Officially, these people were considered free, but in reality their life was practically no different from the life of prisoners. They usually lived in barracks. There was a lack of warm clothes, linen, bedding, shoes, not to mention food.

Mortality among the labor army was very high. They mostly died from dystrophy, in other words, malnutrition, since the rations were very scarce.

So, out of 120 thousand labor army workers who worked at factories Southern Urals, by the end of the war a little more than 34 thousand people survived. The dead were secretly buried at night in common graves without documents. They did not even install signs, which subsequently greatly hampered the work of search teams.

Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of the Volga German Willy Goebel, who was born in 1925 in the village of Keppental and mobilized in November 1942 to the Gremyachinskoye coal deposit: “Every morning one or two dead people were carried out of the barracks. I especially remember January 1943. The frost reached minus 53 degrees. All builders were allowed to stay at home for two days. Later, it got a little warmer to minus 49, and then some boss ordered everyone to be taken out of the hut to clean up the railway track near the mine. More than 300 came out

Human. Every third person who returned from snow removal had frostbite on his hands or feet. Employees of the medical unit did not have the right to release even severely frostbite from work. And they were unable to go to work, and they were immediately deprived of bread rations and hot meals. For weakened people, this was tantamount to death. As a result of someone's bungling, we lost forever more than forty comrades.

Since the time of the USSR, many secrets have remained, one of them is the Soviet Germans in the labor army during the war years and the differentiated attitude of the occupying authorities of Deutschland towards the Germans who are on the territory of Ukraine. The official history and chronology do not answer many questions concerning the Soviet Germans, they have not yet been fully rehabilitated and the issue of creating German autonomy has not been resolved.


The film "Labour Army", created in 2013 by order of the Public Organization "German National Autonomy of the Omsk Region", contains memories of Russian Germans who ended up in the labor army. The film is unique in its kind - a lot of books about this black page in the history of Russian Germans have been published, but there are practically no films with the memories of eyewitnesses. Financial support for the autonomy of the Omsk region in the implementation of this project was provided by the Regional Public Fund "Azovo" and the German Ministry of Internal Affairs with the assistance of AEO " international union German culture". *Express sincere gratitude German national autonomy of the Omsk region for the opportunity to place this film in the video archive of Russian Germans.

labor army

Zyryanovskie Germans in the labor army.

This documentary was filmed in 2013 and tells about the events of 1941-42, at the time of which the participants were at least 16 years old. That is, the year of birth should be 1925-26, as the latest.
In 2013, these people should be 2013-1925=88 years old, and this is the youngest of them.
Members of the labor armies look much younger, they are at most 70-75 years old, and this despite the fact that the years spent in difficult conditions have greatly aged them. Excellent memory, vivid speech, their native language is Yiddish, not Russian. Look at racial composition, almost all of them are not pure white. We can say that this is a genetically mutilated white race with the addition of foreign impurities.

The official chronology does not explain why the Soviet Germans were ranked among the "guilty peoples", sent to labor armies and kept with such brutal cruelty.

The first labor armies, according to official history, began to be created in 1920-21, even in 1919, in order to raise the economy destroyed by the civil war.
Why is the 1st World War, is Civil, although in fact, it is predatory and led to revolutions and raider seizure of the property of the entire nation-nationalization?
The ominous meaning of the "Civil War" is that an army of genetically deformed white people, many of whom were the so-called Soviet Germans, was thrown at the white race.

Historians told us something completely different, that a civil war is when, due to political differences, representatives of the same people fought against each other, following their convictions. In fact, the war criminals who planned to take over the planet and all property cloned in secret laboratories genetically modified biorobots based on the genetic material of white people and forced them to fight with weapons against their own blood and flesh.

Of course, the memory of this was erased and a new one was recorded.

Can these biorobots be blamed for helping their masters rise to power by killing white people?
Cloned biorobots do not have the concept of good and evil, they are like machines, machines, inventory, whatever you order, they will do. They will invest one program - they will be pianists, artists, scientists, businessmen, etc., they will invest another - they will be killing machines, strong, hardy, strong, not knowing pity, practically indestructible by conventional weapons.

Here are the Deutsches, white race, pure blood:







Compare with the people you saw in documentary. The difference is huge.

Genetically mutilated clones created on the basis of white human DNA can and should be reprogrammed, but in very humane conditions. For example, in Israel, the prison regime is very relaxed for Jews, it is enough for the prisoners to realize their mistakes and not make them again, see the article at the link below. The biorobots in human form that brought the Bolsheviks of the Comintern to power are not to blame for this. It is necessary to judge and execute war criminals, the Bolsheviks, the Comintern for all their atrocities.

Next, another inconsistency that can not be explained by official history. Why were Soviet Germans massively deported and driven into labor camps precisely in 1941-42 and beyond? Why, what is their fault? Why was the Soviet leadership afraid that the Soviet Germans would go over to the side of the Wehrmacht?

Let's try to understand these inconsistencies, let's turn to the official history and chronology:

Labor armies of 1920-1921 -Wikipedia

Labor Army - formation (association, army) in the Soviet Republic, which were created in 1920 - 1921 on the basis of departments (headquarters), units, formations and spare parts of the Red Army to help the national economy.

In the Red Army there were many ball-bearing, white blacks, "Germans", such as this tattooed inhabitant of the prison zone:

The Red Army (RKKA), the underworld and the intelligentsia, the backbone of the Soviet occupation commandant's office.

A video created on the basis of my article about clones of the Red Army.



The Red Army (RKKA) was not an army of workers and peasants. Red Army army of combat clones.

Of course, not all soldiers and officers of the Red Army were scumbags and bandits, many went to serve for the sake of rations and a roof over their heads, as well as the opportunity to provide their families with everything they needed in the conditions of post-war devastation.

The devastation and collapse of the national economy were after the October Revolution and the 1st World War, which ended in 1918,
and Soviet Germans began to be sent to the labor army in 1941-42. Why such a gap, as much as 23-24 years, as official historians will explain?

They were involved in the performance of economic and partly managerial tasks in their places of deployment. Separate units were involved in the fight against banditry. They were one of the components of the system of "war communism" and the practical embodiment of the thesis of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of that time on the militarization of labor, which was a necessary measure in the conditions civil war and the virtually non-functioning economy of the Soviet state.

The first labor army was the 1st Revolutionary Army of Labor. The last - the eighth - was the Siberian Labor Army, the decision to create which was made on January 15, 1921.

The average annual number of labor armies did not exceed 300 thousand people.

By a resolution of the STO dated March 30, 1921, the labor armies were transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Labor of the RSFSR. In the Ukrainian SSR, from June 1921, they were subordinated to the authorized representative of the Main Labor Committee in Ukraine under the commander of the labor units of Ukraine.

