BAGRATION Petr Ivanovich (1765-1812), Georgian, prince, Russian infantry general (1809). Member of the Italian and Swiss campaigns of A. V. Suvorov, wars with France, Sweden and Turkey (in 1809-10 commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army). During the Patriotic War of 1812 he was commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, mortally wounded in the Battle of Borodino.

Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration came from the Georgian princes of the royal family of Bagration. He was distinguished by his hot temper, courage and bravery, caring for his subordinates, which, taken together, contributed to his popularity among the troops. On May 1, 1783, Bagration was recorded for military service as a private in the Astrakhan Infantry Regiment and in the same year received the rank of ensign. Family ties among the highest imperial aristocracy and the personal courage of the young officer contributed to the rise of his quick military career. For about 12 years, his service was held in adjutant positions with prominent generals and well-known Russian military leaders, and a long stay with them became a good school for gaining experience in commanding troops. For courage and military merit during the assault on the Turkish fortress Ochakov in 1789, Bagration was promoted from second lieutenant to captain, having distinguished himself in the capture of Prague (a suburb of Warsaw), in 1794 he attracted the attention of A. V. Suvorov himself. During the reign of Emperor Paul I, Peter Ivanovich enjoyed the great favor of this monarch, married Countess E. P. Skavronskaya, who had family ties with the royal family name (the emperor himself was the best man at the wedding), and on February 4, 1799 he was granted the rank of major general.
In 1799-1800 he was in the Italian and Swiss campaigns, took an active part in many major battles, brilliantly commanded the vanguard. This strengthened his reputation as one of the most combative generals in the Russian army, he was considered the favorite student of the famous Suvorov. Bagration confirmed his military prowess in the 1805 campaign against the French in the battle of Shengraben, where the Russian rearguard led by him repulsed all attacks and delayed the advance of the superior enemy, and then broke through and joined with the main forces. For this feat, he received the rank of lieutenant general and was awarded the Order of St. George 2nd class. In the unsuccessful Austerlitz battle for the Russians, the column led by them was able to break through the enemy ranks with minimal losses and break away from the Napoleonic troops.

In the campaigns of 1806-07, he commanded the 4th division and the main vanguard, took part in all the main military clashes with the French. During the Russo-Swedish War of 1808-09, Bagration commanded the 21st division, which cleared the southern coast of Finland from the Swedes, and in 1809 led a large detachment that crossed the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia to the Aland Islands, for which he was promoted to infantry general. In 1809 Bagration was appointed commander in chief of the Moldavian army; under his leadership, Russian troops captured a number of fortresses on the Danube and were able to inflict defeat on the Turks near Rassevat and Tataritsa.
In 1812, despite the personal reluctance of Alexander I, he took the post of commander in chief of the 2nd Western Army, which covered the central direction. During the invasion of Napoleon into the territory of Russia, having received an order not to clash with superior enemy forces, Bagration managed to brilliantly organize the retreat of his troops and, after the battles near Mir and Saltanovka, using the inconsistency of the actions of the French military leaders, was able to break away from the pursuit and connect with the 1st Western army near Smolensk. During this period, the military opposition among the generals and the officer corps, relying on the high popularity of Bagration among the troops and the fame of his beloved Suvorov student and associate, began to use his name in the fight against M. B. Barclay de Tolly and his retreat tactics, nominating his candidacy to the post of commander-in-chief. But before the arrival of M. I. Kutuzov, despite significant differences in views on the methods of warfare, Bagration was forced to nominally obey Barclay, since he was younger and commanded a smaller army. In the battle of Borodino, his troops defended the left flank of the Russian position and at the beginning of the battle took upon themselves the brunt of Napoleon's superior forces. Steadfastly defending the occupied lines, Bagration repeatedly personally led his units into counterattacks. In one of the attacks, Pyotr Ivanovich received a severe wound from a grenade fragment in the tibia of his left leg and was taken from the battlefield, first to Moscow, and then to the village of Simy, where he died during treatment and was buried. Moreover, an interesting fact is that at first the wound began to heal, and Bagration began to recover, however, when the news of the surrender of Moscow, the hot commander abruptly jumped out of bed, which led to the rupture and inflammation of the wound, and the subsequent death of the hero. In 1839 Bagration's ashes were solemnly reburied on the Borodino field. Bagration was rightfully considered one of the best Russian commanders of the Suvorov school, he was distinguished by personal courage in battle, was famous for his energy and assertiveness in achieving his tasks, was loved by ordinary soldiers and officers.

Rennenkampf and his generals were shocked by the Battle of Gumbinnen. They felt what seemed to be the death grip of a terrible enemy, squeezing them. Suddenly, for no apparent reason, the grip loosened. The Germans retreated; they have completely disappeared; they left the battlefield, leaving dead and wounded. Where did they go? This might become clear later. Why did they leave? It was a mystery. But there is one explanation, an explanation that indulges the feelings of the Russians and nourishes their most secret hopes. The repulse and heavy losses of Mackensen's corps led the German army into a panic. They knew they were broken. They accepted the fact that they were absolutely outnumbered by mighty Russia. They retreated in haste, conserving their forces to fight deep within their own country.

EAST PRUSIAN OPERATION, 1914

The 1914 campaign on the Russian front opened with the East Prussian operation. The need to hold it was motivated by the desire to "support the French in view of the Germans' main attack being prepared against them." The troops were tasked with defeating the enemy and capturing East Prussia in order to create an advantageous position for the development of further operations to invade Germany. The 1st Army was to advance around the Masurian Lakes from the north, cutting off the Germans from Koenigsberg (now Kaliningrad). The 2nd Army was to conduct an offensive bypassing the lakes from the west, preventing the withdrawal of German divisions beyond the Vistula. The general idea of ​​the operation was to cover the German grouping from both flanks.

The Russians had some superiority over the enemy. The Northwestern Front included 17.5 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions, 1104 guns, 54 aircraft. The 8th German Army consisted of 15 infantry and one cavalry division, 1044 guns, 56 aircraft, 2 airships. True, the Germans had more powerful artillery. They had 156 heavy guns, while the Russians had only 24. However, on the whole, the balance of forces ensured the fulfillment of the Stavka's plan. It allowed to defeat the 8th German army. The form of operational maneuver chosen by the Russian command was fraught with a great threat to the enemy. She put him under a double blow. The execution of the maneuver was hampered by the fact that the Russian armies had to operate along external operational directions, separated from one another by the region of the Masurian Lakes. Under these conditions, the reliability of troop leadership and, above all, the organization of interaction between the two armies acquired particular importance.

