In September, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation published a progress report on the implementation of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs for short). Information designed to shed light on efforts to end extreme poverty and reduce premature mortality should also act as a stimulus. The nations of the world can—and should—do more to solve problems global development facing the entire planet. This is the conclusion of this report.

The report does not single out any country for its potential to renew the world's "commitment to development." On the contrary, “leaders of all countries” have a responsibility to ensure that the SDG agenda is met by 2030. But we believe that there is one country that can do more than others to build the world described in the SDGs. This country is China.

Two years after the launch of the SDG program, the case international development turned out to be at a crossroads. The United States, which has long acted as the standard-bearer for foreign aid, is winding down its participation, as is Europe (albeit to a lesser extent). Meanwhile, China, which has recently formulated its global ambitions, has a chance to revive the concept and process of providing humanitarian development assistance.

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SDGs endorsed General Assembly The United Nations in 2015 outlined a global development vision that aims to end poverty, improve education and health, reduce inequalities, build resilience and mitigate climate change over the next 15 years. This is a broad approach to the topic of development, according to which problems, once considered specific to each country, are treated as challenges to which the whole world must respond collectively. The UN Millennium Development Goals program, which ended in 2015, was, on the contrary, formulated more narrowly, its primary task was to solve problems in poor countries.

The Gates Foundation study suggests that the achievement of some of the goals of the SDG program is in jeopardy. For example, the health goals (SDG3), including the elimination of preventable deaths in newborns and children, are unlikely to be achieved within the stipulated time frame. At current rates, the target reduction in mortality in countries of South Asia and Africa will not be reached until the middle of this century.

Clearly, more global investment is needed in various forms assistance that has already proven effective on the ground. The Auxiliary Health Workers program in Ethiopia and the Health Care Assistants program in Malawi have helped reduce child mortality. Aid dollars should be used to expand similar programs to other regions.

But the opposite is happening. The growing isolationism that accompanies the populist backlash around the world has led to serious negative consequences for foreign aid programs. According to the OECD, in 2016 the volume of bilateral aid to the least developed countries of the world decreased by almost 4%. For these countries, this drop is a wake-up call because more than two-thirds of the foreign aid they receive comes from official development assistance programs (ODA for short).

The US continues to be the world's largest donor of nutrition programs and maternal and child health initiatives, but the country has led the way in reducing funding. The 2017 Budget Proposal presented by President Donald Trump calls for a blatant 45% cut in US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding for water and sanitation projects, global funding health care by 26%, as well as the cessation of funding for family planning programs. It is not known whether Congress will support Trump's budget proposal, which provides for billions of dollars in aid cuts, but even a small reduction in US foreign aid spending will hurt many of the world's poorest people.

The United States is not alone in curtailing aid to foreign countries. The European Union's 2018 budget proposal calls for €90 million ($106 million) in development spending cuts, with Austria, Germany and Italy allocating their international development aid budgets to the migrant crisis, seen as an imminent threat. national security. These are all worrisome trends because private philanthropy is unable to make up for government cuts in aid.

The world needs a new champion of international development programs, and China must take on this role. With traditional donors waning in their willingness to provide aid, China has a chance to become a leader in spending on human development, poverty alleviation and better healthcare.

Multimedia

RIA Novosti 03.10.2017

The Chinese model of aid to foreign countries is indeed different from the Western one. Europe and the US have historically focused on funding medical and educational initiatives while stimulating the growth and activism of civil society. China, for its part, provides assistance on a bilateral basis and usually directs resources to infrastructure projects. Recently, however, the Chinese leadership has also begun to show interest in providing assistance to strengthen civil society and improve the quality of life.

While China's official aid is still small compared to what OECD countries are spending, the country is signaling its interest in becoming a development leader, especially in health care. At the UN Sustainable Development Summit in 2015, China pledged $2 billion to implement the SDG program, and the proposed strategy of China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative includes cooperation in the medical field. In 2014, China pledged $47 million to help end the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. This amount was significantly less than the $1.8 billion promised by America, but China was one of the first to fulfill its financial obligations.

Geopolitical and economic impact China is growing, and its role in promoting international peace and development. There is no doubt that China's development intentions will be skeptical, as there are political and ideological differences between China and the West. However, such skepticism may be useful if, in particular, it forces the Western powers to reconsider their policy of reducing the amount of assistance to foreign countries.

But even if that doesn't happen, China already has the tools to become a leader in international development. And because China lifted some 470 million of its own citizens out of extreme poverty between 1990 and 2005, it also has experience. But most importantly, China now has a political chance. The United States and Europe are beginning to withdraw into themselves, so the successful achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals will increasingly depend on encouraging Chinese leadership - and gradually getting used to it.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

History

Foreign aid to China during the war with Japan

(1937-1945)

© 2015 B. Gorbachev

The author characterizes the importance of assistance to China from the USSR and the USA in the war against Japan in 1937-1945. The forms of Soviet military assistance in the struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese aggressors are revealed. different stages World War II, US military supplies to China under Lend-Lease are analyzed.

Key words: military aid, China, war with Japan 1937-45, USSR, USA, lend-lease.

(Ending. Beginning at No. 3, 2015)

American Lend-Lease Aid to China

After the start of the war with Japan in 1937, the Kuomintang government received military-technical assistance not only from the Soviet Union and a number of European countries, but also purchased military equipment from the United States. Initially, American deliveries were very small, but increased after the Chinese representative Chen Guangfu1 was sent to the United States in August 1938, where he registered the "World Trade Company" (Universal Trading Corporation). However, at that time, there were restrictions in American law on the supply of weapons abroad in connection with the law on neutrality. Therefore, China could only acquire so-called non-lethal weapons from the United States.

