The Suez Canal problem by the mid-1950s. The role of the channel for the old empires. Nasser coup, Arab-Israeli conflict. Decree on the nationalization of the channel. Operation "Musketeer" - Anglo-French plan of aggression. The role of the USSR and the USA in the Suez crisis.

SUET CRISIS 1956OF THE YEAR

The Suez Canal problem by the mid-1950s

Roosevelt's heirs did not differ in special talents. The limited administrator Truman and General Eisenhower who succeeded him, who had military career equally defeats and victories, obtained by overwhelming superiority, had a common character trait. Both in political practice tended more towards reactions than to actions. They did not see what the predecessor had created. Second World War destroyed the empires of England and France. In 1945, their shape was still preserved, but already as a soap bubble. It was enough to blow, and the "world counter" passed into the undivided property of the United States. Roosevelt wanted this and he achieved it, but the heirs did not see that the world was open to American expansion, or, if you like, development with the prospect of steady growth for the next hundred years.

Instead of piercing the transparent shell of bubbles, the successors turned their attention to the figure of a new partner that appeared in a dark corner of the ring. May my native country forgive me, but it really was so. Our boxer swayed from the fatigue that had accumulated over 1941-1945, and stood in such a way that he was not able to prevent the expansion of the oceanic Civilization, and even more so to start his own at a pace superior to the American one.

Soviet ideas offered for export were beautiful, but the world was perceived as a pie in the sky, in comparison with a titmouse in the hands that the Americans promised. Their goods, having penetrated the colonial markets, could provide a small but rapid increase in living standards. And the Soviet idea required time and labor to implement. The most elementary historical experience was to show the White House hosts that between an idea and a full stomach, people usually choose the latter. And, therefore, America will win without a fight. But in order not to be afraid of other people's thoughts, you must have at least some of your own, but they were not.

The gaze of the American heavyweight with an unprincipled head turned to an only breathtaking ideological partner, whose weight belonged to the super-lightweight. Instead of collecting ownerless treasures, the Yankees started a fight with a passerby who saw gems on the pavement and tried to pick up a couple of stones. The lightweight turned out to be hardy, the fight dragged on, and a scattering of stones under the cover of a racing soap film lay on the asphalt.

Paradoxically, the empires to which Roosevelt signed the death warrant survived. Going against the old policy, the new masters of Washington even made them allies. Instead of nailing the condemned once and for all through the economic enslavement proposed by Roosevelt's comrade-in-arms - Marshal, they were released into the wild. The Europeans, skillfully playing on the Cold War conjuncture, became partners instead of tributaries. In the mid-50s, the British and French revived so much that they began to strengthen the shell of the remaining bubble volume, creating new stiffening ribs. For lack of a better way, the remnants of empires defended themselves with weapons.

The ideas of market liberalism thrown into the world by Roosevelt sprouted. The colonial peoples no longer wanted the economic satrapy of the mother countries, and they themselves began to destroy empires. The strangest thing is that under Truman, the Yankees rushed to help preserve the bubbles, incurring ideological and financial losses. Sobering up came only after Korea, and even then not immediately and not to everyone. And before the conflict on the peninsula, the Americans assisted the French in an attempt to "scare" Indochina, turned a blind eye to the creation of the English ersatz neo-empire system in the form of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and all this only to make American partners look more impressive in Europe. Everything turned out exactly the opposite. Drawn into the world games, the Western European satellites of the United States spent their power thousands of kilometers from the Old World, solving their problems, leaving the Americans to defend their native continent from the danger they invented from the East.

Suez Canal. It has existed on the territory of Egypt for more than 130 years, connecting the Mediterranean and Red Seas and allowing the shortest way to get from the Indian to the Atlantic Ocean. The canal was built by shareholders - Egypt and France together. It was opened in 1849; then the Egyptian shares were bought by Britain. During the World Wars, navigation through the canal was regulated by the British, but an agreement was signed between Britain and Egypt, according to which the British were obliged to withdraw their troops after 20 years. And that time has come.

The role of the channel for the old empires. In the mid-1950s, life was still glimmering in the bodies of traditional empires - France and Britain. The most important arteries that ensured their existence worked. The main among them was rightfully considered the aorta of the Suez Canal. It was her pulsation that guaranteed the ability of the British and the French to solve their problems in the regions that lay, in the apt expression of Rudyard Kipling, “to the east of from Suez." The control of the canal flowing through the Egyptian sands guaranteed a quick supply of industrial blood - oil - for Great Britain and France. In addition, both nations collected bribes from other users, including the Americans, for the channel's shares were divided equally between Paris and London. In both capitals, it was justifiably believed that while the canal was under control, all was not lost.

The situation was involuntarily complicated by the British themselves. Even during the life of Roosevelt, the term of the mandate of the seafarers as colonial owners of the Middle East expired. And although the Second World War was going on, an ally from Washington was asked not to linger. The offended British began to gather, but with all this they organized the withdrawal in such a way that they would have problems that would exclude the possibility of exploitation of the region by the new owners. The British masterfully messed up and, when in 1948. their last soldiers boarded the ships, a war was already flaring up behind them, smoldering to this day without the slightest hope of an end to this process.

Nasser's coup.Arab-Israeli conflict

1948-1949 indirectly hit its organizers. Having lost the first war against Israel, the Arab coalition was puzzled by the search for the reasons for the defeat. The search for the guilty proceeded especially sharply in Egypt. The answer was found by a group of middle-ranking army officers, who considered the main culprit in the disruption of the Arab plans of King Farouk. In 1952, the conspirators carried out a coup and sent the unfortunate crowned bearer to a well-deserved rest in Italy. The country was headed by the coup leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egypt was waiting major changes. The head of the national government began to modernize his country. But modernization cost money, and the British, who left their excolony, made sure that Egyptian revenues went mainly to London.

Nasser's first steps. Nasser dreamed not of peace, but of revenge for the defeat in the war of 1948-1949. A victory would have made him the acknowledged leader of all Arabs. Therefore, the Egyptian president demanded that Israel give up more than half of its territory. Not only the signing of peace, but even negotiations based on such demands were impossible.

Nasser understood that independence begins with the ability to cast steel and produce machines. The creation of industry urgently required finance and an energy base. He decided to extract electricity in the cheapest way, forcing Nile water to turn the turbines of a hydroelectric power station planned for construction near Aswan. For this purpose, they asked for a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The bank, as it is now, was run by the Americans, and the officials left over from Roosevelt's time allocated a loan, but at the usual interest badly tolerated by weak economies. To pay off the debt, Egypt needed to remortgage everything that was, which threatened a new, this time economic, yoke. Nasser chose to go the other way. He began to drive the British out of the canal zone, wishing in the future to return it to the ownership of Egypt.

Nasser finds new allies. In 1954, the British were forced to sign a new treaty on the Suez issue, which implied, in particular, the elimination of the English garrison of the canal. In early 1956, the last Tommys sailed home. In London, they were indignant, but the contract had to be fulfilled. The senior partner across the ocean, apparently, decided to take the place of the Egyptian patron himself, because the Americans watched without regret as the British were driven out. But Nasser also prepared a surprise for Washington, declaring that Egypt would not enter into alliances with the imperialist states, but would pursue an independent course that promised the greatest benefits.

For such a flick on the nose, the Americans, with the full support of the British, decided to punish the obstinate. The Reconstruction Bank was ordered to deny the Egyptians new loans for the construction of a hydroelectric complex in Aswan. At the same time, this step did not have the expected effect. Nasser prepared backup routes. Some time ago, expecting difficulties with the British, he began to look for sources of arms purchases to confidently guarantee the country's sovereignty. The main milestone was the established contact with the Yugoslav leader Tito. At that time, relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR were undergoing a post-Stalin renaissance. Nikita Khrushchev decided to restore contacts with the leader of a regional power. During one of the meetings, Tito recommended that Moscow take a closer look at Nasser and help the latter, if there are desires and means. There were funds, and N.S. Khrushchev suggested that the Egyptians turn to Prague, where everything they needed was delivered: tanks, planes, guns.

Decree on the nationalization of the channel. The established contact came in handy in 1956, when Nasser asked the Soviet Union for help in building a frozen hydroelectric power station. The answer was positive. In Cairo they perked up. Independence from the West, which served as the guiding star of the officer junta, has come closer than ever. 26 July 1956 in his public speaking Nasser announced his intention to nationalize the channel, turning its income to the benefit of the country. On the same day, a government decree of the corresponding content was prepared. Foreign shareholders were asked not to worry.

Despite the expectation of this event, the world experienced a shock. Never before have objects of such significance fallen into the hands of regional powers. And the British and French never paid for cargo transit through the canal and did not ask someone else's permission to send their troops to Singapore or Hong Kong. But most importantly, Nasser was in the hands of an oil noose for the industry of the Western Hemisphere, since if he wanted, he could send tankers around the Cape of Good Hope, lengthening their route three times and making the price of oil unacceptably high. In addition, the Egyptians said that they were guided by Moscow, which served as an additional irritating factor for the West.

Growing Suez Conflict. Britain and France, which owned shares in the channel, refused to recognize the nationalization. In August, an international conference on the Suez Canal was held in London. Of the 28 countries participating in the conference, 18 supported the US proposal to transfer the channel to international jurisdiction. At the same time, Egypt, relying on the unconditional support of the USSR, rejected this decision. The conference ended without results.

