While the Napoleonic troops are relaxing with drunkenness and robbery in Moscow, and the regular Russian army is retreating, making cunning maneuvers that will then allow it to rest, gather strength, significantly replenish its composition and defeat the enemy, let's talk about cudgel of the people's war, as we like to call the partisan movement of 1812 with the light hand of Leo Tolstoy.

Partisans of the Denisov detachment
Illustration for Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace
Andrey NIKOLAEV

Firstly, I would like to say that this cudgel has a very remote relation to guerrilla warfare in the form in which it existed. Namely, army partisan detachments of regular military units and Cossacks, created in the Russian army to operate in the rear and on enemy communications. Secondly, even recently reading various materials, not to mention Soviet sources, you often come across the idea that the alleged ideological inspirer and organizer of them was exclusively Denis Davydov, the famous poet and partisan of that time, who was the first to come out with a proposal to create detachments , like the spanish guerilla, through Prince Bagration to Field Marshal Kutuzov before the battle of Borodino. I must say that the dashing hussar himself put a lot of effort into this legend. Happens...

Portrait of Denis Davydov
Yuri IVANOV

In fact, the first partisan detachment in this war was created near Smolensk by order of the same Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, even before Kutuzov was appointed commander in chief. By the time Davydov turned to Bagration with a request to allow the creation of an army partisan detachment, Major General Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode (commander of the first partisan detachment) was already in full swing and successfully smashing the rear of the French. The detachment occupied the cities of Surazh, Velez, Usvyat, constantly threatened the suburbs of Vitebsk, which caused Napoleon to send the Italian division of General Pino to the aid of the Vitebsk garrison. As usual, we have forgotten the affairs of these "Germans" ...

Portrait of General Baron Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode
Unknown artist

After Borodino, in addition to Davydov's (by the way, the smallest detachment), several more were created that began active fighting after leaving Moscow. Some detachments consisted of several regiments and could independently solve major combat missions, for example, the detachment of Major General Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov, which included dragoon, hussar and 3 cavalry regiments. Large detachments were commanded by colonels Vadbolsky, Efremov, Kudashev, captains Seslavin, Figner and others. Many glorious officers fought in partisan detachments, including future satraps(as they were previously presented to us) Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf, Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev.

Portraits of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov and Ivan Efremovich Efremov
George Dow Unknown artist

At the beginning of October 1812, it was decided to surround the Napoleonic army with a ring of army partisan detachments, with a clear action plan and a specific area of ​​\u200b\u200bdeployment for each of them. So, Davydov's detachment was ordered to function between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, Major General Dorokhov - between Gzhatsk and Mozhaisk, Staff Captain Figner - between Mozhaisk and Moscow. In the Mozhaisk area there were also detachments of Colonel Vadbolsky and Colonel Chernozubov.

Portraits of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev and Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky
George Doe

Between Borovsk and Moscow, the detachments of Captain Seslavin and Lieutenant Fonvizin attacked the enemy's communications. To the north of Moscow, a group of detachments under the general command of General Winzingerode conducted an armed struggle. On the Ryazan road, a detachment of Colonel Efremov operated, on Serpukhovskaya - Colonel Kudashev, on Kashirskaya - Major Lesovsky. The main advantage of partisan detachments was their mobility, surprise and swiftness. They never stood in one place, they constantly moved around, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. If necessary, several detachments were temporarily united for large-scale operations.

Portraits of Alexander Samoilovich Figner and Alexander Nikitich Seslavin
Yuri IVANOV

Without detracting from the exploits of the detachment of Denis Davydov and himself, it must be said that many commanders were offended by the memoirist after the publication of his military notes, in which he often exaggerated his own merits and forgot to mention his comrades. To which Davydov simply replied: Fortunately, there is something to say about yourself, why not talk? And it's true, the organizers, Generals Barclay de Tolly and Winzingerode, passed away one after another in 1818, what to remember about them ... And written in a fascinating juicy language, the works of Denis Vasilyevich were very popular in Russia. True, Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky wrote to Xenophon Polevoy in 1832: Between us, be it said, he wrote out more than cut himself the glory of a brave man.

A memoirist, and even more so a poet, and even a hussar, well, how can we do without fantasies :) So let's forgive him these little pranks? ..

Denis Davydov at the head of the partisans in the vicinity of Lyakhovo
A. TELENIK

Portrait of Denis Davydov
Alexander ORLOVSKY

In addition to partisan detachments, there was also the so-called people's war, which was waged by spontaneous self-defense detachments of the villagers and the significance of which, in my opinion, is greatly exaggerated. And it is already teeming with myths ... Now, they say, they concocted a film about the old man Vasilisa Kozhina, whose very existence is still disputed, and nothing can be said about her exploits.

But oddly enough, the same “German” Barclay de Tolly had a hand in this movement, who back in July, without waiting for instructions from above, turned through the Smolensk governor, Baron Casimir Asch, to the inhabitants of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga regions with appeal:

The inhabitants of Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga! Listen to the voice that calls you to your own comfort, to your own safety. Our irreconcilable enemy, having undertaken a greedy intention against us, fed himself hitherto with the hope that his impudence alone would be enough to frighten us, to triumph over us. But our two brave armies, stopping the daring flight of his violence, with their breasts resisted him on our ancient borders ... Avoiding a decisive battle, ... his robber gangs, attacking unarmed villagers, tyrannize over them with all the cruelty of barbarian times: they rob and burn their houses; they desecrate the temples of God... But many of the inhabitants of the province of Smolensk have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the name of the Russian, punish the villains without any mercy. Imitate them all who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign!

Of course, the inhabitants and the peasants behaved differently in the territories left by the Russians. When the French army approached, they moved away from home or into the forests. But often, first of all, some people ruined the estates of their tyrannical landowners (we must not forget that the peasants were serfs), robbed, set fire to, ran away in the hope that the French would come now and free them (the land was full of rumors about Napoleon’s intentions to rid the peasants of serfdom ).

Destruction of the landowner's estate. Patriotic War of 1812
The looting of the landowner's estate by the peasants after the retreat of the Russian troops before Napoleon's army
V.N. KURDYUMOV

During the retreat of our troops and the entry of the French into Russia, the landlord peasants often rose up against their masters, divided the master's estate, even tore up and burned houses, killed landowners and managers- in a word, they smashed the estates. The passing troops joined the peasants and, in turn, carried out the robbery. Our picture depicts an episode from such a joint robbery of the civilian population with the military. The action takes place in one of the rich landowners' estates. The owner himself is no longer there, and the remaining clerk was seized so that he would not interfere. The furniture was taken out into the garden and broken. The statues decorating the garden are broken; crushed flowers. There is also a barrel of wine lying around with the bottom knocked out. The wine spilled. Everyone takes whatever they want. And unnecessary things are thrown away and destroyed. A cavalryman on a horse stands and calmly looks at this picture of destruction.(original caption for illustration)

Partisans of 1812.
Boris ZVORYKIN

Where the landowners behaved like human beings, the peasants and yard people armed themselves with what they could, sometimes under the leadership of the owners themselves, attacked the French detachments, carts and rebuffed them. Some detachments were led by Russian soldiers who fell behind their units due to illness, injury, captivity and subsequent flight from it. So the audience was diverse.

Homeland Defenders
Alexander APSIT

Scouts Scouts
Alexander APSIT

It is also impossible to say that these detachments acted on a permanent basis. They organized for as long as the enemy was on their territory, and then disbanded, all for the same reason that the peasants were serfs. Indeed, even from the militias created at the behest of the emperor, runaway peasants were escorted home and subjected to trial. So the detachment of Kurin, whose exploits were sung by Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, lasted 10 days - from October 5 to October 14, until the French were in Bogorodsk district, and then was disbanded. Yes, and not the entire Russian people participated in the people's war, but only the inhabitants of several provinces where hostilities took place, or adjacent to them.