In the Ukrainian SSR, labor armies were disbanded in September-December 1921. In the European part of the RSFSR, the disbandment of labor armies began in December 1920 and ended on February 2, 1922, when the 1st Revolutionary Labor Army, which had been created first, was disbanded. On the basis of the former labor armies, state workers' artels are being formed, designed to maintain the leading role of the state in the use of the mass labor force. In the Urals, the economic and administrative structure of the labor army became the basis of the Ural region that appeared in 1923.
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"Trudarmiya" was completed, first of all, from representatives of the "guilty" peoples , that is, Soviet citizens ethnically related to the population of countries at war with the USSR: Germans, Finns, Romanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians , although some other peoples were also represented in it. However, if the Germans ended up in Trudarmia already from the end of 1941 - the beginning of 1942, then work detachments and columns of citizens of other nationalities noted above began to form only at the end of 1942.


View of the place where the Neu-Bauer (Solyanka) colony was. Photo by Vladimir Kakorin. Image: http://wolgadeutsche.rucentr.tv

Several stages can be distinguished in the history of the existence of the "Labor Army" (1941-1946).

The first stage - from September 1941 to January 1942. The beginning of the process of creating labor army formations was laid by the closed resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 31, 1941 “On the Germans living on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR”. On its basis, labor mobilization of German men aged 16 to 60 takes place in Ukraine. It has already been noted that due to the rapid advance of the German troops, this decision was largely not implemented, however, it was still possible to form 13 construction battalions, with a total number of 18,600 people. At the same time, in September, the recall of German servicemen from the Red Army begins, from which construction battalions are also formed. All these construction battalions are sent to 4 NKVD facilities: Ivdellag, Solikambumstroy, Kimpersailag and Bogoslovstroy. Since the end of September, the first of the formed battalions have already started work.

Soon, by decision of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the construction battalions were disbanded, and the military personnel were removed from the quartermaster supply and received the status of construction workers. Of these, work columns of 1 thousand people each are created. Several columns were united into working detachments. This position of the Germans was short-lived. Already in November, they were again transferred to the barracks and subject to military regulations.

As of January 1, 1942, 20,800 mobilized Germans were working on construction sites and in the camps of the NKVD. Several thousand more Germans worked in work columns and detachments attached to other people's commissariats.

Thus, from the very beginning, according to departmental affiliation, the Labor Army work columns and detachments were divided into two types.

1. Formations of the same type were created and placed at the camps and construction sites of the GULAG of the NKVD, obeyed the camp authorities, were guarded and provided according to the standards established for prisoners.

2. Formations of a different type were formed under civilian people's commissariats and departments, obeyed their leadership, but were controlled by local bodies of the NKVD. The administrative regime for the maintenance of these formations was somewhat less strict than the columns and detachments that functioned within the NKVD itself.

Why such a difference in status, regime of maintenance, treatment, subordination, provision between two different types of "Germans"?

The official history also does not answer these questions. The question of labor armies in which Soviet Germans were involved did not come up until the 1980s. Too scary topic, fresh wounds, fear of party bosses and fear of responsibility for their crimes.


On January 12, 1942, in development of the USSR State Defense Committee resolution No. 1123, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria signed order No. 0083 "On the organization of detachments from mobilized Germans at the NKVD camps."
In the order, 80 thousand mobilized, who were to be at the disposal of the people's commissariat, were distributed among 8 objects: Ivdellag - 12 thousand; Sevurallag - 12 thousand; Usollag - 5 thousand; Vyatlag - 7 thousand; Ust-Vymlag - 4 thousand; Kraslag - 5 thousand; Bakallag - 30 thousand; Bogoslovlag - 5 thousand. The last two camps were formed specifically for the mobilized Germans.

All mobilized were required to report to the assembly points of the People's Commissariat of Defense in good winter clothes, with a supply of linen, bedding, a mug, a spoon and a 10-day supply of food. Of course, many of these demands were difficult to fulfill, since as a result of the resettlement, the Germans lost their property, many of them were essentially unemployed, and all of them, as noted earlier, eked out a miserable existence.

According to official history, from the beginning of the 1940s, the USSR received lend-lease from the allies. Whence such pettiness on the part of the Soviet government and poverty? Of course, official historians will bypass these issues as well.


The geographical aspect of the second mass mobilization of the Germans deserves attention. In addition to the territories and regions affected by the first mobilization, the second mobilization also captured the Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Chkalovsky, Kuibyshev, Yaroslavl regions, Mordovian, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurt, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. The mobilized Germans from these regions and republics were sent to build the Sviyazhsk-Ulyanovsk railway. The construction of the road was carried out by order of the State Defense Committee and was entrusted to the NKVD. In Kazan, a management was organized for the construction of a new railway and a camp, called the Volga Correctional Labor Camp of the NKVD (Volzhlag). During March - April 1942, 20 thousand mobilized Germans and 15 thousand prisoners were supposed to be sent to the camp.

Germans living in the Tajik, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Kazakh SSR, Bashkir ASSR, Chelyabinsk region mobilized for the construction of the South Ural railway. They were sent to Chelyabinsk station. The Germans from the Komi ASSR, Kirov, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Ivanovo regions were supposed to work in the timber transport facilities of Sevzheldorlag and therefore were delivered to the Kotlas station. Mobilized from the Sverdlovsk and Molotov regions ended up at Tagilstroy, Solikamskstroy, and Vyatlag. The Kraslag received Germans from the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Irkutsk and Chita regions. Germans from the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories came to Umaltstroy, to the Urgal station of the Far Eastern Railway. In total, about 40.9 thousand people were mobilized during the second mass conscription of Germans into the Labor Army.
(Read completely : http://www.geschichte.rusdeutsch.ru/21/63)

Despite the deportation of the German population of the European part of the USSR carried out by the Soviet authorities, a rather significant number Soviet Germans living in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States and the adjacent western regions of the RSFSR, due to the rapid advance German troops , could not be taken out, they ended up in the occupied territories.

As the front moved east, the territory occupied by German troops handed over to the civilian authorities of Nazi Germany.
(why not the military authorities, if the Second World War was going on and the Nazis attacked the USSR, why did the USSR resignedly surrender territories to civilian authorities without a fight? It does not seem like the behavior of a debtor or a criminal, to whom bailiffs or police come to seize mortgaged property, or confiscate stolen items)

Most of Ukraine (with the exception of Transnistria and Galicia) became part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine (Reichskommissariat Ukraine), which was headed by Reichskommissar E. Koch. The Reichskommissariat, whose administrative center was in the city of Rovno, consisted of six general commissariats (Generalkommissariat): Zhitomir, Lutsk, Kiev, Nikolaev Dnepropetrovsk, Crimea (Tavria).

According to the first estimates of the occupying authorities, there were 163 thousand ethnic Germans (including in the general commissariats: in Zhytomyr - 42 thousand, in Kiev - 9 thousand, in Lutsk - 5 thousand, in Dnepropetrovsk - 70 thousand, in Nikolaev - 37 thousand).
The Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories, headed by A. Rozenberg, in April 1942 developed the "Instructions for the Treatment of Ethnic Germans", intended primarily for the Wehrmacht.
Why was such an instruction needed, are ethnic Germans in the occupied territories and Deutsche Wehrmacht different types of Germans?

The instruction forbade the resettlement of ethnic Germans from compact places of residence to Germany during the war.
The resettlement of Germans from separately located settlements to areas of a compact settlement was encouraged, which was motivated by the need to protect the population from partisan attacks.