Britain and France insisted on the return of the canal, threatening to use force. The United States hoped to squeeze out its NATO allies in the Middle East and strengthen its position among developing countries. Therefore, they strongly objected to the use of military measures.

Forces and capabilities of the conflicting parties. The conflict was brewing grandiose. It was necessary to solve the problem quickly, until the existing situation took the form of an established one, until the world got used to it! until Egypt regained its strength. The fastest way, as you know, is associated with the use of force. Any compromise requires coordination and clarification of mutual claims, and a military action can be swift, of course, if one is ready for it. But both empires - Britain and France - were in deep decline, not having the strength to independently and quickly cope with the difficulties that arose through military intervention. Egypt had a military force sufficient, at least on paper, to resist an invasion.

The French army at that time was bogged down in hostilities against the Algerian anti-colonialist rebels. Paris shamefully borrowed for this purpose even the troops previously involved in the NATO structure. And the reserves for the operation against Egypt had less than what was required according to the most optimistic forecasts. The French fleet was a "hodgepodge" of old ships that survived the war and those that were generously donated by the Yankees. Naturally, they gave unnecessary surpluses that had no special value.

The British fared no better. The country conducted an audit of the armed forces, giving priority to nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Conventional weapons were reduced. Several divisions were stationed on the Rhine, in Germany, and there were still enough troops to maintain garrisons in Cyprus, Hong Kong and Malaya. On the islands of Albion, there were "guardsmen in fur hats", military schools and several brigades of reduced strength. Other power was in the warehouses of old wartime equipment. The fleet of the “mistress of the seas” was also reformed, and there were enough ships, but they were mostly mothballed. The mobile core of the fleet had a minimum ship composition.

Interests of England and France. Nevertheless, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet decided to act. The British wanted to unblock the shortest road to the fragments of the empire, eliminate the oil shortage and return the proceeds from the Suez shares. The French had an additional calculation. They believed, not without reason, that Cairo was helping the Algerians in their struggle against French army, and considered it possible to kill this hare at once, depriving the Front National Liberation Algeria aid from abroad.

Israel as a new ally. The conclusion about the need to form an interested coalition arose by itself. The combined forces should have been enough for the Landing Force to capture the canal and the surrounding area. Guy Mollet immediately proposed expanding the coalition. Paris had a well-established partnership with Tel Aviv. France supplied the Israelis with weapons and military equipment. Contacts between the military of the two countries were quite close. Guy Mollet had no doubt that Israel would do everything possible to safely strike a blow that would weaken Egypt, the leader of the Arab coalition. There was even a formal reason that saved the Israelis from UN sanctions and accusations of aggression. As early as 1951, Egypt, within the framework of pan-Arab measures aimed at! against Israel, forbade the passage of his ships through the canal. The United Nations responded with a resolution demanding not to impede shipping, but both Farouk and Nasser ignored it. So the exit of the IDF and (Israeli army) to the channel could be presented as an action in pursuance of the will of the UN.

In early August 1956, Israel agreed not only to participate in the coalition, but to start hostilities first, pinning down the main grouping of the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula. It was from these considerations that the joint headquarters set up in London on August 8 proceeded in its work. There was "more than enough" time to plan the operation, since at first it was necessary to mobilize sufficient forces for it, which automatically postponed the invasion until autumn.

Military forces of France, England and Israel

Air Force status. The best machines of the British and French were the American-designed F-80s, which were beaten in Korea, and even less comparable to the MiGs, the Misters and Vampires of national production. Israeli aviation was worse. To calm down, the headquarters of the joint forces decided to assume that the Egyptians would not have time to fly around the new fighters and learn how to use them correctly. Another problem was the lack of a transshipment base for the invasion. There were no suitable airfields in British Malta, and the port could not accommodate a significant squadron and even more landing transport ships.

Everything needed was available in Cyprus, but its use as the main transshipment point had to be abandoned. The island was located in an area that planes got from the airfields of Syria, which had a close alliance with Egypt. It was not excluded that the Syrian Air Force could inflict significant damage on the forces operating from Cyprus. Involuntarily, I had to admit that the aviation covering the landing force would have to operate from aircraft carriers. An emergency reactivation of British ships of this class has begun.

For lack of another possibility, the invasion fleet had to operate without transshipment, taking up a waiting position on the high seas. As part of the preparatory measures, the French transferred to Israel a large amount of military equipment, primarily aircraft, in this case there was hope that Hel Haavir (Israeli Air Force) would be able to suppress the Egyptian aircraft.

Helicopters as a military novelty. The allies decided to use the novelty - helicopters. Rotorcraft were used quite widely in Korea, but mainly as rescue or auxiliary equipment, serving and supplying isolated military units. Now helicopters, convenient because of the ability to take off and land on limited areas, decided to replenish the air groups of aircraft carriers. They were to ensure the delivery to the immediate rear of the Egyptian troops near the tactical landing canal. The advantage was that such groups could consist of fighters who did not have parachute training, who landed by landing method outside the prepared areas. It was believed that the appearance of numerous groups of "commandos" next to the battle formations of the Egyptians would paralyze their defensive efforts. This method, used for the first time, was called "vertical coverage" in the landing) operation.

The number of troops and equipment. The time spent on gathering forces and resources was not in vain. The Tripartite Coalition has concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean quite! significant grouping. By the way, the coalition was precisely threefold, despite the fact that subsequently Israel tried to dissociate itself from the role of an accomplice in aggression, referring to the fact that it was conducting an independent one! operation. The joint headquarters managed to attract 45,000 British and 20,000 French to participate in the landing. More than 400 tanks, 520 field guns and a lot of other equipment were to be unloaded ashore. The amphibious forces, in addition to 60 troop transports, included dozens of landing barges, pontoons and other means of delivering troops from ships to shore.

The paratroopers were supposed to be covered by a fleet of 5 aircraft carriers and one carrier of helicopters, 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers and even 6 submarines included in the group for unexplained purposes. Total in the Eastern part mediterranean sea by November 1956, over 130 Allied ships were concentrated.

More than 300 aircraft were based at the airfields of Cyprus and Malta. On aircraft carriers - another 280. These forces should have been enough to carry out any tasks that might arise during the landing operation.

"Kadesh". But this was not the end of the anti-Egyptian contingent. For the invasion of Sinai and access to the Suez Canal, the IDF allocated 10 brigades, numbering more than 100 thousand people, 200 tanks, 600-odd artillery systems and almost all aviation, which had 180 modern aircraft. The "independent" operation of the Israelis received the code name "Kadesh" ("Purification"). In its course, it was necessary to break the resistance of the main Egyptian forces in the Sinai and advance to the canal area within seven days.

The success of this plan was the diplomatic highlight of the coalition project. The fighting in the area of ​​the engineering system of the shipping canal could lead to its damage and failure. This gave the Anglo-French a reason to intervene in the conflict in order to save an object of indispensable importance for world trade and shipping.

Washington's position. The propaganda support of the operation had a special meaning. In Paris and London, there was a firm belief in the negative reaction of the USSR, but there was no clear opinion about the position of the "American patron". Washington was playing its own complicated game, the outcome of which was not calculated in European capitals. Therefore, the reason for the invasion should not have raised the slightest doubt about its validity. The determination of the allies was based on an assessment of two realities in 1956. First, on Soviet problems in Hungary, where the most acute crisis of the Eastern Bloc was taking place. This allowed us to hope that the Kremlin would not be able to reorient itself towards resolving the second conflict and would limit itself to general declarations of rejection of the actions of the Anglo-French in Egypt.

Second, Washington's silence, essentially limited to an August 2 call for an international conference on freedom of navigation through the canal, inspired confidence in American sympathy. In any case, the US Secretary of State spoke in solidarity with his Parisian and London colleagues, denoting the rejection of Nasser's decision to nationalize the facility, called in the communiqué an "international institution." The fact that the Allies were withdrawing troops from Europe and moving them to the east of the Mediterranean Sea, the Americans could not know. But they didn't react! and in the joint headquarters considered that the Yankees were silent for the sake of maintaining the image of champions of freedom, but would not to be surprised if the dirty work of saving Egypt from the "Reds" is done by someone else's hands. It was necessary to take the channel, eliminate Nasser, and then convene an international summit. In ancient times, allied leaders remembered that the best argument in any negotiations about the future is the soldiers who are de facto at the point of contention.

That they could be placed there, the coalition had little doubt.

Armed Forces of Egypt

Diversity of Egyptian weapons. The Egyptian armed forces were going through a perilous stage of rapid construction. Formally, they were large, under arms were more than 300 thousand people. At the same time, 2/3 of this number were soldiers from paramilitary organizations that did not have normal training and weapons for modern combat operations. There were only a little over 100,000 regular troops. There was enough military equipment, but it belonged to different types, which made it difficult to use, equip and repair. Some of the military equipment was left by the former colonialists, some came from Rommel, passing through his hands! the British, who did not know what to do with trophies, and, finally, the bulk was received from Soviet warehouses through Czech exporters.

The basis of the tank fleet was made up of glorious wartime vehicles: the T-34 and the self-propelled fighter SU-100. They sold the Egyptians and unsurpassed but powerful heavy IS tanks. At the same time, the development of these machines, which differed significantly from the samples familiar to the Arabs, was delayed. At first glance, the difference between the British heritage Valentine and the T-34 is barely discernible. The driver has the same levers and the commander has similar observation devices, and the gun is loaded in the same way. But upon closer examination, a lot of features emerge. The engine is serviced differently. The gun takes some getting used to, and other little things are revealed over time. And he was not.