French guards under the escort of grandmother Spiridonovna
Alexey VENETSIANOV, 1813

I started this whole conversation in order, firstly, to understand that our cudgel of the people's war could not stand any comparison with the Spanish-Portuguese guerilla (you can read a little about this), which we allegedly looked up to, and, secondly, to once again show that the Patriotic War was won primarily thanks to the actions of our commanders, generals, officers , soldier. And the emperor. And not by the forces of the Gerasimov Kurins, the mythical lieutenants Rzhevskys, Vasilis Kozhins and other entertaining characters ... Although they could not do without them ... And more specifically, we will talk more about the guerrilla war ahead ...

And finally, today's picture:

Archpriest of the Cavalier Guard Regiment Gratinsky, serving a prayer service in the parish church of St. Euplas, in Moscow, in the presence of the French on September 27, 1812.
Engraving from a drawing by an unknown artist

... Wishing to create a more favorable attitude towards himself among the population, Napoleon ordered not to interfere with the celebration of worship in churches; but this was possible only in a few temples that were not touched by the enemy. From September 15, divine services were regularly performed in the church of Archdeacon Evpla (on Myasnitskaya); divine services were performed daily in the church of Kharitonius in Ogorodniki. The first evangelism in the church of Peter and Paul on Yakimanka made a particularly deep impression in Zamoskorechye...(w-l Tourist's companion No. 3, published for the centenary of the war of 1812)

Introduction

This paper examines both the partisan movement itself as a whole and the role of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov in it, who commanded one of the numerous partisan detachments created by order of the command and arising spontaneously.

The historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812, namely the role of the partisan movement in it, has almost two hundred years of history. Studies on this topic were written by both Russian and French researchers. In the first period after the end of the war, a large number of eyewitness accounts of recent events appeared (Glinka S.N. Notes on 1812 by Sergei Glinka, the first warrior of the Moscow militia. - St. Petersburg, 1836.)

The historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812 is extensive according to I.P. Liprandi and N.F. Dubrovin, almost 1800 works were written by the end of the nineteenth century. In the first decade of the 20th century, in connection with the centenary of the war, which was widely celebrated in Russia, about 600 more works were published. Studies of the events of 1812 did not stop and in Soviet time. The Soviet scientist E. Tarle devoted most of his life to the study of war and the life of Napoleon (E.V.

At present, there are also many works devoted to the war of 1812, as an example (Troitsky N.A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. - M .: Nauka. 1988., Troitsky N.A. Alexander I and Napoleon. - M .: graduate School. 1991, Troitsky N.A. Soviet historiography of the war of 1812 (Traditions. Stereotypes. Lessons). - M., 1992.

It is quite difficult to determine and analyze the role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, since initially no one tried to trace its role, and when the first attempts were made to investigate this topic, there are practically no living witnesses of past events. IN Soviet period history of Russia, when studying this aspect of the war, researchers were forced to pay more attention to the role of the people - the peasant masses in the victory over the Napoleonic army. Some works published before the 1917 revolution became inaccessible to Soviet historians.

This work consists of two sections: The first of which describes the development of the partisan movement, and the second presents the role of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov in the partisan movement.

Partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812

Even during the retreat to Moscow, the Russian army had the idea of ​​using partisan methods of warfare against the enemy's significantly extended communications. Kutuzov, who at that time avoided major battles with a still fairly strong enemy, while in the Tarutino camp, begins a "small war". In partisan actions against the French conquerors, the efforts of both military partisan detachments and popular formations were successfully combined. "Small war" inflicted irreparable damage to the enemy. Partisan detachments of I.S. Dorohova, A.N. Seslavina, D.V. Davydova, A.S. Figner did not give rest to the enemy day or night, neither on vacation, nor on a campaign.

In a brief analysis of the events of 1812, it would be completely unthinkable to try to give any complete picture of the internal situation in Russia in the year of the Napoleonic invasion. We will try here on a few few pages to find out in the very general view what impression the events made on the different classes of the Russian people. We must begin, of course, with the fundamental question of great historical importance: how did the overwhelming majority of the people, i.e., the serfs of that time—the landlord, state, appanage peasants— react to the invasion?

At first glance, it would seem that we are confronted with a strange phenomenon: the peasantry, which hates serfdom, protests against it with the murders of landlords and unrest, annually registered by statistics, which endangered the entire feudal system in general only 37 - 38 years before in the Pugachev uprising - this same peasantry meets Napoleon as a fierce enemy, sparing no effort, fights him, refuses to do what the peasants did in all of Europe conquered by Napoleon, except for Spain, i.e., refuses to enter into any trade deals with the enemy, burns bread, burns hay and oats, burns his own huts, if there is any hope of burning the French foragers who have climbed there, actively helps the partisans, shows such violent hatred for the invading army, which the French have never seen anywhere, except for the same Spain. Meanwhile, back in 1805-1807, and even at the beginning of the invasion of 1812, rumors circulated among the Russian peasantry, in which the idea of ​​Napoleon was associated with dreams of liberation. It was said about the mythical letter that the French emperor allegedly sent to the tsar, saying that until the tsar liberates the peasants, until then there will be war and there will be no peace. What are the reasons that led to such a sharp turn, to such a decisive change in views?

After all that has been said above, there is no need to repeat that Napoleon invaded Russia as a conqueror, a predator, a merciless destroyer and did not in the least think about freeing the peasants from serfdom. For the Russian peasantry, the defense of Russia from the invading enemy was at the same time the defense of their lives, their families, their property.

The war begins. The French army occupies Lithuania, occupies Belarus. The Belarusian peasant rebels, hoping to free himself from the oppression of the pans. Belarus was in July and August 1812 directly engulfed in violent peasant unrest, which in places turned into open uprisings. The landowners in a panic flee to the cities - to Vilna to Duke Bassano, to Mogilev to Marshal Davout, to Minsk to the Napoleonic General Dombrovsky, to Vitebsk to the emperor himself. They ask for armed assistance against the peasants, they beg for punitive expeditions, since the newly established Polish and Lithuanian gendarmerie, which was newly established by Napoleon, is not strong enough, and the French command is fully prepared to pacify the peasants and restore all serfdom intact. Thus, the actions of Napoleon in Lithuania and Belarus, occupied by his troops, already showed that not only was he not going to help the peasants in their independent attempt to throw off the chains of slavery, but that he would support the feudal gentry with all his might and suppress every peasant with an iron hand. protest against the landowners. This was consistent with his policy: he considered the Polish and Lithuanian nobles the main political force in these places and not only did not want to scare them away, inspiring their peasants with the idea of ​​liberation, but also suppressed huge unrest in Belarus with his military force.

“The nobles of these provinces of Belarus ... paid dearly for their desire to free themselves from Russian rule. Their peasants considered themselves free from the terrible and disastrous slavery, under the yoke of which they were due to the stinginess and debauchery of the nobles. They rebelled in almost all villages, broke the furniture in the houses of their masters, destroyed factories and all establishments and found in the destruction of their dwellings petty tyrants as much barbaric pleasure as the latter used the arts to bring them to poverty. The French guards, invoked by the nobles to protect themselves from their peasants, further increased the frenzy of the people, and the gendarmes either remained indifferent witnesses to the riots, or did not have the means to prevent them "Kharkevich V. 1812 in diaries..., vol. II, pp. 78--79. ( Notes by Benckendorff). - such, for example, is the testimony of A. Kh. Benckendorff (then a colonel in the Winzengerode detachment). There are many such indications.

Marshal Saint-Cyr, who went through the campaign of 1812, directly says in his memoirs that a movement of peasants had definitely begun in Lithuania: they drove the landlords out of their estates. "Napoleon, true to his new system, began to protect the landlords from their serfs, returned the landlords to their estates, from where they had been expelled," and gave them his soldiers to guard against the serfs. The peasant movement, which in some places (in the western provinces) began to take on a very pronounced character, was mercilessly strangled by Napoleon himself both in Lithuania and Belarus.