According to the American archives, by the end of 1939, the Universal Trading Corporation purchased various products in the United States for a total of $ 74.67 million, including: cars, spare parts and repair equipment for $ 16.74 million; gasoline and lubricants for 11.45 million; ferrous and non-ferrous metals by 24.68 million; radio and telephone communications by 5.6 million; surgical instruments and others medical devices by 3.6 million; khaki material and woolen blankets at 3.44 million; universal equipment for 2.15 million; railway property for 4 million; equipment for the extraction of tin ore for 3 mln.

Gorbachev Boris Nikolaevich, doctor historical sciences, full member of the Academy of Military Sciences. Email: [email protected].

In the USA, some military equipment, but neither in quantity nor in its type could it satisfy the needs of China. Thus, according to the data of the Burmese customs (the supply was then carried out through Burma), in the period from October 28 to December 31, 1939, the cost of weapons received from different countries in China amounted to $ 8.35 million. At the same time, $ 5.41 million accounted for Soviet deliveries (artillery guns, machine guns, rifles and ammunition), which accounted for 64.87% of the total. Purchases from Belgium, Great Britain, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and France ( anti-aircraft guns, rifles, explosives, ammunition) amounted to $1.7 million, i.e. 20.39%, and purchases from the USA (pistols, fuses, cartridges, aircraft parts and ammunition) amounted to only 1.23 million dollars, i.e. only 14.74%. This statistic says

The fact that US military assistance to China at that time occupied a modest place in the total amount of foreign aid to that country.

With the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe in September 1939, great changes took place in the American policy of exporting arms abroad. In November 1939, the U.S. Neutrality Act was amended to allow the sale of weapons abroad for cash, with the purchaser self-transporting them. In June 1940, Chiang Kai-shek sent his representative Sun Tzu-wen to the United States in order to expand the supply of weapons to China. He brought with him a list of military equipment in the amount of $ 70 million. It was the largest bid, including a list of weapons from small arms to combat aircraft. In addition, Sun Ziwen asked the United States for a loan to the stabilization fund in the amount of $50 million to support

exchange of Chinese currency.

The US government responded actively to China's requests for help. On October 22, 1940, a $25 million loan agreement was signed between the United States and China for the supply of tungsten. A month later, the Americans provided a loan in the amount of $50 million for the supply of metals to stabilize the Chinese currency. Although these loans could not directly buy weapons from the US, with cash dollars, the Chinese had considerable freedom in buying weapons.

Prior to the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, China acquired military materials on the basis of export-import loans, which in two years received from America for a total of $ 120 million. They were urgently needed by the warring China, but not enough to meet all military needs. After the Americans recognized on May 6, 1941, that the defense of China was vital to the security of the United States, a program of supplying weapons to China through Lend-Lease began. During this time, Sun Ziwen set up China Defense Supply as the official agency of the government. Republic of China under the Lend-Lease program4.

1 thousand aircraft and other materiel to create modern Air Force; weapons and materiel for 30 divisions; various means of transport to ensure communications, primarily through Burma and India.

This was the first application since the adoption of the Lend-Lease Act, and the Americans gradually granted China's requests. First of all, from April 28, 1941, the United States began to provide assistance for the establishment of transport communications in the amount of 45.1 million dollars. This direction of assistance was the main one for a whole year. In May 1941, America approved $49.34 million in munitions. This was a fraction of the $129.59 million requested in Sun Ziwen's bid. The issue of aircraft deliveries was more difficult to resolve. Initially, Sun Ziwen expected to receive 700 fighters and 300 bombers. However, during the negotiations it became clear that the American side could not provide such supplies, therefore total requested aircraft was reduced to 350 fighters and 150 bombers. However, this number of aircraft was not delivered. In July 1941 the command american army and fleet

agreed to supply the Chinese side with 435 aircraft. 110 of them were taken from deliveries to the British side, which agreed to cede them to the Chinese.

The key figure in coordinating American policy in China was General J. Stilwell6, who had previously served as the military attaché in China and knew Chinese and country specifics.

Stilwell arrived in Chongqing on March 6, 1942, serving as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces on the Sino-Burmese-Indian front. At the same time, he served as chief of staff of the Kuomintang army and deputy commander of the allied forces in the southeastern theater of operations. Stilwell was to ensure that Lend-Lease military aid was used for its intended purpose in the fight against Japan. On the eve of Stilwell's arrival in February 1942, the US government provided the Chinese national government with a loan of $500 million. (Before that time, China had already received four loans totaling $120 million, including $25 million in 1939; in 1940 - 20 and 25 million dollars, in 1941 - 50 million dollars9). But the American general, in addition to controlling the spending of military aid, had to lead such a course in the Pacific War that, along with the defeat of Japan, weaken the positions of his rivals in the Far East, including England. Under these conditions, America's relations with China were determined not so much by an alliance in the war with Japan, but by the desire to consolidate US hegemony in East Asia.

A serious obstacle stood in the way of the implementation of the Lend-Lease program - great difficulties in transportation. At first, it was carried out through Burma, which was extremely difficult and dangerous. After the Japanese occupation of Rangoon in Burma, a significant amount of American cargo destined for China was seized. Subsequently, US military aid to China began to be delivered via complex routes through India. At the same time, due to the difficulties of delivery in Indian ports and bases, a significant amount of cargo accumulated. As E. Stettinius10 admits, the Chinese, isolated from the outside world by mountains and territory captured by the Japanese, have been waging a hard war for several years, receiving meager outside help. They were very poorly armed compared to the Japanese troops, and the American plans to arm China were only partially realized through India, but the US was unable to organize direct supplies to China.