During the war, the reprivatization of collectivized land and inventory was frozen.

Persons who are ethnic Germans and have held leadership positions in party, Soviet, administrative and economic work, those involved in the repressions against their fellow countrymen were subject to “removal”.

Reichskommissar of Ukraine E. Koch believed that ethnic Germans in the USSR did not correspond to the ideas of people belonging to the “nation of winners”. They needed, above all, appropriate education. A program was developed to create nurseries, kindergartens and boarding schools, retrain teachers (produced in Kyiv, Novograd-Volynsk, Berlin) and provide schools educational material, corresponding to the standards of the Reich (by May 1942, 31.5 thousand primers were printed). In Zhitomir, a pharmaceutical and dental school (May 1942) and an agricultural school (March 1943) were opened, in Kyiv - the Institute of Regional Studies and Economics and central Library Reichskommissariat (June 1942), preparations began for the creation of German universities in Kyiv and Odessa.

Until the end of October 1941, a wave of purges took place in the occupied territory, the victims of which were mainly communists, Soviet workers, as well as Jews. Ethnic Germans were also among those shot. Self-defense detachments were repeatedly involved in raids, protection and escort of those arrested. In general, the German population reacted passively to the activities of the occupation authorities, to the execution of Germans and Jews with incomprehension, although there were cases of local Germans entering the special units of the SS and their participation in punitive operations, including mass executions.

As civil administration was established in the occupied territory, ethnic Germans were issued certificates of their nationality (Volkstumsausweis). This confirmed their special status (they stood out from among the population of the occupied territory), but German citizenship was not granted to them. When entering a job, persons who received the status of an ethnic German were paid higher than Russians or Ukrainians, but significantly lower than German citizens. They could serve in self-defense units, but as foreigners they were not subject to conscription into the Wehrmacht and other military and police units.

According to the instructions of the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine of December 7, 1942, four categories of ethnic Germans were introduced.

to the second category - persons who meet the criteria of the first category, but are married to a representative of another nationality. Spouses are not Germans and children from mixed marriages for practical reasons, they were also classified in the second category, provided that they already gravitated to the German way of life until June 21, 1941. The overall impression of a given family or family clan was decisive.

To the third category included "purebred" Germans who adopted the language and lifestyle of a foreign spouse. This category included persons who had one German parent, but did not gravitate towards German culture and did not consider themselves to be of German nationality.

Fourth category not specified in the instructions. On the basis of this instruction, German children who, after the loss of their parents, were brought up by non-Germans, were subject to transfer to guardians belonging to the first category. If in a mixed family a non-German spouse did not speak well German, then he was ranked in the third category. At the request of the Rosenberg Ministry, Germans married to Armenians, Greeks and Karaites, as well as their children, were not subject to inclusion in the Register of Ethnic Germans in Ukraine.

German citizenship was granted to persons classified in the first two categories ,
and considered to be in force. from June 21, 1941 Persons assigned to the third category were granted citizenship temporarily for 10 years. Registration was carried out in a forced manner from the spring of 1943. Under the pressure of the advancing Red Army, however, it was not carried out in the Dnepropetrovsk region and in the territory located southeast of it. In the winter of 1943 - 1944 the evacuation of the civilian occupation services, as well as ethnic Germans, began. At the same time, there was an outflow of masses of Russian and Ukrainian refugees to the west.
Ethnic Germans were sent to territories annexed to the Reich. Since February 1944, the registration and granting of German citizenship was carried out under the auspices and control of the SS in the camp of the Immigration Office in Lodz (Litzmanstadt).
(Read in full: http://www.geschichte.rusdeutsch.ru/21/71)
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As you can see official history and chronology do not provide an answer to the above questions, but on the contrary, they are increasingly confusing and misleading.

We put the correct chronology, let's see what happens:

1917 (1967), the October Revolution, the Bolshevik government comes to power, nationalizes all property (people's shares on all property).
Immediately after the raider seizure of property by the Bolsheviks, the mega-state cut off their use of advanced technologies and the financial system:
1917(1967)-Prohibition of Trade with the Enemy of the United States, more than 6,000 patents retired;
1947 (1967) the so-called monetary reform, the property shares seized from the people were exchanged in the ratio of 10:1 for Soviet rubles.

The Bolsheviks, having seized all the people's property, launched the production of armored trains, weapons, ammunition and army equipment, and used the warehouse stocks of resources and food.

The construction of armored trains began immediately after the revolution of 1918 (1968) on the basis of spare parts for Pullman cars In 1920 (1970) the Red Army had 103 armored trains in service.

Weapons of Victory 20 - Armored Trains (English subtitles)

On these armored trains, exploiting the captured equipment and trophy population, including Soviet Germans, the Bolsheviks exported the revolution around the world, even the historical department has recently split, that all revolutions happened not in 1918, but in 1968. The introduction of tanks into Poshelovakia -1968, the division of Germany into the GDR and the FRG did not take place in 1949, but in 1968, here are the official confirmations:

Germany is the unofficial name of the Federal Republic of Germany, commonly known from 1968-1990 s the socialist government of the GDR (East Germany) to refer to West Germany.

Within Germany itself, such a name is not welcome, because it is humiliating and unacceptable, it can only be used for FIFA and for the International Olympic Committee. After the unification of the two Germanys: the GDR and the FRG, the country became known as Germany (Deutschland)

List of IOC country codes -Wikipedia
List of international Olympic codes for participating countries:

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) uses three-letter abbreviation country codes to refer to each group of athletes that participate in the Olympic Games. Each code usually identifies a National Olympic Committee (NOC), but there are several codes that have been used for other instances in the past Games, such as teams composed of athletes from multiple nations, or groups of athletes not formally representing any nation.

Clickable in a new window:



Germany-English Germany

Germany French. Allemagne
1968 is the year of the revolution, the split of the country into 2 parts.




(Read more here:)

Deutsche is the army of Deutschland, Germany, and the so-called Germans are the infantry of the GDR, satellites of the Bolshevik regime under the command of the Comintern.

During the so-called 1st World War of 1914-1918 (1964-68), this infantry of the Comintern captured almost the entire world, captured the indigenous white population in order to use them to extort money and technology from the megastate. The "Germans" driven from Europe belonged to the first category mentioned above, since they did not bring the Bolsheviks to power; they were given all privileges during the war of 1941-45 (1971-75), even if they married someone who was not of their race.

Who were the representatives of the 3rd and 4th categories? It is most likely that these were the very genetically mutilated clones that were created on the basis of the white man's DNA, but they did not possess his qualities, they had to be reformatted. They were not granted German citizenship. The Deutsches treated them humanely, patiently and with understanding.

The captured Deutsches were kept in best conditions than "Germans" clones. After the visit of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1955 (1975), many Deutsche prisoners of war were returned to their homeland, and Soviet Germans continued to be exploited until the end of the war.

Many Soviet Germans, when they applied for permanent residence to the German consulate, found their original documents there. This means that all revolutions, the Second World War and labor armies were not events of the years declared by the official chronology, but happened much later, from 1968-75.