The feeling of the homeland flared up among the people, especially after the death of Smolensk. Nowhere did Napoleon's army decisively, even in Egypt, even in Syria, behave so unbridled, did not kill and torture the population as brazenly and cruelly as it was in Russia. The French took revenge for the fires of villages, towns and cities, for the burning of Moscow, for the irreconcilable hostility on the part of the Russian people, which they felt from beginning to end during their entire stay in Russia. The ruin of the peasants by the passing army of the conqueror, countless marauders and simply robbing French deserters was so great that hatred of the enemy grew every day.

Recruitment sets in Russia followed one after another and were met by the people not only resignedly, but with an unheard-of and never-before-seen enthusiasm.

Of course, Napoleon was clearly fantasizing and exaggerating when he spoke of the "numerous villages" that asked him to free them, but, undoubtedly, there could not have been single attempts to such an appeal to him, until all the peasants were convinced that Napoleon was not even thinking about destroying them. landlord power and that he came as a conqueror and robber, and not at all as a liberator of the peasants.

Bitterness, which was almost imperceptible until Napoleon went from Vitebsk to Smolensk, which began to manifest itself sharply after the death of Smolensk, which already attracted everyone's attention after Borodino, during the march " great army"from Borodino to Moscow, - now, after the fire of the capital, it has reached an extreme degree among the peasants. The peasants around Moscow not only did not enter into commercial relations with the French, despite all the solicitations and promises, but they brutally killed those foragers and marauders who fell into their hands alive. When the Cossacks led the captured French, the peasants rushed to the convoy, trying to recapture and personally destroy the prisoners. When foraging was accompanied by a large convoy, the peasants burned their stocks (whole villages burned out) and fled to the forests. Those caught desperately defended themselves and perished. The French did not take the peasants prisoner, and sometimes, just in case, even as soon as they approached the village, they began to fire at it in order to destroy the possibility of resistance.

The partisan movement, which began immediately after Borodin, achieved tremendous success only thanks to the most active, voluntary, zealous assistance from the Russian peasantry. But the insatiable anger towards the invaders, destroyers, murderers and rapists, who came from nowhere, manifested itself most of all in the way they went in 1812 to military service and how the Russian peasants fought afterwards.

The irreconcilable hatred of thousands and thousands of peasants, which surrounded Napoleon's great army with a wall, the exploits of unknown heroes - the elder Vasilisa, Fyodor Onufriev, Gerasim Kurin - who, daily risking their lives, going into the forests, hiding in ravines, lay in wait for the French - this is what , which most characteristically expressed peasant sentiments since 1812 and which turned out to be disastrous for Napoleon's army.

It was the Russian peasant who destroyed Murat's magnificent, first in the world cavalry, before the victorious onslaught of which all European armies fled; and the Russian peasant destroyed it, starving its horses, burning hay and oats, for which Napoleon's foragers came, and sometimes burning the foragers themselves.

Representatives of national minorities and individual groups did not concede to the native Russian population in the desire to defend the common fatherland. Don Cossacks, Bashkirs, Tatars, Ural Cossacks, the peoples of the Caucasus fought, judging by all the reviews, remarkably staunchly and courageously. Hero Bagration adequately represented Georgia. The Kalmyks (who made up the Stavropol Kalmyk Regiment) became famous for their bravery in 1812: their "flying detachments" especially distinguished themselves in the second half of the war, when pursuing the retreating enemy. Platov fell in love with the Bashkirs so much that out of two hundred especially distinguished Bashkir riders he formed special detachment, and on July 27, 1812, at Molev-Bolot, this detachment made its first brilliant attack on the French.

About the Jews Denis Davydov speaks very persistently several times as about such an element of the population of the western provinces, on which it was quite possible to rely. The “Collection” of records and memoirs about the Patriotic War, published by the government already in 1813, repeats the same thing, and completely independently of Denis Davydov: “It must be confessed that the Jews do not deserve those reproaches with which they were once weighed down by almost the whole world ... because, in spite of all the tricks of the godless Napoleon, who declared himself a zealous defender of the Jews and the worship they performed, they remained loyal to their former (Russian) government and, in the most possible cases, did not even miss various means of proving by experience their hatred and contempt for the proud and inhuman oppressor peoples ... " Denis Davydov was very upset when one brave man from his detachment, introduced by him to George, did not get this order for a moment solely because of his Jewish religion.

The merchant class, the “middle class” that Napoleon hoped to find in Moscow, showed a spirit of complete intransigence towards the conqueror, although Rostopchin in Moscow was very suspicious of schismatic merchants and believed that they were waiting for something from Napoleon in their hearts. In any case, the merchants did not conduct any trade with the enemy (who very much sought this), did not enter into any transactions with him, and together with the entire population, which only had the material opportunity to do so, left the places occupied by the enemy, abandoning houses, shops, warehouses, storehouses to the mercy of fate. The Moscow merchants donated 10 million rubles for the defense, a huge sum for that time. There were significant donations of money from the merchants of other provinces as well.

The donations were very significant. But if part of the merchants lost a lot from the great ruin created by the invasion, then the other part gained a lot. Many merchant firms "went to live after the Frenchman." We're not talking about such luck-seeking lucky ones as Kremer and Baird (later a famous manufacturer), who got rich on the supply of guns, gunpowder and ammunition.

There were about 150,000 workers in what was then Russia (in 1814, 160,000). The workers were for the most part serfs and worked in the factories of their landlords or in the enterprises of merchants, to whom the landowners handed over the peasants for a certain period, while some of the workers were also civilian employees. Both of them were in most cases closely connected with the countryside, and when the thunderstorm of the twelfth year came, the workers of the places occupied by the enemy fled to the villages. There was also a lot of speculation on weapons. This speculation received a new impetus after the tsar's visit to Moscow. Before the tsar's arrival in Moscow and before his patriotic appeals and the announcement of militias, a saber in Moscow cost 6 rubles or less, and after appeals and the establishment of militias - 30 and 40 rubles; a Tula-made gun before the appeals of the tsar cost from 11 to 15 rubles, and after the appeals - 80 rubles; pistols have risen in price by five to six times. The merchants saw that it was impossible to repulse the enemy with bare hands, and shamelessly took advantage of this opportunity to enrich themselves, as the unfortunate Bestuzhev-Ryumin testifies, who did not manage to leave Moscow in due time, ended up in the Napoleonic "municipality", tried without significant results) to protect the life and safety of the remaining handful of Russians, and in the end, after the departure of the French, he was suspected of treason, was persecuted and reprimanded.

The graciously granted land in the Kozelsk district was given to me by the Kaluga State Chamber, which, it seems, has not been notified to this day.

This simple-hearted “meanwhile” with a direct transition from Napoleon, from whom Russia must be wrested, to the Kaluga State Chamber, from which the “granted” estate must be wrested, is very typical both for the class to which the author of the letter belonged, and for the moment. After all, he is clearly equally sincere in his desire to defeat Napoleon and in his efforts to break the resistance of the Kaluga State Chamber.

Despite the gradually increasing feeling of hatred for the enemy among the people, despite the absence of any noticeable opposition sentiments in the noble class of Russian society, the government was restless in 1812. The disastrous beginning of the war, the ridiculous Drissa camp of the German Ful, where the entire Russian army almost perished, the pursuit of the French army after Barclay and Bagration, the death of Smolensk - all this greatly agitated the minds of the nobility, and the merchants, and the peasantry (especially those affected invasion in neighboring provinces). Rumors that Bagration himself considers Barclay a traitor, that the German Wolzogen, the German Winzengerode and others are snooping around the army, gave a particularly ominous meaning to this endless retreat of Barclay and the generous return to the enemy of almost half of the Russian Empire. The surrender and death of Moscow brought irritation to a rather dangerous point.

Although the mood of the people was such that there was not the slightest need to raise hostility towards the enemy by artificial means, the government nevertheless tried, through the mediation of the synod, to mobilize the clergy for the work of patriotic preaching. The Napoleonic army took church utensils, used church buildings as apartments and often as stables. This provided the main content of the anti-French church sermon.

