1939-1940 ( Soviet-Finnish war, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a large Soviet territory in Karelia, followed by the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that the acceptance of Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state, lead to the loss of neutrality by Finland and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) was only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Mainil incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Allegedly, three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the government of Finland and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was not feasible, because then the Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was presented with a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the troops of the Leningrad Front received an order to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyösti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During the "perestroika" several versions of the Mainilsky incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret NKVD unit. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary evidence.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantage in forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1476 tanks and about 1200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships from the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The grouping of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The rest of the troops covered separate directions from Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the "Mannerheim Line" - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of the Mannerheim line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on The Gulf of Finland and to Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered coastal batteries large-caliber, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

"Mannerheim Line" had a frontal width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip, 2-15 kilometers away from the main one, and the rear (Vyborg) line of defense. Over two thousand long-term firing structures (DOS) and wood-and-earth firing structures (DZOS) were erected, which were combined into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 item). The main line of defense consisted of 25 nodes of resistance, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. The strongholds were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). Between the strongholds and nodes of resistance were positions for field troops. The strongholds and positions of the field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. Only in the security zone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

On November 30, 1939, after a long artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and launched an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, they overcame the zone of operational obstacles in separate directions and reached the main strip of the Mannerheim Line. For more than two weeks, unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. Troops have been replenished. As a result, the Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. The Finnish side by the beginning of February 1940 had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, on February 28, Soviet troops reached the third. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to start a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg grouping of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the "Mannerheim Line" and the defeat of the main grouping of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult position. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government with a request for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. March 13 fighting stopped.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the sea area around it were leased by the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership - to secure the northwestern border. However, worsened international position Soviet Union: he was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France escalated, an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.

Losses Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irretrievable losses of the Finnish troops - about 23 thousand people, sanitary - over 43 thousand people.

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On the eve of the World War, both Europe and Asia were already blazing with many local conflicts. International tension was due to the high probability of a new big war, and all the most powerful political players on the world map, before it began, tried to secure favorable starting positions for themselves, while not neglecting any means. The USSR was no exception. In 1939-1940. the Soviet-Finnish war began. The reasons for the inevitable military conflict lay in the same impending threat of a major European war. The USSR, more and more aware of its inevitability, was forced to look for an opportunity to push back state border as far as possible from one of the most strategically important cities - Leningrad. With this in mind, the Soviet leadership entered into negotiations with the Finns, offering their neighbors an exchange of territories. At the same time, the Finns were offered a territory almost twice as large as the USSR planned to receive in return. One of the demands that the Finns did not want to accept in any case was the request of the USSR to deploy military bases in Finland. Even the admonitions of Germany (Helsinki's ally), including Hermann Goering, who hinted to the Finns that Berlin's help could not be counted on, did not force Finland to move away from its positions. Thus, the parties that did not come to a compromise came to the beginning of the conflict.

The course of hostilities

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939. Obviously, the Soviet command was counting on a quick and victorious war with minimal losses. However, the Finns themselves were also not going to surrender to the mercy of their big neighbor. The President of the country is the military Mannerheim, who, by the way, was educated in Russian Empire, planned to delay the Soviet troops with a massive defense for as long as possible, until the start of assistance from Europe. The complete quantitative advantage of the country of the Soviets was obvious both in human resources as well as in equipment. The war for the USSR began with heavy fighting. Its first stage in historiography is usually dated from 11/30/1939 to 02/10/1940 - the time that became the most bloody for the advancing Soviet troops. The line of defense, called the Mannerheim Line, became an insurmountable obstacle for the soldiers of the Red Army. Fortified pillboxes and bunkers, Molotov cocktails, later called "Molotov cocktails", severe frosts, reaching up to 40 degrees - all this is considered to be the main reasons for the failures of the USSR in the Finnish campaign.

Turning point in the war and its end

The second stage of the war begins on February 11, the moment of the general offensive of the Red Army. At that time, a significant amount of manpower and equipment was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. For several days before the attack, the Soviet army carried out artillery preparation, subjecting the entire surrounding area to heavy bombardment.