Weapons from the USSR. Soviet deliveries began in 1955. A lot of weapons were brought in, worth 250 million dollars. The whole army was retrained, but did not have time to retrain. The pace of mastering new technology in the East is different and depends on many mental characteristics. The officers of the Egyptian army belonged to a privileged caste. Such hands will not stain with oil. They explained the theory to the fighters, and by 17.00 they went to casinos and clubs, since the working day was over. And the soldiers themselves cannot understand the technology due to the lack of elementary skill read and service experience of any mechanisms. Of course, the situation is exaggerated, there were exceptions, but in general, eyewitnesses paint just such a picture. In capable hands 200 Soviet tanks, 100 self-propelled guns and 200 armored personnel carriers would become a formidable force, but where to get them, these hands ?!

Egyptian planes. A similar situation exists in the Air Force. Leaving, the colonialists left almost a hundred aircraft, including quite modern Vampire jet fighters. The same number of "Korean heroes" MiG-15 and the most modern jet bombers for operations in the Il-28 tactical zone came from the Soviet Union. They took flight personnel seriously, creating in Poland training base to train two crews for each aircraft and a contingent of maintenance personnel. They taught normally, which means - for a long time. To complete the course by 1956 did not have time to complete. For example, out of 39 Il-28s delivered to Egypt, only 12 had crews. The rest of the planes were at the airfields with no hope of taking off.

Egyptian fleet. The Egyptians also had a fleet of several destroyers and frigates donated by the British, as well as torpedo boats. But all the ships had a shortage of crews. Those who were nevertheless enrolled in the teams, for the most part, had no idea what and how it works on the ship. As a result, the ships, in fact, have become large-sized expensive targets. Nasser had no submarines, and the Anglo-French naval grouping could feel completely safe from sudden attacks from under the water.

From what has been described, it by no means follows that the Egyptians were unable to fight using sophisticated equipment. But for this it was necessary to study long and diligently. It is no coincidence that in the 20th century it was often said that wars were won by schoolteachers. Moreover, to learn for real, in practice, paying attention not to painting fences, but to handling weapons. For this, any nation needs a fair amount of time, which the Coalition did not give Egypt.

Campaign in the Sinai

Israeli paratroopers. On the evening of October 29, Israel was ready to carry out Kadesh and began to put the plan into action. The leaders of the IDF were people with imagination, each time inventing another surprise for opponents from the Arab coalition. This time the salt of the operation was that its beginning did not at all resemble a major offensive. Nasser's officers, who studied the experience of recent wars, were convinced that as soon as they and the enemy had real, properly equipped armies, then this time everything would start according to the standard scheme. Artillery preparation from hundreds of barrels, an air raid, then an attack on enemy positions by infantry and tanks. But nothing even remotely similar happened. Instead, the Israelis, by the way, as usual, without declaring war, slowly dropped paratroopers into the rear of two Egyptian divisions in the Sinai. On the night of October 29-30, paratrooper battalions saddled the strategic passes on the most important communications of the enemy without much noise. From the first hours of the war, the Egyptian units in front of the Israeli front were cut off from the main forces in the Nile Delta and from supplies from their supply bases, and without suspecting it.

Battles for the Mitla Pass. In the morning, when the IDF paratroopers were firmly established in the position of the strategic Mitla Pass, the Israeli brigades launched an attack. The brigade of the current Israeli Prime Minister Sharon was the first to join with his paratroopers near Mitla. Then the Egyptian forces covering the border were knocked down from their lines along the entire front. One Nasser division ended up in a "bag". Sinai does not give much room for maneuver, no matter how well equipped the armies of the 20th century are, it is still better not to leave the roads, because it is a desert. The actions of the Egyptians became predictable, and they were not allowed to retreat to their own. The quite reasonable desire of the Arabs to unblock the mountain passes was carried out by clearly insufficient forces, and failed. And after Sharon's main forces approached Mitla, the deblockade of the pass turned into a utopia. Although the Israeli brigade was beaten from the sky by the Egyptian Air Force, its combat capabilities were generally preserved. Evidently, the Egyptian ground targets were doing fine, since Sharon requested air support, and received it. In the sky over Mitla, Israeli "Mysters" and "Hurricanes" made in France appeared.

Attack in the center. Hel Haavir did not achieve much success, realizing that it was not easy to fight the Migars on French cars, even when the Egyptians were at the helm, but the attacks on the Sharonites stopped. To the northwest, along the Sinai border, events also moved quickly. The offensive in the center began on the afternoon of 30 October. It was necessary to take a well-equipped fortified area around the populations of Kuseim and Aveygil. The Egyptians "rested", and 2 Israeli brigades stalled. Attempts to take positions with a frontal strike cost a lot of blood, which the IDF did not like. In order not to lose momentum, they called for help. Tank brigade number 7 bypassed the Egyptians and hit the rear. Tankers demonstrated a high level of skill by marching through areas that were considered impassable.

In full accordance with the military wisdom of the Hasek soldier Schweik, the Egyptians decided that "the unit, surrounded on all sides, must inevitably surrender." And so they did. And the 7th brigade rushed to the air bases lying behind enemy lines, which the pilots persistently asked for, who did not see "useful prospects" in the air confrontation with the MiGs. Tankers decided to help. At the same time, the Egyptian command penetrated the meaning of the enemy's plan. To parry the breakthrough of the 7th brigade, Nasser's tank division moved. There was a counter tank battle which the Israelites feared. Checking the quality of "Russian armor" was risky, and the Egyptians were caught in the old "French mistake".

Their division went through the Sinai during the day in fine weather, like the French in May 1940. And the Arab aircraft at that time operated south of Mitla, the sky over the tank columns was seductively clear. The Jews filled this gap. Hel Haavir's attack aircraft managed to destroy 20-30 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and damage several dozen more. The Egyptians did not repair and tow damaged or recognized as such tanks, but simply turned west and quickly moved back to the canal, pursued by the 7th brigade, which had equaled in number. Thus, the most probable opportunity to defend Sinai failed in the greatest measure.

Affairs in the Gaza Strip. In the north, in and around the Gaza Strip, things were no better. Demoralized by the news of the widespread defeat, the Egyptian commanders decided to retreat to the canal line before it was too late. The tank and infantry brigades of the IDF took advantage of this, knocking down the rearguards of the enemy from the coastal highway and moving along it to the west. By the morning of November 1, the front on the peninsula had completely collapsed.

Results of the Sinai Campaign. The road to the fulfillment of the "allied duty", which consisted in accessing the canal, was open to Israel. Providing a propaganda reason for the invasion of the Anglo-French took place. The exit of the IDF to the navigable artery became a matter of hours. The canal was 20 km away. The campaign in Sinai had the following results. For the Egyptians, this is about 3 thousand people killed and wounded. Israel acknowledged the loss of 1 thousand people, of which 200 soldiers and officers died. "Technical losses" were higher. Israeli trophies were 27 T-34 tanks, 6 SU-100s and 107 Western-made armored vehicles. In general, Egypt was missing 400 cars. In Tel Aviv, hundreds of troop mechanization equipment, including trucks, were decommissioned.

Israel got almost all the means of artillery reinforcement of the Nasser army in the Sinai. And even a warship - the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim El Aval, sent to shell the enemy port of Haifa, was! intercepted by two similar Israeli Navy ships. The sea battle had a somewhat comical appearance. A long fire duel of ships ended without hits. But then "Ibragim" was attacked by two attack aircraft. The damaged ship surrendered and was taken by the Israelis as a prize.

The "Sinai score" in the air was just as unpleasant for Egypt. The Arabs shot down 9 aircraft, the Jews - 22. However, this result was logical, since only 30 Arab fighters took off, which, despite their qualitative superiority, could not count on success in battles with a hundred enemy aircraft. The Ilyushin bombers tried to bomb Israeli airfields, but they chose a false target for this, striking at an empty place. Subsequently, the flights were not repeated. The loss of air bases on the peninsula made it necessary to redeploy aviation to airfields in the Nile Delta, where it waited for Operation Musketeer.

Operation Musketeer

November 30th ultimatum."Musketeer" was called the Anglo-French plan of aggression on the canal. The allies were in a hurry. As soon as they received information about the debut of the Israelis in the Sinai, not yet understanding how things had gone, the interested Europeans began to implement the plan. At 6 am on November 30, a joint Anglo-French ultimatum was handed over to the Cairo authorities, demanding the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian troops 10 km away from the canal, the banks of which were subject to occupation by Allied contingents for a period until the further status of the Suez facilities was determined.

From a diplomatic point of view, the document was an absurdly concocted tale. At that moment there were no Israeli troops near the canal, but only Egyptian ones in their sovereign right. But neither Paris nor London were excited by legal subtleties, although they should have been. When the text of the ultimatum was presented to the US ambassador in London, he accurately described it with the term "nonsense."

Nasser reaction. The British would have been frightened, but they were not afraid, but gave Nasser half a day to think. The character of the Egyptian colonel was taken into account exactly. The national leader could not accept the conditions dictated from outside, based on considerations of both internal and foreign policy. The return of the colonialists was a disaster for the foundations of the Egyptian regime and the collapse of the country's claims to a leadership position in the Arab world. Even before the expiration of the term, a shocked Gamal Abdel responded with an unequivocal refusal. He turned to the United States, the USSR and the United Nations for support. He could not betray the idea for which he worked all his life and, having rejected the ultimatum, prepared for the worst. Rather, he prepared just sluggishly and poorly. For example, despite the presence of an invasion fleet with aircraft carriers off the Egyptian coast, Nasser did not have time to remove aircraft from the airfields closest to the enemy, where they came under attack from allied "kites" in the first hours of the invasion.

