The final act of the security meeting was signed. The Helsinki Accords ended in Helsinki. Doping success for the doomed

The detente in relations between West and East made it possible to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Consultations on it took place in 1972-1973. in the Finnish capital Helsinki. The first stage of the meeting was held at the level of foreign ministers from 3 to 7 July 1973 in Helsinki. It was attended by representatives of 33 European countries, as well as the USA and Canada - See: Valiullin K.B., Zaripova R.K. Russian history. XX century. Part 2: Tutorial. - Ufa: RIO BashGU, 2002. P. 148 ..

The second phase of the meeting was held in Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975. He represented rounds of negotiations lasting from 3 to 6 months at the level of delegates and experts appointed by the participating States. At this stage, agreements were developed and agreed on all items on the agenda of the meeting.

The third stage of the meeting took place in Helsinki on July 30 - August 1, 1975 at the level of the highest political and state leaders of the countries participating in the meeting, who headed the national delegations - See: History of Russia, 1945--2008. : book. for the teacher / [A.V. Filippov, A.I. Utkin, S.V. Alekseev and others]; ed. A.V. Filippova. -- 2nd ed., revised. and additional -- M.: Enlightenment, 2008. S.247..

The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) July 3 - August 1, 1975 was the result of a peaceful progressive process in Europe. Representatives of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada, attended in Helsinki. The meeting was attended by: general secretary Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev, US President J. Ford, French President V. Giscard d "Estaing, British Prime Minister G. Wilson, German Federal Chancellor G. Schmidt, First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee E. Terek; General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia , President of Czechoslovakia G. Husak, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED E. Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, Chairman of the State Council of the PRB T. Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP J. Kadar, General Secretary of the RCP, resident of Romania N. Ceausescu, Chairman of the SKJ, President Yugoslavia I. Broz Tito and other leaders of the participating states The Declaration adopted by the CSCE proclaimed the inviolability of European borders, mutual renunciation of the use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of the participating countries, respect for human rights, etc.

The heads of delegations signed the Final Act of the meeting. This document is still in effect today. It includes agreements that must be implemented in full as a whole, on:

1) security in Europe,

2) cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology, environmental protection;

3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields;

4) further steps after the meeting - See: Ratkovsky I. S., Khodyakov M. V. History of Soviet Russia - St. Petersburg: Lan Publishing House, 2001. P. 414 ..

The final act contains 10 principles that define the norms of relationships and cooperation: sovereign equality respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; non-use of force or threat of force; inviolability of borders; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destiny; cooperation between states; fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The final act guaranteed the recognition and inviolability of post-war borders in Europe (which was in the hands of the USSR) and imposed obligations on all participating states to respect human rights (this became the basis for using the problem of human rights against the USSR) - See: Sokolov A.K. , Tyazhelnikova V.S. Course of Soviet history, 1941-1999. - M.: Higher. School, 1999. P. 195.

The signing by the heads of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki, of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the apogee of international detente. The final act included a declaration of the principles of mutual relations between the CSCE participating countries. The USSR attached the greatest importance to the recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders and territorial integrity states, which meant the international legal consolidation of the situation in Eastern Europe. The triumph of Soviet diplomacy was the result of a compromise: the Final Act also included articles on the protection of human rights, freedom of information and movement. These articles served as the international legal basis for the dissident movement within the country and the campaign for the protection of human rights in the USSR, which was actively carried out in the West.

It should be said that since 1973 there has been an independent negotiation process between representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the reduction of armaments. However, the desired success was not achieved here because of the tough position of the Warsaw Pact countries, which surpassed NATO in conventional weapons and did not want to reduce them.

After the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union felt like a master in Eastern Europe and began to install new SS-20 medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the restriction on which was not provided for by the SALT agreements. .Under the conditions of the campaign for the protection of human rights in the USSR, which intensified sharply in the West after Helsinki, the position of the USSR became exceptionally tough. This provoked retaliatory measures from the United States, which, after Congress refused to ratify SALT-2 in the early 1980s, deployed "cruise missiles" and Pershing missiles in Western Europe capable of reaching the territory Soviet Union. Thus, a military-strategic balance was established between the blocs on the territory of Europe - See: History of Russia. 1917--2004: Proc. allowance for university students / A. S. Barsenkov, A. I. Vdovin. -- M.: Aspect Press, 2005. S.514..

The arms race had an extremely negative impact on the economies of countries whose military-industrial orientation did not decrease. The general extensive development increasingly affected the defense industry. The parity with the United States achieved in the early 1970s primarily concerned intercontinental ballistic missiles. Already since the late 1970s, the general crisis of the Soviet economy began to negative impact to the defense industries. The Soviet Union began to lag behind certain types weapons. This was revealed after the introduction of "cruise missiles" in the United States and became even more obvious after the beginning of the work of the United States on the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI) program. Since the mid-1980s, the leadership of the USSR has been clearly aware of this lag. The depletion of the economic possibilities of the regime is revealed more and more fully.

The restructuring process European system international relations on principles designed to ensure peace, security and cooperation. It began with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the final stage of which took place in Helsinki in 1975. The leaders of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada, took part in the Conference.

On August 1, 1975, the signing ceremony of the Final Act took place in the plenary hall of the Finlandia Palace.

The signing of the Final Act became possible in the conditions of the onset of detente in international tension. He initiated the cessation cold war and elimination of its consequences. Historically, the act is associated with the decisions of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition on the post-war structure of Europe, which certain forces tried to revise in their favor during the years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union became the initiator of the convening of the Conference and an active participant in all its stages.

The Final Act, signed in Helsinki, opens with a Declaration of Principles on which the pan-European system of international relations should be based: sovereign equality, mutual renunciation of the use of force or threat of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights rights and fundamental freedoms, equality and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny, cooperation between states, conscientious fulfillment of obligations under international law. The Declaration was an authoritative confirmation and development of the basic principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter (see United Nations Organization).

The Helsinki Act also includes a Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, which contains provisions on prior notification of military exercises and major troop movements, on the exchange of military observers, on other confidence-building measures and on disarmament matters. Many of these measures are unprecedented in international relations.

Considerable attention is paid to cooperation in the field of economy, science, technology and environmental protection. Regulations on the development of trade and industrial cooperation have been established. Particular attention to cooperation in the field the latest trends science and technology. An important place is occupied by provisions on cooperation in the humanitarian fields: contacts between people, information, culture, education. In conclusion, further steps are outlined after the Meeting. In other words, from the very beginning it was about a continuous process in the course of which the strengthening of common security and the development of all-round cooperation would take place.

The USSR did a lot of work to implement the act in its domestic and foreign policy. Article 29 was included in the Constitution of the USSR, which established that the basis of relations with other states are principles that completely coincide with those listed in the act. In the humanitarian sphere, laws on citizenship, legal status foreign citizens, the rules for the stay of foreign citizens in the USSR and the transit passage of foreign citizens through the territory of the USSR, etc. Numerous agreements were concluded on economic, scientific, technical and other types of cooperation with European countries.

The Helsinki Act not only marked a turning point in the development of international relations in Europe, but also gave the rest of the world a model for solving the most difficult problems. He influenced world system international relations in general. However, the opportunities opened by him were not used to a sufficient extent. A new aggravation of international tension stood in the way of implementing the provisions of the act. The former Soviet leadership also bore its share of responsibility for this. The introduction of Soviet troops to Afghanistan. During the period of stagnation, many provisions of a humanitarian nature were not implemented in the USSR either.

And yet, despite the aggravation of tension, the Helsinki process did not stop, but continued to develop. Meetings and conferences in Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983), Stockholm (1984-1986), Vienna (1986-1989) testify to this. At the Madrid meeting, it was decided to convene a Conference on Confidence, Security and Disarmament Building Measures in Europe. Its first stage took place in Stockholm (1984-1986) and opened in the face of a sharp deterioration in the international situation. The situation changed radically with the start of transformations in the USSR, which laid the foundation for fundamental changes in international relations. The results were reflected in the adoption of the Stockholm Document, which was a huge achievement in the development of the Helsinki process. The document obligated states to give advance notice of exercises, troop movements above the established parameters, exchange annual plans for military activities subject to notification, invite observers, and even conduct foreign inspections on the ground. Special meaning had an agreement confirming the duty of non-use of force in all its forms, including armed.

