Operation of the Red Army Bagration. The liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. Operation "Bagration"

For three years, Belarus was under the yoke of the enemy. The occupants plundered the territory of the republic: cities were devastated, more than a million buildings in the countryside were burned, and 7 thousand schools were turned into ruins. The Nazis killed more than two million prisoners of war and civilians. In fact, there was no family in the Byelorussian SSR that did not suffer from the Nazis. White Rus' was one of the most affected territories of the Union. But people did not lose heart and resisted. Knowing that in the East the Red Army repulsed the enemy's onslaught on Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, defeated the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge, and liberated the regions of Ukraine, the Belarusian partisans were preparing for decisive action. By the summer of 1944, approximately 140 thousand partisans were operating on the territory of Belarus. The general leadership of the partisans was carried out by the underground organizations of the Communist Party of the BSSR, headed by Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, who at the same time was the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement of the USSR. It should be noted that contemporaries noted his amazing honesty, responsibility and deep analytical abilities. Stalin highly appreciated Ponomarenko, some researchers believe that the leader wanted to make him his successor.

A few days before the start of the operation to liberate Belarus, partisan detachments delivered a series of sensitive blows against the Germans. The partisans destroyed their transport infrastructure, communication lines, actually paralyzed the rear of the enemy at the most crucial moment. During the operation, the partisans attacked individual enemy units and attacked the rear structures of the Germans.

Operation preparation

The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed back in April. The general plan of the General Staff was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of the capital of the BSSR and completely liberate Belarus. It was a very ambitious and large-scale plan, the simultaneous crushing of an entire enemy army group was planned very rarely during World War II. It was one of the largest operations ever military history humanity.

By the summer of 1944, the Red Army had achieved impressive success in Ukraine - the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, the Soviet forces carried out a number of successful offensive operations, liberating most of the territory of the republic. But things were worse in the Belarusian direction: the front line approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge ledge that was turned deep into the USSR, the so-called. "Belarusian balcony".

In July 1944, the German industry reached the highest point of its development in this war - in the first half of the year, the Reich factories produced more than 16 thousand aircraft, 8.3 thousand tanks, assault guns. Berlin carried out several mobilizations, and the strength of its armed forces was 324 divisions and 5 brigades. Army Group Center, which defended Belarus, had 850-900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1350 aircraft. In addition, at the second stage of the battle, Army Group Center was supported by formations of the right flank of Army Group North and the left flank of Army Group Northern Ukraine, as well as reserves from the Western Front and various sectors of the Eastern Front. The Army Group "Center" included 4 armies: the 2nd field army, it held the Pinsk and Pripyat region (commander Walter Weiss); 9th Field Army, it defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk (Hans Jordan, after June 27 - Nikolaus von Forman); The 4th Field Army (Kurt von Tippelskirch, after June 30, the army was commanded by Vinzenz Müller) and the 3rd Panzer Army (Georg Reinhardt), which occupied the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper, as well as a bridgehead from Bykhov to the area northeast of Orsha. In addition, formations of the 3rd Panzer Army occupied the Vitebsk region. The commander of Army Group Center was Field Marshal Ernst Busch (on June 28, Bush was replaced by Walter Model). His chief of staff was Hans Krebs.

If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of ​​the future offensive, then the command of Army Group Center and the headquarters of the Reich ground forces had a completely wrong idea about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign of 1944. Adolf Hitler and the High Command of the Wehrmacht believed that a major Soviet offensive should still be expected in Ukraine, north or south of the Carpathians (most likely north). It was believed that from the area south of Kovel Soviet troops will strike towards the Baltic Sea, trying to cut off the army groups "Center" and "North" from Germany. Large forces were allocated to parry a possible threat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of heavy tanks "Tiger". And the Army Group "Center" had one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and one battalion of heavy tanks. In addition, they feared an attack on Romania - on the oil fields of Ploiesti. In April, the command of Army Group Center submitted to the top leadership a proposal to reduce the front line and withdraw troops to better positions beyond the Berezina. But this plan was rejected, Army Group Center was ordered to defend in the same positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared "fortresses" and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense, a possible struggle in the environment. For engineering work, forced labor of local residents was widely used. Aviation, radio intelligence and German agents were unable to reveal the preparations by the Soviet command for a major operation in Belarus. Army Groups Center and North were predicted to have a "calm summer"; the situation inspired so little concern that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the Red Army operation. But, it should be noted that the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, and the Nazis managed to create a developed defense system. It included "fortress" cities, numerous field fortifications, bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable positions for artillery and machine guns. The Germans assigned a large role to natural obstacles - wooded and swampy terrain, many rivers and streams.

Red Army. Stalin made the final decision to conduct the summer campaign, including the Belarusian operation, at the end of April. Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov was instructed to organize work in the General Staff on planning operations. The plan to liberate Belarus received a code name - Operation Bagration. On May 20, 1944, the General Staff completed the development of an offensive operation plan. A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov and G. K. Zhukov were called to the Headquarters. On May 22, the commanders of the fronts, I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, and K. K. Rokossovsky, were received at Headquarters to hear their views on the operation. The coordination of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to Vasilevsky and Zhukov, they left for the troops in early June.

The rate provided for the application of three powerful blows. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts advanced in general direction to Vilnius. The troops of the two fronts were supposed to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, develop an offensive to the west and cover the left-flank grouping of the Borisov-Minsk group of German forces. The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to defeat the Bobruisk group of Germans. Then develop the offensive in the direction of Slutsk-Baranovichi and cover the Minsk group of German troops from the south and south-west. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left-flank grouping of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was to move in the general direction towards Minsk.

From the Soviet side, about 1 million 200 thousand people participated in the operation as part of four fronts: the 1st Baltic Front (General of the Army Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan); 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky); 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov); 1st Belorussian Front (General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky). Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was the coordinator of the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and the chief of the General Staff Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky was the coordinator of the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts. The Dnieper military flotilla also took part in the operation.

Preparation of the Belarusian operation (from left to right) Varennikov I. S., Zhukov G. K., Kazakov V. I., Rokossovsky K. K. 1st Belorussian Front. 1944

Operation "Bagration" was supposed to solve several important tasks:

Completely clear the Moscow direction from German troops, since the leading edge of the "Belarusian ledge" was 80 kilometers from Smolensk. The configuration of the front line in the BSSR was a huge arc extended to the east with an area of ​​almost 250 thousand square kilometers. The arc stretched from Vitebsk in the north and Pinsk in the south to the Smolensk and Gomel regions, hanging over the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The German high command attached great importance to this territory - it protected the distant approaches to Poland and East Prussia. In addition, Hitler still cherished plans for a victorious war if a "miracle weapon" was created, or if major geopolitical changes took place. From the bridgehead in Belarus, it was possible to strike at Moscow again.

Complete the liberation of the entire Belarusian territory, parts of Lithuania and Poland.

Reach the Baltic coast and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the German front at the junctions of Army Groups "Center" and "North" and isolate these German groups from each other.

To create profitable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive operations in the Baltic states, in Western Ukraine, in the Warsaw and East Prussian directions.

Main milestones of the operation

The operation was carried out in two stages. At the first stage (June 23-July 4, 1944) the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk front offensive operations were carried out. At the second stage of Operation Bagration (July 5–August 29, 1944), Vilnius, Shauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets front-line offensive operations were carried out.

The first stage of the operation

The offensive began on the morning of June 23, 1944. Near Vitebsk, the Red Army successfully broke through the German defenses and already on June 25 surrounded five enemy divisions to the west of the city. The liquidation of the Vitebsk "cauldron" was completed by the morning of June 27, on the same day Orsha was released. With the destruction of the Vitebsk German grouping, a key position on the left flank of the defense of Army Group Center was captured. The northern flank of the Army Group "Center" was actually destroyed, more than 40 thousand Germans died and 17 thousand people were captured. In the Orsha direction, after breaking through the German defenses, the Soviet command brought the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. Having successfully crossed the Berezina, Rotmistrov's tankers cleared Borisov of the Nazis. The withdrawal of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the Borisov region led to significant operational success: the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group Center was cut off from the 4th field army. The formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front advancing in the Mogilev direction broke through the powerful and deeply echeloned defense of the Germans, which the enemy had prepared along the Pronya, Basya and Dnieper rivers. On June 28 they liberated Mogilev. The withdrawal of the 4th German Army lost organization, the enemy lost up to 33 thousand killed and captured.

The Bobruisk offensive operation was supposed to create a southern "pincer" of the huge encirclement conceived by the Soviet Headquarters. This operation was entirely carried out by the most powerful of the fronts - the 1st Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. The 9th Army of the Wehrmacht resisted the offensive of the Red Army. We had to advance through very difficult terrain - swamps. The blow was struck on June 24: from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th army of Batov (reinforced by the 1st Don tank corps) moved, from the east to the west the 3rd army of Gorbatov advanced with the 9th tank body. For a quick breakthrough in the Slutsk direction, the 28th Army of Luchinsky and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps of Pliev were used. The armies of Batov and Luchinsky quickly broke through the defenses of the stunned enemy (the Russians made their way through the swamp, which was considered impassable). But the 3rd army of Gorbatov had to literally bite into the orders of the Germans. The commander of the 9th Army, Hans Jordan, threw his main reserve against her - the 20th Panzer Division. But soon he had to redirect his reserve to the southern flank of the defense. The 20th Panzer Division was unable to close the gap. On June 27, the main forces of the 9th Field Army fell into the "boiler". General Jordan was replaced by von Forman, but this could not save the situation. Attempts to deblockade from the outside and from the inside failed. Panic reigned in encircled Bobruisk, and on the 27th its assault began. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was completely liberated. The Germans lost 74 thousand people killed and captured. As a result of the defeat of the 9th Army, both flanks of Army Group Center were open, and the road to Minsk was free from the northeast and southeast.

On June 29, the 1st Baltic Front attacked Polotsk. The 6th Guards Army of Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of Beloborodov bypassed the city from the south (the guards of the 6th Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th shock army of Malyshev - from the north. Butkov's 1st Panzer Corps liberated the city of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. Then, with a sudden attack, the tankers seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina. But it did not work out to take the Germans into the "ring" - Karl Hilpert, who commanded the garrison of the city, arbitrarily left the "fortress", without waiting for the withdrawal routes to be cut by the Russian troops. Polotsk was occupied on 4 July. As a result of the Polotsk operation, the German command lost a strong stronghold and a railway junction. In addition, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of the German Army Group North were outflanked from the south and were under the threat of a flank attack.

The German command, trying to rectify the situation, replaced the commander of Army Group Center Bush with Field Marshal Walter Model. He was considered a master of defensive operations. Reserve units were sent to Belarus, including the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.

The 4th German Army, in the face of the threat of imminent encirclement, retreated across the Berezina River. The situation was extremely difficult: the flanks were open, the retreating columns were subjected to constant Soviet air strikes and partisan attacks. Pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was located directly in front of the 4th Army, was not strong, since the plans of the Soviet command did not include the expulsion of German troops from the future "boiler".

The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two main directions: to the southwest (toward Minsk) and west (to Vileyka). The 1st Belorussian Front advanced on Slutsk, Nesvizh and Minsk. German resistance was weak, the main forces were defeated. On June 30, Slutsk was taken, and on July 2, Nesvizh, the escape routes to the southwest were cut off for the Germans. By July 2, tank units of the 1st Belorussian Front approached Minsk. The advancing units of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to endure a fierce battle with the 5th German Panzer Division (reinforced by a battalion of heavy tanks), which arrived in the Borisov region on June 26-28. This division was full-blooded, did not participate in hostilities for several months. In the course of several bloody battles, the last one took place on July 1-2 north-west of Minsk, the tank division lost almost all its tanks and was driven back. On July 3, Burdeyny's 2nd Panzer Corps broke into Minsk from the northwest. At the same time, advanced units of Rokossovsky approached the city from the south. The German garrison was not numerous and did not last long, Minsk was liberated by lunchtime. As a result, units of the 4th Army and units of other armies that joined it fell into the encirclement. The Red Army actually avenged the "cauldrons" of 1941. The encircled were not able to organize a long resistance - the area of ​​​​the encirclement was shot through with artillery fire, it was constantly bombed, the ammunition ran out, there was no outside help. The Germans fought until July 8-9, made several desperate attempts to break through, but were defeated everywhere. July 8 and. O. commander of the army, the commander of the XII Army Corps Vinzenz Müller signed the surrender. Even before July 12, there was a “cleansing operation”, the Germans lost 72 thousand killed and more than 35 thousand were captured.

The poverty of the road network in Belarus and the marshy and wooded terrain led to the fact that many kilometers of columns of German troops crowded together on only two major highways - Zhlobinsky and Rogachevsky, where they were subjected to massive attacks by the Soviet 16th Air Army. Some German units were practically destroyed on the Zhlobin highway.

Photo of destroyed German equipment from the area of ​​the bridge across the Berezina.

The second stage of the operation

The Germans tried to stabilize the situation. The head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Kurt Zeitzler, proposed to transfer Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with the help of its troops. But this plan was rejected by Hitler for political reasons (relations with the Finns). In addition, the naval command opposed - the withdrawal from the Baltic worsened communications with the same Finland and Sweden, led to the loss of a number of naval bases and strongholds in the Baltic. As a result, Zeitzler resigned and was replaced by Heinz Guderian. Model, for its part, tried to erect a new defensive line that ran from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi in order to close a hole in the front about 400 km wide. But for this he had only one whole army - the 2nd and the remnants of other armies. Therefore, the German command had to transfer significant forces to Belarus from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and from the West. Until July 16, 46 divisions were sent to Belarus, but these troops were not brought into battle immediately, in parts, often "from wheels", and therefore they could not quickly turn the tide.

From July 5 to July 20, 1944, the Vilnius operation was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky. The Germans did not have a continuous front of defense in the Vilnius direction. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps of Obukhov reached the city and began to encircle it. An attempt to take the city on the move failed. On the night of July 8, new German forces were brought up to Vilnius. On July 8-9, the city was completely surrounded and its assault was launched. German attempts to unblock the city from the western direction were repulsed. The last centers of resistance were crushed in Vilnius on 13 July. Up to 8 thousand Germans were destroyed, 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. On July 15, units of the front occupied several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Neman. Until the 20th, there were battles for bridgeheads.

On July 28, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on a new offensive - they were aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki. On July 30, the German defense along the Neman was broken through; on August 1, the Germans left Kaunas so as not to be surrounded. Then the Germans received reinforcements and went on a counteroffensive - the battles went on with varying success until the end of August. The front did not reach several kilometers to the border of East Prussia.

Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front received the task of reaching the sea to cut off the North group. In the Dvina direction, the Germans were initially able to hold back the offensive, since the front was regrouping forces and waiting for reserves. Dvinsk was cleared in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right only on July 27th. On the same day they took Siauliai. By July 30, the front managed to separate the two enemy army groups from each other - the advanced units of the Red Army cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic in the Tukums region. On July 31 Jelgava was captured. The 1st Baltic Front went to the sea. The Germans began to try to reconnect with Army Group North. The fighting went on with varying success, and at the end of August there was a break in the battles.

The 2nd Belorussian Front advanced to the west - to Novogrudok, and then Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th army of Grishin and the 50th army of Boldin participated in the destruction of the Minsk "boiler", therefore, on July 5, only one army, the 33rd, went on the offensive. The 33rd Army advanced without encountering much resistance, covering 120-125 km in five days. On July 8, Novogrudok was liberated, on the 9th the army reached the Neman River. On July 10, the 50th Army joined the offensive and the troops crossed the Neman. On July 16, Grodno was liberated, the Germans were already putting up fierce resistance, a series of counterattacks was repulsed. The German command tried to stop the Soviet troops, but they did not have enough strength for this. July 27 Bialystok was recaptured. Soviet soldiers reached the pre-war border Soviet Union. The front was unable to carry out significant encirclements, since it did not have large mobile formations (tank, mechanized, cavalry corps) in its composition. On August 14, Osovets and the bridgehead beyond the Narew were occupied.

The 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Baranovichi-Brest. Almost immediately, the advancing units collided with German reserves: the 4th Panzer Division, the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, the 28th Light Infantry Division, and other formations went. July 5-6 was a fierce battle. Gradually, the German forces were crushed, they were inferior in number. In addition, the Soviet front was supported by powerful Air Force formations, which inflicted strong blows on the Germans. On July 6, Kovel was liberated. On July 8, after a fierce battle, Baranovichi was taken. On July 14 they took Pinsk, on the 20th Kobrin. On July 20, units of Rokossovsky crossed the Bug on the move. The Germans did not have time to create a line of defense along it. On July 25, a “cauldron” was created near Brest, but on the 28th, the remnants of the encircled German group broke out of it (the Germans lost 7 thousand people killed). It should be noted that the battles were fierce, there were few prisoners, but a lot of Germans were killed.

On July 22, units of the 2nd Panzer Army (which was attached to the front during the second phase of the operation) reached Lublin. On July 23, the assault on the city began, but due to the lack of infantry, it dragged on, the city was finally taken by the morning of the 25th. In late July - early August, Rokossovsky's front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula.

Operation results

As a result of the two-month offensive of the Red Army, White Rus' was completely cleared of the Nazis, part of the Baltic states and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, on a front of 1100 kilometers, the advance of troops to a depth of up to 600 kilometers was achieved.

It was a major defeat for the Wehrmacht. There is even an opinion that it was the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Army Group Center was defeated, Army Group North was threatened with defeat. The powerful line of defense in Belarus, protected by natural barriers (swamps, rivers), has been broken. The German reserves were depleted, which had to be thrown into battle in order to close the "hole".

An excellent groundwork has been created for a future offensive into Poland and further into Germany. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of the capital of Poland (Magnushevsky and Pulawsky). In addition, during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front occupied a bridgehead near Sandomierz.

What is Operation Bagration? How was it carried out? We will consider these and other questions in the article. It is known that 2014 marked the 70th anniversary of this operation. The Red Army during it was able not only to liberate the Belarusians from the occupation, but also, by destabilizing the enemy, accelerated the collapse of fascism.

This happened thanks to the extraordinary courage, determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet partisans and soldiers of Belarus, many of whom died in the name of victory over the invaders.

Operation

The offensive Belarusian operation "Bagration" is a large-scale campaign of the Great Patriotic War, carried out in 1944, from June 23 to August 29. It was named after the Russian commander of Georgian origin P. I. Bagration, who gained fame during the Patriotic War of 1812.

Campaign value

The liberation of Belarus was not easy for Soviet soldiers. During the aforementioned extensive offensive, the Belarusian lands, part of the Baltic states and eastern Poland were saved, the German group of detachments "Center" was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered impressive losses, partly due to the fact that A. Hitler forbade retreat. Subsequently, Germany was no longer able to restore the troops.

Campaign Background

The liberation of Belarus was carried out in several stages. It is known that by June 1944, in the east, the front line approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, establishing an impressive ledge - a wedge directed deep into the USSR, called the "Belarusian Balcony".

In Ukraine, the Red Army was able to achieve a series of tangible successes (many Wehrmacht soldiers died in the chain of "cauldrons", almost all the lands of the Republic were liberated). If they wanted to break through in the winter of 1943-1944 in the direction of Minsk, the successes, on the contrary, were very modest.

Along with this, by the end of the spring of 1944, the invasion in the south stalled, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to change the course of efforts.

Side forces

The liberation of Belarus was swift and inevitable. Information about the forces of opponents in different sources varies. According to the publication “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War”, 1 million 200 thousand soldiers took part in the campaign from the USSR (not including rear units). On the part of the Germans - as part of the "Center" group of detachments - 850-900 thousand souls (plus about 400 thousand rear soldiers). In addition, in the second phase, the left wing of the Northern Ukraine detachment group and the right wing of the North Ukraine group of troops participated in the battle.

It is known that four regiments of the Wehrmacht resisted four Soviet fronts.

Campaign preparation

Before the liberation of Belarus, the Red Army men were intensively preparing for the operation. At first, the Soviet leadership thought that the Bagration campaign would be identical to the Battle of Kursk - something like the Rumyantsev or Kutuzov, with a huge expenditure of ammunition in the subsequent modest movement of 150-200 km.

Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into the operational depth, with stubborn, long-term battles in the tactical area of ​​\u200b\u200bprotection to exhaustion - required an enormous amount of ammunition and a small amount of fuel for mechanical parts and low capacities for the revival of railway lines, the actual evolution of the campaign turned out to be unexpected for the Soviet leadership.

In April 1944, the General Staff began to develop an operational scheme for the Belarusian operation. The command intended to crush the flanks of the German group "Center", surround its base forces east of Minsk and completely liberate Belarus. The plan was extremely large-scale and ambitious, since during the war the simultaneous defeat of an entire group of troops was planned extremely rarely.

Significant personnel changes have been made. Direct preparations for the Belarusian operation began at the end of May. On May 31, private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, containing specific plans, were delivered to the front commanders.

The Red Army men organized a thorough reconnaissance of the positions and forces of the enemy. Information was obtained in various directions. For example, the reconnaissance teams of the 1st Front of Belarus were able to capture about 80 "languages". Undercover, active acoustic reconnaissance was also carried out, enemy positions were studied by artillery observers, and so on.

The headquarters sought to achieve the utmost surprise. The commanders of the armies personally gave all orders to the commanders of the units. It was forbidden to talk on the phone about preparations for the offensive, even in coded form. The fronts preparing for the operation began to observe radio silence. The troops were concentrated and regrouped mainly at night. It was necessary to monitor compliance with camouflage measures, so officers of the General Staff were specially assigned to patrol the area.

Before the offensive, commanders of all levels, up to companies, carried out reconnaissance. They assigned tasks to subordinates on the spot. To improve interaction, Air Force officers and artillery spotters were sent to the tank units.

It follows that the campaign was prepared very carefully, while the enemy remained in the dark about the coming assault.

Wehrmacht

So, you already know that the Red Army prepared thoroughly for the liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders. The leadership of the Red Army was perfectly aware of the enemy grouping in the area of ​​​​the future attack. The General Staff of the ground detachments of the Third Reich and the commanders of the "Center" group of troops were in the dark about the plans and forces of the Red Army.

The Supreme High Command and Hitler thought that a major offensive must still be expected in Ukraine. They expected that the Soviet garrisons would strike from the area south of Kovel towards the Baltic Sea, cutting off the groups of troops "Center" and "North".

The General Staff of the Third Reich assumed that the Red Army wanted to mislead the German military leaders about the course of the most important strike and withdraw reserves from the region between Kovel and the Carpathians. The situation in Belarus was so calm that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the campaign.

The course of hostilities

So, the Great Patriotic War was going on. The liberation of Belarus played a decisive role in this tense confrontation. The preliminary phase of the campaign symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union - June 22, 1944. The Berezina River turned out to be the most significant battlefield, as it was during the Patriotic War of 1812.

For the liberation of Belarus, the commanders used all their skills. The Soviet troops of the 2nd, 1st, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, with the support of the partisans, broke through the defense of the German group of forces "Center" in many sectors. The Red Army surrounded and destroyed impressive enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Vilnius, Bobruisk, Brest and east of Minsk. They also liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and Vilnius (July 13), the eastern regions of Poland. Soviet soldiers were able to reach the boundaries of the Vistula and Narew rivers and to the Rubicons of East Prussia. It is noteworthy that the Soviet troops were commanded by General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, General G.F. Zakharov, General K.K. .Model.

The operation to liberate Belarus was carried out in two steps. The first step was taken from June 23 to July 4 and included the following offensive front-line operations:

• Mogilev operation;
• Vitebsk-Orsha;
• Minsk;
• Polotsk;
• Bobruisk.

• Osovets operation;
• Kaunas;
• Vilnius;
• Bialystok;
• Siauliai;
• Lublin-Brestskaya.

Partisan actions

So, you already know that the liberation of Belarus in the Second World War played a significant role. Before the offensive, a partisan action of unprecedented proportions took place. In Belarus at that time there were many active partisan formations. The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement recorded that 194,708 supporters joined the troops of the Red Army during the summer of 1944.

Soviet commanders successfully linked military operations with the actions of partisan groups. Taking part in the Bagration campaign, the partisans first disabled enemy communications, and later prevented the retreat of the defeated Wehrmacht troops.

They began to destroy the German rear on the night of 19/20 June. Russian partisans in the central region of the eastern front carried out 10,500 explosions. As a result, they were able to delay the transfer of enemy operational reserves for a couple of days.

The partisans planned to produce 40 thousand various explosions, that is, they managed to fulfill only a fourth of their intentions. And yet, they were able to briefly paralyze the rear of the "Center" group of troops.

At the end of June 1944, on the night before the general attack of the Russians in the zone of the "Center" group of troops, the partisans made a powerful raid on all important roads. As a result, they completely deprived the enemy troops of control. During this one night, the partisans managed to install 10.5 thousand mines and charges, of which only 3.5 thousand were discovered and neutralized. Due to the activities of partisan detachments, communication along many routes was carried out during the day and only under the cover of an armed convoy.

Railways and bridges became the basic objects of application of partisan forces. In addition to them, communication lines were also actively disabled. This activity greatly facilitated the offensive of the Red Army at the front.

Operation results

The liberation of Belarus in 1944 turned history back. The success of the Bagration campaign surpassed all the aspirations of the Soviet leaders. Having attacked the enemy for two months, the Red Army completely cleared Belarus, recaptured part of the Baltic states, and liberated the eastern regions of Poland. In general, on a front 1100 km long, Soviet soldiers were able to advance to a depth of 600 km.

The operation also made the North group of troops stationed in the Baltics defenseless. After all, the Panther line, a carefully constructed border, was bypassed. In the future, this fact greatly facilitated the Baltic campaign.

And the Red Army captured two large bridgeheads south of Warsaw beyond the Vistula - Pulawski and Magnushevsky, as well as a bridgehead near Sandomierz (recaptured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Sandomierz-Lviv campaign). By these actions, they created a reserve for the upcoming Vistula-Oder operation. It is known that the offensive of the 1st Front of Belarus, which stopped only on the Oder, began in January 1945 from the Pulavsky and Magnushevsky bridgeheads.

The military believes that the liberation of Soviet Belarus contributed to the large-scale defeat of the German Armed Forces. Many are sure that the Battle of Belarus can be safely called "the largest defeat of the German Armed Forces in World War II."

On the scale of the German-Soviet front, the Bagration campaign was the greatest in a long history of offensives. It is a sensation in the Soviet theory of military prowess thanks to the superbly coordinated movement of all fronts and the operation carried out to deceive the enemy about the location of the fundamental assault that began in the summer of 1944. She destroyed the German reserves, seriously localizing the ability of the invaders to fend off both the Allied advance in Western Europe and other attacks on the Eastern Front.

So, for example, the German command transferred the division "Grossdeutschland" from the Dniester near Siauliai. As a result, she was unable to participate in the reflection of the Yasso-Chisinau campaign. The Hermann Goering division had to leave its positions in mid-July in Italy near Florence, and was thrown into the battles on the Vistula. When Goering units vainly attacked the Magnushevsky sector in mid-August, Florence was liberated.

Losses

The human losses of the Red Army are known quite accurately. In total, 178,507 soldiers died, went missing and were captured, 587,308 people were injured and fell ill. Even by the standards of World War II, these losses are considered high. In absolute numbers, they far outnumber the victims not only in successful, but also in many unsuccessful campaigns.

So, for comparison, the defeat near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943 cost the Red Army a little more than 45 thousand dead, and the Berlin operation - 81 thousand. Such an undermining is associated with the duration and scope of the campaign, which was carried out on intricate terrain against a competent and energetic enemy who occupied superbly prepared defensive lines.

Scientists are still discussing the human losses of the Wehrmacht today. Western professors believe that the Germans had 262,929 captured and missing, 109,776 wounded and 26,397 dead, for a total of 399,102 soldiers. These data were obtained from ten-day reports that were compiled by the fascist troops.

Why, then, in this case, the number of those killed is small? Yes, because many of the dead were recorded as missing, and sometimes this status was received by the personnel of the division in full force.

However, these figures are criticized. For example, D. Glantz, a US historian of the Eastern Front, found that the difference between the number of servicemen of the "Center" group of troops before and after the campaign is much larger. D. Glantz said that the information of the ten-day reports gives the situation a minimal assessment. When the investigator of the Russian Federation A.V. Isaev spoke on the Ekho Moskvy radio, he stated that the losses of the Nazis amounted to about 500 thousand souls. S. Zaloga claims that before the surrender of the 4th Army, 300-500 thousand Germans died.

It is also necessary to emphasize that in all cases the losses of the "Center" group of troops were calculated, without taking into account the victims of the "North" and "Northern Ukraine" regimental groups.

It is known that the Soviet Information Bureau published Soviet information, according to which German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 lost 631 aircraft, 2,735 self-propelled guns and tanks, 57,152 vehicles, 158,480 people were captured, 381,000 soldiers were killed. Perhaps these data are rather overestimated, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses. In any case, the question of the human losses of the Wehrmacht in the "Bagration" is not yet closed.

The Germans, captured near Minsk in the amount of 57,600 people, were marched through Moscow - a column of prisoners of war walked through the streets of the capital for about three hours. In this way, the significance of success was demonstrated to other powers. After the march, every street was cleared and washed.

Memory

The year of the liberation of Belarus is also honored today. In honor of this event, the following commemorative signs were created:

• Memorial "Campaign" Bagration "near the village of Rakovichi (Svetlogorsk district).
• Mound of Glory.
• In 2010, on April 14, the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus issued and put into circulation a series of coins “Bagration Campaign”.

Awards

Subsequently, commemorative awards appeared in Belarus in the form of a medal "For the Liberation of Belarus". In 2004, a commemorative badge "60 years of the liberation of Belarus from Nazi invaders" was introduced. Later, commemorative medals were issued for the 65th and 70th anniversaries of the liberation of Belarus.

There is no repeated awarding of the jubilee medal. If you have lost a medal or a certificate for it, a duplicate will not be issued to you. They can only allow the wearing of the bar of the installed version.

Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences 03-2004

BELARUSIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION ("BAGRATION ")

Army General M. A. GAREEV, Doctor of Military Sciences, Doctor historical sciences, professor, president of AVN

Lessons and Conclusions

Operation Bagration is one of the most instructive and outstanding offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from June 23 to August 28, 1944 with the main goal of defeating the strongest and largest grouping of Nazi troops - the Army Group Center, the liberation of Belarus, part of the territory of Lithuania and Poland.

Strategic situation at the beginning of the operation

In order to better understand the features and lessons arising from the experience of this operation, it is necessary to remember in what conditions of the military-political and strategic situation it took place, what preceded this operation.

After the defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk, by the beginning of 1944 the fascist German army finally switched to a tough strategic defense. At the subsequent stages of the war, it also undertook strong counterattacks, separate offensive operations (as, for example, in the area of ​​​​Lake Balaton, the Ardennes in early 1945), but these active actions were already private character subordinated to the interests of defense with the aim of prolonging the war and concluding a separate or multilateral peace on terms acceptable to Germany. The assassination attempt on Hitler in July 1944 was also calculated for this.

By the beginning of 1944, the armed forces of Germany numbered over 10 million people, they still held the Baltic states, Karelia, a significant part of Belarus, Ukraine, Kalinin and Leningrad regions, Crimea and Moldova. As part of the army, they had 6.7 million people, of which about 5 million people were on the Soviet-German front - 198 divisions (out of 314 divisions and brigades), 56.6 thousand guns and mortars, 5400 tanks and assault guns, over 3,000 combat aircraft. Until July 1944, the growth of military production continued.

However, Germany's position worsened. Its defeat on the Soviet-German front led to an aggravation of the internal political situation in Germany itself and in the camp of its allies. The situation with human resources has become especially aggravated.

In general, the military-political and strategic situation has changed radically in favor of the USSR and its allies. In 1942-1944. 2,250 enterprises were newly built in the eastern regions of our country and more than 6,000 enterprises were restored in the liberated regions. The defense industry in 1944 produced five times more tanks and aircraft every month than in 1941.

By the beginning of 1944, the Soviet active army had more than 6.3 million people, over 86.6 thousand guns and mortars (without anti-aircraft guns and 50-mm mortars), about 5.3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 .2 thousand aircraft.

By this time, there was no overwhelming superiority of the Soviet armed forces over the German ones. It appeared when the Allies landed a large landing in Normandy in June 1944 and a second front was opened in Europe, which made it even more difficult for the German command to maneuver forces and means from one front to another.

The Soviet armed forces were faced with the task of preventing the fascist German army from gaining a foothold on the occupied lines and dragging out the war, completing the liberation of the territory of their country, liberating other peoples of Europe from fascist occupation and ending the war with complete defeat. Nazi Germany with Western allies. These tasks could be solved only by active offensive actions.

In accordance with the agreement with the allies at the Tehran Conference, a new powerful strategic offensive was launched in 1944, when the Red Army conducted 10 major offensive operations, starting with an offensive to liberate the right-bank Ukraine and lift the blockade of Leningrad in the winter of 1944. The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk, Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz, Iasi-Kishinev operations were carried out.

Our allies delayed the opening of the second front for three years, and only when they saw that the Soviet armed forces could crush the Nazi army without them, finally, on June 6, 1944, they began the Normandy landing operation.

For the first time since the beginning of the Second World War, Nazi Germany found itself under coordinated attacks from East and West. The successful offensive of the allies in France was greatly facilitated by the Belarusian operation.

The successive offensive operations carried out by the Soviet troops in different directions (operations in new directions, as a rule, began at a time when operations in other directions were still ongoing) disoriented the German command, forced them to disperse their forces and deprived it of the opportunity to repel or frustrate the offensive actions of the Soviet troops. Moreover, successive offensive operations alternated not only along the front, but also in depth, when, from the moment of completion of some without significant operational pauses, new offensive operations were undertaken with a view to their further development.

These were grandiose, unprecedented in scale offensive operations, unfolding on a front from 2 to 4.5 thousand km and to a depth of 800 km, in which from 8 to 11 fronts participated with the active action of the Navy, long-range aviation and air defense forces of the country. The level of strategic leadership, the operational-tactical skills of command personnel and staffs have risen; on the whole, the art of war of the Soviet armed forces reached its peak. The confidence and morale of our army were on the rise.

By the beginning of the Belarusian operation, the front line in Belarus with a length of over 1100 km passed along the line: Lake. Nescherda, east of Vitebsk, Mogilev, Zhlobin, along the river. Pripyat, forming a huge ledge, facing its top to the East. From this ledge, the German command continued to threaten Moscow, from the airfields located here, it was possible to deliver air strikes along the shortest path in the western, northern and southern directions.

The grouping of fascist German troops, occupying the so-called Belorussian balcony with a well-developed network of roads, was able to widely maneuver along internal lines, create the threat of flank attacks on the Baltic and Belorussian fronts, blocking the path for Soviet troops to Warsaw.

On this ledge, the troops of the Army Group "Center" (commander Field Marshal E. Bush, from July 28 - Field Marshal V. Model) were defending as part of the 3rd Tank, 4th, 9th and 2nd armies with support of the 6th and partially the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the grouping consisted of 63 divisions and 3 brigades, I, 2 million people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, 1350 combat aircraft.

It should also be noted that the fascist German troops occupied a pre-prepared, defense in depth with a developed system of field fortifications and natural lines favorable for defensive operations.

The concept and preparation of the operation "Bagration"

The idea of ​​the Belarusian strategic operation was to pin down the enemy from the front with the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front and, delivering the main blows with the forces of the 3rd and 1st Baltic Fronts from the north and the 1st Belorussian Front from the south, first defeat the most powerful flank enemy groups, encircle and destroy them in the area of ​​Vitebsk and Bobruisk, and then, developing the offensive in depth, encircle the enemy's Minsk grouping and thereby prevent his withdrawal to the West.

It is interesting to note that initially the operations of the fronts were planned to a depth of 200-250 km. When such relatively limited tasks were assigned to the fronts, apparently, the syndrome of unsuccessful offensive operations of the Western Front in the autumn-winter campaign of 1943-1944 affected. This circumstance also affected the decisions of the German command. Having believed from the experience of previous military operations in the strength of its defense on the territory of Belarus, it believed that the Soviet command would not dare to deliver the main blow in Belarus in the summer of 1944 and therefore was waiting for it in the south, in the Lvov direction. Army commands and groups had only 11 divisions in reserve. By the beginning of the summer offensive of the Soviet troops, 24 out of 34 tank and motorized divisions were held south of Polesie. Looking ahead, let's say that when the Belarusian operation began, the command of the Nazi troops began to transfer most of the tank formations to Belarus, but at that time, with some ledge in time, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front began, and part of these German divisions had to return south. This thwarted the German plans for the massive use of the bulk of the armored forces for the consistent delivery of counterattacks and disruption of the Soviet offensive in the Lvov and Belorussian directions. This once again shows how skillfully and thoughtfully the Soviet command chose the timing and sequence of strikes against the enemy.

For the Belarusian operation, the following grouping of troops was created:

1st Baltic Front (commander General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan): 4th shock, 6th guards, 43 armies, 1 tank corps;

3rd Belorussian Front (commanded by Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky): 39th, 5th, 11th Guards, 31st Army, 5th Guards. TA, horse-mechanized group, 2nd Guards Tank Corps;

2nd Belorussian Front (commanded by Colonel General G.V. Zakharov): 33rd, 49th, 50th armies, 1st tank corps;

1st Belorussian Front (commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky): 3, 48, 65, 28, 61, 70, 47, Guards, 69th Army, during the operation - the 1st Army of the Polish Army (General Berling ), Dnieper Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev). The troops of the fronts supported: 3, 1, 4, 6, 16 air armies. Long-range air defense aviation was also involved.

In total, the group included: 20 combined arms and 2 tank armies, 166 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 21 brigades, 2.4 million personnel, 36 thousand guns and mortars, 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns , 5.3 thousand combat aircraft. Power ratio: sex / s 2: 1; artillery 3.8:1; tanks 5.8:1; aircraft 3.9:1 in our favor. Approximately 20% of these forces and assets were transferred to the fronts during the operation.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of the I PF and 3 BF, and Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. tasks, then in the Belarusian operation their rights were expanded, they were given the right to clarify tasks and directly supervise the combat operations of the fronts during the operation.

Belarusian partisans provided great assistance to the troops during the operation. By the summer of 1944, 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments with a total number of 143 thousand partisans were operating on Belarusian soil. Only on the night of June 20 they blew up 40 thousand rails.

Expecting an intensification of partisan operations from the beginning of the offensive of our troops, the command of the Army Group "Center" decided to send all reserve divisions and security units to destroy ■ the main forces of the partisans and blocking the remaining detachments in deep forests and swampy areas || away from critical communications. The main partisan formations and units were in an extremely difficult situation, and alarming signals were sent from them about the provision of urgent assistance. In this regard, the offensive of our troops was launched a few days earlier than expected.

To help the partisans, 10 columns of 50-60 vehicles with food and medicine were prepared in advance, which began to move to the partisan base areas following the advanced units immediately after breaking through the enemy defenses. The author of these lines happened to lead one of the columns, which was heading to the Palik Lake area.

The plan of the Belarusian strategic offensive operation as a whole and the plans for operations of the fronts were approved at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at the end of May. The directives were given to the fronts on May 30, signed by I. V. Stalin and G. K. Zhukov. Initially, in accordance with the plan of the General Staff, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver one blow in the Bobruisk direction. During the report to I. Stalin of his decision, K. Rokossovsky proposed to inflict not one, but two approximately equally powerful blows with the aim of encircling and destroying the Bobruisk enemy grouping. But theoretically it has always been considered that one of the blows should be the main one, and I.V. Stalin attached paramount importance to the choice of the direction of the main blow. Therefore, he twice invited Rokossovsky to go out and think about his decision again.

