Organization of units of anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. Fighter-anti-tank artillery of the Red Army The birth of artillery special forces

A great contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War was made by Soviet artillerymen. No wonder they say that artillery is the "God of War". For many people, the symbols of the Great Patriotic War remain the legendary guns - the "forty-five", a 45-mm gun of the 1937 model, with which the Red Army entered the war, and the most massive Soviet gun during the war - the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1942 model ZIS-3 . During the war years, this weapon was produced in a huge series - more than 100 thousand units.

The legendary "forty-five"

The battlefield is shrouded in clouds of smoke, flashes of fire and the noise of explosions all around. An armada of German tanks is slowly moving towards our positions. They are opposed by only one surviving artilleryman, who personally charges and aims his forty-five at the tanks.

A similar plot can often be found in Soviet films and books, it was supposed to show the superiority of the spirit of simple Soviet soldier, who, with the help of practically "scrap metal", managed to stop the high-tech German horde. In fact, the 45 mm anti-tank gun was far from a useless weapon, especially at the initial stage of the war. With reasonable use, this tool has repeatedly demonstrated all its best qualities.

The history of the creation of this legendary gun dates back to the 30s of the last century, when the first anti-tank gun, the 37-mm gun of the 1930 model, was adopted by the Red Army. This gun was a licensed version of the German 37-mm gun 3.7-cm PaK 35/36, created by Rheinmetall engineers. In the Soviet Union, this gun was produced at plant No. 8 in Podlipki, the gun received the designation 1-K.

At the same time, almost immediately in the USSR, they thought about improving the gun. Two ways were considered: either to increase the power of the 37-mm gun by introducing new ammunition, or to switch to a new caliber - 45 mm. The second way was recognized as promising. Already at the end of 1931, the designers of plant No. 8 installed a new 45-mm barrel in the casing of the 37-mm anti-tank gun of the 1930 model, while slightly strengthening the gun carriage. So the 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model was born, its factory index was 19K.

As the main ammunition for the new gun, it was decided to use a unitary shot from a 47-mm French cannon, the projectile of which, more precisely, not even the projectile itself, but its obturating belt, was simply turned from 47 mm to 46 mm in diameter. At the time of its creation, this anti-tank gun was the most powerful in the world. But even despite this, the GAU demanded a modernization - in order to reduce the weight of the gun and bring armor penetration to 45-55 mm at ranges of 1000-1300 meters. On November 7, 1936, it was also decided to transfer 45-mm anti-tank guns from wooden wheels to metal wheels filled with sponge rubber from the GAZ-A car.

By the beginning of 1937, the 45-mm cannon of the 1932 model was fitted with new wheels and the gun went into production. In addition, an improved sight, new semi-automatic, push-button trigger, more reliable shield attachment, suspension, better balancing of the oscillating part appeared on the gun - all these innovations made the 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model of the year (53K) meet all the requirements of the time.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it was this gun that formed the basis of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. As of June 22, 1941, 16,621 such guns were in service. In total, during the war years, 37,354 pieces of 45-mm anti-tank guns were produced in the USSR.

The gun was intended to fight enemy armored vehicles (tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers). For its time and at the beginning of the war, its armor penetration was quite adequate. At a distance of 500 meters, an armor-piercing projectile pierced 43-mm armor. This was enough to fight German tanks those years, the armor of most of which was more bulletproof.

At the same time, already during the war in 1942, the gun was modernized and its anti-tank capabilities increased. The 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model, designated M-42, was created by upgrading its 1937 predecessor. The work was carried out at the plant number 172 in Motovilikha (Perm).

Basically, the modernization consisted in lengthening the gun barrel, as well as strengthening the propellant charge and a number of technical measures that were aimed at simplifying the serial production of the gun. At the same time, the thickness of the gun shield armor increased from 4.5 mm to 7 mm for better protection calculation from armor-piercing bullets. As a result of modernization, the muzzle velocity of the projectile was raised from 760 m/s to 870 m/s. When using caliber armor-piercing shells, the armor penetration of the new gun at a distance of 500 meters increased to 61 mm.

The M-42 anti-tank gun was able to fight all medium German tanks of 1942. At the same time, during the entire first period of the Great Patriotic War, it was forty-fives that remained the basis of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. During the Battle of Stalingrad, these guns accounted for 43% of all guns that were in service with anti-tank regiments.

But the appearance in 1943 of new German tanks, primarily the "Tiger" and "Panther", as well as the modernized version of the Pz Kpfw IV Ausf H, which had a frontal armor thickness of 80 mm, Soviet anti-tank artillery was again faced with the need to build up firepower.

The problem was partially solved by re-starting production of the 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun. But despite this, and thanks to well-established production, the production of the M-42 continued. With tanks Pz Kpfw IV Ausf H and Panther, this gun could fight by firing on their side, and such fire could be counted on due to the high mobility of the gun. As a result, he was left in production and in service. A total of 10,843 such guns were manufactured from 1942 to 1945.

Divisional gun model 1942 ZIS-3

The second Soviet weapon, no less legendary than the forty-five, was the ZIS-3 divisional cannon of the 1942 model, which today can be found on many pedestals. It is worth noting that by the time the Great Patriotic War began, the Red Army was armed with both rather outdated field guns of the 1900/02, 1902/26 and 1902/30 models, as well as fairly modern guns: 76.2-mm divisional guns of the 1936 model ( F-22) and 76.2-mm divisional gun model 1939 (USV).

At the same time, work on the ZIS-3 was started even before the war. The well-known designer Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin was engaged in the design of the new gun. He began work on the gun at the end of 1940 after his 57 mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun had successfully passed the tests. Like most anti-tank guns, it was quite compact, had a light and durable carriage, which was quite suitable for the development of a divisional gun.

At the same time, for the 76.2-mm divisional guns F-22 and USV, a technological barrel was already created, which had good ballistic characteristics. So the designers practically had only to put the existing barrel on the carriage of the ZIS-2 gun, equipping the barrel with a muzzle brake to reduce the load on the gun carriage. In parallel with the process of designing a divisional gun, issues related to the technology of its production were resolved, and the production of many parts was carried out by stamping, casting, and welding. Compared to the USV gun, labor costs were reduced by 3 times, and the cost of one gun fell by more than a third.

The ZIS-3 was a weapon of a modern design at that time. The barrel of the gun is a monoblock with a breech and a muzzle brake (they absorbed about 30% of the recoil energy). A semi-automatic wedge gate was used. The descent was lever or push-button (on guns of different production series). The barrel resource for the guns of the first series reached 5000 rounds, but for most guns it did not exceed 2000 rounds.

Already in the battles of 1941, the ZIS-3 gun showed all its advantages over the F-22 and USV guns, which were heavy and inconvenient for gunners. This allowed Grabin to personally present his gun to Stalin and obtain official permission from him to launch the gun into mass production, moreover, the gun was already being produced and actively used in the army.

At the beginning of February 1942, formal tests of the gun took place, which lasted only 5 days. According to the test results, the ZIS-3 gun was put into service on February 12, 1942 with the official name "76-mm divisional gun of the 1942 model." For the first time in the world, the production of the ZIS-3 gun was carried out in-line with a sharp increase in productivity. On May 9, 1945, the Volga Plant reported to the party and the government about the production of the 100,000th 76-mm ZIS-3 gun, increasing their production during the war years by almost 20 times. A in total, more than 103 thousand of these guns were manufactured during the war years.

The ZIS-3 gun could use the entire range of 76-mm cannon shells available, including a variety of old Russian and imported grenades. So the 53-OF-350 steel high-explosive fragmentation grenade, when the fuse was set to fragmentation action, created approximately 870 lethal fragments, the effective radius of which was 15 meters. When the fuse was set to high-explosive action at a distance of 7.5 km, a grenade could penetrate a brick wall 75 cm thick or an earth embankment 2 m thick.

The use of the 53-BR-354P sub-caliber projectile ensured penetration of 105 mm of armor at a distance of 300 meters, and at a distance of 500 meters - 90 mm. First of all, sub-caliber shells were sent to provide anti-tank units. Since the end of 1944, the troops also appeared HEAT projectile 53-BP-350A, which could penetrate armor up to 75-90 mm thick at a meeting angle of 45 degrees.

At the time of adoption, the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1942 model fully met all the requirements facing it: in terms of firepower, mobility, unpretentiousness in everyday operation and manufacturability. The ZIS-3 gun was a typical weapon of the Russian school of design: technologically simple, cheap, powerful, reliable, absolutely unpretentious and easy to operate.

During the war years, these guns were produced in-line using any more or less trained workforce without losing the quality of the finished samples. The guns were easily mastered and could be kept in order by the personnel of the units. For the conditions in which the Soviet Union found itself in 1941-1942, the ZIS-3 gun was almost ideal solution not only in terms of combat use, but also in terms of industrial production. All the years of the war, the ZIS-3 was successfully used both against tanks and against enemy infantry and fortifications, which made it so versatile and massive.

122-mm howitzer model 1938 M-30

The M-30 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model became the most massive Soviet howitzer of the Great Patriotic War period. This gun was mass-produced from 1939 to 1955 and was, and still is, in service with some countries. This howitzer took part in almost all significant wars and local conflicts of the 20th century.

According to a number of artillery successes, the M-30 can be safely attributed to one of the best examples of Soviet cannon artillery in the middle of the last century. The presence of such a howitzer in the composition artillery units The Red Army made an invaluable contribution to the victory in the war. In total, during the release of the M-30, 19,266 howitzers of this type were assembled..

