Russian artillery of the First World War. The weapon that started World War I. Battle of Scra di Legen
At midnight on July 28, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum presented to Serbia in connection with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand expired. Since Serbia refused to fully satisfy it, Austria-Hungary considered itself entitled to begin fighting. On July 29, at 00:30, the Austro-Hungarian artillery located near Belgrade “spoke” (the Serbian capital was almost on the very border). The first shot was fired by the gun of the 1st battery of the 38th artillery regiment under the command of Captain Wödl. It was armed with 8-cm M 1905 field guns, which formed the basis of the Austro-Hungarian field artillery.
In the second half of the 19th century, in all European states, the doctrine of the field use of artillery provided for its use in the first line for direct support of the infantry - the guns fired direct fire at a distance of no more than 4–5 km. The key characteristic of field guns was considered to be the rate of fire - it was precisely over its improvement that the design idea worked. The main obstacle to increasing the rate of fire was the design of the carriages: the gun barrel was mounted on trunnions, being rigidly connected to the carriage in the longitudinal plane. When fired, the recoil force was perceived by the entire carriage, which inevitably knocked down the aiming, so the crew had to spend precious seconds of the battle restoring it. The designers of the French company Schneider managed to find a way out: in the 75-mm field gun of the 1897 model they developed, the barrel was movably installed in the cradle (on rollers), and the recoil devices (rollback brake and knurler) ensured its return to its original position.
The solution proposed by the French was quickly adopted by Germany and Russia. In particular, three-inch (76.2 mm) rapid-fire field guns of the 1900 and 1902 models were adopted in Russia. Their creation, and most importantly, the rapid and massive introduction into the troops caused serious concern for the Austro-Hungarian military, since the main weapon of their field artillery - the 9-cm cannon M 1875/96 - was no match for the new artillery systems of a potential enemy. Since 1899, new samples were tested in Austria-Hungary - an 8 cm gun, a 10 cm light howitzer and a 15 cm heavy howitzer - however, they had an archaic design without recoil devices and were equipped with bronze barrels. If for howitzers the issue of rate of fire was not acute, then for a light field gun it was a key one. Therefore, the military rejected the 8-cm gun M 1899, demanding from the designers a new, faster-firing gun - "no worse than the Russians."
New wine in old wineskins
Since the new gun was required “for yesterday”, the specialists of the Vienna Arsenal took the path of least resistance: they took the barrel of the rejected M 1899 gun and equipped it with recoil devices, as well as a new horizontal wedge gate (instead of a piston one). The barrel remained bronze - thus, during the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian army was the only one in which the main field gun did not have a steel barrel. However, the quality of the material used - the so-called "Thiele bronze" - was very high. Suffice it to say that in early June 1915, the 4th battery of the 16th field artillery regiment used up almost 40,000 shells, but not a single barrel was damaged.
“Thiele Bronze”, also called “steel-bronze”, was used to make barrels using a special technology: punches of a diameter slightly larger than the barrel itself were sequentially driven through the drilled bore. As a result, precipitation and compaction of the metal occurred, and its inner layers became much stronger. Such a barrel did not allow the use of large charges of gunpowder (due to its lower strength compared to steel), but it did not corrode and break, and most importantly, it cost much less.
In fairness, we note that field guns with steel barrels were also developed in Austria-Hungary. In the years 1900-1904, the Skoda company created seven good examples of such guns, but they were all rejected. The reason for this was the negative attitude towards steel of the then inspector general of the Austro-Hungarian army, Alfred von Kropachek, who had his share in the patent for the Thiele bronze and received a substantial income from its production.
Design
The caliber of the field gun, which received the designation "8 cm Feldkanone M 1905" ("8 cm field gun M 1905"), was 76.5 mm (as usual, it was rounded in official Austrian designations). The forged barrel was 30 calibers long. The recoil devices consisted of a hydraulic recoil brake and a spring knurler. The recoil length was 1.26 m. With an initial projectile velocity of 500 m / s, the firing range reached 7 km - before the war this was considered quite sufficient, but the experience of the first battles showed the need to increase this indicator. As often happens, the soldier's ingenuity found a way out - they dug a recess under the frame in the position, due to which the elevation angle increased, and the firing range increased by a kilometer. In the normal position (with the frame on the ground), the vertical aiming angle ranged from −5 ° to + 23 °, horizontal - 4 ° to the right and left.
By the beginning of the First World War, the 8-cm gun M 1905 formed the basis of the artillery park of the Austro-Hungarian army
Source: passioncompassion1418.com
The gun ammunition included unitary shots with two types of shells. A shrapnel projectile was considered the main one, which weighed 6.68 kg and was equipped with 316 bullets weighing 9 g each and 16 bullets weighing 13 g each. It was supplemented by a grenade weighing 6.8 kg, equipped with an ammonal charge weighing 120 g. Thanks to unitary loading, the rate of fire was quite high - 7-10 rds / min. Aiming was carried out using a monoblock sight, which consisted of a level, goniometer and sight.
The gun had a single-beam L-shaped carriage typical of its time and was equipped with an armored shield 3.5 mm thick. The diameter of the wooden wheels was 1300 mm, the track width was 1610 mm. In the combat position, the gun weighed 1020 kg, in the stowed position (with a limber) - 1907 kg, with full equipment and crew - over 2.5 tons. The gun was towed by a six-horse team (another such team towed a charging box). Interestingly, the charging box was armored - in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian instructions, it was installed next to the gun and served as additional protection for the servants, which consisted of six people.
The regular ammunition of the 8-cm field gun consisted of 656 shells: 33 shells (24 shrapnel and 9 grenades) were in the limber; 93 - in the charging box; 360 - in the ammunition column and 170 - in the artillery park. According to this indicator, the Austro-Hungarian army was at the level of other European armed forces(although, for example, in the Russian army, the regular three-inch ammunition consisted of 1000 shells per barrel).
Modifications
In 1908, a modification of the field gun was created, adapted for use in mountainous conditions. The gun, which received the designation M 1905/08 (the abbreviated M 5/8 was more often used), could be disassembled into five parts - a shield with an axle, a barrel, a cradle, a carriage and wheels. The mass of these units was too large to be transported in horse packs, but they could be transported on special sledges, delivering the gun to hard-to-reach mountain positions.
In 1909, using the artillery part of the M 1905 cannon, a gun for fortress artillery was created, adapted for mounting on a casemate gun carriage. The gun received the designation "8 cm M 5 Minimalschartenkanone", which can literally be translated as "the gun for the minimum size of the embrasure". A short designation was also used - M 5/9.
Service and combat use
The refinement of the M 1905 gun dragged on for several years - the designers for a long time could not achieve normal operation recoil devices and shutter. Only in 1907 did the production of a serial batch begin, and in the fall of the following year, the first cannons of the new model arrived in parts of the 7th and 13th artillery brigades. In addition to the Vienna Arsenal, the production of field guns was established by the Skoda company (although bronze barrels were supplied from Vienna). Quite quickly, it was possible to re-equip all 14 artillery brigades of the regular army (each brigade united the artillery of one army corps), but later the pace of supplies decreased, and by the beginning of the First World War, most artillery units Landwehr and Honvedsheg (Austrian and Hungarian reserve formations) were still armed with "antique" 9-cm guns M 1875/96.
By the beginning of the war, field guns were in service with the following units:
- forty-two field artillery regiments (one per infantry division; originally had five six-gun batteries, and after the outbreak of war an additional sixth battery was created in each regiment);
- nine divisions of horse artillery (one per cavalry division; three four-gun batteries in each division);
- reserve units - eight landwehr field artillery divisions (two six-gun batteries each), as well as eight field artillery regiments and one horse artillery division of the Honvedsheg.
As in the era of the Napoleonic Wars, at the beginning of World War I, Austro-Hungarian artillerymen tried to fire direct fire from open firing positions.
Source: landships.info
During the First World War, 8-cm field guns were widely used by the Austro-Hungarian army on all fronts. Combat use revealed some shortcomings - and not so much the gun itself, but the concept of its use. The Austro-Hungarian army did not draw proper conclusions from the experience of the Russo-Japanese and Balkan wars. In 1914, the Austro-Hungarian batteries of field guns, as in the 19th century, were trained to fire only direct fire from open firing positions. At the same time, by the beginning of the war, Russian artillery already had a proven tactic of firing from closed positions. The Imperial-Royal field artillery had to learn, as they say, "on the go." There were also complaints about the damaging properties of shrapnel - its nine-gram bullets often could not cause any serious injury to enemy personnel and were completely powerless even against weak shelters.
In the initial period of the war, field gun regiments sometimes achieved impressive results, firing from open positions as a kind of "long-range machine guns." However, more often they had to endure defeats - as, for example, on August 28, 1914, when the 17th field artillery regiment was completely defeated in the battle of Komarov, losing 25 guns and 500 people.
Not being a specialized mountain gun, the M 5/8 gun was widely used in mountainous areas.
Source: landships.info
Taking into account the lessons of the first battles, the Austro-Hungarian command "shifted the focus" from cannons to howitzers capable of firing on hinged trajectories from closed positions. At the beginning of the First World War, guns accounted for approximately 60% of field artillery (1734 guns out of 2842), but later this proportion changed significantly not in favor of guns. In 1916, compared with 1914, the number of batteries of field guns decreased by 31 - from 269 to 238. At the same time, 141 new batteries of field howitzers were formed. In 1917, the situation with guns changed slightly in the direction of increasing their number - the Austrians formed 20 new batteries. At the same time, 119 new howitzer batteries were formed in the same year (!). In 1918, the Austro-Hungarian artillery underwent a major reorganization: instead of homogeneous regiments, mixed regiments appeared in it (each with three batteries of 10-cm light howitzers and two batteries of 8-cm field guns). By the end of the war, the Austro-Hungarian army had 291 batteries of 8 cm field guns.
During the First World War, 8-cm field guns were also used as anti-aircraft guns. To do this, the guns were placed on various kinds of improvised installations, which provided a large elevation angle and circular fire. The first case of using the M 1905 cannon for firing at air targets was noted in November 1915, when it was used to protect an observation balloon near Belgrade from enemy fighters.
Later, on the basis of the M 5/8 gun, a full-fledged anti-aircraft gun was created, which was a field gun barrel superimposed on a pedestal installation developed by the Skoda plant. The gun received the designation "8 cm Luftfahrzeugabwehr-Kanone M5 / 8 M.P." (The abbreviation "M.P." meant "Mittelpivotlafette" - "carriage with a central pin"). In a combat position, such an anti-aircraft gun weighed 2470 kg and had circular horizontal fire, and the vertical aiming angle ranged from -10 ° to + 80 °. The effective range of fire against air targets reached 3600 m.
During the First World War, artillery played a key role on the battlefield. The hostilities lasted for four whole years, although many believed that they would be as fleeting as possible. First of all, this was due to the fact that Russia built the organization of its artillery on the principle of the transience of armed confrontation. Therefore, the war, as expected, was supposed to be maneuverable. One of the main qualities of artillery was tactical mobility.
Target
The main purpose of artillery in World War I was to defeat the enemy's manpower. This was especially effective, since there were no serious fortified positions at that time. The core of the artillery that worked in the field was made up of light cannons, the main ammunition for which was shrapnel. At that time, military tacticians believed that due to high speed projectile it is possible to perform all the tasks that are assigned to artillery.
In this regard, the French cannon of the 1897 model stood out, which, in terms of its technical and tactical characteristics, was among the leaders on the battlefield. At the same time, in terms of its initial speed, it was significantly inferior to the Russian three-inch gun, but it compensated for this due to profitable shells, which were spent more economically during the battle. Moreover, the gun had a high stability, which led to a significant rate of fire.
In Russian artillery in World War I, the three-inch gun stood out, which was especially effective during flanking fire. With fire, she could cover an area up to 800 meters with a width of about 100 meters.
Many military experts noted that the Russian and French field guns had no equal in the struggle for destruction.