Konstantin Konstantinovich insisted on his own, and in the end, with the support of G.K. Zhukov, he managed to achieve the approval of his decision. It was, of course, justified. The 1st Belorussian Front included 10 combined arms armies - 50% of all the forces and means participating in the Belorussian operation, and it was irrational to use all these forces in one direction, where the enemy could transfer all his reserves and troops from others not attacked directions.

The commanders of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts also achieved a refinement of the plan originally outlined in the General Staff. I.D. Chernyakhovsky also suggested that, instead of one blow, strike two blows on the Bogushevsky and Orsha directions of the enemy’s defense, I.Kh. Bagramyan convinced the Stavka that after the breakthrough, it would be more profitable for his troops to develop the offensive not to the southwest, but to the west. From this we see how far from the truth are the statements of some historians that I.V. Stalin did not reckon with anyone. In reality, the process of making decisions and planning operations was of a purely creative, businesslike nature, when the plans of the General Staff and the fronts seemed to overlap, and the most rational decisions were worked out under the leadership of the Supreme Commander.

When the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front encircled and destroyed the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy, even the very restrained Stalin was forced to say: "What a fine fellow! ... insisted and achieved his goal ...". Even before the end of the Belarusian operation, K. Rokossovsky was awarded the rank of marshal, and I. Chernyakhovsky - army general.

In practice, the preparation of the troops of all the fronts mentioned for the offensive began as early as April 1944. It acquired the most purposeful character after the approval of the plans for the operation at the Supreme Command Headquarters (May 23-25) and the subsequent setting of combat missions for formations and formations. Enormous preparatory work was carried out in all instances: on conducting reconnaissance, planning combat operations, organizing combat, interaction between military branches, engineering equipment for starting positions, communication routes, combat training of each unit, taking into account specific upcoming tasks, resupplying troops with personnel and equipment, operational camouflage, transportation of ammunition, fuel and lubricants and other materiel. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops concentrated 4 rounds of ammunition, 10-20 fuel stations, 30-day food supplies - a total of 400 thousand tons of ammunition, 300 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants, 500 thousand tons of food and fodder. Only for the delivery of one ammunition load, 130 railway cars were required.

Moral and psychological preparation was carried out purposefully by the task of creating a high offensive impulse of the personnel. It was prepared a large number of improvised means for overcoming swamps by personnel and equipment (wet shoes, flooring, etc.).

Features of the development of an offensive operation.

Given that during previous offensive operations carried out by our troops, the fascist German troops, before our artillery preparation, suddenly withdrew their advanced subunits in depth; it was decided a day before the transition to the offensive of the main forces to conduct reconnaissance in combat by forward battalions in order to clarify the outline of the front line, the enemy’s fire system and achieve the greatest effectiveness of artillery preparation. In order to hide the direction of the offensive of the strike groups, reconnaissance in force was carried out on a wide front - 450 km. On the very first day, these battalions penetrated the enemy defenses to a depth of 2-4 km.

The enemy, mistaking the attack of the advanced battalions for the offensive of the main forces, brought into action the main forces, which, with the start of the general offensive on the morning of July 23, came under the influence of our powerful artillery fire and air strikes. All this from the very beginning predetermined successful breakthrough and the development of the offensive in the offensive zones of the 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian and 2nd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Belorussian Front began its offensive a day later - on June 24th. At the beginning, the defense breakthrough was very difficult, by 12.00 the attacking units managed to reach only the second enemy trench. G.K. Zhukov explained this by weak reconnaissance, overestimated breakthrough areas in the bands of the 3rd and 48th armies, and some other reasons. These circumstances seem to have had some significance. But it is not difficult to guess that with the beginning of the offensive on June 23 of other fronts, the enemy in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front prepared to repel attacks, and the element of tactical surprise was lost. In connection with the current situation, the commander of the front troops ordered the commanders A.V. Gorbatov and N.A. Romanenko regroup forces north of the direction of the main attack and continue the offensive with the introduction of reserves.

On July 26, especially after the 9th Panzer Corps was brought into battle, a turning point occurred, and the troops, having broken through the enemy defenses, began to develop the offensive in operational depth.

Historically, the course of the Belarusian operation is divided into two stages. At the first stage (from June 24 to July 4, 1944), the Polotsk, Bobruisk, Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev operations were carried out and the encirclement of the Minsk group of enemy troops was completed. In the Vitebsk area, the joint actions of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts encircled and defeated 5 enemy divisions. Initially, the enemy broke through the encirclement in the zone of the 39th Army and began to reach the rear of the 5th Army. Commander 5. And General N.I. Krylov, on his own initiative, threw parts of the 45th Rifle Corps onto this threatening sector and the group that had broken through was destroyed or captured.

On July 1, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated the city of Borisov. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, having broken through the enemy's defenses, forced the rivers Pronya, Basya, Dnieper, and on June 28 liberated the city of Mogilev.

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded and destroyed 6 enemy divisions in the area of ​​Bobruisk and reached the line of Svisloch, Osipovichi, Old Roads. The enemy group surrounded in Bobruisk tried to break through from the encirclement, but this action was thwarted by massive strikes of 16 VA.

As a result of the Minsk operation, Minsk was liberated on July 3, to the east of which the 100,000-strong grouping of the main forces of the 4th and 9th German armies was surrounded.

The task of completing the destruction of the Minsk group and capturing it was entrusted to the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the 31st Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

On July 17, more than 57,000 German prisoners of war, who had surrendered to Soviet troops, were led through the streets of Moscow.

The 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk and developed the offensive on Siauliai, in 12 days the front troops advanced to a depth of 225-280 km with an offensive rate of 20-25 km per day.

Thus, Army Group Center suffered a serious defeat. Field Marshal Bush was removed from office. With the release of our troops to the line of Polotsk, Lake. Naroch, Molodechno, Nesvizh, a gap of up to 400 km was formed in the strategic front of the Nazi troops. Using these favorable conditions, our troops developed a rapid pursuit of the enemy.

The German command began to urgently transfer reserves from the depths (including from the territory of France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, where the Normandy operation was going on), from Lvov and other strategic directions. Only from June 23 to July 16, 46 divisions and 4 brigades were transferred to Belarus.

As G.K. Zhukov noted, in this situation, the new commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal V. Model, showed operational flexibility. He did not take up defensive positions with suitable reserves in the entire zone, but concentrated his forces into one powerful shock fist and delivered rather strong counterattacks against our advancing troops, thereby delaying the development of our offensive in the Warsaw direction. We have to talk about this in order to remind once again that we were dealing with a very strong, skillful, determined enemy, and even in generally successful operations, victory was not easy, it had to be won in hard, intense battles. In the second stage of the Belorussian operation (July 5-1J to August 29), the advancing fronts, closely interacting with each other, successfully carried out the Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Belostok and Lublin-Brest operations.

On July 16, the city of Grodno was liberated, on July 26 - Brest. Our troops completed the liberation of Belarus, part of the territory of Lithuania, Poland and reached the approaches to Warsaw, and on August 17 they reached the East Prussian border. Advancing in a strip of up to 1,100 km along the front, our troops advanced to a foothold of 550-600 km and created favorable conditions for conducting offensive operations in the Lvov-Sandomierz direction and a subsequent offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction.

Not only in preparation, but also in the course of a successfully developing offensive operation, many difficulties and problems arose. During the offensive, not all tasks were solved easily. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the commanders of the troops of the fronts very demandingly achieved the fulfillment of the assigned tasks. When forcing the river. Berezina and subsequently the 5th Guards Tank Army operated unsuccessfully, as a result of which the army commander P.A. Rotmistrov was removed from his post. After the war, they wrote that it was removed unreasonably, since the army could not advance due to lack of fuel. But when General M. Solomatin was appointed instead of him, he ordered to collect the remnants of fuel from all tanks, fill them with tanks of 7O 80 vehicles and advanced units resumed the offensive. It turns out that you can always find a way out if you do not stop at difficulties and persistently look for ways to overcome them.

A lot of creativity, tactical ingenuity and perseverance in the performance of tasks was shown by the commanders of the armies, commanders of formations, units and subunits. The organization of combat operations, their comprehensive support had to be dealt with constantly, not only before the start of the operation, but also during the development of the offensive. For new tasks constantly arose, and the fulfillment of each of them required a great deal of organizational work.

Most of the personnel selflessly and skillfully performed combat missions, showing courage and courage. Everyone knows the feat of Private Yu. Smirnov from the 11th Guards. army and other warriors.

In a number of cases, the tank units that had pulled ahead took partisan detachments with them as infantry.

1,500 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; in July-August alone, more than 400,000 soldiers were awarded orders and medals. Many formations and units received the honorary names of Minsk, Bobruisk, Vitebsk, and the names of other cities. For example, the legendary 120 Guards. rifle division became Rogachev.

Marshal G.K. Zhukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the Belarusian operation, the main forces of the Army Group "Center" were defeated, the German troops lost 409.4 thousand soldiers and officers, including 255.4 thousand - irretrievably, 200 thousand German soldiers were taken prisoner by our troops.

Our losses were also heavy - 765,813 people were killed, wounded, missing and left due to illness, of which 178,507 people were irretrievably lost. From July 23 to August 29, the troops of four fronts lost 2957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2447 guns and mortars, 822 combat aircraft. From June 23 to the end of July, when there were battles for the liberation of Belarus, our losses amounted to 440,879 people, incl. 97,233 people were killed (6.6% of the total number of troops). In the counteroffensive near Moscow, irretrievable losses reached 12-14 percent. Thus, almost 100 thousand Soviet people - Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and representatives of other peoples - gave their lives for the liberation of Belarus.

Relatively big losses of our troops in the Belarusian operation, in addition to the general reasons characteristic of other operations, were explained, first of all, by the fact that the Army Group Center included selected German formations and units, which for almost two years successfully defended on the territory of the Smolensk region , Belarus and created a heavily fortified defense.

In addition, in contrast to the fronts of the southern direction, which over the past years have carried out a number of large-scale offensive operations, the troops of the western direction had mainly to defend themselves or conduct offensives limited in scale. And they had no experience in conducting large offensive operations. At the second stage of the Belarusian operation, infantry and some other units were understaffed mainly at the expense of the local population of the liberated regions, which were included in the combat units without prior military training. And in general, the tasks assigned to the troops were successfully completed.

Thus, first of all, at the operational-strategic level, every element of the decision, every practical step in the preparation of the operation was so comprehensively thought out, with such foresight the possible options for the course of the operation, and the necessary measures in the event of an unfavorable development of events, were determined that the subordinate troops were placed in the most favorable conditions for the fulfillment of their tasks.

The main thing was that the concept and scope of the Bagration operation, the purposeful and concrete creative and organizational work of the commanders and staffs created a general atmosphere of upsurge and confidence, which very often neutralize, make, as it were, not so significant shortcomings in the actions of tactical commanders and troops ( yen and create favorable conditions for them to carry out their tasks.In one case, as was the case on the Western and Crimean fronts, the high command, without taking all the necessary efforts depending on it, completely shifts the entire burden of hostilities onto subordinate troops, hoping with its tough pressure to squeeze everything possible and impossible out of them and force them to complete the task at any cost, blaming them for failures.In another case, as happened on the 1st and 3rd Belorussian fronts in the Belorussian operation, the high command took on a significant part of the burden, with in order to put subordinate troops in the most favorable conditions for the performance of combat missions. Such bosses will never shift the blame on their subordinates, but will take full responsibility for themselves.

These are the most important operational-strategic conclusions from the experience of the Byelorussian operation, which are of current importance even in modern conditions.

New in military art

During the Belarusian operation, Soviet military art was further developed. First of all, in contrast to the winter campaign of 1943-1944, when the Western, Belorussian fronts carried out separate front-line operations, in the summer of 1944, the Headquarters of the All-Russian Supreme Command organized and carried out an integral single strategic operation, the plan of which was to combine efforts and coordinately act the troops of four fronts , Long-range aviation and air defense formations, which made it difficult for the enemy to maneuver with forces and means. As part of the Belarusian operation, several operations were carried out to encircle and destroy the enemy (Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Minsk). Moreover, in the Minsk operation, for the first time, a large enemy grouping was surrounded not in its original position, as it was near Stalingrad, but during the development of the offensive in operational depth. And if near Stalingrad the 6th army of the Nazi troops was first surrounded, and then for 2.5 months they were engaged in its destruction, then the encirclement, dismemberment and destruction of the enemy grouping east of Minsk were carried out simultaneously as a single operational process. At the same time, frontal and parallel pursuit of the enemy was carried out with the release of moving units on the flanks and behind enemy lines. This was a new phenomenon in military art.

The Byelorussian operation is also characterized by a more daring and resolute massing of forces and means in the directions of the main strikes. In these areas, which accounted for approximately 1/3 total length front, concentrated up to 50% of personnel, 60-65% of artillery and tanks, the main part of aviation. Taking into account the increased depth and strength of the enemy's defense, high densities of forces and means were created. Thus, up to 50% of rifle divisions, 50-80% of artillery, over 80% of tanks and self-propelled guns, and almost all aviation were concentrated in the breakthrough areas, which accounted for 10-15% of the total offensive zone of the fronts, which ensured a density of up to 250-300 guns and mortars , 20-30 tanks and self-propelled guns (taking into account the tank corps and armies introduced in these areas - up to 80 armored units) on the 1st km of the front. Thus, a decisive superiority over the enemy was achieved in the breakthrough areas: in infantry - 3-5 times, in artillery and tanks 6-8 times, aviation - 3-5 times. Artillery and aviation training became more powerful. Fire damage was carried out to a depth of 8-10 km. For comparison, we recall that in offensive operations in 1941-1942. the density of forces and means did not exceed 20-80 for guns and mortars, 3-12 for tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front. The bold and covert massing of forces and means ensured the enormous power of the first strike and the rapid development of success in depth and on the flanks.

During the operation, especially during the defeat of the Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk enemy groupings, massive use of aviation was carried out, which made it possible to achieve the destruction of the most important enemy groupings and the defeat of his suitable reserves in a short time. During the Belarusian operation, the Air Force carried out 153,000 sorties.

In conditions when in Belarus it was necessary to break through the defense in depth of the enemy, it was necessary to abandon the formal replenishment of the requirements of the NPO order No. In the armies, corps, divisions and regiments operating on the main axes, a two-echelon formation of combat formations was carried out or strong reserves were allocated.

A new method of artillery support for the attack of infantry and tanks was used in the form of a double barrage.

All commanders of the troops of the fronts and most of the army commanders acted with great foresight, foreseeing the necessary measures in advance in case of unforeseen actions by the enemy and other changes in the situation.

Much was instructive in ensuring the secrecy of the preparation of the operation and the surprise of actions.

For example, K. Rokossovsky and I. Bagramyan in some directions delivered strikes in the most difficult areas of the terrain and achieved success only because the enemy did not expect this, the youngest front commander I. Chernyakhovsky was especially creative and inventive. He did everything not in the usual way, not according to the standard rules of military art, but in such a way that his actions took into account the specifics of the current situation to the maximum extent and were unexpected for the enemy.

Usually, before the start of an offensive, disinformation measures are carried out for operational camouflage in order to show preparations for defense.

But Chernyakhovsky, contrary to this hackneyed rule, begins to designate a false concentration of troops using wooden mock-ups precisely in those areas where the actual concentration of strike groups for the offensive was envisaged. The Germans, as a sign that they "revealed" the plan of our command, bombed these areas several times with wooden bombs. Only after that the commander of the troops of the front advances his troops to the initial areas for the offensive. As a result, the blows of the 3rd Belorussian Front were unexpected for the enemy.

On the whole, the decision of General I.D. Chernyakhovsky for the operation turned out to be not only original, far-sighted, very well thought out, taking into account the weak and strengths the enemy and his own search, terrain conditions, but also very flexible, which ensured early readiness to respond to changes in the situation and guaranteed the successful development of the offensive under any circumstances. Thus, the encirclement of the Vitebsk enemy grouping from the south was entrusted to the 39th Army. But at the same time, in case of a breakthrough from the encirclement, one division of the second echelon of the 45th rifle corps of the 5th army was aimed at this direction. As it turned out later, without these additional forces, the encircled enemy could make a breakthrough to the south.

The 5th Guards Tank Army - a mobile front group - was intended for operations in the Orsha direction in the 11th Guards Army zone. But at the same time, the issues of introducing the 5th Guards Tank Army in the 5th Army lane were carefully worked out, which was very useful, since the offensive of the 11th Guards Army at first developed slowly and the tank army had to be introduced precisely according to the second option.

Troop control at the operational and tactical level was characterized by its maximum approach to the troops in front. If in the operations of 1941-1942. command posts of the fronts were located 60-80 km from the front line (on the Western Front and in 1943 - 100 km), army command posts 40-80 km, and permanent observation posts were not always created, then in the Belarusian operation command front points were located on the lines of action of the main groupings at a distance of 25-40 km, armies - 8-15 km from the front line. During this period, observation posts began to play the role of forward command posts and were located at a distance of 2-3 km from the front line. This increased the efficiency of command and control, allowed commanders to directly observe the battlefield, communicate closely with subordinates, and quickly respond to changes in the situation. The control posts of formations and units were located directly in the battle formations of the advanced units.

During the offensive operation, the commanders of the troops of the fronts, armies, commanders of formations and units widely maneuvered their forces and means, quickly increasing the power of the offensive in the directions where the greatest success was planned.

The high pace of the offensive, the increased maneuverability of troops, and the efficiency of command and control were facilitated by the equipping of artillery, tank and mechanized units, headquarters with highly passable vehicles received under Lend-Lease.

Lessons for training personnel in modern conditions

The most important lesson is the clarification of the fact that, along with many other objective factors, the personality of the commander, commander, commander, creative and active, proactive staff is of great and sometimes decisive importance.

An illustrative example. Belarusian and Western fronts in the autumn-winter campaign of 1943-1944. acted in approximately the same conditions, but with Rokossovsky - the operation is relatively successful, and with Sokolovsky - a complete failure. How can lessons be drawn from this positive and bitter experience for today in terms of training, education and selection of military personnel, especially instilling efficiency in their activities, resolutely getting rid of formalism, improving the methods of work of command and staff in command and control of troops, taking into account modern requirements?

Based on the experience of the Belarusian operation, we will focus mainly on the moments that the author of these lines had to witness, who had the opportunity to see the work of the commander of the front, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, the commander of the 5th Army, General N.I. Krylov, the commander of the 45th Rifle Corps, General S. G. Poplavsky and a number of other commanders. All their activities were so deeply imbued with the interests of carrying out the concept of the operation, so organically merged with the finest features of the situation, and the methods of organizing combat operations were so concrete and objective that in all this creative and organizational process there was no room for formalism, abstract conversations and theoretical rhetoric. Only what was needed for the upcoming battle and operation was done.

So, for example, General Chernyakhovsky worked in the 184th Infantry Division of Major General B. Gorodovikov. Instead of listening to the decision in detail, as was the case before, he carefully studied the decision cards (silently, concentratedly), then asked several questions: where exactly was the enemy’s front line, the lines of transfer of artillery fire during the attack, the calculation of the time for the advancement of tanks from their original positions, where counterattacks and forces are possible, the means to repel them.

After listening to the answers, he briefly and clearly clarified the procedure for solving some problems. When working at the forefront, he demanded to indicate the places for making passes in the minefields of the enemy and the procedure for overcoming them, compared the planned artillery fires on the maps of the commanders of the rifle battalion and the artillery battalion. Having discovered one inaccuracy, he ordered the division commander to compare all the cards of the commanders of rifle and artillery units. He gave the command to fire two shells at one of the prepared areas of fire. I made sure that the fire was prepared, basically, accurately. Arriving at the initial concentration area for tanks of the NPP, he heard a concise report from the officers of the tank technical service of the front on the readiness of the tanks for battle, and then ordered the company commander and the driver of the lead tank to lead it along the route of the advancement of the NPP tanks. Having reached the deployment line and making sure that the company commander knew the places of passages in his minefields, he went to the positions of the regimental artillery group. No stories or verbal explanations of how the nomination, change of position or other tasks will be carried out. Everything was checked only practically, in practice. For malfunctions and errors in the preparation of hostilities, there was a strict demand. A deadline was set for the elimination of deficiencies. When mistakes were repeated, some commanders were removed from their posts and replaced by more energetic and experienced ones.

