Introduction

This work examines both the partisan movement itself as a whole, and the role in it of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov, who commanded one of the many partisan detachments created by order of the command and emerging spontaneously.

Historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812, namely the role partisan movement it has almost two centuries of history. Research on this topic was written by both Russian and French researchers. In the first period after the end of the war, a large number of eyewitness accounts of recent events appeared (Glinka S.N.

The historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812 is extensive according to the estimates of I.P. Liprandi and N.F. Dubrovin, by the end of the nineteenth century, almost 1,800 works were written. In the first decade of the 20th century, in connection with the century of the war, which was widely celebrated in Russia, about 600 more works were published. Research into the events of 1812 did not stop during the Soviet era. The Soviet scientist E. Tarle devoted most of his life to the study of war and the life of Napoleon (Tarle E.V. Napoleon. - M .: Military Publishing. 1939., Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia. - M., 1943).

Currently, there are also many works devoted to the war of 1812, as an example (Troitsky N.A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. - M .: Science. 1988., Troitsky N.A. Alexander I and Napoleon. - M .: graduate School... 1991, Troitsky N.A. Soviet historiography of the war of 1812 (Traditions. Stereotypes. Lessons). - M., 1992.

It is rather difficult to define and analyze the role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, since no one initially tried to trace its role, and when the first attempts to investigate this topic were made, there were practically no living witnesses of past events. V soviet period history of Russia, when studying this aspect of the war, researchers were forced to pay more attention to the role of the popular - peasant masses in the victory over the Napoleonic army. Some works published before the 1917 revolution became inaccessible to Soviet historians.

This work consists of two sections: The first of which describes the development of the partisan movement, and the second presents the role of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov in the partisan movement.

Partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812

Even during the retreat to Moscow, the Russian army conceived the idea of ​​using partisan methods of warfare against significantly extended enemy communications. Kutuzov, who at that time avoided major battles with a still strong enough enemy, while in the Tarutino camp, begins a "small war". The partisan actions against the French conquerors successfully combined the efforts of both military partisan detachments and popular formations. The "small war" caused irreparable damage to the enemy. Partisan detachments of I.S. Dorokhova, A.N. Seslavina, D.V. Davydova, A.S. Figner did not give rest to the enemy either day or night, neither on vacation, nor on a campaign.

In a brief analysis of the events of 1812, it would be completely unthinkable to try to give any complete picture of the internal situation in Russia in the year of the Napoleonic invasion. We will try here on a few few pages to find out in the very general view what impression the events made on different classes of the Russian people. It is necessary to start, of course, with the main question of great historical importance: how did the overwhelming majority of the people, i.e., the then serf peasantry - landowners, state, appanage peasants, react to the invasion?

At first glance, it would seem that we are faced with a strange phenomenon: the peasantry, hating serf bondage, protesting against it with the annually recorded statistics of the murders of landlords and unrest, which endangered the whole serf system in general only 37 - 38 years before in the Pugachev uprising - this very peasantry meets Napoleon as a fierce enemy, sparing no effort, fights against him, refuses to do what the peasants did in all the Europe conquered by Napoleon, except Spain, that is, it refuses to enter into any trade deals with the enemy, he burns bread, burns hay and oats, burns his own huts, if there is a hope to burn the French foragers who have climbed there, actively helps the partisans, shows such a fierce hatred of the invading army, which the French have never met anywhere except in Spain. Meanwhile, back in 1805 - 1807, and at the beginning of the invasion of 1812, rumors circulated in the Russian peasantry, in which the idea of ​​Napoleon was associated with dreams of liberation. It was said about a mythical letter, which the French emperor allegedly sent to the tsar, that, they say, until the tsar freed the peasants, until then there would be war and peace. What are the reasons that led to such a sharp turn, to such a decisive change in views?

After all that has been said above, there is no need to repeat that Napoleon invaded Russia as a conqueror, a predator, a merciless destroyer and did not in the least think about freeing the peasants from serf bondage. For the Russian peasantry, the defense of Russia from the invading enemy was at the same time the defense of their lives, their families, their property.

The war begins. The French army occupies Lithuania, occupies Belarus. The Belarusian peasant revolts, hoping to free himself from the master's oppression. Byelorussia was in July and August 1812 directly gripped by stormy peasant unrest, which in some places turned into open uprisings. In panic, the landowners flee to the cities - to Vilna to the Duke of Bassano, to Mogilev to Marshal Davout, to Minsk to Napoleon's general Dombrovsky, to Vitebsk to the emperor himself. They ask for armed help against the peasants, plead for punitive expeditions, since the Polish and Lithuanian gendarmerie re-established by Napoleon is not strong enough, and the French command readily pacifies the peasants and restores all serfdom to inviolability. Thus, the actions of Napoleon in Lithuania and Belarus, occupied by his troops, showed that he was not only not going to help the peasants in their independent attempt to throw off the chains of slavery, but that he would support the feudal nobility with all his might and with an iron hand suppress any peasant protest against the landlords. This was consistent with his policy: he considered the Polish and Lithuanian nobles to be the main political force in these places and not only did not want to scare them away, instilling in their peasants the idea of ​​liberation, but also suppressed huge unrest in Belarus with his military force.

“The nobles of these provinces of Belarus ... paid dearly for the desire to free themselves from Russian rule. Their peasants considered themselves free from the terrible and disastrous slavery, under the yoke of which they were due to the avarice and debauchery of the nobles. They rebelled in almost all villages, broke furniture in the houses of their masters, destroyed factories and all institutions and found them in the destruction of their homes. petty tyrants as much barbaric delight as the latter used the arts to bring them to poverty. The French guards, requested by the nobles to protect them from their peasants, further increased the fury of the people, and the gendarmes either remained indifferent witnesses of the riots, or did not have the means to prevent them. " 1812 in the diaries ..., vol. II, pp. 78-79. ( Benckendorff's notes). - such is, for example, the testimony of A. Kh. Benckendorff (then a colonel in Wincengerode's detachment). There are many such testimonies.

Marshal Saint-Cyr, who carried out the campaign of 1812, directly says in his memoirs that a movement of peasants had definitely begun in Lithuania: they drove the landowners out of their estates. "Napoleon, loyal to his new system, began to defend the landlords from their serfs, returned the landlords to their estates, from where they were expelled," and gave them his soldiers to guard against the serfs. The peasant movement, which already here and there (in the western provinces) began to take on a very pronounced character, was mercilessly strangled by Napoleon himself both in Lithuania and in Belarus.