What is the fault of some "Soviet Germans" who were forced to work in the most difficult conditions in the labor armies? The fact that they were fighting clones and the workforce of the Comintern, without which its coming to power and its retention would have been impossible.
They have had their memories selectively erased, so they have no idea what they were suffering for.

But can the Soviet Germans be blamed for this? The author of the article thinks not. The war criminals who mutilated the white man's DNA and put the created clones at their service should bear the full guilt and punishment.

Read

large military. formations of the Red Army, used in 1920-22 at work in the bunk. x-ve. In the beginning. 1920 Sov. state-in as a result of victories on the fronts of civil. war achieved a peaceful respite. But military. the danger did not allow to begin the demobilization of the army, in which there were 5 million people. (see Soviet Armed Forces), conditions were created for the broad participation of Red Army units in the restoration of the bunks. x-va. The initiative to use the military. units on the labor front belonged to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army (commander M. S. Matiyasevich, member of the Revolutionary Military Council D. E. Gaevsky), which in January. 1920 sent a telegram to V. I. Lenin, proposing "to turn all the forces and means of the 3rd Red Army to the restoration of transport and the organization of the economy" in the Urals. In a reply telegram, Lenin approved this proposal (see Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 51, p. 115). Jan 15 1920 Workers' council and cross. Defense decided to transform the 3rd Army into the 1st (Ural) Revolutionary. army of labor with the task of restoring well. etc., to harvest food and timber, to mine coal in the districts of the Urals and the Urals. By agreement of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR and the All-Ukr. Revolutionary Committee Jan 21 1920 was adopted by the regulation on the Council of Ukrainian. labor armies. It was formed from the troops of the South-West. front for the restoration of Donbass, providing mines, railway. etc. and factories of Ukraine with fuel, raw materials and food. The same tasks faced the Donetsk Labor Army, formed on 3 December. Jan 23, 1920 1920 The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted a regulation on the Council of the Caucasus. Army of Labor (it is also the Labor Army of the South-East of Russia), which was formed from parts of the 8th Army Kavk. front by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front of March 20, 1920. It was mainly used at work in the oil industry of the North. Caucasus. Restoration and repair of the South-East. and. The 2nd Army Kavk was engaged in. front, transferred to the labor position by the decision of the Workers' Council and the cross. Defense of 27 Feb. 1920 and called the 2nd special railway. T. a. (it is also the Labor Railway Army of the Caucasian Front). Decree of the Council of the worker and cross. defense 23 Jan. 1920 the forces and means of the Reserve Army of the Republic were sent to restore the through railway. communications Moscow - Yekaterinburg, for the repair of steam locomotives and wagons. Feb 10 1920 Workers' council and cross. defense decided to transfer the 7th army, which was stationed near Petrograd, to a working position. It was named Petrogradskaya T. a. Its main tasks were: transportation of fuel, repair of agricultural-x. machines. Based on the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of April 21. 1920, the 2nd Revolutionary Army was formed from units of the 4th Army of the Turkestan Front. army of labor with the aim of: building a railroad. from Alexandrov-Gaya to the Emba oil district, procurement and delivery of food, firewood, etc. messages, logging and food was engaged in Sib. T. a., formed on 15 Jan. 1921. Along with the transfer of entire armies to the labor front, it was also practiced episodic. attraction of various military units and formations to work on the restoration of bunks. x-va, the fight against hunger and banditry. T. a. obeyed in the military-adm. relation to the RVS of the Republic, and in the economic and labor - STO. Spare T.'s activity and. and Zheleznodorozhnaya led the Revolutionary Military Councils of these armies, the activities of the rest were led by the Soviets of T. a., which consisted of representatives of the military. and political army command and plenipotentiaries of the Workers' Council and the cross. defense (since April 1920 - the Council of Labor and Defense), the Supreme Council of National Economy and various people's commissariats and departments, depending on the household. tasks T. a. As a rule, these Soviets were the highest adm.-hoz. body of the district of T.'s location and. The IX Congress of the RCP(b) in the resolution "On the Immediate Tasks of Economic Construction" in the section "Labor Armies" pointed out that "the use of military units for labor tasks is of equal practical economic and socialist educational significance" ("CPSU in resolutions...", 8th ed., vol. 2, 1970, p. 161). T. a. together with the military parts of a number of military districts to the beginning. sept. 1920 repaired 16 thousand steam locomotives and St. 100 thousand wagons; cleared and repaired more than 12 thousand miles of railway. ways; loaded and unloaded 360 thousand wagons; prepared 873 thousand cubic meters. fathoms of firewood and taken to their destinations 384 thousand cubic meters. fathoms. Only from 15 Apr. to July 1, 1920, approx. 2.5 million Red Army soldiers. The use of army units on households. front was temporary and depended on the military. environment. So, with the beginning of the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, Petrograd. T. a. was converted to combat. End of civil war caused changes in the position of T. a. By the resolution of the SRT of March 30, 1921 "On labor units" T. a. and dep. military units, transferred to the labor front (which then accounted for 1/4 of the entire Red Army), from May 1 came under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Labor. Under him, the Labor Department of the Republic and its local bodies were created. On December 30, 1921, the STO decided to disband the T. a. T.'s activity and. was of great importance both in the decision of households. tasks, and in the implementation of party-political. and cultural-mass construction. A variety of information about the activities of T. a. contained in the newspapers published by them: 1st Labor Army - "Red Alarm"; Ukrainian - "Labor Army"; Caucasian - "Izvestia of the Grozny-Vladikavkaz Revolutionary Committee and the Political Department of the Caucasian Army of Labor" (they are then "Izvestia of the Grozny District Revolutionary Committee and the Political Department of the Caucasian Army of Labor"), "Red Labor", the weekly "To the Light", etc.; Spare - "Red Fighter"; 7th Army - "Combat Truth"; 2nd Labor Army - "Red Fighter" with the weekly supplement "Great Initiative"; Donetsk - "Donetsk Labor Army" and others. Lit .: Lenin V.I., Report on the work of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars at the first session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the VII convocation on February 2, 1920, Full. coll. soch., 5th ed., vol. 40 (vol. 30); his own, Order from the STO (Council of Labor and Defense) to local Soviet institutions. Draft, ibid., vol. 43 (vol. 32); Red Army on the farm. front, in the book: Five years of the power of the Soviets, M., 1922; Gukovsky A., Three-month respite, "Historian-Marxist", 1940, No 9; From the history of the civil war in the USSR, vol. 3, M., 1961; Buryak V. I., Nationalization of the Grozny oil industry and the creation of its management bodies, IZ, t. 78, M., 1965; his, The First Communist Subbotniks in Grozny, "ISSSR", 1966, No 1; The role of the Red Army in the economy. and cultural construction in the North. Caucasus and Dagestan in 1920-1922. Sat. documents and memories, Makhachkala, 1968. V. P. Butt, A. M. Ivanov. Moscow.

This was the name given in 1920 to the armies transferred to the economic front. Keeping your military organization, these armies carried out certain economic operations (logging, fuel for transport, work in coal mines, etc.).