Such military leaders as K.K. Rokossovsky, I.D. Chernyakhovsky. N.I. Krylov, P.I. Batov, I.I. Lyudnikov, S.G. Poplavsky and many others, taking into account the acquired combat experience, especially clearly understood that the most important, decisive for a successful breakthrough of the defense, are two most important conditions: the first is a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s defense system and fire weapons, the second is the precise imposition of artillery fire and air strikes on specific identified targets in order to reliably destroy and suppress them. If we exaggerate this problem a little, then from the practice of all attacks and offensive battles it becomes more and more obvious that if these two tasks - reconnaissance and fire defeat are carried out accurately and reliably, then even with a not very organized attack, successful advancement of troops and breakthrough of the enemy defenses were achieved. . This, of course, is not about any underestimation of the need for successful actions by infantry, tanks and other branches of the armed forces in the course of an attack and the development of an offensive. Without this, it is impossible to fully use the results fire damage enemy. But it is also true that no harmonious and "beautiful" attack will make it possible to overcome the resistance of the enemy if his firepower is not suppressed. This is equally important in both big and small wars and in the fight against terrorism.

The attitude to this issue also determined the direction of combat training before the start of an offensive operation. In some cases, as was noted in the troops of the Western Front in the winter of 1943-1944, everything came down to training in the deployment and movement of units on the attack, and only formally (often verbally) the tasks of conducting reconnaissance and fire damage were worked out. In others, as was the case in the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, along with practicing the actions of troops in an attack and during an offensive, the main emphasis was placed on training commanders, staff officers, reconnaissance units, artillery and infantry observers to identify enemy fire weapons and accurate, effective use of all their firepower. In the rear, strongholds were also equipped, similar to those that were to be found in the depths of the enemy’s defense.

In the classroom and exercises, painstaking work was carried out to determine the locations of the enemy’s fire weapons day and night, to compare the schemes (maps) of the designated defense and the results of its reconnaissance, methods of calling, transferring and ceasefire, and many other issues of interaction between rifle, tank, artillery and sapper units. Such exercises and exercises were not as flashy and attractive as the attacks of tanks and infantry, it can be said that they were outwardly very routine and even seemed boring to some commanders, but in fact they were saturated with great internal content, reproducing the most complex and difficult issues. combat, on which his success depended in the first place.

It took considerable time and the expenditure of very great labor until commanders and scouts mastered the art of identifying, notching and accurately marking enemy firepower on maps. I with the same thoroughness worked out with commanders of all degrees and other issues of organizing the battle. All this ensured the success of the Belarusian operation.

From all that has been said, the conclusion suggests itself how important it is when making a decision, planning an operation, not only to determine the groupings, but also to reveal a possible plan for enemy actions, to foresee and think over possible conditions development of the operation, carefully calculate the balance of forces, create the necessary groupings of friendly troops, determine the most expedient and unexpected methods of action for the enemy, comprehensively provide and prepare the operation in moral-political, operational, rear and technical terms.

Decision-making, planning operations were seen as very important, but only the initial part of their preparation. After that, directly on the ground, in the troops, hard work continued on studying the enemy, clarifying tasks, organizing interaction, transporting materiel, engineering equipment of the starting position, carrying out camouflage, disinformation and other measures for all types of operational, logistic and technical support, combat training of troops taking into account the upcoming combat missions. With the commanders and headquarters of the operational level, the proposed course of the operation was worked out at command and staff exercises.

G.K.Zhukov, A.V.Vasilevsky, the commanders of the Fronts and armies in the preparation of the operation met not only with the commanders, commanders, but also with officers and soldiers on the front line. And in general, in the entire system of measures for the preparation of the operation, an extremely important month-10 was occupied by educational work in order to achieve a high political spirit, courage, courage and offensive impulse of the personnel, to mobilize them for the successful fulfillment of the assigned combat missions. The complex and varied activities of the command and staff in preparing the operation were carried out with great responsibility and the utmost exertion of human strength and capabilities.

Particularly great importance was attached to the training of commanders, staffs and troops. A distinctive feature of all these exercises and trainings was their purposefulness, concreteness and maximum approximation of training to the actual conditions of the combat mission that the troops were directly to perform. In the areas where the formations of the second echelons were located, approximately the same strongholds were equipped as were in the enemy's position, and the troops trained in their assault and overcoming.

Artillery, engineering units and other reinforcements were involved in all battalion, regimental and other similar exercises, which were supposed to jointly carry out combat missions. At first, the exercises and trainings were carried out mainly by the tactical-combat method, and then ended with the continuous development of all training issues and the combat coordination of subunits and units.

Not all commanders were able to immediately comprehend the "secrets" and master the art of such substantive preparatory work. It was not always that in training and exercises the most thoroughly worked out precisely those questions and methods of action that were of decisive importance for the success of the offensive. Newly arrived officers and generals did not really believe that these were the methods of organizing combat operations, because they were too different from what they were taught. Already during the Belarusian operation, when they were preparing fighting on crossing the Neman River, the deputy chief of staff of the 5th army, who had recently arrived from the academy, came to the 184th rifle division “for control and assistance”. For a long time he watched with bewilderment how the division commander, Major General B. Gorodovikov, worked with one or another regiment commander at the NP, or rather, it would be more accurate to say - he thought with them, consulted, argued, and then came to a certain decision and determined the tasks, the procedure for artillery preparation, forcing the river and actions on the bridgehead (the issues of crossing tanks and artillery pieces along the bottom of the river). B. Gorodovikov had an imperious character and, when setting goals, he could, of course, have acted more categorically. But the responsibility was so great that in the process of live communication with the regimental commanders, he apparently wanted to once again check the correctness of his decisions and not only formally order, but at the same time convince his subordinates that this is how it should be done.

After about 1-1.5 hours, the checking general, whose patience was already at the limit, turned to the division commander: “Comrade Gorodovikov! I'm waiting for you to issue a combat order." “Now I’ll explain to the regimental commanders how to cross the river, how to take that bank, there will be time left, I will give this combat order,” the division commander replied.

This short episode reflected two different eras in the field of command and control, two different approaches to solving specific military tasks. The representative of the academic school recognized only a monologue when issuing a combat order and organizing interaction with the obligatory listing of all points and statutory requirements. The commander, who had taken a sip of combat experience, was absorbed only in how best to bring the task to his subordinates, to achieve its deep understanding. Any experienced commander during the war knew that he would be judged not by how he outwardly “correctly” organized the battle, but solely by how the combat mission would be completed. Therefore, it was pointless for him to pay attention to the external side of the matter.

All this had to be recalled more than once during post-war exercises, when, after a loud and pathos announced lengthy combat order and many hours of instructions on interaction, subordinate commanders and heads of military branches could not really understand what tasks were set and how they should act. For the whole process of developing a solution, setting tasks, organizing combat operations was saturated with formalism, and the main concern of the commanders and staffs was not to better complete the task (the exercises often went according to the plan, and the leadership cared more about this than the trainees), and in an effort to better "show" yourself. Yes, and they judged the commanders mainly by the way they reported. Outwardly, everything seemed to be “correct”, but it was completely divorced from the essence of the matter. All hard work in preparation for battle and operations, they began to basically reduce it to the development of numerous, cumbersome documents, where concrete tasks and the essence of the matter were buried among the abundance of abstract theoretical provisions. The main part of the work of commanders and staffs in organizing the battle began to recede into the background. Gradually, the precious experience gained during the war began to be lost. Especially great harm was caused by exercises where the commanders of formations and formation commanders themselves acted as leaders of the exercises conducted with these formations, formations and acted in these exercises, knowing in advance the situation on both sides and the course of its development.

Thus, the perverted system of operational and combat training gave rise to military leaders of various calibers, who became more like bad military propagandists than combat commanders.

Flaws in the training and education of personnel also affected the quality of combat training of the troops as a whole. The more and louder they talked about the maximum approximation of troop training to what is required in the war, the more it broke away from the interests of combat reality.

In the 60s, when he was the chief of staff of the 28th Army of the Belarusian Military District, the author had a chance to conduct a regimental tactical exercise, where the main emphasis was on reconnaissance and fire engagement of the enemy, i.e. tasks, the fulfillment of which, according to the experience of the war, depended on the success of the battle and operation. All the chiefs of reconnaissance of formations and units, as well as all the reconnaissance equipment of the division laid down for wartime, were involved in the exercise. In the disposition of the defending side, all enemy fire weapons were actually marked and simulated, which periodically changed their locations. Despite the availability of reconnaissance assets, which were required by the state and more advanced than during the war, during the three days of preparing the offensive, only 15-18% of all targets available in the enemy’s defenses were identified and accurately spotted. Then, with the permission of the district headquarters, we asked the Grodno regional military commissar to call from the reserve 30 artillery and other intelligence officers with combat experience. Despite the fact that they lost their previous skills in many respects, after two days 50-60% of the enemy’s fire weapons were opened. On this example, one could once again see how difficult this is - real intelligence, for the effective conduct of which it is absolutely not enough to study foreign armies. Here, practical skills brought to perfection are needed, which are acquired by repeated training in reconnaissance.

The senior chief who arrived for the exercise was extremely dissatisfied that so much study time was spent on working out only one educational issue. “During this time,” he said, “it was already possible to work out 5-6 attacks.” And before my eyes there also surfaced sad pictures of our endless attacks in the operations of the Western Front, and how successfully the offensive developed in the summer of 1944, and how in many post-war exercises we reduced everything to only completely unprepared attacks, and how success was given to the troops depending on , whether the enemy is reconnoitered and suppressed or not. And in the light of all this, it was thought with heartache that in the event of war we would again have a hard time.

How did it happen that in an army consisting mainly of many and well-fought people, the combat experience suffered during the war was so easily lost? This is one of the biggest mysteries, the unequivocal answer to which is not so easy to give. But one of the reasons, apparently, was that far from the best personnel came to the leadership, there were many teachers left in military schools and academies who did not sip the “lead experience” properly and did not understand the full depth of its inner essence. Front-line soldiers who came to military educational institutions, both as students and teachers, being still not very knowledgeable in the field of theory, at first looked at it more with reverence than from the point of view of critical experience. At the same time, for some reason, it was believed that military science was the highest sphere of activity that special people should be engaged in, although, as it has now become clear, it was people with combat experience who were supposed to feed science with new ideas and thoughts. And the whole system of ostentation and showing off, the neglect of business, the encouragement of dullness and the suppression of creativity, which was established after the war, did not contribute much to the organic combination of theory and practice.

And today, in higher educational institutions, the main drawback of military training and education of officers is that they are reduced mainly to the study of theoretical provisions, the development of various documents, and the development of a commanding character, developed operational-tactical thinking, strong-willed, organizational qualities necessary for display of martial arts. The main flaw in the methods of operational and combat training is that the situation characteristic of modern military operations is not reproduced to the fullest extent, and conditions are not created in which trainees could train themselves and systematically show themselves.

It is well known that in order to instill intelligence, courage and diligence in officers, it is necessary in all classes and exercises to put them in such conditions when they could systematically, in practice, demonstrate these qualities.

We are not talking about the fact that after the war it was necessary to teach the army what was in the last war. Everyone understands that the content of military training should be oriented towards the future achievements of military art. But the very approach to solving operational and tactical tasks, the wide creativity and methods of specific organizational work that were manifested at the same time, the thoroughness and painstaking work with subordinate commanders and troops of all preparatory measures, the ability to train troops in exactly what may be required of them cannot become obsolete. in a combat situation, and much more, which determines the whole spirit of military art, in which there are, if not "eternal", then very long-lived principles and provisions.

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Belarusian operation 1944
	Belarus, Lithuania, eastern regions of Poland.
	Red Army victory. Liberation of Belarus and Lithuania. The entry of Soviet troops into Poland.
Opponents
PKNO, 1st Army of the Polish Army	BCR, Belarusian Regional Defense
Poland, Home Army
Commanders
Ivan Bagramyan (1st Baltic Front)
Ivan Chernyakhovsky (3rd Belorussian Front)
Georgy Zakharov (2nd Belorussian Front)	Georg Reinhardt (3rd Panzer Army)
Konstantin Rokossovsky (1st Belorussian Front)	Kurt von Tippelskirch (4th Field Army)
Georgy Zhukov (coordinator of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts)
Alexander Vasilevsky (coordinator of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts)
Alexey Antonov (development of the operation plan)
	Walter Weiss (2nd Field Army)
Side forces
(at the time of the start of the operation) 2.4 million people, 36 thousand guns and mortars, St. 5 thousand tanks, St. 5 thousand aircraft	(according to Soviet data) 1.2 million people, 9500 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1350 aircraft
178,507 killed/missing 587,308 wounded, 2,957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,447 guns and mortars, 822 combat aircraft	Exact losses are unknown. Soviet data: 381 thousand dead and missing, 150 thousand wounded 158,480 prisoners David Glantz: estimate from below - 450 thousand total losses. Alexey Isaev: more than 500 thousand people Steven Zaloga: 300-350 thousand people, including 150 thousand prisoners (until the 10th of July)

Belarusian offensive operation, "Bagration"- a large-scale offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War, carried out on June 23 - August 29, 1944. It was named so in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812, P.I. Bagration. One of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

Significance of the operation

During this extensive offensive, the territory of Belarus, eastern Poland and part of the Baltic states was liberated and the German Army Group Center was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, partly due to the fact that A. Hitler forbade any retreat. Subsequently, Germany was no longer able to make up for these losses.

Background of the operation

By June 1944, the front line in the east approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge ledge - a wedge facing deep into the USSR, the so-called "Belarusian balcony". If in Ukraine the Red Army managed to achieve a series of impressive successes (almost the entire territory of the republic was liberated, the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses in the chain of "boilers"), then when trying to break through in the direction of the Minsk Winter of 1943-1944, the successes, on the contrary, were quite modest.

At the same time, towards the end of the spring of 1944, the offensive in the south slowed down, and the Supreme High Command decided to change the direction of efforts. As K.K. Rokossovsky noted,

Side forces

The data on the forces of the parties differ in various sources. According to the publication “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War”, 1 million 200 thousand people participated in the operation from the Soviet side (excluding rear units). On the German side - as part of the Army Group "Center" - 850-900 thousand people (including approximately 400 thousand in the rear). In addition, at the second stage, the right wing of the North Army Group and the left wing of the Northern Ukraine Army Group took part in the battle.

Four fronts of the Red Army were opposed by four armies of the Wehrmacht:

• the 2nd Army of Army Group Center, which held the area of ​​Pinsk and Pripyat, acted 300 km east of the front line;
• the 9th Army of Army Group Center, which defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk;
• The 4th Army and the 3rd Panzer Army of the Army Group Center, which occupied the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper, as well as the bridgehead from Bykhov to the area northeast of Orsha. In addition, units of the 3rd Panzer Army occupied the Vitebsk region.

Composition of the parties

The section shows the alignment of forces of the German and Soviet troops as of June 22, 1944 (the corps of the Wehrmacht and the army of the Red Army are listed in the order of their alignment from north to south, reserves are indicated separately first).

Germany

Army Group Center (Field Marshal Ernst Busch, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Krebs)

• 6th Air Fleet (Colonel-General von Greim)

* 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel-General Reinhardt) composed of:

• • 95th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Michaelis);
  • 201st Security Division (Lieutenant General Jacobi);
  • battle group "von Gottberg" (SS Brigadeführer von Gottberg);

* 9th Army Corps (General of Artillery Wutmann);

• • 252nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Meltzer);
  • corps group "D" (lieutenant general Pamberg);
  • 245 Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Knupling);

* 53rd Army Corps (General of the Infantry Gollwitzer);

• • 246th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Müller-Büllow);
  • 206th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Hitter);
  • 4th Air Field Division of the Luftwaffe (Lieutenant General Pistorius);
  • 6th Air Field Division of the Luftwaffe (Lieutenant General Peschel);

* 6th Army Corps (General of Artillery Pfeiffer);

• • 197th Infantry Division (Major General Hane);
  • 299th Infantry Division (Major General Junk);
  • 14th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Flerke);
  • 256th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Wüstenhagen);
  • 667 assault gun brigade (Hauptmann Ulman);
  • 281st Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Fenkert);

* 4th Army (General of Infantry Tippelskirch) composed of:

• • Panzergrenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" (Major General von Steinkeller);

* 27th Army Corps (General of the Infantry Voelkers);

• • 78th Assault Division (Lieutenant General Trout);
  • 25th Panzer Grenadier Division (Lieutenant General Schürmann;
  • 260th Infantry Division (Major General Klammt);
  • 501st Heavy Tank Battalion (Major von Legat)

* 39th Panzer Corps (Artillery General Martinek);

• • 110th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Kurowski);
  • 337th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Schünemann);
  • 12th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Bamler);
  • 31st Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Ochsner);
  • 185th Assault Gun Brigade (Major Glossner);

* 12th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Muller);

• • 18th Panzer Grenadier Division (Lieutenant General Tzutavern);
  • 267th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Drescher);
  • 57th Infantry Division (Major General Trowitz);

* 9th Army (General of the Infantry Jordan) composed of:

• • 20th Panzer Division (Lieutenant General von Kessel);
  • 707th Infantry Division (Major General Gittner);

* 35th Army Corps (Lieutenant General von Lutzow);

• • 134th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Philip);
  • 296th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Kulmer);
  • 6th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Heine);
  • 383rd Infantry Division (Major General Gere);
  • 45th Infantry Division (Major General Engel);

* 41st Army Corps (Lieutenant General Hoffmeister);

• • 36th Infantry Division (Major General Konradi);
  • 35th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Richert);
  • 129th Infantry Division (Major General von Larisch);

* 55th Army Corps (Infantry General Herrlein);

• • 292nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Jon);
  • 102nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Berken);

* 2nd Army (Colonel General Weiss) composed of:

• • 4th Cavalry Brigade (Major General Holste);

* 8th Army Corps (Infantry General Khon);

• • 211th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Eckard);
  • 5th Jaeger Division (Lieutenant General Tumm);

* 23rd Army Corps (General engineering troops Tiemann);

• • 203rd Security Division (Lieutenant General Pilz);
  • 17th Tank Grenadier Brigade (Colonel Kerner);
  • 7th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Rappard);

* 20th Army Corps (General of Artillery von Roman);

• • corps group "E" (lieutenant general Feltsmann);
  • 3rd Cavalry Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Boeselager);

In addition, the Hungarian units were subordinate to the 2nd Army: 5th, 12th and 23rd reserve and 1st cavalry division. The 2nd Army took part only in the second phase of the Belarusian operation.