The operation began on August 4 (17) with the advance of the 1st (Neman) Army. Going state border, its formations entered the territory of East Prussia. The first encounter with the enemy took place at Stallupepen (now Nesterov). Russian troops defeated the 1st Army Corps of General G. Francois and forced him to retreat to the river. Angerap.

The German command decided, hiding behind the 2nd Army of General A.V. Samsonov, to move the main forces against the 1st Army of General P.K. Rennenkampf. General M. Prittwitz intended to defeat the Russians with a double blow: from the north with the 1st corps of Francois and from the south with the 17th corps of A. Mackensen. In the direction of Goldap, auxiliary actions of the 1st reserve corps of G. Belov were envisaged.

On August 7 (20) in the area of ​​​​Gumbinnen (now Gusev), one of biggest battles world war. At first the Germans were successful. Then the Russian counterattacks put to flight parts of the 1st army corps. Mackensen's 17th Corps, having fallen under the most severe artillery and machine-gun fire of the Russians and having suffered huge losses, retreated in a panic. Here is what the German authors write about this: “The combination of unfortunate circumstances led to the fact that the superbly trained troops, who later showed themselves worthy everywhere, lost their restraint at the first collision with the enemy. The hull was badly damaged. In the infantry alone, losses reached 8,000 men in round figures - a third of all available forces, with 200 officers killed and wounded. The Russians took about 1,000 prisoners and captured 12 guns.

The situation allowed the Russian command to inflict a major defeat on the 8th German Army. But the moment was lost. Instead of organizing the pursuit of the German troops defeated in the Gumbinnen-Goldap battle, General Rennenkampf was inactive. By his order, the troops were on vacation for two days, putting themselves in order. Only on August 10 (23) did they begin a slow advance to the west of the river. Angerap, almost unopposed. The command and headquarters of the army had no reliable information about the enemy. The considerations of the Russian command did not at all correspond to the true state of affairs. All calculations were based on an incorrect assessment of the situation. It was believed that the enemy was defeated and partly retreated to Koenigsberg, and partly to the line of the river. Vistula. The operation was considered essentially completed. They hoped to soon transfer troops from East Prussia to another direction. The Stavka energetically worked on a plan of attack from Warsaw to Poznan.

In turn, the initial decision of the command of the 8th German Army to leave East Prussia did not meet with approval in the main apartment. The fate of General Prittwitz and his chief of staff, General Waldersee, was sealed. On August 8 (21) they were removed from their posts. Instead, they were appointed: army commander - General P. Hindenburg, chief of staff - General E. Ludendorff, who took up their duties on August 11 (24).

On August 13 (26), the German command, having completed the regrouping of its troops, began to implement the plan. On this day, the 6th Russian Corps was forced to move away from Bischofsburg. The enemy's attempt to push the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Army was not successful. The next day, the Germans transmitted a false order to withdraw on behalf of the commander of the 1st Army Corps. This led to the retreat of the corps. As a result of the fighting on 13 (26) and 14 (27) August, the situation of Samsonov's 2nd Army worsened. The flanks of the central corps group were exposed.

The command of the Northwestern Front did not take all measures to prevent the defeat of the 2nd Army. It didn't know the situation very well. The real intentions of the enemy became known only in the evening of 14 (27) August. On the night of August 15 (28) Oranovsky telegraphed Samsonov that the commander-in-chief ordered "to withdraw the corps of the 2nd Army to the line Ortelsburg, Mlava, where they will start organizing the army." However, the order did not reach the troops. On the morning of 16 (29) August, the 1st and 20th army and 1st reserve German corps were on the offensive, covering the central corps of the 2nd army from three sides. The 17th German Corps did not receive an order to concentrate at Allenstein and continued to operate in a southwestern direction towards Passenheim. In his movement, he entered the Russian retreat path. The encirclement ring around the 13th and 15th buildings was closed. In total, about 30 thousand people and 200 guns were surrounded in the Komusinsky forest area. On the night of August 17 (30), Samsonov committed suicide at the Karolinenhof farm (near Wilenberg). Having taken command of the army, General N.A. Klyuev did not use all the opportunities to break through the encircled buildings. The order to surrender was given. Some unit commanders rejected this decision and fought their troops out of the encirclement.

GENERAL SAMSONOV

The army headquarters, led by Samsonov, breaking out of the encirclement, moved in the direction of Yanov. Alexander Vasilyevich was in a difficult moral state. According to the chief of staff, General Postovsky, on the 15th and 16th Samsonov said more than once that his life as a military leader was over. After a short night's halt in the forest on August 17, when the headquarters officers moved on on foot, Alexander Vasilyevich quietly went into the depths of the forest, and his shot sounded there ...

Despite the search, his body was never found, and besides, it was necessary to evade persecution. However, there is another version of Samsonov's death. According to one of the officers leaving the encirclement, he last saw his commander at the edge of the forest, leaning over the map. “Suddenly a huge column of smoke enveloped our headquarters. One of the shells hit a tree trunk, exploded and killed the general on the spot ... ”The fate of Samsonov’s army was tragic, a few units and groups managed to escape from the encirclement, losses amounted to tens of thousands of dead, wounded and captured. One of the culprits of what happened - Front Commander Zhilinsky reported supreme commander: “If the behavior and orders of General Samsonov, as a commander, deserve severe condemnation, then his behavior, as a warrior, was worthy; he personally led the battle under fire and, not wanting to survive the defeat, committed suicide. Two weeks later, the high command, which had planned the East Prussian operation, removed Zhilinsky from his post. However, a strategic result was achieved: the Germans transferred part of their forces to East Prussia, weakening their onslaught on France. The sacrificial fate of General Samsonov and the salvation of France turned out to be closely linked.

Widow the deceased general, left with a 15-year-old son and a 12-year-old daughter, a pension of 10,645 rubles a year was allocated by the tsar. In the autumn of 1915, Ekaterina Alexandrovna Samsonova, as a sister of mercy, took part in an inspection of the camps for Russian prisoners of war in East Germany, and she managed to find her husband's burial place. She identified him by a locket in which he kept tiny photographs of herself and her children. She transported his remains to Russia, to her native village of Akimovka, where she first met Alexander Vasilyevich, and buried him in the graveyard of the Akimovskaya church.

