the USSR

Germany Germany

Commanders Losses Audio, photo, video at Wikimedia Commons

The direct command of the tank formations during the battle was carried out by: Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov from the Soviet side and SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser from the German side.

None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the German troops failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.

The situation on the eve of the battle

Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the operational line Yakovlevo - Oboyan. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and the Kempf Army Group went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, on the positions of 6- 1st and 7th Guards Armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions. On July 6, two counterattacks were delivered against the advancing Germans from the side of the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) area - Kalinin by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repulsed by the forces of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Side forces

Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1500 tanks participated in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly smaller number is indicated - 1200.

Many modern researchers believe that, probably, the forces put into battle were much smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the river Psel, and on the other - by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such a sector.

It must be said that the overestimation of enemy forces took place at the preliminary stage as well. So Shtemenko S. M. in his work indicates: “ By April 8, the enemy had concentrated 15-16 tank divisions with 2,500 tanks against the Voronezh and Central Fronts. ... On April 21, N.F. Vatutin already counted only in front of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod region up to 20 infantry and 11 tank divisions.» GK Zhukov assesses the situation more realistically. We read from him: In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, as I have already said, were somewhat superior in strength and means to the enemy. ... in people - 1.4 times, in guns and mortars - 1.9 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in aircraft - 1.4 times. However, making the main bet on tank and motorized troops, the German command grouped them in narrow areas ...". There is a version that the command of the Voronezh Front also tried to group tank forces near Prokhorovka.

Germany

From the western direction, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2nd SS TC) advanced on Prokhorovka, while the SS division “Adolf Hitler” operated in the strip between the Psyol River and the railway, and from the south - the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 TC) . Known for the presence of tanks and assault guns without self-propelled guns: Grille, Vespe, Hummel and Marder 2, the data on which are being specified, in divisions of the 2nd SS TC as of the evening of July 11 and the 3rd TC as of the morning of July 12 are indicated in the table.

The staffing of units and formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps 4 TA and the 3rd Panzer Corps AG "Kempf" on July 11, 1943
Pz.II Pz.III
50/L42		 Pz.III
50/L60		 Pz.III
75 mm		 Pz.IV
L24		 Pz.IV
L43 and L48		 Pz.VI "Tiger" T-34 Stug III Bef.Pz. III Total tanks and StuG
2nd SS Panzer Corps
TD Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler" (at 19.25 11.07) 4 - 5 - - 47 4 - 10 7 77
TD SS "Das Reich" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 34 - - 18 1 8 27 7 95
TD SS "Totenkopf" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 54 - 4 26 10 - 21 7 122
2nd SS Panzer Corps, total 4 - 93 - 4 91 15 8 58 21 294
3rd Panzer Corps
6th Panzer Division (on the morning of 11.07) 2 2 11 ? - 6 - - - 2 23 (?)
7th Panzer Division (on the morning of 12.07) - - 24 2 1 9 - - - 3 39
19th Panzer Division (on the morning of 12.07) - - 7 4 - 3 - - - 1 15
503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of 11.07) - - - - - - 23 - - - 23
228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of 12.07) - - - - - - - - 19 - 19
3rd Panzer Corps, total 2 2 42 6 1 18 23 - 19 6 119
Total armored units 6 2 135 6 5 109 38 8 77 27 413

It should be noted that the Panther tanks did not take part in the Prokhorov battle on July 12, continuing to operate as part of the Great Germany division in the Oboyan direction. In the post-war press, instead of a company of captured T-34 tanks (8 units in the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich), which actually participated in the battle near Prokhorovka, Panther tanks were indicated. About the "Panthers", allegedly acting against his 5th Guards. TA, said P. A. Rotmistrov.

the USSR

Commander of the Voronezh Front General of the Army, Headquarters Representative Supreme High Command Vasilevsky A. M. - until 14.07.43. Since July 14, Zhukov G.K. has been coordinating the actions of the front with the Headquarters.

The Soviet group included the following forces:

  • 2nd Air Army (2 VA, Lieutenant General of Aviation Krasovsky S. A.);
  • 5th Guards Army (5th Guards A, Lieutenant General Zhadov A.S.);
  • 5th Guards Tank Army (5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General of the military unit Rotmistrov P.A.) consisting of:
    • 18th Tank Corps (18th Tank Corps, Major General of the military unit Bakharov B.S.), 148 tanks:
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
110th tank brigade (110 brigade, lieutenant colonel Khlyupin M. G.) 24 21
170th Tank Brigade (170th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov V.D.) 22 17
181st tank brigade (181st brigade, lieutenant colonel Puzyrev V.A.) 24 20
36th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment (36th Separate Guards Tank Regiment) 0 0 20

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (32nd Motor Rifle Brigade Colonel Stukov I.A.).