Labor armies were one of the stages in the development of the militarization of labor. Universal labor service was only the starting point of this development. The need for labor armies began to be felt when it became clear that the task of organizing labor required not only measures of centralized accounting and distribution of labor, but also direct management of the labor process in the new conditions. Interdepartmental commissions on labor service did not satisfy this last goal, since they were more like meetings to coordinate individual labor assignments, rather than bodies of direct management of labor service; moreover, they were not connected in their daily work with the production itself. All these shortcomings were eliminated by the creation of labor armies that had a ready-made apparatus and a cadre of disciplined workers and took an active part in the production process itself. According to the meaning of their existence, they were temporary bodies, intended to function only until the national economy recovered from the wounds inflicted on it by the war. But during this period they were that "link, to keep which meant to keep the whole chain." With the further development of the labor armies, they became a connecting and unifying center in the localities, which, on the basis of certain economic plans, could unite and combine the work of various local economic institutions. Thus, they began to turn into regional economic bodies. Both the militarization of labor in general and one of its higher forms- labor armies - at first aroused opposition in the ranks of the party (on this see note 84). At the beginning of 1921, in view of the relative strengthening of the economy and the emerging change in the direction of the New Economic Policy, the labor armies were liquidated, and the military labor units were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Labor Service Committees. /T. 15/

1st Army of Labor. - After the defeat of Kolchak, the 3rd Army, located in the Urals, raised the issue of using it for labor purposes. Signed by the commander of the 3rd Army Comrade. Matiyasevich and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council Gaevsky On January 10, 1920, a telegram was sent to the Chairman of the Soviet Defense and the Pre-revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, in which the question was raised of turning the 3rd Army into an army of labor.

“In order to restore and organize the economy throughout the Urals as soon as possible (in Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk and Tobolsk provinces), the telegram read, “Revsovar three proposes: 1) to apply all the forces and means of the Red Army to the restoration of transport and the organization of the economy in the above area, 2 ) rename the Red Army of the Eastern Front into the 1st revolutionary labor army, 3) establish a revolutionary labor council consisting of three persons with a chairman at the head, appointed and led directly by the Defense Council, etc.

"I fully approve your proposal. I welcome the initiative. I am submitting the question to the Council of People's Commissars. Begin to act subject to the strictest coordination with the civil authorities, giving all your strength to the selection of all surplus food and the restoration of transport."

January 15 Com. Trotsky had already introduced a project for the organization of the 1st Army of Labor. The decision of the Council of Defense on this matter read:

"The 3rd Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is used for labor purposes on a regional scale as an integral organization, without destroying and crushing its apparatus, under the name of the 1st Revolutionary Army of Labor."

On the same day Com. Trotsky sent a telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army, in which he warned of difficulties and set a number of priority tasks:

“It is necessary,” Comrade Trotsky wrote, “to overcome departmentalism and mutual distrust. It is necessary, by all external and internal means, to give the work the character of communist service, and not serving official service. For this, all local communist forces must be involved. Your experience is of tremendous importance. If only he broke down in a squabble or unforeseen - this would be a very cruel blow for the Soviet Republic.

On the same day, it appeared in Pravda, signed by comrade. Trotsky, order-memo on the 3rd Red Army - 1st Revolutionary Labor Army.

Representatives of economic departments were introduced to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Labor Army; it was headed by a board of 8 people. According to Article 9 of the 1st Labor Army, the Council of the Labor Army includes: plenipotentiaries of the People's Commissariat of Food, the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of Transport, the People's Commissariat of Labor and members from the military department. At the head of the Council was a specially authorized Council of Defense with the rights of chairman of the Council of the Labor Army. Since the 1st Labor Army was the first attempt, the first experience in the use of labor armies, its work was of decisive importance for all further economic construction. January 23 Com. Trotsky wrote to the Soviet of the Labor Army: "The main thing is to firmly remember that every step practical work more important than all organizational restructurings and renamings. "By a resolution of the STO, Comrade Trotsky was placed at the head of the Council of the Labor Army. Members of the Soviet Labor Army were: 1) Sergeev, 2) Gaevsky (member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army), 3) Lokatskov (representative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions), 4 ) Paper (authorized by the People's Commissariat of Labor and head of the labor department of the Yekaterinburg Provincial Executive Committee), 5) Maksimov (representative of the Supreme Economic Council), 6) Muravyov (authorized by the People's Commissariat of Food), 7) Dovgalevsky.

On February 20, on the issue of using the army apparatus of the 3rd Army, comrade. Trotsky wrote to Lenin the following:

"Further preservation of the entire apparatus of the 3rd Army seems inexpedient. The army has only one rifle and one cavalry division at its disposal. Everything else is army departments and institutions. Under these conditions, the army can send only 23% to work. We will not need an army apparatus. Military units "We will preserve and strengthen. From the composition of headquarters institutions and departments, we will single out shock labor detachments of specialist technicians, communists, etc. The field headquarters agrees with the disbandment of the army apparatuses. I have given appropriate preparatory orders. I believe that there will be no objections from the Defense Council."

It soon became clear that it was necessary to concentrate all local economic work in one center, in connection with which Comrade. Trotsky raised the question of turning the 1st Labor Army into a regional economic body. Even in his draft resolution on the 1st Labor Army Comrade. Trotsky proposed to operate with the forces of the 1st Labor Army on a regional scale. Now the practice of economic work has confirmed the need for this, and the Defense Council, in repeal of its first resolution on the 1st Army of January 15, 1920, worked out a regulation "on the Revolutionary Council of the First Army of Labor", in which it instructed

"To the Revolutionary Council of the 1st Army of Labor, the general leadership of the work to restore and strengthen normal economic and military life in the Urals"

Steam. 2 of this provision reads: "Sovtrudarm acts as a regional body of the Council of Labor and Defense of the RSFSR." According to par. 8,

"Soviet Labor Army 1 consists of: 1) a chairman appointed by the Council of Labor and Defense, 2) a Ural district military commissar, 3) an authorized representative of the Supreme Council of National Economy, 4) an authorized representative of the People's Commissariat of Food, 5) an authorized representative of the People's Commissariat of Railways, 6) an authorized representative of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, 7) an authorized representative of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions."

The work of the 1st Labor Army was carried out mainly in logging, food collection, assistance to railway transport and in the Chelyabinsk coal mines.

The 1st Labor Army played a huge role in the field of labor mobilization. Having a ready-made military apparatus and a cadre of disciplined workers, it greatly advanced the cause of general labor mobilization in the Urals. The leadership in this work belonged entirely to the Soviet Labor Army. Despite the unfavorable General terms work, the relatively high labor productivity of the labor army and the general pace of work of the entire apparatus of the 1st labor army as a regional economic body proved the possibility and profitability of using labor armies in those areas where war and devastation had so destroyed economic life that it was hardly possible to restore it by normal means . Starting from March, a number of labor armies are being established in other parts of the Republic. /T. 15/

Incomplete definition ↓

Most Koreans were never able to get into the active army. Being mobilized, they were sent to the "labor army": labor battalions, construction and work columns. And until recently, this is one of the most poorly studied pages of the history of Koryo saram.