The howitzer was developed in 1938 by the Motovilikha Plants Design Bureau (Perm), the project was led by Fedor Fedorovich Petrov. Serial production of howitzers began in 1939 at three plants at once, including Motovilikhinskiye Zavody (Perm) and at the Uralmash artillery plant (Sverdlovsk, since 1942, artillery plant No. 9 with OKB-9). The howitzer was in mass production until 1955, which most clearly characterizes the success of the project.

In general, the M-30 howitzer had a classic design: a reliable, durable two-bed carriage, a rigidly fixed shield with a raised central sheet, and a 23-caliber barrel that did not have a muzzle brake. The M-30 howitzer was equipped with the same carriage as the 152 mm D-1 howitzer. Large-diameter wheels received solid slopes, they were filled with sponge rubber. At the same time, the M-30 modification, which was produced in Bulgaria after the war, had wheels of a different design. Each 122nd howitzer had two different types of coulters - for hard and soft soil.

The 122 mm M-30 howitzer was, of course, a very successful weapon. A group of its creators, led by F.F. Petrov, managed to very harmoniously combine simplicity and reliability in one model of artillery weapons. The howitzer was very easily mastered by personnel, which was largely characteristic of the howitzers of the First World War era, but at the same time it had a large number of new design solutions that made it possible to increase the firepower and mobility of the howitzer. As a result, the Soviet divisional artillery received a powerful and modern howitzer, which was able to operate as part of the highly mobile tank and mechanized units of the Red Army. The wide distribution of this 122-mm howitzer in various armies of the world and the excellent reviews of gunners only confirm this.

The gun was appreciated even by the Germans, who at the initial stage of the war managed to capture several hundred M-30 howitzers. They adopted the gun under the index heavy howitzer 12.2 cm s.F.H.396 (r), actively using them on the Eastern and Western fronts. Starting from 1943, for this howitzer, as well as some other samples of Soviet cannon artillery of the same caliber, the Germans even launched a full-fledged mass production of shells. So in 1943 they fired 424 thousand shots, in 1944 and 1945 - 696.7 thousand and 133 thousand shots, respectively.

The main type of ammunition for the 122-mm howitzer M-30 in the Red Army was a fairly effective fragmentation projectile, which weighed 21.76 kg. The howitzer could fire these projectiles at a range of up to 11,800 meters. Theoretically, an armor-piercing cumulative projectile 53-BP-460A could be used to combat armored targets, which, at an angle of impact with armor of 90 °, pierced armor up to 160 mm thick. Sighting range firing at a moving tank was up to 400 meters. But of course that would be an extreme case.

The M-30 was intended primarily for firing from closed positions against openly located and dug-in enemy manpower and equipment. The howitzer was also successfully used to destroy enemy field fortifications (dugouts, bunkers, trenches) and to make passages in barbed wire when it was impossible to use mortars for these purposes.

Moreover, the barrage fire of the M-30 howitzer battery with high-explosive fragmentation shells posed some threat to German armored vehicles. The fragments formed during the rupture of 122-mm shells were able to penetrate armor up to 20 mm thick, this was quite enough to destroy the sides of enemy light tanks and armored personnel carriers. For vehicles with thicker armor, fragments of howitzer shells could disable the gun, sights, and chassis elements.

HEAT shells for this howitzer appeared only in 1943. But in their absence, the gunners were instructed to fire at tanks and high-explosive fragmentation shells, having previously set the fuse to high-explosive action. Very often, with a direct hit on a tank (especially for light and medium tanks), it became fatal for an armored vehicle and its crew, up to the failure of the turret from the shoulder strap, which automatically made the tank incapacitated.

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The anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was subdivided into military and RGK. Military anti-tank artillery was first introduced into the rifle troops in the early 30s of the last century as a "separate anti-tank battery" as part of a rifle division. Due to the lack of materiel, the batteries were completely introduced into the rifle units in the year 1936. In 1938 a separate anti-tank division was introduced into the structure of a rifle division in 1941. The composition of units and units of anti-tank artillery in various divisions of the Red Army as of June 11, 1441 is given in Table No. batteries of regimental artillery, batteries of divisional 76-mm cannons of artillery regiments, separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions of divisions).
Studying the experience of the combat use of the armored forces of the Wehrmacht in 1939-1940, Soviet military experts came to the conclusion that the attacks of enemy tanks could only be countered by massing anti-tank weapons. As an experimental organizational form of this massing, a separate cannon artillery regiment of the RGK was chosen, armed with 76-mm F-11 cannons and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. In total, four such regiments were formed in KOVO and ZapOVO. These were the first anti-tank artillery units of the RGK. But the results of the activities of the regiments new structure the military unit of anti-tank defense was determined by the brigade.
On October 14, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR turned to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with proposals for holding NEW organizational measures in the Red Army in the first half of 1941. In particular, it was proposed:

To form 20 machine-gun and artillery motorized brigades with powerful cannon and machine-gun armament, designed to fight and counter enemy tank and mechanized troops. The deployment of E brigades should have:
A). L VO - 5 brigades.
b). PribOVO - 4 brigades.
V). ZapOVO - 3 brigades.
G). KOVO - 5 brigades,
e). ZabNO - 1 brigade.
With). DVF - 2 brigades ... ".
It was proposed to use three artillery regiments of the fortified areas of the KOVO and OdVO, as well as all four separate artillery regiments armed with 76-mm cannons and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, created temporarily to reinforce the troops of the KOVO and ZapOVO, to form brigades.
Permission to form was received, and on November 4, 1940, by the directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the formation of 20 machine-gun and artillery motorized brigades began as part of the Armored Forces of the Red Army with the deadline for staffing the brigades with personnel and training materiel on January 1, 1941. The receipt of materiel and equipment was to take place gradually as it came from industry. Soon, the phrase "machine-gun-artillery" was canceled, and the brigades began to be called "motorized", confusing some publications on the history of the pre-war Red Army, where they were called "motorized rifles". brigades were formed according to wartime staffs No. 05 / 100-05 / 112 (Scheme 1).

In total, the brigade was supposed to have: 6199 people, 17 T-26 tanks, 19 armored vehicles, machine guns: D11 - 56, easel - 156, large-caliber anti-aircraft guns - 48. Mortars: 50 mm -90.82 mm - 28, 107 mm - 1 2. guns: 45 mm anti-tank - 30.76 mm F-22 - 42.37 mm automatic anti-aircraft guns - 12, 76 mm or 85 mm anti-aircraft guns - 36, tractors - 82. motor vehicles - 545.

The 4th (KOVO) and 5th (ZapOVO) cannon artillery regiments were turned to the formation of brigades. 48th reserve artillery regiment of the OdVO, 191st rifle regiment of the Grodekovsky UR of the Far Eastern Front. Motorized brigades were formed in the following military districts (fronts): LVO - 1. 4.7, 10th; PribOVO - 2,% 8, 11th, ZapOVO - 3, 9, 13, 14th, KOVO - 6, 15, 18, 20, 22nd, OdVO -12th and on the Far Eastern Front - 16th and 23rd -I.
Considering the structure of a motorized brigade, one can notice the main drawback - 76 and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were not quite suitable for anti-tank defense purposes due to their weight and size characteristics and the absence of an armor shield. In addition, the divisions armed with these guns did not have artillery anti-aircraft fire control devices (PUAZO) and rangefinders, which did not allow them to be used for air defense purposes.

As was often the case in the Russian Armed Forces, without having time to complete and train, in February-March 1941, all brigades were disbanded, equipment and personnel were not used for new formations - rifle divisions of 6,000 men and motorized divisions of mechanized corps. For example, in the LVO, on the basis of the 4th brigade, by July 1, 1941, the 237th rifle division was formed, from the 10th brigade - the 177th rifle division, in the OdVO on the basis of the 12th brigade -218th motorized division 18- mechanized corps. in PribOVO on the basis of the 11th brigade - the 188th rifle division.

At the beginning of 1911, the head of the GAU of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Kulik, informed the leadership of the Red Army intelligence data that the German army was rapidly re-equipping its troops with tanks with armor of increased thickness, in the fight against which all our artillery of 45-mm caliber would be ineffective. The intelligence received most likely referred to captured French B-1 bis tanks. having armor 60 mm thick. Just in the spring of 19-11, a small number of these vehicles were re-equipped with flamethrowers and, with the k-2 index, entered service with individual tank battalions of the Wehrmacht.

Be that as it may, the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense took this information quite seriously. As a result, just before the war, the production of 45 mm anti-tank and 76-mm divisional guns was stopped, and instead of them, preparations were hastily made for the release of 107-mm guns.

In addition, on April 23, 1911, by the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the SNKSSSR No. 1112-459ss "On new formations as part of the Red Army", it was planned to form ten anti-tank artillery brigades of the RUK by June 1, 1941, consisting of:
- Brigade management:
- 2 artillery regiments:
- Headquarters battery;
- Minno sapper battalion;
- Motor transport battalion.

According to the state, the brigade had 5322 people, 48 76-mm cannons of the 1936 model (F-22), 48 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, 24 107-mm M-6O cannons, 16 - 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. 12 heavy machine guns, 93 DT light machine guns. 584 trucks.
123 special vehicles, 11 cars and 165 tractors (Scheme 2).