Equipment of the Russian Corps
The field artillery of the First World War stood out among other armies for its powerful equipment. True, if before the war light guns were mainly used, then during the battles a shortage of heavy artillery began to be felt.
Basically, the organization of the Russian artillery troops was the result of an underestimation of machine-gun and rifle fire by the opponents. Artillery was required primarily to support the infantry attack, and not to conduct independent artillery preparation.
Organization of German artillery
German artillery in the First World War was organized in a fundamentally different way. Here everything was built on an attempt to foresee the nature of the coming battle. The Germans were armed with corps and divisional artillery. Therefore, by 1914, when positional warfare began to be actively used, the Germans began to equip each division with howitzers and heavy guns.
This led to the fact that field maneuvering became the main means for achieving tactical success, moreover, in artillery power, the German army surpassed many of its opponents. It was also important that the Germans took into account the increased initial velocity of the shells.
Situation during the war
Thus, during the First World War, artillery became the leading means of warfare for many powers. The main qualities that began to be presented to field guns were mobility in conditions of mobile warfare. This trend began to determine the organization of the battle, the quantitative ratio of troops, the proportional ratio of heavy and light artillery.
So, at the very beginning of the war, the Russian troops were armed with about three and a half guns per thousand bayonets, the Germans had about 6.5 of them. At the same time, Russia had almost 7 thousand light guns and only about 240 heavy guns. The Germans had 6.5 thousand light guns, but almost 2 thousand heavy guns.
These indicators clearly illustrate the views of military leaders on the use of artillery in the First World War. Also, they can give an impression of the resources with which each of the key powers entered into this confrontation. It is obvious that it was the German artillery in the First World War that was more in line with the requirements of modern warfare.
bomber
Russian artillery in the First World War was widely represented by Aazen bombers. These were special stock mortars, which the famous designer Nils Aazen created in France in 1915, when it became obvious that the available units of military equipment did not allow the Russian army to fight on a par with opponents.
Aasen himself had French citizenship, and was of Norwegian origin. His bomb launcher was produced in Russia from 1915 to 1916, and was actively used by Russian artillery in the First World War.
The bomber was very reliable, it had a steel barrel, it was loaded from the side of the treasury in a separate type. The projectile itself was a cartridge case used for the Gras rifle, which was outdated by that time. A large number of these rifles were transferred by France to Russian troops. This mortar had a hinged bolt, and the carriage was of a frame type, standing on four pillars. The lifting mechanism was firmly attached to the rear of the barrel. The total weight of the gun was about 25 kilograms.
With the help of a bomb-launcher, it was possible to fire directly, and he also had a grenade in his ammunition load, equipped with shrapnel.
At the same time, he had one, but a very significant drawback, due to which the shooting became unsafe for the calculation itself. The thing was that with the upper bolt open, the firing pin was sunk to a very shallow depth. It was necessary to carefully monitor that the sleeve was sent manually, and not with the help of a shutter. This was especially important when firing at an angle of about 30 degrees.
If these rules were not respected, then a premature shot occurred when the shutter was not fully closed.
76 mm anti-aircraft gun
One of the most popular guns in the artillery of the Russian army in the First World War was the 76 mm. For the first time in our country, it was produced for firing at air targets.
Its project was developed by military engineer Mikhail Rozenberg. It was supposed that it would be specifically used against airplanes, but in the end such a proposal was rejected. It was believed that there was no need for special anti-aircraft artillery.
Only in 1913 the project was approved by the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The next year it was transferred to the gun. It turned out to be semi-automatic, by that time it was realized that special artillery for firing at air targets was needed.
Since 1915, Russian artillery in the First World War began to use this gun. For this, a separate battery was equipped, armed with four guns, which were based on armored vehicles. They also stored spare charges.
During the war, these guns were sent to the front in 1915. In the very first battle, they were able to repel the attack of 9 German aircraft, while two of them were shot down. These were the first aerial targets shot down by Russian artillery.
Some of the guns were mounted not on cars, but on railway cars, similar batteries began to form by 1917.
The gun turned out so successful that it was also used during the Great Patriotic War.
Fortress artillery was still actively used in the First World War, and after it ended, the need for such guns finally came to naught. The reason was that the defensive role of fortresses faded into the background.
At the same time, Russia had a very extensive fortress artillery. By the beginning of the war, there were four artillery fortress regiments in service, which were combined into brigades, there were also 52 separate fortress battalions, 15 companies and 5 so-called sortie batteries (in wartime conditions, their number increased to 16).
In total, during the years of the First World War, about 40 artillery systems were used in the Russian army, however, most of them were very outdated by that time.
After the end of the war, fortress artillery practically ceased to be used at all.
Much of the fighting took place at sea. The naval artillery of the First World War played a decisive role in them.
For example, large-caliber weapons were rightfully considered the main weapon at sea. Therefore, by the total number of heavy guns and the total weight of the fleet, it was possible to determine how strong the fleet of a particular country was.
By and large, all the heavy guns of that time could be conditionally divided into two types. These are English and German. The first category included guns developed by Armstrong, and the second - produced by the Krupp company, which became famous for its steel during the Second World War.
The English had a barrel, which was covered with a casing from above. In the German artillery of the First World War, special cylinders were used, which were put on top of each other in such a way that the outer row completely covered the places of internal joints and associations.
The German design was adopted by most countries, including Russia, as it was objectively considered more progressive. English guns lasted until the 20s of the XX century, and after that they also switched to German technology.
It was these guns that were used on ships for naval battles. They were especially common in the era of dreadnoughts, differing only in minor details, in particular the number of guns in the tower. For example, for the French battleship Normandy, a special four-gun turret was developed, in which there were two pairs of guns at once.
As already different, the heavy artillery of the First World War determined the outcome of more than one battle. It was characterized by the possibility of firing at long distances, and was able to effectively hit the enemy from cover.
Before the First World War, heavy guns were almost always part of the fortress artillery, but heavy field artillery at that time was just beginning to take shape. At the same time, the urgent need for it was felt even during Russo-Japanese War.
The First World War, almost from the very beginning, had a pronounced positional character. It became obvious that without heavy guns it would not be possible to carry out a single successful offensive of the troops. After all, for this it was necessary to effectively destroy the first line of defense of the enemy, as well as move further, while remaining in a safe shelter. Field heavy artillery became one of the main ones during the war, including siege functions.
In 1916-1917, on the initiative of Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, who at that time held the post of inspector general of artillery, a reserve was formed for the High Command, called special-purpose heavy artillery. It consisted of six artillery brigades.
The formation of this unit took place in conditions of high secrecy in Tsarskoye Selo. In total, during the war, more than five hundred such batteries were created, which included more than two thousand guns.
The most famous German artillery weapon of the First World War was the Big Bertha mortar, also called the Fat Bertha.
The project was developed back in 1904, but this gun was built and launched into mass production only in 1914. The work was carried out at the factories of Krupp.
The main creators of the "Big Bertha" were a major German designer, Professor Fritz Rauschenberger, who worked in the German concern "Krupp", as well as his colleague and predecessor named Dreger. It was they who nicknamed this 420-mm cannon "Fatty Bertha", dedicating it to the granddaughter of Alfred Krupp, the "cannon king" of the early 20th century, who brought his enterprise to the world leaders, making the company one of the most successful among other arms manufacturers.
At the moment when this mortar was launched into industrial production, its actual owner was the granddaughter of the legendary Krupp, whose name was Bertha.
Mortar "Big Bertha" was actively used in the artillery of Germany. In the First World War, it was intended to destroy the strongest fortifications of that time. At the same time, the gun itself was produced in two versions at once. The first was semi-stationary and bore the code "Gamma type", and the towed one was designated as "M type". The mass of the guns was very large - 140 and 42 tons, respectively. Only about half of all mortars produced were towed, the rest had to be disassembled into three parts in order to move them from place to place using steam tractors. In order to assemble the entire unit on alert, it took at least 12 hours.
The rate of fire of the gun reached one shot in 8 minutes. At the same time, its power was so great that rivals preferred not to face it on the battlefield.
Interestingly, for different types guns used a variety of ammunition. For example, the so-called type M fired powerful and heavy projectiles, the mass of which exceeded 800 kilograms. And the range of one shot reached almost nine and a half kilometers. For the Gamma type, lighter projectiles were used, which, on the other hand, could fly over 14 kilometers, and heavier ones, reaching the target at a distance of 12.5 kilometers.
The impact force of the mortar was also achieved due to the large number of fragments, each of the shells scattered into about 15 thousand pieces, many of which could be deadly. Among the defenders of the fortresses, armor-piercing shells were considered the most terrible, which could not stop even ceilings of steel and concrete about two meters thick.
The Russian army suffered serious losses from the "Big Bertha". This is despite the fact that its characteristics were at the disposal of intelligence even before the start of the First World War. In many domestic fortresses, work began on the modernization of old and the construction of fundamentally new structures for defense. They were originally designed to hit the shells that the Big Bertha was equipped with. The thickness of the overlap for this ranged from three and a half to five meters.
When the First World War began, German troops began to effectively use the "Bertha" during the siege of the Belgian and French fortresses. They sought to break the will of the enemy, forcing the garrisons to surrender one by one. As a rule, this required only two mortars, about 350 shells and no more than 24 hours, during which the siege continued. On the Western Front, this mortar was even nicknamed the "fort killer".
In total, 9 of these legendary guns were produced at Krupp's enterprises, which participated in the capture of Liege, the siege of Verdun. To capture the Osovets fortress, 4 "Big Berts" were brought at once, 2 of which were successfully destroyed by the defenders.
By the way, there is a very widespread opinion that the "Big Bertha" was used for the siege of Paris in 1918. But in reality this is not so. The French capital was shelled by the Colossal gun. "Big Bertha" still remained in the memory of many as one of the most powerful artillery pieces of the First World War.
During the years of the First World War, a huge leap in military production was made in the Russian Empire, and the pace of industrial development was so high that it was not repeated after that in Russian history, and was not repeated in any of the segments of the Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The basis of this leap was the rapid expansion of military production capacities in 1914-1917. due to four factors:
1) Expansion of the capacities of existing state military enterprises.
2) Massive involvement of private industry in military production.
3) A large-scale emergency construction program for new state-owned factories.
4) Extensive construction of new private military factories secured by state orders.
The Russian Empire entered the war with an unfinished military reform that was to be completed by 1917. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the planning authorities of absolutely all countries made a mistake with the forecasts of the course of the war. Nobody thought that it would last more than a year.
Accordingly, military stocks were designed for relatively short-term hostilities. Industry, including Russia, could not quickly compensate for the decline that a long war implies.
Therefore, the purchase of weapons and ammunition abroad were natural and justified. The tsarist government ordered 1.5 million rifles of the 1891-1910 model. from the American companies "Remington" and "Westinghouse", plus 300 thousand rifles under the Russian three-line cartridge from the "Winchester". But this order, for the most part, did not reach Russia - after the Bolshevik revolution, the US government confiscated the rifles and adopted them as US Rifle, Cal. .30, Model of 1916.
How great were the needs of the Russian army for weapons at the beginning of the First World War, and how they were subsequently satisfied by the domestic industry, can be judged by the figures that are now quite accessible. They were analyzed in his study by Mikhail Barabanov, former scientific editor of the Arms Export magazine, since 2008 a researcher at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, editor-in-chief of the Moscow Defense Brief magazine. The following are excerpts from his work.
Rifles. 
Rifles were produced at three state-owned arms factories - Tula, Izhevsk and Sestroretsk. The military power of all of them for the summer of 1914 was estimated in total at 525 thousand rifles per year. In reality, during the first five months of the war from August to December 1914, these three factories produced 134,000 rifles.