In these conditions great importance had the delivery of American aid by air - essentially the only way to transport American and British military materials to China. However, its use was hampered by an insufficient number of transport aircraft. So, at the beginning of 1942, the United States had a little more than 300 transport vehicles, since before that the American aviation industry had focused on the production of bombers and fighters. By the end of 1943, the results of increasing the number of transport aviation, which ensured an increase in the volume of deliveries.

The United States helped China establish the Camel's Hump Airway, linking Kunming (Yunnan Province) with Assam in Northeast India.

American assistance in creating a combat-ready Chinese air force began in the late 1930s, when Reservist Colonel Claire Lee Chennault (Claire Lee Chennault) in voluntary became a technical adviser in Chinese aviation. He trained a lot of Chinese pilots to fly planes. american models 1930s, old German and a considerable number of Soviet aircraft. In the spring of 1941, K. Chennault managed to find more than 100 veteran pilots and 150 ground personnel. Volunteers signed contracts under which they were supposed to cash reward- 600-750 dollars per month for pilots and about 300 dollars for technical personnel. At the same time, the Chinese government agreed to pay for every Japanese aircraft shot down or destroyed on the ground11.

SOKOLOV VLADIMIR VASILIEVICH - 2010

YURI MAKARTSEV'S NOVEL "ITURUP"

GRINYUK V. - 2013

NAVAL LAND LENSES FOR THE USSR DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

KOMARKOV ALEXANDER YURIEVICH - 2015

Our Primorsky Territory and Manchuria are often mentioned together and are located side by side, as is the border between northeastern China and Russia, that is, the Far East and China are located side by side, and, speaking of the Far East, it is necessary to explain our policy towards China in thirties of the twentieth century. The USSR pursued a policy towards China that developed and strengthened our friendship.

Great China still remembers our help at the most dangerous time for the independence of the country.

In 1931, militaristic Japan occupied Manchuria. In 1937, Japan launched a war to take over all of China.

The Soviet Union provided assistance to China in the fight against the Japanese invaders. In two years, the USSR supplied China with 985 aircraft, 82 tanks, more than 1,300 artillery pieces, over 14,000 machine guns, as well as ammunition, equipment and supplies, oil products and medicines. Transportation was carried out by 5200 Soviet trucks ZIS-2. An airline was created for transportation by air.

The aviation of Japan dominated the skies of China and did whatever it wanted, bringing destruction and death to the Chinese people on its wings. With the arrival of Soviet volunteer pilots in China in 1937, the lawlessness perpetrated by Japanese aviation was put to an end.

Our fighter and bomber aircraft operated very effectively in China. From our fighters, Japanese aviation carried big losses. Our bombers bombed Japanese air bases, destroying dozens of Japanese aircraft on the ground, railway stations, military echelons, bridges, crossings.

I will give just one example - on February 23, 1938, 28 Soviet SB aircraft under the command of Captain Polynin even raided the very remote island of Taiwan, destroying more than 40 enemy aircraft. 280 bombs were dropped on the Japanese air base. The Japanese were shocked, as they considered themselves on the island inaccessible to Soviet aviation.

In addition to volunteer pilots, there were 80 Soviet military specialists in the Chinese army. In Wuhan, where the fiercest air battles took place, a monument was erected to Soviet pilots with the inscription: "Eternal glory to the Soviet volunteer pilots who died in the war of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders." The inscriptions are made in Chinese and Russian.

In the thirties, more than three and a half thousand Soviet volunteers passed through China. According to official figures, 211 people died from them.
It is not known how the fate of Russia would have developed if the USSR had not helped China in 1937-1940. In China, Japan, and England, and the USA, and Germany could establish their dominance. Any of these countries, having a colony with a huge population, would be able to organize an invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union and destroy our people. And at that time, as in all times, Japan, and England, and the USA, and Germany sought to destroy our people. The deeply thought-out policy of the USSR, JV Stalin did not allow the Western countries, together with Japan, to seize all of China.

The moral and political support, as well as military and economic assistance provided by the Soviet state to the people of China, continued throughout their struggle for freedom and national independence . In 1911-1913. In China, a bourgeois-democratic revolution took place, as a result of which the Qing imperial dynasty was overthrown. Nevertheless, the feudal system and colonial dependence of the country on the imperialist powers, its fragmentation remained the same. Under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917, a new revolutionary upsurge began in China. A revolutionary-democratic government headed by Sun Yat-sen was established in the south of the country, and established contact with Soviet Russia. At his request, the USSR sent political and military advisers to China, provided weapons, assisted in the formation and training of the People's Revolutionary Army (NRA), as well as in directing its military operations against militaristic groups, and later against the Japanese invaders. In 1923, the first group of advisers left Moscow for the south of China. At the same time, the government of the USSR allocated the necessary funds in the amount of 2 million dollars. From 1924 to 1927, up to 135 Soviet military advisers worked in China. They represented various types of troops. Among them were such well-known military leaders as V. K. Blyukher, A. I. Cherepanov. Help from the USSR came to China with weapons, ammunition, military equipment, medicines, although at that time our country itself was in dire need of many things. The difficult international situation and the threat of aggression forced the Soviet government to spend significant funds on defense needs. In the early 1930s, after seizing the northeastern provinces of China, Japan began to turn the occupied territory into a springboard for advancing into northern China and attacking the Soviet Union. On the initiative of the Chinese Communist Party, which entered into cooperation with the Kuomintang in power, a united anti-Japanese front was created. Several liberated regions were formed, where significant forces of the Chinese Red Army were concentrated. But under the circumstances, China was under the threat of occupation by Japanese troops. Only prompt and comprehensive Soviet assistance could prevent aggression and ensure an independent state existence for China. In total, on the basis of agreements, China was supplied from the USSR: aircraft, tanks, machine guns, etc. The first mechanized division in the history of the Chinese army was created on the basis of Soviet technology. They did a lot to organize and train gun crews, and artillery officers and infantry officers - the basics of combat interaction. They took a direct part in the hostilities.