It must be said that the idea of ​​a guerrilla war was prompted primarily by the example of Spain. This was recognized by the leaders of the Russian partisan movement. Colonel Chuikevich, who wrote his "Discourses on the War of 1812" during this war itself (although the book was published already in March 1813), recalls and uses the Spaniards as a model: "The rapid successes of French weapons in Spain were due to the fact that the inhabitants these countries, seething with vengeance against the French, relied too much on their personal courage and the rightness of their cause. Hastily gathered militias opposed the French armies and were defeated by enemies who outnumbered them and experienced. These unfortunate lessons persuaded the courageous Spaniards to change the face of war. They generously decided to prefer a long-term, but true struggle in their favor. Avoiding general battles with the French forces, they divided their own into parts ... often interrupted communications with France, destroyed the enemy's food and tormented him with uninterrupted marches ... In vain, the French generals passed with a sword in their hands from one part of Spain to another, conquered cities and entire regions. The magnanimous people did not let go of their weapons, the government did not lose courage and remained firm in the intention once adopted: to liberate Spain from the French or to bury itself under the ruins. No, you will not fall, brave Spaniards!” The Russian people's war, as I have already had occasion to observe, was not at all like the Spanish one. It was conducted most of all by Russian peasants already in army and militia uniforms, but this did not make it less popular.

One of the manifestations of the people's war was the partisan movement.

That's how the organization of this case began. Five days before Borodino, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov, who had served as an aide-de-camp with the prince for five years, appeared to Prince Bagration. He outlined his plan to him, which consisted in using Napoleon's colossally extended communication line - from the Neman to Gzhatsk and further Gzhatsk, in the event of further French movement - to launch constant attacks and surprise raids on this line, on warehouses, on couriers with papers, on carts with food. According to Davydov, small cavalry detachments make sudden raids, and, having done their job, the partisans hide from persecution until a new opportunity; they could, moreover, become strongholds and cells for the concentration and arming of the peasants. The case was before Borodin, and, according to Davydov, "the general opinion of that time" was that, having won, Napoleon would make peace and, together with the Russian army, would go to India. “If I must surely die, then I’d rather lie down here; in India, I will disappear with 100 thousand of my compatriots without a name and for a benefit alien to my fatherland, and here I will die under the banner of independence ... ”Davydov D.V. Works, vol. II. - St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 32. - so said Davydov to Prince Bagration. Bagration reported this plan to Kutuzov, but Kutuzov was very cautious and was not inclined to flights of heroic fantasy, however, he allowed Denis Davydov to be given 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks. Bagration was dissatisfied with this stinginess. “I don’t understand the fears of His Serene Highness,” he said, conveying to Davydov about the too modest results of his petition, “is it worth bargaining over several hundred people when it comes to the fact that, if successful, he can deprive the enemy of deliveries, so he needs, in case of failure he will lose only a handful of people. How can it be, the war is not for kissing ... I would give you 3 thousand from the very first time, because I don’t like to do things gropingly, but there’s nothing to talk about; the prince himself appointed the strength of the party; must be obeyed" Davydov D.V. Works, vol. II. - St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 32. Bagration said this five days before his mortal wound in battle, and after his death, Davydov even more so could not hope to get more people. But, anyway, he set off on his journey with his 130 hussars and Cossacks, bypassing the great army behind Napoleon's lines.

Such was the very modest and so far quite inconspicuous beginning of the guerrilla war, which undoubtedly played its role in the history of 1812, and precisely in the second half of the war. Not only career officers became the organizers of partisan detachments. There were also such cases: on August 31, 1812, the Russian rearguard began to retreat in battle from Tsareva-Zaimishch, where the French were already entering. Under the soldier of the dragoon regiment Yermolai Chetvertakov, a horse was wounded, and the rider was taken prisoner. In Gzhatsk, Chetvertakov managed to escape from the convoy, and he appeared in the village of Basmany, which lay far south of the Smolensk high road along which the French army was moving. Here, Chetvertakov came up with a plan for the same partisan war that Davydov also had in those days: Chetvertakov wished to assemble a partisan detachment from the peasants. I will note interesting feature: when, back in 1804, the peasant Chetvertakov was “shaved off his forehead”, he fled from the regiment, was caught and punished with rods. But now he not only decided to fight the enemy with all his might, but also to encourage others to do so. The peasants of the village of Basmany treated him with distrust, and he found only one adherent. Together they went to another village. Along the way, they met two Frenchmen, killed them and changed into their clothes. Having then met (already in the village of Zadkovo) two French cavalrymen, they killed them too and took their horses. The village of Zadkovo provided 47 peasants to help Chetvertakov. Then small squad under the leadership of Chetvertakov, he first killed a party of French cuirassiers numbering 12 people, then partly killed, partly put to flight a French half-company numbering 59 people, selected the crews. These successes made a huge impression, and even now the village of Basmany gave Chetvertakov 253 volunteers. Chetvertakov, an illiterate man, turned out to be an excellent administrator, tactician and strategist of the guerrilla war. Disturbing the enemy with surprise attacks, cleverly and carefully tracking down small French parties and exterminating them with lightning attacks. Chetvertakov managed to defend the vast territory around Gzhatsk from looting robberies. Chetvertakov acted mercilessly, and the bitterness of the peasants was such that it would hardly have been possible to restrain them. They did not take prisoners, but the French also shot without trial, on the spot, those partisans who fell into their hands. In the village of Semionovka, the peasants of Chetvertakov's detachment burned 60 French marauders. As we have seen, the French did the same on occasion.

They started talking about Chetvertakov. At his first demand, about 4 thousand peasants once joined his small (300 people) permanent detachment, and Chetvertakov undertook no more and no less than an open attack on the French battalion with guns, and the battalion retreated. 4 thousand peasants after that went home, and Chetvertakov with his permanent detachment continued his work. Only when the danger had passed and the French left, Chetvertakov appeared in November 1812 in Mogilev in his regiment. General Kologrivov and General Emmanuel, after conducting an investigation, were convinced of the remarkable achievements of Chetvertakov, of the enormous benefits he brought. Wittgenstein asked Barclay to reward Chetvertakov. The award was ... "a sign of a military order" (not George) Russian antiquity, vol. VII, pp. 99--102. That is how the matter ended. For the serf, the path to real distinction was barred, whatever his exploits.

It must be said that the true historical place of the partisans has been disputed more than once. At first, in hot pursuit, from fresh memory, the cases of Denis Davydov, Figner, Seslavin, Dorokhov, Vadbolsky, Kudashev and others were spoken of with enthusiasm. The dashing and boldness of the valiant raids of small parties on large detachments captivated the imagination. Then there was some reaction. The generals and officers of the regular troops, the heroes of Borodin and Maloyaroslavets, were not very willing to put these remote riders on the same level as their comrades, who obeyed no one, who flew in from nowhere, who hid who knows where, who took away the carts, divided the booty, but were unable to withstand a real open battle. with regular units of the retreating French army. On the other hand, Ataman Platov and the Cossack circles insisted that it was the Cossacks who constituted the main force of the partisan detachments and that the glory of the partisans was, in essence, the glory of the Cossack army alone. The French helped a lot to strengthen this point of view: they talked a lot about the terrible harm that the Cossacks brought them, and said almost nothing (or spoke with some disdain) about the partisans. Justice demands that it be admitted that the partisans brought a very great and undoubted benefit from mid-September to the Berezina, i.e., the end of November.

The partisans were excellent and often insanely brave scouts. Figner, the prototype of Tolstoy's Dolokhov, actually went to the French camp in a French uniform and did it several times. Seslavin really crept up to the French non-commissioned officer, put him on his saddle and brought him to the Russian headquarters. Davydov, with a party of 200-300 people, really caused panic and, putting to flight detachments five times as large, took away the convoy, beat off Russian prisoners, and sometimes captured guns. The peasants got along and communicated with the partisans and their commanders much more easily and simply than with the regular units of the army.