When evaluating the participation of Koreans in the "labor army", one sometimes comes across a sharply negative attitude towards the mobilization of Koreans to this sector of the labor front. Here it is necessary to distinguish between two aspects of this problem. The first aspect is related to the issue of labor mobilization during the Great Patriotic War. at all, and the second - with the mobilization itself Koreans. This distinction is fundamental, since the two aspects are sometimes confused, and are equally seen as a manifestation of the repressive policies of Stalinism.

Speaking of labor mobilization Koreans, then it, of course, was an act of political mistrust on the part of the authorities towards them. The Koreans were ready to defend their homeland with weapons in their hands, just as they did in the event of foreign intervention in the Far East. However, Stalin saw them as a "fifth column", as in some other ethnic groups. Mobilization into the "trudarmiya" on ethnic grounds meant discrimination - the denial of the right to bear arms and fight at the front to representatives of certain ethnic groups. It was fundamentally illegal, because it violated Article 123 of the Constitution, which read: “Equality of rights for citizens of the USSR, regardless of their nationality and race, in all areas of economic, state, cultural and socio-political life is an immutable law. Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights or, on the contrary, the establishment of direct or indirect advantages of citizens depending on their racial and national origin, as well as any preaching of racial or national exclusiveness, or hatred and neglect, are punishable by law.

However, political discrimination against Koreans as defenders of the Fatherland does not mean that during the war they could not be used as labor resources, like other peoples. So, by the end of 1943, more than 155,000 residents of Uzbekistan were mobilized for defense enterprises and construction projects of the RSFSR. And here the question of labor mobilization arises. at all. In conditions of war, it was the only condition for victory. In this regard, it seems to us that its integral interpretation as a “punitive” policy, which made sure that no one “evaded”, without taking into account the specific historical context, seems fundamentally wrong. [Cm.: 81 , 16]

As you know, the economic losses suffered by the USSR in the first year of the war were enormous. Before the war, 45% of the country's population lived in the territory occupied by November 1941, 63% of coal was mined, 68% of cast iron, 50% of steel and 60% of aluminum were produced. As a result of the occupation and evacuation of industry, 303 enterprises producing ammunition were put out of action. The monthly losses from stopping them were colossal: 8.4 million shells, 2.7 million shells of mines, 2 million shells of aerial bombs, 7.9 million fuses, 5.4 million igniters, 5.1 million shell casings, 2.5 million hand grenades, 7,800 tons of gunpowder, 3,000 tons of TNT and 16,100 tons of ammonium nitrate. In November and December 1941, not a single ton of coal was received from the Donetsk and Moscow region basins. By December 1941, the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, ball bearings - the basis of the military industry - was catastrophically reduced: rolled ferrous metals - 3.1 times, ball bearings - 21 times, rolled non-ferrous metals - 430 times. [ 11 , 505-506; 84 , 251-252]

Mobilization into the ranks of the Red Army sharply reduced the number of workers and employees. Their number decreased from 31.5 million by the beginning of 1941 to 18.5 million by the end of the year. From July to November 1941, more than 10 million people and more than 1,360 large enterprises were evacuated to the east of the country. [ 61 , 18, 22; 22 , 456]

In these difficult conditions, each pair of hands was worth its weight in gold. People worked hard, sometimes 13-14 hours a day. Pensioners returned to the enterprises, teenagers got up behind the machines. In the villages, women were harnessed instead of bulls and horses; they became the main labor force in the mines and logging sites. Were canceled labor holidays, the working day has been extended, overtime compulsory work has been introduced. Employees, the able-bodied population not working at industrial and transport enterprises, students, schoolchildren of 6-10 grades were involved in the implementation of agricultural work. [ 61 , 18-24] Since the autumn of 1942, disabled people of the 3rd group, as well as pregnant women up to 5 months of pregnancy, were forced to work.

Thanks to these extraordinary measures and the titanic labor of the entire people, "the military industry already in the first half of 1942 not only restored the lost capacities, but significantly blocked them." [ 11 , 506] The transfer of the entire economy of a huge country to a military footing was carried out within a year, while it took Germany 7 years. In the shortest possible time, the task was solved, which made it possible to eliminate the backlog of the fuel, energy and metallurgical base, to ensure superiority in weapons, which ultimately led to a radical change in the map of military operations and became the key to victory over fascism. Calling these measures "punitive", while millions of people sacrificed everything to turn the tide of the war, means either not understanding what happened in the 40s, or deliberately standing on the positions of a deliberate negative attitude to everything that took place during these years.

The mobilization of Koreans into the labor army, as well as the mobilization into the active army, was carried out by military registration and enlistment offices.

Until recently, it was not clear on the basis of what decisions the Koreans were mobilized. In this regard, a variety of opinions were expressed.

So, from the point of view of G. M. Kim, who spent 3 years in the "labor army" (in the Ukhta-Izhma camp of the Komi ASSR), such a document was the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 2409 of October 14, 1942, according to which the Decrees State Defense Committee of the USSR on the procedure for using Germans of military age from 17 to 50 years. [ 33 , 42]

There is an error here. The fact is that in this resolution, the Koreans not mentioned. The full name of Resolution No. 2409ss is "On the extension of GOKO resolutions No. 1123ss and No. 1281ss to citizens of other nationalities of countries at war with the USSR." Japan, which declared the Koreans after the annexation of Korea in 1910 its subjects, was not at war with the USSR at the time of the adoption of the decision, although it was an ally of Germany. Relations between Japan and the USSR were regulated by the neutrality treaty signed on April 13, 1941, which was denounced by the Soviet government only on April 5, 1945. It is no coincidence that the decree specifies the nationalities of only those countries that were officially at war with the USSR. We read: “To extend the effect of the resolutions of the GOKO ... on the mobilization of German men fit for work, aged 17 to 50, into work columns of the NKVD - to citizens of other nationalities of countries at war with the USSR - Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Finns. " [ 93 ] The decree does not indicate the nationalities of other countries - satellites of Germany, but not at war with the USSR: Bulgaria, which did not declare war on the USSR, although on March 1, 1941 it joined the Berlin Pact; Turkey, which in March 1941 confirmed its neutrality regarding military operations against the USSR.

Other documents also speak of the fact that citizens of nationalities that were at war and not at war with the USSR were clearly distinguished from the point of view of the activities carried out in relation to them. So, in the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0974 of December 21, 1942, paragraph 9 specifically stipulates: “Conscripts by nationality of Germans, Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Finns should not be drafted into the army, but used in accordance with the Decree of the GOKO No. 2383ss of 7 October 1942 (Directive No. M/5/4652 of October 12, 1942) and No. 2409 of October 14, 1942 (Directive No. M/5/4666 of October 17, 1942). Conscripts by nationality of Bulgarians, Chinese, Turks, Koreans working in industry and transport should be left in place, and the rest should be sent according to the orders of the Glavupraform to work in industry and construction.