Since 1915, accelerated work was undertaken to expand all three factories, as a result of which the monthly production of rifles for them from December 1914 to December 1916 was quadrupled - from 33.3 thousand to 127.2 thousand pieces . In 1916 alone, the productivity of each of the three plants was doubled, and the actual delivery was: the Tula plant 648.8 thousand rifles, Izhevsk - 504.9 thousand and Sestroretsky - 147.8 thousand, a total of 1301.4 thousand. rifles in 1916
In 1915, appropriations were approved for the construction of a second arms factory in Tula with an annual capacity of 500 thousand rifles per year, and in the future it was supposed to be merged with the Tula Arms Plant with a total total capacity of 3,500 rifles per day. In addition, money was allocated for the purchase of equipment from Remington (1691 machines) for the manufacture of another 2 thousand rifles per day! In total, the entire Tula weapons complex was supposed to produce 2 million rifles per year. The construction of the 2nd plant was started in the summer of 1916 and was to be completed by the beginning of 1918.
In 1916, the construction of a new state-owned Yekaterinoslav Arms Plant near Samara began, with a capacity of 800,000 rifles per year.
Thus, in 1918, the annual production capacity of the Russian industry for the production of rifles (without machine guns) should have been 3.8 million pieces, which meant an increase of 7.5 times in relation to the mobilization capacities of 1914 and a tripling in relation to the release of 1916. This overlapped the applications of the Headquarters (2.5 million rifles per year) by one and a half times.
Ammo.
In 1914, in Russia, three state-owned cartridge factories were engaged in the production of rifle cartridges - Petrograd, Tula and Lugansk. The maximum capacity of each of these plants was 150 million cartridges per year with one-shift operation (450 million in total). In fact, all three plants already in the peaceful 1914 should have produced a total of a third more - the state order amounted to 600 million cartridges.
From the beginning of 1915, great efforts were made to expand the capacities of all three factories, as a result of which the production of Russian three-line cartridges was tripled from December 1914 to November 1916 - from 53.8 million to 150 million pieces. In 1916 alone, the total output of Russian cartridges was increased one and a half times (up to 1.482 billion pieces). In 1917, while maintaining productivity, it was expected to supply 1.8 billion rounds of ammunition, plus the receipt of approximately the same number of Russian cartridges from imports. In 1915-1917. the number of pieces of equipment of all three cartridge factories doubled. Think about it, 3 billion rounds a year!
The rate in 1916 made clearly excessive demands for cartridges - for example, at the inter-allied conference in January 1917, the need was estimated at 500 million cartridges per month (including 325 million Russians), which gave an expense of 6 billion per year, or twice as high as the consumption of 1916, and this with sufficient supply of cartridges to the units by the beginning of 1917.
In July 1916, the construction of the Simbirsk Cartridge Plant began (with a capacity of 840 million cartridges per year). In general, the total expected capacity of the Russian cartridge industry for 1918 can be calculated up to 3 billion cartridges per year.
Machine guns.
In fact, until the coup of 1917, only the Tula Arms Plant was producing easel machine guns, which increased their production to 1200 units per month by January 1917. Thus, in relation to December 1915, the growth was 2.4 times, and in relation to December 1914 - seven times. During 1916, the production of machine guns almost tripled (from 4251 to 11072 pieces), and in 1917 the Tula plant was expected to supply 15 thousand machine guns.
Together with large import orders (in 1917, the delivery of up to 25 thousand imported heavy machine guns and up to 20 thousand light machine guns was expected), this should have satisfied the requests of the Stavka. In exaggerated hopes of imports, private industry proposals for the production of easel machine guns were rejected by the GAU (Main Artillery Directorate).
The production of Madsen light machine guns was organized at the Kovrov Machine Gun Plant, which was being built under an agreement with Madsen. An agreement on this with the issuance of an order to the syndicate in 15 thousand light machine guns was concluded in April 1916, the contract was signed in September, and the construction of the plant began in August 1916 and was carried out at a very fast pace. The assembly of the first batch of machine guns was made in August 1917. By the beginning of 1918, despite the "revolutionary" mess, the plant was ready. The production of machine guns was planned at 4,000 pieces in the first half of the year of work, followed by an output of 1,000 pieces per month and bringing it up to 2.5-3 thousand units. light machine guns month.
However, contrary to popular belief, the armies of the countries participating in the First World War were driven into fortifications not by machine guns, but by light field artillery and shrapnel.
A good example is the armament of the Russian infantry division in 1914, where there were only 32 Maxims in the machine gun teams of the regiments, but 48 Death Scythes in the artillery brigade of the division. In one Russian shrapnel projectile there were 260 bullets, in a Maxim machine-gun belt - 250 rounds. Artillery was definitely more effective than machine guns!
Light weapons. 
The production of light and mountain three-inch artillery was carried out at the Petrograd state and Perm gun factories. In 1915, the private Putilov Plant (which was eventually nationalized at the end of 1916), as well as the private "Tsaritsyn Group of Plants" (Sormovsky Plant, Lessner Plant, Petrogradsky Metallic and Kolomensky) were connected to production. As a result, the monthly production of guns of the 1902 model increased over 22 months (from January 1915 to October 1916) by more than 13 times (!!!) - from 35 to 472 systems.
To further expand artillery production, at the end of 1916, the construction of a powerful Saratov state-owned gun factory began. Due to the revolution of February 1917, construction was stopped in initial stage.
Thus, with a monthly requirement for 1917, declared by the Headquarters in January 1917, of 490 field and 70 mountain 3-inch guns, Russian industry had actually already reached its supply by that time, and in 1917-1918, apparently would greatly exceed this requirement. With the commissioning of the Saratov plant, it was possible to expect the production of more than 700 field guns and 100 mountain guns per month (assuming the retirement of 300 guns per month by execution without taking into account combat losses) ...
It should be added that in 1916 the Obukhov plant began mastering the 37-mm Rosenberg trench gun. Of the first order of 400 new systems from March 1916, 170 guns were delivered already in 1916, the rest were scheduled for delivery in 1917. There is no doubt that this would be followed by new mass orders for these guns.
Heavy weapons. 
By the beginning of the war, the production of 48-linear howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model was carried out at the Putilov factory, the Obukhov factory and the Petrograd gun factory, and the 6-inch howitzers of the 1909 and 1910 model were carried out at the Putilov and Perm factories.
The release of heavy artillery increased very quickly. In the first half of 1915, only 128 heavy artillery pieces were manufactured, but in a year and a half the volume increased by 7 times! In total, in 1917, without a revolution, the GAU (without Morved) by industry should have been estimated to have delivered up to 2000 Russian-made heavy guns (against 900 in 1916).
The second new center for the production of heavy artillery was to be the Saratov State Gun Plant with an annual program for heavy guns: 42-lin guns - 300, 48-lin howitzers - 300, 6-inch howitzers - 300, 6-inch fortress guns - 190, 8 -dm howitzers - 48. Due to the revolution of February 1917, the construction was stopped at the initial stage. Among other measures considered by 1917 to increase the production of heavy artillery were the issuance of an order for 48-lin howitzers to the private "Tsaritsyn Group of Plants", as well as the development in 1917 of the production of 12-inch howitzers and new "light" 16-inch howitzers for built since 1913 with the participation of Vickers Tsaritsyno plant for the production of naval heavy artillery (RAOAZ), whose construction was carried out sluggishly during the WWI, but the first stage of which was expected in July 1916 of the year, and commissioning in the spring of 1917.
With the commissioning of the howitzer plant at the Putilov plant and the first stage of the Tsaritsyn plant, Russian industry in 1918 would have reached an annual output of at least 2600 heavy artillery systems, and more likely more. In fact, this meant that the applications of the 1916 Headquarters for heavy artillery could be covered by Russian industry by the end of 1917.
According to imports in 1917 - early 1918. about 1000 more heavy artillery systems were to be imported. In total, the total Russian heavy artillery, even minus losses, could reach the number of 5000 guns by the end of 1918, i.e. be comparable in number to the French.
Shells. 
The main role in the shell production along the line of the GAU was played by the Perm plant, as well as the Putilov plant, which eventually united a number of other private enterprises around itself (the Russian Society, the Russian-Baltic and Kolomenskoye). Thus, the Perm plant, with an annual estimated capacity of 3-dm shells of 500 thousand units, already in 1915 produced 1.5 million shells, and in 1916 - 2.31 million shells. The Putilov plant with its cooperation produced in 1914 only 75 thousand 3-dm shells, and in 1916 - 5.1 million shells.
If in 1914 the entire Russian industry produced 516 thousand 3-dm shells, then in 1915 - already 8.825 million according to Barsukov, and 10 million according to Manikovsky, and in 1916 - already 26.9 million. shots according to Barsukov. Reports from the War Ministry give even more significant figures for the supply of Russian-made 3-inch shells to the army - in 1915, 12.3 million shells, and in 1916, 29.4 million rounds. Thus, the annual production of 3-dm shells in 1916 practically tripled, and the monthly production of 3-dm shells from January 1915 to December 1916 increased 12 times!
Barabanov writes that, according to all calculations, the requirements of the army for shells would have been more than satisfied in 1917 only by domestic production. “Most likely, by 1918, Russian light artillery would have come up with a frank overstocking of ammunition,” in particular, he believes, “and if the pace of production and deliveries were maintained and at least limitedly increased by the end of 1918, the warehouses would generally be bursting with huge stocks 3 dm shells".
The Russian Empire achieved a colossal and still underestimated jump in military production in 1914-1917. The growth of military production and development of the defense industry in 1914-1917 were probably the largest in Russian history, surpassing in relative numbers any jumps in military production in the Soviet period, including the Great Patriotic War.
The Russian Empire has demonstrated a high ability to invest in the military industry and the real possibility of a gigantic increase in the power and capabilities of the PKK in the shortest possible time.
The well-known organization of the authorized GAU Vankov attracted 442 (!) Private factories to cooperation in military production. The conversion was not invented under Yeltsin, but under him it was carried out in one direction. In the Russian Empire, it was considered normal that if your private factory did not receive a military order today, then you produce, for example, blanks for handicraftsmen, and "if there is war tomorrow", then instead of samovars, cartridges and shells begin to leave your production lines. And it was very honorable (and profitable!) to be among the firms trusted by the state.
In general, the same assessment of the pre-revolutionary defense industry is given by S.V. Volkov: "During 1915-16, a giant leap was made in arming and supplying the army. And it had great inertia - the production that was established led to the fact that by the spring of 1917 the Russian army was overwhelmed with weapons and ammunition" .
But the Bolshevik non-humans who captured the central warehouses, these reserves were enough for the entire war of 1917-1922.
Russia is the only country involved in the First World War that did not have food problems. None. Not only in 1917, but also in 1918.
The Russian Empire at the time of its exit from the First World War had a huge mobilization resource. Only 39% of men of the corresponding age were called up in our country, while, for example, in Germany and France - over 80%.
Russia has actually demonstrated the mobilization ability of the economy. By 1917-1918, the country almost completely provided itself with weapons and ammunition of domestic production (for a number of items - with a strong supply).
Russia was, as they say, in step with the times: a significant increase in armored forces was expected in the army and new capacities in the field of aircraft construction were being prepared.
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Greece before entering World War I
After the Balkan wars of 1912-13, which were victorious for the Greek weapons, a short period of peace followed, which was used to reorganize the country, which doubled its territory. In 1913, a temporary organization of the army was established, which did not have time to become permanent, since mobilization was announced in November 1915, in response to the mobilization announced by Bulgaria, which entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. Greece entered the First World War belatedly, due to the confrontation between King Constantine and Prime Minister E. Venizelos. Balkan wars. Venizelos' response to the German-Austrian remark that allied agreements could and could be violated remained in the collective memory of the Serbian people: "Greece is too small a country to commit such a great disgrace":308. King Constantine, whose wife was Kaiser Wilhelm's sister, was confident in the victory of the Central Powers and insisted that Greece should remain neutral. His decision was not shaken either by the promises of the Entente for territorial acquisitions in Northern Epirus, nor by the promises of Britain to transfer the island of Cyprus to Greece. But neutrality did not prevent Venizelos from assisting in the evacuation of the defeated Serbian army to the Greek island of Corfu and allowing the Entente troops to land in Thessaloniki to organize the Macedonian Front, where the Serbian divisions were then transferred. The surrender by the supporters of Constantine of the forts of Rupel on the Greek-Bulgarian border to the German-Bulgarians, which opened the last road to Eastern Macedonia, was regarded by the supporters of Venizelos as a national betrayal and led to the National Schism and the formation of the Government of National Defense in Thessaloniki. Greece was split into two states. The Government of the National Defense began the formation of volunteer divisions to participate in the war on the side of the Entente on the Macedonian front, and then mobilized in the territories under its control.