As a result of the successful preparation of the operation and the further assault, the first line of defense was broken through within three days, and by February 17, the Finns completely switched to the second line. During February 21-28, the second line was also broken. On March 13, the Soviet-Finnish war ended. On this day, the USSR stormed Vyborg. The leaders of Suomi realized that there were no more chances to defend themselves after breaking through the defense, and the Soviet-Finnish war itself was doomed to remain local conflict, without outside support, which Mannerheim counted on so much. Given this, the request for negotiations was the logical end.

The results of the war

As a result of protracted bloody battles, the USSR achieved the satisfaction of all its claims. In particular, the country has become the sole owner of the waters of Lake Ladoga. In total, the Soviet-Finnish war guaranteed the USSR an increase in territory by 40 thousand square meters. km. As for losses, this war cost the country of the Soviets dearly. According to some estimates, about 150 thousand people left their lives in the snows of Finland. Was this company necessary? Given the fact that Leningrad was the target of the German troops almost from the very beginning of the attack, it is worth recognizing that yes. Nevertheless, big losses seriously questioned the combat capability of the Soviet army. By the way, the end of hostilities was not the end of the conflict. Soviet-Finnish war 1941-1944 became a continuation of the epic, during which the Finns, trying to return the lost, again failed.

"Unknown War" - this is the name given to the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. It is mentioned in many history books. However, it does not reflect the real state of affairs: everyone who is at least a little interested in the history of the Soviet Union knows about the hostilities of the USSR and Finland in late 1939 and early 1940.

She tested the communist empire in battles of increased complexity, gave invaluable experience and ultimately led to the expansion of the territory of the Union by annexing parts of Finland, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. An event of this magnitude should be known to everyone.

Rapid start

November 26, 1939 is considered to be the start date of the confrontation, when, according to Soviet media reports, near the village of Mainila, a group of Finnish troops attacked Soviet border guards serving in this region. Despite the fact that the Finnish side tried with all its might to indicate its non-involvement in the episode, events began to develop very rapidly.

Two days later, the Non-Aggression Treaty and the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts between Finland and the Soviet Union of January 21, 1932, was terminated in Moscow without fulfilling the procedure for creating a conciliation commission to investigate the shelling of the village. The offensive was already launched on November 30th.

Background of the military conflict

It is unlikely that the beginning of the conflict can be called "unexpected". The “explosive” year 1939 is a conditional date, because The disagreements between the Soviet Union and Finland have existed for a long time. The main reason for the conflict is invariably called the desire of the leadership of the Union to move the border away from Leningrad because of the hostilities that began in Europe with the participation of Germany, while gaining the opportunity to own the maritime territories of Karelia.

Back in 1938, the Finns were offered an exchange - in return for the part of the Karelian Isthmus that interested the commander-in-chief, it was proposed to take control of the territory of a part of Karelia, twice as large as the "Country of Soviets" would have received.

Finland, despite the rather adequate terms of exchange, did not agree to the demands proposed to it by the Soviet Union. That was the main reason for the conflict. The country's leadership believed that the proposed territory could not be equivalent to the Karelian Isthmus, on which, by the way, a network of fortifications had already been built between Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland (the so-called "Mannerheim Line").

Mannerheim Line 1939

Many myths are generally associated with the Mannerheim Line. One of them says that its dimensions were so huge, and the saturation was so gigantic, that it would have been impossible for any of the armies operating at that time to pass it without serious losses.

Mannerheim line device

In fact, even Carl Gustav Mannerheim himself, the President of Finland, admitted that most of these structures were one-story and single-level, incapable of for a long time resist any army equipped with equipment.

fighting

The course of hostilities was as follows. Mobilization within the country was not announced, and all military operations were carried out either with the participation of regular formations, or with the help of those formed in Leningrad region detachments. Limiting ourselves to numbers, it is briefly worth saying that 425,000 army personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, almost 2,500 aircraft and 2,300 tanks were concentrated on the side of the Red Army. Finland, having carried out a general mobilization, was able to oppose only 265,000 people, 834 guns, 270 aircraft and 64 tanks.