Air bombings. The aggressors gave Egypt almost no extra time. 13 hours after the deadline indicated in the note, their aircraft delivered a disarming strike on five coastal airfields, where the doomed Ilys and MiGs stood without crews. There was no one to ferry planes to the south, inland. On October 31, after 19.00, about 100 cars burned down in their parking lots. Other targets were hit, including the major cities of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said, the latter hit especially hard. The Allies did not know the exact location of military installations and bombed their approximate location within the city limits. Losses among the civilian population began to grow rapidly.

"Quarantine Zone""Saviors" of the channel during air training and the landings sank several Egyptian ships in its fairway, indeed hindering the freedom of navigation. At the same time, in general, aviation coped well with its tasks. After 2 thousand sorties, the defense of the approaches to the canal was practically destroyed. The lack of forces forced the Egyptians to abandon the defense of the coast and limit themselves to the defense of individual points in the immediate vicinity of the invasion object, this circumstance was recorded by the intelligence of the aggressors.

The prospects for a successful landing increased markedly, the invasion fleet moved into close proximity to the landing area, located 50-100 km from the coast. On November 2, the Allies declared the adjacent water area a "quarantine zone", where navigation under neutral flags was prohibited. There were no such precedents even during the Second World War. The landing could follow at any moment. This was announced by leaflets dropped on Cairo, and a radio station from Cyprus, broadcasting in Arabic. The Egyptians were called upon to overthrow Nasser and allow back the former masters of the country and the canal.

The situation in the Egyptian army. Despondency reigned in the Egyptian capital. Attempts by Nasser and the army command to build a defense in the north failed. It was not possible to pull the troops out of the "Sinai quagmire". The order given on November 1 allowing the retreat to the canal did not reach everyone, and part of the Egyptian army continued to fight in their numerous pockets, and not nearly as ingloriously as the IDF commanders later claimed. In the south of the peninsula, Sharon's brigade again got it. There were other successes, but they did not change anything. Those who managed to get to the channel were demoralized, weakened and could not be immediately thrown into battle in the north.

Allied landing. Some hope dawned only on November 5, when the IDF, as if fulfilling the conditions of the Allied ultimatum, suspended the offensive in the Sinai, but this did not bring relief. At about 7 am on the same day, in the area of ​​​​the northern entrance to the canal, the allied paratroopers began to drop, in front of it, about 200 aircraft "ironed" the positions of the surviving Egyptian air defense systems and the lines occupied by its troops. After that, the landing went extremely smoothly. At the height of the day, more than 3 thousand paratroopers turned out to be in the Egyptian rear. The coast was isolated from the country. The British entrenched themselves to the west of the entrance to the canal, having captured the Gamal airfield, the French - south of Port Said on one side and Port Fuad on the other. The isolation of the combat area was performed "perfectly well." Coordinating their actions with the pilots and not experiencing problems with supplies, up to and including beer, the paratroopers ruled out the possibility of the Egyptian reserves approaching. However, this existed only in principle; in fact, the Egyptians had nothing to fight for the "northern gate" of the canal. Dawn of the next day caught the main body of the amphibious assault on the way to the landing zones. For the British, the western coast was determined, the French were assigned the opposite. The first waves of attackers met no resistance. And Helicopters for "vertical coverage" drove ashore in vain. The commandos they landed behind the coastal fortifications found the defenders' positions empty. The Egyptian soldiers who survived under air strikes fortified themselves in the cities, hoping that the battle within the densely built-up area would help at least partially correct the extremely unfavorable balance of power.

Capture of Port Said. After the first wave of landing, a stream of people and equipment poured onto the shore. In just 2 days, 40 thousand people, 76 tanks, 100 armored vehicles, 50 guns were transported to the coast, not counting those small-caliber artillery systems that the paratroopers had with them. All this army quickly captured Port Said, which had not received water for a day from the water supply cut by the French. An ultimatum to the Egyptian commandant of Port Said, General Salah ed-Din Moguy, demanding the surrender of the city, was sent on the 5th. The paratroopers dreamed of taking over the city themselves, without outside help. But the call for surrender was rejected. A skirmish broke out on the southern outskirts. All night small groups of paratroopers made their way to the center of Port Said. But success came only with the appearance on the scene of amphibious assaults, which captured the commandant and the headquarters of the resistance, putting an end to it. Some doubts are caused by the figures of Egyptian losses, defined by the aggressors as 800 killed and over 1 thousand wounded defenders of the city. Moguy simply did not have such a number of fighters under his command. Obviously, in the excitement of the paratroopers and marines, they threshed hundreds of civilians, which they did not hesitate to report in the victory report.

In battles that were not distinguished by fierceness, the British lost 16 people killed, the French - 10. And the reason for this was not only the weak resistance of the enemy. Assessing the Musketeer operation, it must be admitted that of all the large combined landings of the 20th century, it was the most organized and clear. The American "Flash of Fury" in 1983 against Grenada went worse, despite the fact that the enemy was incomparably weaker than Egypt. By the end of the day on November 7, the jubilant Allies were preparing to move south along the canal to end their journey on the shores of the Red Sea. And they certainly would have succeeded if they had had the freedom to do so. Nasser would not have lasted even a day. But the aggressors were not given "freedom of hands".

The role of the USSR and the USA in the Suez crisis

Rapprochement of Egypt with the USSR. As mentioned above, in search of a counterbalance to British influence in the Middle East, Nasser began rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

In 1953-1954. between the USSR and Egypt were concluded trade agreements. In 1955, after the creation of the Baghdad Pact, which included Great Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq, the government of G.A. Nasser for the first time in history Arab world acquired a large batch of Soviet weapons (officially, Egypt, like Israel, bought weapons in Czechoslovakia). This fact laid the foundation for the strategic penetration of the USSR into the Middle East.

The USSR played a special role in the Suez crisis.

The official reaction of the United States and the United Nations to the events in Egypt. First, let's list the main facts. US President D. Eisenhower condemned the actions of his NATO allies, calling them "erroneous" and stated that the issue should be resolved at the UN General Assembly. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs limited itself to condemning the aggression against Egypt. Moscow's main focus at that moment was on Hungary, where Soviet troops were suppressing an anti-communist revolution.

November 2 General Assembly The UN demanded a ceasefire in the Sinai Peninsula and the withdrawal of troops beyond the 1948 armistice line. On November 4, the question was raised about sending UN peacekeeping forces to the Suez Canal zone.

However, hostilities continued. On November 5, an Anglo-French landing began in the canal zone. By this time, Israeli troops had captured almost the entire territory of the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptian army suffered heavy losses. More than 6 thousand of its soldiers and officers were captured. The Israelis also seized most of the Soviet weapons delivered to Egypt.

TASS message. On November 5, 1956, in Hungarian Budapest, far from the Egyptian coast, Soviet troops squeezed insurgent forces in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe last resistance center, near the Korvin cinema. The Hungarian crisis was practically resolved. This meant that the USSR could completely switch to the "Egyptian theme." The calculation of the Anglo-French coalition that the Kremlin was distracted by Eastern European affairs did not materialize from the very beginning, although at first the Soviets reacted sluggishly. On the first day of November, TASS published a report condemning the tripartite aggression as such, but not specifying how Moscow intends to act. The languid tone of the Soviets pleased Eden and Guy Mollet, the Foreign Ministry analysts decided that the Russians had no time for Suez.

US reaction. At the same time, it was the indecision of the Soviet statement that may have played a decisive role in activating another force that was watching the escalation of the conflict. It dawned on the employees of the American State Secretariat. Soviet restraint and non-involvement in the conflict open the way for the implementation of the anti-colonial ideals of the great Roosevelt. It is time to burst the imperial bubbles and not get accused of "non-resistance to the communists" for this. Eisenhower's entourage was clearly smarter than Truman's, instantly developing a line of conduct. As soon as Washington reached the message of Nasser, containing a request to stop the conflict, sent in addition to the Predsmin of the USSR and the leaders of the largest non-aligned states, the Indian Nehru and the Indonesian Sukarno, the Americans began to act.

Security Council. The United Nations Security Council met in New York. At the meeting American delegation was categorically against the use of force.1 The Soviet representatives did not object, although they apparently did not have precise instructions, and our delegation followed in the wake of the Yankees' initiatives. Representatives of the coalition were dumbfounded by the betrayal of the patron. Panic set in, quiet at first. Despite the depressed mood, the invasions decided not to cancel and miscalculated.

After the landing, Eisenhower spoke more harshly. The president informed the world that the Americans had no idea about the plans of the allies, but NATO did not intend to support them, on the contrary, they considered it necessary to localize the conflict and ceasefire. His words sounded like a death knell to the empires. The American reaction alone was enough to expel the allies from the region of the planet's oil aorta with a bang. But the Americans were not alone.