The exaggerations made by some partisans in describing their actions caused, among other things, a too harsh assessment from the future Decembrist Prince Sergei Volkonsky, who himself commanded a partisan detachment for some time in 1812: “Describing the partisan actions of my detachment, I will not fool the reader, as many partisans do, with stories of many unprecedented skirmishes and dangers; and at least with my conscientiousness, in comparison with the exaggerated stories of other partisans, I will gain confidence in my notes ” Volkonsky S. G. Notes. - St. Petersburg, 1902, p. 207. . Quite right, there were exaggerations; but the partisans also had indisputable feats of resourcefulness, fearlessness, selflessness, and the partisans firmly occupied their place of honor in the history of the Patriotic War, in the heroic epic of defending the homeland from a foreign conqueror.

He knew how to boast on occasion, but much more moderately, and the "partisan poet" Denis Davydov. But the feeling of truth nevertheless took over from Denis Davydov, and his notes are, no matter what the enemies of the dashing rider may say about them in their time, a precious source for the history of 1812, which, of course, must be treated with serious criticism, but which should not be discarded under any circumstances. Describing a number of feats of arms and remote enterprises of partisan detachments that attacked the rear, on carts, on small detachments of the French army that had strayed away, he at the same time definitely says that the attack of partisans on large units, for example, on Napoleon’s guards, was absolutely beyond their power. . “I cannot be reproached for giving in to anyone in hostility to an encroacher on the independence and honor of my homeland ... My comrades remember, if not my weak successes, then at least my efforts, which tended to harm the enemy during the Patriotic and foreign wars; they also remember my astonishment, my admiration for the exploits of Napoleon, and the respect for his troops that I had in my soul in the heat of battle. A soldier, even with a weapon in my hands, did not cease to do justice to the first soldier of the centuries and the world, I was fascinated by courage, no matter what clothes it was dressed in, no matter where it manifested itself. Although Bagration's "bravo", bursting out in praise of the enemy in the very heat of the Battle of Borodino, echoed in my soul, it did not surprise her. Davydov D. V. Works, vol. III. - St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 77. Such was Davydov's mindset. He behaved like a knight in relation to captured enemies. This cannot be said about many other leaders of partisan detachments. Figner was especially inexorable (he died already in the war of 1813).

The help of the peasantry at the very beginning of the partisan movement was especially important for the partisans. The peasants of the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, the peasants of the village of Nikola-Pogorely near the city of Vyazma, the Bezhetsky, Dorogobuzh, Serpukhov peasants brought very significant benefits to the partisan detachments. They tracked down individual enemy parties and detachments, exterminated French foragers and marauders, and with full readiness delivered food to the partisan detachments for people and feed for horses. Without this help, the partisans would not have been able to achieve even half of the results that they actually achieved.

Then the retreat of the great army began, and it began with the senseless explosion of the Kremlin, which infuriated the anger of the people returning to Moscow, who found the whole city in ruins. This final act - the explosion of the Kremlin - was looked upon as a vicious mockery. The retreat was accompanied by a systematic, on the orders of Napoleon, the burning of cities and villages through which the French army was moving. The peasants, finding dead Russian prisoners on both sides of the road, immediately took an oath not to spare the enemies.

But the actions of the peasants were not limited only to helping the partisan detachments, catching and exterminating the marauders and stragglers, were not limited to fighting the foragers and destroying them, although, we note, this was the most terrible, annihilating blow that the Russian peasants inflicted on the great army, killing it hunger. Gerasim Kurin, a peasant in the village of Pavlova (near the city of Bogorodsk), formed a detachment of peasants, organized them, armed them with weapons taken from the killed French, and together with his assistant, the peasant Stulov, led his detachment against the French and, in a battle with French cavalrymen, put them to flight . Peasant women, embittered by the violence of the French against women who fell into their hands, acted energetically and showed particular cruelty towards the enemy. Rumors (quite reliable and confirmed) spoke of the violence of the French against women falling into their hands. The headman Vasilisa (Sychevsky district of the Smolensk province), who took the French prisoner, personally killed a lot of French soldiers with a pitchfork and a scythe, attacked, as they told about her, the stragglers of the convoys, was no exception. The participation of women in the people's war is noted by all sources. There were whole legends about the same Vasilisa or about the lace-maker Praskovya, who worked near Dukhovshchina, but it is difficult to single out the truth in them, to separate history from fantasy. Official historiography for a long time neglected the collection and clarification of facts in the field of the people's war, dwelling almost exclusively on the actions of the regular army and the leaders of the partisans (although very little and fluently was said about the partisans), and when contemporaries died out, it became even more difficult to collect completely reliable factual material. Of course, offensive actions (like the speeches of Kurin and Stulov or Chetvertakov) were not very frequent; most often, the actions of the peasants were limited to organizing surveillance of the enemy, defending their villages and entire volosts from attacks by the French and marauders, and exterminating the attackers. And this was infinitely more disastrous for the French army than any, even the most successful raids for the peasants, and not the fire of Moscow, not the frost, which almost did not exist until Smolensk itself, but the Russian peasants, who fiercely fought the enemy, dealt a terrible blow to the retreating great armies, surrounded her with a dense wall of implacable hatred and prepared for her final death.

The fears of the government and its restless attitude towards the peasantry in 1812 have already been cited above. Russian government, appears from the following order. Standing near the city of Klin, Captain Naryshkin with a cavalry detachment. He, taking advantage of the ardent desire of the peasants to help the army against the enemy, distributes the extra weapons he has in the detachment to the peasants, and the peasants themselves arm themselves with French weapons, which they remove from the French killed by them - foragers and marauders. Armed in this way, the peasant small parties, rummaging around Moscow, mercilessly killed the French, who tried to go from Moscow to look around the neighborhood for hay and oats for horses. These peasant partisans thus brought enormous benefits. And suddenly Naryshkin receives an unexpected paper from above. Let us leave the word to him: “On the basis of false reports and low slander, I received an order to disarm the peasants and shoot those who would be caught in indignation. Surprised by the order, which did not so much respond to the generous ... behavior of the peasants, I answered that I could not disarm the hands that I armed myself, and which served to destroy the enemies of the fatherland, and call those rebels who sacrificed their lives to defend ... independence , wives and dwellings, and the name of the traitor belongs to those who, at such a sacred moment for Russia, dare to slander her most zealous and faithful defenders ”Kharkevich V. 1812 in diaries ..., vol. II, p. 112.

There are many such cases. There is a number of documentary evidence of the indisputable fact that the government interfered in every possible way with the peasant partisan movement and tried to disorganize it to the best of its ability. It was afraid to give the peasants weapons against the French, they were afraid that these weapons would later be turned against the landowners. Alexander was afraid, the “Novgorod landowner” Arakcheev was afraid, Balashov was afraid, and the super-patriot Rostopchin was afraid, who most of all intimidated the tsar with the ghost of Pugachev. Fortunately for Russia, the peasants in 1812 disobeyed these orders to disarm them and continued to fight the enemy until the invaders were finally expelled from Russia.

Partisan warfare, active peasant struggle, Cossack raids - all this, with increasing malnutrition, with the daily death of horses, forced the French to throw cannons along the road, throw part of the luggage from carts, and most importantly, throw sick and wounded comrades to the fierce death that awaited them, unless they were lucky enough to fall into the hands of the regular army. Exhausted by unprecedented suffering, half-starved, weakened, the troops marched along the completely ruined road, marking their path with the corpses of people and horses. Near Mozhaisk, the retreating army passed by a vast plain, crossed by a ravine and a river, with small hills, with the ruins and blackened logs of two villages. The whole plain was covered with many thousands of rotting, decomposed corpses and men and horses, mangled cannons, rusty weapons lying in disarray and unusable, because the good was carried away. The soldiers of the French army did not immediately recognize scary place. It was Borodino with its still unburied dead. This field now produced a terrifying impression. great battle. Who went to painful suffering and death in last time looked at the comrades already dead. The emperor with the guard was in the forefront. Leaving Vereya on October 28, Napoleon was in Gzhatsk on the 30th, in Vyazma on November 1, in Semlevo on November 2, in Slavkov on the 3rd, in Dorogobuzh on the 5th, in village of Mikhailov and on the 8th entered Smolensk. The army followed him in parts from 8 to 15 November. Throughout this disastrous journey from Maloyaroslavets to Smolensk, all the hopes - both of Napoleon himself and his army - were connected with Smolensk, where food supplies were supposed and the possibility of a somewhat calm stop and rest for tortured, hungry people and horses. The field marshal moved south, along a parallel line, with a slowness that amazed the French. This "parallel pursuit", conceived and carried out by Kutuzov, most likely ruined the Napoleonic army. The French headquarters, of course, did not know this then. It seemed that in Smolensk there would be good vacation, the soldiers will be able to come to their senses, come to their senses from the terrible suffering they endured, but it turned out to be something else. In a dead, half-ruined, half-burnt city, the retreating army was waiting for a blow that finally broke the spirit of many of its units: there were almost no supplies in Smolensk. From that moment on, the retreat finally began to turn into a flight, and everything that was transferred from Maloyaroslavets to Smolensk had to turn pale in front of the abyss that opened up under the feet of the great army after Smolensk and which swallowed it almost entirely.

