Who is violating the INF Treaty? Russian military take American threats calmly

The elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles, on which the Soviet-American agreement was reached in 1987, was the most significant achievement foreign policy M. Gorbachev and the period of "Perestroika". After discussions about the possibility of complete nuclear missile disarmament, the parties settled on a more modest but concrete achievement, which significantly reduced the risk of nuclear missiles. nuclear war.

M. Gorbachev's foreign policy course, known as "New Thinking", became an important part of the Perestroika policy. Gorbachev tried to improve relations with the West and end the Cold War. This was not easy to do, as Soviet-American relations reached an impasse before Gorbachev came to power.
In 1983, despite the protests of the USSR, the United States Western Europe new medium-range missiles, which practically could not be intercepted and had high accuracy. The Soviet leadership feared that the deployment of these missiles would tempt the American leadership to start a war. In response to Soviet proposals to abandon the deployment of this type of weapon in Europe, US President R. Reagan proposed a "zero option": the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles. But there were still French and British missiles, and in the conditions of an atomic war they could cause great damage to the USSR. The USSR demanded that these missiles be taken into account when reducing armaments, and Reagan replied that allied missiles were not under his control.
In 1983, US President Reagan put forward the idea of a "Strategic defense initiative"(SOI), go" star wars"- space systems that could protect the United States from nuclear strike. This program was carried out in circumvention of the ABM treaty. great success research in this area was not accepted, it was very difficult to create an effective missile defense system. But the Soviet leadership feared the unpredictable consequences of an arms race in space. Gorbachev spoke categorically against SDI.
On November 19-21, 1985, he met with Reagan in Geneva and proposed a significant reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe. Gorbachev proposed a plan for complete nuclear missile disarmament, but demanded the abolition of SDI, and Reagan did not concede. But the two presidents got to know each other better, which helped them negotiate later.
Gorbachev tried to convince the leaders of Western European countries that he was right. They sympathized with the ideas of the "new thinking" and supported Perestroika. Gorbachev proposed the creation of a "common European home", that is, closer ties between the European countries of East and West. But the alliance of Western Europe with the United States turned out to be a more significant factor, and it was still necessary to negotiate with Reagan.
Then Gorbachev suddenly suggested that Reagan meet halfway between the US and the USSR in Reykjavik. Gorbachev hoped that without long bureaucratic preparations, he would be able to get around the petty problems that officials of foreign affairs agencies put forward in the negotiations. At a meeting in Reykjavik on October 10-12, 1986, Gorbachev proposed a large-scale reduction in nuclear weapons, but only "in a package" with the US abandoning SDI. Reagan was not ready to agree to such a plan without careful study, he feared that Gorbachev might outmaneuver him, and that America's militaristic circles might not support such decisive steps towards disarmament. Gorbachev left empty-handed, but his authority in the world grew enormously. Now it was he, and not Reagan, who was considered the main initiator of disarmament.
Since it was not possible to agree on a common nuclear missile disarmament, the parties decided to start with the most acute problem - medium-range missiles in Europe.
In order to surpass Reagan's "zero option", Gorbachev proposed a "global zero" - that is, the destruction of a whole class of weapons - medium and shorter range missiles (INF missiles) with a range of 500-1500 km. However, on April 13-14, US Secretary of State D. Schultz, who flew to Moscow, demanded that even shorter-range missiles be added to the agreement - the Soviet Oka (OTR-23 - operational tactical missile). It was believed that its range was 400 km, which was less than the agreement provided. Schultz was outraged that the USSR was trying to "smuggle" dangerous weapons, citing a somewhat smaller radius of action. The Americans threatened that in response to the USSR's refusal to dismantle the Oka, they would modernize the Lance missile, reduce its range and place it in Europe, which would be a rollback from nuclear disarmament. The Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, S. Akhromeev, was against the concession on the Oka, and in order not to disrupt the agreement, he was not invited to that part of the negotiations, which dealt with the elimination of short-range missiles. Under the conditions of nuclear missile disarmament that had begun, the preservation of nuclear missiles of the shortest range became a dangerous anachronism. With the fall iron curtain» the buildup of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will become pointless.
Concessions on the issue of medium-range missiles were for Gorbachev a means to move on to solving larger problems. On October 27, Gorbachev proposed to Reagan, after the signing of the treaty on medium-range missiles, that by next spring, prepare an agreement on a 50% reduction in ballistic missiles. While agreeing to “unleash the package” that he spoke about in Reykjavik, Gorbachev still insisted that “without a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of outer space, it will be impossible to finally agree on a radical reduction in strategic offensive weapons ...”
On December 7, Gorbachev arrived in Washington to sign the INF treaty. Reagan continued to lecture Gorbachev on the subject of human rights violations in the USSR, which seriously angered Secretary General. He reminded Reagan that he was building fences along the Mexican border, and this violated human rights like the Berlin Wall. In addition, “Americans have fewer rights than Soviet people. What about your people sleeping on the streets and all your unemployed?” Reagan started talking about unemployment benefits. The situation of ideological confrontation between the USSR and the USA, characteristic of the Cold War, still persisted.
On December 8 in Washington, Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of the INF Treaty, as well as documents accompanying the Treaty: a memorandum on initial data, protocols on procedures for eliminating missiles and conducting inspections. These documents regulated in detail the procedure for the movement and destruction of medium and shorter range missiles.
Destroyed within 3 years Soviet Union- 826 and 926 and the United States - 689 and 170 RSD and RMD, respectively. Launchers for these missiles, auxiliary facilities and equipment were also eliminated.
As a result, the USSR eliminated missile carriers in a ratio of 2: 1, and nuclear warheads they have a ratio of 4:1 more than the United States.
The first one was made and practical step to the elimination of dangerous and modern weapons themselves.
Gorbachev believes that "by signing the INF Treaty, we, in fact, took the gun away from the temple of the country." True, their nuclear missiles retained by Great Britain and France, but it was practically impossible that they would strike the USSR first.
When Gorbachev stopped his car in Washington on December 10 and walked out to the crowd, it caused a furore that was comparable to the delight of the Soviet people in 1985. And later, in conversations with Soviet citizens, most Western people sincerely wondered why their compatriots were so dissatisfied with Gorbachev, who took a decisive step towards ending the Cold War, achieved sharp decline threats of a nuclear missile catastrophe.
After the conclusion of the agreement on the liquidation of the INF Treaty, Gorbachev continued to insist on the abandonment of SDI. He recalled: “The Americans sought the adoption of a joint statement providing for the right of both sides after a ten-year period to deploy defense systems. (Imagine, if we agreed to these conditions, in 1997 nuclear and laser weapons could be suspended above the ground!)”.
Gorbachev and Reagan agreed not to leave the missile defense system for 10 years. Gorbachev told his colleagues in the Politburo: “For us, this time is needed to close the gap ... We need to carefully deal with new defense topics. What are they ahead of? Gorbachev was still not convinced that the US had not been able to overtake the USSR in the arms race. But now both sides had time to "sort things out." By 1989, Akhromeev convinced Gorbachev of the futility of US research on SDI, and the USSR lifted the rejection of SDI as a precondition for reducing strategic nuclear weapons.
The signing of the treaty on the liquidation of the INF Treaty significantly reduced the risk of a sudden outbreak of a nuclear war, opened the way for further nuclear missile disarmament and an end to the Cold War.

The possible withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty) has caused a flurry of criticism. EU High Representative for foreign affairs Federica Mogherini said that "the world does not need a new arms race," while Niels Annen, Minister of State at the German Foreign Ministry, called the decision "catastrophic." Beijing saw blackmail in what was happening and invited Washington to "think twice." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that any action will "meet opposition" and reminded the United States of its "share of responsibility" for global stability.

Trump's statement is also criticized at home: Senator Rand Paul called it "destructive", "destroying decades of work." However, the American president did not say anything new, but rather stated a fait accompli: the treaty signed 30 years ago became invalid due to a number of circumstances, turning into a relic of the Cold War. It does not provide security by fending off threats that have not existed for a long time, but it ties hands - more of the United States, but also of Russia.

Times change

The Treaty on the Elimination of Missiles was discussed throughout the 80s and was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan only after a series of serious concessions from the USSR. For example, I had to destroy a hundred missile systems"Oka", although they did not fall under the definition of the INF Treaty. As a result, the USSR "cut" 1846 installations - 1000 more than the United States.

In this regard, the treaty is often criticized for its "softness", but it is truly parity: the Soviet Union lost the opportunity to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe, corresponding to the "Ustinov Doctrine"; The United States could no longer implement the concept of an "instant decapitation strike" on the USSR with missiles stationed in Europe, proposed by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.

The significance of the INF Treaty is difficult to overestimate - before it, in nuclear war theoretically, there could be a winner, which increased the risk of a conflict to an extreme. After the fulfillment of the treaty, the superpowers could only exchange "mutually destroying", and therefore senseless, intercontinental strikes.

In 2000, newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the country might withdraw from the INF Treaty in response to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the second key document that ensured parity between the USSR and the United States. It prohibited the creation, testing and deployment of systems aimed at combating strategic ballistic missiles. Despite the threat, the United States nevertheless denounced the agreement; construction of missile defense systems began in Central and Eastern Europe.

Above domestic forces The strategic deterrence threat once again loomed: not destruction on the ground, as in the 1980s, but the interception of launched missiles. In the future, however distant, such a weakening of Russia's nuclear potential will negate the postulate of mutually assured destruction, the cornerstone of the existing nuclear parity.

Since 2001, the issue of missile defense has become one of the most acute in relations with the West. Vladimir Putin returns to her again and again, last time- in the sensational "weapon" message to the Federal Assembly in 2018. “We have been persuading the Americans for a long time not to destroy the ABM treaty. Everything is in vain,” the president lamented, presenting the new developments of the military-industrial complex to the senators.

Recrimination

Russia has hinted more than once that the EuroPRO components will become priority targets in the period of danger: “People who make the relevant decisions should know that they have lived so far calmly, comfortably and safely. Now, after deploying these missile defense elements, we will have to think about stopping the threats,” Putin said in 2016.

"Kupirovaniye" requires appropriate weapons, so national security dictated the need to restart the production of short and medium-range missiles. Probably, Russia is already producing them: the Novator 9M729, a cruise missile for the Iskander complex, is under the suspicion of Western experts. It is assumed that this is a land analogue of the Kalibr sea-based missile. Its range is estimated at 5500 km, which is quite enough to hit targets in the entire European theater of operations. "Innovator", stationed in Siberia, will be able to keep at gunpoint West Coast USA.

The US has been making claims about this missile since 2013; it is stated that at least two Iskander batteries are already armed with 9M729. The Russian side denies the charges, arguing that the range of the Novator does not exceed the "conventional" 500 km. The statements are not believed: NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu said that if Russia does not justify itself, "the allies will assume that the most plausible assessment is that Russia is violating the INF Treaty."

Russia, for its part, also accuses the United States of violating the treaty: claims against universal missile defense launchers in Romania and Poland, which can easily be converted to launch sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles. In addition, Russia insists that the American strike "drones" are the same cruise missiles, and there are no reservations in the treaty as to whether SMD missiles must be disposable. Finally, the creation of medium-range target missiles for missile defense testing is also a violation of the letter of the INF Treaty.

Defending the legality of its developments, the United States indulges in such cunning casuistry, explaining, for example, that the document refers to the launch (Launch) of missiles, and unmanned vehicles take off (Take-off), which becomes obvious: within the framework of the current agreement, the parties cannot agree . The INF Treaty needs modernization, but for Russia the key aspect of the new treaty is the settlement of the missile defense problem, and the United States defiantly does not make any concessions on this issue.

The third side

The conflict with Russia over missile defense is not the only reason for the US to denounce the INF Treaty. And perhaps not even the main one, since the United States hardly expects, after withdrawing from the treaty, to again deploy missiles in Europe aimed at Russia. Although Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands still have American thermonuclear bombs during the Cold War, Europeans are unlikely to be happy about the appearance of new installations in their territories. The existing arsenal burdens countries: the requirement to remove bombs is contained in the programs of four of the six parties of the Bundestag, and the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Ruud Lubbers said that the storage of nuclear weapons is a “meaningless tradition” and “stupidity”.

Not bound by any treaties, China is actively developing a class of weapons that is prohibited for the United States and Russia. According to US Admiral Harry Harris, this allowed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to acquire "the most impressive and most flexible missile force in the world" - over 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles. 95% of them would violate the INF Treaty if China participated in the treaty, the admiral stressed.

Trump's demand that Beijing "join the new deal" on the INF - that is, destroy 95% of the missiles - is obviously rhetorical. Against the background of the growing confrontation between China and the United States, the old treaty with the defunct USSR on the limitation of effective weapons certainly seems like an American military relic of the past. Despite assurances to the contrary by domestic officials, Russia can hardly help but feel threatened by Chinese medium- and short-range missiles, just as the United States is aware of the futility of self-restraint under the circumstances.

US President Donald Trump at a meeting with his supporters in Nevada, he accused Russia of non-compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and said that the White House could sign a decree to terminate it within a few weeks. According to Trump, Russia is not honoring its end of the deal and is developing missiles prohibited by the treaty. At the same time, the head of the White House added that this situation puts the United States at a disadvantage, since countries such as China develop weapons, while these restrictions do not apply to them.

What is the INF treaty?

The INF Treaty is one of the key treaties of the Cold War, signed Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan December 8, 1987 The document was signed in order to reduce the risk of war (including the use of nuclear weapons) and to consolidate peace.

The treaty is open-ended and concerns only Russia and the United States. It involves the destruction and renunciation of further production of all complexes of ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles of medium and shorter range.

Which missiles and how many were destroyed?

The missiles were to be destroyed by detonation or by burning the steps. In the first 6 months after the entry into force of the treaty, it was allowed to liquidate up to 100 RSD by the launch method.

18 months after the entry into the INF Treaty, each side eliminated all of its shorter-range missiles (over 500 to 1,000 km) and launchers of such missiles, as well as those associated with such missiles and launchers all ancillary facilities and all ancillary equipment.

Three years after the entry into force of the treaty, medium-range missiles (over 1,000 to 5,500 km) were eliminated. As a result, the USSR destroyed 1846 missile systems, and the USA - 846 systems.

What will be the consequences of the US withdrawal from the treaty?

According to Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia, the US intentions to withdraw from the treaty are primarily related to the fact that this treaty has ceased to be relevant.

“The INF Treaty has long been attacked because it does not correspond to reality. There is a very powerful group of people in the US, the most notable of which is Trump's National Security Assistant John Bolton, who believes that this treaty is outdated primarily because it is bilateral and limits only Russia and the United States, and the main threats come from different places and above all from China, which is not included in the treaty. Therefore, in the United States, they believe that it is time to change the very model of bilateral treaties in general, since they are no longer relevant, now it is no longer the Cold War, and everything is not happening in the form it used to be, ”says Lukyanov.

According to the expert, the United States will not limit itself to withdrawing from this treaty, but also may not extend the US-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-3 (START-3), which provides for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and the exchange of data on strategic forces.

“I can assume that the last remaining START treaty, the so-called START-3, which the Americans call New START, is also unlikely to be renewed - for the same reason. The United States generally does not consider the model of bilateral treaties to be relevant. This means that we are entering a completely new reality, and this will probably happen after some time. Not currently, because this moment it is pointless to try to do anything for internal political reasons. But when the situation develops in one way or another, then some consultations will begin on the topic of new models of possible strengthening of mutual trust in the sphere of strategic stability, and they will no longer be based on the principles that were before. What these principles will be is not yet clear. How actively the United States will develop after the withdrawal from the treaty those types of weapons that the treaty prohibits is also not yet clear. The Americans themselves claim that their main concern is China, so if missiles are deployed, it will be primarily Asian territories. But all this is the subject of further clarification, ”Lukyanov says.

The danger of withdrawing from the treaty, according to Lukyanov, primarily lies in the fact that in such a situation any institutions and mechanisms of mutual deterrence disappear, and most importantly, mutual understanding. “This model was based on certain principles for checking transparency. If this goes away, and nothing new comes, then there is a complete inconsistency in strategic cultures and mutual misunderstanding will be aggravated. It's hard to say exactly what to expect. So far, Trump has only said that the United States intends to withdraw from the treaty, but how this will be done is still unknown. Although, understanding the logic and psychology of the Trump administration and the people who surround him, one can understand that the United States has come to a decision to change international institutions', says Lukyanov.

According to political scientist and president of the Center for Global Interests in Washington, Nikolai Zlobin, we still need to wait for the termination of the treaty, since there are many opponents in the United States of withdrawing from it. “First of all, the US military and the Pentagon are opposed to withdrawing from the treaty. I think there will be strong resistance and discussion in Congress. Secondly, even if the president announces such a withdrawal, this does not mean that the situation will change from tomorrow. It will be a rather lengthy procedure, from six months to a year. There is no point in expecting immediate changes the next day. In general, the Americans have a number of arguments, and it is most reasonable for the Russian, European and Chinese sides to try to hear these arguments, remove American fears and thus force the United States to remain within the framework of this treaty. If this does not happen, then countries that have land borders will be in a very vulnerable situation, because medium and short-range missiles are designed for this kind of distance, and the US itself will be beyond the reach of these missiles, ”says Zlobin.

Withdrawal from the treaty will aggravate the situation regarding global security, but the reasons for the break in the United States are also very significant, the expert believes. “To date, only two countries are prohibited from launching medium and short-range missiles, while other countries can do so. In this sense, the Americans are raising the question of the need to rewrite the treaty to include all countries capable of producing such missiles. But China clearly does not want to join this alliance and limit itself. But we must keep in mind that Chinese missiles and the Chinese border in Russia are the longest in the world. Now Russia and China have wonderful relations, but no one knows what will happen in twenty years. Relationship fluctuations are pretty common. I hope that the Americans will not withdraw from this treaty, and if they remain in the treaty, then all the problems that Trump is voicing today will need to be addressed, ”says Zlobin.

The consequences of withdrawing from the treaty could be very severe if only Russia and the United States remain parties to the treaty. According to Zlobin, completely different agreements are needed today. “We need a different system of coordinates for international security, since it is necessary to take into account not only nuclear, but also hypersonic weapons. Short and medium-range missiles today are the ideal weapon for conducting local wars. It is very dangerous that it can fall into the hands of local leaders, criminal groups, terrorists, etc. Therefore, control over this must be maintained. It is another matter to what extent this control can be carried out, given the current treaty. I do not see a good way out of this situation in either direction, and here we just need to show wisdom to world leaders, sit down at the negotiating table and start talking not only about these missiles, but in general about a new level of international security, taking into account new types of weapons that we have today. We live today in a world of post-nuclear weapons, where there are no treaties at all. Of course, the withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty in itself will worsen the situation, but we are worsening it anyway, without doing anything taking into account the new realities, ”says Zlobin.

Once again on the fate of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

The treaty is important for us, Russia does not violate it and is not going to withdraw from it at the moment

Evgeny BUZHINSKY

For the first time, the issue of terminating the INF Treaty was raised in October 2003 by the then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov during a meeting with his American counterpart Donald Rumsfeld.

The American, known for his rejection of any treaties in the field of arms control, responded cautiously to Sergei Ivanov's proposal, in the spirit of: "Come out if you think it's necessary, we won't object." It is obvious that the Americans, who shortly before that unilaterally terminated their participation in the 1972 ABM Treaty, for which they were subjected to almost unanimous condemnation by the world community, were clearly not in a position to initiate the destruction of yet another disarmament treaty, which is to also an important element in maintaining strategic stability. Moreover, the INF Treaty, unlike the ABM Treaty, in no way contradicts the plans for the construction of the US Armed Forces. In order to understand this, it is necessary to understand the history and content of this treaty.

The beginning of the nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the USA in Europe dates back to the late 50s - early 60s of the last century. Then the Americans deployed PGM-17 Thor and PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) with nuclear warheads in Turkey, Italy and the UK, reducing the flight time to objects in the USSR from 30 to 8-10 minutes. In 1962, the Soviet Union symmetrically responded by deploying its R-12 IRBMs with nuclear warheads in Cuba, rightly believing that their deployment in Europe would not be an adequate response. Flight time Soviet missiles to US military facilities and cities has become exactly the same as American missiles to military facilities and cities of the USSR. The United States did not like this parity, and they initiated the Caribbean crisis, which was resolved by withdrawing Soviet missiles from Cuba and American missiles from Europe. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States abandoned plans to deploy nuclear IRBMs in Europe for almost 20 years.

However, in 1979, the so-called “double decision” of NATO was adopted, which provided for the deployment of medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in the countries of Western Europe since 1983 and negotiations with the USSR to limit nuclear and conventional weapons. When making this decision, the Americans hoped that the Soviet leadership, remembering the Caribbean crisis, would not again place their missiles in Cuba, and if they tried, the United States, which by that time had established a naval blockade of the island, would not allow this.

It was planned to deploy 108 Pershing II IRBMs and 464 BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Western Europe. This decision was justified by the need to eliminate the imbalance that arose as a result of the deployment by the Soviet Union of new Pioneer IRBMs with multiple warheads, designed to replace obsolete medium-range R-12 and R-14 missiles. At the same time, in terms of the number of means of delivery of medium-range nuclear weapons (missiles and aircraft, including carrier-based), NATO at that time exceeded the USSR by almost two times (1800:1000).

The developing situation was clearly not in favor of the USSR. The fact is that Soviet Pioneer missiles did not threaten US territory, while American Pershings and cruise missiles created a direct threat of a nuclear strike against vital military facilities in the USSR.

In 1980-1983 The USSR put forward a number of proposals to reduce medium-range nuclear weapons based in Europe, the last of which provided for the establishment of equality between the USSR and NATO in the number of medium-range carrier aircraft and declared its readiness to keep no more than 140 Pioneer IRBMs in service (less than than was in service with France and Great Britain). At the same time, the United States had to refuse to deploy its IRBMs and GLCMs in Europe. Negotiations on medium-range missiles were effectively frozen in the period 1983-1985. due to the launch of the American program of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which provided for the creation of a full-scale space-based missile defense system capable of intercepting Soviet ICBMs in the upper stage of the flight path. The analysis carried out showed that the "Euromissiles - SDI" link poses a threat to the security of the USSR. Therefore, in August 1983, the Soviet leadership decided that negotiations on medium-range missiles would be conducted only in a package with negotiations on space weapons (SDI). Due to the fact that the Americans categorically objected to such a linkage, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, it was removed.

In turn, the United States in 1981 proposed the so-called zero option, which provided for the abandonment of the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles in Western Europe in exchange for the elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the country. Thus, it was proposed to eliminate the actually deployed Soviet grouping of 600 IRBMs in exchange for the US abandoning the plan to deploy its missiles in Western Europe, which were still under development. After that, the Americans put forward a number of proposals aimed at establishing quantitative parity in medium-range missiles between the USSR and NATO, but all of them were rejected by the Soviet leadership, since they did not provide for the abandonment of the deployment of American missiles on the European continent. In late 1983, the US began deploying medium-range missiles in Europe.

As a response, the USSR considered several options, ranging from building up the IRBM group on the territory of Eastern European states to deploying Pioneer complexes in Chukotka.

The approach to solving the problem of American forward-based medium-range missiles changed dramatically in 1985 after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. First, Moscow unilaterally suspended the deployment of its missiles in Europe, and in the spring of 1987, Gorbachev came up with an initiative on the so-called "double global zero" - the elimination of not only all American and Soviet medium-range missiles (from 1000 to 5500 km), but also all shorter-range missiles (from 500 to 1000 km). This option was legally enshrined in the prisoner in 1987 in Washington termless Treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles. The treaty provides for the renunciation of the production, testing and deployment of such missiles. He was the forerunner of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START-1).

In the process of implementing the Treaty, until mid-1991, the USSR had to eliminate twice as many missiles as the United States (1846:846), almost three times as many launchers (825:289) and almost seven times as many missile bases (69:9 ). Soviet destroyed missiles could carry four times more nuclear warheads than American ones (3154:846).

The only type of missile that the US destroyed more than the USSR was the GLCM (443:80). However, for the Americans, this was not of fundamental importance, since they possessed a large grouping of sea-based (Tomahawk) and air-based (ALCM-B) cruise missiles, which by the mid-1990s. it was planned to bring up to 7000 units. Currently, the US Air Force and Navy have more than 10,000 cruise missiles in their arsenal.

The degree of unilateral compliance on the part of the USSR when agreeing on the parameters of the INF Treaty was most clearly demonstrated by the consent of the Soviet leadership to the destruction of a group of 239 of the latest Oka ballistic missiles with a firing range of 400 km.

The Oka complex, the predecessor of the current OTK Iskander-M, was unique in terms of the adopted technical solutions and their implementation and had no analogues in the world. The rocket of the complex has never been tested at a distance of more than 400 km and, according to this criterion, did not fall into the number of limited ones. However, the Americans, having assessed the potential capabilities of the complex, including its modernization potential, insisted on its inclusion among those limited under the treaty, threatening otherwise to modernize the Lance operational-tactical missile and deploy it in Europe, which would actually mean refusing to continue the nuclear process. disarmament. The final solution to this issue was reached in September 1987 at the talks in Washington with the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze. The Soviet Union agreed to develop a unified classification for the INF Treaty and include it in the future Oka Treaty, although it did not fall under the definition of the INF Treaty. The United States, in turn, pledged to destroy the Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles and to refrain from deploying OTP Lance with neutron warheads in Central Europe. Such is the story.

In February 2012, at a meeting with leading experts in the field of ensuring national security in Sarov, Vladimir Putin, who at that time held the post of Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, spoke for the first time about the INF Treaty. In particular, he noted that “other states are actively improving medium-range missiles, and around us, almost all of our neighbors are developing these weapons systems. The Soviet Union at one time and, of course, the Russian Federation abandoned medium-range missiles by signing an appropriate agreement with the United States. This is not very clear, since for the Americans these systems are not relevant at all, since there is nowhere to use them, but for the Soviet Union and for today's Russia, especially considering that our other neighboring countries are developing these shock systems, such a decision was, controversial to say the least.

Soviet inspectors inspect Pershing II missiles being destroyed in accordance with the INF Treaty. January 1989

In 2014, Sergei Ivanov spoke again about the impossibility of an endless existence of a ban on medium-range missiles. At the same time, he confirmed the idea expressed by Vladimir Putin in Sarov that the United States did not need this class of missiles either before or now, which is basically true. To some extent, for the United States, the situation with IRBMs and ground-based missiles is similar to the situation with non-strategic nuclear weapons. Neither one nor the other is necessary for Washington to protect national territory and is only suitable as a means of forward basing, which has changed after the end of " cold war» conditions are hardly necessary for the Western European members of NATO.

In fairness, it should be noted that against the backdrop of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and the provocative actions of the US and NATO leadership to build up their military presence near Russian borders, the arguments of supporters of Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty are becoming more and more substantiated. In particular, the deployment of Iskander-K missile systems (further development of the Iskander-M complex) in the Kaliningrad region and Crimea is considered one of the most effective responses to the deployment of elements of the European segment of the US global missile defense system in Romania and Poland. True, for this it will be necessary to increase the flight range of these missiles, which will mean a violation of the provisions of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

What is the situation with medium-range missiles today? Over the years since the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the situation with this class of missile weapons has changed dramatically. Today, five countries (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea) have nuclear-equipped ground-based IRBMs. A number of other countries are armed with missiles of this class in conventional equipment. Russia's attempts, made in the mid-2000s, to make the INF Treaty multilateral did not find support, which was generally quite predictable.

There are several options for compensating for the loss of the potential of ground-based medium-range missiles: improvement of strategic nuclear forces; deployment of medium-range sea or air-based missiles. Each of them has its pros and cons, but if necessary, can be implemented.

The option of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, as noted above, is being probed, but is hardly possible in the foreseeable future. The fact is that Russia's unilateral withdrawal from this treaty is politically inexpedient, and it is hardly realistic to count on the support of such a step from the United States in the current conditions. Moreover, recently Washington has been paying increased attention to this Treaty in connection with the alleged development of new types of rocket technology in Russia that violates its restrictive provisions.

For the past two years, intensive Russian-American consultations on the INF Treaty have been underway. The reason for their start was the accusations made by the Americans in mid-2014 against Russia about allegedly preparing to adopt a ground-based cruise missile tested a few years ago, which contradicts the provisions of the INF Treaty. At the same time, as before, all the accusations of the Americans are unfounded. As “evidence”, the standard American argument is given: “we know that you are testing this missile, we have objective data from these tests, but we cannot provide them for fear of revealing the source of this information.” Such fears usually relate to undercover sources. But what do they have to do with it, if it is obvious that we are talking about information obtained with the help of national technical means of intelligence?

This is not the first time Washington has accused Russia of violating the provisions of the Treaty, but in the past they sounded somehow sluggish, perhaps because there were much more violations by the United States, and proven violations. It was precisely in connection with the obviousness of Russian claims that in 2003, on the initiative of Washington, the activities of a special control commission were terminated, within which the mechanism for settling disputes regarding its implementation provided for by the Treaty was operating.

Let me remind you that for more than a decade, Moscow has consistently accused the United States of regularly launching target missiles imitating medium-range ballistic missiles to test missile defense systems, and although they are not formally prohibited by the Treaty, the nature and scale of these launches create a well-founded suspicion that that production technologies are being developed and combat use prohibited range missiles.

Then the list of violations was added to the large-scale use by the Americans of long-range strike drones, which fully fall under the treaty definition of ground-based cruise missiles. The Americans proceed from the fact that at the time of the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, there were no such strike weapons. Yes this is true. But, as Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the department for non-proliferation and arms control of the Russian Foreign Ministry, rightly noted in his interview with the TASS agency, when these funds appeared, it was necessary to adopt an amendment to the Treaty or somehow resolve this issue, but the Americans did not do this . Moreover, continues M. Ulyanov, “in a dispute with drones, former US President Ronald Reagan, his administration and lawyers unexpectedly found themselves on our side. The fact is that the Americans have a practice of presenting their article-by-article analysis of treaties and agreements in the Senate when they are ratified. At one time, the Reagan administration submitted to the Senate an article-by-article analysis of the INF Treaty. During the ratification debate, the administration official was asked a direct question: how to distinguish prohibited missiles from non-prohibited ones? The response named three parameters that should guide the answer to this question, namely: the ability to carry a warhead, a range of 500 to 5,500 km, and ground-based. All these parameters are fully present in unmanned vehicles. aircraft impact type. And this was written not by Russian lawyers, but by American ones.”

At the consultations held in September 2014 in Moscow, the Russian delegation voiced another claim against Washington, namely the creation by the Americans of the ground-based Aegis missile defense system, which provides for the deployment of universal vertical launchers (VLA) Mk 41 not only on ships (where they are not subject to restrictions INF Treaty), but also on land (in Romania and Poland). At the same time, three batteries of such installations capable of launching 24 anti-missiles will be deployed in Romania by the end of 2016. These installations can also launch cruise missiles. At the same time, it should be noted that the Tomahawk SLCM is not much different from its ground-based counterpart, which was destroyed at one time as part of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. True, during the hearings in the US Congress, a representative of the Barack Obama administration argued that the UVPs planned for deployment in Romania are some other installations different from the Mk 41, but did not provide any evidence for his assertion.

After several rounds of bilateral consultations held lately, the Russian delegation has not received clear answers to the concerns expressed from its American colleagues.

Takova actual side ongoing consultations. There would be nothing unusual in the very fact that they were held (it can be assumed that American INF specialists simply missed their Russian colleagues for more than a decade pause in discussing the implementation of the treaty), if not for the immediate reason for their holding, namely the letter from the US President to his Russian colleague dated 29 July 2014 regarding an alleged violation by Russia of a letter of the Treaty. Heads of state resort to such letters extremely rarely, in exceptional cases, when the violation is clearly proven and is of significant importance for the interests of national security. From my point of view, practically unfounded accusations without presenting concrete evidence of the fact of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty do not fall under this criterion.

There remains the only reasonable explanation for the hype raised by Washington at that time. Having made a political decision to maximally (politically, economically, militarily) weaken and isolate Russia against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, the Obama administration decided to "heap" to blame Moscow for non-compliance with its obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament. I do not rule out that the measures taken by the Russian leadership to modernize and strengthen the strategic nuclear missile potential, carried out strictly within the framework of the START treaty, will soon cause a negative reaction from the United States and accusations of violating the "spirit" of this treaty.

The Americans understand that the resumption of the development and production of new ground-based IRBMs does not make much sense from a military point of view, not to mention the additional financial burden on the shrinking military budget. As noted above, ground-based IRBMs are forward-based missiles, and confidence that the European allies of the United States, as well as their allies in Asia (Japan and the Republic of Korea), will agree to the deployment of such missiles on their territory in the conditions of the end of the "cold war" and the absence of a real threat to their security from Russia, the Americans do not.

As for the official Russian position on the INF Treaty, it remains unchanged: the Treaty is important to us, Russia does not violate it and is not going to withdraw from it at the moment.

I think that in the foreseeable future, the INF Treaty will continue to operate, unless there are any fundamental changes in the field of global strategic stability.

At the same time, in the absence of positive in Russian-American relations and the continuation of the US policy of containing and isolating "aggressive" Russia, one cannot exclude the adoption by the President of Russian Federation a political decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, despite the obvious political and military costs of such a decision.

Evgeny Petrovich BUZHINSKY - lieutenant general of the reserve

What is the essence of the treaty on intermediate-range missiles?

Editorial response

On July 28, it became known that the liquidation of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF), which was concluded between the United States and the USSR in 1987. According to the letter US President Barack Obama to Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Russia conducted a test of a ground-based cruise missile.

What is the essence of the treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range missiles?

The Indefinite Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF) between the United States and the USSR, which entered into force on June 1, 1988, obliges its participants to:

not to manufacture, test or deploy medium-range ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles (from 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers);
not to produce, test or deploy short-range ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles (from 500 to 1000 kilometers).

The purpose of signing the document was:

reducing the risk of war (including with the use of nuclear weapons);
consolidation of international peace.

When and by whom was the INF Treaty concluded?

The document was signed on December 8, 1987 in Washington Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan.

Since the moment of the Caribbean crisis, the movement to limit the arms race has not stopped, and everyone knew about the danger of a world nuclear war. The confrontation continued in the late 1970s, when the USSR sent troops to Afghanistan, the United States refused to send its participants to the Moscow Olympics-80, and the Soviet Union in response did not send its athletes to the next Olympic Games In Los Angeles.

In 1963, a ban was introduced on holding nuclear testing, after which, in 1968, followed. In 1972 Nixon and Brezhnev signed a treaty on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT-1) and an ABM treaty.

In December 1979, NATO adopted a "twin decision" that called for the deployment of Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Western Europe, and at the same time a proposal to start negotiations on an "intermediate-range nuclear force" (medium range) . On November 18, 1981, the United States declared its readiness to refuse to deploy Pershing-2 and GLCM missiles if the Soviet Union dismantled its medium-range missiles in both the European and Asian parts of the country.

The USSR did not accept the proposal, but at the same time, the superpower needed to prevent the deployment of Pershings and GLCMs in Europe, since they threatened a large territory of the country, up to the Urals. Therefore, the Soviet side proposed to start negotiations on radical reductions or even on the complete rejection of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons (including aviation) and to freeze their modernization for the duration of the negotiations. The United States did not accept the offer. At the end of 1983, the US began deploying its new missiles in Europe. The Soviet side stopped negotiations.

A new stage of negotiations began with the coming to power in the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev. The first round of negotiations on nuclear weapons - strategic and medium-range - began in Geneva on March 12, 1985, but then the parties did not reach specific agreements.

The next round of negotiations took place in the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik in September 1986. On November 7, the Soviet delegation, already in Geneva, submitted a "package" of proposals based on those discussed at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik. The USSR announced its readiness to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range missiles (IRMs), while Soviet and American IRMs would be eliminated in Europe within five years, while maintaining only 100 warheads on such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and in the United States. At the same time, it was proposed to agree on the establishment of equal levels of operational-tactical missiles (OTR) between the USSR and the USA, on the condition that these missiles, neither Soviet nor American, would be deployed in Europe. The Soviet side agreed to "not count" the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France; postponed the decision on aircraft medium range.

It took a long time to agree on positions. Finally, on December 8, 1987, the INF Treaty was signed in Washington.

What did the INF treaty establish?

According to the agreement, the Soviet ballistic RSD "Pioneer" (SS-20), R-12 (SS-4), R-14 (SS-5) and GLCM RK-55 (S-X-4), as well as smaller range OTR-22 (SS-12) and OTR-23 (SS-23); The United States was supposed to eliminate the Pershing-2 ballistic missile launchers, the BGM-109G (Tomahawk) GLCM, and the Pershing-1A short-range missiles (RMD). The term for the liquidation of the RSD was set at 3 years, the RMD — 1.5 years, the liquidation was carried out in two stages (the first stage took 29 months). Methods for destroying missiles - by undermining or by burning stages, in the first 6 months after the entry into force of the treaty, up to 100 RSDs were allowed to be destroyed by launch.

What are the results of signing the INF Treaty?

18 months after the entry into force of the INF Treaty, each of the parties eliminated all of its shorter-range missiles (over 500 to 1000 km) and launchers of such missiles, as well as all auxiliary facilities and all auxiliary equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. And three years after the entry into force of the treaty, medium-range missiles (over 1,000 to 5,500 km) were eliminated. As a result, the USSR destroyed 1846 missile systems (of which about half were manufactured missiles that were not on combat duty), and the USA - 846 complexes.

What is the attitude towards the INF Treaty today?

The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles today often meets with a negative assessment. So, February 15, 2007 Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky stated that Russia may begin to review the entire legal and treaty system of nuclear deterrence in response to the deployment of elements American system PRO in Eastern Europe. In particular, according to him, Russia can unilaterally withdraw from the treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range missiles.

A similar statement about Russia's possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty had already been made earlier (in June 2000). Russian President Vladimir Putin in response to the US announcement of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

In 2007 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov described the INF treaty as a "cold war relic". He stated that Russia should be armed with medium and short-range missiles, if only because India, Pakistan, Korea, China, Iran and Israel have them. In the same year Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov said at a press conference that Russia is ready to restore the production of medium-range ballistic missiles.

It is noteworthy that this position on the INF Treaty is reflected in the Foreign Policy Review of Russia (2007): “The situation around the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate and shorter range missiles (INF) causes concern. The missiles of these two classes were destroyed in accordance with the treaty back in 1991, but since then this international legal act has not been given a universal character. Moreover, an increasing number of states, including those located near our borders, are developing and adopting such missiles. Under these conditions, it is necessary to think about ensuring our own security.”

On June 22, 2013, Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with representatives of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, called the agreement "at least controversial", but assured that Russia continues to implement it.

Caribbean Crisis - a term that defines an extremely tense political, diplomatic and military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in October 1962, which was caused by the secret transfer and deployment of military units and subunits on the island of Cuba Armed Forces USSR, equipment and weapons, including nuclear weapon. The crisis could lead to a global nuclear war.