Joint Declaration of Non-Aligned States. An appeal to the leaders of the non-aligned countries led to the appearance of their joint declaration, where the Anglo-French people were directly called aggressors. The document was signed by three members of the British Commonwealth of Nations: India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). The situation for the British became a stalemate. Keeping the channel meant breaking with the satellites, who were barely persuaded to buy something made in England. To give up meant to lose the point that allowed cheap and fast penetration into the Indian Ocean. There was something to puzzle over to the specialists of the Foreign Office (British Foreign Office). Moreover, the pause for decision-making was rapidly shrinking.

Moscow is voting. On the day when the coalition paratroopers poured into positions near the canal, Moscow spoke up. Khrushchev's tenacious mind, prone to adventures, a stupid person, singled out clearly advantageous aspects from the situation. However, there were no others in it. Having shown activity, the Kremlin received “hares” in an amount that Grandfather Mazai did not dream of. First, if successful, a sharp increase in the prestige of the USSR in the countries of the Middle East and non-aligned states followed. Secondly, the most powerful European allies of the United States were under attack. Thirdly, all this happened with the actual complicity of the Americans. "Little fluffy rodents" poured without counting to the foot of the Kremlin.

Khrushchev began to act, the next TASS report was sustained in an extremely decisive manner. The Soviet news agency filled the world information space with sensations. It said that Soviet people the fate of Gamal Nasser, and even more so of ordinary Egyptians, is not indifferent, and that the Soviet government will not interfere with those of its citizens who wish to participate in the armed struggle of the Arabs for their freedom. It was said at the right time. The world has not yet forgotten the "Chinese volunteers" brought together in divisions under the command of the Chief of the General Staff of the PRC. Further, the Soviet government refused to recognize the blockade of the coast of Egypt, assessed as an act of "sea piracy." The USSR reserved both the right to provide any military-technical assistance to the Arabs, and the possibility of direct military intervention in the conflict by all available means.

It should be noted here that with the funds at that time things were not bad. There were old atomic and new thermonuclear weapons; "stand on the roof" strategic aviation and quite sufficient for the European expanses of a division of medium-range bombers. The first medium-range missiles capable of covering any object in Europe were put on combat duty.

It was also said in the appeal that the USSR and the USA, in view of the enviable unanimity in condemning aggression, could create joint forces and, transferring them under the UN flag, crush the imperialists of the three-member coalition. At the end, the main idea of ​​the TASS report sounded, which boils down to the fact that if the fire is not stopped by the end of November 6, everything described will begin to come true.

USSR ultimatum. In addition to the informationers' broadcast statement, more personal letters were sent out. Eisenhower received his version, addressees in Paris, London and Tel Aviv.

On the initiative of N.S. Khrushcheva Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.A. Bulganin sent ultimatums to the leaders of Great Britain, France and Israel, demanding within 24 hours to stop hostilities and withdraw troops from Egypt.

The letter to the British Prime Minister A. Eden said: “In what position would Great Britain find itself if it were attacked by a stronger state possessing all kinds of modern! destructive weapon? But these countries can today refrain from sending sea or air force to the shores of Britain and use other means - for example, rocket weapons! The letter contained an unequivocal threat: "We are determined to crush the aggressors by force and restore peace in the Middle East."

The Israeli Prime Minister was warned that the events in the Sinai Peninsula "endanger the very existence of Israel as a state." There was also a threat to send Soviet "volunteers" to help Egypt. When transmitting ultimatums, the ambassadors of the USSR verbally stated that Soviet missiles already getting ready to start. In Moscow, government-inspired protest demonstrations took place outside the walls of the British, French and Israeli embassies. The Soviet ambassador was recalled from Tel Aviv.

US President D. Eisenhower was sent a proposal to undertake a joint Soviet-American military operation against the aggressors. ON THE. Bulganin wrote to the American president: "If the war is not stopped, then it may bring with it the danger of escalating into the Third World War."

Calculations by N.S. Khrushchev. Of course, N.S. Khrushchev understood that the United States would not enter into a military conflict with its main allies. But he hoped to show the countries of the third world, especially the Arabs, that it was the USSR that was their main support. Knew N.S. Khrushchev and that the Soviet Union does not have long-range missiles deployed in combat positions, and in general these missiles are not enough for a decisive strike on Great Britain and France. Military calculations showed that it was unrealistic to ensure the landing of Soviet troops in Egypt: even if Turkey and Iran agreed to provide air corridors, there would not be enough military transport aircraft to transfer and supply a sufficient number of troops and weapons.

In a clash with the Anglo-French expeditionary forces and fleet, the Soviet landing force would be doomed to defeat. At the same time, Khrushchev hoped that it would not come to real hostilities. In this he was right.

Tel Aviv reaction. Israel reacted first, Bep-Gurion had enough of one American criticism.

The IDF completed its tasks by removing the Egyptians from Sinai, it made no sense to persist further. Washington was saddened by the dexterity of the Russians and sat down to draw up a polite refusal to create a joint peacekeeping force. But the UN Security Council still voted for a resolution on an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of interventionist troops from the canal zone.

France and England V embarrassment. Guy Mollet and Eden had the hardest time of all. They wondered if Khrushchev was bluffing or not. It turned out that he was not bluffing. According to NATO intelligence, ballistic invulnerable to air defense! medium-range missiles in the USSR were not only tested, but also put into service with the troops. Therefore, a rapid thermonuclear strike was quite possible. Moreover, the American deterrent potential was out of the game. At one time, Khrushchev, who skillfully used the appearance of tactlessness to achieve his goals, joked rudely with Eden, notifying the Englishman that his military had calculated the number of R-5 missiles needed to destroy the infrastructure of the British Isles. They needed only 4, the French would need 7, Nikita Sergeevich, smiling, announced. Eden remembered the conversation. This doesn't just go out of my head.

Slightly digressing from the topic, I want to recall a few! details. Recently, we, dear readers, have become accustomed to treating Khrushchev as a rude person and a "political hooligan." But the author wants to point out one detail: the “shoe knocking” on the table in the UN General Assembly is known as an act of political barbarism in Moscow. It is less well known that it led to the blockade of the UN resolution that interfered with the USSR. In light of this turn of events, the boot becomes a successful last resort. There is no reason to love Khrushchev, in the author's opinion. He more than deserved his resignation, but it is desirable to remember everything respectfully. Nikita Sergeevich knew how to achieve his “not by washing, but by skating”. He was not so simple. The political clumsiness of Albion's premier may have also served him well. It was not easy for Eden to endure such a psychological burden, the inveterate politician probably understood that the Soviets needed a thermonuclear polsar no more than the rest, but he could not help himself.

Eden and Guy Mollet decided that even if the USSR simply helped Egypt and its Arab allies with specialists and equipment, the outcome of the conflict would become unpredictable. The Americans, even if they want to help, will not be able to, as soon as the previous statements cannot be disavowed. Washington made it clear that oil and Arab friends are more valuable than crazy allies. In this situation, reversing was the only way out, despite the many consequences. Before the expiration of the Moscow ultimatum, both leaders of the empire issued a statement that, not wanting bloodshed and, given the undoubted success of the operation, from 00 hours on November 7, the fire would be stopped.

The failure of the Musketeer. Musketeer failed. After 16 days, following the will of the United Nations, the Anglo-French began to clear the captured positions. In March 1957, the IDF soldiers left the Sinai, however, only until the next time. They were replaced by international UN forces deployed on the Egyptian-Israeli border. The independence of Egypt and its sovereignty over the canal were restored, with the condition that no ships be obstructed. The Soviet Union received large orders for weapons and equipment to recreate the defeated army of Egypt. True, Cairo did not fully pay for the supplies. The Soviet role was highly appreciated by all former colonies. The pro-Soviet orientation became widespread among the "new" independent states. The basis of the "cold war" for the USSR expanded, perhaps even too much, in comparison with the modest possibilities of the economy to provide! mutually beneficial contacts with new allies in need of goods, and more often just help.

As a result of the events of 1956, the USSR significantly strengthened its positions in the Middle East. True, Soviet policy acquired an extremely one-sided - pro-Arab - character, which deprived domestic diplomacy of freedom of maneuver. At the same time, the significance of the Suez crisis did not come down to this: it had a very strong influence on the methods of action of N.S. Khrushchev in the outer! politics. Nuclear missile blackmail was laid out of foreign policy for a number of subsequent years.

The nature of Soviet military-economic assistance. In practice, Soviet military and economic assistance to Egypt, and indeed to many other developing countries, turned out to be just a gift: weapons, equipment, building materials, and much more were provided to real and hypothetical allies almost free of charge. All that was required of the recipients was the declaration of a "socialist orientation" and the approval of the positions of the USSR in the confrontation with the West. In the 1950s-1960s. Socialist orientation in various forms, except for Egypt, adhered to India, Indonesia, Burma, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Congo and some other countries. All of them received significant Soviet assistance.

Meanwhile, socialism in the understanding of Asian and African leaders had, as a rule, nothing in common with what was invested in this concept in Moscow. Marxist ideology served only as a cover for nationalism. Fearing that their new friends in the third world would go over to the side of the "imperialist powers", the Soviet leadership often supported the "third world countries" even in cases where this was associated with a serious risk for the Soviet Union itself and did not correspond to its national interests.

USA and the Suez Crisis. The American provocation was a complete success. There is no doubt that this was a provocation. For no one in the world believed that American generals did not notice how the Allies were withdrawing weapons from Europe and sending them closer to Egypt. The consequences of the provocation affected quickly, by 1960 there were only a few large colonies in the world. The former system of administrative colonialism crumbled. His legacy was mainly inherited by the United States, which proposed new methods of exploiting the resources of peoples who got rid of the primitive enslavement by Europeans.