The merit of Soviet volunteer pilots is great in repelling Japanese aggression. In connection with the supply of aircraft from the USSR, they became instructors and teachers in Chinese aviation schools and courses, and actively participated in hostilities. All this greatly strengthened China's military aviation.

The prospects for the development of the Second World War, which began on September 1, 1939 with the German attack on Poland, were unclear. Japan saw fit to refrain from entering the war on the side of its allies. On September 13, an official government document entitled "Fundamentals of State Policy" was published, which stated: "The basis of policy is the settlement of the China incident. In foreign policy, it is necessary, firmly taking an independent position, to act in accordance with the complex international situation ... Inside the country, focus on completing military preparations and mobilizing the entire power of the state for war.

The purpose of the policy of temporary non-intervention was to wait for the first serious results of the outbreak of the world war, and then, having drawn conclusions about its prospects, to begin to implement their own strategic plans.

Although the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was first seen in Tokyo as a blow to Japanese plans for a joint action against the USSR with Germany, the Japanese military-political leadership did not leave hope that sooner or later the Soviet Union would be involved in a war in Europe. In preparation for such a development, Japanese strategists, both military and political, considered it necessary to “limit military operations in China as much as possible, reduce the number of troops stationed there, mobilize budgetary and material resources, and expand preparations for war against the USSR.”

In December 1939, the "Revised plan for building up power" was adopted. ground forces". In order to release the forces necessary for a future war against the USSR, it was planned, if necessary, to sharply reduce the number of Japanese troops in China (from 850 thousand to 500 thousand). At the same time, it was decided to increase the number of divisions of the ground forces to 65, air squadrons to 160, and to increase the number of armored units. 20 divisions were to operate on the Chinese front, the rest were to be deployed mainly in Manchuria.

The deadline for completing the training was determined - mid-1941.

To ensure favorable international conditions for the implementation of this program, it was decided to take diplomatic steps designed to give the impression of normalizing Japanese-Soviet relations. Increasingly, the opinion began to be expressed about the expediency of concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR, similar to the Soviet-German one. At the same time, the Japanese leadership, convinced during the Khasan and Khalkhingol events in the desire of the USSR to avoid involvement in the war with Japan, was not afraid of a Soviet attack. The goal was set to try, in exchange for a non-aggression pact, first of all to achieve an end to Soviet aid China. In the document of the Japanese government agreed on December 28, 1939, “Basic Principles of the Political Course towards Foreign States,” regarding the Soviet Union, it was said: “A necessary precondition for concluding a non-aggression pact should be official recognition Cessation of Soviet Aid to China.

The Japanese and Germany encouraged the conclusion of the non-aggression pact. At the same time, the German leaders were ready to act as an intermediary between the USSR and Japan. During the Soviet-German negotiations on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, V.M. Molotov raised the question of whether Germany was ready to influence Japan in order to improve Soviet-Japanese relations and resolve border conflicts. At a meeting with I.V. Stalin, German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop assured him that German-Japanese relations "have no anti-Russian basis, and Germany, of course, will make a valuable contribution to resolving problems in the Far East." Stalin warned his interlocutor: “We want better relations with Japan. However, there is a limit to our patience with Japanese provocations. If Japan wants war, she will get it. The Soviet Union is not afraid of this. He is ready for such a war. But, if Japan wants peace, that would be good. We will consider how Germany could help normalize Soviet-Japanese relations. However, we would not want Japan to get the impression that this is an initiative of the Soviet side.

The discussion of this issue was continued after the truce in the battles at Khalkhin Gol was reached during Ribbentrop's conversation with Stalin and Molotov in Moscow on September 28, 1939. From the German recording of the conversation:

“... Mr. Minister (Ribbentrop) suggested to Stalin that after the end of the negotiations, a joint statement by Molotov and the German Imperial Foreign Minister should be published, which would indicate the signed agreements and at the end contain some kind of gesture towards Japan in favor of a compromise between Soviet Union and Japan. The Minister justified his proposal by referring to a recent the German ambassador a telegram to Tokyo stating that certain, mainly military, circles in Japan would like a compromise with the Soviet Union. In this they encounter resistance from certain court, economic and political circles and need our support in their aspirations.

Mr. Stalin replied that he fully approved of Mr. Minister's intentions, but considered the path he proposed unsuitable for the following reasons: Prime Minister Abe had so far shown no desire to reach a compromise between the Soviet Union and Japan. Every step of the Soviet Union in this direction is interpreted by the Japanese side as a sign of weakness and begging. He would ask the Reich Foreign Minister not to be offended by him if he said that he, Stalin, knew Asians better than Herr von Ribbentrop. These people have a special mentality, they can only be acted upon by force. In the days of August, about the time of Herr Ribbentrop's first visit to Moscow, the Japanese ambassador to Togo came running and asked for a truce. At the same time, the Japanese on the Mongolian border launched an attack on Soviet territory with two hundred aircraft, which was repulsed with huge losses for the Japanese and failed. Following this, the Soviet government, without reporting anything in the newspapers, took action during which a group of Japanese troops was surrounded, and almost 25 thousand people were killed. Only after that did the Japanese conclude a truce with the Soviet Union. Now they are engaged in digging up the bodies of the dead and transporting them to Japan. After they had already taken out five thousand corpses, they realized that they had gone too far and, it seems, abandoned their plan.