It should be noted that along with E. Venizelos and Admiral P. Koundouriotis, a member of the National Defense triumvirate was the co-author of the 75 mm Schneider-Danglis mountain gun, Artillery General Panagiotis Danglis, who became the commander of the National Defense Volunteer Army.
Greece's entry into the war
From September 1916, the government of National Defense in Thessaloniki reinforced the Entente forces on the Macedonian front, initially with the Greek Serres Division, which entered the battles in the Axios River sector and on May 14, 1917, took part in the battle of Ravina. In May, two more Greek divisions (Archipelago and Crete) entered the battles on the Macedonian front. In the summer of 1917, after the deposition of King Constantine, the relocation of the National Defense government to Athens, and the official declaration of war by Greece against the Central Powers, three (volunteer) divisions were reinforced with 7 more divisions through mobilization. The participation of 10 Greek divisions in the battles had a decisive influence on the course of the war on the Macedonian front, changing the balance of power in favor of the allies, and made a decisive contribution to the outcome of the war on this front. On May 27, 1918, the Archipelago Division, which was included in the 1st group of divisions, developed an offensive on the German-Bulgarian front south of the Jena spurs, supported from the flanks by the divisions of Crete and Serres. This attack, which became known as the attack on Scra di Legen, after the height of the same name, was a complete success, proved the combat capability of the Greek divisions and approved the confidence of the allied command in the Greek army.
Participation of Greek artillery in the First World War
As far as artillery was concerned, until the outbreak of the First World War, the provisional organization of November 1913 remained in force. In February 1914, the personal weapons of artillerymen were determined: for sergeants and corporals of field and horse artillery - a saber and a revolver, for corporals of mountain and garrison artillery - a carbine and a bayonet. After 1917, the artillery of each division increased by 2 battalions of mountain artillery and a heavy artillery formation was formed. A transport corps was formed, where officers from the abolished material and technical artillery corps were transferred. The Greek artillery in the period 1917-1918 consisted of: 3 field artillery regiments in each army corps with 75 mm Schneider-Kane (Kane, Gustav) and Skoda guns. 1 regiment of heavy artillery in the Army, with 120 mm De Bange guns with a firing range of 11,000 m 1 regiment of 155 mm howitzers in the Army 20 mountain artillery battalions which were provided two (2) each division with 65 mm Schneider or 75 mm Schneider guns - Danglis or Krupa (from the trophies of the Balkan wars).
Artillery of the National Defense Government Army
The initial composition of the Greek Army (corps) of the Government of National Defense, organized in stages from September 1916 to April 1917 and which became the first Greek formation to fight on the side of the Allies, included 3 infantry divisions. These 3 divisions were called the Divisions of Serres, Archipelago and Crete. Each of these divisions had 2 mountain artillery divisions with 75 mm Schneider-Danglis guns (Serr Division with Σ1 and Σ2 divisions, Archipelago Division with Αρ1 and Αρ2 divisions and Crete Division with Κ1 and Κ2 divisions, which corresponded to the initial letters of the name of the divisions). In addition to the divisions under the direct control of the divisions, the National Defense Army Corps had 1 field artillery regiment at its disposal, with a total of 9 batteries of 75 mm Schneider-Kane guns and organized into 3 field artillery divisions. Gradually, from December 1917, the mobilization of the Α΄ and Β΄ army corps began, which consisted of Ι, ΙΙ, ΧΙΙI and ΙΙΙ, IV, XΙV infantry divisions, respectively. Artillery directly subordinated to the Α΄ Army Corps consisted of the Α΄ Field Artillery Regiment, which consisted of 9 batteries of 75 mm Schneider-Kane guns, organized into 3 divisions (Ι, ΙΙ and ΙΙΙ). In addition, each division of the Α΄ army corps (Ι, ΙΙ and ΧΙΙΙ infantry divisions) had 2 divisions with 75 mm Schneider-Danglis guns (a total of 6 divisions - Ια-Ιβ-ΙΙα-ΙΙβ-ΧΙΙΙα and ΧΙΙΙβ). Accordingly, the Β΄ field artillery regiment with 9 batteries of Schneider-Kane 75 mm guns was directly subordinate to the Β΄ army corps. Each division of this corps also had 2 mountain artillery divisions with 75 mm Schneider-Danglis guns. In total, the corps had 6 divisions of mountain artillery (ΙΙΙα-ΙΙΙβ-ΙVα-ΙVβ-ΧΙVα and ΧIVβ). In addition to the above-mentioned army corps, a separate (independent) Yanin Division (ΙΧ infantry division), which had mountain artillery divisions ΙΧα and ΙXβ. In terms of the number of artillery pieces that each division had, in September 1918, the Serre Division had 16 guns, Crete Division 16, Archipelago Division 28, Ι Division 23, ΙΙ Division 17, ΙΙΙ Division 16, ΙV Division 22, Separate (ΙΧ) Yanin Division 28, ΧΙΙΙ Division 17, ΧΙV Division 16. In addition, the Army formations had 72 guns, while outside the divisions, the National Defense Army Corps (ΣΣΕΑ) and the Α΄ Army Corps had 33 guns each. In total, in 1918, and with the completion of mobilization, the Greek army had 337 Schneider-Danglis 75 mm guns for mountain artillery battalions and Schneider-Kane 75 mm guns for field artillery battalions. The regiment of heavy artillery had 120 mm heavy guns of the De Bange type.
The National Defense Field Artillery Regiment was subordinated to the Archipelago Division, while the Α΄ Artillery Regiment was assigned to the Α΄ Army Corps on the front of the Strimonas River. A separate field artillery battalion followed the ΙΧ division. Of the heavy artillery regiments, the Ι and ΙΙ battalions and the Ι battalion of mortars (mortars) formed a heavy artillery group, under the command of Colonel Markos Drakos, which was transferred to the 1st group of divisions. The ΙΙ division of heavy guns and the ΙΙ division of mortars were transferred to the front of the Strimonas River at the disposal of the Α΄ army corps. The ΙΙΙ battalion of howitzers was placed at the disposal of the ΧΙΙ British Army Corps in the Doirana sector.
Significant battles involving Greek artillery
The main battles on the Macedonian front with the participation of Greek artillery were the battles: at Ravina (14/27-5-1917), at Skra (27-5/9-6-1918), near the Strymonas River (from 18 to 28-9 and from 1 to 11-10-1918), under Doiran (5 and 19/9 1918) under Kerkini (25-9 and 9-10-1918), under Jena (21-9 and 4-10-1918), under Golo Bilu (16-9-1918), at Zborska (17-9-1918), at Preslap (17-9-1918) and Erigon (from 16 to 22-9 - 1918) The most significant of these was the Battle of Skra-di- Legen May 30, 1918.
Battle of Scra di Legen
In the spring of 1918, as part of the general plan of the allies and in order to block (distract) as many enemy forces as possible on the Macedonian front, it was decided to launch a series of large-scale offensives. The zone of operations of the 1st group of divisions, specifically the western sector, was occupied by the National Defense Army Corps (ΣΣΕΑ), with the divisions of Crete and the Archipelago at the forefront. The objective goal of the Commander-in-Chief A. Guillaume was to occupy the Scra di Legen mountain range, which was a ledge of the Bulgarian front. It was a fortified position, equipped with a large number of machine guns and mortars, which dominated the line of Greek units located at a short distance from this difficult position to occupy. The commander-in-chief wanted to improve the front line in the sector where the Greek units were located and use the possible Greek success for subsequent wider offensive operations.
The Cretan Division was deployed on the eastern (right) flank of the sector, the Archipelago Division on the western (left) flank. The Serre Division was originally on the second line of the front, but on April 18 it was deployed to the left of the Archipelago Division, which took over the sector from Croup di Bergerie to Bistrita, where the left flank of the Army National Defense Corps began. According to the orders of the 1st Group of Divisions, the offensive of the Corps of the Army of National Defense in general terms included the main attack in the center of the location undertaken by the Archipelago Division (5th and 6th Regiments of the Archipelago and 1st Serres Regiment) and the auxiliary (secondary) attack of the Crete Division (7th Regiment and Ι Battalion 8th regiment). In addition, minor attacks were made by the Serre Division (2nd and 3rd Serre Regiments) after an attack by the II Battalion of the 2nd Regiment against Block Rocheux. This Greek force was supported by 1 field artillery regiment with 3 battalions of 3 batteries of 75 mm Schneider-Kane field guns. In addition, each division had 2 mountain artillery divisions with 75 mm Schneider-Danglis guns.
Commander-in-Chief Guillaume reinforced the 1st group of divisions with 3 light artillery battalions, 5 heavy batteries, 1 trench artillery battery. In total, the offensive of the Archipelago Division was to be supported by the following artillery forces: 44 mountain guns (24 French, 20 Greek), 48 field guns (French), 36 heavy guns of various calibers (34 French and 2 English), 10 trench guns (2 French 240 mm, 6 French and 2 Greek 58 mm). A total of 138 guns. In addition, 9 Greek 120 mm long guns, 20 French 200 mm long guns, 4 French 105 mm long guns, 32 French 155 mm long guns were provided for the offensive. A total of 65 long-barreled guns. The total number of barrels of all types and diameters is 203. The artillery preparation of the allied forces began in the sector of the 22nd French division two days before the offensive and in the sector of the divisions of Crete and the Archipelago the day before. On April 15, by order of the commander-in-chief, the artillery provided to the 1st group of divisions was increased to 4 light artillery battalions, 12 heavy artillery batteries and 2 trench artillery batteries. It was decided to start the operation in the second half of May.
In the offensive sector, the German-Bulgarian forces were represented mainly by the 5th Bulgarian division, which was the right flank of the 1st Bulgarian army.
On May 25, allied aviation discovered new positions of enemy batteries in the Humas region. So in this region the total number of field and mountain batteries of the German-Bulgarians reached 20 (88 guns). If we take into account the 13 batteries found in the Gurinchet and Gevgelia sector, that is, 40 field and mountain guns, 8 heavy and 4 anti-aircraft guns, the total number of guns available to the 5th Bulgarian division reached 140.
On the eve of the offensive, on May 29, 1918, artillery preparation was programmed in the sector of the corps of the National Defense Army, especially in the sector of the Archipelago Division, which began at 05:10 with all available artillery. At 10:00 the bombardment of the Bulgarian positions was interrupted for 30 minutes to allow the airplanes to take photographs to evaluate the effectiveness of the artillery fire. At 10:30 the shelling of the Bulgarian positions began again and continued until 16:00, when it was again interrupted for aerial photography and evaluation of the effectiveness of the shooting. Insufficiently hit targets were fired again. Their destruction was considered completed at 19:30. The Bulgarian artillery responded with occasional salvos against the forward and allied batteries deployed at Point O and at Kupa, but allied artillery silenced them at 08:30. At 16:05, when the allied artillery interrupted their shelling for half an hour, the German-Bulgarian artillery opened barrage fire for 6-8 minutes and fell silent again. Allied artillery observers confirmed reaching breaches in the barbed wire entanglement as early as noon. At 04:30 on May 30, all allied artillery opened fire. Heavy artillery fired against the Tumulus-Pyton-Volan line. At 04:45 field and mountain batteries opened barrage fire with 8 volleys per minute. The artillery continued to support the advance of the Greek infantry throughout its attack, both in the sector of the Archipelago Division and in the sectors of the Serres and Crete Divisions. The glory of the victory at Scra di Legen remained with the Greek infantry, but military analysts note that without the participation of Greek and allied artillery, it would not have been achieved. Only in one case were losses from the fire of their own artillery in the sector of the 1st regiment of Serr. The success of the Greek infantry was facilitated by both rain and light fog during its attack, and the destruction of enemy observation posts during the artillery preparation of the allied artillery. In addition, only a few enemy batteries survived the devastating fire of the allied artillery.