Combat map

The movement of the Red Army, which began on November 30, 1939, gradually slowed down by December 21. The huge army, which had no tactical experience in conditions of wide snow cover, stopped and, having dug in, proceeded to defensive measures. The situation with the snow-covered territories where the equipment got stuck led to the fact that the offensive dragged on for several months.

A separate episode, known to anyone who is interested in the history of the Soviet-Finnish confrontation, was the situation with the 44th and 163rd rifle divisions. In early January 1940, these formations, advancing on Suomussalmi, were surrounded by Finnish troops. Despite the tangible superiority of the Red Army, the Finns, who owned the techniques of rapid landing and camouflage, now and then attacked the flank formations, with small forces achieving superiority over the enemy. As a result, the mistakes of the command and the inept management of the retreat led to the fact that the bulk of the forces of the Soviet military personnel of these divisions were surrounded.

Only by the beginning of February 1940 was it possible to go on the offensive, which lasted until the signing of a peace agreement. By the end of the month, the Red Army reached the last rear fortifications of the Finns near Vyborg, opening a direct road to Helsinki and summing up the fighting.

I have already reported to Moscow about the possibility of occupying the entire territory of the country in a few weeks. The real threat of complete defeat and capture of the country forced the Finns to enter into negotiations with the USSR on a ceasefire. On March 12, 1940, a peace agreement was signed, the next day hostilities were stopped, and the war of 1939-1940 was over.

How did the fighting end?

The Soviet leadership, having lost about 126,000 people, nevertheless received the entire Karelian Isthmus, the cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, as well as a number of islands and peninsulas in the Gulf of Finland. Despite the fact that, from a formal point of view, the war was won, historians agree that this campaign ended in defeat for the USSR. Who won this war? The answer is simple: the Soviet Union. But it was a Pyrrhic victory!

She showed the complete inability of the Red Army to full-scale military operations in the conditions modern war. And she showed it first of all to Hitler.

However, one should not forget that the "small victorious war" turned into certain negative consequences. For the attack on the Finns, the Union was recognized as an aggressor, which led to the expulsion from the League of Nations. In the West, given the expansion of the territory as a result of the victory, a whole anti-Soviet campaign was launched.

Consequences

The significance of the war, which seems lost for the Union, is still difficult to overestimate. She gave the Red Army invaluable experience in combat operations in winter conditions, which later bore fruit in the confrontation with the Third Reich.

The white camouflage uniform of the Finns was adopted by the Red Army, which made it possible to seriously reduce the loss of personnel. In addition, we must not forget that already in the summer of 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, seeing the spread of Germany in Europe, drew a conclusion from the results of the “winter war”, voluntarily joining the USSR. Later, the border of the Union was also changed in the region of Romania - there the troops of the Red Army crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia.

Thus, the Soviet-Finnish war was a serious prerequisite for the unification of many lands under the flag of the USSR. Such historical event invariably gave rise to many theories and conjectures around itself. For example, Marshal of the USSR K.A. Meretskov, who at that time commanded the 7th Army, in his memoirs directly showed that the shelling of the village of Mainila was carried out by Soviet military personnel in order to compromise the leadership of the Scandinavian country and launch an offensive.

History shows that the "Country of the Soviets", acting in conditions heightened danger, nevertheless, managed to turn in its favor both the conflict on the border with the Finns, and the fear of the Baltic countries for their future, emerging victorious in a further, larger battle.

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The official reason for the start of the war is the so-called Mainil incident. On November 26, 1939, the government of the USSR sent a note of protest to the government of Finland about the artillery shelling, which was carried out from Finnish territory. Responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was assigned entirely to Finland.

The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war took place at 8 am on November 30, 1939. The goal of the Soviet Union was to ensure the security of Leningrad. The city was only 30 km from the border. Previously, the Soviet government had asked Finland to move its borders around Leningrad, offering territorial compensation in Karelia. But Finland categorically refused.

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 caused real hysteria among the world community. On December 14, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations with serious violations of procedure (by a minority of votes).