    • 29th Tank Corps (29th Tank Corps, Major General of the military service Kirichenko I.F.), 192 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns:
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
Units of combat-ready equipment and temporarily under repair as of July 11
25th Tank Brigade (25th Tank Brigade, Colonel Volodin N.K.) 26 32
31st Tank Brigade (31st Tank Brigade, Colonel S.F. Moiseev) 32 38
32nd Tank Brigade (32nd Tank Brigade, Colonel Linev A.A.) 64 0
1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1146 SAP) 12 8

53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (53rd Motor Rifle Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev N.P.). The 1529th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment SU-152 (1529 tsap. The regiment in the amount of 11 vehicles out of 12 arrived at the place only by the evening of July 12 without shells. Did not take part in the tank battle on July 12).

    • 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards Mk, Major General of military service Skvortsov B.M.)
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10th Guards MBR, Colonel Mikhailov I. B.) 29 12
11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards MBR, Colonel Grishchenko N.V.) 42 22
12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards MBR, Colonel Borisenko G. Ya.)
24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade (24th Guards Detachment Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Karpov V.P.) 51 0
1447th self-propelled artillery regiment (1147 SAPs) 12 8
  • 5th Guards The TA was reinforced with formations that became part of it from July 10:
    • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards Corps, Colonel Burdeyny A.S.),
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11, pieces
4th Guards Mechanized Brigade (4th Guards MBR, Colonel A. K. Brazhnikov) 28 19
25th Guards Mechanized Brigade (25th Guards MBR, Lieutenant Colonel Bulygin S.M.) 28 19
26th Guards Mechanized Brigade (26th Guards MBR, Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Nesterov) 28 14
47th Guards Separate Breakthrough Tank Regiment (47th Guards Detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Shevchenko M.T.) 0 0 21
    • 2nd Panzer Corps (2nd TC, Major General of the military service Popov A.F.):
      • 26th Tank Brigade (26th Tank Brigade, Colonel Piskarev P.V.) (as of 11.07.43 T-34 1 unit + 7 under repair and T-70 33 units + 2 under repair)
      • 99th Tank Brigade (99th Tank Brigade, Colonel Malov L.I.),
      • 169th Tank Brigade (169th Tank Brigade, Colonel Stepanov I.Ya.).
The state of the materiel and support of the 5th Guards Tank Army at 17:00 on July 11, 1943
Combat vehicles 29 tk 18 tk 2 tk 2 Guards tk 5 Guards mk army units Total
T-34 120 68 35 84 120 36 463
T-70 81 58 46 52 56 8 301
"Churchill" - 18 4 3 - - 25
SU-122 12 - - - 10 - 22
SU-76 8 - - - 7 - 15
Total tanks and self-propelled guns 221 144 85 139 193 44 826
On the way to st. Prokhorovka 13 33 - - 51 4 101
Under repair 2 6 9 - 1 6 24
Total armored units 236 183 94 139 245 54 951

G. A. Oleinikov, as of July 10, has 790 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Churchill Mk IV (Churchill IV modifications). And 40 (two regiments) SU-122 self-propelled assault howitzers and light infantry support assault guns based on the T-70 SU-76.

Rotmistrov himself estimated the amount of equipment as follows: “ The 5th Guards Tank Army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps, the 1529th Self-Propelled Artillery Corps, the 1522nd and 1148th Howitzer, the 148th and 93rd Cannon Artillery Regiments, the 16th and 80th Guards Mortar Regiment. In general, in our army with attached tank formations, there were about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.»

The assessment of the forces of the parties is highly dependent on the assessment of the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps advanced - a total of 348 tanks.

Side Plans

1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having introduced large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the sowing. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).

Commander of the 29th TC, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko

1. The task of the body is the same ...
2. The beginning of the attack - 8.30 on 12.07.43. The beginning of artillery preparation from 8.00.
3. I allow you to use the radio from 07.00 7.00 12.07.43. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov

2nd SS TC defeats the enemy south. Prokhorovka and thus creates the prerequisites for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:

Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take control of the river valley. Psyol with an attack from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.

The AG division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, on the right flag, take Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the department of the Stalinskoye state farm and x. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of the threat from the river valley. Psyol, together with parts of the "MG" to capture Prokhorovka and height 252.4.

Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, take Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After mastering the right-flank units of the "AG" division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, transfer the main efforts in the direction of the south-west heights. Right-handedness. Hold the new frontier Ivanovka, heights southwest. Right-hand, heights 2 km east. Watchtower (suit).

The course of the battle

Exists different versions this battle.

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of 11 July. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o'clock, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades.

At 8 am the next day, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: the 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers received some advantage: rising Sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. Very soon the battle formations mixed up. The high density of the battle, during which the tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tankers got the opportunity to hit accurately in the most vulnerabilities heavily armored German vehicles.

When the Soviet tanks during the counterattack reached the distance of a direct shot of their guns and they were met with dense fire from the German anti-tank guns, the tankers were simply stunned. Under hurricane fire, it was necessary not only to fight, but above all to psychologically reorganize from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defenses to a positional fight against enemy anti-tank weapons.

To the east of the battle area, the German tank group Kempf was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping on the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.

At about 1 pm, the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the Totenkopf Division, attacked the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to help them, and the attack was repulsed.

By 2 p.m., the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy in a southerly direction. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

According to the memoirs of German generals

The winter of 1942-1943 was difficult for the German troops. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses in equipment and manpower. The catastrophe near Stalingrad shook the authority of the Reich, exacerbating internal and external political problems. There was no longer any talk of a German victory in the war; the Germans could only hope to get out of it with the least losses.

To restore political and military prestige, the Nazi elite needed a victorious campaign against their main enemy, the Soviet Union. This is how the idea of ​​Operation Citadel, an offensive near Kursk, was born. Despite the fact that the chances of the success of the operation by many German commanders were extremely skeptical, it nevertheless took place and ended in a completely natural defeat for the Wehrmacht.

One of the key moments of the Battle of Kursk was tank battle near Prokhorovka. In terms of the amount of equipment involved, it was one of the largest for the entire period of the Second World War. The candidate tells us about the details of this battle historical sciences Valery Nikolaevich Zamulin.

Valery Nikolaevich, on July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle of the Battle of Kursk took place near the Prokhorovka station. Although there is a lot of information about this event, it is often contradictory ...

Let's start with the fact that the battle for Prokhorovka took place not only on July 12th. This day can be called the climax and its most dramatic moment. And it began on July 10, when the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps began to fulfill the order of the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, General G. Goth: to take Prokhorovka in order to further strike at the rear of the Soviet troops defending here, primarily the 69th Army . The corps included three motorized SS divisions: "Dead Head", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Das Reich". The battle continued until 16 July. On the night of July 17, German troops began to withdraw from this area to their original positions along the Belgorod-Tomarovka-Borisovka line.

Data on the battle on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka in Soviet, American and German sources differ significantly from each other, including the number of armored vehicles. How many tanks were involved?

The main events with the use of a significant number of armored vehicles on July 12 near Prokhorovka unfolded in two areas. To the west of the station, on the so-called "tank field", for about 9-10 hours of battle, 514 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns and 210 German tanks and assault guns. South of the station, 158 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns fought against 119 German vehicles. Total 1001 armored units. This is according to documents declassified in the late 1990s.

The figure of 1,500 vehicles on both sides, common in Soviet official historiography, was deliberately overstated; it first appeared in the report of the headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank Army for July 1943, and then migrated to historical literature.

Why was it necessary to inflate the numbers on the number of vehicles in battle?

It was important for the army command to show that the high losses suffered by the troops in 10 hours of battle were not the result of mistakes or miscalculations, the army simply participated in a grandiose, unprecedented battle. Consequently, the losses during such a battle could not be small. In the open press, these data were first given in the brochure “The Battle of Kursk. Brief essay, which was published in 1945. The figure of 1500 cars can still be found in print and electronic publications.

What armored vehicles were used opposing sides near Prokhorovka?

The Soviet side - mainly medium tanks T-34, armed with a short-barreled 76-mm cannon (there were about 70%), and light T-70s with a 45-mm gun, as well as three regiments of self-propelled artillery mounts: SU-76, SU- 122 and SU-152. In addition, in the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, there were two regiments of English tanks "Churchill Mk IV". As for the heavy KV-1s, during the entire 7 days of the battle there were only two of them, but they were not used directly in the battles.

The SS divisions had at their disposal regular tanks Pz.Kpfw III, Pz.Kpfw IV, StuG self-propelled guns, as well as Hummel and Vespe self-propelled guns for fire support of armored attacks. "Tigers" were also, but not enough. For example, on the eve of the famous battle, on the evening of July 11, only 15 "Tigers" were listed as serviceable in three SS divisions. Moreover, in the division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", parts of which were on the "tank field", there were only 4 vehicles.