In addition to a large number of prisoners (1835 people, including 35 officers), the Greek units captured 32 guns and 12 trench mortars of the Bulgarians. The success of the Greek army was also impressive for the Allies, who considered the Bulgarian positions on Skra impregnable, given that a year earlier, in March 1917, the French 112th division had failed to occupy them. The battle of Scra di Legen received a great response in Greece. The Greeks for a time forgot about their political passions of the National Schism and remembered the glorious days of the recent victorious Balkan wars. The morale of the Greek army again became high, its fighting efficiency and courage were noted by world public opinion and, in particular, by the allied command. The Greek military was flattered by the statement of Commander Guillaume, who described the Greek infantry as " infantry of unsurpassed courage and exceptional (brilliant) impulse". But most importantly, the Greek victory showed that the morale of the Bulgarian army was broken, which accelerated the allied offensive on the Macedonian front in September 1918.
Ukrainian campaign
The dispatch of the Greek corps was made in a hurry. Thus, the dispatch of troops from Thessaloniki was carried out in stages, mainly on French transports and without heavy weapons delivered later.
The expeditionary force did not have a centralized Greek command. Upon the arrival of the Greek units, they passed under the command of local French commanders and dispersed into smaller formations, battalions and companies without communication with each other.
However, the French did not have any specific plan of operations.
On January 20, 1919, the first units of the ΙΙ Greek division landed in Odessa - the 34th and 7th infantry regiments. The 2nd regiment of the ΧΙΙΙ division landed on March 24 in Sevastopol. A few days later, the rest of the units landed. However, out of the three divisions planned to participate in the expedition, only two, ΙΙ and ΧΙΙΙ divisions, ultimately took part in the campaign.
Ι division "did not reach" Russia. A few months later, Greece was involved by the Entente in the larger Asia Minor campaign, which escalated into a full-scale war. Ι division became the first unit to land on May 15, 1919 in Smyrna: A-178.
Greek artillery in the Ukrainian campaign
The participation of Greek artillery in the Ukrainian campaign was limited. The artillery was represented by two battalions of mountain guns, the personnel of which consisted of 19 officers and 599 privates. The ΙΙα division (commander Major Konstantin Mamuris) was represented by the 1st (commander Lieutenant Plutarch Haloftis) and 2nd (commander Lieutenant Konstantin Vasilakis) batteries. The ΙΙβ division (commander Major Konstantin Matalas) was represented by the 1st (commander Lieutenant Dimitris Kapetanpoulos) and 2nd (commander Captain Dimitris Anastasakos) batteries.
The main battles of the Greek units in support of the White Army and the French troops were: the defense of Kherson on 7 / 20-3-1919, near Berezovka 18 / 31-3, near Serbka from March 22 to 31, near Odessa from March 21 to 24, near Sevastopol April 16/29-4-1919.
On March 19, the Greek units formed a front to cover Odessa in the Serbka region. This front began to be strengthened by the arrival of French and Russian units. On March 26, the front advanced on the right flank to Kapitanskaya, reinforced by a White Army brigade, a Russian 120-mm heavy artillery battery and attached two Evzone battalions. Additionally, these forces were given a French 75-mm artillery squadron and 2 cavalry squadrons (one French and one Romanian). The general command of the front was taken by General Nerel, commander of the 30th French division.
The incessant shelling of armored trains forced the left flank of the defenders to retreat to Bolshoi Buyalyk. These positions were occupied by the Red Army. The commander of the 3rd Greek regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Kondilis, launched a counterattack and re-occupied all the positions left at the Serbka station. The Red Army, building up its forces, attempted to encircle the defenders.
2 Greek battalions of the 5/42 Evzone Guards Regiment (Colonel Plastiras) north of the Buyalik railway station. - The 1st Greek battalion of the 3rd regiment on the heights east of the village of Buyalyk. - 2nd Greek battalion of the 3rd regiment, in reserve, at Buyalyk station. - 3rd Greek battalion of the 3rd regiment, in reserve at Riendza station. - A unit of Greek mountain artillery, with a French battery attached to it, behind the location of two Evzone battalions. - 1 Greek battalion of the 34th regiment, in Kremidovka, at the disposal of General Nerel, providing his headquarters. - The 3rd Greek Battalion of the 5/42 Evzone Regiment, in the Pavlinka area, as a cover and reserve. - The Russian brigade with the rest of the French forces on the Kapitanka-Aleksandrovskaya line, east of Buyalyk.
Artillery is called the "god of war". It was created and still exists at the crossroads of many sciences. It has long been customary that the high rank of "artilleryman" implies awareness of exact sciences the ability to make quick and accurate decisions. The book traces the path of development of world and Russian artillery, tells about outstanding achievements Russian designers who created formidable military equipment.
Before the shots of the Russo-Japanese War had yet been heard, menacing signs of a new armed clash between largest states peace. The empires of Europe persistently strove for a redivision of the world; each demanded a place of honor among the other, most powerful capitalist states.
Two warring coalitions were formed: Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and England, France and Russia, on the other. All the major countries of Europe were intensively preparing for a bloody massacre, unprecedented in its scale and cruelty. It broke out in 1914, turning almost half the world into a blazing fire. It was the First World War 1914-1918.
On the eve of it, most military theorists believed that the war would be extremely maneuverable and short-lived. It was assumed that offensive operations would have to be carried out in a situation where the enemy himself would also be in constant motion, he would certainly attack without resorting to shelters. So thought the tops of the Russian army, contrary to the experience of the war with Japan. And this experience showed that the troops are increasingly taking advantage of various terrain conditions in order to become invisible, in order to more reliably hide, even during oncoming combat clashes.
Preparations for war were carried out on the basis of the idea of decisive offensive actions. Defense was considered something reprehensible, even shameful. Only the so-called active defense was recognized, the purpose of which was to upset the advancing enemy with fire, undermine his forces, in order to then himself go on a decisive offensive and defeat him.
These views on the nature of the coming war left a deep imprint on the development of Russian artillery before the World War. Just as the tsarist government was in bondage to the French banks, so the highest military authorities tsarist Russia were captured by the theoretical views of the French General Staff. Mainly from the French military experts, the high command of the Russian army borrowed the doctrine of maneuverable and short-term warfare, contrary to the lessons of past wars with Turkey and Japan. From the French, the desire for "unity of caliber and projectile" passed into the Russian artillery. The famous French artilleryman Langlois suggested that the army should be armed mainly with one type of gun. Since it was believed that an exceptionally mobile, maneuverable war was ahead, Langlois concluded that all combat missions in such a war could be perfectly resolved by a relatively small-caliber rapid-fire cannon, easily moved and firing shells of great lethal force at the advancing enemy. As such a universal weapon, the French offered a 75-mm cannon.
Such views were very to the taste of the Russian military ministry. Such a “unity of caliber and projectile”, firstly, reduced the cost of the production of artillery materiel and, secondly, greatly simplified the training in shooting and the use of artillery in battle. And in the War Department, considerations of financial savings were often considered much more important than technical and tactical expediency.
The Russian artillery already had such a cannon, which, according to Langlois, could become a universal weapon. It was a 76-mm rapid-fire cannon of the 1902 model. Created by talented Russian artillerymen-inventors, this cannon was very high quality. At that time, she was one of the best among this type and with honor passed the combat test in the Russo-Japanese War.
The 76mm gun fired its projectiles at high muzzle velocity along a very shallow trajectory. Thanks to this, she inflicted serious damage when firing shrapnel at targets located in open areas. The strength of shrapnel fire was so great that one Russian battery could literally destroy an inadvertently opened infantry battalion or even an entire cavalry regiment in a few minutes. The 76-mm cannon was also distinguished by its high rate of fire - up to twenty rounds per minute.
Blind admiration for foreign military thought, excessive enthusiasm for the undoubtedly excellent qualities of the 76-mm cannon and considerations of financial savings led to the fact that the military leaders of tsarist Russia remained deaf to the warning voice of individual experts who referred to the experience of previous wars - the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Japanese . During these wars, in practice, on the battlefields, it has already been proved more than once that it is impossible to get by with only one type of artillery piece that, in addition to a rapid-fire field gun, it is also necessary to have a sufficient number of mounted fire weapons - howitzers and heavy artillery. And yet, on the eve of World War II, the Russian War Ministry was still chasing a illusory ideal: to equip field artillery with a single caliber gun with a single projectile.
Meanwhile, the 76-millimeter field gun, so powerful at hitting open targets, was exceptionally weak at firing at hidden targets. Her shrapnel fire was completely powerless to destroy field shelters. As soon as people who fell under the shrapnel of a 76-mm cannon lay down and sketched a head trench 60–70 centimeters high in front of them, they were already almost safe. The fire of the 76-mm cannon could not sweep away artificial obstacles, since the shock and destructive effect of its shrapnel projectile is small.
There was another drawback to the 76 mm gun, which prevented its full use in the new conditions of field warfare. The very large flatness of the fire limited the possibility of firing over the heads of their infantry. Batteries of 76-millimeter guns had to be placed far behind the infantry - no closer than one kilometer - and they had to stop firing at the front lines of the enemy when the attacking infantry still had 300-400 meters to go.
The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that the most effective means to defeat a hidden enemy is a howitzer. The steep trajectory of its projectiles makes it possible to hit the enemy with mounted fire even when he is not shown from behind cover. And the powerful shells of large-caliber howitzers make it possible to destroy very strong field fortifications.
Before the World War, the Russian artillery adopted the 122-mm howitzer of the 1909 model. It was in many ways superior to the similar howitzer in service with the Austro-German artillery. The shrapnel bullets of the Russian howitzer hit the hiding enemy quite well. In addition, the howitzer could also fire grenades with a powerful bursting charge. Thanks to this, the fire of the 122-mm howitzer acted very destructively on the field fortifications. But there were very few 122mm howitzers. Here, the neglect of the military leaders to the guns of mounted fire clearly affected.
The Russian army also had a 76-mm mountain gun of the 1909 model, produced by the Putilov factory. This gun fired its projectiles at first along a rather flat trajectory, and towards the end of its flight, its projectiles fell in a very steep line. Such shooting is necessary in conditions of mountain warfare, when shells must be thrown over steep slopes.
The 76mm gun was essentially a howitzer. In addition, she was extremely light and therefore could move faster. The mountain gun could be successfully used in ordinary field combat, as it was quite suitable for maneuvering and joint operations with infantry. Thus, the mountain gun could compensate to some extent for the lack of mounted fire guns and replace the 76-mm field rapid-fire gun in cases where it would have to hit a well-hidden enemy. This was all the more easy since both guns fired the same projectile. However, even in this case, the highest military circles showed an underestimation of the entire significance of mounted fire guns in the upcoming war: by the beginning of the world war, the Russian army had even fewer mountain guns than 122-mm howitzers.
However, one should not think that such an attitude of the War Ministry and the General Staff to the problems of arming the army was shared by all gunners. In fact, there was a tragic gap between the creative aspirations of the best gunners and the officially accepted opinion. There were many outstanding and talented specialists in the army who understood perfectly well what new tasks modern war poses for artillery. They made every effort to improve technical equipment. But often all their energy was spent on a fruitless struggle with the inertia, slowness and rottenness of the state and military machine.
The improvement of the designs of guns, shells and materiel, the immediate consideration of inventions, the management of research and experiments in the field of artillery - all this was entrusted to the Artillery Committee under the Main Artillery Directorate. Among the members of this committee there were a large number of scientists and specialists who gained fame not only in Russia, but also far beyond its borders. Many members of the Artillery Committee were professors at the Artillery Academy and other higher educational institutions. Some had the title of academicians - and not only of the Russian Academy of Sciences, but also of the academies of Paris and London. The technical level of the Russian gunners was very high, especially in a theoretical sense.