Essay on the history of a student of grade 11, school 505 Afitova Elena

Partisan movement in the War of 1812

partisan movement, armed struggle popular masses for the freedom and independence of their country or social transformation, conducted in the territory occupied by the enemy (controlled by the reactionary regime). Regular troops operating behind enemy lines may also take part in the Partisan Movement.

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, the armed struggle of the people, mainly the peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of the Napoleonic troops and on their communications. The partisan movement began in Lithuania and Belarus after the retreat of the Russian army. At first, the movement was expressed in the refusal to supply the French army with fodder and food, the massive destruction of stocks of these types of supplies, which created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic troops. With the entry of the pr-ka into the Smolensk, and then into the Moscow and Kaluga provinces, the partisan movement assumed an especially wide scope. At the end of July-August, in Gzhatsky, Belsky, Sychevsky and other counties, the peasants united in foot and horseback partisan detachments armed with pikes, sabers and guns, attacked separate groups of enemy soldiers, foragers and carts, disrupted the communications of the French army. The partisans were a serious fighting force. The number of individual detachments reached 3-6 thousand people. The partisan detachments of G.M. Kurin, S. Emelyanov, V. Polovtsev, V. Kozhina and others became widely known. Imperial law reacted with distrust to the Partisan movement. But in an atmosphere of patriotic upsurge, some landowners and progressive generals (P.I. Bagration, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, A.P. Yermolov and others). Field Marshal M.I., Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, attached particular importance to the people's partisan struggle. Kutuzov. He saw in her great power, capable of inflicting significant damage on the pr-ku, in every possible way contributed to the organization of new detachments, gave instructions on their weapons and instructions on the tactics of guerrilla warfare. After leaving Moscow, the front of the Partisan movement was significantly expanded, and Kutuzov, to his plans, gave it an organized character. This was greatly facilitated by the formation special units from regular troops operating by guerrilla methods. The first such detachment of 130 people was created at the end of August on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov. In September, 36 Cossack, 7 cavalry and 5 infantry regiments, 5 squadrons and 3 battalions acted as part of the army partisan detachments. The detachments were commanded by generals and officers I.S. Dorokhov, M.A. Fonvizin and others. Many peasant detachments, which arose spontaneously, subsequently joined the army or closely cooperated with them. Separate detachments of the formation of bunks were also involved in partisan actions. militia. The partisan movement reached its widest scope in the Moscow, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces. Acting on the communications of the French army, partisan detachments exterminated enemy foragers, captured carts, and reported valuable information about the pr-ke to the Russian command. Under these conditions, Kutuzov set before the Partisan movement broader tasks of interacting with the army and delivering strikes against individual garrisons and reserves of the pr-ka. So, on September 28 (October 10), on the orders of Kutuzov, a detachment of General Dorokhov, with the support of peasant detachments, captured the city of Vereya. As a result of the battle, the French lost about 700 people killed and wounded. In total, in 5 weeks after the Battle of Borodino in 1812, the pr-k lost over 30 thousand people as a result of partisan attacks. Throughout the retreat of the French army, partisan detachments assisted the Russian troops in pursuing and destroying the enemy, attacking his carts and destroying individual detachments. In general, the Partisan movement provided great assistance to the Russian army in defeating the Napoleonic troops and driving them out of Russia.

Causes of guerrilla warfare

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having flared up after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took on more and more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, represented by performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to be created, thousands of folk heroes appeared, talented organizers of the partisan struggle came to the fore.

Why, then, did the disenfranchised peasantry, mercilessly oppressed by the feudal landlords, rise to fight against their seemingly "liberator"? Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at first promising phrases were uttered about the emancipation of the serfs, and even there was talk of the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landlords.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when entering Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was "important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach revolution in Russia."

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf landowners. The interim Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landlords, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving for this if circumstances so require, military force.

Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively join the struggle. In reality, things were different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, the inhabitants went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

Peasants' War

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants took on the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the departure of the population to forests and areas remote from hostilities. And although it was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This did not take long to affect the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers starve, looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.

The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. One French general after the war wrote in his memoirs: "The army could only eat what the marauders, organized in whole detachments, got; Cossacks and peasants daily killed many of our people who dared to go in search." Skirmishes took place in the villages, including shootings, between French soldiers sent for food and peasants. Such skirmishes occurred quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance was born - partisan struggle.

The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants - partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced more and more often to remind the chief of staff Berthier about big losses in people and strictly ordered to highlight all large quantity troops to cover the foragers.

The partisan struggle of the peasants acquired the widest scope in August in the Smolensk province. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky counties, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be held accountable.

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, partisan detachments attacked French parties making their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk partisans, police officer Boguslavskaya and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their detachments with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several partisan detachments on horseback and on foot, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized a defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, and provided significant assistance to the army partisans to Denis Davydov's detachment.

The largest Gzhatsk partisan detachment successfully operated. Its organizer was a soldier of the Elizavetgrad Regiment Fyodor Potopov (Samus). Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself behind enemy lines and, after recovering, immediately set about organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2,000 people (according to other sources, 3,000). Its strike force was a cavalry group of 200 men armed and dressed in French cuirassier armor. The Samusya detachment had its own organization, strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system for warning the population about the approach of the enemy by means of bell ringing and other conventional signs. Often in such cases, the villages were empty, according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes informed when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, one should go into battle. In one of the battles, the members of this detachment managed to capture a cannon. The Samusya detachment inflicted significant damage on the French troops. In the Smolensk province, he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.

Chigvintseva S.V.

Introduction

In our time - the time of grandiose social transformations - the need for a deep understanding of the steep moments in the course of social development, the role of the masses in history, is more acutely felt than ever. In this regard, it seems relevant to us today to address the topic of the partisan movement during the Patriotic War, the 200th anniversary of which our country is celebrating this year.

The purpose of the work is to determine the role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, using the materials of history and literature in an integrated manner.

The objectives of the work are to consider the causes of the emergence of a wide wave of the partisan movement and its significance in the military events of the autumn-winter of 1812.

The theme of the partisan movement of 1812 is represented by a fairly wide range of sources and studies in the historical literature. The drawn range of sources allowed us to divide them into two groups. The first includes legal and government documents. The second group of sources includes diaries of eyewitnesses of the events of the Patriotic War of 1812.

Research methods - analysis of sources, applied a problem-thematic approach to literature, clearly showing the significance of the actions of partisans in alliance with the troops of the people's militia during the autumn-winter period of 1812.

The novelty of the study lies in the integrated approach to using information from literary and historical sources in the analysis of the events of the Patriotic War.

The chronological framework of the study covers the second half of 1812.

The structure of the work corresponds to the set goal and objectives and consists of: an introduction, two chapters with paragraphs, a conclusion, a list of sources and literature used.

ChapterI. Reasons for the development of the partisan movement

Napoleon did not prepare for any of the wars as carefully as for a campaign against Russia. The plan for the upcoming campaign was developed in the most detailed way, the theater of operations was carefully studied, huge warehouses of ammunition, uniforms and food were created. 1,200 thousand people were put under arms. As the great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy rightly notes: “Half of the army was stationed within the vast empire of Napoleon in order to keep the conquered countries in obedience, in which the national liberation movement was rising against the Napoleonic yoke.”