It is clear from these statements by Stalin that he was ready to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Japanese and was interested in such an agreement, but was waiting for the Japanese government to ask for it. Realizing this, the German leadership continued to work with the Japanese in this direction. However, Germany was by no means disinterested in this.

The temporary normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations for the period of the war with the Western powers was beneficial to Germany. In this case, it was easier to induce Japan to act against Great Britain in the Far East. According to Hitler's calculations, a Japanese attack on the Far Eastern possessions of England could neutralize the latter. “Caught in a difficult situation in Western Europe, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East, Great Britain will not fight,” he said. At meetings with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, H. Oshima, Ribbentrop said: “I think the best policy for us would be to conclude a Japanese-German-Soviet non-aggression pact and then oppose Great Britain. If this succeeds, Japan will be able to freely spread its power in East Asia, move in a southerly direction, where its vital interests are. Oshima enthusiastically supported such a policy.

However, the Japanese government continued to hesitate, fearing, not unreasonably, that the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact would complicate Japan's relations with the Western powers. At the same time, Tokyo understood the significance of Germany's mediation in settling Japanese-Soviet relations. A Japanese newspaper wrote: "If necessary, Japan will conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR and will be able to move south without feeling constrained by other states." At the same time, it was also taken into account that such a pact gave Japan a gain in time for thorough preparations for a war against the USSR. In September 1939, F. Konoe told the German ambassador in Tokyo Ott: "Japan will need another two years to reach the level of technology, weapons and mechanization, which the Red Army showed in the battles in the Nomonhan (Khalkin-Gol) region."

In order to demonstrate its intention to normalize relations with the USSR, the Japanese government considered it expedient to first start negotiations on concluding a trade agreement between the two states.

The prospect of a Soviet-Japanese settlement lessened the hopes of the Western powers that Japan would clash with the Soviet Union. In December 1939, the US government tried to obtain official confirmation from the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the non-aggression pact was not included in the Japanese program of negotiations with the USSR. In order to appease the Western powers and induce them to make concessions to Japan in China, the Japanese government joined the anti-Soviet campaign launched in the USA, Great Britain and France in connection with the Soviet-Finnish conflict.

Normalization, even temporary, did not suit not only the Western powers, but also the Kuomintang leadership of China, headed by Chiang Kai-shek. The secret plans and veiled actions aimed at aggravating Soviet-Japanese relations and unleashing a war between them were frankly expressed by the commander of the 5th military region of China, General Li Zongzhen, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador to China A.S. Panyushkin. On October 12, 1939, he said: “The war in the West is beneficial for the USSR ... Germany, England and France will get stuck in the war. They will have no time for the USSR ... England can push Japan to war with the USSR from the East ... If there is a war in the West, then, without worrying about its western borders, the USSR can deliver a decisive blow to Japan. This will entail the liberation of oppressed Korea and give China the opportunity to regain the lost territories. Under the condition of a war in the West, England will welcome a war between the USSR and Japan, since in this case England will not worry that India and Australia will be captured by Japan. The general stated that this view was "supported by many members of the government, including Chiang Kai-shek."

In order to prevent the settlement of Soviet-Japanese relations, the Chinese government at the end of 1939 - beginning of 1940 put before Stalin and Molotov the question of the soonest conclusion of a military alliance between the USSR and China, according to which the USSR would undertake to increase assistance to China. At the same time, the Chinese tried to interest the Soviet government in the possibility of obtaining Chinese territories for Soviet military bases on the Liaodong and Shandong Peninsulas after the war. The prospect of worsening relations with Japan because of China did not suit Stalin, whose main goal was to avoid involvement in the war, whether in the West or in the East. The task of the Soviet leadership was to win time, to provide the country with the longest period of peace in order to have time to prepare to repel aggression, the inevitability of which the Kremlin was aware of.

The success of what then seemed to be a diplomatic maneuver in the German direction gave Stalin hope that something similar could be done in relations with Japan. However, in Japan big influence maintained by supporters of an irreconcilable policy towards the USSR, who opposed the idea of ​​a non-aggression pact, stating that it "undermines the ideological foundations of Japan" . On January 16, 1940, Japanese Foreign Minister H. Arita stated: “The complete settlement of border problems will be tantamount to a non-aggression pact. The conclusion of such a pact is a matter of the distant future and not very useful. Assurances about the desire to regulate relations with the USSR did not mean that the militaristic circles of Japan really abandoned their aggressive plans. Therefore, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (March-April 1940), a warning was issued: “Japan must finally understand that the Soviet Union will in no case allow violation of its interests. Only with such an understanding of Soviet-Japanese relations can they develop satisfactorily.

The position of Japan in relation to the USSR changes only after the defeat of France in May-June 1940 and the defeat of the British army near Dunkirk. The Japanese ruling circles did not want to miss the moment favorable for the seizure of the Asian colonies by the Western powers. For the sake of this, it was necessary to secure their rear by taking measures to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations. By this time, the Soviet leadership was ready to accept such a settlement. During a conversation with the Japanese ambassador to the USSR S. Togo on June 1, 1940, Molotov declared that he was ready "to talk not only about minor issues, taking into account the changes that are taking place in the international situation and that may occur in the future."