The feeling of homeland flared up among the people, especially after the death of Smolensk. Napoleon's army nowhere decisively, even in Egypt, even in Syria, behaved so unbridled, did not kill and torture the population so brazenly and cruelly as in Russia. The French took revenge for the fires of villages, towns and cities, for the burning of Moscow, for the irreconcilable hostility on the part of the Russian people, which they felt from beginning to end during their entire stay in Russia. The devastation of the peasants by the passing army of the conqueror, countless marauders and simply plundering French deserters was so great that hatred of the enemy grew every day.

Recruitment sets in Russia followed one after another and were met by the people not only meekly, but with unheard of and never before seen animation.

Of course, Napoleon clearly fantasized and exaggerated when he talked about the "numerous villages" asking him to release them, but, undoubtedly, there could not be single attempts to address him in this way, while not all the peasants were convinced that Napoleon did not even think about destruction landlord power and that he came as a conqueror and robber, and not at all as a liberator of the peasants.

Fierceness, which was almost imperceptible until Napoleon went from Vitebsk to Smolensk, which began to manifest itself sharply after the death of Smolensk, which already attracted everyone's attention after Borodino, during the march of the "great army" from Borodino to Moscow - now, after the fire in the capital, it reached the extreme among the peasants. The peasants around Moscow not only did not enter, despite all the promises and promises, in trade relations with the French, but fiercely killed those foragers and marauders who fell into their hands alive. When the Cossacks were leading the captured French, the peasants rushed to the convoy, trying to recapture and personally destroy the prisoners. When the foraging was accompanied by a large escort, the peasants burned their reserves (entire villages were burned out) and fled into the forests. Those who were caught desperately defended themselves and perished. The French did not take the peasants prisoner, and sometimes, just in case, even as they approached the village, they began to fire at it in order to destroy the possibility of resistance.

The partisan movement, which began immediately after Borodin, achieved tremendous success only thanks to the most active voluntary, zealous assistance from the Russian peasantry. But the insatiable anger towards the invaders, destroyers, murderers and rapists, who came from nowhere, manifested itself most of all in the way they went to military service and how the Russian peasants fought afterwards.

The irreconcilable hatred of thousands and thousands of peasants, which surrounded the great army of Napoleon with a wall, the exploits of unknown heroes - Elder Vasilisa, Fyodor Onufriev, Gerasim Kurin - who risked their lives every day, going into the woods, hiding in ravines, waiting for the French - that's it. , in which the peasant sentiments were most characteristic since 1812 and which turned out to be disastrous for Napoleon's army.

It was the Russian peasant who destroyed Murat's magnificent, first-ever cavalry, before the victorious onslaught of which all European armies fled; and the Russian peasant destroyed her, starving her horses, burning hay and oats, for which Napoleon's foragers came, and sometimes burning the foragers themselves.

Representatives of national minorities and individual groups were not inferior to the indigenous Russian population in their desire to defend their common homeland. Don Cossacks, Bashkirs, Tatars, Ural Cossacks, the peoples of the Caucasus fought, judging by all reviews, remarkably steadfastly and courageously. Hero Bagration represented Georgia with dignity. The Kalmyks (who made up the Stavropol Kalmyk regiment) became famous for their bravery in 1812: their "flying detachments" especially distinguished themselves in the second half of the war, when pursuing a retreating enemy. The Bashkirs were so fond of Platov that he formed from two hundred especially distinguished Bashkir riders special squad, and on July 27, 1812 at Molev-Bolot, this detachment made its first brilliant attack on the French.

Denis Davydov several times very persistently speaks of Jews as such an element of the population of the western provinces, on which one could well rely. The same is repeated, and completely independently of Denis Davydov, the "Collection" of records and memoirs about the Patriotic War, published by the government already in 1813: “It must be confessed that the Jews do not deserve those reproaches with which they were once burdened by almost the whole world ... because, despite all the tricks of the godless Napoleon, who declared himself a zealous defender of the Jews and the services they performed, they remained committed to their former (Russian) government and, in the most possible cases, did not even miss various means of proving their hatred and contempt for the proud and inhuman oppressor. peoples ... ”Denis Davydov was very upset when one brave man from his detachment, presented by him to George, did not receive this order for a moment solely because of his Jewish religion.

The merchants, that " middle class", Which Napoleon hoped to find in Moscow, showed a spirit of complete irreconcilability towards the conqueror, although Rostopchin in Moscow was very suspicious of schismatic merchants and believed that they were expecting something from Napoleon in their hearts. In any case, the merchants did not conduct any trade deals with the enemy (who was very motivated by this), did not enter into any deals with him, and together with the entire population, which only had a material opportunity for that, left the places occupied by the enemy, abandoning houses, shops, warehouses, storage facilities to the mercy of fate. The Moscow merchants donated 10 million rubles for defense - an enormous amount at that time. There were significant donations in money from the merchants and other provinces.

The donations were very significant. But if part of the merchant class lost a lot from the great devastation created by the invasion, then the other part gained a lot. Many merchant firms "went to live after the Frenchman." We are not talking about such fortunate fortune-tellers as Kremer and Byrd (the then famous manufacturer), who got hold of the supply of guns, gunpowder and ammunition.

There were about 150 thousand workers in Russia at that time (in 1814 - 160 thousand). The workers were mostly serfs and worked in the factories of their landowners or at the enterprises of merchants, to whom the landowners transferred the peasants for certain periods, while some of the workers were also civilians. Both those and others in most cases were closely associated with the village, and when the thunderstorm of the twelfth year came, the workers of the places occupied by the enemy fled to the villages. They speculated very heavily on weapons. This speculation received a new impetus after the Tsar's visit to Moscow. Before the arrival of the tsar in Moscow and before his patriotic appeals and the announcement of the militias, a saber in Moscow cost 6 rubles or less, and after the appeals and the establishment of the militias - 30 and 40 rubles; a gun made in Tula before the appeals of the tsar cost from 11 to 15 rubles, and after the appeals - 80 rubles; pistols rose in price five to six times. The merchants saw that with bare hands it is impossible to repel the enemy, and shamelessly took advantage of this opportunity for their enrichment, - so testifies the unfortunate Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who did not have time to leave Moscow, ended up in the Napoleonic "municipality", tried there (of course, without significant results) to protect life and the safety of the remaining handful of Russians, and in the end, after the departure of the French, he was suspected of treason, was persecuted and criticized.