From the point of view of L. B. Khvan from Nukus, the main document related to the mobilization of Koreans into the “labour army” was the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 13, 1942 “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for the wartime period to work in production and construction ". Indeed, under this Decree, large sections of the population, but not all, were mobilized for work - in the aviation, tank, metallurgical, chemical and fuel industries, the arms and ammunition industry. First, it refers to the urban population, while Koreans mostly lived in rural areas. Secondly, according to the Decree, mobilization must be carried out "for work at the place of residence." [ 10 ] And after all, many Koreans ended up at objects located outside their place of residence - both in Uzbekistan and in Kazakhstan, not to mention the RSFSR and Ukraine. Thirdly, in the development of this Decree, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the same day issued a decree according to which the mobilization of the population is carried out executive committees of regional and city councils by decision of the Council of People's Commissars, while the mobilization of Koreans in construction and work columns was carried out through military commissariats.

Since Koreans were generally not taken into the army and they were on a special list, along with general regulations on labor mobilization, there should have been directives directly prescribing what to do with them; so that the military registration and enlistment offices know who to send to the front, and who to the construction and work columns.

And such resolutions and orders were.

Back in the autumn of 1940, the Main Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense, in a decree on conscription, ordered to call, but not to send to the army, but to enroll recruits from Turkish, Japanese, Korean, Chinese and Romanian nationalities into work battalions. [ 65 , 394]

If we talk about wartime, then, apparently, the documents regulating the mobilization of Koreans were some. The most important of them is the Decree of the GOKO No. 2414s of October 14, 1942 “On the mobilization in the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen SSR of those liable for military service for work in industry and construction railways And industrial enterprises". In a separate line in this Decree in paragraph 1 it is written: "Including mobilize all Koreans of military age." [ 94 ] Of the mobilized, work columns were to be formed, distributed among various people's commissariats. Mobilization was entrusted to NGOs through local military registration and enlistment offices. The decree provided for the distribution of the mobilized "partial replacement by them of the NKVD camp contingents currently working on the construction of existing enterprises."

Other documents are: Decree of the GOKO No. 2640 of 12/20/1942 and the corresponding Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0974 of 12/21/1942 on mobilization in all military districts, in which Koreans, with the exception of those working in industry and transport, were sent along outfits of Glavupraform for work in industry and construction; Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of December 5, 1942 “On the mobilization of 2.5 thousand Koreans liable for military service in the Uzbek SSR and their direction for the construction of the Uzbek Metallurgical Plant” and others.

The mobilized Koreans did not always know that they would work in "labor battalions". According to the stories of Korean Labor Army workers who worked in the Komi ASSR, when they were sent outside Uzbekistan, they were announced that they would be sent either to the front or to military training and then to the front. The fact that they would work in the labor army, they found out only at the place of arrival.

Where did the Korean Labor Army work, and how many were there? The documents available today do not give a complete picture of this issue, although they do allow some idea.

Initially, apparently, there were plans to use the mobilized Koreans only in the republics of their residence. Thus, the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 2414s dated 10/14/1942 prescribed: “All Koreans should be used only within the Uzbek and Kazakh SSR.” However, it is known that Koreans worked both in the RSFSR and in Ukraine.

If we talk about Kazakhstan, then during the war, out of 37,544 Karaganda miners of various nationalities, 2,141 Koreans mined coal, some of whom were drafted into the labor army (according to other documents, 2,622 Koreans worked in labor columns at the Karaganda coal mines). [ 37 , 142; 4 , 93; 8 , 314]

The Koreans were also involved in the construction of Turksib. This is evidenced by the order of the GKO dated January 10, 1943 on leaving 500 Koreans on the construction of the railway until February 20, 1943, to be sent to the coal basin near Moscow.

In the archive collection “History of the Koreans of Kazakhstan” there are 3 nominal lists of fighters of the construction column No. 547 of the construction department of the NKVD of the USSR, who arrived from Guryev. In the first list, as of September 5, 1944, there were 10 Koreans; in the second, as of 10/18/1944 - 19; in the third, as of 01/05/1945 - 27. In addition, partial lists of Koreans who worked in the oil industry are given.

On December 5, 1942, the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR “On the mobilization of 2.5 thousand Koreans liable for military service in the Uzbek SSR and their direction for the construction of the Uzbek Metallurgical Plant” was issued. [ 95 ] A 11.02. 1943, the military commissar of the Tashkent regional military commissariat gives an order to the district military commissariats on the mobilization for the construction of the plant unfit for service, but fit for physical labor; military personnel discharged from hospitals; persons liable for military service evacuated from the western regions; and “Koreans aged 18-50 who did not appear for a medical examination by order of NPO No. 882.” [ 88 ] In October 1943, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR U. Yusupov gives an order to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the SNK of the Uzbek SSR: “I ask you to urgently instruct the Military Commissariat of the Republic and the military department of the Central Committee on the mobilization of Koreans of conscripted age, primarily qualified carpenters, masons for a metal plant.” [ 87 ] From this letter we learn that the Koreans worked on the construction of the theater on Besh-Agach in Tashkent.

The mobilized Koreans also worked on the construction of an electromechanical plant in Chirchik. As of October 5, 1942, they were sent here from the "Korean" collective farms "Krasny Vostok", "New Life", "Eastern Partisan", them. Budyonny and them. Stakhanov 20 people, and from the collective farms. Dimitrov and them. OGPU - 15 people each. [ 89 ] Documents and memoirs of the Labor Army speak of the participation of Koreans in the construction of the Nizhne-Bozsu hydroelectric power station, in the quarries of Jizzakh, in mines and construction cement plant in Angren.

In Russia, Korean laborers worked from the Moscow region to the Komi ASSR. In March 1943, 5135 Koreans were sent to the Moscow region coal basin in the Tula region. As of April 1945, there were 844 Koreans in the Tula region, and 1027 in the second quarter of 1945. This increase in the number of Koreans is associated “with the permission to reunite disparate Korean families mobilized into work columns and battalions, as well as with the arrival of demobilized Korean Red Army soldiers ". In 1945, the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR decided to return all Korean families back to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. [ 8 , 314-316]

IN last years provides archival data on Koreans who found themselves on mobilization in the NKVD forced labor camps in the Komi ASSR. According to a letter from the NKVD of the Komi ASSR addressed to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria, "there are 13,810 mobilized Koreans, Germans and Bulgarians in camps in the republic, and 1,564 people in six forced labor camps of Koreans and Bulgarians." [ 82 ; 8 , 316; 7 , 92] N. F. Bugai also gives a certificate that: “In the information documents of the NKVD of the USSR of that time ... it was indicated that 1,500 citizens of Korean nationality were employed as members of work columns and work battalions in the Ukhta camp of the NKVD of the USSR.” [ 8 , 316] It is also indicated that in 1945, 1,500 Koreans were urgently resettled from the Komi ASSR to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. [ 7 , 92]

There is evidence that the Koreans of the Labor Army worked in the Altai (at the logging site), on the construction of defensive structures near Stalingrad, defense facilities near Kazan, in the mines of Vorkuta and Leningrad region, in the Perm region, in Nizhny Tagil, as well as in Ukraine, for digging trenches near Kharkov and building a strategic railway line.