* 1st Baltic Front (Army General Bagramyan) composed of:

* 4th Shock Army (Lieutenant General Malyshev);

• • 83rd Rifle Corps (Major General Soldatov);
  • reinforcement parts;

* 6th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Chistyakov);

• • 2nd Guards Rifle Corps (hereinafter Guards Rifle Corps)(Lieutenant General Ksenofontov);
  • 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Ruchkin);
  • 23rd Guards rifle corps (lieutenant general Ermakov);
  • 103rd Rifle Corps (Major General Fedyunkin);
  • 8th howitzer artillery division;
  • 21st breakthrough artillery division;

* 43rd Army (Lieutenant General Beloborodov);

• • 1st Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Vasiliev);
  • 60th Rifle Corps (Major General Lyukhtikov);
  • 92nd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Ibyansky);
  • 1st Tank Corps (Lieutenant General Butkov);

* 3rd Air Army (Lieutenant General Papivin);

* 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel-General Chernyakhovsky) composed of:

• • 5th Artillery Corps;

* 11th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Galitsky);

• • 8th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Zavodovsky);
  • 16th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Vorobyov);
  • 36th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Shafranov);
  • 2nd Tank Corps (Major General Burdeyny);
  • 7th Guards division of guards mortars (rocket artillery);

* 5th Army (Lieutenant General Krylov);

• • 45th Rifle Corps (Major General Gorokhov);
  • 65th Rifle Corps (Major General Perekrestov);
  • 72nd Rifle Corps (Major General Kazartsev);
  • 3rd Guards breakthrough artillery division;

* 31st Army (Lieutenant General Glagolev);

• • 36th Rifle Corps (Major General Oleshev);
  • 71st Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Koshevoy);
  • 113th Rifle Corps (Major General Provalov);

* 39th Army (Lieutenant General Lyudnikov);

• • 5th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Bezugly);
  • 84th Rifle Corps (Major General Prokofiev);

* 5th Guards Tank Army (Marshal Rotmistrov);

• • 3rd Guards tank corps (major general Bobchenko);
  • 29th Tank Corps (Major General Fominykh);

* Horse-mechanized group (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky);

• • 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky);
  • 3rd Guards mechanized corps (lieutenant general Obukhov);

* 1st Air Army (Lieutenant General Gromov);

* 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel-General Zakharov) composed of:

* 33rd Army (Lieutenant General Kryuchenko);

• • 70th, 157th, 344th rifle divisions;

* 49th Army (Lieutenant General Grishin);

• • 62nd Rifle Corps (Major General Naumov);
  • 69th Rifle Corps (Major General Multan);
  • 76th Rifle Corps (Major General Glukhov);
  • 81st Rifle Corps (Major General Panyukov);

* 50th Army (Lieutenant General Boldin);

• • 19th Rifle Corps (Major General Samara);
  • 38th Rifle Corps (Major General Tereshkov);
  • 121st Rifle Corps (Major General Smirnov);

* 4th Air Army (Colonel General Vershinin);

* 1st Belorussian Front (Army General Rokossovsky) composed of:

• • 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Kryukov);
  • 4th Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Pliev);
  • 7th Guards Cavalry Corps (Major General Konstantinov);
  • Dnieper river flotilla (Captain 1st rank Grigoriev;

* 3rd Army (Lieutenant General Gorbatov);

• • 35th Rifle Corps (Major General Zholudev);
  • 40th Rifle Corps (Major General Kuznetsov);
  • 41st Rifle Corps (Major General Urbanovich);
  • 80th Rifle Corps (Major General Ragulya);
  • 9th Tank Corps (Major General Bakharov);
  • 5th Guards Mortar Division;

* 28th Army (Lieutenant General Luchinsky);

• • 3rd Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Perkhorovich);
  • 20th Rifle Corps (Major General Shvarev);
  • 128th Rifle Corps (Major General Batitsky);
  • 46th Rifle Corps (Major General Erastov);
  • 5th breakthrough artillery division;
  • 12th breakthrough artillery division;

* 48th Army (Lieutenant General Romanenko);

• • 29th Rifle Corps (Major General Andreev);
  • 42nd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Kolganov);
  • 53rd Rifle Corps (Major General Gartsev);
  • 22nd breakthrough artillery division;

* 61st Army (Lieutenant General Belov);

• • 9th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Popov);
  • 89th Rifle Corps (Major General Yanovsky);

* 65th Army (Lieutenant General Batov);

• • 18th Rifle Corps (Major General Ivanov);
  • 105th Rifle Corps (Major General Alekseev);
  • 1st Guards Tank Corps (Major General Panov);
  • 1st Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General Krivoshein);
  • 26th artillery division;

* 6th Air Army (Lieutenant General Polynin);

* 16th Air Army (Colonel-General Rudenko);

In addition, the 1st Belorussian Front included the 8th Guards, 47th, 70th, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank armies, which took part only in the second phase of the Belorussian operation.

Operation preparation

Red Army

Initially, the Soviet command imagined the Bagration operation as a repetition of the Battle of Kursk, something like the new Kutuzov or Rumyantsev, with a huge consumption of ammunition with a subsequent relatively modest advance of 150-200 km. Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into the operational depth, with long, stubborn battles in the tactical defense zone for attrition - required a large amount of ammunition and a relatively small amount of fuel for mechanized units and modest capacities for the restoration of railways, the actual development of the operation turned out to be for the Soviet command of the unexpected.

The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed by the General Staff in April 1944. The general plan was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of Minsk, and completely liberate Belarus. It was an extremely ambitious and large-scale plan, the simultaneous crushing of an entire army group was planned very rarely during the course of the war.

Significant personnel changes were made. General V. D. Sokolovsky failed to prove himself in the battles of the winter of 1943-1944 (the Orsha offensive operation, the Vitebsk offensive operation) and was removed from command of the Western Front. The front itself was divided in two: the 2nd Belorussian Front (to the south) was headed by G.F. Zakharov, who showed himself well in battles in the Crimea, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, who had previously commanded the army in Ukraine, was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front (to the north).

The direct preparation of the operation was carried out from the end of May. Specific plans were received by the fronts on May 31 in private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

According to one version, according to the original plan, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver one powerful blow from the south, in the Bobruisk direction, but K.K. and two main blows. He motivated his statement by the fact that in the heavily swamped Polesie, with one breakthrough, the armies would bump into each other's heads, clog the roads in the near rear, and as a result, the troops of the front could only be used in parts. According to K.K. Rokossovsky, one blow should have been delivered from Rogachev to Osipovichi, the other from Ozarichi to Slutsk, while surrounding Bobruisk, which remained between these two groups. The proposal of K.K. Rokossovsky caused a heated debate in the Stavka, the members of the Stavka insisted on delivering one blow from the Rogachev area, in order to avoid dispersal of forces. The dispute was interrupted by I. V. Stalin, who declared that the persistence of the front commander spoke of the thoughtfulness of the operation. Thus, K.K. Rokossovsky was allowed to act in accordance with his own idea.

However, G.K. Zhukov argued that this version is not true:

A thorough reconnaissance of enemy forces and positions was organized. The extraction of information was carried out in many directions. In particular, the reconnaissance teams of the 1st Belorussian Front captured about 80 "languages". Air reconnaissance of the 1st Baltic Front spotted 1100 different firing points, 300 artillery batteries, 6000 dugouts, etc. Active acoustic, undercover reconnaissance was also carried out, the study of enemy positions by artillery observers, etc. Due to the combination of various reconnaissance methods and its intensity, the enemy grouping was revealed quite completely.

The headquarters tried to achieve maximum surprise. All orders to the commanders of the units were given personally by the commanders of the armies; telephone conversations relating to preparations for the offensive, even in coded form, were forbidden. The fronts preparing for the operation went into radio silence. At the forefront, active earthworks were carried out to simulate preparations for defense. Minefields were not removed completely, so as not to alarm the enemy, sappers limited themselves to screwing fuses from mines. The concentration of troops and regroupings were carried out mainly at night. Specially assigned officers of the General Staff on planes patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures.

The troops conducted intensive training to work out the interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks, assault operations, forcing water barriers, etc. Units were withdrawn one by one from the front line to the rear for these exercises. Testing of tactical techniques was carried out in conditions as close as possible to combat and with live fire.

Before the operation, commanders of all levels up to companies carried out reconnaissance, setting tasks for subordinates on the spot. Artillery spotters and officers were introduced into the tank units. air force for better interaction.

Thus, the preparation of the operation "Bagration" was carried out extremely carefully, while the enemy was left in the dark about the upcoming offensive.

Wehrmacht

If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of ​​​​the future offensive, then the command of the Army Group Center and the General Staff of the Ground Forces of the Third Reich had a completely wrong idea about the forces and plans of the Soviet troops. Hitler and the High Command believed that a major offensive should still be expected in Ukraine. It was assumed that from the area south of Kovel, the Red Army would strike in the direction of the Baltic Sea, cutting off the Army Groups "Center" and "North". Significant forces were allocated to parry the phantom threat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of heavy tanks "Tiger". In the Army Group "Center" there were one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and only one battalion "Tigers". In April, the command of Army Group Center presented its leadership with a plan to reduce the front line and withdraw the army group to better positions beyond the Berezina. This plan was rejected. Army Group "Center" defended in the same positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared "fortresses" and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense. For construction work, forced labor of the local population was widely used. In particular, in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Army, 15-20 thousand inhabitants were sent to such work.

Kurt Tippelskirch (then commander of the 4th Field Army) describes the mood in the German leadership as follows:

There was as yet no data that would have made it possible to predict the direction or directions of the undoubted Russian summer offensive that was being prepared. Since aviation and radio intelligence usually unmistakably noted large transfers of Russian forces, one could think that an offensive from their side was not yet directly threatened. So far, only in one case have intensive railway transportations lasting for several weeks behind enemy lines in the direction of the Lutsk, Kovel, Sarny region have been recorded, which, however, were not followed by the concentration of newly arrived forces near the front. At times it was necessary to be guided only by guesses. The general staff of the ground forces considered the possibility of repeating the offensive on Kovel, believing that the enemy would concentrate the main efforts north of the Carpathians on the front of the Northern Ukraine Army Group, in order to push the latter back to the Carpathians. Army Groups "Center" and "North" predicted a "calm summer." In addition, the Ploiesti oil region was of particular concern to Hitler. Regarding the fact that the first blow of the enemy will follow north or south of the Carpathians - most likely north - the opinion was unanimous.

The positions of the troops defending in the Army Group "Center" were seriously strengthened field fortifications, equipped with numerous interchangeable positions for machine guns and mortars, bunkers and dugouts. Since the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, the Germans managed to create a developed defense system.

From the point of view of the General Staff of the Third Reich, the preparations against Army Group Center were only intended to "mislead the German command regarding the direction of the main attack and pull back reserves from the area between the Carpathians and Kovel." The situation in Belarus inspired so little concern in the Reich command that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the operation.

The course of hostilities

The preliminary stage of the operation symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the USSR - June 22, 1944. As in the Patriotic War of 1812, one of the most significant battlefields was the Berezina River. Soviet troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts (commanders - Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, Army General G. F. Zakharov, Army General K. K. Rokossovsky), with the support of partisans, broke through the defenses of the German Army Group Center in many areas (commander - Field Marshal E. Bush, later - V. Model), surrounded and liquidated large enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius , Brest and east of Minsk, liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and its capital Vilnius (July 13), the eastern regions of Poland and reached the borders of the Narew and Vistula rivers and to the borders of East Prussia.

The operation was carried out in two stages. The first stage took place from June 23 to July 4 and included the following front-line offensive operations:

• Vitebsk-Orsha operation
• Mogilev operation
• Bobruisk operation
• Polotsk operation
• Minsk operation

• Vilnius operation
• Šiauliai operation
• Bialystok operation
• Lublin-Brest operation
• Kaunas operation
• Osovets operation

Partisan actions

The offensive was preceded by an action of partisans unprecedented in scale. Numerous partisan formations operated in Belarus. According to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, during the summer of 1944, 194,708 partisans joined the troops of the Red Army. The Soviet command successfully linked the actions of partisan detachments with military operations. The goal of the partisans in the operation "Bagration" was, at first, to disable enemy communications, and later - to prevent the retreat of the defeated units of the Wehrmacht. Massive actions to defeat the German rear were launched on the night of June 19-20. Eike Middeldorf said:

The plans of the partisans included the commission of 40 thousand various explosions, that is, in fact, only a quarter of what was planned was carried out, however, it was enough that it was accomplished to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. The head of the rear communications of the army group, Colonel G. Teske stated:

Railways and bridges became the main object of application of partisan forces. In addition to them, communication lines were disabled. All these actions greatly facilitated the advance of troops at the front.

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

If the “Belarusian Balcony” as a whole protruded to the east, then the area of ​​the city of Vitebsk was a “ledge on a ledge”, protruding even further from the northern part of the “balcony”. The city was declared a "fortress", a similar status had Orsha located south. The 3rd Panzer Army under the command of General G. H. Reinhardt was defending in this sector (the name should not be deceived, there were no tank units in the 3rd Panzer Army). The Vitebsk region itself was defended by its 53rd Army Corps under the command of General F. Gollwitzer ( English). Orsha was defended by the 17th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army.

The operation was carried out on two fronts. The 1st Baltic Front, under the command of General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, operated on the northern flank of the future operation. His task was to surround Vitebsk from the west and develop the offensive further southwest towards Lepel. The 3rd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel-General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, operated further south. The task of this front was, firstly, to create a southern "claw" of encirclement around Vitebsk, and secondly, to independently cover and take Orsha. As a result, the front was supposed to reach the area of ​​the city of Borisov (south of Lepel, southwest of Vitebsk). For operations in depth, the 3rd Belorussian Front had a cavalry-mechanized group (mechanized corps, cavalry corps) of General N. S. Oslikovsky and the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov.

To coordinate the efforts of the two fronts, a special task force of the General Staff was created, headed by Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky.

The offensive began with reconnaissance in force early in the morning of June 22, 1944. In the course of this reconnaissance, it was possible in many places to break into the German defenses and capture the first trenches. The next day was the main blow. The main role was played by the 43rd Army, which covered Vitebsk from the west, and the 39th Army under the command of I. I. Lyudnikov, which surrounded the city from the south. The 39th Army had practically no overall superiority in men in its zone, but the concentration of troops in the breakthrough sector made it possible to create a significant local superiority. The front was quickly broken both to the west and south of Vitebsk. The 6th Army Corps, which was defending south of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Within a few days the corps commander and all division commanders were killed. The remaining parts of the corps, having lost control and communication with each other, made their way to the west in small groups. The railway Vitebsk - Orsha was cut. On June 24, the 1st Baltic Front reached the Western Dvina. The counterattack of Army Group North units from the western flank failed. In Beshenkovichi, "corps group D" was surrounded. A cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky was introduced into the gap south of Vitebsk, and began to quickly move to the south-west.

Since the desire of the Soviet troops to encircle the 53rd Army Corps was undeniable, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army G.Kh. On the morning of June 24, Chief of the General Staff K. Zeitzler arrived in Minsk. He got acquainted with the situation, but did not give permission to withdraw, having no authority to do so. A. Hitler initially forbade the withdrawal of the corps. However, after Vitebsk was completely surrounded, on June 25 he approved the breakthrough, ordering, however, to leave one - the 206th Infantry Division in the city. Even before that, F. Gollwitzer had withdrawn the 4th airfield division somewhat to the west to prepare a breakthrough. This measure, however, came too late.

On June 25, in the Gnezdilovichi area (southwest of Vitebsk), the 43rd and 39th armies linked up. In the Vitebsk region (the western part of the city and the southwestern environs), the 53rd Army Corps of F. Gollwitzer and some other units were surrounded. The 197th, 206th and 246th infantry, as well as the 6th airfield division and part of the 4th airfield division, got into the "cauldron". Another part of the 4th aviation field was surrounded to the west, near Ostrovno.

In the Orsha direction, the offensive developed rather slowly. One of the reasons for the lack of spectacular success was the fact that the strongest of the German infantry divisions, the 78th assault, was located near Orsha. She was much better equipped than the others and, in addition, had the support of almost fifty self-propelled guns. Also in this area were parts of the 14th motorized division. However, on June 25, the 3rd Belorussian Front introduced the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov into the breakthrough. She cut the railway leading from Orsha to the west at Tolochin, forcing the Germans to withdraw from the city or die in the "boiler". As a result, by the morning of June 27, Orsha was released. The 5th Guards Tank Army was advancing southwest towards Borisov.

On the morning of June 27, Vitebsk was completely cleared of the encircled German group, which had been continuously subjected to air and artillery strikes the day before. The Germans made active efforts to break out of the encirclement. During the day of June 26, 22 attempts were recorded to break through the ring from the inside. One of these attempts was successful, but the narrow corridor was sealed after a few hours. A group of about 5,000 people that broke through was again surrounded around Moshno Lake. On the morning of June 27, General of the Infantry F. Gollwitzer capitulated with the remnants of his corps. F. Gollwitzer himself, the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Schmidt, the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Hitter (Buchner erroneously listed as killed), the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, Major General Müller-Bülow, and others were captured.

At the same time, small boilers near Ostrovno and Beshenkovichi were destroyed. The last large group of encirclement was led by the commander of the 4th airfield division, General R. Pistorius ( English). This group, trying to leave through the forests to the west or southwest, on June 27 stumbled upon the 33rd anti-aircraft division marching in marching columns and was dispersed. R. Pistorius died in battle.

The forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts began to develop success in the southwestern and western direction. By the end of June 28, they liberated Lepel and reached the Borisov area. The retreating German units were subjected to continuous and most severe air strikes. There was little opposition from the Luftwaffe. Highway Vitebsk - Lepel, according to I. Kh. Bagramyan, was literally littered with dead and broken equipment.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the 53rd Army Corps was almost completely destroyed. According to V. Haupt, two hundred people broke through from the corps to the German units, almost all of them were wounded. Parts of the 6th Army Corps and Corps Group D were also defeated. Vitebsk and Orsha were liberated. The losses of the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet applications, exceeded 40 thousand dead and 17 thousand prisoners (the 39th Army, which destroyed the main "cauldron", showed the best results). The northern flank of Army Group Center was swept away, and thus the first step was taken towards the complete encirclement of the entire group.

Mogilev operation

As part of the battle in Belarus, the Mogilev direction was auxiliary. According to G.K. Zhukov, who coordinated the operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, the rapid pushing of the German 4th Army out of the “cauldron”, which was created by strikes through Vitebsk and Bobruisk to Minsk, was meaningless. Nevertheless, in order to accelerate the collapse of the German forces and the fastest advance, the offensive was organized.

On June 23, after effective artillery preparation, the 2nd Belorussian Front began forcing the Pronya River, along which the German defensive line passed. Since the enemy was almost completely suppressed by artillery, sappers built 78 light bridges for infantry and four 60-ton bridges for heavy equipment in a short time. After a few hours of battle, according to the testimony of prisoners, the number of many German companies fell from 80-100 to 15-20 people. However, units of the 4th Army managed to retreat to the second line along the Basya River in an organized manner. By June 25, the 2nd Belorussian Front captured very few prisoners and vehicles, that is, it had not yet reached the rear communications of the enemy. However, the Wehrmacht army gradually retreated to the west. Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper north and south of Mogilev, on June 27 the city was surrounded and taken by attack the next day. About two thousand prisoners were captured in the city, including the commander of the 12th Infantry Division R. Bamler and the commandant of Mogilev G. G. von Ermansdorf, who was later found guilty of committing numerous serious crimes and hanged.

Gradually, the withdrawal of the 4th Army lost organization. The connection of the units with the command and with each other was broken, the units were mixed up. The retreating troops were subjected to frequent air raids, which caused heavy losses. On June 27, the commander of the 4th Army, K. von Tippelskirch, gave an order by radio for a general withdrawal to Borisov and Berezina. However, many retreating groups did not even receive this order, and not all of those who received it were able to comply.

Until June 29, the 2nd Belorussian Front announced the destruction or capture of 33 thousand enemy soldiers. The trophies included, among other things, 20 tanks, presumably from the Feldhernhalle motorized division operating in the area.

Bobruisk operation

The Bobruisk operation was supposed to create a southern "claw" of a huge encirclement, conceived by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. This action was entirely carried out by the most powerful and numerous of the fronts participating in the Bagration operation - the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. Initially, only the right flank of the front took part in the offensive. He was opposed by the 9th field army of General H. Jordan. As well as near Vitebsk, the task of crushing the flank of Army Group Center was solved by creating a local "cauldron" around Bobruisk. The plan of K.K. Rokossovsky as a whole represented the classic "Cannes": from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th Army advanced (reinforced by the 1st Don Tank Corps), from the east to the west the 3rd I am an army that includes the 9th Panzer Corps. For a quick breakthrough to Slutsk, the 28th Army was used with the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev. The front line in the area of ​​operation made a bend to the west near Zhlobin, and Bobruisk, among other cities, was declared a “fortress” by A. Hitler, so that the enemy himself in some way contributed to the implementation of Soviet plans.

The offensive near Bobruisk began in the south on June 24, that is, somewhat later than in the north and center. Bad weather at first severely limited aviation operations. In addition, the terrain conditions in the offensive zone were very difficult: it was necessary to overcome an extremely large, half a kilometer wide, swampy swamp. However, this did not stop the Soviet troops, moreover, the corresponding direction was chosen intentionally. Since the German defense was quite dense in the well-passable area of ​​Parichi, the commander of the 65th Army, P. I. Batov, decided to advance somewhat to the south-west, through a swamp that was relatively poorly guarded. The quagmire was overcome along the gats. P. I. Batov noted:

On the first day, the 65th Army broke through the defenses of the enemy, completely stunned by such a maneuver, to a depth of 10 km, and a tank corps was introduced into the breakthrough. A similar success was achieved by its left-flank neighbor - the 28th Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. A. Luchinsky.

