones. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryaga (1989) the number of those killed Soviet soldiers it was indicated in 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A. M. Noskov, a year later - 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P. A. Aptekar in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, then, according to P. A. Aptekar, their number is more than double the results of the study of Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people. According to the data of the Soviet military archives and hospitals, sanitary losses amounted (by name) to 264,908 people. It is estimated that about 22 percent of the losses were from frostbite.

Losses in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. based on the two-volume “History of Russia. XX century»
		Finland
1. Killed, dead from wounds	around 150,000
2. Missing
3. POWs	about 6000 (returned 5465)	825 to 1000 (about 600 returned)
4. Wounded, shell-shocked, frostbitten, burned
5. Aircraft (in pieces)
6. Tanks (in pieces)	650 destroyed, about 1800 shot down, about 1500 out of action for technical reasons
7. Losses at sea	submarine "S-2"	auxiliary patrol ship, tug on Ladoga

"Karelian question"

After the war, the local Finnish authorities, the provincial organizations of the Karelian Union, created in order to protect the rights and interests of the evacuated residents of Karelia, tried to find a solution to the issue of returning the lost territories. During the Cold War, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen repeatedly negotiated with the Soviet leadership, but these negotiations were unsuccessful. The Finnish side did not openly demand the return of these territories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of transferring territories to Finland was raised again.

In matters relating to the return of the ceded territories, the Karelian Union acts jointly with the foreign policy leadership of Finland and through it. In accordance with the program "Karelia" adopted in 2005 at the congress of the Karelian Union, the Karelian Union seeks to contribute to political leadership Finland actively followed the situation in Russia and began negotiations with Russia on the return of the ceded territories of Karelia as soon as a real basis arises and both sides are ready for this.

Propaganda during the war

At the beginning of the war, the tone of the Soviet press was bravura - the Red Army looked perfect and victorious, while the Finns were portrayed as a frivolous enemy. On December 2 (2 days after the start of the war), Leningradskaya Pravda writes:

However, a month later the tone of the Soviet press changed. They began to talk about the power of the "Mannerheim Line", difficult terrain and frost - the Red Army, losing tens of thousands killed and frostbite, got stuck in the Finnish forests. Starting with Molotov's report on March 29, 1940, the myth of the impregnable "Mannerheim Line", similar to the "Maginot Line" and "Siegfried Line", begins to live, which so far have not been crushed by any army. Anastas Mikoyan later wrote: “ Stalin, an intelligent, capable person, in order to justify the failures during the war with Finland, invented the reason that we “suddenly” discovered the well-equipped Mannerheim Line. A special motion picture was released showing these installations to justify that it was difficult to fight against such a line and quickly win.».

If Finnish propaganda depicted the war as defending the homeland from cruel and merciless invaders, connecting communist terrorism with traditional Russian great power (for example, in the song “No, Molotov!”, the head of the Soviet government is compared with the tsarist Governor-General of Finland Nikolai Bobrikov, known for his Russification policy and struggle against autonomy), then the Soviet Agitprop presented the war as a struggle against the oppressors of the Finnish people for the sake of the freedom of the latter. The term White Finns, which was used to designate the enemy, was intended to emphasize not the interstate and not the interethnic, but the class nature of the confrontation. “Your homeland has been taken away more than once - we have come to return it to you”, says the song "Take us, beautiful Suomi", in an attempt to fend off accusations of capturing Finland. The order for the LenVO troops dated November 29, signed by Meretskov and Zhdanov, states:

• Cartoon in the Chicago Daily Tribune. January 1940
• Cartoon in the Chicago Daily Tribune. February 1940
• "Accept us, Suomi-beauty"
• "Njet, Molotoff"

Mannerheim line - alternative point of view

Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify a long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth about incredibly strong» The Mannerheim Line is firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the chanting of the line by the Finnish side in the literal sense - in the song Mannerheimin linjalla("On the Mannerheim Line"). The Belgian General Badu, a technical adviser on the construction of fortifications, a participant in the construction of the Maginot Line, stated:

The Russian historian A. Isaev is ironic about this passage of Badu. According to him, “In reality, the Mannerheim Line was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of the long-term structures of the Finns were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete buildings in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors.