To resolve certain complex issues, the Artillery Committee invited the most prominent experts of that time - scientists, researchers, production workers. This made it possible to use the latest achievements of science and technology for the development of artillery.
However, despite all this, the initiative for new inventions rarely came from the bowels of the Artillery Committee. And the proposals put forward by the committee were often either not carried out at all, or they were carried out in a perverted form.
Representatives of the authorities, and first of all the Minister of War Sukhomlinov, clearly patronized large foreign firms that own powerful military factories - Schneider in France, Krupp in Germany, Vickers in England. They were given preference even in those cases when some proposal coming from a Russian factory or artillery inventor was clearly better and more expedient than a foreign one. Of course, all this put heavy obstacles to the development of Russian artillery and stifled the inventive initiative.
In what working conditions the Russian gunners were placed by the tsarist authorities, it can be seen at least from the following example. Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, a special commission arose at the Main Artillery Directorate to study the experience of this war. The commission included very large and authoritative gunners of that time. They made a number of important proposals for the reorganization of Russian artillery on the basis of combat experience. The question of howitzers and heavy field artillery arose especially sharply. The commission insisted that it was necessary to equip the Russian army as soon as possible with long-range cannons and large-caliber howitzers firing projectiles of great destructive power. At the same time, it was emphasized that the combat effectiveness of the Russian army in the new conditions of war could be more or less satisfactory only if each corps had at least two batteries of 152-mm howitzers and one battery of 107-mm long-range guns. The War Ministry and the General Staff formally accepted the proposal of the commission. But even ten years later, that is, by the beginning of the World War, the planned program was carried out to an absolutely insignificant degree: there were so few heavy howitzers and long-range guns that they could only be attached to entire armies consisting of several corps.
An even more criminal attitude was shown by the military leaders towards heavy artillery of the siege type. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War showed that not a single Russian siege weapon met the new requirements. But the general staff, clouded by spectacular ideas about the maneuverable, offensive nature of the upcoming war, did not attach serious importance to heavy siege-type artillery. It was believed that siege artillery, due to its heaviness and bulkiness, would only bind the maneuvering actions of troops. And for the destruction of enemy fortresses and strongholds, they considered it possible to take heavy artillery from their fortresses, which, during the offensive, would remain in the rear, out of the threat from the enemy. Therefore, in the mobilization schedule, the General Staff did not even provide for siege artillery at all.
The installation of the General Staff was strongly supported by the Minister of War Sukhomlinov and, of course, pleased the Ministry of Finance, since there was no need for special appropriations for the creation of heavy siege-type artillery.
During the First World War, it became clear why Sukhomlinov supported such ridiculous views. Sukhomlinov betrayed his homeland. He was connected with German spies and, where he could, carried out with impunity the policy of "disarmament" of Russia in the interests of its future enemy - Germany. Sukhomlinov suppressed military inventive thought in every possible way and deliberately made the weapons of the Russian army dependent on foreign factories, in particular on the German breeder Krupp. Sukhomlinov achieved that just on the eve of the World War, Russian fortresses began to be abolished, which were supposed to restrain the pressure of the German troops if they entered the territory of Russia. The destruction of the fortresses took place under the pretext of obsolescence, but it was no accident that such first-class fortresses as Novogeorgievsk and others were among the "obsolete". Many fortresses had to be hastily restored already during the war.
By the beginning of the World War, Russian artillery was technically armed much weaker than the artillery of its opponents.
Many legends circulated about the German heavy howitzer called "Fat Berta", which appeared with the Germans during the World War and for a long time was their pride. Its caliber is 420 millimeters; a powerful projectile weighed 800 kilograms. This is a tool of strong destructive action, before which the most durable field and fortress structures could not resist.
Many know about it, but few know about following fact. In 1912, experimental firing of Russian artillery took place on the island of Berezan in the Black Sea. The newest heavy Schneider howitzer with a caliber of 280 millimeters was tested. Experimental shooting showed that this howitzer cannot destroy strong reinforced concrete fortifications.
The gunners were convinced that for this purpose a gun of a larger caliber was needed. In early 1913, such a howitzer was designed by a member of the Artillery Committee, Durlyakhov, together with a group of engineers from the Metal Plant in St. Petersburg. It was a powerful howitzer with a caliber of 420 millimeters. All calculations convinced that its effect even on the most powerful fortifications would be unusually strong. However, there was no plant in Russia that would undertake to manufacture such weapons. The War Department, of course, was in no hurry to implement this invention. It transferred an order for one prototype howitzer to the French Schneider factory. And they weren't in too much of a hurry to get it done. A prototype howitzer was already made during the war, but it was never received by the Russian army.
Meanwhile, in Germany it became known about the experiments at Berezan and about the design of a powerful howitzer by Russian artillerymen. And there is every reason to think that the Germans hurried to draw the appropriate conclusions from this ... Thus, there can be no question of the originality of the invention of the German "Fat Berta"; it is obvious that the German artillerymen do not have to brag and be especially proud of this howitzer.
Only the suspicious slowness of the War Ministry prevented the Russian gunners from fielding the siege howitzer, which proved so necessary during the World War, on the battlefield.
The fate of the invention of the talented Russian artilleryman V. Tarnovsky was a little better. He foresaw the enormous role that military aviation would later play, and long before the war he proposed the original design of a special anti-aircraft gun. But even this proposal was not taken seriously. Tarnovsky eventually ceded his idea to the Putilov factory, where he belatedly started designing the gun together with the factory engineer Lender. The first four anti-aircraft guns of Tarnovsky and Lender were made only in March 1915.
Every major war brings something new to the art of war. But no war has brought as many surprises as the world war. It overturned many assumptions and theories, it raised such questions in the face of which the bourgeois military art for a long time turned out to be completely powerless.
The hopes of all the belligerent countries for exceptional maneuverability and the short duration of the war were completely unjustified. The maneuvering period of the war ended rather quickly. The unusually increased strength of the fire forced the troops to dig deep into the ground, erect an uninterrupted line of the strongest fortifications in the field and go on to a long positional struggle.
The imperialist world war also introduced many new things into the development of artillery. Never before has the role of this type of troops been as great as on the battlefields of 1914–1918. Not a single operation, not a single offensive, not a single defensive battle could be successfully carried out without a sufficient concentration of artillery fire. The fate of many battles was decided exclusively by artillery. The power of artillery fire increased so much that often nothing could resist it - neither earthen fortifications, nor reinforced concrete shelters, nor steel armor, nor the will and endurance of the soldiers of the warring armies.
There have never been so many guns on the battlefield as in the First World War. During their offensive in Galicia, in the autumn of 1914, the Russians concentrated more than one and a half thousand guns for the general battle that decided the outcome of the operation. And during failed attempt The Germans, at the end of the same year, defeated the Russian armies near Lodz on both sides, almost three thousand guns participated. The massing of artillery reached unprecedented proportions during the positional period of the war, especially in the Western European theater. Some battles in this war can be safely called artillery. In 1917, to break through the German positions at Malmaison, the French concentrated 1860 guns on a very small stretch. In the area of the main attack, the saturation with artillery was so great that for every four and a half meters there was one gun.
The consumption of shells during the war reached an unheard-of value. In the battles near Verdun, from August 13 to 27, 1917, 4 million shells were fired. Their total weight reached 120 thousand tons. For every meter of the front, there were 6 tons of metal! There were battles in the World War in which the consumption of shells reached one million in just one day - this is about the same amount of shells that Russia spent during the entire Russo-Japanese War.
From the very first months of the war, it became clear that the desire for "unity of caliber and projectile" was wrong. The rapid-firing 76-millimeter cannon was far from being able to solve all the new tasks that the World War posed for artillery. It took guns of a wide variety of types and calibers - and in large numbers. We needed both quick-firing guns, and field mounted fire guns - howitzers, and long-range guns, and heavy siege-type howitzers. Special melee weapons were also needed - for trench warfare, and anti-aircraft guns - for fighting an air enemy, as well as light assault guns - for direct escort of infantry in battle. The need for heavy artillery was especially acute, the shells of which could destroy artificial obstacles and strong earthen and reinforced concrete shelters.
Russian gunners did not have the abundance and variety technical means, which their main enemy, the Germans, had.
The guns of the Russian artillery were in no way inferior in their combat qualities to the guns of the same type in Germany and Austria, but in almost all battles the Austro-German artillery outnumbered the Russian. Each German corps had 160 guns, including 35 howitzers. And in the Russian corps, there were only 108 guns, including 12 howitzers. Russian corps did not have heavy artillery at all, and each German corps had four heavy batteries.
During the unsuccessful offensive of the Germans at the end of 1914 on the left bank of Poland, they had a quantitative superiority in artillery in all battles. In the battle near Vlatslavsk, the Russians had 106 guns, while the Germans had 324; in the battle at Kutno, the Russians had 131 guns, and the Germans - up to 400, etc. And so in almost all battles. This huge discrepancy in the saturation of military equipment had to be compensated by the artillerymen with the art of their shooting.
For all the belligerent states, the grandiose scope that the world imperialist war assumed was unexpected. It required the use of a colossal amount of a wide variety of technical means. The consumption of fire supplies exceeded to a large extent all pre-war calculations and showed the insignificance of peacetime mobilization stocks. It became obvious that the armies should be saturated with military equipment on an incomparably larger scale than planned on the eve of the war. Under these conditions, the work of the rear, industry, the state of the entire economy of the country, of course, played a decisive role. All states began hastily re-equipping their troops with more modern, powerful equipment.
In setting the size of stocks of artillery shells, the War Department proceeded from the following considerations. During the entire war with Japan, the Russians used up an average of 720 rounds for each 76-millimeter cannon. A new war must demand more shells. And the War Department set an increased rate for a future war - 1,000 shots per cannon during the year. In addition, the general staff, carried away by the ideas of a short-term war, was going to fight for no more than six months. Therefore, the Ministry of War complacently believed that the artillery was provided with shells for the entire duration of the war with a large supply. This complacent mood was not disturbed by the fact that the set of shells for light howitzers was by no means completely ready by the beginning of the war, and for heavy field guns there were only half of the required stocks. The leaders of the army did not worry, convinced that the fate of the war would be decided by quick strikes in field maneuver battles, where 76-mm guns would play the main role.
Reality brutally shattered all these calculations and assumptions. Already at the end of the first month of the war, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed the Minister of War that the artillery was operating successfully, but that "the situation with regard to the supply of cannon cartridges is critical." And in early September 1914, the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front urgently telegraphed Nicholas II that he was forced to suspend military operations on the entire front until stocks of 76-mm cannon cartridges were replenished.
By the end of 1914, the supply of 76-mm shells had dried up. And it was not possible to replenish it, since the mobilization of Russian factories that manufactured shells was not prepared in advance and their productivity was extremely low. Sukhomlinov carried out the task of German intelligence - to disrupt the supply of shells to the front, not to give guns to the front, not to give rifles.
At the beginning of 1915, the lack of 76-mm shells was felt so acutely that their consumption on the day of the battle had to be limited to 5-10 shots per gun. Under the threat of court martial, the commanders of batteries and artillery battalions had to strictly comply with this order. Of course, under such conditions it was impossible to even think about an offensive.
The lack of shells in the Russian army decreased to some extent only by 1916, the third year of the war. By that time, the upper echelons of power were convinced of the subversive activities of Sukhomlinov. In addition, Russian patriotic entrepreneurs mobilized all the country's internal resources for military needs, and weapons ordered from foreign factories also began to arrive. However, we note that until the end of the war, Russia was not able to supply its army with a sufficient number of shells.
With the transition to positional warfare, there was an especially acute shortage of shells for howitzer and heavy artillery. Namely, in positional conditions, the fire of howitzers and heavy guns is especially important, since no advance is possible unless the enemy’s defensive fortifications are first destroyed and his firing points hidden in strong shelters are not suppressed.