At the Vienna meeting, which became a new stage in the development of the Helsinki process, much attention was paid to cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology, the environment, etc.

An important step in the development of the Helsinki process was the Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1990. It was timed to coincide with the signing of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The agreement provided for a significant reduction in the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTS) members, thus achieving a balance at a significantly lower level. As a result, the possibility of a surprise attack was practically excluded.

A Joint Declaration of 22 states was adopted, which is a multilateral political commitment of non-aggression.

The Conference's central document is the Paris Charter for a New Europe, which was signed by the leaders of 35 states. The signatories of the Charter committed themselves to building and strengthening democracy as the only system of government in their countries; to help each other in order to make democratic gains irreversible.

The Conference participants proceeded from the indivisibility of security, believing that the security of each of them is linked to the security of the others. Further development of cooperation in the field of economy and environmental protection is envisaged. It's about about deeper integration into the international economic and financial system.

The significance of the Paris meeting is especially great for the formation of the organizational structure of the Helsinki process, for its institutionalization. The USSR was the initiator here. A mechanism has been established for regular meetings and consultations at the level of heads of state and government. The central forum for political consultation will be the Council of Foreign Ministers, to which the Committee of Experts will be attached as a subsidiary body. To serve these bodies, a Secretariat is being created in Prague.

The Center for Conflict Prevention, which is being established in Vienna and is designed to monitor the military-political situation in Europe, deserves special attention. A bureau for free elections is being set up in Warsaw to facilitate the exchange of information about elections. A parliamentary assembly of the CSCE (now the OSCE) is to be created, consisting of representatives of the parliaments of all participating countries.

The Paris Conference played an important role in defining common European values and principles and set far-reaching goals for cooperation, up to and including integration. Participants have made broad security commitments. The organizational foundations of the Helsinki process were laid. All this marks the onset of a new stage in the development of the process, which reflects its vitality and meaning.

On July 3, 1973, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began in Helsinki at the initiative of the Warsaw Pact Organization. All European countries agreed to take part in the work of the Meeting, with the exception of Albania. The purpose of the event was to soften the confrontation between both blocs - NATO and the European Community, on the one hand, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, on the other. Despite all the political contradictions, the planned meetings were supposed to help defuse tension and strengthen peace in Europe.

On August 1, 1975, after two years of negotiations, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference was finally signed, in which the European countries were guaranteed the immutability of borders, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of conflicts, non-interference in internal affairs, renunciation of the use of violence, equality and equality of sovereignties. In addition, the document recorded an obligation to respect the right of peoples to self-determination and human rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and freedom of belief.

Consideration of the international situation on the eve of the conclusion of the Helsinki Accords, i.e. in the late 1960s - early 1970s;

Determining the basic prerequisites for international "détente";

Consideration of the consequences of the conclusion of the Helsinki Accords;

Definition of the main results of the Helsinki pan-European meeting.

When writing a test to achieve this goal, the author analyzes textbooks on world history, the history of Russia and the USSR, the history of state and law foreign countries, as well as scientific works of some domestic and foreign authors.

As a result of the analysis of information sources, the author examined in detail the process of signing the Helsinki Accords, their prerequisites and main results.

In October 1964, when the new leadership of the USSR took power into their own hands, in a passive foreign policy Khrushchev were: the unity of the socialist camp, shaken because of the split with China and Romania; strained relations between East and West due to the Cuban Missile Crisis; finally, the unresolved German problem. The decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 confirmed the trend towards a tougher foreign policy: peaceful coexistence was now subordinated to a more priority class task - strengthening the socialist camp, solidarity with the international working class and the national liberation movement.

The Soviet leadership was prevented from restoring full control over the socialist camp by difficulties in relations with China, Cuba, as well as by events in Czechoslovakia. Here, in June 1967, a congress of writers openly opposed the leadership of the party, followed by mass student demonstrations and strikes. The intensified opposition forced Novotny in January 1968 to cede the leadership of the party to Dubcek. The new leadership decided to carry out a series of reforms. An atmosphere of freedom was established, censorship was abolished, the HRC agreed to alternative elections of its leaders. However, the traditionally Soviet "exit" was imposed: "at the request of the Czechoslovak comrades" on the night of August 20-21, 1968, the troops of five Warsaw Pact countries entered Czechoslovakia. It was not possible to immediately pacify discontent, demonstrations of protest against the occupation continued, and this forced the Soviet leadership to remove Dubcek and his entourage from the leadership of the country and put G. Husak (April 1969), a supporter of the USSR, at the head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. By force suppressing the process of reforming the Czechoslovak society. The Soviet Union stopped the modernization of this country for twenty years. Thus, on the example of Czechoslovakia, the principle of "limited sovereignty", often called the "Brezhnev Doctrine", was implemented.

A serious situation also arose in Poland due to the rise in prices in 1970, which caused mass unrest among the workers of the Baltic ports. In the next ten years, the situation in the economy did not improve, which gave rise to a new wave of strikes, which was led by the independent trade union Solidarity, headed by L. Walesa. The leadership of the mass trade union made the movement less vulnerable and therefore the leadership of the USSR did not dare to send troops into Poland and shed blood. The "normalization" of the situation was entrusted to the Pole, General Jaruzelski, who introduced martial law in the country on December 13, 1981.

Although there was no direct intervention of the USSR, its role in "calming" Poland was noticeable. The image of the USSR in the world was increasingly associated with the violation of human rights both within the country and in neighboring states. The events in Poland, the emergence of Solidarity there, which covered the entire country with a network of its organizations, testified that the most serious breach had been made in the closed system of Eastern European regimes here.

In the early 1970s, relations between West and East underwent a radical turn towards a real détente. It became possible thanks to the achievement of an approximate military parity between the West and the East, the USA and the USSR. The turn began with the establishment of interested cooperation between the USSR, first with France, and then with the FRG.

At the turn of the 1960s-1970s, the Soviet leadership switched to the implementation of a new foreign policy course, the main provisions of which were announced in the Peace Program adopted at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU in March-April 1971. The most significant moment new policy one should consider the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor the West abandoned the arms race. This process now acquired a civilized framework, which was an objective need on both sides after the Caribbean crisis of 1962. However, such a turn in East-West relations made it possible to significantly expand the areas of cooperation, primarily Soviet-American, caused a certain euphoria and gave rise to hopes in the public mind. This new state of the foreign policy atmosphere has been called "détente".

"Detente" began with a significant improvement in relations between the USSR and France and the FRG. France's withdrawal in 1966 from military organization NATO has become an impetus for the development of bilateral relations. The Soviet Union tried to enlist the mediation of France in resolving the German issue, which remained the main obstacle to the recognition of post-war borders in Europe. Mediation, however, was not required after the Social Democrat Willy Brandt became Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1969, proclaiming the "new Ostpolitik". Its essence was that the unification of Germany ceased to be a prerequisite in relations between East and West, but was postponed for the future as the main goal of multilateral dialogue. This made it possible, as a result of Soviet-West German negotiations on August 12, 1970, to conclude the Moscow Treaty, according to which both parties pledged to respect the territorial integrity of all European states within their actual borders. In particular, the FRG recognized the western borders of Poland along the Oder-Neisse. At the end of the year, relevant border treaties were signed between the FRG and Poland, as well as between the FRG and the GDR.

An important milestone The European settlement was the signing in September 1971 of a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, which confirmed the groundlessness of the territorial and political claims of the FRG to West Berlin and stated that West Berlin is not an integral part of the FRG and will not be controlled by it in the future. This was a complete victory for Soviet diplomacy, since at last all the conditions that the USSR had insisted on since 1945 were accepted without any concessions.