These events signaled that the narrow-minded politics of the early years of the Cold War were giving way to pragmatism and private interests that made the positions of the superpowers more flexible. Before them lay huge world, whose borders were remade much easier than in Europe or the "old" countries of Asia. The constructivism of expansion led to some reduction in the intensity of geopolitical confrontation. " cold war” could not end, because both Moscow and Washington needed this “bogey” for taxpayers. But her events have become more predictable. The world has progressed with less risk of total conflict. The commonality of these tendencies, obviously, can be considered as positive by all the peoples of the world, with the exception of the British and French, who had to say goodbye to free "carrots". However, in that era, the prices of “flour” soared so much that the most sober-minded people! in European capitals, without regret, they said goodbye to the symbols of their former power.

Militarily, the crisis at the Suez Canal has taught humanity little, basically confirming the axiom that trained armies are more effective than untrained ones. In tactics, only the use of helicopters was new as a promising means of increasing the mobility of troops. Another consequence was the realization of the need to have a constantly combat-ready rapid reaction force. The military leaders of London and Paris realized that they were simply late in deploying forces, otherwise, perhaps, the Musketeer would have been carried out before the moment when the USSR got the opportunity to actively intervene.


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Q. 8 A serious crisis followed in 1973. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established after the Seven Sisters, a cartel that united Royal Dutch / Shell, British Petroleum, Shevron, Exxon, Mobil, Galf, Texaco and controlled the processing of crude oil and the sale of petroleum products throughout world, unilaterally lowered the purchase prices for oil, on the basis of which they paid taxes and interest for the right to develop natural resources to oil-producing countries. In the 1960s, there was an excess supply of oil on the world markets, and the purpose of the creation of OPEC was to prevent a further fall in prices. However, in the 1970s, a sharp increase in world demand for oil allowed producing countries to significantly increase their revenues from its sale, especially by quadrupling world oil prices in 1973-1974 and doubling again in 1979. At the OPEC meeting on December 22, 1973, it was decided to raise prices to $11. per barrel, of which 7 dollars. received by exporting countries. The growth in incomes and budgets of the oil-producing states allowed them to embark on gigantic construction projects. The measures taken by the OPEC countries led to an increase in the cost of energy for consumers and producers in most countries of the world, which led to a slowdown in economic development. For the first time in the post-war years, a serious inflationary wave emerged in the United States and other developed countries. According to official data from the Federal Treasury, the price level in the United States rose by 8.7% in 1973 and by 12.3% in 1974. Between 1972 and 1982, the cost of living increased by an unprecedented 133%. Yields on long-term bonds in 1973 turned negative for the first time since the Great Depression, reaching a value of 1.1% per year. Unemployment has more than doubled to 9% of the working population. From its record level of 1051.7 points (January 11, 1973), the Dow Jones fell by December 6, 1974 to 577.6 points, that is, by more than 45%. Similar processes unfolded in European countries. Inflation in Germany, France and Great Britain exceeded "in 1974, 10% per annum, the stock market experienced the most serious decline in the post-war period, and unemployment, despite a significant outflow of immigrant workers from Western European countries, rose in 1973-1975 by more than than twice. The result was a recession that hurt industrial production in developed countries. The economic growth rate of the OECD member states in 1974-1980 averaged 2.8% compared to almost 5% in the period 1950-1973, and American industry reduced output by almost 15%. In 1975 (for the first time since 1945) the crisis, which manifested itself in a decline in production and an increase in unemployment along with unceasing inflation, led to a fall in the volume of international trade by 4%. Thus, in the mid-1970s, the Western world was hit by a major structural crisis. Its sources were largely hidden in the policies of developing countries, which at that time had the ability to dictate prices for energy and raw materials. Quite deserving of the name of the global crisis, it struck first of all the developed countries of the Western bloc - the United States and Western Europe. It was the longest crisis of the last two decades, lasting more than two years. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the formation of a new economic reality was marked by three drastic changes, to the greatest extent transformed the economic and social life most Western countries: 1) the industrial sector for the first time became susceptible to limited raw materials and energy; During 1973-1978, oil consumption per unit value of industrial output decreased in the USA by 2.7% year on year, in Canada by 3.5%, in Italy by 3.8%, in Germany and Great Britain by 4%. .8, and in Japan - by 5.7%; as a result, from 1973 to 1985, the gross national product of the OECD countries increased by 32%, while energy consumption increased by only 5%. Between 1975 and 1987, with a gross domestic product growth of more than 25%, American agriculture reduced energy consumption by a factor of 1.65, and the US economy now uses less ferrous metals than it did in 1960. As a result, structural adjustment has intensified, and the first steps towards the accelerated development of non-material-intensive industries and the curtailment of the most inefficient industries have been outlined. An important consequence was the increased attention of entrepreneurs to the markets for those products, the consumption of which could grow without encountering saturation in demand. In the conditions when in the USA there was a car for every two inhabitants, 99% of all families had televisions, refrigerators and radios, and more than 90% had vacuum cleaners and automatic washing machines, the saturation of the market for monotonous mass goods was obvious; the structural crisis gave additional dynamism to new industries such as telecommunications and computers, increased demand for education and health services, ensured the growth of the production of unique goods, a boom in the fashion and entertainment industries, etc. 2) structural changes in the economy caused an objective decline rates of economic growth; If between 1965 and 1973 the economies of the OECD member countries developed at a rate of about 5% per year, then in 1974 growth slowed to 2%, remaining at this level for the next decade. Particularly radical, as could be expected, was the decline in growth rates in traditional industries (in 1973-1979 they amounted to 1.8% in the US manufacturing industry against 2.87 in 1948-1973). However, putting more money and effort into the development of new technologies, while not raising the gross domestic product as fast as the development of mass production (for example, the price of a standard personal computer per unit of hard disk storage fell by more than 100% between 1983 and 1995). 1,800 times, and the cost of copying information has decreased by almost 600 times over the past 15 years), ensured the absolute technological dominance of Western countries, which determines the face modern era. By the beginning of the 1990s, members of the "club of seven" owned 80.4% of the world's computer equipment and provided 90.5% of high-tech production. 3) the mid-1970s also marked a turning point in the dynamics of income distribution among citizens of Western societies. If in 1939 about half of the US population lived in families with incomes below the current poverty level (recalculated in comparable prices), then in the mid-70s their share decreased to 11.6%, and by 1992 it increased again to 14.5% . The material situation of people employed in the industrial sector worsened the most. The inequality index, which reflects the ratio of the incomes of highly paid workers to the incomes of low-paid workers, reached its lowest value over the past 80 years precisely in 1972-1976, while in the period 1973-1990 its growth ranged from 30 to 45%. In 1980, crisis phenomena reappeared in the world economy: in many countries, economic growth slowed down, inflation rose, wages were frozen, and unemployment reached a high level. The reasons lay in the fact that for the countries of the "third world" the increase in prices for raw materials remained the only source of growth in their foreign exchange earnings. On July 1, 1980, the price of oil hit a record $34.72. per barrel. Prices for other types of basic commodities also rose non-stop: between 1975 and 1980, prices per ton of hard coal rose from $38.5 to $45.3, iron ore- from 22.8 to 28.1 dollars, wood - from 61.8 to 137 dollars, copper - from 1320 to 2200 dollars, nickel - from 4560 to 6500 dollars, tin - from 6860 to 16750 dollars. The dynamics of prices for gold and silver remained the most impressive: from 1975 to 1980, silver rose in price (per 10 grams) from 1.42 to 6.62, and gold - from 56.8 to 214.4 dollars. A significant slowdown in economic growth in the second half of the post-war period is characteristic feature almost all regions of the world and groups of countries. The differences lie only in the scale of this slowdown. In the entire group of countries with market economies, “the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP decreased by 1.8%, in developing countries - by 1.2, and in Latin America- by 1.8, in countries located south of the Sahara desert - by 2.6, and in energy exporting countries - even by 6.5%. A similar slowdown in economic growth occurred in most of the former socialist countries, including in the former USSR - by 5.5%, in Russia - by 5.2%. At the same time, in many of them, as well as in the entire group of energy exporting countries, the average annual economic growth rates for the period 1974-1996 became negative. It should be emphasized that in the 1970s and 1980s, economic crises usually took on a global scale, covering to some extent the leading countries of America, Europe and Asia.

Suez Canal. 1956

With the coming to power of Nasser in Egypt and the growth of his authority in the Arab world, the situation in the region escalated again. Nasser, seeking to realize the pan-Arab idea, intended to oust the British from the region, destroy Israel and restore the dominance and former splendor of Islam in the region. Naturally, the British were opposed to him, as well as the French, who at that time were fighting Arab nationalism in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Nasser's flirting with Moscow, his uncompromising position towards Israel, alienated him from the United States, which at first intended to allocate funds to Egypt for the construction of the Aswan dam. The refusal of the West to finance the construction of the dam pushed Nasser to the decision to nationalize the General Company of the Suez Canal Maritime. July 26, 1956, speaking at a rally on the occasion of the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, he announced the nationalization of the company. An international crisis arose. The conservative cabinets of London, Paris (France owned a significant stake in the channel) and Israel decide to carry out a coup in Egypt and throw Nasser. There was also a precedent (the coup in Iran in August 1953). According to the decision made at the end of July 1956, Great Britain and France launched preparations for intervention. Great Britain called up 20,000 reservists, France sent its troops to Cyprus. Secret negotiations began between both countries with Israel, the development of joint plans for intervention. Taking advantage of the international crisis, Israeli troops invade Egypt.