Brigades were formed in Kiev (1. 2, 3.4 and 5th). Western (6. 7.8th) and Baltic (9th and 10th) Special Military Districts. All brigades were created at the ball formed in February - April 1941 of the rifle divisions of the 6,000-strong staff N * 4/120. The brigade directorates were formed from the headquarters of the chiefs of artillery of divisions, the rest of the units and subunits from howitzer and light artillery regiments of integral anti-aircraft artillery divisions, separate communications battalions, separate engineer battalions, automobile divisions transport companies. The personnel missing to the states came from other parts of the KOVO. ZanOVO and PriboVO. The brigades equipped with vehicles and tractors were supposed to be stuffed in the second half of 1941.

For example, in the ZapOVO all brigades were formed on the basis of three rifle divisions that arrived in the district in the first half of May 1941 from the Moscow (22-4th and 231st rifle divisions) and Siberian (201st rifle divisions) military districts.

Commanders and chiefs of artillery of rifle and mechanized corps or divisions were promoted to the positions of brigade commanders. For example, the chief of artillery of the 2nd mechanized corps of the OdVO, Major General of Artillery K. Moskalenko, was appointed commander of the 1st anti-tank artillery brigade, and Colonel M. Nedelin, chief of artillery of the 160th rifle division of the Moscow Military District, was appointed commander of the 1st brigade. Interestingly, both of these brigade commanders later became the first and second Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces.

It was believed that an anti-tank artillery brigade was capable of creating a density of 20-25 anti-tank guns per 1 km of front on a front 5-6 km wide and, in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces, repelling an attack by one or two enemy tank divisions.
Apparently, the presence of ten anti-tank defense brigades seemed insufficient, therefore, in order to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the troops, by the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army of May 16, 1941, 50 tank regiments and several separate reconnaissance battalions of the newly formed mechanized corps before they received tanks by July 1, 1941 should have been armed with 76- mm p 45 mm cannons and DT machine guns based on: for a tank regiment 18 45-MM and 24 76-MM cannons and 14 machine guns, for a reconnaissance battalion 18 45-mm cannons.

Checking the implementation of the directives of the ICS) of the USSR, carried out by the General Staff of the Red Army at the beginning of June 1911, showed that the staffing of brigades with personnel, vehicles and other property of the GVOM was carried out slowly. On June 11, 1941, the brigades had from 30 to 78% of the regular number of guns. So. in the 6th Iptabr of the RGK there were only about 11% of the number of cars assigned to it by the state and there were no tractors at all. Due to the lack of traction equipment, the 11th Iptabr RGK could only use 3 divisions from 11. In the 636th artillery regiment of the 9th Iptabr RGK, there were only 15 tractors and vehicles for 68 guns.

The very first battles with Wehrmacht tank formations revealed a new mental illness of the Red Army soldiers - a disease called "tank fear". Numerous stories of retreating soldiers about the power and abundance of German tanks, capable of quickly, suddenly, making coverage - “pincers * and encirclement - * boilers *, made an indelible impression on those leading to the front.

Headquarters of the High Command in last decade On June 11, it was decided to form separate anti-tank artillery regiments of the RGK according to state No. 04/133 (wartime) with a total number of 1551 people without a school of junior command personnel, divisions of 107-mm guns and air defense. From June 30, 1941, according to the directives of the General Staff of the Red Army, the formation of such regiments began in Orlovsky (753rd Ap readiness deadline for the morning of July 7. 761st Ap readiness date for July 7, 7b5th Ap. Ready date for August 15) and Kharkov ("64th ap. readiness deadline for August 15) military districts. Difficulties with staffing the materiel led to the fact that in order to accelerate the formation of directives of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 71 / org and 72 / org of July 18, 1911, all four The regiments were reorganized according to a paid calculation as part of five 4-gun battalions of 85-mm anti-aircraft guns.They received the name "artillery regiments of anti-aircraft defense."

Air defense units with 76- and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were thrown into the formation of anti-tank artillery regiments. So, the 509th anti-aircraft artillery regiment (commander - Major V.A. Gerasimov) met the beginning of the war as part of the 4th air defense division in the city of Lvov. Batteries of the regiment on the outskirts of the city destroyed at least 11 enemy aircraft. After numerous battles, on July 7, 1941, the regiment concentrated in the Ignatopol camps near Korosten. where on July 8 it was reorganized into the 509th anti-tank artillery regiment (since 1942 - the 3rd guards artillery regiment of the PTO).

By GOKO Decree No. 172ss of July 16, 1941 "On the Mozhaisk Line of Defense", the commander of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General P. Artemyev, was allowed to withdraw 200 85-mm cannons from Moscow's air defense and form 10 lightweight artillery (anti-tank) regiments (five batteries each) in each regiment).The deadline for the readiness of these regiments (Nos. 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876. 877, 878.879, 880) was set to a minimum - July 18-20.

Decree of the GOKO No. 735ss of October 5, 1941 “On the formation of 24 anti-tank regiments. armed with 85 mm and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns - to strengthen the anti-tank defense of the army of the Western Front, it was ordered to form 4 anti-tank artillery regiments at the expense of the 1st air defense corps, which covered the capital from the air. Each regiment consisted of 8 - 85 mm and 8 - 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, the readiness date was set on October 6. In addition, according to the same decree, 20 more NTO artillery regiments of the same composition were formed in the Moscow Military District, but with the possibility of replacing 37-mm anti-aircraft guns with 45-mm anti-tank ones. The readiness date for the first six regiments was set on the 8th. the next four on the 10th and the remaining ten by October 15th.
On the Leningrad Direction, on July 5, 1941, the 2nd Air Defense Corps allocated 100 anti-aircraft guns with the best crews to reinforce and support ground forces and sent them to anti-tank defense. By order of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front on August 11, 115. 189. 194 and 351 anti-aircraft artillery regiments additionally formed four anti-tank divisions and sent them to anti-tank defense in the Southern fortified area.

All further formations of anti-tank regiments were carried out in 4 or 6-battery composition. The number of batteries in a regiment was determined mainly by the availability of materiel at the time of formation, as well as by the desire to experimentally find out the most advantageous form of regiment organization. It was believed that a regiment of this composition was maneuverable, easily controlled, it was easier to complete it with materiel and personnel due to its small number.

In total, in 1941, according to some data, 72 were rationed and sent to the front, according to others, at least 90 artillery regiments of the NTO. In addition, in the Leningrad Military District in July 1941, the 14th anti-tank artillery brigade of two field strength was formed, which also took part in hostilities on the Northern (later Leningrad) Front.

The experience of the first battles showed. that the anti-tank brigades of the RGK are a powerful means of fighting tanks. At the same time, they also revealed shortcomings - the difficulty of managing units and subunits, the cumbersomeness of the organizational structure. Numerous command and control units (brigade - regiment - division - battery) did not allow to quickly and timely bring information to the performers, process it in a short time, making a timely decision. The maneuverable nature of the slaughterhouses gave rise to rapid changes in the situation and the balance of forces and means in certain sectors of the front. The success of repulsing enemy tank attacks largely depended on the continuous control of units and subunits of brigades from speed
their maneuver to threatened areas and the timely opening of fire.

The brigade organization of anti-tank artillery made it difficult to meet these requirements. Regiments of anti-tank brigades, as a rule, acted separately and often at a considerable distance from one another, which not only made it difficult for the brigade commander to manage them, but sometimes completely excluded him. At the same time, it was very difficult for the regimental commander to control the actions of six divisions. The brigades, having taken the first blows of German tanks, disappeared in the crucible of battles of the first year of the war: the 1st - in September as part of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front, the 2nd - in August as part of the 12th Army of the Southern Front, 3rd - in August as part of the 6th Army of the Southern Front, 1st - in November as part of the 18th Army of the Southern Front 5th - in October as part of the 40th Army of the Southwestern Front, 6, 7 and 8th - in June-July as part of the Western Front. The 9th - in September as part of the 11th Army of the North-Western Front and the 10th in October as part of the North-Western Front.

In the military anti-tank artillery, due to the large losses of 45-mm guns, blocking four times the income from industry, as well as the formation of a significant number of new rifle and cavalry divisions, it was decided to reduce the number of 45-mm guns in rifle divisions. On July 29, 19-11, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR approved the new state of rifle division No. 04/600 (wartime), to which newly formed divisions and divisions recovering after battles were transferred. Therefore, the payment was completely excluded - a platoon of 45-mm guns of a rifle battalion and a separate artillery battalion of 45-mm guns of a rifle division. In total, 18 45-mm guns remained in the rifle division instead of 54 in the pre-war state. In cavalry, in July 1941, a new staff of light cavalry division No. 07/3 (wartime) was introduced, according to which the number of cavalry regiments was reduced to three, and 45 mm guns in each regiment to two. Thus, the cavalry division had only 6 45-mm guns instead of 16 according to the pre-war state. According to such states, 81 cavalry divisions were formed in 1911.

To some extent, the decrease in the number of anti-tank guns was offset by the start of production in October and the arrival of Simonov and Degtyarev anti-tank rifles to the front in November. However, at first, the design of anti-tank rifles went with big problems. Things got to the point that on August 10, 1941, by decree of GOKO No. 453ss at the Tula Arms Plant, a German 7.92-mm anti-tank rifle was launched into series, and by decree of GOKO No. 661ss of September 11, an anti-tank cartridge of caliber 7.92- was adopted by the Red Army. mm.