This development of events strengthened the confidence of the Soviet leadership that a radical change in the balance of power had taken place in the world in favor of the USSR and the countries of the “socialist commonwealth”. The positions of the USA and the imperialist bloc were assessed in Moscow as "weakened". The confidence of the USSR was built on a number of factors, the main of which was the continued growth of the national liberation movement and the achievement in 1969 of military-strategic parity with the United States in terms of the number of nuclear charges. Proceeding from this, the buildup of armaments and their improvement, according to the logic of the Soviet leadership, became an integral part of the struggle for peace.

The achievement of parity put on the agenda the issue of limiting arms on a bilateral basis, the purpose of which was the regulated, controlled and predictable growth of the most strategically dangerous type of weapon - intercontinental ballistic missiles. Of exceptional importance was the visit of US President Richard Nixon to Moscow in May 1972. During this visit, by the way, the US President's first visit to the USSR, the process of "détente" received a powerful impetus. Nixon and Brezhnev signed "Fundamentals of Relations between the USSR and the United States of America", stating that "in the nuclear age there is no other basis for relations other than peaceful coexistence." On May 26, 1972, an Interim Agreement on Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT) was concluded for a period of 5 years, later called SALT-1. In the summer of 1973, during Brezhnev's visit to the United States, an agreement was also signed to prevent nuclear war.

SALT-1 set limits for both sides on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs). The authorized levels for the USSR were higher than those for the United States, because America had missiles carrying multiple warheads. These parts with nuclear charges from one warhead could be directed at different targets. At the same time, the number of nuclear charges themselves was not stipulated in SALT-1, which made it possible, while improving military equipment, without violating the treaty, to achieve unilateral advantages in this area. Thus, the shaky parity fixed by SALT-1 did not stop the arms race. Such a paradoxical situation was a consequence of the concept of "nuclear deterrence" or "nuclear deterrence". Its essence was that the leadership of both countries understood the impossibility of using nuclear weapons for political and even more so for military purposes, but continued to build up its military potential, including nuclear missiles, in order to prevent the superiority of the "potential enemy" and even surpass it. In fact, the concept of "nuclear deterrence" made bloc confrontation quite natural and fueled the arms race.

In November 1974, at Brezhnev's meeting with American President J. Ford, the formation of a system of treaties was continued. The parties managed to agree on a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-2), which was supposed to regulate a wider range of weapons, including strategic bombers and multiple warheads. The signing of the treaty was scheduled for 1977, but this did not happen due to the appearance in the United States of a new type of weapon - "cruise missiles". The US categorically refused to take into account the maximum allowable levels for new types of weapons, although they were already super high - 2,400 warheads, of which 1,300 were multiple warheads. The US position was a consequence of the general deterioration of Soviet-American relations since 1975, not directly related to the treaty as such. Although Brezhnev and Carter did sign SALT II in 1979, it was never ratified by the US Congress until 1989.

Despite this, the policy of detente had a beneficial effect on the development of East-West cooperation. During these years, the total trade turnover has increased 5 times, and the Soviet-American 8 times. The strategy of cooperation during this period was reduced to the conclusion of large contracts with Western firms for the construction of factories or the purchase of technology. Thus, the most famous example of such cooperation was the construction in the late 1960s and early 1970s of the Volga Automobile Plant under a joint agreement with the Italian company Fiat. However, this was more of an exception than the rule. Basically, international programs were limited to fruitless business trips of delegations of officials. In general, there was no well-thought-out policy in the import of new technologies, administrative and bureaucratic obstacles had an extremely negative impact, and contracts did not justify initial hopes.

The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) July 3 - August 1, 1975 was the result of a peaceful progressive process in Europe. Representatives of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada, attended in Helsinki. The meeting was attended by: General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev, President of the United States J. Ford, President of France V. Giscard d "Estaing, Prime Minister of Great Britain G. Wilson, Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany G. Schmidt, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP E Terek; General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, President of Czechoslovakia G. Husak; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED E. Honecker; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, Chairman of the State Council of the PRB T. Zhivkov; First Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP J. Kadar; General Secretary of the RCP, resident of Romania N Ceausescu, Chairman of the CYU, President of Yugoslavia I. Broz Tito and other leaders of the participating states.The Declaration adopted by the CSCE proclaimed the inviolability of European borders, the mutual renunciation of the use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of the participating countries, respect for the rights person, etc.

The heads of delegations signed the Final Act of the meeting. This document is still in effect today. It includes agreements that must be implemented in full as a whole, on:

1) security in Europe,

2) cooperation in the field of economy, science and technology, environmental protection;

3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields;

4) next steps after the meeting.

The final act contains 10 principles that define the norms of relationships and cooperation: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; non-use of force or threat of force; inviolability of borders; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destiny; cooperation between states; fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The Final Act guaranteed the recognition and inviolability of post-war borders in Europe (which was in the hands of the USSR) and imposed obligations on all participating states to respect human rights (this became the basis for using the problem of human rights against the USSR).

The signing by the heads of 33 European states, as well as the United States and Canada on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki, of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the apogee of international detente. The final act included a declaration of the principles of mutual relations between the CSCE participating countries. The USSR attached the greatest importance to the recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders and the territorial integrity of states, which meant the international legal consolidation of the situation in Eastern Europe. The triumph of Soviet diplomacy was the result of a compromise: the Final Act also included articles on the protection of human rights, freedom of information and movement. These articles served as the international legal basis for the dissident movement within the country and the campaign for the protection of human rights in the USSR, which was actively carried out in the West.

After the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union felt like a master in Eastern Europe and began to install new SS-20 medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, the restriction on which was not provided for by the SALT agreements. .Under the conditions of the campaign for the protection of human rights in the USSR, which intensified sharply in the West after Helsinki, the position of the USSR became exceptionally tough. This provoked retaliation from the United States, which, after Congress refused to ratify SALT-2 in the early 1980s, deployed "cruise missiles" and Pershing missiles in Western Europe capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union. Thus, a military-strategic balance was established between the blocks on the territory of Europe.

The arms race had an extremely negative impact on the economies of countries whose military-industrial orientation did not decrease. The general extensive development increasingly affected the defense industry. The parity with the United States achieved in the early 1970s concerned primarily intercontinental ballistic missiles. Since the late 1970s, the general crisis of the Soviet economy began to have a negative impact on the defense industry. The Soviet Union began to gradually lag behind in certain types of weapons. This was revealed after the introduction of "cruise missiles" in the United States and became even more obvious after the beginning of the work of the United States on the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI) program. Since the mid-1980s, the leadership of the USSR has been clearly aware of this lag. The depletion of the economic possibilities of the regime is revealed more and more fully.

Since the end of the 1970s, detente has been replaced by a new round of the arms race, although the accumulated nuclear weapons were already enough to destroy all life on Earth. Both sides did not take advantage of the détente that had been achieved and took the path of whipping up fear. At the same time, the capitalist countries adhered to the concept of "nuclear deterrence" of the USSR. In turn, the Soviet leadership made a number of major foreign policy miscalculations. For a number of weapons, for the size of the army, tank armada, etc. The USSR surpassed the USA and their further build-up became meaningless. The USSR began to build a fleet of aircraft carriers.

A major factor that undermined confidence in the USSR was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. The 200,000-strong expeditionary force waged a war that was extremely unpopular in the country and the world. The war consumed human and material resources, 15,000 Soviet soldiers died, 35,000 were crippled, about one or two million Afghans were exterminated, and three to four million became refugees. The next miscalculation of Soviet foreign policy was the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe in the mid-1970s. It sharply destabilized the situation and upset the strategic balance.

It should also be taken into account that in the second half of the 1970s - early 1980s, the USSR, following the class principle, provided all possible assistance (military, material, etc.) to the countries of the third world, supporting the struggle against imperialism there. The Soviet Union took part in armed conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, inspired the Cuban intervention in Angola, armed "progressive" regimes in Iraq, Libya and other countries from the point of view of the Soviet leadership.