The most graciously granted to me the land in the Kozelsk district was given by the Kaluga treasury chamber, which, it seems, has not been notified to this day. "

This simple-minded "meanwhile" with a direct transition from Napoleon, from whom Russia must be wrested, to the Kaluga state chamber, from which the "granted" estate must be wrested, is very typical both for the class to which the author of the letter belonged and for the moment. After all, he is clearly equally sincere in his desire to defeat Napoleon and in his efforts to break the resistance of the Kaluga treasury chamber.

Despite the gradually increasing feeling of hatred of the enemy among the people, despite the absence of any noticeable oppositional moods in noble class Russian society, the government was restless in 1812. The disastrous beginning of the war, the ridiculous Drissa camp of the German Fuller, where the entire Russian army was almost killed, the chase French army behind Barclay and Bagration, the death of Smolensk - all this very much worried the minds of the nobility, the merchants, and the peasantry (especially those affected by the invasion in the neighboring provinces). Rumors that Bagration himself considered Barclay a traitor, that the German Wolzogen, the German Wincengerode and others were sneaking around the army, gave a particularly ominous meaning to this endless retreat of Barclay and the generous sacrifice of almost half of the Russian Empire to the enemy. The surrender and death of Moscow drove irritation to a rather dangerous point.

Although the mood of the people was such that there was not the slightest need to raise hostility to the enemy by artificial means, the government nevertheless tried, through the synod, to mobilize the clergy for the work of patriotic preaching. The Napoleonic army took away church utensils, used church buildings as apartments and often as stables. This provided the main content of the anti-French church sermon.

It must be said that the idea of ​​guerrilla warfare was prompted primarily by the example of Spain. This was also recognized by the leaders of the Russian partisan movement. Colonel Chuykevich, who wrote his "Discourses on the War of 1812" during this war itself (although the book was published already in March 1813), recalls and sets as a model the Spaniards: "The rapid successes of French arms in Spain occurred because the inhabitants of this country, seething with revenge against the French, relied unnecessarily on their personal courage and the justice of their cause. The hastily assembled militias were opposed to the French armies and were defeated by enemies outnumbered and experienced. These unfortunate lessons convinced the courageous Spaniards to change the image of the war. They generously decided to prefer, though long-term, but true in favor of their struggle. Eluding general battles with the French forces, they divided their own into parts ... often interrupted communications with France, exterminated the enemy's food and tormented him with continuous marches ... cities and entire regions. The generous people did not let go of their arms, the government did not lose vigor and remained firm in its once-adopted intention: to free Spain from the French or to bury itself under the ruins. No, you will not fall, courageous Spaniards! " The Russian people's war, as I have already had occasion to notice, was not at all similar to the Spanish one. It was carried out most of all by Russian peasants already in army and militia uniforms, but this did not make it less popular.

One of the manifestations of the people's war was the partisan movement.

This is how the organization of this case began. Five days before Borodino, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov, who had served as the prince's adjutant for five years, appeared to Prince Bagration. He outlined to him his plan, which was to use Napoleon's colossally extended communication line - from the Neman to Gzhatsk and further Gzhatsk, in the event of further movement of the French - to begin constant attacks and surprise raids on this line, on warehouses, on couriers with papers, for carts with food. According to Davydov, small cavalry detachments make sudden raids, and, having done their job, the partisans hide from persecution until a new incident; they could, moreover, become strongholds and cells for the concentration and arming of the peasants. It was before Borodin, and, according to Davydov, the "general opinion of that time" was that, having won a victory, Napoleon would make peace and, together with the Russian army, would go to India. “If I must inevitably perish, then I would rather lie here; in India I will perish with 100 thousand of my compatriots without a name and for the benefit, alien to my fatherland, and here I will die under the banner of independence ... "Davydov DV Works, vol. II. - SPb., 1893, p. 32. - so Davydov said to Prince Bagration. Bagration reported to Kutuzov about this plan, but Kutuzov was very careful and was not inclined to flights of heroic imagination, but he allowed Denis Davydov to be given 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks. Bagration was dissatisfied with this stinginess. “I don’t understand the fears of His Serene Highness,” he said, conveying to Davydov about the too modest results of his petition, necessary for him, in case of failure he will lose only a handful of people. How to be, the war is not for kissing ... I would give you 3 thousand from the very first time, because I do not like to grope things, but there is no need to talk about it; the prince himself appointed the strength of the party; one must obey. " Davydov D. V. Works, vol. II. - SPb., 1893, p. 32. Bagration said this five days before his mortal wound in battle, and after his death, Davydov could not even hope to receive more people... But, all the same, he set out on a journey with his 130 hussars and Cossacks, bypassing the great army in the rear of Napoleon.

This was a very modest and so far completely inconspicuous beginning of the partisan war, which undoubtedly played its role in the history of 1812, and precisely in the second half of the war. Not only regular officers became organizers of partisan detachments. There were also such cases: on August 31, 1812, the Russian rearguard began to withdraw in battle from Tsarev-Zaymishche, which already included the French. Under a soldier of the dragoon regiment Yermolai Chetvertakov, a horse was wounded, and the rider was captured. In Gzhatsk, Chetvertakov managed to escape from the convoy, and he came to the village of Basmani, which lay far to the south of the Smolensk pole road along which the French army was marching. Here Chetvertakov developed a plan for the very partisan war that Davydov had in those days: Chetvertakov wished to assemble a partisan detachment from the peasants. Let me note an interesting feature: when, back in 1804, the peasant Chetvertakov was “shaved”, he fled from the regiment, was caught and punished with rods. But now he not only decided to fight the enemy with all his might, but also to induce others to do so. The peasants of the Basmana village treated him with distrust, and he found only one adherent. Together they went to another village. On the way, they met two Frenchmen, killed them and changed into their clothes. Then they met (already in the village of Zadkovo) two French cavalrymen, they killed them and took their horses. The village of Zadkovo allocated 47 peasants to help Chetvertakov. Then small squad under the leadership of Chetvertakov, he first killed a party of 12 French cuirassiers, then partly interrupted, partly put to flight the French half-company of 59 people, and took away the crews. These successes made a tremendous impression, and now the village of Basmana has given Chetvertakov 253 volunteers. Chetvertakov, an illiterate person, turned out to be an excellent administrator, tactician and strategist of partisan warfare. Alarming the enemy with surprise attacks, cleverly and carefully tracking down small French parties and exterminating them with lightning attacks. Chetvertakov managed to defend the vast territory around Gzhatsk from marauding robberies. Chetvertakov acted ruthlessly, and the bitterness of the peasants was such that it was hardly possible to restrain them. They did not take prisoners, but the French also shot without trial, on the spot, those partisans who fell into their hands. In the village of Semionovka, the peasants of Chetvertakov's detachment burned 60 French marauders. As we have seen, the French did the same on occasion.