As for the Panther tanks and self-propelled guns Ferdinand, often mentioned in connection with the events near Prokhorovka, they have never been here. The Panther battalion was planned to be transferred here by the beginning of the battle, but they were partially killed by the soldiers of the 1st Panzer Army of General M. E. Katukov west of Prokhorovka, and partially they were out of action for technical reasons. And the Ferdinands operated in the north of the Kursk Bulge, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Ponyri station.

I want to emphasize that the main role in the disruption of our counterattack on July 12 was played by difficult terrain conditions and the fact that the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" went on the defensive on the evening of July 11. And the biggest losses were not inflicted on us by enemy tanks, but by artillery.

When it comes to this battle, the picture is often presented of a huge field on which the tanks converged "hand to hand". How was it really?

There are many stereotypes regarding the Prokhorov battle, but they are, as a rule, far from reality. Firstly, in the strike area of ​​the 5th Guards Tank Army, the conditions of the terrain did not allow deploying the very “armored avalanche” that we often hear and read about in the context of the battle. If this were possible, then the German positions would be crushed in the first hour of the battle, because main blow inflicted by the 18th and 29th tank corps, numbering 368 tanks and self-propelled units. Theoretically, this is 60 tanks per kilometer, not counting the self-propelled guns.

But even more than 200 tanks of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were in the second echelon of the army. In the event of the successful implementation of the initial plan of the counterattack of the Soviet command, this would inevitable disaster for the Germans, even despite the fact that our guards were opposed by the SS corps - the most powerful and prepared formation of the enemy.

However, the Soviet tank brigades were squeezed in a gorge to the west of the station, between the floodplain of the Psyol River, deep ravines and the Storozhevoye tract. In this area, the tank-passable section is only up to 900 meters, that is, a tank battalion of a full staff (26 tanks) could hardly turn into a line here, and there is no need to talk about a brigade, let alone a corps.

The 29th Corps of General I.F. Kirichenko, operating along the Belgorod-Prokhorovka railway, could simultaneously move no more than 30-35 tanks between the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252 in two echelons. Therefore, it was not possible to create a "tank skating rink", the formation was introduced into the battle in small units, with a significant interval for the dynamics of the battle, under heavy enemy fire. Our troops already suffered significant losses at the beginning of the attack, and the broken tanks made the task of the crews following them even more difficult.

On the way of the neighboring 18th Corps of General B.S. Bakharov to the Oktyabrsky state farm there was a large beam, passable for tanks in only one place. And even after crossing it, our tanks could not immediately turn into an offensive line, they had to go several hundred meters more under enemy fire. That is, the real offensive of the Soviet troops looked like this: our combat vehicles they went in three or four groups of 30-35 vehicles in two echelons, one brigade after another with an interval of 30 minutes to an hour.


Estimates of the losses of the parties in the Prokhorov tank battle, cited by different historians, differ significantly. Which numbers are closest to reality?

The most confusing situation is with the analysis of the losses of German troops. They talk about 80, 130 and even 350 tanks and self-propelled guns. There are even stupid things - 5 German tanks. Some historians, to whom I belong, consider the most plausible such figure of losses throughout the SS corps for the entire day of July 12, 1943 - 155-163 vehicles, and irretrievable within 20-30 units.

A small number of deadweight losses can be misleading, but the SS men were badly battered. Despite the fact that they controlled the territory of the battlefield near Prokhorovka until July 17 and could take out their equipment, a large part of the damaged vehicles that could be restored were sent to Germany for repairs. This is not an irretrievable loss, but a long-term one.

Our troops on July 12 lost 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns. Of these, 193 tanks and 14 self-propelled guns are irrevocable. The high percentage of irretrievable losses is explained by the fact that the battlefield, as a rule, remained behind the Nazis and we could not completely evacuate the damaged equipment. And the Germans blew up all our tanks during the retreat.

On the night of the 13th, the command of the Voronezh Front received data indicating that the 5th Guards Tank Army, due to huge losses, was actually incapacitated. The best tank formation, which was aimed at a breakthrough to the Dnieper, was killed in ten hours at a small station, advancing two kilometers in the center and retreating 4.5 kilometers on the flanks. The neighboring 5th Guards Army, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov, who also participated in the counterattack, was also in a difficult situation.