The staff of a separate rifle brigade No. 04/730 (wartime) dated October 15, 1941, it included a separate anti-tank division of three batteries (12-57th anti-tank guns of the 1941 model of the year (ZIS-2)). On December 6, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR approved the next staff of rifle division No. 04/750 (wartime), in which a company of anti-tank rifles (27 anti-tank rifles), a battery of 45-mm guns (6 guns), and also the division was restored a separate anti-tank division (12 - 57-mm guns. 8 anti-tank rifles. In total, according to the new staff, the division had 12 - 57-mm, 18 -45-mm guns and 89 anti-tank guns.
On January 1, 1942, in the active army and in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, there were: one artillery brigade. 57 artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery battalions. They were on the following fronts:
- Leningradsky - 14 ABR VET, 1.2. 3.4. 5, 6.7, b90ap PTO;
- Volkhovsky - 884 ap VET;
- North-West - 171.698, 759 ap PTO);
- Kalininsky - 873 app. 213 AADN VET;
- Western - 289. 296, 304, 316. 483. 509. 533, 540. 551. 593. 600. 610. 6-I, 694, 703, 766. 768.863. PTO:
- Bryansk - 569.1002 ap PTO;
- Southwest - 338.582, 591, 595, 651.738.760. 76-1 ap PTO,
- Southern - 186.521.530.558.665.727.754. 756 ap PTO:
- 7th Separate Army - 514 anti-tank guns; The reserve of the Supreme High Command rate is 702.765 an IITO.

More than 30 anti-tank regiments were lost in the first year of the war. The previous numbers of the disbanded or reorganized artillery regiments of the PTO are known - 18. 24, 39.79,117.121.197.367.395.421.452.453,455. 525, 559. 598. 603, 689, 696, 697. 699. 700, 704, 753. 758, 761, 872, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880. 885th and regiment of Major Bogdanov Leningradsky front.

For skillful combat operations, by order of the NPO of the USSR No. 4 of January 8, 1942, five artillery regiments of the NTO of the Western and one regiment of the South-Western Fronts were transformed into guards; 289, 296, 509, 760, 304, 871 respectively in the 1. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6th Guards.

The release of the required number of 76-mm F-22USV guns made it possible to replace them in anti-tank artillery units with 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. By GOKO Decree No. GOKO-1530SS of April 3, 1942 - On the replacement and withdrawal of 85 mm anti-aircraft guns from the anti-tank regiments of the fronts * during April 1942, 272 guns were withdrawn from the composition of the fronts:
- Western - 98,
- Kalininsky-20,
- Northwestern - 6,
- Volkhovsky - 10.
- Crimean - 8,
- South-80.
- Southwest-42.
- 7th Separate Army - 8.

All these guns were transferred to the Moscow Air Defense Corps, and in return, the same number of USV guns will be received from industry in April. A little later, the new resolution of the GOKO No. 1541 of April 5, 1942 “On strengthening the air defense of the mountains. Moscow had to transfer another 100 85-mm anti-aircraft guns in April, and another 80 guns in May 1942, at the expense of anti-tank artillery regiments of the fronts, to strengthen the air defense of the capital.

On April 3, 1942, the formation of 20 artillery regiments of the RGK (20 76-mm F-22USV guns each) began with a deadline for readiness by April 25 (10 regiments) and by May 10, 1942.
By GOKO Decree No. GOKO-1607ss of April 16, 1942, "On the organization, staffing and armament of a fighter brigade," new anti-tank formations of a combined arms type began to be formed - separate fighter brigades (onbr). According to the approved organization, the brig yes included:
A). Brigade management (with a communications platoon and a motorcycle platoon);
b). Two anti-tank battalions (72 1GGR each);
V). Anti-tank artillery regiment (four batteries of 76-mm ZIS-3 cannons (The People's Commissariat of Defense in the draft resolution proposed F-22USV guns, but I.V. Stalin's hand and red pencil in the text of the Decree -USV- was corrected to * ZIS-3 * -
Note. authors), three batteries of 45 mm guns, one battery of 37 mm anti-aircraft guns):
G). Separate engineering-mine battalion;
e). Separate tank battalion (21 T-34 tanks, 11 T-60 or T-70 tanks);
e). A separate company of submachine gunners (100 people);
and). Separate mortar division (8 -82-mm and 4 - 120-mm mortars).

In total, the fighter brigade had 1~9S people. 453 submachine guns, 10 light machine guns. 144 anti-tank rifles. 4 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. 12-45mm anti-tank guns, 16-76mm ZIS-3 guns, 8-82mm and 4 120mm mortars, 33 tanks, 193 vehicles and 22 motorcycles.

The decree ordered the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR to form "25 fighter brigades with a deadline - the first five by May 5. ten by May 20 and ten by June 28, 1942. In the Red Army, separate fighter brigades were kept according to states No. 0 4/270 - 04/276 (wartime).

The next decree No. GOKO-1901 ss of June 8, 1942 introduced a new organization of anti-tank formations. The twelve formed fighter brigades were combined into four fighter divisions (id) of three brigades each. The division was formed:
- in the Moscow military district - 1st and 2nd; in the Volga Military District - 3rd;
- in the Ural military district - 4th. Fighter divisions were supposed
use: 1st - on the South-Western, 2nd - on the Bryansk, 3rd - on the Western and 4th - on the Kalinin fronts.

_______________________________________________________________________________________
Data source: quote from the magazine "Front illustration for 2003-5" "Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army"

Soviet anti-tank artillery played essential role in the Great Patriotic War, it accounted for about 70% of all destroyed German. Anti-tank warriors fighting "to the last", often at the cost of own life repulsed the attacks of the Panzerwaffe.

The structure and materiel of anti-tank subunits were continuously improved in the course of hostilities. Until the fall of 1940, anti-tank guns were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. Anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were thus interspersed in organizational structure connections, being their integral part. The rifle battalion of the rifle regiment of the pre-war state had a platoon of 45-mm guns (two guns). The rifle regiment and motorized rifle regiment had a battery of 45-mm cannons (six guns). In the first case, horses were the means of traction, in the second case, Komsomolets specialized caterpillar armored tractors. The rifle division and the motorized division included a separate anti-tank division of eighteen 45-mm guns. For the first time, an anti-tank division was introduced into the state of a Soviet rifle division in 1938.
However, maneuvering with anti-tank guns was possible at that time only within a division, and not on a corps or army scale. The command had a very limited opportunities to strengthen anti-tank defense in tank-hazardous areas.

Shortly before the war, the formation of anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK began. According to the state, each brigade was supposed to have forty-eight 76-mm guns, forty-eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 107-mm guns, sixteen 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The staff strength of the brigade was 5322 people. By the beginning of the war, the formation of brigades had not been completed. Organizational difficulties and the general unfavorable course of hostilities did not allow the first anti-tank brigades to fully realize their potential. However, already in the first battles, the brigades demonstrated the broad capabilities of an independent anti-tank formation.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the anti-tank capabilities of the Soviet troops were severely tested. Firstly, most often rifle divisions had to fight, occupying a front of defense that exceeded the statutory standards. Secondly, Soviet troops had to face the German tactics of the "tank wedge". It consisted in the fact that the tank regiment of the Wehrmacht tank division struck at a very narrow defense sector. At the same time, the density of attacking tanks was 50–60 vehicles per kilometer of front. Such a number of tanks on a narrow sector of the front inevitably saturated the anti-tank defense.

The heavy loss of anti-tank guns at the beginning of the war led to a decrease in the number of anti-tank guns in a rifle division. The July 1941 state rifle division had only eighteen 45 mm anti-tank guns instead of fifty-four in the pre-war state. In July, a platoon of 45-mm guns from a rifle battalion and a separate anti-tank battalion were completely excluded. The latter was restored to the state of the rifle division in December 1941. The shortage of anti-tank guns was to some extent made up for by the recently adopted anti-tank guns. In December 1941, an anti-tank rifle platoon was introduced at the regimental level in a rifle division. In total, the state division had 89 anti-tank rifles.

In the field of organizing artillery general trend At the end of 1941, there was an increase in the number of independent anti-tank units. On January 1, 1942, the active army and the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters had: one artillery brigade (on the Leningrad front), 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery battalions. Following the results of the autumn battles, five artillery regiments of the PTO received the title of guards. Two of them received a guard for the battles near Volokolamsk - they supported the 316th Infantry Division of I.V. Panfilov.
1942 was a period of increasing the number and consolidation of independent anti-tank units. April 3, 1942 was followed by a decision of the State Defense Committee on the formation of a fighter brigade. According to the state, the brigade had 1795 people, twelve 45-mm guns, sixteen 76-mm guns, four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 144 anti-tank guns. By the next decree of June 8, 1942, the twelve formed fighter brigades were merged into fighter divisions, each with three brigades.

A milestone for the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0528 signed by I. V. Stalin, according to which: the status of anti-tank units was raised, a double salary was set for personnel, a cash bonus was established for each tank that was destroyed, all command and personnel destroyer-anti-tank artillery units were placed on a special account and were to be used only in these units.

The distinctive sign of the anti-tankers was a sleeve insignia in the form of a black rhombus with a red border with crossed gun barrels. The rise in the status of anti-tankers was accompanied by the formation in the summer of 1942 of new anti-tank regiments. Thirty light (twenty 76-mm guns each) and twenty anti-tank artillery regiments (twenty 45-mm guns each) were formed.
The regiments were formed in a short time and immediately thrown into battle on the threatened sectors of the front.

In September 1942, ten more anti-tank regiments with twenty 45-mm guns were formed. Also in September 1942, an additional battery of four 76-mm guns was introduced to the most distinguished regiments. In November 1942, part of the anti-tank regiments was merged into fighter divisions. By January 1, 1943, the Red Army anti-tank artillery included 2 fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, 2 heavy anti-tank regiments, 168 anti-tank regiments, 1 anti-tank battalion.