Historian A.Z. Manfred focuses on what Russia knew about Napoleon's preparations for war. The Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince A. B. Kurakin, starting from 1810, delivered to the Russian military ministry accurate information about the number, armament and deployment of French troops. Valuable information was delivered to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Napoleon Ch. Talleyrand, as well as J. Fouche.

Since 1810, the rearmament of the Russian army began, the strengthening of its western borders. However, the archaic recruiting system did not allow to prepare the necessary manpower reserves for the upcoming war. The Russian army numbered about 240 thousand people and was divided into three groups: the first army (M. B. Barclay de Tolly) covered the Petersburg direction, the second (P. I. Bagration) - Moscow, the third (A. P. Tormasov) - Kiev .

The usual tactic of warfare by Napoleon was to win 1-2 major battles and thus decide the outcome of the war. And this time, Napoleon's plan was to use his numerical superiority in border battles to defeat the first and second armies one by one, then capture Moscow and St. Petersburg. Napoleon's strategic plan was frustrated when - in June-August 1812, the Russian armies retreated, they decided to unite in Vitebsk, and then Smolensk. In the very first days, a partisan movement began (20 thousand peasants rose). G.R. Derzhavin wrote about those days:

“In the fiery dawn of the previous battles:
Every village was boiling
Crowds of bearded warriors ...

And cunning warrior
He suddenly called his eagles
And burst into Smolensk ...

We shielded ourselves here
Threshold of Moscow - doors to Russia;
Here the Russians fought like animals,
Like angels! (between 1812-1825)

In August, the army and the people demanded that M. I. Kutuzov be appointed commander-in-chief. The battle of Borodino showed the courage of the Russian army, the French withdrew to their original positions, but Moscow had to surrender to the French.

Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov made a remarkable maneuver: having created the appearance of a retreat along the Ryazan road, he moved with the main forces to the Kaluga road, where he stopped in September 1812 near the village of Tarutino (80 km from Moscow). He wrote: “Always fearing that the enemy would not take control of this road with his main forces, which would deprive the army of all its communications with the most grain-growing provinces, I found it necessary to detach the 6th corps with the general of infantry (infantry - the author) Dokhturov: on Kaluga Borovsky road to the side of the village of Folminsky. Soon after this partisan, Colonel Seslavin really opened the movement of Napoleon, striving with all his forces along this road to Borovsk.

The war of 1812 appears in the image of Tolstoy as a people's war. The author creates many images of peasants, soldiers, whose judgments together make up the people's worldview.

In the Tarutinsky camp, the formation of a new Russian army, the troops were given rest, and the partisan detachments tried to replenish their reserves and equipment. N.A. Durova wrote about those days as follows: “In the evening, our regiment was ordered to be on horseback. ... Now we have become a rearguard and will cover the retreat of the army.

Historian V.I. Babkin believes that "partisan detachments, parts of the militia of the 1st district were an essential element in the plan for preparing and carrying out the victorious offensive of the Russian army." In our opinion, we can agree with the author on this, since in a report to Alexander I, M. I. Kutuzov wrote: “When retreating ... I made it a rule for myself .. to wage an incessant small war, and for this I put ten partisans on the wrong foot in order to be able to take away all means from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of food in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.

However, the researcher L. G. Beskrovny does not agree with our opinion, who believes that the partisans mostly acted spontaneously, without coordinating "their actions with the forces of the high command."

While the Russian army had the opportunity in a calm situation to replenish with new fresh forces, the enemy, surrounded in Moscow, was forced to conduct continuous military operations against the partisans. Thanks, among other things, to the actions of the partisans, there was virtually no break in hostilities against Napoleon during the Tarutino period. Having occupied Moscow, the enemy received neither respite nor peace. On the contrary, during his stay in Moscow, he suffered significant damage from the blows of the people's forces. To help the militia and partisans, M.I. Kutuzov allocated army flying detachments of regular cavalry to strengthen the blockade of Moscow and strike at enemy communications. In our opinion, the clear interaction of the main elements of the "small war" - militias, partisans and army flying detachments, made it possible for M. I. Kutuzov to create a solid foundation for a victorious counteroffensive.

The campaign in Russia was not like those that Napoleon had had to lead before. Armand de Caulaincourt, who was under Napoleon, wrote: “There were no local residents, no prisoners could be taken, no stragglers along the way, we had no spies ... The remaining residents were all armed; no vehicles could be found. Horses were harassed for trips for food ... ". Such was the nature of the "small war". Around the main French forces in Moscow, an internal front was formed, consisting of militias, partisans and flying detachments.

Thus, the main reasons for the rise of a broad wave of the partisan movement were the application of the demands of the French army to the peasants for the delivery of food, uniforms, and fodder; robbery of native villages by the soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; brutal methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "age of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.

ChapterII. The rise of the wave of the partisan movement in the autumn-winter of 1812

On October 10, 1812, being isolated, fearing the indignation of his multinational hungry army, Napoleon left Moscow. Moscow burned for 6 days, 2/3 of the houses died, the peasants went to the forests. A guerrilla war broke out. In the memory of the Russian people, partisan heroes remained, whom L.N. Tolstoy called "the club of the people's war" - D. Davydov, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin, A. S. Figner, the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the elder Vasilisa Kozhina. The partisans destroyed about 30 thousand enemy soldiers during the war years. G.R. dedicated his poems to D. Davydov. Derzhavin, A.N. Seslavin - F.N. Glinka, the patriotism of the common people was sung by V.V. Kapnist.

Among historians, there are different points of view on the role of partisans in the liberation struggle of 1812. Thus, if academician E.V. there was neither occupation nor Russian state power(that is, he actually carried out management functions in it), then the historian A.S. Markin considers this opinion an exaggeration.

If we consider the issue of the emergence of the partisan movement, here you can see different opinions of historians. E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in the Poresensk, Krasinsk and Smolensk counties in July 1812, since the population of these counties first of all suffered from the invaders. But as the enemy army advanced deep into Russia, he notes, the entire population of the Smolensk province rose to the fight. The Sychevsk zemstvo police officer Boguslavsky, the leader of the Sychevsk nobility Nakhimov, Major Emelyanov, retired captain Timashev and others took part in its organization. Historian Troitsky N.A. argues differently - it showed itself later, in Smolensk in August 1812: “The partisans of the Smolensk province dealt a tangible blow to the enemy, and also helped the Russian army a lot. In particular, the detachment of the merchant of the city of Porechye Nikita Minchenkov helped the army detachment to eliminate the French detachment under the command of General Pino.

The episode of the Patriotic War of 1812, connected with the activities of the peasant detachment of Gerasim Matveyevich Kurin (1777-1850), for many decades has served as a textbook illustration of the thesis of the peasant partisan war against the Napoleonic invaders.

On September 24, 1812, the foragers of the French corps of Ney, who arrived from Bogorodsk, plundered and burned the Vokhon village of Stepurino. Kurin expected the appearance of the enemy, dividing his three thousandth squad into three parts, which began to methodically beat the French. On the same day, in the evening, Ney's corps, along with other corps stationed around Moscow, received an order to return to the capital. Upon receiving the news of the occupation of Bogorodsk by the French, the Vokhonsky volost gathering, of course, with the approval of the local head Yegor Semyonovich Stulov, decided to form a squad for self-defense, women, the elderly, children and movable property to hide in the forests. The gathering also instructed the local peasant Gerasim Kurin to command the squad.

One of the large peasant partisan detachments of up to four thousand people was led in the region of the city of Gzhatsk (Moscow region) by the soldier Yeremey Chetvertakov. In the Smolensk province in the Sychevsky district, a partisan detachment of four hundred people was led by a retired soldier S. Yemelyanov The detachment fought 15 battles, destroyed 572 enemy soldiers and captured 325 Frenchmen.