They started talking about Chetvertakov. At his first demand, about 4 thousand peasants once joined his small (300 people) permanent detachment, and Chetvertakov undertook nothing more and nothing less than an open attack on the French battalion with guns, and the battalion retreated. 4 thousand peasants then went home, and Chetvertakov with his permanent detachment continued his work. Only when the danger had passed and the French left, Chetvertakov appeared in November 1812 in Mogilev in his regiment. General Kologrivov and General Emmanuel, after conducting an investigation, became convinced of the remarkable achievements of Chetvertakov, of the enormous benefit that he brought. Wittgenstein asked Barclay to reward Chetvertakov. The award was ... "the badge of the military order" (not George) Russian antiquity, vol. VII, pp. 99-102. And that was the end of it. For the serf peasant, the path to real distinction was barred, whatever his exploits.

It must be said that the true historical place of the partisans has been controversial more than once. At first, hot on the heels, with fresh memory, the cases of Denis Davydov, Figner, Seslavin, Dorokhov, Vadbolsky, Kudashev and others were spoken with enthusiasm. The daring and daring of the young raids of small parties on large detachments captivated the imagination. Then there was some reaction. The generals and officers of the regular troops, the heroes of Borodin and Maloyaroslavets, did not very willingly agree to put on the same level with their comrades these daring riders, who did not obey anyone, who flew from nowhere, who were hiding out of nowhere, took away the carts, divided the spoils, but were unable to withstand a real open battle with regular units of the retreating French army. On the other hand, Ataman Platov and Cossack circles insisted that it was the Cossacks who constituted the main force of the partisan detachments and that the glory of the partisans was, in essence, the glory of the Cossack army alone. The French were very helpful in strengthening this point of view: they talked a lot about the terrible harm that the Cossacks had brought them, and said almost nothing (or spoke with some disdain) about the partisans. It is fair to admit that the partisans have brought very great and undoubted benefit from mid-September to Berezina, that is, the end of November.

The guerrillas were brilliant and often insanely brave scouts. Figner, the prototype of Tolstoy's Dolokhov, actually went to the French camp in a French uniform and did this several times. Seslavin actually crept up to the French non-commissioned officer, loaded him onto his saddle and brought him to the Russian headquarters. Davydov with a party of 200 - 300 people really panicked and, putting to flight the detachments five times large, took the baggage train, fought off Russian prisoners, sometimes captured the guns. The peasants were much easier and simpler to converge and deal with the partisans and their leaders than with the regular units of the army.

Exaggerations made by some partisans when describing their actions, by the way, caused too harsh assessment from the future Decembrist Prince Sergei Volkonsky, who himself commanded a partisan detachment for some time in 1812: “Describing the partisan actions of my detachment, I will not fool the reader, as many partisans do, with stories of many unprecedented clashes and dangers; and at least by my conscientiousness, in comparison with the exaggerated stories of other partisans, I will gain confidence in my notes. ”Volkonsky S. G. Notes. - SPb., 1902, p. 207.. Quite right, there were exaggerations; but the partisans were also indisputable, feats of resourcefulness, fearlessness, selflessness, and their place of honor in the history of the Patriotic War, in the heroic epic of defending the homeland from a foreign conqueror, the partisans took firm hold.

He knew how to boast on occasion, but much more moderately, and the "poet-partisan" Denis Davydov. But the sense of truth still prevailed over Denis Davydov, and his notes are, no matter what the enemies of the dashing rider may say about them in their time, a precious source for the history of 1812, which, of course, must be treated with serious criticism, but which cannot be discarded in any case. Describing a number of feats of arms and daring undertakings of partisan detachments that attacked the rear, on carts, on small detachments of the French army that had fought back, he at the same time definitely says that the partisans' attack on large parts, for example, on Napoleon's guard, was decidedly beyond their strength. ... “I cannot be reproached for yielding to someone in enmity with an encroach on the independence and honor of my homeland ... My comrades remember, if not my weak successes, then at least my efforts, which tended to harm the enemy during the Patriotic foreign wars; they also remember my surprise, my delight, excited by the exploits of Napoleon, and the respect for his troops, which I had in my soul in the heat of the struggle. A soldier, even with arms in hand, I never ceased to give justice to the first soldier of centuries and the world, I was charmed by courage, no matter what clothes she put on, no matter where she showed herself. Although Bagration's "bravo", which escaped into the praise of the enemy in the midst of the fervor of the Battle of Borodino, echoed in my soul, it did not surprise her "Davydov D. V. Works, vol. III. - SPb., 1893, p. 77 .. Such was the mindset of Davydov. He behaved in a chivalrous manner towards the captured enemies. The same cannot be said for many other chiefs of partisan detachments. Figner (who died already in the war of 1813) was particularly inexorable.

Particularly important for the partisans was the help of the peasantry at the very beginning of the partisanship. The peasants of the Bronnitsk district of the Moscow province, the peasants of the village of Nikola-Pogorely near the town of Vyazma, the Bezhetsk, Dorogobuzh, Serpukhov peasants brought very significant benefits to the partisan detachments. They hunted down individual enemy parties and detachments, exterminated French foragers and marauders, and readily delivered food for people and horse feed to the partisan detachments. Without this help, the guerrillas could not have achieved half the results they actually achieved.

Then the retreat of the great army began, and it began with a senseless explosion of the Kremlin, which infuriated the anger of the people returning to Moscow, who had found the whole city in ruins. This final act - the explosion of the Kremlin - was viewed as a vicious mockery. The retreat was accompanied by the systematic, by order of Napoleon, the burning of cities and villages through which the French army moved. The peasants, finding dead Russian prisoners on both sides of the road, immediately took an oath not to spare their enemies.