Therefore, to hold the flanks of the 69th Army, which was defending south of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov's guardsmen were not able to, although they fought heroically. Therefore, on the night of July 15, the SS corps and the 3rd Panzer Corps moving from the south of Belgorod managed to surround the entire 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army, consisting of four rifle divisions, in the Donets interfluve. At dawn, these forces nevertheless left the encirclement, but with heavy losses. These events ended the Battle of Prokhorov.

How important was the Battle of Prokhorov for the Red Army for the victory at Kursk?

On July 12, 1943, during the battle, a frontal counterattack was carried out, the main content of which was the battle between the SS corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army west of Prokhorovka. The goal - the defeat of the SS corps - was not achieved, because in those conditions it was impossible to do this. The enemy kept a powerful grouping of Soviet troops and inflicted great damage on it. Soviet propaganda distorted its essence, inflated it to "the greatest tank battle of all time." He was not like that.

Nevertheless, the result of a tank battle is precisely a victory, and far from being a "combat draw", as, for example, the German military historian Colonel Karl Frieser believes. Undoubtedly, the battle for Prokhorovka is the culminating moment of the Kursk defensive operation, after which the tension of the battles in the south of the Kursk salient subsided sharply. But once again I want to emphasize that in many publications a common logical error is made: after this, then because of this! One should not put an equal sign between the events called the Prokhorov battle and the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. tank battle is only a part, albeit an important one, of this battle.

The Soviet troops in the battle for Prokhorovka, of course, solved their task, preventing the last line of defense from breaking through and inflicting serious losses on the enemy.


About the interlocutor: Zamulin Valery Nikolaevich - military historian, candidate of sciences. In 2009 he defended his dissertation on the problems of the history of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front on July 5-23, 1943. From March 1996 to August 2009, he worked first as a director and then as deputy director for scientific work Federal State Institution of Culture "State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoye Pole"". Author of over 60 scientific publications, including five monographs in Russian and English. With his participation, a number of documentaries and TV programs on Russian federal channels, as well as several radio programs on the history of the Battle of Kursk.

The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoe Pole" was opened on the site of the legendary tank battle of the Great Patriotic War, which became the greatest battle armor and shells throughout the history of mankind. About a thousand tanks and self-propelled guns converged here, on a relatively small area of ​​flat Central Russian land. And today, traces of those battles are found here every day: the earth is overflowing with burnt metal.

TANKS ROOMED ALONG THE FIELD ...

The Battle of Prokhorovka is considered one of the largest in military history battle with the use of armored forces.

Prokhorovka would have remained an ordinary village in the Russian hinterland if there had not been an event here that some historians consider decisive in the entire Second World War.

On July 12, 1943, during the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in the Second World War - and in the entire history of the world - was played out. Up to 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns participated on both sides.

In the history of the country, the Prokhorovka field is called the Third military field of Russia along with Kulikov and Borodino.

The battle of Prokhorov unfolded in the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge, where the German command decided to direct the main blow. The Germans went on the offensive best forces: 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which included the elite divisions "Dead Head", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Reich". An armored wedge consisting of up to 300 tanks and assault guns broke through two lines of fortifications of the Soviet troops and reached the third, which was created 10 km southwest of the Prokhorovka station (in parallel, other German units developed the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge: west and east of the Prokhorovka direction , which created a threat to the environment - it was necessary to hurry).

On July 11, the enemy managed to break the defenses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 183rd rifle division Red Army and approached the outskirts

Prokhorovka. At the cost of great loss Soviet troops stopped the Germans. A situation was created when the outcome of a grandiose battle was no longer decided by hours, but by minutes. The Soviet command decided to carry out a powerful counterattack and destroy the enemy troops that had penetrated the defenses. It was decided to strike on the morning of July 12 by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov (1901-1982). The army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps. In total - more than 700 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations of self-propelled guns.

At 08:30 on July 12, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, a counterattack was launched, after which the tank formations moved towards each other. The battle took place on a small - for such an incredible number of tanks and self-propelled guns - a territory from 3 to 8 km wide between the railway and the bend of the Psyol River.

The armor of Soviet tanks was not as powerful as that of the German ones, but they wedged into the battle formations of the German troops, gaining an advantage due to speed and maneuverability, shot the enemy from close range in side armor. Fight on short distance deprived the Germans of the opportunity to use the advantage of powerful guns. As a result, the battle formations mixed up, and tank duels ensued.

Toward evening, the "Dead Head" division, having received the support of aviation and artillery, managed to break through the defenses of the Soviet rifle units. This was given to the Germans at the cost of huge losses, which weakened their combat capabilities. The offensive fizzled out.