An unfortunate fate awaited the second main participant in the East Prussian operation - General Rannenkampf. After October 1917, the already old general lived in Taganrog under a false name. Representatives of the Soviet government identified him and, recalling his participation in the massacre of Siberian peasants in 1905, they shot him.

Chronos: Samsonov Alexander Vasilievich

DECIDED IN THE EAST

The consequences of the Battle of Gumbinen for the Russian North-Western Front generally resulted in the surrender of Samsonov's army to its own fate. But this battle had a very important influence on the entire course of the campaign. Firstly, it brought significant assistance to the French by forcing the Germans to withdraw from the French front at the most decisive moment 2 corps and 1 cavalry. division and urgently send them to the Russian front. These corps were also removed from the strike group. Secondly, it pointed out to the Germans the possibility for the Russians, conducting an offensive operation against the Austrians, to conduct the same operations in large sizes and against East Prussia, which aroused a natural desire among the Germans to better secure their Eastern Front, which is why part of the new formations was sent there. Finally, thirdly, a new command (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) was appointed to the Eastern Front, which subsequently, both by its nature and by the significance acquired after the victories, put great pressure on the German Headquarters in the sense of shifting the center of gravity of the war from the Western to the Eastern Front.

ACT OF INVESTIGATION

about the murder of the cavalry general Pavel Karlovich Rennenkampf by the Bolsheviks

The former commander of the 1st Army in the first period of the Russo-German War, the head of campaigns in East Prussia, General of the Rennenkampf Cavalry, lived at the beginning of 1918 in the city of Taganrog at rest, away from the military and political activity. On January 20, 1918, after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, he immediately had to go into hiding, and under the name of the Greek citizen Mansudaki, he moved to the apartment of one worker, the Greek Langusen, along Kommerchesky lane, house number 1, and hid there.

However, the Bolsheviks put him under surveillance, and on the night of March 3, General Rennenkampf was arrested and put under arrest at the headquarters of the Taganrog military commissar Rodionov.

During the detention of General Rennekampf in custody, the Bolsheviks offered him three times to take command of their army, but he always categorically refused this offer and once told them: “I am old, I have little left to live, for the sake of saving my life I will not become a traitor and against my will not go. Give me a well-armed army and I will go against the Germans, but you have no army; to lead this army would mean to lead people to the slaughter, I will not take this responsibility upon myself.

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did not lose hope and tried to win over the general to their side, but soon they had to finally be convinced of the futility of their attempts.
In the last days of March, on one of the visits to the city of Taganrog by the Bolshevik "head" of the Southern Front, Antonov-Ovseenko, the latter, when asked by Rodionov what to do with General Rennenkampf, expressed surprise that he was still alive, and ordered to shoot him ...

CITY GUSEV

The 564th Rifle Regiment of the 130th Rifle Division, commanded by Guards Colonel Penov, advanced on the Gross-Baytchen stronghold. The Nazis fought here desperately. Enemy machine gunners counterattacked several times. They climbed from the ruins of houses, jumped out of yards and cellars. From the labyrinth of narrow lanes and streets, the long barrels of Ferdinands and Tigers suddenly protruded.

Soon the commander of the 6th company of this regiment was seriously wounded. Then the deputy commander of the 2nd battalion for political affairs of the guard captain S.I. Gusev assumed command of the company.

When repulsing another enemy counterattack, Gusev raised his company to attack. Behind the 6th company, other units of the regiment also rose.

The stronghold was taken, and the regiment began fighting directly on the outskirts of Gumbinnen.

Here, in one of the bayonet attacks, Gusev died.

On the bank of a quiet river, in the very center of the city of Gusev, a marble obelisk now stands with a laconic inscription: “Hero Soviet Union Gusev Sergey Ivanovich. The Motherland named the city of Gumbinnen after this man.

The Kaliningrad region, the former East Prussia, is unique in that it is the only region in Russia where the battles of the First World War took place (

East Prussian operation of 1914 4 (17) August - 2 (15) September. The offensive operation of the Russian troops, who were tasked with defeating the 8th German army and capturing East Prussia in order to develop the offensive directly into the depths of the territory Germany . First Russian Army (General Rennenkampf ) was supposed to advance around the Masurian Lakes from the north, cutting off the Germans from Koenigsberg. The second army (of General Samsonov) was to lead an offensive around these lakes from the west. The main idea of ​​the operation was to cover the German army grouping from both flanks.

The Russian North-Western Front included 17.5 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions, 1104 guns, 54 aircraft. The German 8th Army had 15 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, 1044 guns, 56 aircraft, 2 airships.

The operation began on August 4 (17) with the offensive of the 1st Russian Army, during which the enemy was defeated at Gumbinnen. The German command decided to leave East Prussia. However, instead of developing the operation and completing the defeat of the German troops, General Rennenkampf ordered the withdrawal of the Russian units. Under these conditions, the Germans changed their plans and attacked the 2nd Army of General Samsonova . The unsatisfactory leadership of the Northwestern Front (commander-in-chief, General Ya.G. Zhilinsky) and the inaction of General Rennenkampf ultimately led to the defeat of the Russian troops, the death and capture of 50 thousand soldiers (General Samsonov also died) and the withdrawal of Russian units from East Prussia. At the same time, the Germans were forced to transfer from France to the Russian front 2 army corps and 1 cavalry division, which ensured the victory of the French in the Battle of the Marne and saved Paris from surrender to the Germans.