But the actions of the peasants were not limited only to helping partisan detachments, capturing and exterminating marauders and stragglers, they were not limited to fighting foragers and destroying them, although, we note, this was the most terrible, destructive blow that the Russian peasants of the great army inflicted, starving it to death. hunger. Gerasim Kurin, a peasant from the village of Pavlova (near the city of Bogorodsk), formed a detachment of peasants, organized them, armed them with weapons taken from the killed Frenchmen and, together with his assistant, the peasant Stulov, led his detachment against the French and, in a battle with French cavalrymen, put them to flight ... The peasant women, embittered by the French violence against women who fell into their hands, acted energetically and showed particular cruelty towards the enemy. Rumors (quite reliable and confirmed) spoke of French violence against women who fell into their hands. Elder Vasilisa (Sychevsky uyezd, Smolensk province), who took the French prisoners, who personally interrupted many French soldiers with a pitchfork and a scythe, who, as they said about her, attacked the lagging parts of the carts, was no exception. The participation of women in the people's war is noted by all sources. Whole legends circulated about the same Vasilisa or about the lacemaker Praskovya, who operated near Duhovschina, but it is difficult to single out the truth in them, to separate history from fantasy. For a long time, official historiography neglected the collection and clarification of facts in the field of the people's war, dwelling almost exclusively on the actions of the regular army and the leaders of the partisans (although very little and fluently was said about partisans), and when contemporaries died out, it became even more difficult to collect completely reliable factual material. Of course, offensive actions (like the speeches of Kurin and Stulov or Chetvertakov) were not very frequent; most often, the actions of the peasants were limited to organizing surveillance of the enemy, defending their villages and entire volosts from attacks by the French and marauders, and exterminating the attackers. And this was infinitely more destructive for the French army than any raids, even the most successful for the peasants, and not the fire of Moscow, not the frosts, which almost did not exist until Smolensk itself, but the Russian peasants, who fiercely fought the enemy, dealt a terrible blow to the retreating great armies, surrounded her with a dense wall of irreconcilable hatred and prepared her final death.

Above, the government's fears and its anxious attitude towards the peasantry in 1812 have already been cited. Russian government, is evident from the following order. Captain Naryshkin with a cavalry detachment is standing near the town of Klin. Taking advantage of the peasants' ardent desire to help the army against the enemy, he distributes the surplus weapons he has in the detachment to the peasants, and the peasants themselves arm themselves with French weapons, which they remove from the French foragers and marauders who have been killed by them. Armed in this way, small peasant parties, groping near Moscow, mercilessly killed the French, who tried to travel from Moscow to search the surroundings for hay and oats for horses. The benefits of these peasant partisans were thus enormous. And suddenly Naryshkin receives an unexpected paper from above. Let us give the floor to himself: “On the basis of false reports and low slander, I received an order to disarm the peasants and shoot those who would be caught in indignation. Surprised by the order, which did not correspond so much to the generous ... behavior of the peasants, I replied that I could not disarm the hands that I had armed myself, and which served to destroy the enemies of the fatherland, and call those rebels who sacrificed their lives to defend ... independence. , wives and dwellings, and the name of the traitor belongs to those who, at such a sacred moment for Russia, dare to slander her most zealous and loyal defenders "V. Kharkevich, 1812 in his diaries ..., vol. II, p. 112.

There are many such cases. There is a number of documentary evidence of the indisputable fact that the government in every possible way interfered with the peasant partisan movement and tried to disorganize it to the best of its ability. They were afraid to give the peasants weapons against the French, they were afraid that these weapons would later turn against the landlords. He was afraid of Alexander, he was afraid of the "Novgorod landowner" Arakcheev, he was afraid of Balashov, he was also afraid of the superpatriot Rostopchin, who most of all intimidated the tsar with the ghost of Pugachev. Fortunately for Russia, the peasants in 1812 did not obey these orders to disarm them and continued to fight the enemy until the invaders were finally driven out of Russia.

Guerrilla war, peasant active struggle, Cossack raids - all this, with increasing malnutrition, with the daily death of horses, forced the French to throw guns along the road, throw some of their luggage from the carts, and most importantly - throw sick and wounded comrades to the fierce death that awaited them, if only they would not have been lucky enough to fall into the hands of the regular army. Exhausted by unprecedented suffering, half-starved, weakened troops walked along the road completely devastated, marking their way with the corpses of people and horses. Near Mozhaisk, the retreating army passed by a huge plain, crossed by a ravine and a river, with small hills, with ruins and blackened logs of two villages. The whole plain was covered with rotting, decomposed by many thousands of corpses and people and horses, warped by cannons, rusty weapons lying in disarray and unusable because the good had been taken away. The soldiers of the French army did not immediately recognize scary place... It was Borodino with his still-unburied dead. This field now made a terrible impression. great battle... Those who went to painful suffering and death for the last time looked at their comrades who had already died. The emperor and his guards marched in the vanguard. Leaving Vereya on October 28, Napoleon was in Gzhatsk on the 30th, on November 1 - in Vyazma, on November 2 - in Semlev, on the 3rd - in Slavkov, on the 5th - in Dorogobuzh, on the 7th - in the village of Mikhailov and on the 8th entered Smolensk. The army followed him in units from 8 to 15 November. Throughout this disastrous journey from Maloyaroslavets to Smolensk, all hopes - both of Napoleon himself and his army - were associated with Smolensk, where food supplies and the possibility of a somewhat quiet stay and rest for tortured, hungry people and horses were supposed. The field marshal moved further south, along a parallel line, with an astonishing slowness to the French. This "parallel persecution", conceived and carried out by Kutuzov, and most likely destroyed the Napoleonic army. The French headquarters, of course, did not know this then. It seemed that in Smolensk there would be good vacation, the soldiers will be able to come to their senses, come to their senses from the terrible suffering they endured, but it turned out to be different. In a dead, dilapidated, half-burnt city, the retreating army was awaited by a blow that finally broke the spirit of many of its parts: there were almost no supplies in Smolensk. From that moment on, the retreat finally began to turn into a flight, and everything that was transferred from Maloyaroslavets to Smolensk should have turned pale before the abyss that opened up under the feet of the great army after Smolensk and which swallowed it almost entirely.

Partisan movement - "the club of the people's war"

"... the cudgel of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, with stupid simplicity, but expediently, without disassembling anything, it rose, fell and nailed the French until the entire invasion had died."
... L.N. Tolstoy, "War and Peace"

The Patriotic War of 1812 remained in the memory of all Russian people as a people's war.

Don't cover it up! Let me come! Hood. V.V. Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

This definition is not accidentally firmly entrenched in her. Not only the regular army participated in it - for the first time in the history of the Russian state, the entire Russian people rose to defend their homeland. Various volunteer units were formed, taking part in many major battles... Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzov called on the Russian militia to provide assistance to the army in the field. The partisan movement developed greatly throughout the territory of Russia, where the French were stationed.