On July 16, the German army stopped the attack and began to retreat towards Belgorod, the Soviet troops pursued the retreating.

The result of the tank battle near Prokhorovka was the failure of the German plan on the Kursk Bulge "Citadel" and significant losses in the tank forces of the German army. The tank battle near Prokhorovka was a prologue to the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943), which became a turning point in the entire Second World War.

The State Military Historical Museum-Reserve "Prokhorovskoe Pole" is located in the north of the Belgorod region, near the source of the Psel River, and is an area with memorial structures and monuments, the main one is the Victory Monument "Belfry".

QUIET FIELD

There is silence over the Prokhorovka field, as befits in the place where thousands of soldiers fell. And it is hard to believe that relatively recently tank armies met here in a deadly battle.

April 26, 1995, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War, President Russian Federation signed the Decree “On the establishment of the Prokhorovskoye Pole State Military Historical Museum-Reserve” “in order to perpetuate the memory of those who died defending the Fatherland in the Battle of Kursk and in connection with the completion of the creation of the Prokhorovskoye Pole Museum and Memorial Complex”.

In 2010, a museum complex with a cultural and historical center "The Third Military Field of Russia" Prokhorovskoe Field "" was opened.

In the center of the square in front of the museum there is a sculptural and artistic composition “Tank battle near Prokhorovka. Ram". The composition is very emotional, as the veterans said, fully conveying the intensity of the battle.

On the square in front of the museum there is a Candle of Memory. At the entrance to the museum there are six stelae - a kind of stone book about the Battle of Kursk.

In the museum itself, in the center of the hall dedicated directly to the battle of Prokhorova, a genuine T-34 tank froze.

Fragments of Soviet and German defensive fortifications have been recreated behind the museum building: dugouts, trenches, trenches, communication passages, observation posts, artillery platforms and shelters for tanks. The museum forms a single architectural ensemble with the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, built with public donations. The temple was opened in 1995 in memory of those killed near Prokhorovka and on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The names of 7382 soldiers who died on this earth are inscribed on the walls of the temple.

On the annual Day of the Battle of Prokhorovka, divine services are held in the church of Peter and Paul in memory of the fallen soldiers.

The center of the museum complex is the Victory Monument "Belfry". It is a stylized old Russian belfry, which was placed two kilometers from the outskirts of Prokhorovka, at an altitude of 252.2, where the epicenter of the Prokhorovka tank battle was located. It was also opened on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War in 1995.

The walls of the Belfry are four white marble pylons separated from each other, symbolizing the four years of the war. In the upper part of the “Belfry”, on a copper plate, the words from the Bible in Church Slavonic are fixed: “No one has more sowing love, but who will lay down his life for his friends” (No more love the one who lays down his life for his friends). The alarm bell of the "Belfry" sounds after 20 minutes - three times an hour: the first time - about the heroes of the Kulikovo field, the second - about the soldiers of Borodin, the third - in memory of the Prokhorov battle.

Near the Belfry, episodes of the beginning of the attack of a tank company of the 5th Guards Tank Army were recreated. Every year on July 12, on the day of the tank battle near Prokhorovka, a rally of thousands takes place near the Belfry. The urban-type settlement Prokhorovka, located next to the museum, has been known since the 17th century, although under different names. Currently - the administrative center of the Prokhorovsky district of the Belgorod region of Russia. It's pretty big locality with a population of about 10 thousand people. and several industrial enterprises.

CURIOUS FACTS

■ In the old days, the settlement was called Ilyinskaya Sloboda after its founder, the Polish gentry Cyril Ilyinsky (Korchak). In the 1860s was renamed in honor of the reigning Emperor Alexander II in the village of Aleksandrovskoe. In the 1880s near the village, a line of the Kursk-Kharkov-Azov railway was laid and the Prokhorovka station was built, named after the railway engineer V. I. Prokhorov, who supervised the construction. Later, the village itself began to be called by the name of the station.

■ On the part of the German troops, medium tanks T-IV of modification G and H (hull armor thickness - 80 mm, towers - 50 mm), as well as heavy tanks T-VIE "Tiger" (hull armor thickness - 100 mm, towers - 110 mm). Both tanks were armed with long-barreled guns of 75 and 88 mm caliber, which pierced the armor of Soviet tanks almost anywhere at a distance of more than 500 m. The only exception was the heavy tank IS-2.