East Prussian operation of 1914, Offensive operation of the troops of the Russian North-Western Front (commands, General Ya. G. Zhilinsky), carried out on August 4 (17). - 2(15) Sept. 1914 at the beginning of the 1st World War. At the insistence of the Anglo-French. command The offensive was undertaken before the end of the Mobilization and the concentration of Russian. army in order to thwart the offensive Ch. forces of Germany against France. The immediate goal of the operation was to defeat the 8th Nem. army and take over Vost. Prussia. According to the plan of the front command, the 1st Rus. army of Gen. P. K. RennenKampf (6.5 infantry divisions, 5.5 cavalry divisions, 492 op.) was to strike around the Masurian Lakes from the north, the 2nd Army under the command of General. A. V. Samsonov (11.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 720 op.) bypassing these lakes from the west. The offensive began on 4 (17) Aug. invasion of the East. Prussia of three army corps of the 1st Army. 6(19) Aug. in the battle at Shtallupönen he was defeated and the 1st German army retreated. corps, on the trail, a day on the Gumbinnen-Goldap front, a head-on battle broke out between Ch. by the forces of the 1st Russian. and 8th German. armies. German the troops were defeated and began to retreat to 3. Favorable conditions were created for organizing the pursuit and complete defeat of the units of the 8th German army, however, on August 8-9 (21-22). The 1st Army was inactive. Its further offensive was carried out slowly and not to connect with the 2nd Army, but towards Koenigsberg, which allowed the troops of the pr-ka to get out of the blow. Taking advantage of the gap between Russian armies and knowing from the intercepted Russian. radiograms about their plan of action, German, command 8 (21) Aug. suspended the retreat and directed against the 2nd Rus. army that crossed the border on August 7 (20), almost all the forces of the 8th army. Pr-to, using the developed railway. network, regrouped troops and, leaving a barrier of 2 divisions against the 1st Army, concentrated Ch. forces on the flanks of the 2nd Army, operating app. Masurian lakes. Deprived of the help and assistance of the 1st Army, the 2nd Army was defeated and on 17 (30) Aug. was forced to move beyond the river. Narew. During 25 Aug. (7 Sept.) - 2(15) Sept. 8th German the army launched an offensive against the 1st Rus. army, dropping it to 9 (22) Sept. for the river Not man. An attempt to surround the 1st Rus. the army failed. Offensive operation North-West. front in East. Prussia ended in failure. The Russians lost approx. 250 thousand soldiers and a large number of weapons. The reasons for this were the unsatisfactory leadership of Zhilinsky and the actual betrayal of Rsnpenkampf. Despite this, the operation had important strategists, results: it. command was forced to transfer from the French. front in East. Prussia 2 corps and 1 cav. division. In addition, the 1st Corps, located in the Metz region, was also prepared for the transfer, which weakened the strike group of German troops in the west and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the Germans. army in the battle of the Marne at the beginning of Sept. 1914 (see Battle of the Marne 1914). Active actions troops in the initial period of the war thwarted the plan of it. command - beat the allies one by one.

M. A. Alekseev.

Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 2.

First major defeat

East Prussian operation (First World War, 1914-1918) - fighting in East Prussia on August 4 - September 2, 1914 the 1st (General P.K. Rennenkampf) and 2nd (General A.V. Samsonov) Russian armies against the 8th German Army (Generals M. Prittwitz, then P . Hindenburg). On August 4, 1914, the Russians, without completing their mobilization, went on the offensive in East Prussia. Such haste was explained by persistent requests for help from allied France, which was suffering a strong onslaught of the Germans.

In the battles of August 4 and 7 at Shtallupönen and Gumbinnen, the 1st Army defeated the Germans. At this time, the 2nd Army was advancing from the south, bypassing the Masurian Lakes, to cut off the escape route for the German troops. Rennenkampf did not pursue the Germans and stood still for two days. This allowed the 8th Army to get out of the attack and regroup forces. Not having accurate information about the location of Prittwitz's troops, the commander of the 1st Army then moved it to Koenigsberg.

Meanwhile, the German 8th Army withdrew in a different direction (to the south of Koenigsberg). While Rennenkampf was slowly advancing towards Koenigsberg, the 8th Army, led by General Hindenburg, was able to carry out a successful operation that decided the outcome of the battle in East Prussia. Despite the risk of being hit in the rear by the 1st Army, Hindenburg turned his forces south against Samsonov's army, who was unaware of such a maneuver. The Germans, thanks to the interception of radio messages, knew everything about the plans of the Russians.

On August 9, Samsonov's 2nd Army crossed the East Prussian border and began to move in a northwestern direction with the forces of 4 corps. The offensive was carried out on a front stretched 120 km without proper preparation and interaction of units. In fact, there were no rear services, and the troops did not receive food for several days.

Meanwhile, Hindenburg, having transferred the main forces to this direction, on August 13 delivered powerful blows to the flank corps of the 2nd Army (1st and 6th). The central corps of the 2nd Army (13th and 15th), due to the lack of close communication between the Russian units, did not find out in time about the change in the operational situation and continued to advance, deepening into the prepared bag. Under the onslaught of German formations, the 1st Corps began to withdraw, exposing the flanks and rear of their neighbors in the center to attack.

In the battles of August 16-18, the central (13th and 15th) corps, which had lost contact with their neighbors and with each other, were surrounded and defeated. Samsonov, having lost command of the troops, shot himself. According to German data, the damage of the 2nd Army amounted to 120 thousand people. (including more than 90 thousand prisoners). The Germans lost 15 thousand people in battles with her. Then they attacked from the south, from the side of the Masurian Lakes, the 1st Army. Fearing to be cut off, she withdrew beyond the Neman on September 2.

The East Prussian operation had severe tactical and especially moral consequences for the Russians. This was their first ever such a major defeat in battles with the Germans. However, tactically won by the Germans, this operation strategically meant for them the failure of the blitzkrieg plan. To save East Prussia, they had to transfer considerable forces from the Western theater of operations, where the fate of the entire war was then decided. This saved France from defeat and forced Germany to be drawn into a disastrous struggle for her on two fronts. The Russians, having replenished their forces with fresh reserves, soon again went on the offensive in East Prussia (see August operation).

Used materials of the book: Nikolai Shefov. Russian battles. Military History Library. M., 2002.

Literature:

East Prussian operation (Collection of documents). M., 1939;

History of the First World War 1914-1918. T. 1. M., 1975, p. 316 - 329;

Verzhkhovsky D.V., Lyakhov V.F. The First World War 1914-1918. Military-ist. feature article. M. 1964;

Zaionchkovsky A. M. World War 1914 - 1918. Ed. 3rd. T. 1-2. M., 1938;

Kolenkovsky A. K. Maneuverable period of the first world imperialist war of 1914. M., 1940

Talensky N. A. The First World War 1914 - 1918. M., 1944.

Russian bayonet attack in East Prussia.
propaganda leaflet

This is the name of the offensive operation of the troops of the Russian North-Western Front in the First World War, carried out on August 4 (17) - September 2 (15).

It was undertaken at the request of the Frenchgovernment before the end of the full mobilization and concentration of the Russian army in order to disrupt the offensive of the main forces of Germany against France.

In accordance with the plan of the Headquarters, troops of the North-Western Front (Cavalry General Ya.G. Zhilinsky) were deployed on the border with East Prussia as part of the 1st and 2nd armies. The 1st Army (General of the Cavalry P.K. von Rennenkampf) concentrated in the Pilvishki-Kovna - Simno - Olita - Suwalki area.