The improved anti-tank defense system of the Red Army received the name Pakfront from the Germans. RAK is the German abbreviation for anti-tank gun - Panzerabwehrkannone. Instead of a linear arrangement of guns along the defended front, at the beginning of the war they were united in groups under a single command. This made it possible to concentrate the fire of several guns on one target. Anti-tank areas were the basis of anti-tank defense. Each anti-tank area consisted of separate anti-tank strongholds (PTOPs) in fire communication with each other. "To be in fire communication with each other" - means the possibility of firing by neighboring anti-tank guns on the same target. The PTOP was saturated with all types of fire weapons. The basis of the anti-tank fire system was 45-mm guns, 76-mm regimental guns, partially cannon batteries of divisional artillery and anti-tank artillery units.

The finest hour of anti-tank artillery was the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. At that time, 76-mm divisional guns were the main means of anti-tank units and formations. "Forty-five" accounted for about a third of the total number of anti-tank guns on the Kursk Bulge. A long pause in the fighting at the front made it possible to improve the condition of units and formations due to the receipt of equipment from industry and the resupplying of anti-tank regiments with personnel.

The last stage in the evolution of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was the enlargement of its units and the appearance of self-propelled guns in the anti-tank artillery. By the beginning of 1944, all fighter divisions and individual fighter brigades of the combined arms type were reorganized into anti-tank brigades. On January 1, 1944, the anti-tank artillery included 50 anti-tank brigades and 141 anti-tank regiments. By order of the NPO No. 0032 of August 2, 1944, one SU-85 regiment (21 self-propelled guns) was introduced into the fifteen anti-tank brigades. In reality, only eight brigades received self-propelled guns.

Particular attention was paid to the training of personnel of anti-tank brigades, purposeful combat training of artillerymen was organized to fight new German tanks and assault guns. Special instructions appeared in the anti-tank units: "Memo to the gunner - destroyer of enemy tanks" or "Memo on the fight against Tiger tanks." And in the armies, special rear ranges were equipped, where artillerymen trained in firing at mock-up tanks, including moving ones.

Simultaneously with the increase in the skill of artillerymen, tactics were improved. With the quantitative saturation of the troops with anti-tank weapons, the "fire bag" method began to be used more and more often. The guns were placed in "anti-tank nests" of 6-8 guns within a radius of 50-60 meters and were well camouflaged. The nests were located on the ground to achieve long-range flanking with the possibility of concentrating fire. Passing the tanks moving in the first echelon, the fire opened suddenly, to the flank, at medium and short distances.

In the offensive, anti-tank guns were quickly pulled up after the advancing units in order to support them with fire if necessary.

Anti-tank artillery in our country began in August 1930, when, within the framework of military-technical cooperation with Germany, a secret agreement was signed, according to which the Germans pledged to help the USSR organize the gross production of 6 artillery systems. To implement the agreement in Germany, a front company "BYuTAST" was created (a company with limited liability"Bureau for Technical Works and Studies").

Among other weapons proposed by the USSR was a 37 mm anti-tank gun. The development of this weapon, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, was completed at Rheinmetall Borsig in 1928. The first samples of the gun, which received the name Tak 28 (Tankabwehrkanone, i.e., anti-tank gun - the word Panzer came into use later) were tested in 1930, and from 1932 deliveries to the troops began. The Tak 28 gun had a 45-caliber barrel with a horizontal wedge breech, which provided a fairly high rate of fire - up to 20 rounds per minute. A carriage with sliding tubular beds provided a large horizontal pickup angle - 60 °, but at the same time chassis with wooden wheels was designed only for horse traction.

In the early 1930s, this gun pierced the armor of any tank, and was perhaps the best in its class, far ahead of developments in other countries.

After modernization, having received wheels with pneumatic tires that can be towed by a car, an improved carriage and an improved sight, it was put into service under the designation 3.7 cm Pak 35/36 (Panzerabwehrkanone 35/36).
Remaining until 1942 the main anti-tank gun of the Wehrmacht.

The German gun was put into production at the plant near Moscow. Kalinin (No. 8), where she received the factory index 1-K. The enterprise mastered the production of a new weapon with great difficulty, the guns were made semi-handicraft, with manual fitting of parts. In 1931, the plant presented 255 guns to the customer, but did not hand over any due to poor build quality. In 1932, 404 guns were delivered, and in 1933, another 105.

Despite the problems with the quality of the guns produced, the 1-K was a fairly perfect anti-tank gun for the 1930s. Its ballistics made it possible to hit all the tanks of that time, at a distance of 300 m, an armor-piercing projectile normally pierced 30-mm armor. The gun was very compact, its light weight allowed the crew to easily move it around the battlefield. The disadvantages of the gun, which led to its rapid removal from production, were the weak fragmentation effect of the 37-mm projectile and the lack of suspension. In addition, the guns produced were notable for their low build quality. The adoption of this gun was considered as a temporary measure, since the leadership of the Red Army wanted to have a more versatile gun that combined the functions of an anti-tank and battalion gun, and 1-K was poorly suited for this role due to its small caliber and weak fragmentation projectile.

1-K was the first specialized anti-tank gun of the Red Army and played a big role in the development of this type. Very soon, it began to be replaced by a 45-mm anti-tank gun, becoming almost invisible against its background. In the late 30s, 1-K began to be withdrawn from the troops and transferred to storage, remaining in operation only as training ones.

At the beginning of the war, all the guns available in the warehouses were thrown into battle, since in 1941 there was a shortage of artillery to equip a large number of newly formed formations and make up for huge losses.

Of course, by 1941, the armor penetration characteristics of the 37-mm 1-K anti-tank gun could no longer be considered satisfactory, it could only confidently hit light tanks and armored personnel carriers. Against medium tanks, this gun could only be effective when firing into the side from close (less than 300 m) distances. Moreover, Soviet armor-piercing shells were significantly inferior in armor penetration to German ones of a similar caliber. On the other hand, this gun could use captured 37 mm ammunition, in which case its armor penetration increased significantly, exceeding even the similar characteristics of a 45 mm gun.

It was not possible to establish any details of the combat use of these guns; probably, almost all of them were lost in 1941.

The very great historical significance of the 1-K is that it became the ancestor of a series of the most numerous Soviet 45-mm anti-tank guns and Soviet anti-tank artillery in general.

During the "liberation campaign" in western Ukraine, several hundred Polish 37-mm anti-tank guns and a significant amount of ammunition were captured.

Initially, they were sent to warehouses, and at the end of 1941 they were transferred to the troops, because due to the heavy losses of the first months of the war, there was a large shortage of artillery, especially anti-tank artillery. In 1941, the GAU issued a "Brief Description, Operating Instructions" for this gun.

The 37 mm anti-tank gun developed by Bofors was a very successful weapon capable of successfully fighting armored vehicles protected by bulletproof armor.

The gun had a fairly high muzzle velocity and rate of fire, small dimensions and weight (which made it easier to disguise the gun on the ground and roll it on the battlefield with crew forces), and was also adapted for rapid transportation by mechanical traction. Compared to the German 37 mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun, the Polish gun had better armor penetration, which is explained by the higher muzzle velocity of the projectile.

In the second half of the 1930s, there was a tendency to increase the thickness tank armor in addition, the Soviet military wanted to get an anti-tank gun capable of providing fire support to the infantry. This required an increase in caliber.
A new 45 mm anti-tank gun was created by imposing a 45 mm barrel on the carriage of a 37 mm anti-tank gun mod. 1931. The carriage was also improved - wheel suspension was introduced. The semi-automatic shutter basically repeated the 1-K scheme and allowed 15-20 rds / min.

The 45-mm projectile had a mass of 1.43 kg and was more than 2 times heavier than the 37-mm one. At a distance of 500 m, an armor-piercing projectile pierced 43-mm armor normally. At the time of adoption, the 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 pierced the armor of any tank that existed then.
A fragmentation 45-mm grenade, when burst, gave about 100 fragments, retaining lethal force when scattered along the front by 15 m and to a depth of 5-7 m. When fired, grapeshot bullets form a striking sector along the front for up to 60 m and in depth up to 400 m .
Thus, the 45 mm anti-tank gun had good anti-personnel capabilities.

From 1937 to 1943, 37354 guns were produced. Shortly before the start of the war, the 45-mm gun was discontinued, as our military leadership believed that the new German tanks would have a frontal armor thickness impenetrable for these guns. Shortly after the start of the war, the gun was put back into production.

The 45-mm guns of the 1937 model of the year relied on the state of the anti-tank platoons of the rifle battalions of the Red Army (2 guns) and the anti-tank divisions of the rifle divisions (12 guns). They were also in service with separate anti-tank regiments, which included 4-5 four-gun batteries.

For its time, in terms of armor penetration, the "forty-five" was quite adequate. Nevertheless, the insufficient penetration of the 50-mm frontal armor of the Pz Kpfw III Ausf H and Pz Kpfw IV Ausf F1 tanks is beyond doubt. Often this was due to the low quality of armor-piercing shells. Many batches of shells had a technological marriage. In case of violation of the heat treatment regime in production, the shells turned out to be excessively hard and as a result split on the tank's armor, but in August 1941 the problem was solved - technical changes were made to the production process (localizers were introduced).

To improve armor penetration, a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten core was adopted, which pierced 66 mm armor at a distance of 500 m along the normal, and 88 mm armor when fired at a distance of 100 m dagger fire.

With the advent of sub-caliber shells, the later modifications of the Pz Kpfw IV tanks became "too tough" for the "forty-five". The thickness of the frontal armor, which did not exceed 80 mm.