Territories occupied by Israel in 1956 and returned to Egypt in 1957.

On the morning of October 30, 1956, Egyptian units came into contact with Israeli troops. The largest battles began near the village of Abu-Agila. Events in the international arena developed no less rapidly. The day after the start of the aggression, the Egyptian ambassadors in Paris and London were summoned to the ministries of foreign affairs. They were read a demand for a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli troops for 10 miles on both sides of the canal. Egypt was also asked to agree to the temporary occupation by British and French troops of important positions in the area of ​​Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. In our company, where you can order a website, you can choose from our store. Egypt refused to comply. October 31 Anglo - French troops began hostilities. On November 5, an Anglo-French landing began in Port Said and Port Faud. The Egyptian units were ordered to retreat to the canal. By this time, that is, in the five days of the war, the Israeli army captured the Gaza Strip, Rafah, Al-Arish and occupied most of the Sinai Peninsula. A struggle began in the diplomatic arena, the USSR, the socialist countries took the side of Egypt. camps, the Arab League and, most interestingly, the United States. The UN decision, adopted on November 2 by a majority of 64 votes (against only France, Britain, Israel, New Zealand and Australia), noted that Israel was guilty of violating the ceasefire agreement. England and France were declared aggressors. The Security Council demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories.

On November 5, the Soviet government turned to England, France and Israel with an ultimatum demand to immediately stop hostilities, warning of the consequences that a continuation of the intervention might lead to. The message to the British Prime Minister pointed out the possibility of using modern missile weapons, and the message to Israel raised the question of the very existence of this state. 22 hours after the messages of the Soviet government were delivered to the heads of government of England and France, hostilities were stopped. On November 6, US President D. Eisenhower also demanded a cessation of hostilities.

On November 7, 1956, the UN General Assembly voted by 64 votes in favor of the formation of an international UN force to control the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops from Egyptian territory. On November 15, the first UN troops arrived in Egypt. On December 22, 1956, the withdrawal of British and French troops was completed. In March 1957, Israeli troops also left the territories they had occupied during the war.

The failure of the aggression against Egypt was of great international significance. The authority of Egypt and its President Nasser, who became the leader of the Arab world, has sharply increased. Significantly weakened the position of England and France in the Middle East.

War of 1956 and its significance

The decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was met in England and France with open hostility, but there was no opportunity to use force immediately - this took time. This time was used for diplomatic intervention by the United States, which clearly did not approve of the intentions of England and France.

Israel had intentions to fight with Egypt. There were also reasons: terrorist raids from the Sinai Peninsula became more and more daring, the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, leading to the port of Eilat on the Red Sea, continued, in fact, this Israeli port was inactive. By the end of 1956, a secret tripartite treaty between England, France and Israel was signed.

October 29, 1956 Israel began hostilities against Egypt, counting on the support of England and France. In fact, these countries paralyzed the activities of the Egyptian Navy and Air Force, demanded that Egypt withdraw its troops 16 km from the canal.

By November 2, 1956, the main goals of Israel were achieved: the troops occupied most of the Sinai Peninsula, opened the Strait of Tiran for navigation, defeated the terrorist bases and inflicted a tangible defeat on the Egyptian army. The UN Security Council considered a US-submitted resolution demanding Israel to return to its borders, but Britain and France vetoed it. November 5, 1956 French and British began to land troops in channel zone, but a few days later they stopped the offensive.

The reasons for the sudden cessation of hostilities against Egypt can be debated. The position of the United States, the financial crisis in England, the split in British society, the threats to N.S. Khrushchev to send missiles with nuclear weapons against England and France and send volunteers to help Egypt, but the fact remains that the war has been stopped. Israel left the occupied territories, the Sinai Peninsula was demilitarized after the departure of the Israelis, and traffic along the Strait of Tiran was open.

The USSR scored a major propaganda victory and has since openly sided with the Arabs in the conflict. The United States began selling weapons to Israel after it left the occupied territories. The Palestinian problem has entered a new stage.

Confrontation between Arab countries and Israel in the 1960s.

Israel's participation in the military action of England and France in 1956 seemed to confirm the fears of the Arab countries regarding its role in the Middle East. A rapid build-up of Egypt's military potential began. With the help of the USSR, the army was rearmed and retrained; the construction of the Aswan dam was underway, in 1964 its grand opening took place, at which N.S. Khrushchev.


After the 1956 war, Israel managed to maintain calm on its borders for several years. The alliance with France was preserved, ties with the United States were being established. The issue of navigation in the Strait of Tiran was settled: in March 1957, England, France and the United States undertook to guarantee the free passage of ships. Israel withdrew its troops from the area of ​​Sharm el-Sheikh, which dominated the entrance to the strait - UN troops were stationed there. The Israeli port of Eilat prospered, its population increased by 13 times in 10 years.

Soon came to the fore dispute over the distribution of the waters of the Jordan River. The plan, proposed in 1955 by the United States, provided for the division of waters, but was rejected by the Arab countries for political reasons. Israel began to build engineering structures in order to supply water from the North, from the region of Galilee to the south, to the desert of Ne-gev. The amount of water that Israel intended to withdraw from the Jordan was not to exceed the Israeli 1955 quota. When the Israeli water pipeline was completed in 1964, a special meeting of Arab leaders was held in Cairo. They made a decision to divert the waters of the Jordan River in order to prevent their use for the needs of Israel. For this, it was planned to start work in Syria and Lebanon.

In 1964 was created Palestine Liberation Organization(OOP); its creator Ahmed Shukayri belongs to the main slogan of the "Palestinian Charter: "Let's throw the Jews into the sea!". The organization begins to coordinate terrorist actions against Israel, since 1965 terrorist attacks have been carried out in Israel itself.

The largest of the Palestinian organizations is being created - Al Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat. Israel is responding with brutal retaliation by conducting open regular air raids on the villages in Jordan and Lebanon from where the raids originated.

The main countermeasures were directed against Jordan, in November 1966, after an Israeli air raid on the village of Es-Sama, 18 Jordanians were killed. In July 1966, there was a major incident on the border with Syria, where Israeli troops began shelling in order to interfere with the work that had begun to divert the waters of the Jordan River. In April 1967, the Israeli Air Force entered into battle with the Syrian Air Force and shot down 6 MiGs.

On May 15, 1967, Egypt began to transfer troops to the Sinai, violating the demilitarized status of the zone. On May 18, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UN troops from the Gaza Strip (where they were in order to prevent direct contact between Egyptian units and Israeli troops) and put forward detachments of Palestinian organizations to the forefront. On May 27, 1967, an Egyptian landing was landed in Sharm ash-Sheikh, control was established over the Strait of Tiran - the blockade of the port of Eilat was again observed,

This clearly indicated the intentions of the Arab countries to use the growth of their military potential and destroy Israel. Israeli government led by Levi Eshkolom appeals to the countries that stood at the origins of the creation of Israel, with a call to protect it, since one gets the impression of a huge military superiority of the Arab countries. All the more so as the relevant allied treaties between Egypt and Iraq and Jordan, as well as with Syria, are being concluded.

June 1, 1967 created in Israel government of national unity(with the participation of the Herut bloc), and June 5 the famous Six Day War. It began with an unexpected attack on Egyptian airfields, where 350 of the latest aircraft were immediately destroyed. Ground actions followed, well planned and coordinated by the famous generals Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin.

In a few days, Israeli troops took control of the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip, captured the entire Sinai Peninsula, coming to the shore of the Suez Canal. The Israelis also captured the Golan Heights, a strategically important area in Syria, located 30 km from its capital Damascus.

Defeat of the Arab countries was complete; GA. Nasser even immediately resigned, but then he was "called by the people" and "agreed" to remain in office, executing "specific perpetrators of the defeat" from among his generals.

In August 1967, a meeting of the leaders of the Arab countries took place in Khartoum. It decided to compensate Egypt and Jordan for economic losses and damages, to maintain a tough confrontation with Israel, by no means agreeing to negotiations. The USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and unequivocally took the side of the Arabs - a decision was made to rearm Egypt and Syria, compensating for all military losses.

War 1967 caused a feeling of frustration among the Palestinians; some of them began to lean towards terrorism. In 1968, there were cases of hijackings of aircraft of the Israeli airline El Al in Algiers and Athens; in response, the Israeli air force bombarded a civilian airfield in Beirut, destroying 13 aircraft there. This was only the beginning, later terror became massive, and the most popular person in the Palestinian refugee camps was the famous terrorist Leila Khaled.

In 1968-1969 A war of attrition was waged on the Suez front. Since the beginning of 1970, Israel began to bomb the suburbs of Cairo, in response, the USSR increased military assistance to Egypt, sending its pilots and missilemen there. After that, both countries - Israel and Syria - were pressured by the US and the USSR, which led to the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement in August 1970.

Long negotiations began with the mediation of the Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jahring. These talks alarmed the Palestinians, who stepped up their terror by hijacking planes from European countries and the United States.

In September 1970, the war broke out in Jordan: King Hussein gave the order to disarm the Palestinian troops. As a result of armed clashes, 30,000 Palestinian fighters were killed, and the remnants of the PLO forces were ousted from Jordanian territory. The consequences of this event were significant.