Thus, during almost the entire war, Russian artillerymen had to reckon with the lack of shells and often limit their actions because of this. As a result, Russian artillery used up significantly fewer shells during the World War than the artillery of other countries. During all the years of the war, Russian gunners fired no more than 50 million shells of all calibers, including chemical shells. This expense was enormous, even unbearable for the state in which the economy of tsarist Russia was then. But if we compare this figure with the consumption of shells in other warring countries, then it will seem very small. During the war, British artillery fired 170 million shells, German - 272 million, and French artillery used up almost 200 million shells of only two calibers (75 mm and 150 mm).
The grandiose scale of the world war affected not only the number of expendable shells. A significant increase in the number of guns was also required. Artillery had to solve a variety of tasks. The artillery was supposed to stop the advance of the enemy infantry and put it to flight; artillery was to clear the way for its advancing infantry, suppress enemy artillery fire, destroy its barbed wire and all other artificial obstacles, destroy machine-gun nests, deprive the enemy infantry sitting in the trenches of its defense capability; smash the deep rear of the enemy, warehouses, stations, headquarters; artillery was supposed to fight enemy aircraft ... It is difficult to say what artillery was not supposed to do during the world war.
The total number of guns during the war increased in Russia one and a half times, and in France and Germany - three times.
In the Russian army, heavy artillery for special purposes consisted of more than 600 guns of various models and calibers. Among them were 120-mm long-range guns, and 152-mm howitzers, and very large caliber guns, such as 280-mm Schneider howitzers, 305-mm howitzers of Vickers and the Obukhov factory, and others. The TAON also included several Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns and a large number of British and French mortars. In addition, TAON was attached to a sapper battalion, a railway company, aviation and aeronautical detachments.
The TAON included 152-mm Kane coastal guns, firing at a distance of more than thirteen kilometers, and 120-mm guns from the Obukhov plant with a firing range of 14.4 kilometers. Obukhov 305-mm howitzers fired shells weighing almost 400 kilograms at a distance of up to 13 kilometers. The shells of the 305 mm howitzers had a large bursting charge, and therefore their destructive effect was very impressive.
Canet guns and howitzers of the Obukhov factory were transported only by rail. Part of the TAON guns was moved with the help of tractors, and some of the guns were transported disassembled by horse traction, and then they were assembled directly at the position itself.
The most long-range in the Russian army was a 254-millimeter coastal gun. She shot for more than twenty kilometers. Several of these guns, taken from coastal fortresses, were on the Austro-German front. A special railway platform served as a carriage for each gun, from where it fired. Fire from the platform could only be fired in the direction of the railway track. Therefore, it was necessary to adjust branches to the main rail track in order to turn the gun in the direction of fire.
During the shooting, the rail track was strengthened with additional sleepers, as the track settled due to the enormous pressure during the shot.
World War II created a new type of artillery - the so-called trench artillery. It consisted of bombers, mortars and assault guns. Even during the Russo-Japanese War, when trenches and trenches began to be widely used, the troops themselves began to manufacture handicraft melee weapons. These were guns with a very short muzzle, sending shells of high explosive force along a very steep trajectory. They called them mortars.
The firing range of mortars is very short, but such guns are very convenient for hitting an enemy hiding in trenches and trenches.
During the World War, close combat trench guns became very widespread. Bomb throwers were intended mainly to destroy living targets. The infantry used them in cases where it was not possible for some reason to use light field artillery, and the fire of rifles or machine guns alone was not enough. Mortars, on the other hand, were put into action to destroy dugouts, trenches and various barriers. By the end of the war, the Russian army had 14 thousand mortar bombers, 4,500 light mortars and only 267 heavy mortars - the latter were clearly not enough, and there were already more light bombers than the army demanded.
Special guns were needed to accompany the infantry during the attack and subsequently secure it in the taken sections of the enemy position. The 76-mm field gun could not follow its infantry everywhere: it was too heavy for this, it required a team of six horses to transport it. We needed much lighter and more mobile tools that could be rolled by hand by two or three people. Such guns began to gradually appear in the Russian army. They were at the disposal of the infantry itself and served mainly to knock out and destroy enemy machine guns and light guns. If they were not put out of action in a timely manner, they inflicted huge losses on the attacking infantry and deprived it of an offensive impulse.
Russian assault artillery had a rather motley composition. There were also guns taken from navy, and the so-called "short mountain guns", and guns taken from fortresses, and, finally, a number of small-caliber guns of 47 and 37 millimeters. Among the latter, the 37-mm cannon of the system of the Russian inventor Rosenberg was distinguished by high combat qualities.
In general, assault artillery was clearly not enough. Assault guns were about five times less than they were required. Technologically weak industry in Russia could not quickly master the production of new types of weapons.
During the World War, military aviation developed widely. Initially, aircraft served only for reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. Then they were adapted for bombing and machine-gun fire on earthly targets.
The threat from the air became very serious.
Russia, like other states, turned out to be unprepared to fight an air enemy. I had to hastily find artillery that could repel enemy air raids. At first, at the front, they tried to fire on aircraft from field 76-mm cannons. To do this, a small ditch was dug under the trunk of their gun carriage in order to raise the muzzle of the gun as high as possible. But this gave a very weak effect, especially since the height and speed of the flight of airplanes continuously increased.
Then they began to adapt naval rapid-fire guns with a caliber of 75 millimeters for anti-aircraft fire. They were still more effective shooting at airplanes than simple field guns. Finally, in March 1915, with a great delay, the first Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns were made. But it was a drop in the ocean. The production of special anti-aircraft guns was very difficult. Therefore, it was not necessary to count on the rapid production of a large number of such guns. Most often, they resorted to the device of makeshift installations, with the help of which it would be possible to conduct anti-aircraft fire from conventional 76-mm field guns. Such installations were made by means of military units. And in this area, Russian artillerymen showed a lot of ingenuity. The simplest devices were all kinds of pedestals, on which the guns were mounted so that the muzzle of the gun looked as high as possible. And by the end of the war, even a special machine for anti-aircraft firing of the B.N. system was designed. Ivanova. This machine had a circular rail, which made it possible to rotate the gun in a circle during firing and follow the movement of the aircraft with the muzzle.
Most anti-aircraft installations moved disassembled with the help of horse traction. In the same places that were subjected to systematic enemy air raids, fixed anti-aircraft batteries of a more complex device were placed. Finally, vehicles were adapted for the rapid transfer of anti-aircraft guns to a particular area. Each such "car battery for firing at the air fleet" consisted of four Tarnovsky anti-aircraft guns.
The guns were mounted on specially adapted armored vehicles. Steel armor protected the drivers, gunners and vital parts of the vehicle from shrapnel and long-range rifle fire. The cars also served as charging boxes. In addition, each battery was followed by 4 armored vehicles, exclusively for the transport of shells, gasoline and oil. Three passenger cars transported battery commanders and signalmen; scouts with such a battery traveled on motorcycles; and, finally, this whole cavalcade was closed by a kitchen-storehouse, also installed on the car.
Automobile anti-aircraft batteries were already quite perfect, at that time, military weapon to fight the air enemy. However, for the entire duration of the war, only 9 automobile batteries were formed - a completely insignificant number in terms of the scale of the world war. And in total, by the end of the war, there were no more than 70 guns of the Tarnovsky system at the front.
Yes, Russian gunners during the World War were much worse equipped with the latest military equipment than their opponents, the Austro-Germans. But on the other hand, the Russian gunners fired very accurately. And there were often cases when the high art of shooting made up for the lack of guns and shells. Russian gunners were able to achieve great results with little means.
The war with Japan confirmed the absolute necessity of shooting from closed positions with the help of a goniometer. After the end of this war, Russian gunners began to improve in the art of such shooting. Soon, all battery commanders not only imbued with respect for the goniometer, but also completely mastered its use in a variety of conditions. By the beginning of World War II, Russian gunners were excellent at shooting from closed positions. In this respect, the Austro-Germans lagged far behind the Russian gunners. During the maneuverable period of the war, the Austro-German gunners occupied mainly half-open or completely open positions. They often tried to famously ride with their battery to the top of some hill or hillock, and for this they were just as often cruelly beaten by the skilful fire of Russian artillery. During the war, the Austro-German gunners had to retrain, borrowing Russian techniques for the closed location of batteries, and partly the rules of firing.
Artillerymen were the most educated and advanced part of the Russian army. Jr officers received a very solid training in special schools. Most of the commanders not only knew their job well, but also had fairly extensive knowledge in other areas of science, especially in mathematics and chemistry.
Ordinary artillery personnel were recruited from the most literate and intelligent people. Besides, general work in mastering complex equipment, where each gun is a kind of production unit, developed among ordinary artillerymen a collective spirit of comradely soldering and mutual support. No wonder among them it was widely believed that the origin of the word "artillery" is due to the fact that artillerymen work as an "artel".
Fireworks (junior officers) were prepared most thoroughly. They superbly managed the entire work of the gun crew and could, if necessary, replace the commander of an artillery platoon. The fireworkers not only knew their job perfectly as practitioners, but also understood the theoretical foundations of artillery firing.
Senior commanders received combat training at the officers' artillery school. This school played an important role in its time in educating the bulk of Russian artillerymen to the level of modern war requirements. Through the school, new ideas were put into practice in the field of artillery tactics, techniques and shooting rules. Any senior commander, before he received command of a battery, division or battalion of fortress artillery, took a course in an officer's school.
Education in this school was delivered very well. Much attention was paid to practical training and shooting. In this respect, the Russian officer school favorably differed from similar schools in other countries, where a purely theoretical, lecture method of teaching prevailed. The school had its own well-equipped training ground near the city of Luga. The range allowed firing from guns of any caliber, as well as performing a variety of maneuvers. The terrain at the training ground is very rugged and therefore very convenient for conducting a wide variety of combat exercises. The range was equipped with mechanical targets. Some of them made themselves felt with light or smoke flashes, others lowered and rose with the help of special cables, and still others could even move mechanically from one place to another. All this brought the situation of shooting practice closer to the conditions of a real battle.
Senior commanders who went through this school perfectly mastered the art of shooting from closed positions and were quite well versed in the tactical issues of using artillery in battle.
Unfortunately, such an assessment cannot be given to the combined arms commanders of the Russian army. For the most part, they did not understand the properties and tasks of artillery and therefore could not often use it properly. During the World War, there were frequent cases when artillerymen acted in battle at their own discretion and, on their own initiative, carried out certain combat missions.
The Russian gunners were preparing to wage the world war in a resolute offensive spirit. They were well aware that under modern conditions of combat, the situation is changing rapidly and there is not always time to wait for orders from above. The artillery commander must make independent decisions in these cases. In battle, it often happens that an opportunity for an advantageous action of artillery appears suddenly, the outcome of the case is decided in minutes, and the properties of artillery just make it possible to inflict defeat at the very short term. Therefore, Russian gunners attached great importance to any manifestation of personal initiative, decisiveness and speed of action.
A striking example of such a decisive offensive action is the maneuvers of the Russian horse artillery. Great mobility and rapid firing were especially required from horse artillery. By all means they tried to develop dashing and unrestrained forward impulse among horse artillerymen.
During maneuvers, Russian horse artillerymen performed, for example, such a spectacular and bold trick. As soon as the cavalry reorganized into battle formation, the horse batteries jumped out at full quarry from some flank, ahead of their cavalry. Then the guns were quickly removed from the limbers and a sudden rapid fire was opened on the advancing enemy cavalry. To perform such a maneuver and open rapid fire, horse artillery took no more than two minutes. Their cavalry, going on the attack, quickly covered the enemy cavalry rushing towards them, and after that the fire of the horse batteries was transferred to the artillery and machine guns of the enemy.
The experience of the maneuvering period of the World War confirmed that, in general, the training of Russian artillerymen was quite correct. The World War on the Russian front began with oncoming battles on the borders of Russia with Germany and Austria. The wide frontier spaces, which did not hamper the actions of the troops, made it possible to carry out the most daring maneuvers. At that time, Russian gunners dealt mainly with the open manpower of the enemy or with light field fortifications. There was still enough ammunition, and the gunners did not have to save. The fire of the Russian artillery was terrifying, and the art of shooting left nothing to be desired. No wonder the 76-mm cannon was nicknamed the "scythe of death."