However, it is necessary to note the peculiarity noted by the researcher V. I. Babkin - economic (state) peasants (unlike landowners and monasteries) have always been an island of stability and were not prone to anarchy. For example, by 1812 the Vokhonskaya volost consisted mainly of economic peasants, in comparison with their privately owned counterparts, who had long, by law, enjoyed greater personal freedom.

In our opinion, it is necessary to see the difference between the peasant and army partisan detachments. If the peasant detachments were organized by the peasants G. Kurin, the peasant Vasilisa Kozhina in the Smolensk province, the former ordinary soldier Yeremey Chetvertakov, then the first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F. F. Vintsengerode, who led the combined Kazan Dragoon (equestrian), Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the city of Dukhovshchina.

Seslavin Alexander Nikitich (1780-1858) was a lieutenant general, in 1812 a colonel, commander of the Sumy hussar regiment, who, on behalf of M.I. active Russian army.

A real thunderstorm for the French was the detachment of Denis Davydov. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment. Together with his hussars (riders lightly armed with a saber and a carbine), he retreated as part of the army of P.I. Bagration to Borodin. A passionate desire to be even more useful in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For the "test" M.I. Kutuzov allowed D. Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, D. Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near the villages of Tsareva Zaimishch and Slavkogo, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.

An army partisan flying detachment is a mobile unit deployed to various areas of military operations. For example, a detachment of General I. S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A. S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow. In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I. M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks.

Acting, according to the order of the commander-in-chief, between Mozhaisk and Moscow, a detachment of retired soldiers and Colonel A.S. Figner, along with other partisans, helped armed peasants near Moscow in the extermination of small detachments of marauders, intercepting French couriers and convoys.

In early October 1812, Napoleon, leaving Moscow, moved to Kaluga, where the food warehouses of the Russian army were located, hoping to spend the winter there. Russian troops pursued the enemy, inflicting sensitive blows on him. In those years, M.I. Kutuzov addressed the army with the following words: “... Napoleon, not seeing anything else ahead, as a continuation of a terrible people's war, capable of short time destroy his entire army, seeing in every inhabitant a warrior, a common one ... made a hasty retreat back.

Thus, the general offensive of the Russian army was successfully combined with a "small war". The fight against the enemy, together with the army, was successfully fought by tens of thousands of militia warriors and popular partisan detachments. On December 25, 1812, Alexander I published a special Manifesto on the expulsion of the enemy from Russia and the end of the Patriotic War. On this occasion, N.A. Durova noted in her notes: “The French fought furiously. Ah, man is terrible in his frenzy! All the properties of the wild beast are then united in it. No! This is not courage. I do not know what to call this wild, bestial courage, but it is unworthy of being called fearlessness.

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people, who waged a just, liberation struggle. The reason for the rise of the partisan movement in the autumn-winter of 1812 was the following: the Napoleonic invasion caused enormous damage to the country's economy, brought innumerable misfortunes and suffering to the people. Hundreds of thousands of people died, no less became crippled; many cities and villages were destroyed, many cultural monuments were plundered and destroyed.

The significance of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War was manifested in the following: the actions of the partisans raised the spirit of patriotism in battles with the enemy, the national self-consciousness of the Russian people grew; helping the regular army, the partisans made it clear to Napoleon that he would not win the war with lightning speed, and his plans for world domination were destroyed.

Conclusion

The historical past of the people, historical memory, a system of generally significant patterns of behavior at such critical moments in history as the Patriotic War - this is far from a complete list of those facts that influence the formation of the personality of the 21st century. Hence the relevance of our appeal to the theme of the role of the masses, the organization of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people.

In the course of our work, we came to the following conclusions:

If we consider the question of the emergence of the partisan movement, E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in the Smolensk province; Troitsky N.A. - it showed itself later, in Smolensk; Manfred A.Z. - during the capture of Mogilev and Pskov.

Among the reasons for the emergence of the peasant and army partisan movement, historians distinguish such as: the application to the peasants of the demand of the French army to hand over food, uniforms, fodder to them; robbery of villages by soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; brutal methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "age of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.

The role of the partisan movement in World War II was as follows:

1. replenish the reserves of the Russian army with people and equipment,
2. they destroyed the forces of the French army in small detachments, transmitted information about the French to the Russian army,
3. destroyed carts with food and ammunition that went to the French in Moscow.
4. Napoleon's plans for a blitzkrieg against Russia failed.

The significance of the partisan movement was manifested in the growth of the national consciousness of the peasantry and all strata Russian society, a growing sense of patriotism and responsibility for the preservation of their history and culture. The close interaction of the three forces (militia, peasant partisans and army flying detachments) ensured enormous success in the "small war". The great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy, conveying the spirit of that time, noted: "... the club of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, rose, fell and nailed the French until the whole invasion died."

Notes

From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M .: PBOYuL, 2000, From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day // Tamzhe et al.

Zhilin P.A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974. - S. 93.

From the appeal of M.I. Kutuzov to the army about the beginning of the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day. - M., 2000. - S. 271.

Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. - Kazan, 1979. - S. 45.

Tolstoy L.N. War and peace: in 4 volumes - M., 1987. - V.3. - S. 212.

List of used sources and literature

1. Sources

1.1 Borodino. Documents, letters, memoirs. - M.: Soviet Russia, 1962. - 302 p.

1.2. From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva et al. – M.: PBOYuL, 2000. – P. 268-269.

1.3. From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S.Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G.Georgieva and others - M.: PBOYuL, 2000. - P. 270-271.

1.4. From the appeal of M.I. Kutuzov to the army about the beginning of the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva et al. – M.: PBOYuL, 2000. – P. 271.

1.5.Davydov D.V. Diary of partisan actions // http://www.museum.ru/1812/Library/Davidov1/index.html.

2. Literature

2.1. Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 - M.: Sotsekgiz, 1962. - 212 p.

2.2. Beskrovny L. G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of History. - 1972. - No. 1. - S. 13-17.

2.3. Bogdanov L.P. The Russian army in 1812. Organization, management, armament. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1979. - 275 p.

2.4. Glinka F.N. Partisan Seslavin //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.5. Derzhavin G.R. 1812 //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.6. Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. Reissue. - Kazan, 1979. - 200 p.

2.7. Zhilin P.A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974. - 184 p.

2.8. Kapnist V.V. Vision of a Russian crying over Moscow in 1812…//lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, ragged and frozen, Napoleon's army was brutally beaten by flying and peasant partisan detachments of Russians.

Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants

The greatly stretched Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile detachments to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive him of food and fodder.

During World War II, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of the commander-in-chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and groups of peasant partisans, united spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to the actual sabotage actions, the flying detachments were also engaged in reconnaissance. Peasant self-defense forces basically fought off the enemy from their villages and villages.

Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman

Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and offered it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, to capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, to beat small groups of the enemy.

Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of ​​the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. More than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment were killed by Davydov's cavalrymen, another 100 were captured. This operation was followed by others, also successful.

Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first, the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant's caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants did not believe him.

Over time, the detachment of Denis Davydov increased to 300 people. The cavalry attacked the French units, sometimes having a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking the carts and freeing the prisoners, it even happened to capture enemy artillery.

After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. Mostly these were Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the city of Vereya near Moscow. The combined partisan groups could withstand the large military formations of Napoleon's army. So, at the end of October, during a battle near the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousandth brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat was a terrible blow. On the contrary, this success encouraged the Russian troops and set them up for further victories.

Peasant Initiative

A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of the French units was made by the peasants who organized themselves into combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov's instructions. willingly helping flying units and parts of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the peasants at the same time harmed the French everywhere and in every possible way - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, often at the approaches of the enemy they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce resistance on the ground intensified as the demoralized French army became more and more a crowd of robbers and marauders.

One of these detachments was assembled by the dragoons Yermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants how to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy carts with food and livestock. At one time, up to 4 thousand people entered the Chetvertakov compound. And such cases when peasant partisans, led by military personnel, noble landowners, successfully operated in the rear of the Napoleonic troops, were not isolated.