Three pillboxes of the “millionth” type had two levels, three more pillboxes - three levels. Let me emphasize, exactly the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located on different levels relative to the surface, casemates with embrasures slightly buried in the ground and galleries connecting them with barracks, completely buried. Structures with what can be called floors were negligible.” It was much weaker than the fortifications of the Molotov Line, not to mention the Maginot Line, with multi-story caponiers equipped with their own power plants, kitchens, rest rooms and all amenities, with underground galleries connecting pillboxes, and even underground narrow gauge railways. Along with the famous gouges made of granite boulders, the Finns used gouges made of low-quality concrete, designed for obsolete Renault tanks and turned out to be weak against the guns of the new Soviet technology. In fact, the "Mannerheim Line" consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located on the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other and rarely had cannon weapons.

As O. Mannien notes, the Finns had enough resources to build only 101 concrete bunkers (from low-quality concrete), and they took less concrete than the building of the Helsinki opera house; the rest of the fortifications of the Mannerheim line were wood-earthen (for comparison: the Maginot line had 5800 concrete fortifications, including multi-storey bunkers).

Mannerheim himself wrote:

... the Russians, even during the war, set in motion the myth of the "Mannerheim Line". It was argued that our defense on the Karelian Isthmus relied on an unusually strong and built along last word defensive rampart comparable to the Maginot and Siegfried lines and which no army has ever breached. The breakthrough of the Russians was “a feat that has not been equaled in the history of all wars” ... All this is nonsense; in reality, the situation looks completely different ... Of course, there was a defensive line, but it was formed only by rare long-term machine-gun nests and two dozen new pillboxes built at my suggestion, between which trenches were laid. Yes, the defensive line existed, but it lacked depth. The people called this position the Mannerheim Line. Its strength was the result of the stamina and courage of our soldiers, and not the result of the strength of the structures. - Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Memoirs. - M.: VAGRIUS, 1999. - S. 319-320. - ISBN 5-264-00049-2

Artistic works about the war

Documentaries

• "The Living and the Dead". Documentary film about the "Winter War" directed by V. A. Fonarev
• "Mannerheim Line" (USSR, 1940)

1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, known in Finland as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a large Soviet territory in Karelia, followed by the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that the acceptance of Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state, lead to the loss of neutrality by Finland and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) was only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Mainil incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Allegedly, three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the government of Finland and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was not feasible, because then the Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was presented with a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the troops of the Leningrad Front received an order to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyösti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During the "perestroika" several versions of the Mainilsky incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret NKVD unit. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary evidence.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantage in forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1476 tanks and about 1200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships from the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The grouping of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The rest of the troops covered separate areas from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the "Mannerheim Line" - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of the Mannerheim line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

"Mannerheim Line" had a frontal width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip, 2-15 kilometers away from the main one, and the rear (Vyborg) line of defense. Over two thousand long-term firing structures (DOS) and wood-and-earth firing structures (DZOS) were erected, which were combined into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 nodes of resistance, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. The strongholds were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). Between the strongholds and nodes of resistance were positions for field troops. The strongholds and positions of the field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. Only in the security zone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

On November 30, 1939, after a long artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and launched an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, they overcame the zone of operational obstacles in separate directions and reached the main strip of the Mannerheim Line. For more than two weeks, unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. Troops have been replenished. As a result, the Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. The Finnish side by the beginning of February 1940 had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, on February 28, Soviet troops reached the third. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to start a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg grouping of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the "Mannerheim Line" and the defeat of the main grouping of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult position. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government with a request for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the sea area around it were leased by the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France became aggravated, and an anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the West.

The losses of the Soviet troops in the war amounted to: irretrievable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irretrievable losses of the Finnish troops - about 23 thousand people, sanitary - over 43 thousand people.

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