At the very beginning of the war, Russian troops invaded Germany and captured part of East Prussia. During this offensive, the Battle of Gumbinen broke out.
On August 20, 1914, the strong units of the 17th German Corps under General Mackensen attacked two Russian divisions. Forces met unequal. Mackensen had much more infantry and more artillery, and he also had at his disposal heavy guns, which the Russians did not have at all in this sector of the front.
First, the German batteries opened heavy fire. They fired a huge number of shells of various calibers. Then the German infantry moved forward and cut into a wedge between two Russian divisions. The Russian gunners immediately took advantage of this: they opened flank-cross fire on the advancing Germans from two sides - two batteries from the north and two batteries from the south. Shrapnel from 76-millimeter cannons showered bullets on the advancing enemy lines. The German infantry suffered huge losses.
Three hours later, its miserable remnants rushed back in complete disarray, leaving the wounded and dead on the battlefield.
Following that, the Germans tried to outflank one of the divisions. The German infantry marched in thick chains, keeping the alignment, as in a parade. Some German officers even rode on horseback in the ranks of their units. The Russian gunners let the enemy in at a fairly close distance and suddenly immediately unleashed a hurricane of shrapnel fire on him. The German infantry began to thin out greatly, broke up into separate groups and, finally, lay down, continuing to suffer heavy losses. The enemy artillery tried in vain to put out the fire of the 76-mm cannons in order to save their infantry: the Russian batteries stood in well-hidden positions and were invulnerable.
In the same battle, the gunners severely reprimanded the Germans for their manner of riding into open positions. It was near the village of Matishkemen. Two German batteries, wanting to rescue their infantry, famously drove out to an open place 1,200 paces from the dug-in Russian infantry. But the Germans managed to fire only one shot. The gunners suddenly opened their lethal fire from their 76mm cannons. Literally in a few minutes, the German batteries were destroyed by well-aimed fire. The infantry, which went over to the attack, captured 12 German guns and 24 ammunition boxes.
In the battle on August 26, 1914, the German artillery was located east of the village of Tarnaaka. In the first line were three light batteries in a half-covered position. Behind them are three howitzer batteries. They occupied a position closed to the east, but half-closed to the northeast. The Russian batteries were five kilometers northeast of the German ones. On their right flank was a battery of 122mm howitzers. This howitzer battery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery. The task is not easy, given that the Germans had much more guns.
When it began to get dark in the evening, the commander of the howitzer battery saw the brilliance of the shots of the German guns, repulsing the attacks of the Russian infantry with rapid fire. From these flashes, he determined the exact sight for each of his howitzers and then moved on to defeat. They fired with combined fire: either grenades or shrapnel.
An hour has passed. The fire of the German artillery gradually subsided. And soon neither flashes of enemy guns, nor explosions of shrapnel over the Russian infantry, which rushed to the attack, became visible. After the capture of the German positions, it turned out that out of 34 guns, three were hit, one of the howitzers, thrown by a grenade explosion over a charging box, lay a few steps away from it. Nearby lay nine blown up and broken ammunition boxes, and almost all of the German gunners were killed or wounded.
So one battery, despite the extremely difficult firing conditions, destroyed six batteries of the Germans.
The desire of Russian gunners to shoot from closed positions, of course, does not give any reason to reproach them for lack of courage. Possessing quite the art of shooting from closed positions, they did not even think of going to an open position and steadfastly holding out under enemy fire when this was not necessary. But if there was one...
On the night of October 10, 1914, the vanguard units of the 25th Russian Corps crossed to the left bank of the Vistula River near New Alexandria. In the morning they were attacked by a superior Hungarian force supported by heavy artillery. The Hungarians, bypassing both flanks of the Russians and surrounding them in a tight half-ring, began to press against the Vistula. The only bridge along which the Russians could retreat beyond the Vistula was under heavy fire from enemy artillery. The situation has become extremely difficult. Withdrawal threatened complete disaster. The situation was saved by artillerymen. They boldly rode out into the open and began to shower shrapnel on the attacking Hungarians. For almost six hours they were under the strongest rifle fire of the Hungarian infantry, which in some places approached already 400 meters. But the gunners held firm and repelled all enemy attacks.
And in April 1915, during the attack on Chernivtsi, such an incident occurred. Russian infantry captured the crest of the heights near the village of Rapanche. But behind the crest she was met by the destructive machine-gun fire of the enemy. Only artillery could suppress machine-gun fire. However, the gunners could not see from their observation posts what was happening behind the ridge. Then a platoon of a mountain battery rushed to the ridge on a quarry. When he reached it, the Russian infantry had already been almost completely knocked off the ridge by the Austrian counterattack. The gun teams that appeared were also killed. The commander of the mountain platoon was taken prisoner. But the surviving soldiers of the gun crew did not lose their heads. They managed to fire 4-5 shrapnels at buckshot right at point-blank range to the advancing Austrians. The enemy stopped in confusion and lay down. This made it possible for the Russian infantry to again take possession of an important ridge and hold on to it.
Russian gunners were also brought up in the spirit of quick and decisive action, which helped them seize the initiative and decide the outcome of the battle. This quality is especially important in an oncoming battle.
On August 26, 1914, in Galicia, a Russian division clashed with an Austrian division. At the forefront of the Russian division was an artillery battalion consisting of three light batteries of 76-millimeter cannons. In anticipation of an imminent clash, the Russians and Austrians began to deploy in advance into battle formation. The 24 guns of the Russian avant-garde quickly took up position, and the gunners prepared to open fire. The artillery of the Austrian avant-garde was very late, and this gave the Russians a great advantage. As soon as the firing lines of the Austrians appeared on the ridge in front of the lying hills, Russian batteries immediately fell upon them with rapid fire. The 44th Austrian Regiment, having fallen under a sudden shrapnel fire, was almost completely destroyed within fifteen to twenty minutes. An hour and a half later, the Austrian vanguard artillery finally opened fire. But too late: the Austrians lost their offensive initiative and had to go on the defensive. But they didn't succeed either. The Russian troops used their fire superiority and with an energetic attack finally defeated the Austrians.
Horse artillery was especially quick to maneuver. In a battle with the Austrians near the city of Tomashev, the Don Cossack batteries showed an example of a lightning strike. The vastly outnumbered Austrians forced the Russians to retreat to the Tomashevsky Forest. Behind the firing lines of the Austrians was a close reserve column of three battalions. At this time, two Cossack batteries at full quarry rushed, hiding behind the crest of a hill, to the flank of the advancing Austrians. Quickly removing the guns from the limbers, the horse artillerymen opened rapid flanking fire two minutes later: one battery on the reserve column, and the other on the advancing chains.
And those precious minutes decided the whole thing. After two or three minutes, the orderly advancing chains and the reserve column were literally swept away by hurricane fire.
The Austrian artillery, which came to the rescue of its infantry, tried to open fire, but quickly left its position and rushed back, seized by general panic. The battle ended with the complete annihilation of the 44th Austrian regiment - one of the best regiments, which was recruited from the inhabitants of the city of Vienna. The tragic death of this regiment at the very beginning of the war made a depressing impression on the inhabitants of the capital of Austria-Hungary.
During the First World War, anti-aircraft fire was so imperfect that to destroy one aircraft, even with the help of special anti-aircraft guns, it was required to fire from 3 to 11 thousand shells. However, Russian gunners sometimes showed examples of incomparably more accurate shooting at an air enemy.
In 1916, the 7th separate Russian light battery defended the Romanian city of Medzhidie from air raids. On October 1, six German bombers appeared in the area where the battery was located. The artillerymen opened fire. Fleeing from the projectile, two enemy planes immediately quickly left. The rest dispersed across the sky above the city and hastily dropped their bombs. Then the airplanes entered from different directions into the so-called "dead funnel" of the Russian battery, that is, into the zone where its shells could not hit. The aircraft descended and several bombs fell on the battery. Eight Russian anti-aircraft gunners were wounded and shell-shocked. But no one left for dressing until the end of the battle, everyone remained in place. The German planes were leaving. The 7th battery fired several volleys at them. The third volley covered one of the planes. He quickly went down, then caught fire and fell like a flaming torch into the location of the neighboring Romanian troops.
Later a short time from the observation posts they reported by telephone that again five German aircraft rushed towards the city. But only two planes dared to go to the city itself. They flew with great apprehension, making sharp turns and turns all the time. The bombs they dropped were few and random. At the same time, the remaining three planes descended in turn to the dead funnel of the Russian battery and tried to hit the gunners with bombs and machine-gun fire. However, the German pilots did this so timidly and uncertainly that they could not cause any harm. Flying home, the German bombers rose very high at large intervals from each other. Russian anti-aircraft gunners chose one of the enemy aircraft and concentrated their fire on it. Soon, a large metal part separated from the aircraft and fell, which turned out to be the engine hood. The engine stopped, and the plane began to descend towards its positions. He flew over the trenches of the Serbian infantry, falling lower and lower. But he failed to pull through the wire fences, he buried his nose in them and helplessly froze in place.
An hour later, the German bombers reappeared. This time there were four. As they approached the city, they split into pairs. But the first pair immediately turned back under fire from the 7th battery without dropping a single bomb. The second pair also did not complete the task: after dropping only a few bombs, they followed the first.
The death of two German bombers and the flight of four others - such was the result of the firing of Russian anti-aircraft gunners that day. At the same time, only 364 shells were used up - a figure that at that time can be considered insignificant.
In the Russian theater of war, the period of maneuver lasted until approximately the autumn of 1915, when both sides, having exhausted their forces and material resources, dug into the ground and switched to positional warfare. Under these conditions, everyone had to retrain and develop new tactics for the struggle for fortified zones. And the Russian gunners did not lag behind in this regard. They quickly learned that breaking through the enemy's fortified zone is not a field battle in which the situation is assessed on the move, almost at lightning speed, but a well-thought-out and strictly calculated operation. If during an attack in maneuverable conditions, especially in a meeting engagement, it is impossible to foresee all the actions of artillery in a rapidly changing situation, if under these conditions any attempt at an accurate timetable is doomed in advance to failure and even harmful, since it would only tie up the initiative of the artillerymen, then in a breakthrough Fortified zones, on the contrary, are the key to success - in a strictly thought-out plan, in the exact distribution of tasks for individual batteries, in the strict and methodical implementation of the combat schedule. The Russian gunners not only learned this basic principle well, but more than once carried it out very successfully. In cases where their actions were not paralyzed by a complete lack of guns and shells, they carried out breakthroughs of the fortified zone in a truly exemplary way. An example of this can be at least the work of artillerymen on the site of the 11th Army Corps during the famous Brusilov breakthrough in the summer of 1916.
Thanks to the power of their fire and the excellent training of their personnel, Russian artillery quickly achieved brilliant results. At the beginning of September 1914, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief informed the Minister of War: “The whole burden of modern battles is on artillery. She alone sweeps away the deadly machine guns of the enemy and destroys his artillery. Our infantry will not boast of its artillery. She shoots great."
Even the opponents had to recognize the high skill of shooting Russian gunners. The German generals Franus and Hindenburg wrote in their conclusions about the actions of the Russian army that Russian artillery "shoots well", takes exclusively closed positions "with great skill" and already from long distances often develops "such a strong and intense fire that misleads our troops in relation to their numerical superiority, which in fact does not exist.
Russian officers who had been in German captivity said that in August 1914, among the numerous newspaper articles praising the “valor German weapons”, a note appeared in which, despite all the chauvinistic frenzy, the author had to recognize the brilliant actions of the Russian artillery. This note had a very significant title: "Hats off to the Russian gunners."
And Russian gunners during the World War more than once proved the correctness of this high assessment.
As you can see, the main value of Russian artillery was its people. The high art of shooting, the bold initiative and the courageous heroism of ordinary Russian gunners brought them many well-deserved victories. Many of these people subsequently formed the backbone of the artillery cadres of the Red Army.
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