Thus, the period of détente, which was favorable for the USSR, ended, and now the country was suffocating in a difficult arms race in the face of mutual accusations and, giving a considerable reason to the other side to assert about the “Soviet threat”, about the “evil empire”. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan dramatically changed the attitude of Western countries towards the USSR. Many previous agreements remained on paper. The Moscow Olympics-80 was held in an atmosphere of boycott by most capitalist countries.

After the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the international atmosphere changed dramatically, again acquiring the features of confrontation. Under these conditions, R. Reagan, a supporter of a tough approach to the USSR, won the presidential election in the United States.

In the United States, plans began to be developed for a strategic defense initiative (SDI), which provides for the creation of a nuclear shield in space, which has received the figurative name of the "space war" plans. The U.S. Defense Directives for Fiscal Years 1984-1988 stated: “It is necessary to direct military rivalry with the USSR into new areas and thereby make all previous Soviet defense spending meaningless and do everything soviet weapons obsolete." The Soviet Union will be forced to spend annually about 10 billion rubles (72% of military programs) on space programs.

In the USSR, it also became known that at the December (1979) session of the NATO Council (two weeks before the entry of troops into Afghanistan) a decision was made to deploy new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe from November 1983. Under these conditions, the USSR deployed medium-range missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which were able to reach European capitals in a matter of minutes. In response, NATO began to deploy a network in Europe American missiles medium range, as well as cruise missiles. In a short period, Europe was oversaturated with nuclear weapons. In an effort to prevent a further escalation of tension, Yu. V. Andropov made concessions, proposing to reduce the number Soviet missiles in the European part of the USSR to the level of French and British nuclear weapons, moving the rest of the missiles beyond the Urals. Agreeing with objections about the increased tension in Asia, due to the transfer there of Soviet missiles exported from Europe, the Soviet leadership announced its readiness to dismantle the surplus missiles. At the same time, Andropov set about settling the Afghan issue, involving the Pakistani side in the negotiation process. Reducing tension on the Afghan-Pakistani border would allow the Soviet Union to reduce the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and begin to withdraw troops. The incident with a South Korean passenger plane shot down over the territory of the USSR on September 1, 1983 led to the curtailment of the negotiation process. The Soviet side, which denied for some time the fact of the destruction of the liner (obviously led by the US intelligence services over the military facilities of the USSR), in the eyes of the world community was guilty of an incident that claimed the lives of 250 passengers. The negotiations were interrupted .

The most controversial moment in the history of detente in the 1970s is the different understanding of this process in the USSR and in the West. There are several main points of view that differ in the degree of breadth of interpretation of the process, the limits of its distribution. Indeed, what was it: a “smoke screen” that allowed the Brezhnev leadership to strengthen its influence in the world and build up weapons, or a sincere desire, if not to achieve truly peaceful coexistence, then at least to contribute to warming general climate in the world. The truth, apparently, lies somewhere in the middle.

Realizing the need to reform the economy, the Soviet leadership was really interested in expanding the areas international cooperation, hoping to export advanced Western technology. This was especially characteristic of the early stage of "collective leadership", when technocrats enjoyed much more weight than in the mid-1970s. On the other hand, it would be strange to seriously consider the position of the USSR as a sincere desire to completely abandon the expansion of its military presence in the world at a time when the United States was clearly aiming to localize the confrontation "away from its shores." Moreover, at the XXV Congress of the CPSU in February 1976, Brezhnev bluntly stated: "Detente in no way cancels and cannot cancel or change the laws of the class struggle ..". Rather, both sides accepted certain rules of the game: the US recognized the realities in Eastern Europe, the USSR did not interfere in the internal affairs of the West. Although some Western historians claim that the United States was counting on a complete abandonment of the USSR's activity in the rest of the world, it is unlikely that the Americans were in reality as naive and ingenuous as they are now portrayed.

In this regard, the process of detente was not, and could not be, accompanied by the USSR's refusal to support "anti-imperialist forces." Moreover, in these years the USSR has been consistently pursuing a policy of expanding its presence in various regions. the globe under the flag of "proletarian internationalism". For example, the participation of Soviet military advisers and the military-technical assistance of the USSR to North Vietnam during its war with the South. The same cautious policy, which constantly ran into Chinese involvement in Vietnamese affairs, was carried out by the USSR during the years of the American-Vietnamese war, right up to the victorious march of the DRV troops through the streets of Saigon and the unification of South and North Vietnam under communist rule in 1975. The defeat of the United States and establishing communist regime generally contributed to the spread of Soviet influence in neighboring Laos and Cambodia (since 1976 - Kampuchea). This significantly weakened the US position in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Navy received the right to use Vietnamese ports and military bases. The influence of the USSR increased significantly after China - the main Soviet competitor in the struggle for influence in Indochina - became the main enemy of Vietnam. This happened after China's attack on the northern provinces of Vietnam in 1979 and the last victorious war. After the Sino-Vietnamese war, the DRV became the main strategic ally of the USSR in this region.

The pro-Arab position was taken by the Soviet Union during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, sending weapons to Syria and Egypt and a large number of Soviet experts. This significantly contributed to strengthening the influence of the USSR in Arab world which became an important factor in Soviet-American relations. Traditional support for India as an instrument of Soviet influence in the region resulted in military assistance to this country in its periodically flaring conflicts with Pakistan. In the Third World, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) also enjoyed the support of the Soviet Union in their struggle against Portuguese colonial dependence. However, the USSR did not limit itself to only helping in the anti-colonial struggle, but actively intervened in the civil wars that began in these countries on the side of groups that declared their Marxist-Leninist orientation. This led to Soviet support for Cuba's military intervention in Angola, as well as continued military assistance to the Popular Front of Mozambique. As a result, a course towards building socialism was proclaimed in Angola and Mozambique. Through the mediation of Cuba, the USSR also supported partisans in Nicaragua, which led in 1979 to the overthrow of the pro-American regime of Somoza and the coming to power of the Sandinista government, which announced plans to build socialism.

The Helsinki Process clearly linked individual human rights issues with national security. He helped bring an end to communist rule in Eastern Europe and helped launch a new security and economic relationship between East and West. The process resulted in the formation of the now 56-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – an active international body, which advocates for democracy and human rights around the world.

But perhaps Helsinki's greatest achievement has been the human rights and democracy commitments that people across the region continue to demand from their governments.

Retired Army Colonel Ty Cobb, who served as an adviser to President Ronald Reagan on the Soviet Union, told America.gov that when the Soviet government signed the Helsinki Accords 30 years after the end of World War II, it thought it was getting a good deal. .

The agreements reached seemed to legalize the post-war borders between Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, but in reality their human rights provisions made the first breach in the Iron Curtain.

Although conservatives in the West were generally of the opinion that the agreements were unlikely to dramatically change the situation in the USSR, in fact, by signing them, the Soviet Union assumed numerous obligations. Ultimately, the agreements "proved to be a useful tool" for resolving conflicts and ultimately led to the elimination of Soviet power in both Eastern Europe and Russia.

In particular, the Helsinki Final Act allowed member states to form human rights monitoring groups, which created favorable conditions for the activities of dissident movements and non-violent protest organizations in the countries of the Eastern Bloc. The Moscow Helsinki Group proved particularly effective in drawing international attention to human rights violations in the Soviet Union.

The German historian Fritz Stern noted in his recent article "The Roads Leading to 1989" that in the beginning, "few politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain realized the incendiary potential of the Helsinki Accords... and realized that they provided dissident movements in the countries of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union moral support and at least some elements of legal protection.

The direct result of the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the new political thinking that followed them was the "fall" of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, when East Germany opened its borders and allowed citizens to travel to the West.

Within a year, the 106-kilometer Berlin Wall was dismantled, former dissident and political prisoner Václav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, dictatorships from Bulgaria to the Baltics were overthrown, and 100 million people in Eastern Europe after 40 years of communist domination were given the opportunity to choose their own governments.

According to Carol Fuller, US Chargé d'Affaires a.i. to the OSCE, “The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union gave new impetus to the Helsinki process. The OSCE created new structures – including a secretariat and field missions – and faced new challenges, from terrorism and climate change to military transparency and stability in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.”