Passive resistance
The population of Russia began to resist the invasion of the French from the very first days of the war. The so-called. passive resistance. The Russian people left their homes, villages, entire cities. At the same time, people often devastated all warehouses, all food supplies, destroyed their farms - they were firmly convinced: nothing should have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

A.P. Butenev recalled how the Russian peasants fought the French: “The further the army went into the interior of the country, the more deserted were the villages encountered, and especially after Smolensk. The peasants sent their women and children, belongings and cattle to the neighboring forests; they themselves, with the exception of only decrepit old people, armed themselves with scythes and axes, and then began to burn their huts, set up ambushes and attacked backward and wandering enemy soldiers. V small towns that we passed, almost no one was met on the streets: only local authorities remained, who for the most part left with us, having previously set fire to supplies and shops, where there was an opportunity and time allowed ... "

"The villains are punished without mercy"
Peasant resistance gradually took on other forms. Some organized groups of several, caught soldiers of the Great Army and killed them. Naturally, they could not act against a large number of French at the same time. But that was enough to strike terror into the ranks of the enemy army. As a result, the soldiers tried not to walk alone, so as not to fall into the hands of the "Russian partisans".

With weapons in hand - shoot! Hood. V.V. Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

In some provinces left by the Russian army, the first organized partisan detachments were formed. One of these detachments operated in the Sychevsk province. It was headed by Major Yemelyanov, who was the first to excite the people to accept weapons: “Many began to pester him, from day to day the number of accomplices multiplied, and then armed with what they could, they chose the brave Emelyanov over themselves, taking an oath not to spare the belly for the faith, the Tsar and the Russian land and obey him in everything ... Then Emelyanov introduced between the warriors-villagers an amazing order and arrangement. On one sign, when the enemy marched in excellent forces, the villages became empty, on the other they again gathered in houses. Sometimes an excellent lighthouse and bell ringing announced when to go on horseback or on foot to battle. He himself, as the chief, encouraging by his example, was always with them in all dangers and everywhere pursued evil enemies, beat many, and took more prisoners, and, finally, in one hot firefight in the very splendor of the military actions of the peasants with his life he captured his love to the fatherland ... "

There were many such examples, and they could not escape the attention of the leaders of the Russian army. M.B. Barclay de Tolly in August 1812 appealed to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces: “… But many of the inhabitants of the Smolensk province have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the name of a Russian, punish the villains without mercy. Imitate them all who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign. Your army will not go out of your borders, until they drive out or destroy the forces of the enemy. It has decided to the very extreme to fight them, and you will only have to back it up by defending your own homes from more daring than terrible raids. "

The wide scope of the "small war"
Leaving Moscow, the commander-in-chief Kutuzov intended to wage a "small war" in order to create a constant threat to the enemy of his encirclement in Moscow. This task was to be solved by detachments of military partisans and people's militias.

While at the Tarutino position, Kutuzov took control of the partisan activities: “… I put ten partisans on the wrong foot in order to be able to take away all the methods from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of content in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutin, the partisans instilled fear and horror at the enemy, taking away all the means of food ... ".

Denis Davydov. Engraving by A. Afanasyev
from the original by W. Langer. 1820s.

Such actions required bold and decisive commanders and troops capable of acting in any conditions. The first detachment that was created by Kutuzov to conduct a small war was the detachment of lieutenant colonel D.V. Davydova, formed at the end of August in the composition of 130 people. With this detachment, Davydov marched through Yegoryevskoe, Medyn to the village of Skugarevo, which was turned into one of the bases for partisan warfare. He acted in conjunction with various armed peasant detachments.

Denis Davydov did not just fulfill his military duty. He tried to understand the Russian peasant, because he represented his interests and acted on his behalf: “Then I learned from experience that in a people's war one should not only speak the language of the rabble, but adapt to it, to its customs and its clothes. I put on a man's caftan, began to lower my beard, instead of the Order of St. Anne, I hung up the image of St. Nicholas and began to speak the language of quite folk ... ".

Another partisan detachment, led by a major general, was concentrated near the Mozhaisk road. I.S. Dorokhov. Kutuzov wrote to Dorokhov about the methods of partisan struggle. And when information was received at the army headquarters that Dorokhov's detachment was surrounded, Kutuzov reported: “The partisan can never come to this situation, because his duty is to stay in one place as much time as he needs to feed people and horses. A flying detachment of partisans should make marches secretive, along small roads ... During the day, hide in forests and low-lying places. In a word, a partisan must be decisive, quick and tireless. "

Figner Alexander Samoilovich. Engraving by G.I. Grachev with lithographs from the collection of P.A. Erofeeva, 1889.

At the end of August 1812, a detachment was also formed Vincengerode, consisting of 3200 people. Initially, his task was to oversee the corps of Viceroy Eugene de Beauharnais.

Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutino position, Kutuzov formed several more partisan detachments: the detachments of A.S. Figner, I.M. Vadbolsky, N.D. Kudashev and A.N. Seslavin.

In total, in September, 36 Cossack regiments and one team, 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and one command of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns acted as part of the flying detachments. Kutuzov managed to give the partisan war a wide scale. He entrusted them with the task of monitoring the enemy and delivering continuous strikes against his troops.

Caricature of 1912.

It was thanks to the actions of the partisans that Kutuzov had complete information about the movements of the French troops, on the basis of which it was possible to draw conclusions about Napoleon's intentions.

Due to the continuous strikes of the flying partisan detachments, the French had to always keep part of the troops at the ready. According to the journal of military operations, from September 14 to October 13, 1812, the enemy lost about 2.5 thousand people only killed, about 6.5 thousand French were taken prisoner.

Peasant partisan detachments
The activities of military partisan detachments would not have been so successful without the participation of peasant partisan detachments, which had been operating everywhere since July 1812.

The names of their "leaders" will remain in the memory of the Russian people for a long time: G. Kurin, Samus, Chetvertakov and many others.

Kurin Gerasim Matveevich
Hood. A. Smirnov

Portrait of the partisan Yegor Stulov. Hood. Terebenev I.I., 1813

Samusia's detachment operated near Moscow. He managed to exterminate more than three thousand French: “Samus introduced an amazing order in all the villages subordinate to him. He performed everything according to signs, which were given by means of bell ringing and other conventional signs. "

The exploits of Vasilisa Kozhina, who led a detachment in the Sychevsky district and fought against French marauders, received great fame.

Vasilisa Kozhina. Hood. A. Smirnov, 1813

M.I. wrote about the patriotism of Russian peasants. Kutuzov's report to Alexander I of October 24, 1812 about the patriotism of Russian peasants: “With martyrdom they bore all the blows associated with the invasion of the enemy, hid their families and young children in the forests, while the armed men themselves sought defeat in their peaceful homes for the emerging predators. Often the most women cunningly caught these villains and punished them with death for their assassination attempts, and quite often the armed villagers, joining our partisans, greatly helped them in exterminating the enemy, and it can be said without exaggeration that many thousands of the enemy were exterminated by the peasants. These feats are so numerous and delightful to the spirit of the Russian ... ".