In Syria, General Jadid was removed as having failed to provide substantial assistance to the Palestinians; replaced by Hafez al-Assad in 1970. Unexpectedly, on 28 September 1970, he dies heart attack Egyptian President G.A. Nasser - He was replaced by Vice President Anwar Sadat. Radicalism increased among Palestinian organizations, it was then that the most famous terrorist organizations"Black September", "Hand of the Arab Revolution", etc. With great difficulty, it was possible to extinguish the conflict between Y. Arafat, who became the head of the PLO since 1969, and King Hussein of Jordan - they signed a formal ceasefire agreement.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a complex issue with intricate causes and far-reaching consequences for international relations in the Middle East. Tracing the origins of the crisis will lead us to the Arab-Israeli conflict of the late 1940s, as well as to the decolonization that engulfed the entire Earth in the middle of the 20th century and led to conflict between the imperialist powers and peoples who sought independence. Before the Suez Crisis ended, it deepened the Arab-Israeli conflict, exposed the deep opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union, dealt a death blow to British and French imperial claims in the Middle East, and enabled the United States to achieve a prominent political position in the region.

Origin of the conflict

The Suez crisis had a complex origin. Egypt and Israel remained technically at war after the armistice agreement ended their 1948-1949 hostilities. United Nations efforts and various states reaching a final peace agreement—especially the so-called Alpha peace plan proposed by the United States and Britain in 1954-1955—did not lead to an agreement. In an atmosphere of tension, serious skirmishes on the Egyptian-Israeli border almost caused the resumption of full-scale hostilities in August 1955 and April 1956. After Egypt bought soviet weapons At the end of 1955, Israeli sentiment began to increase in favor of a preemptive strike that would damage the positions of Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and undermine Egypt's combat capability before it mastered Soviet weapons.

By then, Britain and France had grown weary of Nasser's challenge to their imperial interests in the Mediterranean basin. Britain viewed Nasser's campaign to withdraw British military forces from Egypt - in accordance with the 1954 agreement - as a blow to its prestige and military capability. Nasser's campaign to increase his influence in Jordan, Syria and Iraq convinced the British that he was seeking to purge the entire region of their influence. French officials were annoyed by the fact that Nasser supported the struggle of the Algerian rebels for independence from France. By early 1956, American and British statesmen had agreed on a top-secret policy, codenamed Omega, aimed at isolating and limiting Nasser's actions through a variety of subtle political and economic measures.

The Suez Crisis erupted in July 1956 when Nasser, left without economic aid from the United States and Britain, retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. Nasser took the British and French-owned firm to demonstrate his independence from the European colonial powers, to avenge the British and US withdrawal of economic aid, and to reap the company's profits earned in his country. This set off a four-month international crisis during which Britain and France gradually concentrated their military forces in the region. They warned Nasser that they were prepared to use force to regain their rights to the canal company if he did not relent. British and French officials secretly hoped that this pressure would eventually lead to Nasser's removal from power, with or without military action on their part.

American response

President Dwight D. Eisenhower approached the Suez crisis from three basic and interrelated premises. First, while he sympathized with Britain's and France's desire to return the company that operated the canal, he did not challenge Egypt's right to take the company back, provided adequate compensation was paid, as required by international law. Eisenhower thus sought to prevent a military confrontation and settle the canal dispute on a diplomatic level before the Soviet Union exploited the situation for political gain. He instructed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to resolve the crisis on terms acceptable to Britain and France through public statements, negotiations, two international conferences in London, the establishment of the Suez Canal Users Association and discussions at the United Nations. By the end of October, however, these efforts proved fruitless, and Anglo-French preparations for war continued.

Second, Eisenhower sought to avoid a break with the Arab nationalists and included Arab statesmen in his diplomacy to end the crisis. His refusal to support the Anglo-French forces against Egypt was partly due to the realization that Nasser's confiscation of the canal company was widely popular among his own and other Arab peoples. Indeed, Nasser's wave of popularity in the Arab states blocked Eisenhower's efforts to resolve the canal crisis in partnership with Arab leaders. Saudi and Iraqi leaders turned down US offers to criticize Nasser's actions or challenge his prestige.

Third, Eisenhower sought to isolate Israel from the canal dispute for fear that the mixing of the Israeli-Egyptian and Anglo-French-Egyptian conflicts would ignite a fire in the Middle East. In this regard, Dulles denied Israel the right to vote at diplomatic conferences convened to resolve the crisis, and did not allow discussion of Israeli complaints about Egyptian policy during hearings at the United Nations. Sensing an increase in Israeli belligerence towards Egypt in August and September, Eisenhower arranged for limited arms shipments from the United States, France, and Canada in the hope of lessening the danger of the Israeli position and thus preventing an Egyptian-Israeli war.

Hostilities begin

In October, in the development of the crisis, there was new turn, unexpected for the United States. Unknown to US officials, France and Britain agreed with Israel on a complex scheme for a covertly coordinated war with Egypt. By stratagem, Israel was to invade the Sinai Peninsula, and Britain and France were to issue ultimatums forcing Egyptian and Israeli troops to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone. And when Nasser, as expected, rejects the ultimatums, European forces will bomb Egyptian airfields for 48 hours, occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. American officials failed to anticipate such a collusive scheme, in part because they were distracted by the military panic between Israel and Jordan, as well as anti-Soviet riots in Hungary, in part because they were preoccupied with the impending US presidential election, and in part because that they believed their friends in the colluding governments, who assured them that any attack was not imminent. Yet war broke out on October 29 when Israel launched a frontal assault on Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Within days, Israeli forces closed in on the Suez Canal.

Caught off guard by the outbreak of hostilities, Eisenhower and Dulles took a number of steps to end the war quickly. Outraged that his allies in London and Paris had tricked him into colluding, Eisenhower also worried that the war would bring the Arab states into dependence on the Soviet Union. To stop the fighting, even as British and French warplanes were bombing Egyptian targets, he sanctioned the conspirators, secured a United Nations truce resolution, and organized a United Nations Emergency Force to separate the belligerents. However, before the UN Emergency Force could be deployed, Britain and France landed paratroopers along the Suez Canal on 5 November.

The landing of paratroopers by Britain and France pushed the crisis to its most dangerous phase. The Soviet Union, in an attempt to divert attention from its brutal repression of the revolutionary movement in Hungary, threatened to intervene in the hostilities and possibly even retaliate by attacking London and Paris using atomic weapons. Intelligence reports that Soviet troops were massing in Syria to invade Egypt alarmed US officials, who felt that the unrest in Hungary made Soviet leaders prone to impulsive behavior. Eisenhower prudently ordered the Pentagon to prepare for war. The intersection of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the decolonization conflict has created a landmark confrontation between East and West.

Shocked at the sudden prospect of global conflict, Eisenhower also acted quickly to prevent it. He applied political and financial pressure on the warring parties to pass a UN truce resolution on November 6, which went into effect the next day. He supported the efforts of UN officials to urgently use the UN Emergency Force in Egypt. The tension gradually subsided. British and French forces departed Egypt in December, and after difficult negotiations, Israeli forces withdrew from Sinai by March 1957.

Consequences of the Crisis

The Suez crisis, although it was quickly mitigated, had a major impact on the balance of power in the Middle East and on the commitments the United States made in the region. This tarnished British and French prestige among the Arab states and therefore undermined the traditional hold of these European powers over the region. In contrast, Nasser not only endured the test, but increased his prestige among the Arab peoples as a leader who challenged European empires and survived the Israeli military invasion. The remaining pro-Western regimes in the region should have averted the uprisings of Nasser's supporters. Although Nasser showed no immediate inclination to become a client of the Soviet Union, American officials feared that Soviet threats to European allies improved Moscow's image in the eyes of the Arab states. And the prospect of establishing an Arab-Israeli peace in the foreseeable future seemed zero.

Reacting to these aftermath of the Suez War, the president announced the Eisenhower Doctrine, an entirely new regional security policy, in early 1957. Proposed in January and approved by Congress in March, the doctrine assured that the United States would provide economic and military assistance and, if necessary, use military force to contain communism in the Middle East. To carry out this plan, Presidential Envoy James P. Richards toured the region distributing tens of millions of dollars in economic and military aid Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Libya.

Although it was never officially recognized, the Eisenhower Doctrine guided US policy in three political disputes. In the spring of 1957, the president provided Jordanian economic aid and sent American warships to the eastern Mediterranean to help King Hussein put down a rebellion among pro-Egyptian army officers. In late 1957, Eisenhower encouraged Turkey and other friendly states to consider invading Syria to prevent the local radical regime from increasing its power. When the violent revolution in Baghdad in July 1958 threatened to ignite similar uprisings in Lebanon and Jordan, Eisenhower finally ordered American soldiers to occupy Beirut and organize supplies for the British troops occupying Jordan. These measures, unprecedented in the history of American policy towards the Arab states, made clear Eisenhower's intention to accept responsibility for the preservation of Western interests in the Middle East.

The Suez Crisis marked a watershed in the history of American foreign policy. By overturning traditional Western notions of Anglo-French hegemony in the Middle East, deepening the problems created by the revolutionary nationalism that Nasser personified, exacerbating the Arab-Israeli conflict, and threatening to give the Soviet Union an excuse to invade the region, the Suez Crisis attracted the United States to a significant, serious and sustained engagement in Middle East affairs.