The 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, on the contrary, met stubborn resistance. H. Jordan used his main mobile reserve, the 20th Panzer Division, against her. This seriously slowed down progress. The 48th Army under the command of P. L. Romanenko, advancing to the left of the 28th Army, was also stuck due to the extremely difficult terrain. In the afternoon, the weather improved, which made it possible to actively use aviation: 2465 sorties were carried out by aircraft, but progress remained insignificant.

The next day, on the southern flank, the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev was introduced into the breakthrough. The contrast between the rapid offensive of P.I. Batov and the slow gnaw through of the defense by A.V. Gorbatov and P.L. Romanenko was noticeable not only to the Soviet, but also to the German command. H. Jordan diverted to southern sector The 20th Panzer Division, which, however, having entered the battle "from the wheels", was unable to eliminate the breakthrough, lost half of its armored vehicles and was forced to retreat to the south.

As a result of the retreat of the 20th Panzer Division and the introduction of the 9th Panzer Corps into battle, the northern "claw" was able to advance deeply. On June 27, the roads leading from Bobruisk to the north and west were intercepted. The main forces of the German 9th Army were surrounded by a diameter of about 25 km.

H. Jordan was removed from the command of the 9th Army, instead of him General of the Tank Forces N. von Forman was appointed. However, personnel changes could no longer affect the position of the encircled German units. There were no forces capable of organizing a full-fledged deblocking strike from the outside. An attempt by the reserve 12th Panzer Division to cut through the “corridor” failed. Therefore, the encircled German units began to independently make energetic efforts to break through. The 35th Army Corps, located east of Bobruisk, under the command of von Lutzow, began to prepare for a breakthrough to the north to join the 4th Army. On the evening of June 27, the corps, having destroyed all weapons and property that could not be carried away, made an attempt to break through. This attempt generally failed, although some groups managed to pass between the Soviet units. On June 27, communication with the 35th Corps was interrupted. The last organized force in the encirclement was General Hoffmeister's 41st Panzer Corps. The groups and individual soldiers who lost control gathered in Bobruisk, for which they crossed the Berezina to the western coast - they were continuously bombed by aircraft. Chaos reigned in the city. The commander of the 134th Infantry Division, General Philip, shot himself in despair.

On June 27, the assault on Bobruisk began. On the evening of the 28th, the remnants of the garrison made the last attempt to break through, while 3,500 wounded were left in the city. The attack was led by the surviving tanks of the 20th Panzer Division. They managed to break through the thin barrier of Soviet infantry to the north of the city, but the retreat continued under air strikes, causing heavy losses. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was cleared. About 14 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were able to get to the positions of the German troops - for the most part they were met by the 12th Panzer Division. 74 thousand soldiers and officers died or were captured. Among the prisoners was the commandant of Bobruisk, Major General Haman.

The Bobruisk operation ended successfully. The destruction of two corps, the 35th Army Corps and the 41st Tank Corps, the capture of both their commanders and the liberation of Bobruisk took less than a week. As part of Operation Bagration, the defeat of the German 9th Army meant that both flanks of Army Group Center were left bare, and the road to Minsk was open from the northeast and southeast.

Polotsk operation

After the crushing of the front of the 3rd Panzer Army near Vitebsk, the 1st Baltic Front began to develop success in two directions: to the northwest, against the German grouping near Polotsk, and to the west, in the direction of Glubokoye.

Polotsk caused concern among the Soviet command, since this next "fortress" now hung over the flank of the 1st Baltic Front. I. Kh. Bagramyan immediately set about eliminating this problem: there was no pause between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. Unlike most of the battles of Operation Bagration, near Polotsk, the main enemy of the Red Army was, in addition to the remnants of the 3rd Panzer Army, Army Group North represented by the 16th Field Army under the command of General H. Hansen. On the enemy side, only two infantry divisions were used as reserves.

June 29 was followed by a blow to Polotsk. The 6th Guards and 43rd Armies bypassed the city from the south (the 6th Guards Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th Shock Army - from the north. The 1st Panzer Corps captured the city of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. The corps seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina with a surprise attack. The counterattack planned by the 16th Army simply did not take place.

The partisans provided considerable assistance to the attackers, intercepting small groups of the retreating, and sometimes attacking even large military columns.

However, the defeat of the Polotsk garrison in the cauldron did not take place. Karl Hilpert, who commanded the defense of the city, arbitrarily left the "fortress" without waiting until the escape routes were cut. Polotsk was liberated on 4 July. Failure in this battle cost Georg Lindemann, commander of Army Group North, the post. It should be noted that despite the absence of "cauldrons", the number of prisoners was significant for an operation that lasted only six days. The 1st Baltic Front announced the capture of 7,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

Although the Polotsk operation was not crowned with a defeat similar to what happened near Vitebsk, it brought significant results. The enemy lost a stronghold and a railway junction, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of Army Group North were outflanked from the south and were in danger of being hit on the flank.

After the capture of Polotsk, there were organizational rearrangements for new tasks. The 4th shock army was transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front, on the other hand, the 1st Baltic Front received the 39th Army from Chernyakhovsky, as well as two armies from the reserve. The front line moved 60 km to the south. All these measures were associated with the need to improve the controllability of the troops and strengthen them before the upcoming operations in the Baltic.

Minsk operation

On June 28, Field Marshal E. Bush was removed from command of Army Group Center, his place was taken by Field Marshal V. Model, who was a recognized specialist in defensive operations. Several fresh formations were sent to Belarus, in particular, the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.

Retreat of the 4th Army for the Berezina

After the collapse of the northern and southern flanks near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the German 4th Army was squeezed into a kind of rectangle. The eastern "wall" of this rectangle was formed by the Drut River, the western - by the Berezina, the northern and southern - by Soviet troops. To the west was Minsk, which was targeted by the main Soviet attacks. The flanks of the 4th Army were not actually covered. The environment looked imminent. Therefore, the army commander, General K. von Tippelskirch, ordered a general retreat across the Berezina to Minsk. The only way to do this was a dirt road from Mogilev through Berezino. The troops and rear institutions that had accumulated on the road tried to cross the only bridge to the western bank of the Berezina under constant destructive attacks from attack aircraft and bombers. The military police withdrew from the regulation of the crossing. In addition, the retreating were attacked by partisans. Additionally, the situation was complicated by the fact that numerous groups of soldiers from units defeated in other sectors, even from near Vitebsk, joined the retreating troops. For these reasons, the passage through the Berezina was slow and was accompanied by great sacrifices. It should be noted that the pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, located directly in front of the 4th Army, was insignificant, since the plans of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not include the expulsion of the enemy from the trap.

Battle south of Minsk

After the crushing of two corps of the 9th Army, K.K. Rokossovsky received new tasks. The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two directions, to the southwest, towards Minsk, and west, to Vileyka. The 1st Belorussian Front received a symmetrical task. Having achieved impressive results in the Bobruisk operation, the 65th and 28th armies and the mechanized cavalry group of I. A. Pliev turned strictly to the west, to Slutsk and Nesvizh. The 3rd Army of A. V. Gorbatova advanced to the north-west, towards Minsk. The 48th army of P. L. Romanenko became a bridge between these shock groups.

In the offensive of the front, mobile formations were in the lead - tank, mechanized units and cavalry-mechanized groups. The cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev, moving quickly towards Slutsk, reached the city on the evening of June 29. Since the enemy in front of the 1st Belorussian Front was for the most part defeated, resistance was weak. The city of Slutsk itself was an exception: it was defended by units of the 35th and 102nd divisions, which suffered serious losses. The Soviet troops estimated the Slutsk garrison to be about two regiments.

Faced with organized resistance in Slutsk, General I. A. Pliev organized an assault from three sides at the same time. The flank coverage brought success: on June 30, by 11 o'clock in the morning, Slutsk was cleared by a cavalry-mechanized group with the assistance of infantry that had bypassed the city.

By July 2, the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev captured Nesvizh, cutting off the escape route to the southeast for the Minsk group. The offensive developed quickly, with only small scattered groups of soldiers resisting. On July 2, the remnants of the German 12th Panzer Division were thrown back from Pukhovichi. By July 2, the tank corps of the front of K.K. Rokossovsky approached Minsk.

Fight for Minsk

At this stage, German mobile reserves began to arrive at the front, withdrawn mainly from the troops operating in Ukraine. On June 26-28, the 5th Panzer Division under the command of General K. Dekker arrived northeast of Minsk, in the Borisov region. It posed a serious threat, given that over the previous few months it had hardly taken part in hostilities and was staffed almost to its full strength (including in the spring the anti-tank battalion was re-equipped with 21 Jagdpanzer IV / 48 tank destroyers, and in June a fully staffed battalion of 76 "panthers"), and upon arrival in the Borisov region was reinforced by the 505th heavy battalion (45 "tiger" tanks). The weak point of the Germans in this area was the infantry: these were either security or infantry divisions that suffered significant losses.

On June 28, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the horse-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps set off to force the Berezina and advance on Minsk. 5th Panzer Army, marching in the middle order of battle, on the Berezina, she collided with a group of General D. von Saucken (the main forces of the 5th Panzer Division and the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion). The group of D. von Saucken had the task of holding the Berezina line in order to cover the retreat of the 4th Army. On June 29 and 30, extremely tough battles were fought between this group and two corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 5th Guards Tank Army advanced with great difficulty and heavy losses, but during this time the cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the arrows of the 11th Guards Army crossed the Berezina, breaking the weak resistance of the police units, and began to cover the German division from the north and south. The 5th Panzer Division, under pressure from all sides, was forced to retreat with heavy losses after brief but fierce street fighting in Borisov itself. After the collapse of the defense at Borisov, N. S. Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group was aimed at Molodechno (north-west of Minsk), and the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were aimed at Minsk. The right-flank 5th Combined-Arms Army at that time was moving north strictly west, to Vileika, and the left-flank 31st Army followed the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Thus, there was a parallel pursuit: Soviet mobile formations overtook the retreating columns of the encircled group. The last frontier on the way to Minsk was broken. The Wehrmacht suffered serious losses, and the proportion of prisoners was significant. The claims of the 3rd Belorussian Front included over 22,000 German soldiers killed and over 13,000 captured. Together with a large number of destroyed and captured vehicles (almost 5 thousand vehicles, according to the same report), it can be concluded that the rear services of Army Group Center were subjected to heavy blows.

To the northwest of Minsk, the 5th Panzer Division gave another serious battle to the 5th Guards. tank army. On July 1-2, a heavy mobile battle took place. German tankers announced the destruction of 295 Soviet combat vehicles. Although such claims should be treated with caution, there is no doubt that the losses of the 5th Guards. tank army were heavy. However, in these battles, the 5th TD was reduced to 18 tanks, and all the “tigers” of the 505th heavy battalion were also lost. In fact, the division lost the ability to influence the operational situation, while the strike potential of the Soviet armored units was by no means exhausted.

July 3 2nd Guards. the tank corps approached the outskirts of Minsk and, having made a roundabout maneuver, broke into the city from the north-west. At that moment, the advance detachment of the Rokossovsky front approached the city from the south, and the 5th Guards advanced from the north. tank army, and from the east - the advanced detachments of the 31st combined arms army. Against such numerous and powerful formations in Minsk, there were only about 1,800 regular troops. It should be noted that the Germans managed to evacuate more than 20 thousand wounded and rear soldiers on July 1-2. However, quite numerous stragglers (mostly unarmed) still remained in the city. The defense of Minsk was very short: by 13:00 the capital of Belarus was liberated. This meant that the remnants of the 4th Army and the units that joined it, more than 100 thousand people, were doomed to captivity or extermination. Minsk fell into the hands of the Soviet troops heavily destroyed during the fighting in the summer of 1941, in addition, retreating, Wehrmacht units caused additional destruction to the city. Marshal Vasilevsky stated: “On July 5 I visited Minsk. The impression I have left is extremely heavy. The city was heavily destroyed by the Nazis. Of the large buildings, the enemy did not have time to blow up only the house of the Belarusian government, the new building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, the radio factory and the House of the Red Army. Power plant, railway station, most industrial enterprises and institutions were blown up ""

Collapse of the 4th Army

The encircled German group made desperate attempts to break out to the west. The Germans even attempted attacks with bladed weapons. Since the army management fled to the west, the actual command of the remnants of the 4th field army was carried out instead of K. von Tippelskirch by the commander of the 12th army corps, W. Muller.

The Minsk "cauldron" was shot through with artillery fire and aircraft, ammunition was running out, supplies were completely absent, so an attempt to break through was made without delay. To do this, the encircled were divided into two groups, one led by W. Muller himself, the other was led by the commander of the 78th assault division, Lieutenant General G. Traut. On July 6, a detachment under the command of G. Traut, numbering 3 thousand people, made an attempt to break through at Smilovichi, but collided with units of the 49th Army and was killed after a four-hour battle. On the same day, G. Trout made a second attempt to get out of the trap, but before reaching the crossings over the Svisloch near Sinelo, his detachment was defeated, and G. Trout himself was captured.

On July 5, the last radiogram was sent from the "cauldron" to the command of the army group. She said:

There was no answer to this desperate appeal. The outer front of the encirclement quickly shifted to the west, and if at the moment of closing the ring it was enough to pass 50 km to break through, soon the front passed already 150 km from the boiler. From the outside, no one made their way to the surrounded. The ring was shrinking, resistance was suppressed by massive shelling and bombing. On July 8, when the impossibility of a breakthrough became obvious, W. Muller decided to capitulate. Early in the morning, he left, focusing on the sounds of artillery fire, towards the Soviet troops, and surrendered to units of the 121st Rifle Corps of the 50th Army. They immediately wrote the following order:

"July 8, 1944. To all soldiers of the 4th Army, located in the area east of the Ptich River! Our position, after many days of heavy fighting, became hopeless. We have fulfilled our duty. Our combat readiness has practically been reduced to nothing, and there is no reason to count on the resumption of supplies. According to the Wehrmacht High Command, Russian troops are already near Baranovichi. The path along the river is blocked, and we cannot break through the ring on our own. We have a huge number of wounded and soldiers who have strayed from their units. The Russian command promises: a) medical assistance to all the wounded; b) officers to leave orders and edged weapons, soldiers - orders. We are required to: collect and hand over in good condition all available weapons and equipment. Let's put an end to senseless bloodshed! I order: Stop resistance immediately; gather in groups of 100 or more under the command of officers or senior non-commissioned officers; concentrate the wounded at collection points; act clearly, energetically, showing comradely mutual assistance. The more discipline we show when surrendering, the sooner we will be put on allowance. This order must be distributed orally and in writing by all available means. lieutenant general and commander XII Army Corps.

The commanders of the Red Army were quite self-critical about the actions to defeat the Minsk "cauldron". The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, General G.F. Zakharov, expressed extreme dissatisfaction:

However, during July 8 - 9, the organized resistance of the German troops was broken. Until July 12, the cleansing continued: partisans and regular units combed the forests, neutralizing small groups of encircled. After that, the fighting east of Minsk finally stopped. More than 72 thousand German soldiers died, more than 35 thousand were captured.

The second stage of the operation

On the eve of the second stage of Operation Bagration, the Soviet side tried to exploit the success achieved as much as possible, while the German side tried to restore the front. At this stage, the attackers had to deal with the arriving enemy reserves. Also at this time, there were new personnel changes in the leadership of the armed forces of the Third Reich. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, K. Zeitzler, proposed withdrawing Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with its help. This proposal was rejected by A. Hitler for political reasons (relations with Finland), and also because of the objections of the naval command: leaving the Gulf of Finland worsened communications with the same Finland and Sweden. As a result, K. Zeitzler was forced to leave the post of chief of the general staff, and was replaced by G. V. Guderian.

Field Marshal V. Model, for his part, tried to erect a defensive line running from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi and seal a hole in the front 400 km wide. To do this, he had at his disposal the only army of the Center group that had not yet been hit - the 2nd, as well as reinforcements and the remnants of the defeated units. In sum, these were obviously insufficient forces. V. Model received significant assistance from other sectors of the front: by July 16, 46 divisions had been transferred to Belarus. However, these formations were introduced into battle gradually, often "from the wheels", and could not quickly change the course of the battle.

Šiauliai operation

After the liberation of Polotsk, the 1st Baltic Front of I. Kh. Bagramyan received the task of attacking in the north-west direction, towards Dvinsk and west, towards Kaunas and Sventsyan. Overall plan consisted of a breakthrough to the Baltic and cutting off Army Group North from other Wehrmacht forces. To prevent the troops of the front from being stretched along different lines of operations, the 4th shock army was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front. Instead, the 39th Army was transferred from the 3rd Belorussian Front. Reserves were also transferred to the front: it included the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer and the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze. These rearrangements caused a slight pause, since on July 4 only two of the front's armies had an enemy in front of them. The reserve armies marched to the front, the 39th was also on the march after the defeat of the Vitebsk "cauldron". Therefore, until July 15, the battle went on without the participation of the armies of Ya. G. Kreizer and P. G. Chanchibadze.

Expecting an attack on Dvinsk, the enemy transferred part of the forces of Army Group North to this area. The Soviet side estimated the enemy forces near Dvinsk at five fresh divisions, as well as a brigade of assault guns, security, sapper and penal units. Thus, the Soviet troops did not have superiority in forces over the enemy. In addition, fuel shortages forced Soviet aviation greatly reduce activity. Because of this, the offensive that began on July 5 stalled by the 7th. Shifting the direction of the blow helped only move forward a little, but did not create a breakthrough. On July 18, the operation in the Dvina direction was suspended. According to I. Kh. Baghramyan, he was ready for such a development of events:

The advance to Sventsiany was much easier, since the enemy did not throw in such significant reserves in this direction, and the Soviet grouping, on the contrary, was more powerful than against Dvinsk. Advancing, the 1st Panzer Corps cut the Vilnius-Dvinsk railway. By July 14, the left flank had advanced 140 km, leaving Vilnius south and moving towards Kaunas.

Local failure did not affect general course operations. The 6th Guards Army again went on the offensive on July 23, and although its advance was slow and difficult, on July 27 Dvinsk was cleared in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right. After July 20, the introduction of fresh forces began to affect: the 51st Army reached the front line and immediately liberated Panevezys, after which it continued to move towards Siauliai. On July 26, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps was brought into battle in its lane, which went to Siauliai on the same day. The resistance of the enemy was weak, from the German side there were mainly separate operational groups, so Siauliai was taken already on July 27.

The enemy quite clearly understood the intention of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to cut off the North group. J. Frisner, the commander of the army group, drew A. Hitler's attention to this fact on July 15, arguing that if the army group does not reduce the front and is not withdrawn, isolation and, possibly, defeat await it. However, there was no time to withdraw the group from the emerging "bag", and on July 23, G. Frisner was removed from his post and sent south, to Romania.

common goal The 1st Baltic Front consisted of access to the sea, so the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, as a mobile front group, was turned almost at a right angle: from west to north. I. Kh. Bagramyan formalized this turn with the following order:

By July 30, it was possible to separate the two army groups from each other: the vanguards of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic in the Tukums region. On July 31, after a rather tense assault, Jelgava fell. Thus, the front went to the Baltic Sea. Arose, in the words of A. Hitler, "a gap in the Wehrmacht." At this stage, the main task of the front of I. Kh. Baghramyan was to retain what had been achieved, since an operation at great depth would lead to a stretching of communications, and the enemy was actively trying to restore land communications between army groups.