Molotov developed this idea more extensively in front of Togo a week after the agreement in principle between the parties was reached on the Agreement between the USSR and Japan on the clarification of the border.

"Tov. Molotov expresses the hope that this agreement will be a prerequisite for resolving other issues of interest to Japan and the USSR, including larger ones.

In response, Togo states that it also hopes that negotiations on the fishing question and on a trade treaty can now be continued with success. “Besides,” adds Togo, “we could simultaneously start discussing the fundamental issues of interest to both sides. I hope for success in resolving other issues as well.”

Tov. Molotov declares that he also expresses the hope that Japan and the USSR can and should come to an agreement, including on fundamental issues.

In response, Togo says that he personally thinks that there are no issues between the USSR and Japan that could not be resolved, especially if there is an understanding of each other. “I am pleased with the statement of comrade. Molotov,” continues Togo, “and for my part I also hope that both sides will agree on all issues.”

It is obvious that both Molotov and Togo meant the non-aggression pact by the expression they used "fundamental issues". However, neither side wanted to be the first to utter these words directly. As for Molotov, he certainly acted in agreement with Stalin and received his approval for an attempt to sound out the Japanese ambassador's position on the possibility of concluding a political agreement between the two states. The situation was different for Ambassador Togo, who was aware that in Tokyo, as noted above, there were conflicting views regarding such a treaty.

Here is what Togo wrote about this in his memoirs:

“Since the United States' cancellation of the Commerce and Navigation Treaty was clearly intended to put pressure on Japan, her hopes for a modus vivendi without a fundamental change in China policy were completely futile. At that moment it occurred to me that Japan had no choice but to conclude a pact with Russia and a peaceful settlement with the Chongqing regime on moderate and rational terms to strengthen its position. I expressed my views in a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As regards the methodology for reaching agreements with the USSR, I recommended that the ministry formulate a policy oriented towards the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and trade agreement…

After the signing of a truce in the Nomonkhansky region in September of the previous year, Moscow's attitude towards Japan became friendly, and various problems were resolved in an atmosphere of exceptional cordiality. Therefore, the negotiations on the conclusion of a trade agreement moved extremely smoothly.

In connection with the second question, namely the non-aggression pact, the instruction of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided that this document should be signed in the form of a neutrality pact, and it was on the basis of this instruction that I began negotiations with Molotov.

On June 17, Molotov told Togo that he hoped that, in parallel with the fishing and trade issues, negotiations would be conducted on other fundamental issues. It was almost direct offer start negotiating a non-aggression pact. And such negotiations began on July 2, 1940.

The Kremlin understood that the very fact of such negotiations could create considerable difficulties for the USSR in relations with other states, primarily with China, whose leadership was very vigilantly watching for signs of the emerging political rapprochement between the USSR and Japan. Therefore, all documents relating to negotiations with Togo on a non-aggression pact or neutrality were assigned the top secrecy stamp - “special folder”. Documents with such a stamp were intended only for the highest Soviet party and government officials.

On July 2, 1940, the first conversation between Molotov and the ambassador of Togo took place, at which the parties began to discuss specific issues related to the draft of the future agreement.

Below is a recording of this conversation made by the Soviet side:

"Togo. ... Over the past 2-3 years, even in such periods when relations between the USSR and Japan were at their worst, we managed to resolve various issues without resorting to war. Therefore, Togo thinks that all issues can be settled peacefully. Of course, in some part of the world there are elements that want a clash between the USSR and Japan in their own interests, but we do not allow such stupidity and do not want to satisfy the wishes of these countries about a clash between the USSR and Japan ... On the other hand, in connection with the outbreak of war in Europe the general situation worsened. Japan, like the USSR, is trying not to be drawn into the orbit of the war, that is, it adheres to a policy of strict non-intervention in the war. However, if, despite Japan's peaceful aspirations, she is attacked by third powers, then she will be forced to take measures against this attack.

Japan, which is in the neighborhood of the USSR, wishes to maintain peaceful, friendly relations with the latter and to mutually respect territorial integrity. If, however, one of the countries, in spite of a peaceful course of action, is attacked by third powers, then in this case the other side should not help the attacking country. If relations of this kind are established, relations between the USSR and Japan will be stabilized and cannot be shaken by anything. If the Soviet government is of the same opinion, says Togo, then he would like to make a concrete proposal next ...

Molotov. ... The general idea of ​​stabilizing relations between both countries is correct, and he can only join in this.

Further Comrade. Molotov asks to clarify the words: "do not attack" or "do not help one of the attacking countries." The general idea contained in Togo's statements about not helping the attacking side and not attacking is correct. All conscious people, both in our country and in Japan, cannot but agree with this.

Togo sets out the content of the draft of the Japanese side. At the same time, he stipulates that the spirit of the project was agreed with the Japanese government, and the text was compiled by him, and he asks the people's commissar to keep this in mind.

1. Both contracting parties confirm that the Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations between Japan and the USSR, signed on January 20, 1925 in Beijing, remains the basis of relations between both countries.

2. Both contracting parties must maintain peaceful and friendly relations and respect mutual territorial integrity.

If one of the contracting parties, in spite of a peaceful course of action, is attacked by a third power or several other powers, then the other contracting party will remain neutral in the continuation of the entire conflict.

Article III

This agreement is concluded for five years.

Togo noted that the draft was drawn up as a copy of the neutrality agreement concluded in 1926 between the USSR and Germany.