 By the beginning of the operation, the 1st Army consisted of 6.5 infantry and 5.5 cavalry divisions, 492 guns. The 2nd Army (General of the Cavalry A.V. Samsonov) concentrated in the area of ​​Augustov - Ostrolenka - Novogeorgievsk. In total, the 2nd Army had 11.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 720 guns. The entire front is over 250,000 fighters.

Russian troops were opposed by the 8th german army(Colonel-General Maximilian von Prittwitz).

The main forces of the army, numbering 14.5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, only about 173 thousand people, about 1000 guns were deployed in the area of ​​Insterburg - Gumbinnen - Angerburg - Deutsch-Eylau - Allenstein - Passenheim. plan Russian Headquarters the invasion of the 1st army into East Prussia was envisaged and, covering the left flank of the enemy, bypassing the Masurian lakes from the north, advancing on the Insterburg (Chernyakhovsk) - Angerburg front. The 2nd Army was to cross the border with East Prussia 2 days later and, bypassing the Masurian Lakes from the west, act in the direction of Rastenburg - Zeerburg. In the future, both armies were supposed to cover the enemy's flanks in order to cut him off from Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) and the Vistula River.

Maximilian von Prittwitz

The operation began on August 4 (17) with the offensive of three army corps of the 1st Russian Army. Having crossed the state border, they entered the territory of East Prussia. The first combat clash with the enemy took place on August 6 (19) near Shtallupenen (Nesterov), during which the 1st German army corps of General G. Francois was defeated and retreated.


"To Prussia!" A painting dedicated to the campaign in East Prussia. The Great War in Images and Pictures edition. Issue I, 1914.

The German command decided, hiding behind the 2nd Russian Army, to move the main forces against the troops of General P.K. Rennenkampf, inflict two blows on them: from the north by the 1st corps of General G. Francois and from the south by the 17th corps of General A. Mackensen. In the direction of Goldap, an auxiliary strike was to be delivered by the 1st reserve corps of General G. Belov.

On August 7 (20) in the Gumbinen, Goldap area, a fierce oncoming battle broke out between the main forces of the 1st Russian Army and the 8th German. The German troops, who were initially successful, were eventually defeated and began to retreat in a westerly direction. Favorable conditions were created for the complete defeat of the 8th German Army. However, they were not used, since Generals Ya. G. Zhilinsky and P.K. Rennenkampf did not organize the pursuit of the enemy, giving the troops of the 1st Army a two-day rest to put themselves in order. Only on August 10 (23) did the Russian corps begin to slowly move west, towards Koenigsberg, almost without resistance and without reliable information about the enemy.

Taking advantage of the gap between the Russian armies and knowing from the intercepted radio messages about their plan of action, the German command suspended the retreat. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who took command of the 8th Army, decided, by holding down the central corps of the 2nd Russian Army (15th and 13th) from the front, to inflict two coordinated blows on it with the main forces: the main one - 1- m corps and one brigade on Uzdau against the left-flank Russian corps (1st), then develop an offensive in the rear of the central corps and a second blow - by the 17th and 1st reserve corps against the 6th Russian corps, covering along with the 4th cavalry division on the left flank of the 2nd Army in the Bischofsburg area, with the same goal - to then develop an offensive on the flank and rear of all its central corps.


Paul von Hindenburg 		Thus, the German command planned to surround the 13th and 15th Russian corps. A small barrier of 1.5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions was left against Rennenkampf units. The Russian command missed the enemy and assumed that the Germans were withdrawing their forces to Koenigsberg. As a result of such a false assumption, the 1st Army received the task of enveloping Koenigsberg, leaving the 2nd Army, in fact, face to face with all the German forces in East Prussia.

By August 13 (26), the 8th German Army, having completed the regrouping, began to implement the plan. During two days of fighting, her striking forces forced the flank Russian corps to withdraw. As a result, the eastern and western flanks of the central corps of the 2nd Army, which by this time had reached Allenstein, turned out to be open.

During 15 (28) and 16 (29) August, in the zone of action of Samsonov's army, devoid of any help and assistance from the 1st Army, fierce battles continued. The 13th and 15th corps, on the evening of August 15 (28), when the situation cleared up, having received the order of the army commander to withdraw, could not do this and ended up surrounded. General N.A. Klyuyev, who took command of the army after the death of Samsonov, did not use all the possibilities to save the encircled corps and gave the order to surrender.


Commander of the German 1st Army Corps General of Infantry
G. von Francois meets a captured Russian lieutenant general
ON THE. Klyuev August 18 (31), 1914

In total, the enemy captured about 30 thousand people and captured up to 200 guns. The remaining forces of the 2nd Army on August 17 (30) began to retreat to the river with battles. Narew.

In this situation, the German command decided, leaving a cover against the 2nd Army, to concentrate the main efforts on defeating the 1st Army of P.K. Rennenkampf. The main blow was to be delivered through the region of the Masurian lakes.

On August 24 (September 6), the German 8th Army went on the offensive, by the end of August 27 (September 9) it broke through the weak Russian defenses and endangered the left flank of the 1st Army. P.K. Rennenkampf gave the order to withdraw under the cover of the rearguards. The command of the 8th Army, fearing a counterattack, acted sluggishly and indecisively. The pursuit was slow. On August 31 (September 13), the directive of the commander-in-chief of the armies of the North-Western Front, Ya. Narew. The East Prussian operation ended. Russian troops failed.

The East Prussian operation had big influence on the course of the armed struggle on the Eastern Front of the 1st World War. Thanks to the active actions of the armies of the North-Western Front, the enemy was unable to provide assistance to the Austro-Hungarian troops, who were defeated in the Battle of Galicia. At the same time, the failure in East Prussia forced the Russian command to use all the reserves on the German border, which prevented the full development of success in Galicia. During the operation, the Russian troops suffered huge losses, which adversely affected the combat capability of all ground armed forces. According to the estimates of the modern Russian historian S. G. Nelipovich, the Russian army lost about 20 thousand people killed, 155 thousand missing and captured, 48 thousand wounded, in total over 223 thousand people, over 300 machine guns, about 500 guns. The German troops lost only 4 thousand people killed, 3 thousand prisoners, 7 thousand missing, 22 thousand wounded - a total of 36 thousand people, 17 guns and 17 machine guns.