The first of the German counterattacks was an attack near the city of Birzhai. This town was located at the junction between the 51st Army, which had broken through to the sea, and the ledge of the 43rd Army, following it on the right. The idea of ​​the German command was to go through the positions of the 43rd Army covering the flank to the rear of the 51st Army running to the sea. The enemy used a fairly large grouping from the Army Group North. According to Soviet data, five infantry divisions (58th, 61st, 81st, 215th and 290th), the Nordland motorized division, the 393rd assault gun brigade and other units participated in the battle. On August 1, going on the offensive, this group managed to encircle the 357th Rifle Division of the 43rd Army. The division was rather small (4 thousand people) and was in a difficult situation. However, the local "cauldron" was not subjected to serious pressure, apparently due to a lack of strength from the enemy. The first attempts to unblock the encircled unit failed, but communication was maintained with the division, it had an air supply. The situation was reversed by the reserves thrown in by I. Kh. Bagramyan. On the night of August 7, the 19th Panzer Corps and the encircled division, which was beating from the inside of the "cauldron", united. Birzhai was also kept. Of the 3908 people who were surrounded, 3230 people left in the ranks and about 400 were wounded. That is, the losses in people were moderate.

However, the counterattacks of the German troops continued. On August 16, attacks began in the Raseiniai area and west of Siauliai. The German 3rd Panzer Army tried to push the Red Army back from the Baltic Sea and reestablish contact with Army Group North. Units of the 2nd Guards Army were pushed back, as were units of the neighboring 51st Army. By August 18, in front of the 2nd Guards Army, the 7th, 5th, 14th tank divisions and the tank division "Grossdeutschland" (in the document erroneously - "SS division") were installed. The situation near Siauliai was stabilized by the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. However, on August 20, an offensive began from the west and east towards Tukums. Tukums was lost, and for a short time the Germans restored land communication between Army Groups Center and North. The attacks of the German 3rd Panzer Army in the Siauliai region failed. At the end of August there was a break in the battles. The 1st Baltic Front completed its part of Operation Bagration.

Vilnius operation

The destruction of the 4th Wehrmacht Army east of Minsk opened up attractive prospects. On July 4, I. D. Chernyakhovsky received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with the task of advancing in the general direction on Vilnius, Kaunas and by July 12, freeing Vilnius and Lida, and subsequently seizing a bridgehead on the western bank of the Neman.

Without taking an operational pause, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the operation on July 5. The offensive was supported by the 5th Guards Tank Army. The enemy did not have sufficient forces for direct confrontation, however, Vilnius was declared by A. Hitler to be another "fortress", and a fairly large garrison was concentrated in it, which was additionally reinforced during the operation and numbered about 15 thousand people. There are also alternative points of view on the size of the garrison: 4 thousand people. The 5th Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps broke through the enemy defenses and advanced 20 km in the first day. For infantry, this is a very high pace. The matter was facilitated by the friability of the German defense: the army was opposed on a wide front by battered infantry formations and construction and security units thrown to the front. The army captured Vilnius from the north.

Meanwhile, the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army were advancing further south, in the area of ​​Molodechno. At the same time, the tank army gradually shifted to the north, surrounding Vilnius from the south. Molodechno itself was taken by cavalrymen of the 3rd Guards Corps on July 5th. A warehouse with 500 tons of fuel was captured in the city. On July 6, the Germans tried to conduct a private counterattack against the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 212th Infantry and 391st Security Divisions, as well as the improvised Hoppe armored group of 22 self-propelled artillery mounts, took part in it. The counterattack had, according to German claims, limited success, but it is not confirmed by the Soviet side; only the fact of a counterattack is noted. It had no effect on the advance to Vilnius, but the 11th Guards Army had to somewhat slow down the pace of movement towards Alytus, repulsing this and subsequent attacks (later, the 11th Guards Army was hit by counterattacks from the 7th and the remnants of the 5th Panzer Divisions, security and infantry units). On July 7 - 8, the city was surrounded by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army from the south and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps from the north. The garrison under the command of Major General R. Shtagel took up all-round defense. The city was defended by the usual for the battles of 1944 consolidated group of various parts, including the 761st Grenadier Brigade, artillery and anti-aircraft battalions and others.

On July 7, an uprising broke out in Vilnius by the Polish nationalist organization the Home Army (Operation Sharp Gates as part of the Storm Action). Her detachments, led by the local commander A. Krzhizhanovsky, according to various sources, numbered from 4 to 10 thousand people, and they managed to take control of part of the city. The Polish rebels were not able to liberate Vilnius on their own, but they provided assistance to the Red Army units.

By July 9, most of the key facilities in the city, including railroad station and the airfield, was captured by units of the 5th Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army. However, the garrison stubbornly resisted.

I. L. Degen, a tanker who participated in the assault on Vilnius, left the following description of these battles:

The lieutenant colonel said that only a hundred people of infantry, a couple of German tanks and several guns - one or two, were holding the defense of the enemy, and counted. (…) And we, three tanks, crawled along the city streets, not seeing each other. The two German guns promised by the lieutenant colonel, apparently, multiplied by non-sexual division, they began to hit us with guns from all sides. They barely had time to destroy them. (…) The battle with the Germans in the city, in addition to the Soviet units, was actively fought by the Poles with red and white bandages on their hands (subordinate to the Polish government in London) and a large Jewish partisan detachment. They had red bands on their sleeves. A group of Poles approached the tank. I jumped down to them and asked: "Do you need help?" The commander, it seems, a colonel, almost with tears in his eyes shook my hand and showed me where the Germans were firing at them most intensively. It turns out that the day before they were left face to face with the Germans without support. That is why the lieutenant general turned out to be so kind to us ... Immediately the lieutenant, who I had already seen at the headquarters of the regiment, ran in and conveyed a request from the commander - to support the battalion in the same direction that the Poles had just indicated to me. Found in the basement of the NP battalion commander. The battalion commander briefed me on the situation and set the task. He had seventeen people left in the battalion ... I chuckled: well, if three tanks are considered a tank brigade, then why can't 17 fighters be a battalion ... One 76-mm gun was attached to the battalion. The calculation had two armor-piercing shells left. It was the entire ammunition load. The gun was commanded by a young junior lieutenant. Naturally, the artillerymen could not support the battalion with fire. Their heads were filled with one thought: what will they do if they walk down the street? german tanks?! Starting from July 9, my tank did not leave the battlefield for three days. We completely lost our orientation in space and time. No one brought me shells, and I was forced to think a thousand times before allowing myself one more shot from a tank gun. He mainly supported the infantry with the fire of two machine guns and caterpillars. There was no connection with the brigade and even with Varivoda. Street fighting is a real nightmare, it is a horror that the human brain cannot fully grasp. (…) On July 13, the fighting in the city stopped. The Germans surrendered in groups. Remember how many Germans the lieutenant colonel warned me about? One hundred people. So, only five thousand German prisoners turned out to be. But there were no two tanks either.

On the night of July 12-13, the German 6th Panzer Division, supported by part of the Grossdeutschland division, broke through the corridor to Vilnius. The operation was personally led by Colonel General G. Kh. Reinhardt, commander of the 3rd Panzer Army. Three thousand German soldiers came out of the "fortress". Others, no matter how many, died or were captured on July 13. The Soviet side announced the death in Vilnius and the surrounding area of ​​eight thousand German soldiers and the capture of five thousand. By July 15, the 3rd Belorussian Front had captured a bridgehead over the Neman. Parts of the Home Army were interned by the Soviet authorities.

While the assault on Vilnius was underway, the southern wing of the front was quietly moving west. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured Lida, and by July 16 reached Grodno. The front crossed the Neman. A large water barrier was passed at a fast pace with moderate losses.

Parts of the Wehrmacht tried to neutralize the bridgeheads beyond the Neman. To this end, the command of the German 3rd Panzer Army created an impromptu battle group from parts of the 6th Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland division. It consisted of two tank battalions, a motorized infantry regiment and self-propelled artillery. The counterattack on July 16 was aimed at the flank of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. However, this counterattack was carried out in a hurry, they did not manage to organize reconnaissance. In the depths of the Soviet defense near the town of Vroblevizh, the battle group stumbled upon the 16th Guards, which had risen to the defense. anti-tank brigade, and lost 63 tanks during the heavy battle. The counterattack bogged down, the bridgeheads beyond the Neman were held by the Russians.

Kaunas operation

After the battle for Vilnius, the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky was aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki, the last major cities on the way to East Prussia. On July 28, the troops of the front went on the offensive and in the first two days advanced 5-17 km. On July 30, the enemy defenses along the Neman were broken through; in the zone of the 33rd Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was introduced into the gap. The exit of the mobile unit to the operational space put the Kaunas garrison at risk of encirclement, so by August 1, Wehrmacht units left the city.

However, the gradual increase in German resistance led to a relatively slow advance with serious losses. The stretching of communications, the exhaustion of ammunition, the growing losses forced the Soviet troops to suspend the offensive. In addition, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks on the front of I. D. Chernyakhovsky. So, on August 9, the 1st Infantry, 5th Panzer Divisions and the "Grossdeutschland" Division counterattacked the 33rd Army of the Front, which was marching in the center, and somewhat pressed it. In mid-August, a counterattack by infantry divisions in the Raseiniai area even led to tactical (regiment-level) encirclements, which, however, were soon broken through. These chaotic counterattacks led to the drying up of the operation by the 20th of August. On August 29, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the defensive, reaching Suwalki and not reaching several kilometers to the borders of East Prussia.

The exit to the old borders of Germany caused panic in East Prussia. Despite the assurances of Gauleiter E. Koch that the situation on the outskirts of East Prussia had stabilized, the population began to leave the region.

For the 3rd Belorussian Front, the battles within the framework of Operation Bagration ended with the Kaunas operation.

Bialystok and Osovets operations

After the creation of the Minsk "cauldron", General G.F. Zakharov, like other front commanders, received the task of moving deep to the west. As part of the Bialystok operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front played an auxiliary role - it pursued the remnants of Army Group Center. Leaving behind Minsk, the front moved strictly to the west - to Novogrudok, and then - to Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th and 50th armies at first could not take part in this movement, as they continued to fight with the German units that were surrounded in the Minsk "cauldron". Thus, only one remained for the offensive - the 3rd Army. She started moving on 5 July. At first, enemy resistance was very weak: in the first five days, the 3rd Army advanced 120-125 km. This pace is very high for infantry and is more characteristic of a march than an offensive. On July 8 Novogrudok fell, on July 9 the army reached the Neman.

However, gradually the enemy built a defense in front of the troops of the front. On July 10, in front of the positions of the front, reconnaissance established the remnants of the 12th and 20th tank and part of four infantry divisions, as well as six separate regiments. These forces could not stop the offensive, but they influenced the operational situation and slowed down the pace of the operation.

On July 10, the 50th Army entered the battle. The Neman was forced. On July 15, the troops of the front approached Grodno. On the same day, the troops repelled a series of counterattacks, causing serious damage to the enemy. On July 16, Grodno was liberated in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front.

The enemy reinforced units in the Grodno direction, but these reserves were not sufficient, and in addition, they themselves suffered heavy losses in battles. Although the pace of the front's offensive fell seriously, from July 17 to July 27, the troops broke through to the Augustow Canal, on July 27 they recaptured Bialystok, and reached the pre-war border of the USSR. The operation took place without noticeable encirclement of the enemy, which is due to the weakness of mobile formations in the front: the 2nd Belorussian Front did not have a single tank, mechanized or cavalry corps, having only tank infantry support brigades. In general, the front fulfilled all the tasks assigned to it.

In the future, the front developed an offensive against Osovets, and on August 14 occupied the city. The bridgehead behind the Narew was also occupied by the front. However, the advance of the troops was rather slow: on the one hand, stretched communications played their role, on the other hand, frequent counterattacks of the strengthened enemy. On August 14, the Bialystok operation was terminated, and for the 2nd Belorussian Front, Operation Bagration also ended.

Building on the success of the 1st Belorussian Front

After the liberation of Minsk, the front of K.K. Rokossovsky, like others, received a directive to pursue the remnants of Army Group Center. The first destination was Baranovichi, in the future it was supposed to develop an offensive on Brest. A mobile grouping of the front was aimed directly at Baranovichi - the 4th Guards Cavalry, 1st Mechanized and 9th Tank Corps.

Already on July 5, the forces of the Red Army encountered the incoming operational reserves of the enemy. The 1st mechanized corps entered into battle with the 4th tank division, which had just arrived in Belarus, and was stopped. In addition, Hungarian units (1st Cavalry Division) and German infantry reserves (28th Light Division) appeared at the front. On July 5 and 6 there were intense battles, the advance was insignificant, only the 65th army of P.I. Batov was successful.

Gradually, the resistance near Baranovichi was broken. The attackers were supported by large aviation forces (about 500 bombers). The 1st Belorussian Front significantly outnumbered the enemy, so the resistance gradually weakened. On July 8, after a heavy street battle, Baranovichi was liberated.

Thanks to the success near Baranovichi, the actions of the 61st Army were facilitated. This army, under the command of General P. A. Belov, advanced in the direction of Pinsk through Luninets. The army operated in extremely difficult wetlands between the flanks of the 1st Belorussian Front. The fall of Baranovichi threatened to envelop the German troops in the Pinsk region and forced them to a hasty retreat. During the pursuit, the Dnieper River Flotilla provided significant assistance to the 61st Army. In particular, on the night of July 12, the ships of the flotilla secretly climbed up the Pripyat and landed a rifle regiment on the outskirts of Pinsk. The Germans failed to destroy the landing force, on July 14 Pinsk was liberated.

On July 19, Kobrin, a city east of Brest, was semi-encircled and the next day taken. The right wing of the front reached Brest from the east.

Fighting was also carried out on the left wing of the front, separated from the right wing by the impenetrable swamps of Polesie. As early as July 2, the enemy began to withdraw troops from Kovel, an important transport hub. On July 5, the 47th Army went on the offensive and on July 6 liberated the city. Front commander Konstantin Rokossovsky arrived here for direct command of the troops. On July 8, in order to capture the bridgehead on the Western Bug (the subsequent task was to reach Lublin), the 11th Panzer Corps was brought into battle. Due to disorganization, the corps was ambushed and irretrievably lost 75 tanks, the corps commander Rudkin was removed from his post. Unsuccessful attacks continued here for several more days. As a result, near Kovel, the enemy retreated 12-20 kilometers in an organized manner and disrupted the Soviet offensive.

Lublin-Brest operation

Start of the offensive

On July 18, the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive in full force. The left wing of the front, which had hitherto remained largely passive, entered the operation. Since the Lvov-Sandomierz operation was already underway to the south, it was extremely difficult for the German side to maneuver with reserves. The opponents of the 1st Belorussian Front were not only parts of the Army Group "Center", but also the Army Group "Northern Ukraine", commanded by V. Model. This field marshal thus combined the posts of commander of Army Groups "Center" and "Northern Ukraine". In order to maintain contact between the army groups, he ordered the 4th Panzer Army to be withdrawn behind the Bug. The 8th Guards Army under the command of V.I. Chuikov and the 47th Army under the command of N. I. Guseva went to the river and immediately crossed it, entering the territory of Poland. K.K. Rokossovsky attributes the crossing of the Bug to July 20, D. Glantz - to the 21st. Be that as it may, the Wehrmacht failed to create a line along the Bug. Moreover, the defense of the German 8th Army Corps fell apart so quickly that the help of the 2nd Panzer Army was not needed, the tankers were forced to catch up with the infantrymen. The tank army of S. I. Bogdanov consisted of three corps, and posed a serious threat. She quickly advanced towards Lublin, that is, strictly to the west. The 11th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, supported by infantry, turned towards Brest, to the north.

Brest "boiler". Assault on Lublin

At this time, Kobrin was released on the right wing of the front. Thus, a local “cauldron” began to form near Brest. On July 25, the encirclement around the units of the 86th, 137th and 261st Infantry Divisions was closed. Three days later, on July 28, the remnants of the encircled group broke out of the "boiler". During the defeat of the Brest group, the Germans suffered serious losses in the dead, which is noted by both warring parties (according to Soviet applications, 7 thousand corpses of German soldiers remained on the battlefield). Very few prisoners were taken - only 110 people.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Army was advancing on Lublin. The need for an early capture was due to political reasons. JV Stalin emphasized that the liberation of Lublin "... is urgently required by the political situation and the interests of independent democratic Poland." The army received the order on July 21, and on the night of the 22nd began to carry it out. Tank units advanced from the battle formations of the 8th Guards Army. The 3rd Panzer Corps struck at the junction between the two German corps, and after a fleeting battle broke through their defenses. In the afternoon, the coverage of Lublin began. The highway Lublin - Pulawy was blocked, on the road the rear establishments of the enemy were intercepted, which were evacuated along with the city administration. Part of the forces of the tank army that day had no contact with the enemy due to interruptions in the supply of fuel.

The success of the first day of the breakthrough to Lublin led to a reassessment by the Red Army of its capabilities. On the morning of July 23, the city was stormed by the forces of tank corps. On the outskirts, the Soviet forces were successful, but the blow towards Loketka Square was parried. The problem of the attackers was an acute shortage of motorized infantry. This problem was alleviated: an uprising of the Home Army broke out in the city. On this day, S. I. Bogdanov, who was watching the assault, was wounded. General A. who replaced him. I. Radzievsky (before that - the chief of staff of the army) energetically continued the assault. Early in the morning of July 24, part of the garrison left Lublin, but not everyone managed to successfully retreat. Before noon, units attacking it from different sides united in the center of the city, and by the morning of July 25, Lublin was cleared.

According to Soviet data, 2228 German soldiers were taken prisoner, led by SS Gruppenführer H. Moser. The exact losses of the Red Army during the assault are unknown, but according to the certificate of Colonel I.N. Bazanov (chief of staff of the army after the wounding of S.I. Bogdanov), from July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1433 people dead and missing. Considering the losses in the battle near Radzimin, the irretrievable losses of the army during the attack on Lublin and the assault can reach six hundred people. The capture of the city took place ahead of plans: the directive for the assault on Lublin, signed by A. I. Antonov and I. V. Stalin, provided for the occupation of Lublin on July 27. After the capture of Lublin, the 2nd Panzer Army made a deep push north along the Vistula, with the ultimate goal of capturing Prague, the eastern suburbs of Warsaw. Majdanek death camp was liberated near Lublin.

Seizure of bridgeheads

On July 27, the 69th Army entered the Vistula near Pulawy. On the 29th, she captured the bridgehead at Pulawy south of Warsaw. The forcing went fairly smoothly. However, not all divisions had the same success.

On July 30, the 69th, 8th Guards, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank armies received an order from K.K. Rokossovsky to seize bridgeheads beyond the Vistula. The front commander, as well as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, intended in this way to create a base for future operations.

1. To the head of the engineering troops of the front, pull up the main crossing facilities to the river. Vistula and ensure the crossing: 60th Army, 1st Polish Army, 8th Guards Army. 2. Army commanders: a) draw up army plans for crossing the river. Vistula, linking them with the operational tasks performed by the army and neighbors. These plans should clearly reflect the issues of infantry interaction with artillery and other means of reinforcement, focusing on the reliable supply of landing groups and units with the task of preventing their destruction on the western bank of the river; b) organize strict control over the implementation of the forcing plan, while avoiding gravity and disorganization; c) bring to the attention of commanders of all degrees that the soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves in forcing the river. Vistula, will be presented to special awards with orders up to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. TsAMO RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 168. L. 105–106

On July 31, the Polish 1st Army unsuccessfully tried to cross the Vistula. Pointing out the reasons for the failure, the head of the political department of the Polish army, Lieutenant Colonel Zambrovsky, noted the inexperience of the soldiers, the lack of ammunition and organizational failures.

On August 1, the 8th Guards Army began to cross the Vistula at Magnuszew. Its bridgehead was to emerge between the Puławy bridgehead of the 69th Army and Warsaw. The original plan called for crossing the Vistula on August 3-4, after the reinforcement of the 8th Guards Army with artillery and crossing facilities. However, V. I. Chuikov, who commanded the army, convinced K. K. Rokossovsky to start on August 1, counting on the surprise of the strike.