Togo. If Japan and the USSR enter into friendly relations and an agreement on neutrality is concluded between them, then Japan wants the Soviet side to voluntarily refuse to provide assistance to the Chungking government.

Molotov replied that he would be able to give an answer to the Japanese proposals after this issue was discussed by the Soviet government. The main idea expressed by Togo will be received positively by the Soviet government ...

Concerning the question of China, comrade. Molotov says that he is familiar from the press with the proposals made by the Japanese government to France and England on the question of aid to China, and thanks Togo for confirming the existence of such proposals. As for the USSR, Comrade continues. Molotov, now this issue is not relevant for the USSR, since in this moment all the talk about helping China is unfounded. If the USSR had helped China, then China would not be in the position it is in now. The USSR has its own needs, and now it is busy providing for its own needs for the defense of the country. (Highlighted by me. - A.K.)

Togo says that he listened with satisfaction to the statement of Comrade. Molotov that now the issue of assistance to China is not relevant and that the Soviet side does not provide assistance to the Chongqing government ... If the Soviet side does not provide assistance now and will not provide such assistance in the future, then the Japanese government would like the Soviet government to inform about this note.

Molotov, on his own initiative, reiterates that he cannot deny the fact that the USSR used to provide assistance to China in people, weapons and aircraft. Another position now. Tov. Molotov says that he cannot now say that the USSR is currently assisting the Chungking government. Our country expanded (meaning the accession to the USSR of Polish eastern regions inhabited by Ukrainians and Belarusians. - A.K.), and we have our own needs to strengthen the defense of our own country.

Molotov points out that if relations between the USSR and Japan are stabilized, then America will take more seriously both the interests of the USSR and the interests of Japan.

Togo concludes by expressing its desire to reach an agreement as soon as possible on the conclusion of an agreement on neutrality.

Togo sets out the content of this conversation somewhat differently in his memoirs. In particular, confirming the fact of Molotov's consent to "not providing assistance to the Chungking regime," he reports that, for his part, Molotov raised the question of the liquidation of Japanese concessions on Sakhalin. Togo writes:

“In response to my plan, Molotov put forward a counterproposal, which boiled down to the fact that each of the contracting parties would refrain from joining groups with countries hostile to the party to the pact. Molotov further stated that he was ready to consider my request not to provide assistance to the Chongqing regime, but, on the other hand, Russia would like Japan to give up its interests in Sakhalin (meaning the rights to extract oil and coal). These enterprises have always been at odds with the Soviet authorities, and they barely managed to continue to work only thanks to huge subsidies from the Japanese government. Therefore, I long ago came to the conclusion that Japan should give up concessions on Sakhalin in exchange for other rights. If Japan were ready to abandon them, and the Soviets to stop helping the Chiang Kai-shek regime, negotiations for a non-aggression pact would immediately end in success.

The unexpected agreement to stop helping China in order to conclude a non-aggression or neutrality pact with Japan was a very serious foreign policy maneuver of the Soviet leadership. It was obvious that Stalin and Molotov decided to repeat last year's diplomatic turn in relations with Germany, which struck the world, in the Japanese direction. The task of ensuring the security of one's state both from the West and from the East began to be considered in the Kremlin as the main goal of Soviet diplomacy. Compared to this task, all others were considered secondary.

If the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany sharply worsened the relations of the USSR with Great Britain and France, then the signing of a similar agreement with Japan threatened to seriously cool, if not break, Soviet-Chinese relations. Moscow could not help but take into account the fact that China, left face to face with Japan, could capitulate. In this case, the danger increased Japanese attack on the USSR, because, having secured its rear in China, Japan, with much greater freedom of hands, could act in the north - against the Soviet Union. However, in an effort to buy time to prepare for the inevitable big war Stalin went to these serious political costs.

Despite the strict secrecy of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that began, China almost immediately learned about their content. Already on July 18, 1940, having invited the Soviet ambassador to China Panyushkin for a conversation, Chiang Kai-shek said: "Some of the Americans fear that the USSR might compromise with Japan." The ambassador had no choice but to try to disavow these reports by presenting them as "rumors". He replied to Chiang Kai-shek: “Such an opinion, of course, is not based on anything. It's just ridiculous. At least it is known, for example, that in the entire Japanese army there is not a single Soviet aircraft, not a single bomb of Soviet origin. Further, he assured his interlocutor of the friendship and loyalty of the Soviet Union: “It is well known that the USSR is China’s most faithful friend, that we provide great assistance to China, that we sincerely and unfailingly express our solidarity with the Chinese people, leading fair fight for their national independence, against the aggressor. I think that the possibility of cooperation between the USSR and America on the Far East issue is not ruled out.

In the same vein, Panyushkin expounded the position of the USSR in his July 22 conversation with Chinese Deputy Chief of Staff Bai Zhongxi. Then the Chinese general bluntly stated: “There are people who ask rather insidious questions, for example, about how long the USSR will help China, what are the limits of this assistance, etc.” And this time, the ambassador had to resort to diplomatic rhetoric, saying: “The friendship of the USSR and China is sealed by the friendship of our great leaders - Lenin and Sun Yat-sen, Stalin and Sun Yat-sen. This obliges us to strengthen our ties, our friendship.” It is quite possible to assume that the ambassador said this sincerely, for he was hardly informed about the upcoming change in Soviet policy towards China.

However, the diplomatic "blitz" in the Japanese direction did not take place. The second Konoe cabinet, which came to power in July 1940, did not force the conclusion of a political agreement with the USSR, preferring first to strengthen military-political alliance with Germany and Italy. In Japan, it was believed that, having such an alliance with the fascist states of Europe, it would be easier to induce the Soviet leadership to sign a non-aggression pact with Japan on Japanese terms.