Patriotic War of 1812. Guerrilla movement

Introduction

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having flared up after the invasion of Napoleonic troops in Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took more and more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, represented by the performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to be created, thousands of folk heroes, talented organizers of the partisan struggle came to the fore.

Why did the disenfranchised peasantry, ruthlessly oppressed by the feudal landlords, rise to fight against their seemingly "liberator"? Napoleon did not even think of any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at first promising phrases about the liberation of the serfs were uttered and even talked about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, this was only a tactical move, with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. And this did not correspond to his political goals when joining Russia. In the opinion of Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was important for him to consolidate monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach a revolution to Russia.

The purpose of the work is to consider Denis Davydov as a hero of partisan warfare and a poet. Consider the tasks of the work:

1. The reasons for the emergence of partisan movements

2. Partisan movement D. Davydov

3. Denis Davydov as a poet

1. The reasons for the emergence of partisan detachments

The beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality, the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, residents, when the French approached, went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be plundered and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of freeing them from serfdom.

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants took on the character of the mass abandonment of villages and villages and the withdrawal of the population to forests and areas far from military operations. And although this was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. French troops, with a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This did not take long to affect the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers were starving, and looting intensified. More than 10 thousand horses died before Vilna.

The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev detachments of peasants - partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced more and more often to remind chief of staff Berthier about big losses in people and strictly ordered to allocate an increasing number of troops to cover the foragers.

2. Partisan detachment of Denis Davydov

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war. The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly.

Its commander was General F.F. Vintzengerode, who headed the united Kazan dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​the city of Dukhovshchina.

After the invasion of Napoleonic troops, the peasants began to go into the forests, the heroes-partisans began to create peasant detachments and attack individual French teams. The struggle of the partisan detachments unfolded with particular force after the fall of Smolensk and Moscow. Partisan troops boldly went to the enemy and captured the French. Kutuzov allocated a detachment for operations behind enemy lines under the leadership of D. Davydov, whose detachment violated the enemy's communication routes, freed prisoners, and encouraged the local population to fight the invaders. Following the example of Denisov's detachment, by October 1812, there were 36 Cossack, 7 cavalry, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and other units, including artillery, by October 1812.

The inhabitants of the Roslavl district created several cavalry and foot partisan detachments, armed with lances, sabers and rifles. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders who made their way into the neighboring Yelnensky district. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized a defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment of Denis Davydov.

Denis Davydov's squad was a real thunderstorm for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyr hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodino. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention, he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A.Tuchkov, who had been taken prisoner. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the riots, the poor defense of the rear in the French army.

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food depots, guarded small detachments... At the same time, he saw how difficult it was for the flying peasant detachments to fight without an agreed plan of action. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent to the rear of the enemy could inflict great damage on him and help the partisans' actions.

D. Davydov asked General PI Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For the "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and -1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the enemy's rear. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaimishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several detachments of the French, captured a baggage train with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous moving ring.

A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. A detachment of General I.S.Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A. S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the area of ​​Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol hussar regiment and 500 Cossacks. The roads between Borovsk and Moscow were controlled by the detachment of Captain A. N. Seslavin. Colonel ND Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road was a detachment of Colonel I. Ye. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Vintzengerode, which, separating from itself small detachments to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrovskaya roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

The partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first, there were many difficulties. Even the inhabitants of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Quite often the hussars had to change into peasant caftans and grow beards.

The partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one, except the commander, knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift. To fly like snow on your head and quickly hide became the main rule of the partisans.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Davydov's detachment on the evening of September 3, 1812 went to Tsarev - Zaymishch. Not reaching 6 versts to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French train with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. A detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo - Zaymishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost broke into the village with them. The wagon train and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of French to resist was quickly suppressed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 carts with food and fodder were in the hands of the partisans.

3. Denis Davydov as a poet

Denis Davydov was a wonderful romantic poet. He belonged to such a genre as romanticism.

It should be noted that almost always in human history, a nation subjected to aggression creates a powerful layer of patriotic literature. This was the case, for example, during the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia. And only some time later, having recovered from the blow, overcoming pain and hatred, thinkers and poets think about all the horrors of the war for both sides, about its cruelty and meaninglessness. This is very vividly reflected in the poetry of Denis Davydov.

In my opinion, Davydov's poem is one of the outbursts of patriotic militancy caused by the invasion of the enemy.

What was this unshakable Russian strength composed of?

This power consisted of patriotism, not in words, but in deeds, the best people from the nobility, poets and just the Russian people.

This strength consisted of the heroism of the soldiers and the best officers of the Russian army.

This invincible force consisted of the heroism and patriotism of Muscovites who are leaving hometown, no matter how sorry it is for them to leave their property to perish.

The invincible strength of the Russians consisted of the actions of partisan detachments. This is Denisov's detachment, where the most needed person is Tikhon Shcherbaty, the people's avenger. Partisan detachments destroyed the Napoleonic army piece by piece.

So, Denis Davydov in his works depicts the war of 1812 as a national, Patriotic war, when all the people rose to defend the Motherland. And the poet did it with tremendous artistic power, creating a grandiose poem - an epic that has no equal in the world.

The work of Denis Davydov can be illustrated by the following

Who could cheer you so much, my friend?

Laughing makes you almost unable to speak.

What joys delight your mind, Or do they lend you money without a bill?

Or a happy waist came to you

And the two of the trantel-va took the endurance?

What happened to you that you don't answer?

Ay! let me rest, you know nothing!

I really am beside myself, I almost lost my mind:

I found Petersburg quite different now!

I thought that the whole world had changed completely:

Imagine - with debt N<арышки>he paid;

No more pedants, fools,

And even wiser Z<агряжск>oh, c<вистун>ov!

There is no courage in the unfortunate old rhymes,

And our dear Marin does not stain paper,

And, delving into the service, he works with his head:

How, having started a platoon, in time to shout: stop!

But more than that, I was surprised with delight:

NS<пь>ev, who so pretended to be Lycurgus,

For our happiness he wrote to us,

Suddenly, fortunately for ours, he stopped writing them.

In everything, a happy change appeared,

Theft, robbery, treason disappeared,

No more complaints or grievances are visible,

Well, in a word, the city took on a completely disgusting look.