The Koreans worked both at "ordinary" facilities and in the ITL of the NKVD; both together with "ordinary" citizens, and with prisoners and "special contingent". Most of them lived in barracks with bunks, dugouts, wagons or wagons. They ate very little. A little help was rice brought with him, oats from the stable (in exchange for money or things), mushrooms and berries in the summer, rare parcels and money orders from home. Of course, all this was episodic. Since food rations were extremely small, many Koreans were on the verge of starvation.

Koreans-Labour Army were involved in the construction of factories, hydroelectric power stations, roads and railways, defensive structures and cultural facilities; felling and floating timber, fodder for livestock, quarries and mines, oil drilling, charcoal harvesting, etc. They worked 11-12 hours a day. Both prisoners and "special contingent" and local residents worked alongside them.

According to the memoirs of former labor army members of the Ukhta-Izhma camp of the Komi ASSR, many of them were on the verge of survival due to constant starvation and hard work. Complaints are known to the head of the camp, Lieutenant-General S. Burdakov, about difficult conditions. According to documents from the Komi archives, in January 1944, the Koreans staged a strike. For two days, up to 200 people did not go to work due to abnormal living conditions. After the arrest of 7 strike leaders, work was resumed. [ 92 ]

A few years ago, I wrote down the stories of 6 Labor Army members (Ugai Chersik, Khegai S.I., Kim A.I., Li K.M., Tyan E.N., Kim K.A.). In order to imagine the labor army years spent in the Komi ASSR, I quote the story of one of them, Khegai Sergei Ilyich:

“In October 1943, 17 young Koreans (born in 1926) were mobilized from the Polar Star, where my family lived, according to the agenda. I also wanted to go to the front and volunteered, saying that I had lost my documents. The military enlistment office said that we were going to the army: first they would send us to Kuibyshev for training, and then to the front. Everyone was shaved like a soldier, every evening on the collective farm there are farewells, concerts - just like they see off to the front.

In mid-October, 18 people from the collective farm were taken by truck to Tashkent. Loaded into a freight train, about 700 people, all Koreans. After 2-3 days we arrived in Kuibyshev. We lived in the car for two days. Then they loaded us onto the train, but they didn't tell us where we were going.

We drove for almost a month (sometimes we spent the whole day at the stations). We arrived in the Komi ASSR, Ukhta, in the Ukht-Izhimsky camp. The arrivals were assigned to the places of work: oil fields or road construction. I was assigned to the construction of a highway.

At night they loaded onto Studebakers (cars open type) for 30 people. It was cold, the temperature was about 25 degrees. When we arrived, no one could get up - they froze. They began to bring us into the hut like logs. It was hot in the hut. Frozen faces began to flow. We rested for 1-1.5 hours, the order was to leave. We walked 8 km, the snow was waist-deep, then we took a ferry across the river.

There were log cabins on the shore. We were taken to a large house with bunk beds for 100 people. Other barracks housed prisoners. The territory was not guarded, since there was nowhere to run - everywhere there was a forest.

The next day we were sorted into departments - 23 people each. I was assigned as a section leader. The foreman was a prisoner. Gave axes, two-handed saws and shovels. They felled the forest, uprooted, hammered stakes, leveled (lowered and raised the canvas). This is how we worked 1943-1944. They worked 12 hours a day.

They were given 700 grams of "bread" per day - black and raw surrogate. In the early days, they didn’t go to the canteen: they gave “shchi” from salted cabbage and barley or oatmeal twice a day, they didn’t give meat, occasionally potatoes. They ate food taken from home, especially rice. They also bought groceries with money taken from home. Products (bread and cereals) were bought from a Korean prisoner who came to our barracks. He was among those arrested in 1938 and worked in Ukhta as an oil rig operator. He played cards and invited us to play for money. Soon he won all the money from us and stopped coming.

Since December, they began to eat what they were given. Many began to lose weight. February got even worse. daily rate became 300 grams of bread and gruel. Many due to weakening have ceased to develop the norm. In March, due to malnutrition, everyone could not work out the norm. People could not even lift an axe. He was tied to a rope and carried on his back. Many could not stand on their feet because of the strong wind.

The committee arrived in April. All were divided into three categories: LFT - light physical labor, SFT - medium physical labor and TFT - heavy physical labor. Out of 100 people, 26 ended up in the TFT, including me, because before that I worked as a bread cutter for 2 months. All LFTs and SFTs were taken away in cars. We were 26 people sent to OLP No. 10, a quarry for the extraction of gypsum for the radio industry. Worked with prisoners. A gypsum-containing stone was blown up and loaded onto trucks. They lived in barracks with double bunks.

In October 1944, I was sent alone to the point of unloading and loading stones, 5 km from the quarry. There was a swamp nearby. He worked there together with 2 prisoners - a Georgian and a Belarusian. They lived in a tent. A car from the OLP brought stones from the quarry through the frozen swamp, we unloaded it, put it in piles, then another one came and we loaded it. So I worked all winter until April 1945. In winter, I began to swell from malnutrition. I was given dry rations for 10 days: bread - 7.5 kg. For a week I ate everything, and for 3 days I went hungry. When I took the stones, it got dark in my eyes.

When the swamp melted, I was sent back to the quarry. From May 1945, we were transferred to the Vodnoye settlement, something like a workers' camp, next to the OLP. He worked in the agricultural sector, prepared fodder for livestock (birch branches).

Then I was sent to "charcoal". They said that they did not return alive from there. The place was located 50 km from the OLP on the river bank. My work was as follows. On 6 horses, it was necessary to clear the area (of moss and clay) with a drag of 3 x 5 m. Then bring a log 0.5 by 2 m. Fold a cube of 40 cubic meters from the logs. m. Inside the cube is gentle (the diameter of the shaft is 0.5 m.), And inside it is a fire. Then close the whole cube with moss, cover everything with yellow clay from above. Everything inside is smoldering. The result was valuable charcoal. Then everything was filled with water.

So it worked for 20 days. The food was good, even "premium" dishes were given out. But during the day he was so tired that he did not even want to eat. I went straight to sleep from exhaustion. Soon I refused to work and took to my bed. They thought I was sick. The temperature is normal, but I still do not go out. They put another one, but he did not cope with the work. Didn't go to work for 6 days. The boss began to threaten that he would send me to prison for shirking work during wartime.

He was sent back to the OLP for a medical examination for ability to work. I was in the hospital for a week. After the hospital, I was again to be sent for "charring". I said I won't go. They put me on an alloy, to get logs from the river. And a few days later they sent me to "charcoal", but as a captain - to manage an industrial and food warehouse. From June to December 1945 I worked here.

During my stay in the Komi ASSR, I wrote one letter, but I did not receive a letter. In 1944 he received two parcels from home - 8 kg of rice each

In December 1945, he received a call from home (through the military enlistment office) due to the fact that his parents were old and had no breadwinner. I wrote an application to the OLP. Passed the supply room and arrived in the 2nd part (NKVD department). I was given a pass home (with a red diagonal stripe). I had money and food with me. Returned along the route Ukhta-Kotlas-Chkalovsk-Tashkent.

Later, Koreans who worked in the labor army were recognized as participants in the labor front during the war years. In connection with the anniversaries of the victory, they began to receive government awards. They also received certain benefits.