On July 27, the new Japanese Cabinet, in which Y. Matsuoka became Minister of Foreign Affairs, approved the “Program of Measures Corresponding to Changes in international position". In this document, as the most important task determined "the establishment of a new order in Great East Asia", for which it was envisaged "the use at a convenient moment military force". The program planned: 1. Strengthen the alliance of Japan, Germany, Italy. 2. Conclude a non-aggression agreement with the USSR in order to prepare the armed forces for war, which would preclude their defeat. 3. To carry out active measures to include the colonies of England, France, Holland and Portugal in the sphere of the Japanese "new order" in East Asia. 4. Have a firm determination to eliminate US military intervention in the process of creating a "new order" in East Asia.

In accordance with these political guidelines, the command of the armed forces began to develop possible options for Japan's entry into the Second World War: "southern" - against the United States and Western European states and "northern" - against the USSR. Preference was given to "southern". The solution of the "northern problem" was postponed until the start of the Soviet-German war. Since the "Program ..." demanded "to avoid a war on two fronts", the conclusion of a neutrality pact with the USSR remained one of the priority tasks of Japanese diplomacy. “Relations with the USSR should be regulated on the basis of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact,” a Japanese newspaper wrote. In this way, Japan can achieve the security of her northern border, which will enable her to carry out her policy of expansion to the south. This will also allow her to prepare for a war against the United States.

Making sure that new office Japanese ministers are ready to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a neutrality pact, the Soviet government on August 14, 1940 responded to the version of the pact proposed by Togo. It said: “The Soviet government hereby confirms its positive attitude towards the idea of ​​concluding an agreement on neutrality between the USSR and Japan proposed by the Japanese government ... The Soviet government understands the present proposal of the Japanese government in the sense that the proposed agreement, as can be seen from its content, will not only a treaty of neutrality, but, in essence, it will be a treaty of non-aggression and non-entry into hostile coalitions.

At the same time, the Soviet government declared that the interests of the USSR and Japan require, even before signing the treaty, "the settlement of certain essential issues of Soviet-Japanese relations, the presence of which in an unresolved state is and will be a serious obstacle to the desired improvement in relations between the two countries."

Agreeing with Articles 2 and 3 of the Japanese draft, the Soviet government opposed the agreement being based on the Beijing Convention of 1925, which left in force the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, according to which Russia, as a result of the defeat in Russo-Japanese War forced to cede to Japan South Sakhalin. In addition, the Treaty of Portsmouth was violated by Japan, which seized Northeast China contrary to its provisions. Finally, the Soviet government continued to press for the elimination of Japanese oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin.

By this time, the so-called "Matsuoka purge" had replaced Japanese ambassadors to the major world powers. He responded to his homeland and the ambassador to the USSR Togo. Nevertheless, he continued to meet with Molotov and discuss the prospects for a neutrality pact. After reviewing the Soviet Government's reply of 14 August, Togo requested new meeting with Molotov. Molotov received the ambassador on 20 August.

From the recording of the conversation:

“Molotov expresses regret over the departure of Togo: “It is a pity that it will not be possible to negotiate with Togo. We have learned to understand each other better than before.”

Now, points out Togo, there is a good opportunity to resolve the fundamental issues. You have to strike while the iron is hot.

Tov. Molotov throws a line: “That's right. Absolutely correct".

Molotov: "The Soviet government understands the advantages that the agreement gives to both parties, and especially to Japan, since it receives a reliable and stable position in the North and, therefore, can manifest itself in the South with greater activity."

Pointing out to the ambassador the advantages of the pact for Japan, Molotov wanted to persuade the Japanese government to agree to the Soviet conditions for concluding the treaty. He pursued this goal during subsequent meetings with Togo.

On September 5, Molotov told Togo: “The Treaty of Portsmouth has been violated by Japan on very significant points and thus has lost its vitality in modern conditions. And if so, then the Convention on the Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and Japan of 1925 is also far from meeting the changed conditions. Therefore, making the Treaty of Portsmouth the base cannot be considered correct.

Togo objects to this approach.

Molotov: “If Japan is thinking of building its relations with the USSR on the basis of the Treaty of Portsmouth, concluded after the defeat of Russia, then this is a profound mistake. It is impossible to make the Treaty of Portsmouth, concluded after the defeat of Russia and reminiscent of the Treaty of Versailles, a basis for development good relations between Russia and Japan".

The main reason for the reluctance of the Soviet government to recognize the Treaty of Portsmouth as effective was that Moscow expected to restore Russian sovereignty over South Sakhalin, which had been torn away by Japan.

Taiheiyo senso si (History of the war on pacific ocean). Tokyo, 1972. Vol. 3. S. 283.

Daihonei rikugun bu. Part 2. P. 4.

Nihon rekishi (History of Japan). Tokyo, 1977, vol. 20, p. 8.

Daihonei rikugun bu. Part 2. S. 9.

DVP.T. XXIII. S. 304.

There. pp. 120–121.

Togo Shigenori. Memoirs of a Japanese diplomat / Per. from English. M., 1996. S. 207–208.

DVP.T. XXIII. pp. 400–406.

Togo Shigenori. Decree. op. pp. 208–209.

DVP.T. XXIII. S. 441.

There. S. 447.

Taiheyo senso shi. T. 3. S. 316.

Tikhvinsky S.L. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of 1941 // New and recent history. 1990. No. 1. S. 26.

DVP.T. XXIII. pp. 543–544.