The results of the operation revealed major shortcomings in the organization, management and training of the Russian army. The main reasons for the failure in East Prussia include disagreements between the front headquarters and the command of the 2nd Army on the choice of the main operational direction, unsatisfactory coordination of the actions of the 1st and 2nd armies, careless use of radiotelegraphy, poor intelligence work and poor supply of troops.

Despite this, the operation had important strategic results: the German command was forced to transfer 2 corps and 1 cavalry division from the French front to East Prussia. In addition, one corps, located in the Metz region, was also prepared for the transfer, which weakened the strike force of the German troops in the west and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the German army in the Battle of Marne in 1914. The actions of the Russian troops in the initial period of the war frustrated the plan of the German command crush allies one by one.

East Prussian operation 1945

East Prussia, northern part of Poland, Baltic Sea

Red Army victory

Commanders

K. K. Rokossovsky
I. D. Chernyakhovsky
A. M. Vasilevsky
V. F. Tributs

G. Reinhardt,
L. Rendulich

Side forces

1,670,000 men 25,426 guns and mortars 3,859 tanks 3,097 aircraft

At the beginning of the operation, 580,000 people, at least 200,000 Volkssturm, 8,200 guns and mortars, approx. 1000 tanks and assault guns 559 aircraft

584,778 (of which 126,646 were killed)

About 500 thousand (of which at least 150 thousand were killed and 220 thousand were taken prisoner)

East Prussian operation(January 13-April 25, 1945) - during the Great Patriotic War Soviet troops of the 2nd (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) and 3rd (General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky, from February 20 - Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky) Belorussian Fronts in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V. F. Tributs) broke through the powerful defenses of the German Army Group Center (Colonel General G. Reinhardt, from January 26 - Army Group North, Colonel General L. Rendulich), went to Baltic Sea and liquidated the main enemy forces (over 25 divisions), occupying East Prussia and liberating the northern part of Poland.

The German command attached to the retention of East Prussia importance. For a long time there were powerful fortifications here, which were subsequently improved and supplemented. By the beginning of the winter offensive of the Red Army in 1945, the enemy had created a powerful defense system up to 200 km deep. The strongest fortifications were on the eastern approaches to Koenigsberg.

In the course of this strategic operation, the Insterburg, Mlavsko-Elbing, Hejlsberg, Koenigsberg and Zemland front-line offensive operations were carried out. The most important goal of the East Prussian strategic offensive operation was to cut off the enemy troops stationed there from the main forces of Nazi Germany, cut them up and destroy them. Three fronts took part in the operation: the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and the 1st Baltic fronts, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and I.X. Bagramyan. They were assisted by the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral VF Tributs.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to defeat the enemy in northern Poland with strikes from bridgeheads on the Narew River. The 3rd Belorussian Front received the task of advancing on Koenigsberg from the east. In defeating the enemy in the Koenigsberg direction, he was assisted by the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front.

The troops of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky, together with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, by the beginning of 1945, numbered 1669 thousand people, 25.4 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and more than 3 thousand combat aircraft .

In East Prussia and Northern Poland, the troops of Army Group Center under the command of General G. Reinhardt defended. The group had 580 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 8 thousand guns and mortars, 560 combat aircraft.

Thus, the superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy in personnel and artillery was 2-3 times, and in tanks and aircraft - 4-5.5 times. However, the German troops had the opportunity to replenish their units, at the expense of the Volkssturm, the Todt organization (engineering and construction units that are not part of the Wehrmacht, but with basic military training) and simply the local population, bypassing the militia stage, which in 1945 was a common practice for the active army.

The 2nd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin, chief of staff - Lieutenant General A.N. Bogolyubov) had the task of striking from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in general direction Pshasnysh, Mlawa, Lidzbark to defeat the enemy’s Mlava grouping, no later than 10-12 days of the operation, take control of the Myshinets, Dzialdovo, Bezhun, Plock line and then advance in the general direction to Nowe Miasto, Marienburg. The front was supposed to strike the second blow from the Serotsky bridgehead in the general direction of Naselsk, Belsk. In addition, the front was supposed to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Warsaw grouping: part of the left wing forces to strike around Modlin from the west.

Marshal Rokossovsky planned to strike from bridgeheads on the Narew River. It was planned to break through the enemy defenses in the main direction from the Ruzhansky bridgehead in a sector of 18 km by the forces of three armies. To develop success to the north, it was supposed to use first separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, and then a tank army. By concentrating such forces in the direction of the main attack, Rokossovsky sought to go to the sea and cut off the German troops in East Prussia. Another blow was planned by two armies in a 10 km section from the Serock bridgehead along the northern bank of the Vistula.

The 3rd Belorussian Front (commander - General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky, member of the Military Council - Lieutenant General V. Ya. Makarov, chief of staff - Colonel General A. P. Pokrovsky) received the task of defeating the Tilsit-Insterburg enemy grouping and not later than 10-12 days of the offensive, capture the line of Nemonin, Norkitten, Darkemen, Goldap; further develop the offensive against Koenigsberg along both banks of the Pregel River, with the main forces on the southern bank of the river. The main blow to the front was ordered to be delivered from the area north of Stallupenen, Gumbinnen in the general direction to Wellau, and auxiliary ones - to Tilsit and Darkemen.

The general plan of General Chernyakhovsky was to launch a frontal attack on Koenigsberg, bypassing the powerful enemy fortifications north of the Masurian Lakes. The ultimate goal of the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was to cover the main forces of the East Prussian grouping of Germans from the north and subsequently, together with the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat them. Given the difficulty of overcoming the powerful defense of the enemy, Chernyakhovsky decided to break through the defenses in the 24 km section with the forces of three armies, after which he would bring two tank corps, a second-echelon army into battle and develop success in depth to the Baltic Sea.

The Baltic Fleet (commander - Admiral V.F. Tributs, member of the Military Council - Vice Admiral N.K. Smirnov, chief of staff - Rear Admiral A.N. Petrov) received the task of assisting them with their artillery when the Soviet troops reached the sea coast and landings, as well as to cover the coastal flanks of the fronts.

Soviet troops were preparing to go on the offensive on February 8-10, 1945. However, on December 16, 1944, an unexpected German counteroffensive began in the Ardennes, as a result of which a strong grouping of troops of Army Group B, commanded by Field Marshal V. Model, broke through the weak defenses of American troops and began to quickly move deep into Belgium. Taken by surprise, the allies were defeated. To the place of the breakthrough, which exceeded 100 km, General D. Eisenhower hastily pulled up troops. Powerful Anglo-American aviation could provide quick assistance to the withdrawing troops, but its operations were hampered by non-flying weather. A critical situation has arisen.