■ The Soviet T-34 tanks that took part in the battle had an advantage over all German tanks in terms of speed and maneuverability. And because of this, the Germans regularly used captured T-34s. In the battle of Prokhorovka, 8 such vehicles participated in the SS Panzer Division Das Reich.

■ In the battles near Prokhorovka on July 11, senior sergeant of the 2nd tank corps M.F. Borisov distinguished himself, knocking out seven enemy tanks and awarded for this feat the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

■ Externally, the building of the museum "The Third Military Field of Russia" resembles a semicircle (symbolizing the Kursk Bulge), the main facade of the building is made in the form of tank tracks, and the ends - in the form of tank armor.

■ The feast day of the holy apostles Peter and Paul, after whom the temple in Prokhorovka was named, falls on July 12, the day of the famous battle.

■ Belfry - in old Russian architecture - a building for hanging bells, usually located near the church. It can also denote a particularly memorable place.

■ At the foot of the Belfry there is a monument to the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov (1939-2006), its main author. As conceived by the creators of the monument, the sculptor considers the result of his work.

ATTRACTION

■ museum complex"Third military field of Russia" (2010).
■ Victory Monument "Belfry" (1995).
■ Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul (1995).
■ Monument "Candle of Memory".
■ Sculptural composition "The Great Commanders of the Three Military Fields of Russia - Dmitry Donskoy, Mikhail Kutuzov, Georgy Zhukov" (2008).
■ Exhibition of armored vehicles of the Great Patriotic War.
■ Bell of the Unity of the Slavic Peoples (2000).
■ Monument to the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov, the main author of the Belfry.

NUMBERS

The forces of the participants in the battle of Prokhorovka: USSR (5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov) - 699 (according to other data 714) tanks and 21 self-propelled guns, Germany (2nd tank corps of SS Oberstgruppen Fuhrer Paul Hausser) - 232 tanks and 70 self-propelled guns .
Losses of the parties: the USSR - about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, Germany - about 100 tanks and assault guns.
The forces of the parties in the Battle of Kursk: USSR - about 2 million people, about 5000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3500 aircraft, up to 30 thousand guns and mortars, Germany - about 850 thousand people, more than 2500 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 2000 aircraft and up to 8000 guns.
Museum complex "Third military field of Russia": total area - 5000 m2.
The total number of museum exhibits: around 20,000.
Monument of Victory "Belfry": height - 59 m, the weight of the alarm bell - 3.5 tons, the height of the domed figure of the Virgin on the top of the Belfry - 7 m.
Distance: 56 km from Belgorod.

Atlas. The whole world is in your hands №282

N. S. Khrushchev in his memoirs describes the situation when they, together with Georgy Zhukov and the commander of the 5th tank army, Rotmistrov, passed in the vicinity of Prokhorovka. “In the fields one could see many wrecked tanks of both the enemy and ours. There was a discrepancy in the assessment of losses: Rotmistrov says that he sees more wrecked German tanks, but I saw more of ours. Both are, however, natural. There were tangible losses on both sides,” Khrushchev noted.

The calculation of the results showed that there were much more losses on the part of the Soviet army. With the impossibility of maneuvering on a field crammed with armored vehicles, light tanks could not use their advantage in speed and one after another died under long-range artillery shells and heavy enemy combat vehicles.

The reports of the commanders of tank units testify to the large losses of personnel and equipment.

The 29th Panzer Corps lost 1,033 men killed and missing, 958 men wounded. Of the 199 tanks that participated in the attack, 153 tanks burned down or were knocked out. Of the 20 self-propelled artillery mounts, only one remained on the move: 16 were destroyed, 3 were sent for repair.

The 18th Panzer Corps lost 127 people killed, 144 people missing, 200 people wounded. Of the 149 tanks that participated in the attack, 84 burned out or were knocked out.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 162 people killed and missing, 371 people were wounded. Of the 94 tanks that participated in the attack, 54 burned out or were knocked out.

Of the 51 tanks that took part in the counterattack, the 2nd Panzer Corps irretrievably lost 22, that is, 43%.

Thus, summing up the reports of the corps commanders, Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army lost 313 combat vehicles, 19 self-propelled guns and at least 1466 people killed and missing.

The official data of the Wehrmacht are somewhat different from the above. So, according to the results of the reports of the German headquarters, 968 people were captured; 249 Soviet tanks were knocked out and destroyed. The discrepancy in numbers refers to those combat vehicles that were able to leave the battlefield under their own power, and only then completely lose their combat effectiveness.