At first, new shells were on special account and were issued individually. For the unjustified consumption of sub-caliber shells, the gun commander and gunner could be court martialed.

In the hands of experienced and tactically skilled commanders and trained crews, the 45-mm anti-tank gun posed a serious threat to enemy armored vehicles. Its positive qualities were high mobility and ease of disguise. However, for better destruction of armored targets, a more powerful gun was urgently required, which was the 45-mm cannon mod. 1942 M-42, developed and put into service in 1942.

The 45 mm M-42 anti-tank gun was obtained by upgrading the 45 mm gun of the 1937 model at factory No. 172 in Motovilikha. The modernization consisted in lengthening the barrel (from 46 to 68 calibers), strengthening the propellant charge (the mass of gunpowder in the sleeve increased from 360 to 390 grams) and a number of technological measures to simplify mass production. The armor thickness of the shield cover has been increased from 4.5 mm to 7 mm to better protect the crew from armor-piercing rifle bullets.

As a result of the modernization, the muzzle velocity of the projectile increased by almost 15% - from 760 to 870 m/s. At a distance of 500 meters along the normal, an armor-piercing projectile pierced -61mm, and a sub-caliber projectile pierced -81mm armor. According to the memoirs of anti-tank veterans, the M-42 had very high firing accuracy and relatively low recoil when fired. This made it possible to fire at a high rate of fire without correcting the pickup.

Serial production of 45-mm guns mod. 1942 was launched in January 1943 and was carried out only at plant number 172. In the most stressful periods, the plant produced 700 of these guns monthly. In total, in 1943-1945, 10,843 mod. 1942. Their production continued after the war. New guns, as they were produced, were used to re-equip anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades, which had 45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937.

As it soon became clear, the armor penetration of the M-42 to fight German heavy tanks with powerful anti-shell armor Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther" and Pz. Kpfw. VI "Tiger" was not enough. More successful was the firing of sub-caliber shells on the sides, stern and undercarriage. Nevertheless, thanks to well-established mass production, mobility, ease of camouflage and low cost, the gun remained in service until the very end of the war.

In the late 30s, the issue of creating anti-tank guns capable of hitting tanks with anti-shell armor became acute. Calculations showed the futility of the 45-mm caliber in terms of a sharp increase in armor penetration. Various research organizations considered calibers 55 and 60 mm, but in the end it was decided to stop at 57 mm. Guns of this caliber were used in tsarist army and (guns of Nordenfeld and Hotchkiss). A new projectile was developed for this caliber - a standard cartridge case from a 76-mm divisional cannon was adopted as its cartridge case with the neck of the cartridge case re-compressed to a caliber of 57 mm.

In 1940, a design team led by Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin began to design a new anti-tank gun that meets the tactical and technical requirements of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). The main feature of the new gun was the use of a long barrel with a length of 73 calibers. The gun at a distance of 1000 m pierced armor 90 mm thick with an armor-piercing projectile

A prototype gun was made in October 1940 and passed factory tests. And in March 1941, the gun was put into service under the official name "57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941" In total, from June to December 1941, about 250 guns were handed over.

57-mm guns from experimental batches took part in the fighting. Some of them were mounted on the Komsomolets light tracked tractor - this was the first Soviet anti-tank self-propelled gun, which, due to the imperfection of the chassis, was not very successful.

The new anti-tank gun easily pierced the armor of all German tanks that existed at that time. However, due to the position of the GAU, the release of the gun was stopped, and the entire production reserve and equipment were mothballed.

In 1943, with the appearance of heavy tanks among the Germans, the production of guns was restored. The gun of the 1943 model had a number of differences from the guns of the 1941 issue, aimed primarily at improving the manufacturability of the gun. However, the restoration of mass production was difficult - there were technological problems with the manufacture of barrels. Mass production of guns under the name "57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1943" ZIS-2 was organized by October - November 1943, after the commissioning of new production facilities, provided with equipment supplied under Lend-Lease.

Since the resumption of production, until the end of the war, more than 9,000 guns entered the troops.

With the restoration of production of the ZIS-2 in 1943, the guns entered the anti-tank artillery regiments (iptap), 20 guns per regiment.

From December 1944, the ZIS-2 was introduced into the staff of the guards rifle divisions - into the regimental anti-tank batteries and into the anti-tank battalion (12 guns). In June 1945, ordinary rifle divisions were transferred to a similar state.

The capabilities of the ZIS-2 made it possible at typical combat distances to confidently hit the 80-mm frontal armor of the most common German medium tanks Pz.IV and StuG III assault self-propelled guns, as well as the side armor of the Pz.VI Tiger tank; at distances of less than 500 m, the Tiger's frontal armor was also hit.
In terms of the cost and manufacturability of production, combat and service performance, the ZIS-2 became the best Soviet anti-tank gun of the war.

According to materials:
http://knowledgegrid.ru/2e9354f401817ff6.html
Shirokorad A. B. The Genius of Soviet Artillery: The Triumph and Tragedy of V. Grabin.
A. Ivanov. Artillery of the USSR in the Second World War.

Active work on the creation of self-propelled artillery installations began in the USSR in the early 30s of the XX century, although their design had been carried out since 1920. in the developed "System of artillery weapons of the Red Army for the second five-year plan 1933 - 1938. The new weapon system, approved by the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR on January 11, 1934, determined the widespread development and introduction of self-propelled artillery into the troops, and it was planned to begin mass production of self-propelled guns as early as 1935.

The main work on the creation of self-propelled guns was carried out at factories No. 174 named after. Voroshilov and No. 185 im. Kirov under the guidance of talented designers P. Syachintov and S. Ginzburg. But despite the fact that in 1934 - 1937. a large number of prototypes of self-propelled guns for various purposes were manufactured, they practically did not enter service. And after P. Syachintov was repressed at the end of 1936, work on the creation of self-propelled artillery was almost completely curtailed. Nevertheless, before June 1941, the Red Army received a number of self-propelled artillery installations for various purposes.

The first to enter the army were the SU-1-12 (or SU-12), developed at the Kirov plant in Leningrad. They were a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927, installed on GAZ-ALA or Moreland trucks (the latter were purchased in the early 30s in the USA for the needs of the Red Army). The gun had an armor shield and an armor plate on the rear of the cockpit. In total, in 1934 - 1935. The Kirov Plant manufactured 99 of these vehicles, which entered the artillery battalions of some mechanized brigades. SU-1-12s were used in the battles near Lake Khasan in 1938, on the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939 and during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The experience of their operation has shown that they have poor terrain and low survivability on the battlefield. By June 1941, most of the SU-1-12s were badly worn out and in need of repair.

In 1935, the reconnaissance battalions of the Red Army began to receive the Kurchevsky self-propelled gun (SPK) - a 76-mm recoilless (according to the terminology of that time - dynamo-active) gun on the GAZ-TK chassis (a three-axle version of the GAZ-A passenger car). The 76-mm recoilless gun was developed by the inventor Kurchevsky among a large range of guns of a similar design with a caliber from 37 to 305 mm. Despite the fact that some Kurchevsky guns were produced in large quantities - up to several thousand pieces - they had a mass design flaws. After Kurchevsky was repressed in 1937, all work on dynamo-reactive guns was curtailed. Until 1937, 23 SPKs were transferred to the Red Army. Two such installations participated in the Soviet-Finnish war, where they were lost. By June 1941, the troops had about 20 SPKs, most of which were out of order.

The only serial pre-war self-propelled artillery installation on a tank chassis was the SU-5. It was developed in 1934 - 1935. at the plant number 185 named after. Kirov as part of the so-called "small triplex" program. The latter was single base, created on the chassis of the T-26 tank, with three different artillery systems (76-mm gun model 1902/30, 122-mm howitzer model 1910/30 and 152-mm mortar model 1931). After the manufacture and testing of three self-propelled guns, which received the designations SU-5-1, SU-5-2 and SU-5-3, respectively, the SU-5-2 (with a 122-mm howitzer) was adopted by the Red Army. In 1935, an initial batch of 24 SU-5-2s was made, which entered service with the tank units of the Red Army. The SU-5 was used in the fighting near Lake Khasan in 1938 and during the Polish campaign in September 1939. They turned out to be quite effective vehicles, but had a small portable ammunition load. By June 1941, all 30 SU-5s were in the army, but most of them (with the exception of those in the Far East) were lost in the first weeks of the war.

In addition to the SU-5, the armored units of the Red Army had another vehicle that can be classified as self-propelled artillery on a tank base. We are talking about the tank BT-7A (artillery), developed at the Kharkov plant number 183 named after. Comintern in 1934, the BT-7A was intended for artillery support of line tanks on the battlefield, combating fire weapons and enemy fortifications. From line tank BT-7 he was distinguished by the installation of the tower bigger size with 76 mm KT-27 gun. In total, in 1935 - 1937. Red Army units received 155 BT-7A. These vehicles were used in the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. During these conflicts, the BT-7A, but to the reviews of the command of the tank units, proved to be the best side as an effective means of supporting tanks and infantry on the battlefield. As of June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 117 BT-7A tanks.

In addition to self-propelled guns, by the beginning of the war, the Red Army also had self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. First of all, these are 76-mm 3K anti-aircraft guns mounted on YaG-K trucks) manufactured by the Yaroslavl Automobile Plant. In 1933 - 1934 troops received 61 such installations, which by the beginning of the war were part of the units of the Moscow military district. In addition, there were about 2,000 anti-aircraft machine gun mounts (ZPU) - quadruple Maxim machine guns installed in the back of a GAZ-AAA car.

Thus, by June 1941, the Red Army had about 2,300 self-propelled artillery mounts for various purposes. Moreover, most of them were vehicles with weapons installed on them without any armor protection. In addition, it should be borne in mind that ordinary civilian trucks were used as a base for them, which had very low traffic on country roads, not to mention rough terrain. Therefore, these vehicles could not be used to directly support troops on the battlefield. There were only 145 full-fledged self-propelled guns on a tank chassis (28 SU-5 and 117 BT-7A). In the very first weeks of the war (June - July 1941), most of them were lost.

In the course of the very first battles of the Great Patriotic War, the question arose of the need to develop an anti-tank self-propelled artillery installation as soon as possible, capable of quickly changing positions and fighting German tank units, which were significantly superior in mobility to units of the Red Army. On July 15, 1941, at plant No. 92 in Gorky, the ZIS-30 self-propelled gun was urgently developed, which was a 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun mounted on the chassis of the Komsomolets armored tractor. Due to the lack of tractors, the production of which was discontinued in August, it was necessary to search for and seize Komsomol members from military units, repair them and only after that install tools on them. As a result of this, the production of the ZIS-30 began in mid-September and ended on October 15th. During this time, the Red Army received 101 installations. They entered service with anti-tank batteries of motorized rifle battalions of tank brigades and were used only in battles near Moscow as part of the Western, Bryansk and right wing of the Southwestern Fronts.

Due to heavy losses in tanks in the summer of 1941, the leadership of the Red Army adopted a resolution "On shielding light tanks and armoring tractors." Among other measures, the production of armored tractors under the KhTZ-16 index was prescribed at the Kharkov Tractor Plant. The KhTZ-16 project was developed at the Scientific Automotive and Tractor Institute (NATI) in July. KhTZ-16 was a slightly modernized chassis of the STZ-3 agricultural tractor with an armored hull made of 15 mm armor mounted on it. The armament of the tractor consisted of a 45-mm tank gun mod. 1932, installed in the front hull plate and had limited firing angles. Thus. KhTZ-16 was an anti-tank self-propelled gun, although in the documents of that time it was referred to as an "armored tractor". The volume of production of KhTZ-16 was planned to be quite large - when Kharkov was handed over in October 1941, KhTZ had 803 chassis ready for armor. But due to problems with the supply of armor plates, the plant produced from 50 to 60 (according to various sources) KhTZ-16, which were used in the battles of the autumn - winter of 1941, and some, judging by the photographs, "survived" until the spring of 1942 .

In the summer - autumn of 1941, work on the creation of self-propelled guns was actively carried out at the enterprises of Leningrad, primarily at the Izhora, Kirov, Voroshilov and Kirov factories. So, in August, 15 self-propelled guns were manufactured with the installation of a 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 on the chassis of the T-26 tank with the turret removed. The gun was mounted behind the shield and had a circular fire. These vehicles, which were documented as T-26-SAUs, entered service with tank brigades of the Leningrad Front and operated quite successfully until 1944.

On the basis of the T-26, anti-aircraft installations were also made. For example, in early September, the 124th Tank Brigade received "two T-26 tanks with 37-mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on them." These vehicles operated as part of the brigade until the summer of 1943.

In July-August, the Izhora plant manufactured several dozen ZIS-5 armored trucks (the cabin and sides of the loading platform were completely protected by armor). From the car, which mainly entered service with the divisions of the Leningrad People's Militia Army (LANO), they were armed with a machine gun in the frontal sheet of the cockpit and a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1932, which rolled into the body and could fire forward in the direction of travel. It was supposed to use these "brontasaurs" primarily to fight from ambushes with German tanks. Judging by the photographs, some vehicles were still used by the troops during the lifting of the blockade of Leningrad in the winter of 1944.

In addition, the Kirov plant manufactured several self-propelled guns of the SU-1-12 type with the installation of a 76-mm regimental gun behind a shield on the chassis of ZIS-5 trucks.

All self-propelled guns created in the first months of the war had a large number of design flaws due to the fact that they were created in a hurry using the tools and materials at hand. Naturally, it was out of the question to talk about the mass production of machines created in such conditions.

On March 3, 1942, the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry signed an order to create a special bureau for self-propelled artillery. The special bureau was supposed to develop in the shortest possible time a single chassis for self-propelled guns using the units of the T-60 tank and cars. Based on the chassis, it was supposed to create a 76-mm assault self-propelled support gun and a 37-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun.

On April 14-15, 1942, a plenum of the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) was held with the participation of representatives from the troops, industry and the People's Commissariat for Armaments (NKV) of the USSR, at which issues of creating self-propelled artillery were discussed. In its decision, the plenum recommended the creation of infantry support self-propelled guns with a 76-mm ZIS-3 cannon and a 122-mm M-30 howitzer, as well as self-propelled guns with a 152-mm ML-20 howitzer cannon to combat fortifications and with 37-mm anti-aircraft gun to combat air targets.

The decision of the plenum of the GAU Artillery Committee was approved by the State Defense Committee and in June 1942 the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry (NKTP), together with the NKV, developed a "self-propelled artillery system for arming the Red Army." At the same time, the NKV led the development and manufacture of the artillery part of the self-propelled guns, and the NKTP was engaged in the design of the chassis. The general coordination of work on the ACS was carried out by the NKTP special bureau, headed by the talented designer S. Ginzburg.

In the summer of 1942, the first samples of self-propelled guns were tested. It was a 37-mm anti-aircraft and 76-mm assault self-propelled guns of plant No. 37 NKTP. Both vehicles were made on a single chassis, which was created using the units of the T-60 and T-70 tanks. The tests of the machines ended successfully, and in June 1942 the GKO ordered the preparation of mass production of self-propelled guns after the identified shortcomings were eliminated. However, the beginning of the German offensive on Stalingrad required an urgent increase in the production of tanks and work on the creation of self-propelled guns was curtailed.

In addition, at the plant number 592 NKN (in Mytishchi near Moscow), the design of self-propelled guns of the 122-mm M-30 howitzer was carried out on the chassis of the captured German StuG III installation. The prototype, which received the designation self-propelled assault howitzer "Artsturm" or SG-122A, was put to the test only in September.

On October 19, 1942, the GKO, by its Decree No. 2429ss, decided to prepare for the mass production of assault and anti-aircraft self-propelled guns of 37 - 122-mm caliber. Plant No. 38 im. Kuibyshev (Kirov) and GAZ them. Molotov (Gorky), 122 mm self-propelled howitzer developed Uralmashzavod and plant No. 592 NKV. The design deadlines were set quite strict - by December 1, it was required to report to the State Defense Committee on the results of testing new models of self-propelled guns.

And in November, the first prototypes of assault and anti-aircraft self-propelled guns went to the test. These were SU-11 (anti-aircraft) and SU-12 (assault) of plant No. 38, as well as GAZ-71 (assault) and GAZ-72 (anti-aircraft) of the Gorky Automobile Plant. When creating them, an already proven layout scheme was used, proposed back in the summer of 1942 by the special bureau of the self-propelled guns PKTP - two twin parallel engines in front of the vehicle and a fighting compartment in the stern. The armament of the vehicles consisted of a 76-mm ZIS-3 divisional gun (assault self-propelled guns) and a 37-mm 31K gun (anti-aircraft self-propelled guns).

On November 19, the commission that conducted the tests drew up a conclusion on testing samples of the ACS of plant No. 38 and GAZ. In it, the GAZ-71 and GAZ-72 were characterized as vehicles that did not meet the requirements for them, and it was recommended that factory No. 38 self-propelled guns be adopted.

At the same time, self-propelled samples of the 122-mm M-30 howitzer were tested: U-35 of Uralmashzavod, created on the chassis of the T-34 tank and SG-122 of factory No. 592 NKV, developed on the basis of captured tank Pz.Kpfw. III (the last sample was an improved version of ST-122A).

On December 9, 1942, tests of the SU-11, SU-12, SG-122 and U-35 began at the Gorohovets training ground. As a result, the government commission that conducted the tests recommended that the SU-76 (SU-12) and SU-122 (U-35) self-propelled guns be adopted by the troops. The SU-11 did not pass the tests due to the poor layout of the fighting compartment of the unfinished sight installation and the shortcomings of a number of other mechanisms. The SG-122 was abandoned because of its trophy base (at that time the number of captured tanks was still not large enough).

Even before the completion of testing of prototypes of self-propelled guns, by the GKO decree of November 25, 1942, the Directorate of mechanical traction and self-propelled artillery was created in the system of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. The duties of the new department included control over the production, supply and repair of self-propelled artillery installations. On December 2, 1942, the State Defense Committee decides to expand the production of self-propelled artillery mounts SU-12 and SU-122 for the Red Army.

At the end of December 1942, the People's Commissar of Defense, by directives No. 112467ss and 11210ss, demanded the formation of 30 self-propelled artillery regiments of the Reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, armed with new types of installations. Already by January 1, 1943, the first batch of 25 SU-76s and the same number of SU-122s was sent to the newly formed training center for self-propelled artillery.

But already on January 19, in connection with the beginning of the operation to break the blockade of Leningrad, the first two self-propelled artillery regiments formed (1433rd and 1434th), by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, were sent to the Volkhov Front. In March, two new self-propelled artillery regiments were sent to the Western Front - the 1485th and 1487th.

Already the first experience of the combat use of self-propelled artillery showed that it was capable of providing significant artillery fire support to the advancing infantry and tank units. The memorandum of the Chief of Staff of the Red Army Artillery to GKO member V. Molotov dated April 6, 1943 stated: “Experience has shown that self-propelled guns are needed, since no other type of artillery has given such an effect in continuous accompaniment of infantry and tank attacks and interaction with them in close combat. The material damage inflicted on the enemy by self-propelled guns and the results of the battle compensate for the losses..

At the same time, the results of the first combat use of self-propelled guns revealed major flaws in their design. For example, in the SU-122 there were frequent breakdowns of the stopper for mounting the gun in the stowed position and the lifting mechanism. In addition, the poor layout of the fighting compartment of the self-propelled gun was very tiring for the calculation of the gun during operation, and insufficient visibility made it difficult for the vehicle to operate during the battle. But most of the shortcomings of the SU-122 were eliminated fairly quickly. The situation with the SU-76 was much more complicated.

During the very first battles, most of the SU-76s failed due to breakdowns in gearboxes and main shafts. It was not possible to solve the matter by simply strengthening the design of the shafts and gears of the gearboxes - such self-propelled guns failed just as often.

It soon became clear that the cause of the accidents was the parallel installation of two twin engines running on a common shaft. Such a scheme led to the occurrence of resonant torsional vibrations on the shaft and its rapid breakdown, since the maximum value of the resonant frequency fell on the most loaded engine operation mode (this corresponded to the movement of the ACS in second gear through snow and mud). It became clear that the elimination of this design defect takes time. Therefore, on March 21, 1943, the production of the SU-12 was suspended.

To compensate for the decrease in the production of SU-76, which the front urgently needed, on February 3, factory No. 37 was ordered to produce 200 self-propelled guns based on the captured Pz.Kpfw tank. III. By that time, according to the trophy services, after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, about 300 German tanks and self-propelled guns were delivered to repair enterprises. Using the experience of work on the SG-122, plant No. 37 quickly developed, tested and put into production the SU-76I ("foreign") self-propelled gun, created on the basis of the Pz.Kpfw sneaker. III and armed with a 76-mm F-34 cannon, adapted for installation in self-propelled guns. In total, until December 1945, the Red Army received 201 SU-76Is. after which their release was discontinued.

Meanwhile, Plant No. 38 hastily worked to eliminate the shortcomings of the SU-76 (SU-12). In April, the SU-12M machine was created. differed from the SU-12 by the presence of additional elastic couplings between the motors, gearboxes and final drives. These measures made it possible to drastically reduce the accident rate of the SU-76, and since May they have been sent to enter the troops.

Technical difficulties in eliminating design flaws in the chassis and insufficient study of the issues of technical operation of self-propelled artillery installations caused the GKO decree of April 24, 1943, in which issues of factory acceptance of self-propelled guns. the formation of self-propelled artillery units were transferred from the GAU KA to the jurisdiction of the Commander of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army. All further work on the creation of new and improvement of existing models of self-propelled guns was carried out through the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA).

In May 1913, Plant No. 38 manufactured a modernized sample of a self-propelled artillery mount under the SU-15 index. In it, the layout of the engine compartment was made according to the type of the T-70 tank: the engines were in series one after the other, and the crankshafts were interconnected. The self-propelled gun had only one gearbox, and the roof over the fighting compartment was dismantled to improve the working conditions of the crew (on the SU-12, there were cases when crews died due to poor ventilation of the fighting compartment). Tests of the installation, which received the army designation SU-76M, showed a completely fatal operation of the transmission, and from June 1943 the machine was put into mass production. In the fall of 1943, GAZ and Plant No. 40 (created on the basis of Plant No. 592 NKV) joined the production of the SU-76M. The production of this machine was carried out until November 1945.

By GKO Decree No. 2692 of January 4, 1943, Plant No. 100 NKTP (Chelyabinsk) and Plant No. 172 NKV (Molotov) were ordered within 25 days to design and manufacture a prototype self-propelled artillery mount based on the KB-1C gun with 152-mm gun-howitzer ML-20. Despite a number of difficulties, the task was completed on time, and by February 7, tests of a prototype that received the factory index KB-14 were completed at the Chebarkul training ground. By a resolution of the State Defense Committee dated February 14, the KB-14 installation under the index SU-152 was adopted by the Red Army and put into mass production. The first SU-152 regiments took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943.

To combat the new German guns "Tiger", captured at the beginning of 1943 near Leningrad, the GKO, by decree No. 3289 of May 5, 1943, ordered the NKTP and the NKV to produce a prototype of a medium self-propelled artillery mount with an 85-mm gun based on the T tank -34, intended for the direct escort of medium tanks in their combat formations.

The development of the new self-propelled guns was entrusted to Uralmashzavod, and the guns for it were assigned to the design bureau of plant No. 9 and the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB). In early August 1943, two samples of installations were tested at the Gorohovets artillery range - with an 85-mm D-5S gun from plant No. 9 and S-18 TsAKB. The D-5S gun turned out to be more successful, and by GKO Decree No. 3892 of August 7, 1943, the new machine was adopted by the Red Army under the symbol SU-85. In the same month, serial production of the SU-85 began, and the production of the SU-122 was discontinued.

In connection with the adoption by the Red Army of the new heavy tank IS in the fall of 1943 and the decommissioning of the KB-1C, plant No. 100 developed a 152-mm self-propelled artillery mount based on the new heavy tank, which was put into service under the symbol ISU- 152 and since November it has been put into serial production, with the simultaneous termination of the production of the SU-152.

Some design changes were made to the design of the ISU-152, based on the results of the experience of combat use of self-propelled artillery mounts SU-152.

Due to the fact that the program for the production of self-propelled artillery installations ISU-152 was not provided with the necessary number of 152-mm ML-20S howitzer guns, in 1944, in parallel with the ISU-152, the production of ISU-122 installations armed with a 122-mm cannon was carried out A-19. Subsequently, the A-19 gun was replaced by a 122-mm D-25S gun mod. 1943 (similar to the one installed on the IS-2 gun) and the installation received the name ISU-122S.

In connection with the armament of the T-34 tank in the fall of 1943 with an 85-mm gun and the need to strengthen the armament of medium self-propelled artillery installations, the GKO, by decree No. artillery mount SU-85.

Plant No. 9, on its own initiative, got involved in this work and, ahead of schedule, designed, tested and presented to Uralmashzavod a 100-mm D-10S gun for installation in a self-propelled gun. On February 15, 1944, Uralmashzavod manufactured two prototypes of the SU-100 installation, one of which was armed with a D-10S gun designed by plant No. 9, and the second with a 100-mm S-34 gun developed by TsAKB. After carrying out factory tests of samples by shooting and mileage, on March 9, the plant presented self-propelled units to the state commission for field tests. On them top scores showed a self-propelled artillery mount with a D-10S cannon designed by plant No. 9, which in July 1944 was adopted by the Red Army under the symbol SU-100. However, due to problems with organizing the serial production of D-10S guns, the production of the SU-100 began only in September 1944. Until that time, Uralmashzavod produced the SU-85M, which differed from the SU-85 in the use of an armored hull new design(with a commander's cupola and thicker armor) designed for the SU-100.

It should be said that according to the experience of summer battles, which showed that not all serial self-propelled artillery installations of the Red Army can successfully fight new German tanks and heavy self-propelled guns. GKO in December 1943 offered the GBTU KA and NKV to design, manufacture and by April 1944 submit for testing self-propelled artillery mounts with high-powered guns the following types:
- with an 85-mm cannon with an initial projectile velocity of 1050 m / s;
- with a 122-mm gun with an initial projectile velocity of 1000 m/s;
- with a 130-mm gun with an initial projectile velocity of 900 m / s;
- with a 152-mm cannon with an initial projectile velocity of 880 m / s.

All of these guns, except for the 85-mm cannon, were supposed to penetrate armor up to 200 mm at ranges of 1500 - 2000 m. Tests of these installations took place in the summer of 1944 - in the spring of 1945, but not a single silt of these guns was put into service.

Along with self-propelled units of domestic production, in parts of the Red Army, American ones supplied to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program were also actively used.

At the end of 1943, the T-18 self-propelled artillery mounts began to arrive first (and in Soviet documents they are referred to as SU-57). The T-48 was a 57 mm cannon mounted on an M3 half-tracked armored personnel carrier. The order for the manufacture of these machines was given by Great Britain, but due to the weakness of weapons, some of the machines were transferred to the Soviet Union. The SU-57 was not popular in the Red Army: the vehicle had large overall dimensions, weak armor protection and armament. However, with proper use, these self-propelled guns could act quite effectively.

In 1944, the Red Army received two anti-aircraft self-propelled guns: self-propelled guns M15 and M17. The first was a combined installation of a 37 mm M1A2 automatic cannon and two 12.7 mm Browning M2 machine guns on an M3 half-track armored personnel carrier. The M17 differed from the M15 in its base (M5 armored personnel carrier) and armament - it had four 12.7 mm Browning M2 machine guns. M15 and M17 were the only self-propelled anti-aircraft guns that were in service with the Red Army during the war. They turned out to be an effective means of protecting tank formations on the march from air attack, and were also successfully used for fighting in cities, firing at upper floors buildings.

In 1944, a small batch of anti-tank self-propelled guns M10 Wolverine ("Wolverine"), created on the basis of a medium american tank M4A2. The armament of the M10 consisted of a 76 mm M7 cannon mounted in a circular rotation turret open at the top. During the fighting, the M10 proved to be a powerful anti-tank weapon. They could successfully deal with heavy German tanks.

Captured German self-propelled guns were also used in the Red Army. However, their number was small and hardly exceeded 80 units. The most commonly used assault guns were StuG III, which were called “artillery assaults” in our army.