During August 1 - 4, the army managed to conquer a vast area on the western bank of the river, 15 km along the front and 10 in depth. The supply of the army on the bridgehead was provided by several built bridges, including one with a carrying capacity of 60 tons. Taking into account the possibility of enemy attacks on a sufficiently long perimeter of the bridgehead, K.K. Rokossovsky on August 6 ordered the deployment of the “outsider” of the battles for the bridgehead, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, under Magnuszew. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front provided itself with two large bridgeheads for future operations.

Tank battle near Radzimin

In the literature there is no single name for the battle that took place on the eastern bank of the Vistula in late July and early August. In addition to Radzimin, he is also tied to Warsaw, Okunev and Volomin.

The Lublin-Brest operation called into question the reality of Model's plans to hold the front along the Vistula. The field marshal could fend off the threat with the help of reserves. On July 24, the 9th Army was recreated, the forces arriving on the Vistula were subordinated to it. True, at first the composition of the army was extremely meager. At the end of July, the 2nd Panzer Army began to test its strength. The ultimate goal of Radzievsky's army was to capture a bridgehead behind the Narew (a tributary of the Vistula) north of Warsaw, in the Serock region. On the way, the army was supposed to capture Prague, a suburb of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula.

On the evening of July 26, the army's motorcycle vanguard ran into the German 73rd Infantry Division at Garwolin, a town on the east bank of the Vistula northeast of Magnuszew. This was the prelude to a difficult mobile battle. The 3rd and 8th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army were aiming at Prague. The 16th Panzer Corps remained near Demblin (between the Magnushevsky and Pulawsky bridgeheads), waiting for the infantry to relieve it.

The 73rd Infantry Division was supported by separate units of the "airborne tank" division "Hermann Goering" (reconnaissance battalion and part of the division's artillery) and other scattered infantry units. All these troops were combined under the leadership of the commander of the 73rd Infantry Division Fritz Franek into the Franek group. On July 27, the 3rd TC crushed the reconnaissance battalion of the Hermann Goering, the 8th Guards. TK also achieved a breakthrough. Under the threat of coverage, the Franek group rolled back to the north. At this time, tank units began to arrive to help the battered infantry division - the main forces of the Hermann Goering division, 4th and 19th tanks. divisions, SS divisions "Viking" and "Dead Head" (in two corps: the 39th Panzer Dietrich von Saucken and the 4th SS Panzer Corps under Gille). In total, this grouping consisted of 51 thousand people with 600 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 2nd Tank Army of the Red Army had only 32 thousand soldiers and 425 tanks and self-propelled guns. (the Soviet tank corps approximately corresponded in size to the German division). In addition, the rapid advance of the 2nd TA led to a backlog of rears: fuel and ammunition were delivered intermittently.

However, until the main forces of the German tank formation arrived, the Wehrmacht infantry had to endure a heavy blow from the 2nd TA. On July 28 and 29, heavy fighting continued, Radzievsky's corps (including the approaching 16th tank) tried to intercept the Warsaw-Sedlec highway, but could not break through the defenses of the Hermann Goering. The attacks on the infantry of the Franek group were much more successful: a weak spot in its defense was found in the Otwock area, the group began to be enveloped from the west, as a result of which the 73rd division began to retreat unorganized under the blows. General Franek was captured no later than July 30 (it is on the 30th that Radzievsky's report on his capture is dated). The Franek group was divided into separate parts, suffered heavy losses and quickly rolled back to the north.

The 3rd Panzer Corps was aimed deep to the northwest with the aim of enveloping Prague, through Volomin. It was a risky maneuver, and in the following days it almost led to disaster. The corps broke through the narrow gap between the German forces, in the face of the accumulation of enemy battle groups on the flanks. The 3rd TC suddenly underwent a flank attack at Radzimin. On August 1, Radzievsky orders the army to go on the defensive, but the 3rd TC does not withdraw from the breakthrough.

On August 1, units of the Wehrmacht cut off the 3rd TC, repulsing Radzimin and Volomin. The escape routes of the 3rd TC were intercepted in two places.

However, the collapse of the encircled corps did not take place. August 2 8th Guards. the tank corps, with a blow from the outside, broke through a narrow corridor towards the encircled. It was too early to rejoice in the salvation of those surrounded. Radzimin and Volomin were left, and the 8th Guards. the tank and 3rd tank corps were to defend themselves against enemy tank divisions attacking from several sides. On the night of August 4, in the location of the 8th Guards. maybe the last large groups of encircled people came out. In the 3rd TC, two brigade commanders were killed in a cauldron. By August 4, Soviet infantry represented by the 125th Rifle Corps and cavalry (2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) arrived at the battlefield. Two fresh formations were enough to completely stop the enemy on August 4. It should be noted that the forces of the 47th and 2nd tank armies carried out a search for the soldiers of the encircled 3rd tank regiment remaining behind the front line, the result of these activities was the rescue of several hundred encircled. On the same day, the 19th Panzer Division and Hermann Goering, after unsuccessful attacks on Okunev, were withdrawn from Warsaw and began to be transferred to the Magnushevsky bridgehead, with the goal of destroying it. The unsuccessful attacks of the Germans on Okunev continued (with the forces of the 4th division) on August 5, after which the forces of the attackers dried up.

German (and, more broadly, Western) historiography evaluates the Battle of Radzimin as a serious success for the Wehrmacht by the standards of 1944. It is alleged that the 3rd Panzer Corps was destroyed or at least defeated. However, information about the actual losses of the 2nd Panzer Army casts doubt on the validity of the latter statement. From July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1,433 people killed, missing and captured. Of this number, 799 people accounted for the counterattack near Volomin. With the actual strength of the corps of 8-10 thousand soldiers, such losses do not allow us to talk about the death or defeat of the 3rd TC in the boiler, even if he alone suffered all of them. It must be admitted that the directive to seize the bridgehead beyond the Narew was not carried out. However, the directive was issued at a time when there was no information about the presence of a large group of Germans in the Warsaw area. The presence of a mass of tank divisions in the Warsaw area in itself made it unrealistic to break through to Prague, and even more so, across the river, by the relatively small 2nd Panzer Army. On the other hand, a counterattack by a strong grouping of the Germans, with their numerical superiority, brought modest results. The losses of the German side cannot be precisely ascertained, since during the ten-day period of July 21-31, 9, the Wehrmacht army did not provide reports on the losses incurred. Over the next ten days, the army reported the loss of 2155 people dead and missing.

After a counterattack near Radzimin, the 3rd TC was assigned to Minsk-Mazovetsky for rest and replenishment, and the 16th and 8th Guards. tank corps were transferred to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Their opponents there were the same divisions, "Hermann Goering" and the 19th tank division, as near Radzimin.

Beginning of the Warsaw Uprising

With the approach of the 2nd Panzer Army to Prague, the eastern district of Warsaw, the leaders of the underground "Home Army" decided on a large-scale uprising in the western part of the city. The Polish side proceeded from the doctrine of "two enemies" (Germany and the USSR). Accordingly, the purpose of the uprising was twofold: to prevent the destruction of Warsaw by the Germans during the evacuation and at the same time to prevent the establishment of a regime loyal to the USSR in Poland, as well as to demonstrate the sovereignty of Poland and the ability of the Home Army to act independently without the support of the Red Army. The weak point of the plan was the need to very accurately calculate the moment when the retreating German troops would no longer be able to resist, and the Red Army units would not yet enter the city. On July 31, when units of the 2nd Panzer Army were a few kilometers from Warsaw, T. Bor-Komorowski convened a meeting of the commanders of the Home Army. It was decided to implement the "Storm" plan in Warsaw, and on August 1, a few hours after the army of A. I. Radzievsky went on the defensive, the uprising began.

At the end of the battle at Radzimin, the 2nd Panzer Army was divided. The 3rd tank corps was withdrawn from the front line to the front rear for rest, the other two were sent to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Only the 47th Army remained in the Warsaw area, operating on a broad front. Later, the 1st Army of the Polish Army joined it. Initially, these forces did not provide assistance to the uprising. After that, an unsuccessful attempt was made by the army of the Polish Army to force the Vistula.

After the initial successes of the uprising, the Wehrmacht and the SS began the gradual destruction of parts of the Home Army. The uprising was finally crushed in early October.

The question of whether the Red Army could provide assistance to the uprising, and whether the Soviet leaders were willing to provide such assistance, is debatable. A number of historians argue that the stop near Warsaw is connected mainly with the desire of I.V. Stalin to give the Germans the opportunity to put an end to the uprising. The Soviet position boiled down to the fact that helping the uprising was extremely difficult due to the stretching of communications and, as a result, interruptions in supply, and the increased resistance of the enemy. The point of view, according to which the offensive near Warsaw stopped due to purely military reasons, is shared by some Western historians. Thus, there is no consensus on this issue, but it can be stated that, in fact, the Home Army fought the Germans in the insurgent Warsaw one on one.

Fight for bridgeheads

The 8th Guards Army occupied the defenses on the Magnushevsky bridgehead with the main forces, and two more divisions were concentrated on the east coast in the Garvolin area due to K.K. Rokossovsky's fears about possible German counterattacks. However, the attacks of the German 19th Panzer Division and the Hermann Goering Division, withdrawn from under Radzimin, fell not on the rear of the bridgehead, but on its front, on its southern part. In addition to them, the Soviet troops noted the attacks of the 17th Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division reorganized after the death in the Minsk and Bobruisk "cauldrons". To combat these forces, V. I. Chuikov had, in addition to infantry, a tank brigade and three regiments of self-propelled artillery. In addition, reinforcements gradually arrived at the bridgehead: on August 6, a Polish tank brigade and a regiment of IS-2 heavy tanks were thrown into battle. On the morning of August 8, it was possible to build bridges across the river, thanks to the anti-aircraft "umbrella", which was hung by the newly arrived three anti-aircraft divisions. Using the bridges, the 8th Guards Tank Corps, withdrawn from the 2nd Tank Army, crossed to the bridgehead. This moment became a turning point in the struggle for the Magnushevsky bridgehead, in the following days the activity of the enemy fell. The introduction of the "fresh" 25th Panzer Division did not help either. Then the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army arrived. By August 16, the enemy had stopped attacking.

This battle was given to the 8th Guards Army very hard. From August 1 to August 26, her total losses amounted to more than 35 thousand people. However, the bridgehead was held.

At the Pulawy bridgehead on August 2, the 69th Army, with the support of the Polish Army, united two small bridgeheads near Pulawy into a single one, 24 km along the front and 8 in depth. From August 5 to 14, the Germans tried to destroy the bridgehead, but failed. After that, the army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi finally consolidated the bridgeheads, by August 28 creating a bridgehead 30 by 10 km.

On August 29, the front went on the defensive, although the right wing of the front still continued private operations. From this date, the operation "Bagration" is considered completed.

Polish Committee of National Liberation

On July 21, 1944, after the Red Army had crossed the Curzon Line and entered Polish territory, a provisional government of Poland, also known as the Polish Committee of National Liberation, was established. It was created with the active participation of the USSR and with complete disregard for the Polish government in exile in London, which is why many historians consider it a puppet. The Polish Committee of National Liberation included representatives of the Polish Workers' Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the parties "Strongist of the People" and "Strongist of the Democrats". On July 27, members of the Polish Committee of National Liberation arrived in Lublin (hence another name for this body - "Lublin Committee"). Initially, by no one except the USSR, not recognized as the government of Poland, he actually controlled the liberated part of the country. The members of the government in exile were forced to either remain in exile or join the Lublin Committee.

Operation results

The success of the operation "Bagration" significantly exceeded the expectations of the Soviet command. As a result of a two-month offensive, Belarus was completely cleared, a part of the Baltic states was recaptured, and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, advancement to a depth of up to 600 km was achieved on a front of 1,100 km. In addition, the operation endangered Army Group North in the Baltic; carefully built line, the line "Panther", managed to get around. Subsequently, this fact greatly facilitated the Baltic operation. Also, as a result of the capture of two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of Warsaw - Magnushevsky and Pulawski (as well as the bridgehead near Sandomierz, captured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation), a reserve was created for the future Vistula-Oder operation. In January 1945, the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began from the Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bridgeheads, stopping only on the Oder.

From a military point of view, the battle in Belarus led to a large-scale defeat of the German armed forces. There is a widespread point of view that the battle in Belarus is the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Operation Bagration is a triumph of the Soviet theory of military art due to the well-coordinated offensive movement of all fronts and the operation to misinform the enemy about the location of the general offensive that began in the summer of 1944. On the scale of the Soviet-German front, Operation Bagration was the largest in a long series of offensives. She swallowed up German reserves, seriously limiting the enemy's ability to fend off both other offensives on the Eastern Front and the Allied advance in Western Europe. So, for example, the division "Grossdeutschland" was transferred to Siauliai from the Dniester and, thus, was deprived of the opportunity to participate in repelling the Yasso-Chisinau operation. The division "Hermann Goering" was forced to leave its position near Florence in Italy in mid-July, and was thrown into battles on the Vistula, Florence was liberated in mid-August, when units of the "Goering" unsuccessfully stormed the Magnushevsky bridgehead.

Losses

USSR

The human losses of the Red Army are quite accurately known. They amounted to 178,507 dead, missing and captured, as well as 587,308 wounded and sick. These are high losses even by the standards of the Second World War, in absolute numbers significantly exceeding the victims not only in successful, but even in many unsuccessfully completed operations. So, for comparison, the Berlin operation cost the Red Army 81 thousand irretrievable losses, the defeat near Kharkov in early spring 1943 - a little over 45 thousand irretrievably. Such losses are associated with the duration and scope of the operation, carried out on difficult terrain against a skillful and energetic enemy, who occupied well-prepared defensive lines.

Germany

The issue of human losses of the Wehrmacht is debatable. The most common among Western scientists are the following data: 26,397 dead, 109,776 wounded, 262,929 missing and captured, and a total of 399,102 people. These figures are taken from ten-day casualty reports provided by the German armies. The extremely small number of those killed is due to the fact that many of the dead were recorded as missing, sometimes the entire division was declared missing.

However, these figures are subject to criticism. In particular, the American historian of the Eastern Front, D. Glantz, drew attention to the fact that the difference between the strength of Army Group Center before and after the operation was much larger. D. Glantz emphasized that the data of ten-day reports are minimum minimorum, that is, they represent a minimum estimate. The Russian researcher A. V. Isaev, in a speech on the Echo of Moscow radio station, estimated German losses at about 500 thousand people. S. Zaloga estimated German losses at 300-350 thousand people up to and including the surrender of the 4th Army.

It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that in all cases the losses of the Army Group "Center" are calculated, without taking into account the casualties of the Army Groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".

According to official Soviet data published by the Soviet Information Bureau, the losses of German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 were estimated at 381,000 killed, 158,480 prisoners, 2,735 tanks and self-propelled guns, 631 aircraft and 57,152 vehicles. It is likely that these data, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses, are significantly overestimated. In any case, the issue of Wehrmacht casualties in Bagration has not yet been put to rest.

In order to demonstrate to other countries the significance of success, 57,600 German prisoners of war captured near Minsk were marched through Moscow - for about three hours a column of prisoners of war walked along the streets of Moscow, and after the march the streets were washed and cleaned.

They clearly demonstrate the scale of the catastrophe that befell Army Group Center, the loss of command personnel:

Demonstrate the scale of the disaster
3 tank army
53 Army Corps	General of the Infantry Gollwitzer	captured
206 Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Hitter ( English)	captured
4 airfield division	Lieutenant General Pistorius
6 airfield division	Lieutenant General Peschel ( English)
246 Infantry Division	Major General Müller-Bülow	captured
6th Army Corps	General of the Artillery Pfeiffer ( English)
197 Infantry Division	Major General Hane ( English)	missing
256 Infantry Division	Major General Wüstenhagen
39 tank corps	General of Artillery Martinek
110 infantry division	Lieutenant General von Kurowski English)	captured
337 Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Schönemann ( English)
12th infantry division	Lieutenant General Bamler	captured
31st Infantry Division	Lieutenant General Ochsner ( English)	captured
12th Army Corps	Lieutenant General Müller	captured
18 motorized division	Lieutenant General Zutavern	committed suicide
267 infantry division	Lieutenant General Drescher ( English)
57th Infantry Division	Major General Trowitz ( English)	captured
27th Army Corps	General of the Infantry Völkers	captured
78 assault division	Lieutenant General Trout English)	captured
260 infantry division	Major General Klamt German)	captured
army engineering service	Major General Schmidt	captured
35th Army Corps	Lieutenant General von Lützow English)	captured
134th infantry division	Lieutenant General Philip	committed suicide
6th infantry division	Major General Heine English)	captured
45th Infantry Division	Major General Engel	captured
41 tank corps	Lieutenant General Hoffmeister ( English)	captured
36th Infantry Division	Major General Conradi ( English)	captured
commandant of Bobruisk	Major General Haman English)	captured
Spare parts
95th Infantry Division	Major General Michaelis	captured
707 Infantry Division	Major General Gere ( English)	captured
motorized division "Feldherrnhalle"	Major General von Steinkeller	captured

This list is based on Carell, is incomplete and does not cover losses incurred during the second phase of the operation. So, it lacks a lieutenant-general. Franek, commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, who was captured in the last days of July near Warsaw, the commandant of Mogilev, Major General Ermansdorf, and others. However, it shows the scale of the shock experienced by the Wehrmacht and the loss of senior officers of Army Group Center.

Operation Bagration is considered one of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

It represents the third stage of the "Rail War", which took place in June and August 1944 on the territory of Belarus.

During this operation, the German troops suffered such swipe that they could not recover from it.

Prerequisites

At that time, the Germans advanced in several directions. On the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Soviet troops managed to accomplish something unprecedented: to liberate almost the entire territory of the republic and destroy a huge number of Nazi troops.

But on the Belarusian territory, the Red Army for a long time could not organize a successful breakthrough to Minsk. The German forces were lined up in a wedge directed towards the USSR, and this wedge stood at the line of Orsha - Vitebsk - Mogilev - Zhlobin.

Belarusian operation photo

At the same time, part of the troops was transferred to Ukraine, which the Wehrmacht still hoped to recapture. Therefore, the General Staff and the Supreme High Command decided to change the course of action and focus on the liberation of Belarus.

Side forces

The offensive in Belarus was organized on four fronts. Soviet troops were opposed by four German armies here:

• 2nd Army of the "Center", located in the area of ​​Pinsk and Pripyat;
• the 9th Army of the "Center", located in the Berezina region near Bobruisk;
• 4th Army of the "Center" - the space between the rivers Berezina and Dnieper and between Bykhov and Orsha;
• 3rd Panzer Army "Center" - in the same place, as well as Vitebsk.

Operation progress

Operation "Bagration" was very large-scale and was carried out in two stages. At the first stage, the actions were carried out on the territory of Belarus, and at the second stage - on the territory of Lithuania and Eastern Poland.

On June 22, 1944, reconnaissance in force began to clarify the point location of enemy guns. And on the morning of June 23, the operation itself began. Soviet troops surrounded a group of five divisions near Vitebsk and liquidated it already on June 27. Thus, the main defensive forces of the "Center" army were destroyed.

In addition to the actions of the Red Army, Operation Bagration was accompanied by unprecedented partisan activity: in the summer of 1944, almost 195,000 partisans joined the Red Army.

Soviet troops in attack photo

Eike Middeldorf noted that "Russian partisans" carried out more than ten thousand explosions on railways and other communications, which delayed the movement of German troops for several days. On the other hand, partisan actions facilitated the offensive actions of the Soviet army.

The partisans planned to produce much more explosions - up to forty thousand, however, what was done was enough to inflict a crushing blow on the German side.

Polish Committee of National Liberation

In the midst of "Bagration" Soviet troops entered the territory of Poland. There they formed an interim government, which many experts regard as puppet. The provisional government, called the Polish Committee of National Liberation, did not take into account the Polish government in exile and consisted of communists and socialists. Subsequently, some of the emigrants joined the Committee, but the rest decided to stay in London.

The result of the operation

Operation Bagration exceeded all expectations of the Soviet command. The Red Army showed the advantage of its theory of military affairs and demonstrated careful organization and sequence of actions. Many believe that the defeat of the Germans on the Belarusian front is the largest in the history of the Second World War.