The troops of the Finnish army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities consisted of 130 aircraft, 30 tanks, 250 thousand soldiers. However, the Western powers pledged their support. In many ways, it was this promise that led to the refusal to change the line of the border. By the time the war began, the Red Army had 3,900 aircraft, 6,500 tanks and 1 million soldiers.

The Russian-Finnish war of 1939 is divided by historians into two stages. Initially, it was planned by the Soviet command as a short operation, which was supposed to last about three weeks. But the situation turned out differently.

First period of the war

It lasted from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 (until the Mannerheim Line was broken). The fortifications of the Mannerheim Line were able to stop the Russian army for a long time. The better equipment of the Finnish soldiers and the harsher winter conditions than in Russia also played an important role.

The Finnish command was able to perfectly use the features of the terrain. Pine forests, lakes, swamps slowed down the movement of Russian troops. The supply of ammunition was difficult. Finnish snipers also caused serious problems.

Second period of the war

It lasted from February 11 to March 12, 1940. By the end of 1939, the General Staff developed a new plan of action. Under the leadership of Marshal Timoshenko, the Mannerheim Line was broken through on 11 February. A serious superiority in manpower, aviation, tanks allowed the Soviet troops to move forward, while suffering heavy losses.

The Finnish army experienced a severe shortage of ammunition and people. The Finnish government, which did not receive Western assistance, was forced to conclude a peace treaty on March 12, 1940. Despite the disappointing results of the military campaign for the USSR, a new border was established.

After Finland will enter the war on the side of the Nazis.

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Manpower

By the end of November 1939, Finland concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades.

The land army interacted with and was supported by the Finnish navy and coastal defense forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, to the payroll of the army in 337 thousand people as military force connected:

The paramilitary formations of the Shutskor and "Lotta Svärd" - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of human forces involved in the war from Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

The 150,000-strong Anglo-French Expeditionary Force to help Finland was also preparing and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - the beginning of March 1940, the arrival of which only thwarted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed, possessed everything necessary. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 warships of the Navy.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent her weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand. artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million rounds of ammunition.

90% of the financial aid came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly French and Scandinavian.

B. Fortifications

basis military power Finland was made up of unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its prefloor, main and rear lanes and defense nodes.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bedding) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, channels) of Finland, combined with high-tech engineering structures to create a defense line capable of giving layered fire on the advancing enemy (on different levels and at different angles) along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, blockages, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and floors of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. A forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three lanes of the "Mannerheim Line" there were over 1,000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

The space between the fortifications, as well as the foreground in front of the entire "Mannerheim Line" were literally covered with solid military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer accounted for: 0.5 km of wire fences, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete gouges. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, all roads for damage. On possible ways movements of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were arranged - funnels 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 minutes were set for each linear kilometer. Forest blockages reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish War Plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the approach military aid from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the line of the White Sea - Lake Onega.

E. Directions of hostilities and the command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north of it, to the north west coast Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Kyakisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later he was replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the active army of Finland.

Chief of Staff of the Headquarters - Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is General of the Swedish Army Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In the fighting on the entire 1500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, at the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

Headcount ground forces: 916 thousand people. They include: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal and engineering troops.

The ground forces were supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million people of the Red Army personnel took part in the Soviet-Finnish war and Navy, and taking into account the necessary replenishment during the war to replace the dead and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyer destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three boats of the "D" type, seven boats of the "Shch" type, six boats of the "M" type). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) North and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

Commander of the 7th Army - Commander of the 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in terms of the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and the defense in depth of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not enough not only to break through them, but even to destroy the deep and extremely difficult fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield during the fighting.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they did not manage to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally intended, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor hindering the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely severe winter of 1939/40, with its frosts down to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in waging war in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army.

The course of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. fighting until the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. combat operations to break through the "Mannerheim Line" itself.

In the first period, the most successful was the advance in the north and in Karelia.

1. The troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

2. Troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses in North and Central Karelia, i.e. slightly, but still went beyond the state border. Further progress could not be ensured due to complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and total absence settlements in this part of Finland.