The January offensive of the Red Army, launched earlier than scheduled at the request of the allies, forced the German command to stop offensive operations in the West. After the Soviet troops broke through the line on the Vistula, the 6th German Panzer Army - the main striking force of the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes - began to be transferred to the East. The command of the Wehrmacht finally abandoned plans for offensive operations against the American-British troops and on January 16 was forced to give the order to go over to the defensive in the West.

The powerful thrust of the Soviet troops from the Vistula to the Oder provided an opportunity for the Allied armies to recover from the blows of the German troops, and on February 8, after a six-week delay, they managed to launch an offensive.

To defeat the enemy in East Prussia, the 3rd Belorussian Front, which carried out the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, was the first to go on the offensive. The Germans were expecting a blow. Their artillery fired methodically at the combat formations of the infantry preparing for the attack. On January 13, the troops of the front began the operation. After making sure that the offensive had begun, the enemy at dawn conducted a powerful artillery counter-preparation. The fire concentrated on the strike force of Chernyakhovsky's troops testified that the Germans had discovered the direction of the main attack of the front and prepared to repel it. Their batteries were suppressed by artillery return fire and night bombers raised into the air, but surprise was not achieved.

After two hours of artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the enemy. By the end of the day, the 39th and 5th armies of generals I. I. Lyudnikov and N. I. Krylov wedged into the defense, but only 2-3 km. The 28th army of General A. A. Luchinsky advanced more successfully, but even she, having advanced 5-7 km, failed to break through the enemy’s defenses. Solid fog did not allow the use of aviation. The tanks advanced by touch and suffered heavy losses. No one fulfilled the tasks of the first day of the offensive.

In six days, the strike force of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through to a depth of 45 km in a 60 km section. And although the pace of advance was 2 times slower than planned, the troops inflicted heavy losses on the German 3rd Panzer Army and created the conditions for continuing the offensive on Koenigsberg.

Due to bad weather, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, twice postponed the start of the offensive and was forced to start it on January 14th. The first two days of the Mlavsko-Elbing operation, which was carried out by the front, did not go well: the shock groups advancing from the Ruzhansky and Serotsky bridgeheads advanced only 7-8 km.

The blows from both bridgeheads combined into a common breakthrough in the 60 km section. Having advanced 30 km in three days, the shock groups of the front created the conditions for rapid development success in depth. On January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army of General V.T. Volsky was introduced into the gap. Pursuing the enemy, she quickly moved north and on January 18 blocked the Mlavsky fortified area.

The pace of advancement of the rest of the troops of the front also increased. The tankers of General Volsky, bypassing the German fortifications, continued on their way to the sea. The 65th and 70th armies advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead under the command of Generals P.I. Batov and B.C. Popova rushed along the northern bank of the Vistula to the west and captured the Modlin fortress.

On the sixth day, Rokossovsky's troops took the line, which was planned to reach on the 10-11th day. On January 21, the Headquarters specified the task of the 2nd Belorussian Front. He had to continue the offensive with the main forces to the north, and part of the forces - to the west, in order to capture the Elbing, Marienburg, Torun line on February 2-4. As a result, the troops went to the sea and cut off the enemy in East Prussia from Germany.

Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front pursued the enemy. On the evening of January 23, the advance detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Army broke into the city of Elbing. Stunned by the sudden appearance Soviet tanks, the garrison did not have time to prepare for battle. The detachment proceeded through the city and reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. The enemy quickly organized the defense of Elbing and delayed the advance of the 29th Panzer Corps. Bypassing the city, the formations of the tank army, together with the 42nd rifle corps, went to the sea. Enemy communications were cut. The 2nd German Army under the command of General V. Weiss was thrown back to the west, beyond the Vistula.

Continuing the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front from January 19 to 26 broke through to the outer defensive bypass of Koenigsberg. To the south, they immediately overcame the line of the Masurian Lakes. Bypassing Koenigsberg from the north, the 39th Army reached the sea west of the city. The 43rd Army of General A.P. Beloborodov, the 11th Guards Army of General K.N. Galitsky broke through to the Frisch-Gaff Bay south of Koenigsberg. Pressed to the sea by the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, Army Group Center, renamed on January 26 as Army Group North, was cut by Chernyakhovsky’s troops into three unequal parts: four enemy divisions ended up in Zemland, about five in Koenigsberg and up to twenty divisions - in the Heilsberg area, southwest of Koenigsberg. On January 30, German formations launched a strong counterattack on the left flank of the 11th Guards from the direction of Brandenburg (Grossdeutschland tank division and one infantry division) and from Koenigsberg (5th Panzer Division, assault gun brigade and one infantry division). army of General K. Galitsky and pushed back 5 kilometers from the Frisches-Haff Bay, the Soviet units that broke through, thereby releasing Koenigsberg from the southwest and restoring the connection of the city garrison with the 4th German army in the Heilsberg-Heiligenbal area (the Germans held the corridor until mid-March ).

On February 8, Marshal Rokossovsky received the task of turning west, defeating the enemy in Pomerania and reaching the Oder. The 3rd Belorussian Front was to strike at the Heilsberg grouping, and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I. Kh. Bagramyan - at the enemy in Zemland and Koenigsberg.

As a result of the Heilsberg operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which was extremely fierce in nature, the enemy was destroyed south of Koenigsberg. Weakened by heavy fighting, the troops of the front resumed the offensive on February 11, which proceeded slowly. During the day it was possible to advance no more than 2 km. In an effort to turn the tide of the operation, the front commander was almost continuously in the army. On the way from the 5th to the 3rd Army on February 18, he was mortally wounded by a fragment of an artillery shell. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky died. The Red Army lost a talented commander who was only 38 years old. The Stavka appointed Marshal A.M. to command the front. Vasilevsky.

The 1st Baltic Front was preparing to go on the offensive on February 20, having the task of clearing the Zemland Peninsula from the Germans within a week. However, a day earlier, the Germans themselves launched converging strikes from Fischhausen and Koenigsberg with the forces of several infantry and the 5th Panzer Division (Operation " West wind”) in parts of the 39th Army of General I. Lyudnikov, as a result of which the land connection between Zemland and Koenigsberg was restored and the Soviet offensive was thwarted.