Nature has given beauty to the ugly,

And L himself<ава>I stopped squinting at nature,

B<агратио>on the nose became an inch shorter,

And D<иб>and frightened people with the beauty,

Yes I, who myself, from the beginning of this century,

Wore the name of a man with a stretch,

I look, I am glad, I don’t recognize myself:

Whence is beauty, whence is growth - I look;

That the word is bon mot * that the gaze is infused with passion,

I wonder how I have time to change intrigues!

Suddenly, about the wrath of heaven! suddenly rock struck me:

Among the blissful days Andryushka woke up,

And all that I saw that I had so much fun -

I saw everything in a dream, I lost everything with sleep.

In a smoky field, in a bivouac

By the blazing fires

In the beneficent arak

Behold the savior of the people.

Get together around

All Orthodox!

Serve the golden tub,

Where the fun lives!

Pour vast bowls

In the noise of joyful speeches,

How our ancestors drank

Among spears and swords.

Burtsev, you are a hussar of hussars!

You are on a wicked horse

The most brutal of frenzy

And the rider in the war!

Let's hit the bowl and bowl together!

Today it is still idle to drink;

Trumpets will be blown tomorrow

Tomorrow thunders will thunder.

Let's drink and swear

That we surrender to the curse,

If we ever

Let's give in a step, turn pale,

Pity our breasts

And in misfortune we will become intimidated;

If we give when

Left side flanking,

Or we'll besiege the horse,

Or a pretty little cheat

Let's give our heart for free!

Let not a saber blow

My life will be cut short!

Let me be a general

How many have I seen!

May among the bloody battles

I will be pale, fearful

And in the collection of heroes

Sharp, courageous, talkative!

May my mustache, the beauty of nature,

Black and brown, curled,

Excised in youth

And disappear, like dust!

Let the fortune be for annoyance,

To multiply all the troubles

Will give me a rank for watch parades

And "George" for advice!

Let ... But chu! no time to walk!

To the horses, brother, and a leg in the stirrup,

The saber out - and in the fight!

Here is another Feast God gives us,

And noisier and more fun ...

Well, tka, shako on one side,

And - hurray! Happy day!

V. A. Zhukovsky

Zhukovsky, dear friend! Debt is red by payment:

I read poems dedicated to me by you;

Now read mine, bivouac fumigated

And sprinkled with wine!

I haven't chatted with my muse or you for a long time,

Was it up to me? ..

.........................................
But even in the thunderstorms of war, still on the battlefield,

When the Russian camp went out,

I greeted you with a huge glass

The impudent partisan roaming the steppes!

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the war of 1812 was named the Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of "war not by the rules", Kutuzov said that such were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Berthe, he wrote on October 8, 1818: "It is difficult to stop the people, bitter with everything that he saw; the people who for so many years did not know the war on their territory; the people who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland ... ". Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war proceeded from the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that manifested themselves in the national liberation war.

During the preparation of the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militia and partisans fettered the actions of Napoleon's troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The Smolen-10th road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly raided by partisans. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones delivered to the headquarters of the Russian army.

The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. "The peasants," wrote Kutuzov, "from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy ... They kill enemies in great numbers, and bring the captured ones to the army." The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6 thousand Frenchmen.

And yet one of the most heroic actions of 1812 remains the feat of Denis Davydov and his detachment.

Bibliographic list

1. Zhilin P. A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1974. History of France, t. 2. M., 2001.-687s.

2. History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V.G. Tyukavkina, Moscow: INFRA, 2002.-569p.

3. Orlik OV Thunderstorm of the twelfth year .... M .: INFRA, 2003.-429s.

4. Platonov S. F. Textbook of Russian history for high school M., 2004.-735s.

5. Reader on the History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V.G. Tyukavkina - Moscow: DROFA, 2000.-644s.

The partisan movement of 1812 (partisan war) is an armed conflict between Napoleon's army and detachments of Russian partisans, which broke out during the time with the French.

The partisan troops consisted mainly of Cossacks and regular army units in the rear. Gradually they were joined by liberated prisoners of war, as well as volunteers from the civilian population (peasants). Partisan detachments were one of the main military forces of Russia in this war and offered significant resistance.

Creation of guerrilla units

Napoleon's army moved inland very quickly, pursuing Russian troops, who were forced to retreat. As a result of this, quite soon, Napoleon's soldiers stretched across a large territory of Russia and created communication networks with the border, along which the delivery of weapons, food and prisoners of war took place. To defeat Napoleon, these networks had to be cut. The leadership of the Russian army decided to create numerous partisan detachments throughout the country, which were supposed to engage in subversive work and prevent the French army from receiving everything it needed.

The first detachment was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.

Cossack partisan detachments

Davydov presented to the leadership a plan for the partisan attack on the French, which was quickly approved. To implement the plan, the army leadership gave Davydov 50 Cossacks and 50 officers.

In September 1812, Davydov's detachment attacked a French detachment, which was secretly transporting additional human forces to the camp of the main army, as well as food. Due to the effect of surprise, the French were captured, some were killed, and the entire cargo was destroyed. This attack was followed by several more of the same, who turned out to be extremely successful.

Davydov's detachment began to gradually replenish with released prisoners of war and volunteers from the peasants. At the very beginning of the partisan war, the peasants were wary of subversive soldiers, but soon they began to actively help and even participated in attacks on the French.

However, the very height of the partisan war began after Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow. He gave the order to start active partisan activities in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments had already been formed throughout the country and numbered from 200 to 1,500 people. The main force was made up of Cossacks and soldiers, but the peasants also actively participated in the resistance.

Several factors contributed to the success of the guerrilla war. Firstly, the detachments always attacked suddenly and acted in secret - the French could not predict where and when the next attack would occur and could not prepare. Secondly, after the capture of Moscow, discord began in the ranks of the French.

In the middle of the war, the guerrilla attack was at its most acute stage. The French were exhausted by the hostilities, and the number of partisans increased so much that they could already make up their army, not inferior to the troops of the emperor.

Peasant partisan detachments

The peasants also play an important role in the resistance. Although they did not actively join the detachments, they actively helped the partisans. The French, deprived of food supplies from their own, in the rear constantly tried to get food from the peasants, but they did not surrender and did not conduct any trade with the enemy. Moreover, the peasants burned their own warehouses and houses, so that the grain did not get to the enemies.

As the guerrilla war expanded, the peasants began to participate more actively in it and often attacked the enemy themselves, armed with whatever they could. The first peasant partisan detachments appeared.

Results of the partisan war of 1812

The role of the partisan war of 1812 in the victory over the French is difficult to overestimate - it was the partisans who were able to undermine the enemy's forces, weaken him and allow the regular army to expel Napoleon from Russia.

After the victory, the heroes of the partisan war were deservedly rewarded.