3. The troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia went deep into the enemy’s territory up to 80 km, but were also forced to suspend the offensive, since some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well acquainted with the area.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of hostilities:

5. Waging heavy battles, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the Mannerheim Line, which happened on different areas offensive from 2 to 12 December. During the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terioki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet took possession of the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, Soomeri.

In early December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and exit to the rear of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications.

Despite the crossing of the river and heavy losses in the battles on December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the "Mannerheim Line" on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army had reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to the huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended on virtually the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided on a radical restructuring of military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy's defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the "Mannerheim Line", which consisted of a group of commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of command and control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from the control of the Leningrad Military District and passed directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the High Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (date of formation: January 7, 1940).

Front commander: commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko.

Chief of Staff of the Front: Commander of the 2nd rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov (since December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Commander V.D. Grendal (since March 2, 1940 - commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev (since February 12, 1940).

8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and reinforced:

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 RGK artillery regiments, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 RGK artillery regiments, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period was the active preparation by the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the "Mannerheim Line", as well as the preparation by the command of the troops better conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the foreground, covertly clear mines for the foreground, make numerous passes in the rubble and wire fences before attacking directly the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line itself. Within a month, the Mannerheim Line system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began by methodical daily artillery fire.

Only on the 43-kilometer sector, the 7th Army daily fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy.

The destruction of the front line and the depth of the enemy's defense was also caused by aviation. During the preparation for the assault, the bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and the fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (Budyonnovka, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflaps, sheepskin coats, felt boots. The front received 2,500 mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, the troops worked out new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for undermining pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft.

11. The front troops were tasked with breaking through the "Mannerheim Line", defeating the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reaching the Kexholm - Antrea - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began with a powerful two-hour artillery preparation at 8.00, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy defenses by the end of the day in a decisive sector and by February 14 wedged into the depth of the line by 7 km, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions 123 sd. (lieutenant colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire "Mannerheim Line". To develop success in the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command pulled up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important knot of fortifications. But as a result of 3-day battles and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karhulsky knot of resistance, while the neighboring Khottinensky knot had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanjärvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army went on the offensive, the tanks of which approached the Muola-Ilves node.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, inner line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that one more such breakthrough - and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant-General H.V. Esterman was suspended. On February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. was appointed to his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd army corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the enemy's rear, inner defense line, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command expected that, stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had unique system flooding the foredfield for 30 km, Finland will be able to drag out the war for at least a month and a half, which will enable England and France to deliver a 150,000-strong expeditionary force to Finland. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. Troop Commander Vyborgsky district was appointed Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieutenant General K.L. Ash, which testified to the confidence of the Finnish command in their forces and the seriousness of their intentions to hold back a long siege of the fortified city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army advanced on Kexholm and st. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The offensive of the Soviet troops began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, the Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a northeasterly direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 23:00, and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At that time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, all hoping that Western assistance would be in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position made it necessary to wage war until the last minute and led to huge losses, both on the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Side losses*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter
What was in the fortieth year
Killed in Finland on the ice.

Lying somehow clumsily
Childishly small body.
Frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew off.
It seemed that the boy was not lying,
And still running
Yes, the ice held the floor ...

In the midst of a great war cruel,
From what - I will not apply my mind -
I feel sorry for that distant fate,
As if dead, alone
Like I'm lying
Frozen, small, dead,
In that war, not famous,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of those killed - 65,384 people.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss in the troops during the period of hostilities - 391.8 thousand people. or, rounded, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish "Blue and White Book" of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war is 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.е. 20%, while Soviet losses are 40% of those involved in operations, or, in other words, 2 times higher in percentage terms.

Note:

* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and losses from 1990 to 1995. reduction of Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryaga, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Apothecary in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while the data of the Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

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Winter war 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ros. acad. Sciences, Inst. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history/ Rev. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehvilyainen. - 381s.

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Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: by doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541s. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Names. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [per. from English. V. D. Kaidalova]. - M. : Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa : talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla:, 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: S. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Used materials from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Used materials from the book: Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999