When 35 European countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, signed the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on August 1, 1975, this led to a series of events that culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall and left an imprint on international relationships.

Why the authorities of the USSR failed to discern a typical “Trojan horse” in the proposal of the West can only be understood now by analyzing the Helsinki Pact, as well as the experience of the defeats of the USSR and modern Russia. Such an analysis is undoubtedly needed, since we are still “herding” that “Trojan horse”, although foreign soldiers continue to parachute from it - now these are the soldiers of the “orange revolutions”.

An analysis of the Helsinki Accords and their prerequisites shows that the Soviet Union took this step out of pragmatic considerations. The first "basket" of the Helsinki Accords provided for the inviolability of the borders that existed at that time in Europe. The Soviet Union, it seemed to him, had the opportunity to perpetuate the gains of 1945, not only de facto (thanks to the superiority of conventional armed forces in Europe, this task seemed to be solved forever), but also de jure. In exchange, demands for the “third basket” that were not very clear to the then Soviet officials were accepted - the free movement of people across borders, the dissemination of foreign press and sound information, the right of nations to self-determination.

The “first basket” contained so many pleasant things (primarily the recognition of the GDR as a full-fledged state) that, in the end, Brezhnev and his colleagues in the Politburo decided to swallow the obscure humanitarian appendage from the “third basket”. It seemed that the game was worth the candle, especially since the requirements of the "third basket" the Soviet Union sabotaged and minimized with all its might almost until its death.

Foreign press for the broad Soviet masses was limited to the communist "Morning Star" and "Humanite", permission to leave was required until 1989, foreign broadcasts in Russian were jammed until 1987. True, Soviet citizens had to be allowed to marry and marry foreigners, as well as to reunite families separated by borders (there were separate sections on this in the Helsinki Final Act). But even this departure from the Stalinist family policy (under Stalin marriages with foreigners were, as you know, forbidden) was surrounded by such humiliations that the damage seemed to be minimal.

And yet, as it is now becoming clear, the "third basket" outweighed the first, although this was not believed by many in both the Soviet bloc and the West. “Having swallowed the bait of recognizing the borders in Europe in 1975, the Soviet leadership found itself on a hook from which it could no longer get off, and when Gorbachev agreed in the late 1980s to discuss humanitarian issues at international summits along with disarmament and political issues, this the hook began to work with might and main.

Despite all the attempts of the authorities in some countries of the Eastern bloc to suppress the activities of human rights movements, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference became the most important document on the way to overcoming the split of the European continent. Taking the initiative to begin the process of detente, the Eastern European countries expected, first of all, to achieve guarantees of their own territorial integrity, but it was this process that significantly contributed to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the period from 1975 to 1990.

As a result of the geostrategic changes that have taken place in Europe, the confrontation between East and West has also ended, which in the past has repeatedly threatened to turn into a third - already nuclear - world war.

1. Antyasov M.V. Pan-Americanism: Ideology and Politics. Moscow, Thought, 1981.

2. Valiullin K.B., Zaripova R.K. Russian history. XX century. Part 2: Tutorial. - Ufa: RIO BashGU, 2002.

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4. Grafsky VG General history of law and state: Textbook for universities. - 2nd ed., revised. and additional - M.: Norma, 2007.

5. History of the state and law of foreign countries. Part 2. Textbook for universities - 2nd ed., Sr. / Under the total. ed. prof. Krasheninnikova N.A and prof. Zhidkova O. A. - M .: NORMA Publishing House, 2001.

6. History of Russia, 1945-2008 : book. for the teacher / [A.V. Filippov, A.I. Utkin, S.V. Alekseev and others]; ed. A.V. Filippova. - 2nd ed., revised. and additional - M. : Enlightenment, 2008.

7. History of Russia. 1917-2004: Proc. allowance for university students / A. S. Barsenkov, A. I. Vdovin. - M.: Aspect Press, 2005.

8. Sokolov A.K., Tyazhelnikova V.S. Course of Soviet history, 1941-1999. - M.: Higher. school, 1999.

9. Ratkovsky I. S., Khodyakov M. V. History of Soviet Russia - St. Petersburg: Publishing house "Lan", 2001

10. Khachaturyan V. M. History of world civilizations from ancient times to the end of the XX century. Grades 10-11: A manual for general education. studies, institutions / Ed. V. I. Ukolova. - 3rd ed., Rev. and additional - M.: Bustard, 1999.

See: Sokolov A.K., Tyazhelnikova V.S. Course of Soviet history, 1941-1999. - M.: Higher. school, 1999, p.193.

See: Ratkovsky I. S., Khodyakov M. V. History of Soviet Russia - St. Petersburg: Lan Publishing House, 2001. P. 412.

See: History of Russia, 1945-2008. : book. for the teacher / [A.V. Filippov, A.I. Utkin, S.V. Alekseev and others]; ed. A.V. Filippova. - 2nd ed., revised. and additional - M. : Education, 2008. S.241.

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In October 1964, the leadership changed in the USSR. The unity of the socialist camp was broken, relations between East and West were very strained due to the Caribbean crisis. In addition, the German problem remained unresolved, which greatly worried the leadership of the USSR. Under these conditions, the modern history of the Soviet state began. The decisions taken at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 confirmed the orientation towards a tougher foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence from that moment was subordinated to a qualitatively different trend towards strengthening the socialist regime, strengthening solidarity between the national liberation movement and the proletariat.

Complexity of the situation

The restoration of absolute control in the socialist camp was complicated by tense relations with China and Cuba. Problems were delivered by events in Czechoslovakia. In June 1967, a congress of writers openly spoke out against the leadership of the party. This was followed by massive student strikes and demonstrations. As a result of the growing opposition, Novotny had to cede the leadership of the party to Dubcek in 1968. The new board decided to carry out a number of reforms. In particular, freedom of speech was established, the HRC agreed to hold alternative elections for leaders. However, the situation was resolved by the introduction of troops from 5 participating states. It was not possible to immediately suppress the unrest. This forced the leadership of the USSR to remove Dubcek and his entourage, placing Husak at the head of the party. On the example of Czechoslovakia, the so-called principle of "limited sovereignty" was implemented. The suppression of reforms halted the modernization of the country for at least 20 years. In 1970, the situation in Poland also became more complicated. The problems were related to the rise in prices, which caused mass uprisings of workers in the Baltic ports. Over the following years, the situation did not improve, the strikes continued. The leader of the unrest was the trade union "Solidarity", which was led by L. Walesa. The leadership of the USSR did not dare to send troops, and the "normalization" of the situation was entrusted to the gene. Jaruzelsky. On December 13, 1981, he introduced martial law in Poland.

Detention

In the early 70s. relations between East and West have changed dramatically. The tension began to ease. This was largely due to the achievement of military parity between the USSR and the USA, East and West. At the first stage, interested cooperation was established between the Soviet Union and France, and then with the FRG. At the turn of the 60-70s. The Soviet leadership began to actively implement a new foreign policy course. Its key provisions were fixed in the Peace Program, which was adopted at the 24th Party Congress. The most important points here are the fact that neither the West nor the USSR renounced the arms race within the framework of this policy. The whole process at the same time acquired a civilized framework. The recent history of relations between the West and the East began with a significant expansion of areas of cooperation, mainly Soviet-American. In addition, relations between the USSR and the FRG and France improved. The latter withdrew from NATO in 1966, which served as a good reason for the active development of cooperation.

German problem

To resolve it, the USSR expected to receive mediation assistance from France. However, it was not required, since the Social Democrat W. Brandt became Chancellor. The essence of his policy was that the unification of the territory of Germany was no longer a prerequisite for establishing relations between East and West. It was postponed to the future as a key goal of multilateral negotiations. Thanks to this, the Moscow Treaty was concluded on August 12, 1970. In accordance with it, the parties pledged to respect the integrity of all European countries within their actual borders. Germany, in particular, recognized the western borders of Poland. And a line with the GDR. An important step was also the signing in the autumn of 1971 of a quadripartite treaty on the West. Berlin. This agreement confirmed the groundlessness of political and territorial claims on it by the FRG. This was an absolute victory for the USSR, since all the conditions on which the Soviet Union had insisted since 1945 were fulfilled.

Assessing America's Position

A completely favorable development of events allowed the leadership of the USSR to strengthen the opinion that on international arena there was a fundamental shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. And the states of the socialist camp. The position of America and the imperialist bloc was assessed by Moscow as "weakened". This confidence was based on several factors. The key factors were the continued strengthening of the national liberation movement, as well as the achievement of military-strategic parity with America in 1969 in terms of the number of nuclear charges. In accordance with this, the buildup of types of weapons and their improvement, according to the logic of the leaders of the USSR, acted as an integral part of the struggle for peace.

OSV-1 and OSV-2

The need to achieve parity made the issue of bilateral arms limitation, especially ballistic intercontinental missiles. Of great importance in this process was Nixon's visit to Moscow in the spring of 1972. On May 26, the Interim Agreement was signed, defining restrictive measures in relation to strategic weapons. This treaty was called OSV-1. He was imprisoned for 5 years. The agreement limited the number of US and USSR ballistic intercontinental missiles launched from submarines. The allowable levels for the Soviet Union were higher, as America possessed weapons carrying multiple warheads. At the same time, the number of charges themselves was not specified in the agreement. This allowed, without violating the contract, to achieve a unilateral advantage in this area. SALT-1, therefore, did not stop the arms race. The formation of a system of agreements was continued in 1974. L. Brezhnev and J. Ford managed to agree on new conditions for the limitation of strategic arms. The signing of the SALT-2 agreement was supposed to be carried out in the 77th year. However, this did not happen, in connection with the creation in the United States of "cruise missiles" - new weapons. America categorically refused to take into account the limit levels in relation to them. In 1979, the treaty was nevertheless signed by Brezhnev and Carter, but the US Congress did not ratify it until 1989.

Results of the policy of détente

Over the years of the implementation of the Peace Program, serious progress has been made in cooperation between East and West. The total volume of trade increased by 5 times, and the Soviet-American - by 8. The interaction strategy was reduced to signing large contracts with Western companies for the purchase of technologies or the construction of factories. So at the turn of the 60-70s. VAZ was created under an agreement with the Italian corporation Fiat. But this event is more likely to be attributed to the exception than to the rule. For the most part, international programs were limited to inappropriate business trips of delegations. The import of foreign technologies was carried out according to an ill-conceived scheme. Really fruitful cooperation was negatively affected by administrative and bureaucratic obstacles. As a result, many contracts fell short of expectations.

Helsinki Process 1975

Detente in relations between East and West, however, has borne fruit. It made it possible to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The first consultations took place in 1972-1973. The host country of the CSCE was Finland. states) became the center of discussion of the international situation. The first consultations were attended by the ministers of foreign affairs. The first stage took place from 3 to 7 July 1973. Geneva became the platform for the next round of negotiations. The second stage took place from 09/18/1973 to 07/21/1975. It involved several rounds lasting 3-6 months. They were negotiated by delegates and experts nominated by the participating countries. The second stage was the development and subsequent coordination of agreements on items on the agenda of the general meeting. Finland again became the site of the third round. Helsinki hosted top state and political leaders.

Negotiators

The Helsinki Accords were discussed:

Gene. Secretary Brezhnev.
President of America J. Ford.
German Federal Chancellor Schmidt.
French President V. Giscard d "Estaing.
British Prime Minister Wilson.
President of Czechoslovakia Husak.
Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED.
Chairman of the State Council Zhivkov.
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP Kadar and others.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held with the participation of representatives of 35 states, including officials from Canada and the United States.

Accepted Documents

The participating countries approved the Declaration of Helsinki. In accordance with it, proclaimed:

Inviolability of state borders.
Mutual renunciation of the use of force in conflict resolution.
Non-intervention in internal politics participating states.
Respect for human rights and other provisions.

In addition, the heads of delegations signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It contained agreements to be executed as a whole. The main directions fixed in the document were:

Key principles

The final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe included 10 provisions, in accordance with which the norms of interaction were determined:

sovereign equality.
Non-use of force or threat of its use.
Respect for sovereign rights.
Territorial integrity.
The inviolability of borders.
Respect for freedoms and human rights.
non-intervention in domestic politics.
Equality of peoples and their right to independently manage their own destiny.
Interaction between countries.
Fulfillment of international legal obligations.

The Helsinki Final Act acted as a guarantee of the recognition and inviolability of post-war borders. This was beneficial primarily to the USSR. In addition, the Helsinki process made it possible to formulate and impose obligations on all participating countries to strictly observe freedoms and human rights.

Short term consequences

What prospects did the Helsinki process open up? The date of its holding is considered by historians as the apogee of detente in the international arena. The USSR was most interested in the issue of post-war borders. For the Soviet leadership, it was extremely important to achieve recognition of the inviolability of post-war borders, the territorial integrity of countries, which meant international legal consolidation of the situation in Eastern Europe. All this happened as part of a compromise. The question of human rights is a problem that interested those who attended the Helsinki process. The year of the CSCE has become Starting point for development in the USSR. The international legal consolidation of the obligatory observance of human rights made it possible to launch a campaign to protect them in the Soviet Union, which at that time was actively pursued by Western states.

It is worth saying that since 1973, separate negotiations have been held between representatives of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The issue of arms reduction was discussed. But the expected success was never achieved. This was due to the tough position of the Warsaw Pact states, which were superior to NATO in terms of conventional types of weapons and did not want to reduce them.

Military-strategic balance

The Helsinki process ended in a compromise. After signing the final document, the USSR began to feel like a master and began to install SS-20 missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, which were distinguished by an average range. Restriction on them was not provided for under the SALT agreements. As part of the human rights campaign that intensified sharply in Western countries after the end of the Helsinki process, the position of the Soviet Union became very hard. Accordingly, the United States has taken a number of retaliatory measures. After refusing to ratify the SALT-2 treaty in the early 1980s, America deployed missiles (Pershing and cruise missiles) in Western Europe. They could reach the territory of the USSR. As a result, a military-strategic balance was established between the blocs.

Long-Term Consequences

The arms race had a rather negative effect on the economic condition of countries whose military-industrial orientation did not decrease. The parity with the United States, achieved before the start of the Helsinki process, concerned primarily ballistic intercontinental missiles. Since the end of the 70s. the general crisis began to have a negative impact on the defense industries. The USSR gradually began to lag behind in certain types of weapons. This came to light after the appearance of "cruise missiles" in America. The lag became more obvious after the start of the development of a program for "strategic defense initiative" in USA.

Magomedov Marad Sheikhmagomedovich,

Graduate of the Faculty of Law of the Southern Federal University (former Rostov State University)

August 1, 2010 marked the anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe dated 1 August 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Final Act of the CSCE or the CSCE Act). At a lecture timed to coincide with this anniversary at the University of Helsinki on April 20, 2009, Russian President D. A. Medvedev proposed the development of a new European security treaty, which he called “Helsinki plus”: taking into account the cessation of ideological confrontation and the emergence of new subjects of international law”.

As is known, seven principles have found their consolidation in the UN Charter: conscientious fulfillment of obligations, sovereign equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs, refraining from the threat and use of force, peaceful resolution of international disputes, equality and self-determination of peoples, international cooperation. It is easy to see that the last two principles are not included in Art. 2 (“Principles”), and in Art. 1 ("Goals").

These principles reflected the obligations envisaged for the UN itself, and the obligations assumed by the states participating in it. However, as a result of further implementation, the basic principles began to be recognized as the fundamental principles of all international law. Such recognition was enshrined in the Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1970 on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation between states in accordance with the UN Charter (hereinafter referred to as the 1970 Declaration). The International Court of Justice in the Case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua (1986) characterized the provisions of this Declaration as customary law.

The specificity of the basic principles of international law also lies in the fact that they, falling under Art. 103 of the UN Charter (on the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter over obligations under any other international treaty), at the same time differ from many other provisions of the UN Charter by the quality of a peremptory norm of general international law (the norm jus cogens).

The Final Act of the CSCE included in its text a Declaration of Principles by which "the participating States will guide their mutual relations." The Russian international legal doctrine indicates that this Declaration added three more to the previously existing seven basic principles of international law: the principle of the territorial integrity of states; the principle of inviolability of state borders; the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. In this regard, the question involuntarily arises as to whether the principles of the CSCE Final Act have all the characteristics just listed (given their updated normative content).

The practical significance of understanding the legal significance of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE is also due to the fact that in the process of international communication, the highest officials of states geographically located in Europe or directly connected with it, in their statements regarding the confirmation of the existence of any fact or right, often refer to those enshrined in Final Act of the CSCE principles. Accordingly, the legal assessment of such political statements encounters at least the following problems: (1) what is the quantitative composition of the basic principles of international law; and (2) what is the legal and normative content of each of the main principles, since this issue raises the problem of changes by the provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE of the norms defined in the Declaration of 1970. In this connection, a more general question is whether the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE are covered by the imperative principle pacta sunt service and, ultimately, whether the non-observance or improper observance of any principle from the CSCE Act entails the responsibility of states under international law.

The importance of providing answers to the questions just outlined is also dictated by the fact that it is the analysis of the previous experience in building a system of interstate communication that can be used as the basis for solving the urgent problem of bringing the existing regulatory superstructure, expressed primarily in the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE, in line with the needs international relations that developed at the end of the first decade of the XXI century in Europe. D. A. Medvedev noted that “one of the main principles of the new treaty on European security should be the rule on the indivisibility of the security space, regardless of existing alliances, it is necessary to include in the document the principles of arms control, measures to strengthen mutual trust and reasonable containment of military construction. In addition, within the framework of this treaty, each signatory state must refuse to deploy strategic offensive weapons outside national territories.

In connection with the above, we would like to state our vision of the problems of the topic indicated in the title of this article. However, we do not set ourselves the goal of legally evaluating other (except for the principles) provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE.

The legal significance of an international legal document is determined, first of all, by the possibility of referring to it as an act containing mandatory norms, the non-fulfillment or improper fulfillment of which entails responsibility under international law. The initiative put forward by the President of the Russian Federation to change the configuration of the normative regulation of international relations in Europe points to the conclusion international treaty. In this regard, it is first necessary to determine whether the Final Act of the CSCE is an international treaty.

Professor G. I. Tunkin noted that the coordination of the wills of states in the process of creating a norm of international law concerns both (1) the rule of conduct and (2) its recognition as a legal norm. When forming the norms of international law, the wills of the states regarding the rules of conduct are first coordinated. When creating treaty norms, this happens through negotiations, during discussions at international conferences, in international organizations, and ends with the adoption of the text as final. This ends the coordination of the wills of states regarding the content of the treaty norm of international law, but does not end the process of its formation. It is important to emphasize that agreement on the wills of states regarding the content of a treaty norm does not yet make it binding on states.

Not every agreement between states is an international treaty; this conclusion was specifically noted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. Thus, it is necessary to study the will of the participating States of the CSCE Final Act regarding the recognition of its provisions as the norms of treaty international law.

As you know, the Helsinki process was political in nature, and most of the decisions taken within its framework were only the result of political compromises, which seemed to be a more flexible tool that allows finding acceptable formulations and formalizing agreed positions in the conditions of the level of relations between states that existed at that time. in Europe. The main objective of the Final Act of the CSCE was seen as the fact that with the help of this act all disputes between European states remaining after the Second World War would be finally settled, and thus the inviolability of the European world would be confirmed.

Thus, we can conclude that it is impossible to talk about the explicit will of the states participating in the Helsinki process regarding the recognition of the nature of the norms of treaty international law behind the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE.

It can also be argued that the participating states of the Helsinki process quite deliberately tried not to give the CSCE Final Act the quality of an international treaty. Thus, it was specifically stated that the CSCE Act is not subject to registration in accordance with Art. 102 of the UN Charter. The legal consequence of this decision was the absence of the right for the participating states of the CSCE Final Act to refer to it as an international treaty in any of the UN bodies. However, it should be noted that the registration of an international legal act in accordance with Art. 102 of the UN Charter is not considered a constitutive feature of this act as an international treaty. Therefore, the decision of the participating States not to register the CSCE Final Act indirectly indicates that it lacks the quality of an international treaty.

The argument in favor of not recognizing the CSCE Final Act as an international treaty is seen in the absence of provisions defining the procedure for joining the CSCE Act, the procedure for secession from the participating states, and the mechanism of national legal implementation. In support of this thesis, let us point to the statement of the representative of the US State Department: “[p]olitical obligations are not regulated by international law, and there are no rules relating to their observance, modification or refusal.”

Professor A. Ya. Kapustin, in a textbook dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Russian Association of International Law, described the positions existing in the doctrine regarding the legal significance of the CSCE Final Act: MM.) as an international agreement, but at the same time, not recognizing in it an international treaty within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. Such an approach made it possible to deny the legal nature of the obligations arising from it, recognizing only their moral or political significance. A close position was taken by supporters of the recognition of the significance of the act of “soft law” behind the Helsinki Act. opposite position were occupied by some lawyers who proposed considering the Final Act of the CSCE ... as a treaty[a] suit generis. They were joined by those who, without denying the political nature of the obligations contained in the Final Act, emphasized the unique nature of this document, which, in their opinion, had an impact on European development many times greater than the significance of most legally binding treaties.

It should be noted that some lawyers, emphasizing the unique nature of the Final Act of the CSCE, in fact, oppose such categories as the importance and effectiveness of any act and the quality of binding under international law. In this regard, a textbook example can be given when moral or religious norms turn out to be more effective regulators of social relations, however, it is generally recognized that this fact does not give them the quality of law. Apparently, within the framework of the position pointing to the uniqueness of the CSCE Final Act, its supporters should determine what is the impact of such uniqueness on the legal significance of the provisions of the CSCE Act.

The draft Commentary of the UN International Law Commission on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts contains the following thesis: “[r]commendations made by organs of an international organization or “non-binding” agreements, such as the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of August 1, 1975 may express obligations or norms which are not intended to be legally binding as such." Violation of such obligations or norms does not give rise to international legal responsibility.

Thus, it can be argued that, using the example of the CSCE Final Act, we are dealing only with the agreement of wills regarding the rule of conduct. Since there is no agreement on the wills of states regarding the recognition of a rule of conduct as a legal norm, the CSCE Act cannot be considered an international treaty. However, in this regard, one should not, going to extremes, downplay or underestimate the element of agreement of wills regarding the rule of conduct, which makes it possible to say that the principles of the CSCE Final Act can acquire the status of customary legal norms.

The Russian legal literature notes that “... the principles (of the territorial integrity of states; inviolability of state borders and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (three principles) - MM.), fixed, it would seem, only for regional (European) application, however, with good reason can be considered and are considered the basic principles of international law. They have found their regulatory and legal recognition and consolidation in thousands of international treaties of a universal and regional nature and in the international practice of states on all continents.” Unfortunately, the content of this statement is not disclosed, so we can only offer our own vision of the mechanism within which the attribution of the status of the main principles of international law to the three principles is explained.

First of all, you should join the position of Prof. Yu. M. Kolosov, who will accurately notice that the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE are not called the basic principles of international law.

Guided by the thesis that there is nothing obvious in international law, but everything must be confirmed, it should be pointed out that the reference to “thousands” of international treaties of a universal and regional nature only means that the principles enshrined in such documents are binding only as treaty-legal for participating States and with the legal content as defined in the text of the relevant treaty. With regard to regional and bilateral treaties, it should be said that, unless specifically stated otherwise, they do not oblige participating states to apply these principles to states of other regions.

Probably, in the statement analyzed at this stage about the belonging of the three principles of the Final Act of the CSCE to the number of basic principles of international law, it is meant that by virtue of their “recognition[s] and consolidation[s] in thousands of international treaties of a universal and regional nature and in international the practice of the states of all continents” acquired such a status and became obligatory under international law as universal customs.

First of all, we note that in the Asylum case (Colombia/Peru, 20.11.1950) the International Court of Justice stated that the party invoking the custom “must confirm that it has been established in such a way that it has become binding on the other party” (§ 276) .

In Art. 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice of June 26, 1945, international custom is defined as "general practice recognized as law." In the decision in the Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta, 3.6.1985), the International Court of Justice stated: “It is an axiom that elements of custom in international law must be sought, first of all, in practice and opinio juris states” (§ 27). In fact, this statement of the Court is consistent with the concept of prof. G. I. Tunkina on the harmonization of wills.

Let us assume that the very principles of the CSCE Final Act and the norms of international treaties, in which these principles are reflected, can constitute a practice indicating the agreement of wills regarding the rule of conduct. It is even possible that this practice meets the requirements of almost complete uniformity, breadth and representativeness, as such requirements have been defined by the International Court of Justice (for example, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 20.2.1969. § 74).

However, there are serious doubts about the ability of this practice to pass the test for compliance with the requirement of sufficient legal conviction ( opinio juris) states in that such principles and their normative content are customary in nature. In this regard, two approaches to assessing opinio juris developed by the International Court of Justice: (1) in some cases (for example, the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Canada/United States of America. 1984. § 91-93) this Court has concluded that there are opinio juris on the basis of existing state practice or previous court decisions; (2) a more "rigorous" approach, consisting in the need to search for more evidence opinio juris (e.g., the Nicaragua case, 1986. § 14). In this article, we will adhere to the second approach, which will allow us to avoid the main drawback of the first, the methodology of which, in modern conditions, may be considered inadequate for proving the corresponding fact.

not in favor opinio juris the recognition of the nature of customary legal norms behind the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE is evidenced by everything that we said earlier in connection with an attempt to identify the quality of an international treaty in the CSCE Act. To this must also be added the following.

When evaluating opinio juris Special attention should be paid to the fact that currently 56 states are members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), i.e. in the 35 years that have elapsed since the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE, the number of members of the organization has increased by 21. This happened due to the accession of Albania and Andorra, the collapse of Czechoslovakia. Later, starting in 1992, 18 new members appeared as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the SFRY.

The view that the principles of the CSCE Final Act apply to these states in exactly the same way as to the original participants in the Act seems superficial. In fact, the analysis of the provisions of the CSCE Act itself tells a somewhat different story. Thus, its participants established that they "consider as inviolable all the borders of each other, as well as the borders of all states in Europe." The interpretation of this provision calls into question what the original participants "consider as inviolable" the borders of the newly formed states in Europe. Similarly, the fact that the new entrants “see as inviolable” their (i.e. new) boundaries is called into question. The reference to the fact that the original and new states never challenged the inviolability of the borders of the newly formed states in an appropriate form cannot be used as direct evidence, since this variant of behavior could be caused not only by a legal conviction in an existing obligation, but also by the fact of awareness of the existence of a right ( on a claim) that simply was not realized (for a variety of reasons).

It seems that in international law there are no rules on succession in relation to an act of a recommendatory nature, which also causes certain difficulties in identifying opinio juris newly formed states.

Most of the principles of the CSCE Final Act contain references to their applicability only in relations between participating States. Thus, even the provisions of the CSCE Act itself do not oblige (at least even morally) states to adhere to a given variant of behavior in relation to non-participating states (or non-European states in the case of the principle of inviolability of state borders). Accordingly, from what has just been said it is impossible to derive a legal conviction of the universality of these principles.

It is doubtful what can be deduced opinio juris some states from the fact of their accession to the CSCE/OSCE. In fact, even if it is recognized that accession entails the assumption of obligations, then their very nature allows us to speak of the acceptance by new participants of only political obligations.

Proving the customary legal status of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE can be carried out in two ways: through the recognition that these principles belong to universal or regional customs. Apparently, it is difficult to recognize the status of universal customary legal norms behind the three principles of the Final Act of the CSCE.

For objective reasons, the requirements for the formation of a regional custom are not so high, therefore, it is probably advisable to consider the three principles as regional customs that have established themselves within Europe. However, even if one takes this path, one cannot ignore the above arguments about the absence of a precisely established opinio juris. In addition, in theory and practice, the existence of regional and local customs is being questioned. Although in some of its decisions (for example, the Right of Passage over Indian Territory case, Portugal v. India, 11/26/1957. § 39-43) the International Court of Justice referred to such usages, it appears that in the cases under consideration the Court, in fact, applied the provisions on a unilateral act as a source of obligations or the doctrine of estoppel.

When discussing the topic of this work, one cannot but touch upon the possible position of the Russian Federation on the nature of the obligations arising from the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE. So, as it seems, nothing prevents Russia from considering them binding under international law. However, in this regard, it is necessary to consider the likely legal consequences of such a position.

It can be argued that the RF statement regarding the legal significance of the principles of the CSCE Final Act is a unilateral act. Although Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not refer to unilateral acts of subjects of international law, the practice of states itself shows that such acts can be a source of obligations under international law. This thesis is confirmed in judicial practice. Thus, the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Tests case (New Zealand v. France, 12/20/1974) pointed out that “a statement [to do something] ... entails an obligation (according to international law - MM.) follow this course of action” (§ 267-271).

Without denying that such a unilateral act is an indicator opinio juris Russian Federation in favor of the formation of a customary legal norm, it must be stated that before the formation of a norm of this nature, the Russian Federation will not be able to refer to the applicability of the principles of the CSCE Act under international law to its relations with states that consider these principles only as recommendations. On the contrary, such states may indicate that the Russian Federation has unilaterally assumed obligations under the Final Act of the CSCE.

As it seems, within the framework of this situation, it is necessary to take into account the following point: if the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE contain norms that reflect the course of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, it is necessary to look for other sources of these norms that are binding on all relevant states; if it is not possible to find binding norms, then it is necessary to seek their inclusion in a new international treaty.

In conclusion, we would like to point out that nothing in this article should be considered as intended to diminish the significance of the principles of the CSCE Final Act. The research done here is necessary for a proper understanding of the legal significance of these principles, as well as for understanding and taking into account for the future when developing Helsinki Plus certain shortcomings in the implementation of the CSCE Act.

As we have established, the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE cannot, on their own, be regarded as either treaty or customary law. However, in general, the significance of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE can be expressed as follows:

their appearance indicated that states at a certain historical stage were able to cooperate with each other in order to ensure peace and security in Europe;

these principles are new approach states to address security issues in Europe;

although it is worth recognizing the lack of binding quality of these principles under international law, it should be noted that they do not simply recommend a certain rule of conduct, they recognize the legitimacy of the corresponding actions or inactions that could be considered illegal in the absence of these principles;

these principles outlined the features of the general course of the further progressive movement of interstate communication on issues of security and cooperation in Europe. It should be noted that this communication took place and is now taking place with the participation of four permanent members of the UN Security Council, which inevitably increases the role of such a process;

provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE may be included in the process of formation of international legal custom, forming part of state practice and/or opinio juris, the other part must be formed by acts binding on international law;

the entire experience of implementing the CSCE Final Act can be taken into account when concluding a new Helsinki Plus Treaty.

Although many representatives of the Russian international legal doctrine emphasize the political nature of the principles of the Final Act of the CSCE, nevertheless Russian science adheres to the position that there are ten basic principles of international law. It seems to us that such a position is quite suitable in educational purposes, however, cannot be considered impeccable when proving the relevant fact in the framework of the legal process. However, we do not exclude the possibility of taking into account the position of Russian international scientists in accordance with Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that "...the doctrines of the most qualified publicists of the various nations as an aid to the determination of legal rules" may be applied.

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Ivanenko V. S., Kuznetsov V.I. Principles of international law // International law / otv. ed. V. I. Kuznetsov, B. R. Tuzmukhamedov, 2nd ed. - M., 2007. S. 193.

Cm.: Kolosov Yu. M. Principles of international law // International law / otv. ed. Yu. M. Kolosov, E. S. Krivchikova. - 2nd ed. - M., 2005. S. 64.