On February 24, the 1st Baltic Front, having transferred troops to the 3rd Belorussian Front, was abolished. Having taken command of the front, A. M. Vasilevsky ordered to stop the futile attacks, replenish supplies by March 10 and carefully prepare the final blows. Given the limited forces, the marshal decided to destroy the encircled groups sequentially, starting with the strongest - Hejlsberg.

Having created the necessary superiority, the troops resumed the offensive on March 13. Fogs and low clouds continued to limit the use of artillery and aviation. To these difficulties were added the spring thaw and high water. Despite the difficult conditions and the stubborn resistance of the Germans, on March 26, Soviet troops reached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. The German command began a hasty evacuation of troops to the Zemland Peninsula in advance. Of the 150 thousand German soldiers and officers who were defending southwest of Koenigsberg, 93 thousand were destroyed, and 46 thousand were taken prisoner. On March 29, the remnants of the Hejlsberg group stopped fighting. After the completion of the Hejlsberg operation, six armies were liberated near the 3rd Belorussian Front: three of them were sent to Koenigsberg, the rest were withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve, starting to regroup in the Berlin direction.

During the destruction of the enemy pressed to the sea, the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs actively operated. The fleet attacked the enemy with aircraft, submarine and light surface forces. They violated the sea communications of the Germans. In February and March alone, the fleet destroyed 32 transports and 7 warships.

Outstanding success was achieved by the S-13 submarine under the command of Captain 3rd Rank A.I. Marinesko. On January 30, she sank the German liner Wilhelm Gustloff with a displacement of 25.5 thousand tons, on board of which more than 5 thousand people were evacuated, including 1.3 thousand submariners. On February 9, the Marinesko submarine achieved another success by sinking a German steamship with a displacement of 14.7 thousand tons. Not a single Soviet submariner achieved such brilliant results in one trip. For military merits, the S-13 boat was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

On April 6, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the Koenigsberg operation. After a powerful artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks attacked the positions of the Germans. Due to bad weather, aviation made only 274 sorties during the day. Having overcome the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the troops advanced 2-4 km and by the end of the day reached the outskirts of the city. The next two days were decisive, when flying weather settled. 516 heavy bombers of the 18th Air Army, commanded by Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov, only on the evening of April 7, within 45 minutes, dropped 3742 large-caliber bombs on the fortress. Other air armies, as well as fleet aviation, also participated in massive raids. It is necessary to note the worthy contribution of the pilots of the 4th Air Army, General K. A. Vershinin. In its composition, under the command of Major E. D. Bershanskaya, female pilots from the regiment of night bombers bravely fought. Their courage and heroism were highly appreciated by the Motherland: 23 female pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the assault on the fortress alone, about 14,000 sorties were made (that's over 3,000 a day!). 2.1 thousand bombs of various calibers were dropped on the heads of the enemy. Together with the Soviet pilots, French pilots from the Normandie-Neman regiment bravely fought. For these battles, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and 24 pilots were awarded orders of the USSR.

These days, the personnel of the ISU-152 battery, commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. A. Kosmodemyansky, distinguished themselves. The battery supported units of the 319th Rifle Division, which stormed one of the forts of the fortress. Giving a volley at the thick brick walls fort, self-propelled units broke through them and immediately broke into the fortifications. The fort's garrison of 350 capitulated. 9 tanks, 200 vehicles and a fuel depot were captured. The battery commander was presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, which was awarded posthumously. The brother of the famous partisan Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who was hanged by the Germans in the Moscow region, Alexander died on April 13 during the fighting on the Zemland Peninsula.

The commandant of the Königsberg fortress, General O. Lash, seeing the futility of further resistance, asked the commander of the 4th Army, General Muller, to allow the remaining forces to break through to the Zemland Peninsula, but was refused. Müller tried to strike from the peninsula to the west to help the garrison of Koenigsberg, but Soviet aviation foiled these attacks. By evening, the remnants of the garrison were squeezed into the center of the city and in the morning found themselves under crushing artillery fire. Soldiers began to surrender by the thousands. On April 9, Lash ordered everyone to lay down their arms. Hitler regarded this decision as premature and sentenced the general to death by hanging. The reports of the officers, who testified to the courageous behavior of the general, did not affect the decision of the dictator.

On April 9, the garrison of Königsberg capitulated. Lash himself also surrendered, which saved him from Hitler's sentence. Together with Lash, 93,853 soldiers and officers were captured. About 42 thousand German soldiers of the fortress garrison died. General Müller was removed from the post of army commander, and Gauleiter of East Prussia Koch, who demanded that the troops on the Samland Peninsula fight to the last, fled by ship to Denmark.

Moscow celebrated the completion of the assault on Koenigsberg with a salute of the highest category - 24 artillery volleys from 324 guns. The medal "For the capture of Koenigsberg" was established, which was usually done only on the occasion of capturing the capitals of states. All participants in the assault received a medal.

The port of Pillau was the last point in East Prussia from which the population and troops could be evacuated. The city itself was a fortress that covered the naval base from the sea and land. The Germans defended the land approaches to the port with particular tenacity, aided by forests and bad weather.

The 2nd Guards Army of General P. G. Chanchibadze could not overcome the resistance of the enemy. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky led the 11th Guards Army into battle. The defense was broken only on the third day. In fierce battles for the fortress and port, the 11th Guards Army captured Pillau on April 25.

On this East Prussian strategic operation ended. It lasted 103 days and was the longest operation last year war.

In East Prussia, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. By the end of January in rifle divisions The 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts, which at the beginning of the offensive included 6-6.5 thousand soldiers and officers, remained 2.5-3.5 thousand each. By the end of January, the 5th Guards Tank Army had only half of the tanks available at the beginning of the operation. Even more were lost during the destruction of the encircled groups. Replenishment during the operation was almost non-existent. Moreover, significant forces were transferred to the Berlin direction, which was the main one in the 1945 campaign. The weakening of the 3rd Belorussian Front led to protracted and bloody battles in East Prussia.

The total losses of the Soviet fronts and fleet from January 13 to April 25 were enormous: 126.5 thousand soldiers and officers died and went missing, more than 458 thousand soldiers were injured or out of action due to illness. The troops lost 3,525 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 1,644 guns and mortars, and 1,450 combat aircraft.

In East Prussia, the Red Army destroyed 25 German divisions, the other 12 divisions lost from 50 to 70% of their composition. Soviet troops captured more than 220 thousand soldiers and officers. About 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1442 tanks and assault guns, 363 combat aircraft and many other military equipment became trophies. The loss of large forces and an important military-economic area hastened the defeat of Germany.