The Nazis themselves did not suffer great losses, having lost no more than 100 pieces of equipment, of which most were restored. The very next day, judging by the reports of the commanders of the divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Dead Head" and "Reich", 251 pieces of equipment were ready for battle - tanks and self-propelled assault guns.

The vulnerability of Soviet tanks, so clearly revealed in the battle of Prokhorovka, made it possible to draw the appropriate conclusions and gave impetus to a reorientation military science and industry towards the development heavy tanks with a long range cannon.

The battle near the small Prokhorovka station during the Great Patriotic War became an example of a grandiose tank battle in the entire history of the war. The Battle of Prokhorovka became the personification of the courage and heroism of Soviet tankers. But the outcome of this battle is still hotly debated. The amount of equipment and the scale of the operation, which, according to some historians, were exaggerated by Soviet propaganda, are called into question.

Revenge for the loss in Stalingrad

The battle near the Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region became biggest battle Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge. The Germans planned to conduct one of the most important operations of their Citadel plan here, encircling the Soviet army group.

The fight began on July 10

Staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was carried out not by tanks, but by the rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11, the Nazis were stopped near the outskirts of the station. They occupied all advantageous positions in the area of ​​the station: deployed artillery. natural fortifications- ravines and beams - reliably concealed German soldiers and technique.

Prokhorovskoye field, cut up by gullies and ravines

The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a deliberately difficult situation: the strike group of tanks was located between the beams southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy the tank group to its full extent. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area, limited on one side by the railway, and on the other by the floodplain of the Psel River (this is the left tributary of the Dnieper). German tankers had much more operational space.

Invisible German regrouping

Despite the fact that July 12 is considered the official start date of the battle - the fighting continued until July 15 - the culmination of the battle is considered July 12.

July, 12 great amount German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.

Tank units "Adolf Hitler", "Dead Head", division "Reich" and others were able to regroup their forces on the eve of the decisive battle. The Soviet command did not know about this. Only one German division, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, fought in the direction of Prokhorovka.

The offensive was postponed several times

The time of the offensive of the Soviet units was postponed several times. Finally, at 8.30 in the morning, the units went into battle. However, aviation was unable to provide cover and began to operate in the combat area only by 13.00, 2-10 fighters appeared in the sky.

The Soviet offensive proceeded in tank waves, and the attacks were frontal, in contrast to the German commanders, who were taught to use manpower and equipment prudently. Such waves appeared because, due to small passages through minefields, a large number of tanks could not be brought into battle immediately. Tanks passed in a row, one after another, which held back the attack of the first wave. The Germans saw all these preparations and were able to effectively line up the fire of their artillery.

Tank ratio

The Red Army did not have a single analogue tank capable of withstanding the 56-ton heavy Tiger tank.

Medium tanks T-34 produced in 1942, T-70, lend-lease tanks "Churchill" and self-propelled guns opposed the German heavy "Tigers", medium tanks T-IV, assault and anti-tank self-propelled guns.

The Soviet tank crews sat in narrow and cramped cabins, while the Germans settled quite comfortably in tanks equipped with radios and the latest surveillance devices.

Not only tanks took part in this battle. Historians insist on the term armored forces, which also includes wheeled or tracked vehicles, motorcycles.

The number of tanks involved in the battle on both sides is not exactly known. Various sources have information from 1110 to 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On a burning tank

The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skrypnik was hit. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the funnel. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them with caterpillars. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car, and sent it to the German "Tiger". Both tanks exploded.

Special commission for Rotmistrov

At the end of the battle of Prokhorovka, Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin ordered the creation of a special commission to investigate the circumstances of the defeat. By August 1943, the commission completed its work and submitted a large report. They were preparing to hold a show trial and shoot the commander of the Fifth Tank Army, Pavel Rotmistrov. But Vasilevsky's intercession saved his life. Later, in his memoirs, Rotmistrov admitted that his army had not fulfilled its task.

Number of losses Soviet soldiers, according to some German historians, compared to the enemy is approximately 5:1, some historians insist on a different proportion - 6:1. The number of destroyed German tanks, according to the Germans, does not exceed 25 units, Soviet - 170-180 vehicles. The Soviet military spoke of 350 enemy tanks destroyed.

The remains of warriors and ammunition are still found here, and the legendary world groups compose songs about this battle.

Pavel Rotmistrov safely lived out his life in Moscow. In the 70s he became an honorary resident of the Prokhorovka station.

When the world learned about the "tank duel"

For the first time, Ivan Markin wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century. At the time this book was published, the country was headed by Nikita Khrushchev. During the war years, he was a member of the Military Council in the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge.