At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War Soviet light tanks had to play a role much more significant than the one that was originally intended for them. Back in December 1939, the light (according to the then classification - “small”) T-40 tank was adopted by the Red Army. It was a small car with a crew of two, armed with two machine guns ( large-caliber DShK and conventional diesel). The T-40 was floating, had good mobility, and the armor protected it from fire. small arms. The purpose of the tank was reconnaissance, and no serious combat functions were assigned to it. However, the war decreed otherwise.

A column of T-70 tanks on the outskirts of Krasnoye Selo. 1944 (author's collection)

Three days after the German attack, plant number 37, which produced the T-40, was ordered to curtail the production of these machines. Reconnaissance tanks, of course, are always needed, but at that moment the country needed conventional, linear tanks more. Now plant No. 37 was instructed to use the freed capacity for the production of the T-50 infantry escort tank. The chief designer of the plant, Nikolai Alexandrovich Astrov, raised an objection - the T-50 was fundamentally different in design from the T-40 and was much more difficult to manufacture. The plant, which had previously dealt only with light floating machines, would have taken an unacceptably long time to master it. Instead, Astrov proposed an alternative course of action - to improve the T-40, making it more suitable for the battlefield, and to maximize its output. This, of course, was a half-measure - a light machine-gun reconnaissance, no matter how you improve it, will not become a full-fledged replacement for a normal tank - but anyone understands that in a desperate situation, at least some tanks are better right now than good ones, but someday later, in indefinitely distant future.

Astrov's proposal was given the green light, and the production of the tank began, which initially had the designation T-60, but later became known as the T-30 (from the factory designation of the project - "030"). The T-30 differed from the T-40 in a number of simplifications that made it possible to speed up and reduce the cost of its production. The most significant of these were the abandonment of the ability to swim and the transition to a more easy-to-manufacture homogeneous (uniformly hardened) armor instead of surface hardened armor. Subsequently, the weapons also changed - DShK machine gun turned out to be in short supply in the summer of 1941, as it was produced in quantities of only a few hundred per month. Instead, the T-30 received a 20-mm TNSh automatic gun, created on the basis of aircraft gun SHVAK. Contrary to popular belief, this almost did not increase the firepower of the tank, but it solved the problem with the lack of weapons.

Tankers rest near the T-70 (author's collection)

The next logical step was to simplify the shape of the tank. The T-30 hull carried the heritage of the floating T-40 - it had excessive volume to ensure positive buoyancy, high sides for stability, and its front end had a rather complex shape to reduce resistance when moving in water. All this increased the mass of the tank, its dimensions (which means visibility and vulnerability) and, most importantly, complicated production. A tank with a simplified hull and reduced dimensions was designated T-60M, in some documents it is called T-70, but in the end the name T-60 stuck, under which it went down in history.

It was the T-60 that shouldered the brunt of the fighting at the end of the forty-first and the beginning of the forty-second. The catastrophic losses of the summer campaign led to the fact that there were practically no medium and heavy tanks left in the troops, and due to the evacuation of industry, it was not possible to make up for this shortage in the foreseeable future. It was the “sixties” who had to plug the gap with themselves. In some cases, they amounted to a third or even half of the tank fleet of the Red Army in certain sectors of the front.

German prisoners of war pass by the T-70 tank, which changed hands twice - it was captured by the Germans and used by them, then the Soviet troops recaptured it. Kyiv, 1944 (author's collection)

Of course, the T-60, like any emergency improvisation, had significant drawbacks. The most significant of these were the weakness of weapons and insufficient armor. In terms of real combat value, the TNSh cannon, in fact, was not much different from a heavy machine gun - it only had enough armor penetration to fight weakly armored vehicles, such as armored personnel carriers and light armored vehicles. The high-explosive action of the shells was practically zero, so destroy the infantry and field fortifications it was difficult for them. It was necessary to install a more powerful gun with a caliber of at least 37 mm. Booking, although it was brought up to 30-35 millimeters in the frontal part of the hull, was still insufficient - according to the experience of using the military, they noted that the T-60 is extremely vulnerable and is affected by almost any anti-tank weapons at actual combat distances.

Back in October 1941, in parallel with the deployment of T-60 production, Astrov, sent to the Gorky Automobile Plant, together with a number of other local designers, began work on an improved version of the tank, which received the designation "070" or GAZ-70. The main advantage was enhanced armament - a 45-mm 20-K cannon, which was used on most tanks and cannon armored vehicles of the Red Army, was installed in a new cast streamlined turret. Also, instead of the GAZ-202 engine, a significantly more powerful GAZ-203 was installed - in fact, it was two GAZ-202 engines connected in series. Last modified required an increase in the hull - it was lengthened, and another pair of road wheels was added to the undercarriage.

An echelon with T-70 tanks is preparing to be sent to Stalingrad. 1942 (author's collection)

The work of modernization dragged on despite repeated demands to speed it up from the top leadership, including Stalin personally. The prototype GAZ-70 was submitted for testing only at the end of February 1942. On the military new tank, however, did not make much of an impression. They noted that the armor of the GAZ-70 is the same as that of the T-60, that is, clearly insufficient, and the crew is still insufficient for a full-fledged combat vehicle. The GAZ-70 was driven by two tankers - this was the legacy of its ancestor T-40, not affected by any of the previous alterations and remained so on both the T-30 and T-60. Two people were enough for a reconnaissance tank: the driver drove the vehicle, and the commander, located in the tower, played the role, in fact, of an observer - he had to use weapons only in those few cases when reconnaissance came into fire contact with the enemy. For a combat vehicle, a single turret was a big minus: the commander had to actively participate in the battle - to detect the enemy, make decisions about moving the tank and transfer them to the driver, fire from weapons and reload it. This load was too great for one person, as a result, the effectiveness of the tank was significantly reduced. It was required to increase the crew to three people and, accordingly, to expand the tower to a double one in order to remove at least the duties of a loader from the commander.

Astrov promised to eliminate the noted shortcomings as quickly as possible. The thickness of the armor was increased to 35 mm in the upper part of the forehead and up to 45 mm (as in the medium T-34 tank) in the lower part, where, according to statistics, the largest number of hits falls. The turret was replaced with a welded octahedral turret - the original cast one showed too low resistance (even a 20-mm German tank gun easily pierced it) and, moreover, had no reserves for strengthening the armor. With the expansion of the crew to three people, however, unforeseen difficulties arose. The enlarged tower, according to calculations, was supposed to increase the mass of the machine from nine tons to eleven and a half. The designers had doubts that the undercarriage elements would withstand such a load - after all, they were originally created for the T-40, which weighed half as much. As a result, the tank was decided to be put into service in current form, and on March 6, 1942, this was done - the GAZ-70 went to the troops under the designation T-70.

The development of a three-seater version of the tank began immediately after the adoption of a two-seater. Having tested a serial vehicle, weighted with special loads to the expected mass of the new tank (11.5 tons), the designers were convinced that their fears were not in vain - the chassis really could not cope with the increased mass. Tracks broke, torsion bars burst, the transmission wore out abnormally quickly. The work to strengthen the chassis was successful, but by the time they were completed, the management decided that the creation and production of the three-seater version should be entrusted to another plant so as not to distract GAZ from production self-propelled units SU-76, which were required by the troops in ever greater quantities. As a result, the three-seater T-70, after making several more improvements, went into production at factory No. 40 in Mytishchi under the name T-80. GAZ, in order not to be lost, made the developed changes to the chassis of the T-70, and the tank was produced with the designation T-70M from October 1942. At the cost of a slight (about six hundred kilograms) increase in weight, the T-70M received noticeably better throughput due to wider tracks and a significantly longer suspension and transmission resource. In the end, though, it turned out to be more bad than good. It was technically impossible to upgrade the existing T-70s to the T-70M, so the troops ended up with two almost identical tanks with incompatible chassis parts. For maintenance personnel and repairmen, for obvious reasons, this did not cause joy.

T-70 of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossing the Spree River. 1945 (author's collection)

The combat career of the T-70 was bright, but short-lived. For the first time they went into battle on the Southwestern Front in June 1942. It immediately became clear that, despite all the efforts of the designers to improve the characteristics of the vehicle, the combat value of light tanks was not great. In the year that has passed since the beginning of the war, light tanks PzKpfw.I and PzKpfw.II have practically disappeared from the ranks of the Panzerwaffe, and medium tanks have significantly increased in armor thickness. As a result, the 45-mm 20-K cannon, which was quite enough to fight enemy armored vehicles in the summer of 1941, became largely useless by the summer of 1942. Also, the T-70 turned out to be too vulnerable - although the tank’s forehead was well booked and the armor plates in it were located with a large slope, which increased protection, the armor on the sides was only 15 mm thick and was located vertically, so it was only able to protect against bullets. In addition, both new modifications of the PzKpfw.III and PzKpfw.IV tanks, armed with long-barreled guns, and powerful 75-mm anti-tank guns PaK.40 - it was not difficult for them to break through the armor of the T-70 from any angle at the entire range of aimed fire. It was noted, however, that on average, other things being equal, the survival rate of the T-70 is slightly higher than that of the T-34 and KV due to its smaller size. Positive feedback was given to the good reliability of the tank, ease of use and low weight. The latter not only facilitated the evacuation of wrecked tanks from the battlefield, but also allowed the "seventies" to pass where other tanks could not pass, and take the enemy by surprise with strikes from unexpected directions. This was facilitated by the low noise level of the T-70 in motion - according to eyewitnesses, it was no more noisy than a truck, which made it easier to covertly move into position and approach the enemy.

The most massive was the use of the T-70 in the Battle of Kursk - for example, the tank forces of the Central Front consisted of almost a quarter of it (369 vehicles out of 1487 available on July 4, 1943). As a result of the operation, it was concluded that, due to the rapid development of armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons, the T-70 finally lost even the small combat value that it had at the time of creation. In addition, the situation with the production of full-fledged, non-ersatz tanks was no longer as acute as two years ago, so in October the forty-third T-70 was removed from production, and the freed resources were directed to the production of self-propelled artillery mounts SU-76M, based on his chassis. The vehicles that remained in service went to training units, or were used as commanders in units armed with SU-76M. Some returned to the original role of their distant ancestors, taking up exploration. Many of them survived until the end of the war - at the beginning of 1946, the Soviet armed forces had 1502 T-70 and T-70M tanks (out of 8231 produced).

T-70 in winter camouflage. Leningrad Front, 1944 (author's collection)

T-70 became the most massive light tank Soviet Union in World War II. Despite the fact that he most often had to be used in a role that was completely inappropriate for his characteristics, he honestly performed the task to the best of his ability. For open combat, it was of little use even at the time of its appearance, not to mention the later stages of the war, but with proper use it could still be useful, especially in the absence of a strong anti-tank defense of the enemy. There are also cases of successful combat of the T-70 with enemy armored vehicles. For example, in January 1943, the crew of Senior Lieutenant Zakharchenko, having used up ammunition, went to ram and rammed two German tanks out of action. The type of tanks is not indicated in the documents, but since the 100th Special Purpose Tank Battalion acted as the enemy, these were, with all evidence, PzKpfw.II - conventional or flamethrower. As a result of the battle, the commander and chief of staff of the German battalion were captured by the crew. There is a known case when the T-70 of the 3rd Guards Tank Army destroyed two heavy Panther tanks with fire from an ambush. The story may seem incredible, but the side armor of the Panther was relatively weak, and immediately behind it was an ammunition rack - with close range even the 45-mm gun had every chance to cope. IN skillful hands trained and cold-blooded crew of the T-70 could be extremely formidable - which once again confirms the validity of the old truth: "It's not weapons that fight - people fight."

If the "thirty-four" is considered the best medium tank of the USSR in the Second World War, then this tank rightfully takes first place among light combat vehicles. Starting their combat path in the summer of 1942, these tanks went through the entire war and were used in many sectors of the Soviet-German front. "T-70" became the most massive tank in the USSR after the "T-34". During the war years, Soviet industry produced 8231 T-70 tanks, giving the front an excellent auxiliary vehicle.

Description

The T-70 began to be designed in October 1941, and by January 1942 it had been tested and preparations for mass production began. As a result, so quick jobs From April to October 1942, Soviet military factories managed to produce already 5,000 T-70 light tanks. The Red Army received a fast, maneuverable and convenient light tank with a good power reserve, but a rather weak gun - the famous 45mm 20-K cannon, which at the end of 1942 already coped poorly with enhanced booking German technology. It could only hit light German tanks and armored vehicles in the forehead, but by that time the Germans had already acquired more advanced equipment in large quantities, and the armor of old vehicles had been increased. Thus, the T-70 could still show itself in battles, say, with the Pz.II or Pz.35 (t) and older tanks, but by 1942 there were almost no such tanks left in the German army, but with tanks of later models there were problems. By that time, the German troops were already armed with powerful 75mm Pak40 anti-tank guns, which hit the T-70 in any projection with the very first shot. True, getting into the T-70 was extremely difficult - the small size of the tank and low silhouette made it difficult to conduct aimed fire at it, and good mobility made it possible to quickly retreat or leave the line of fire, changing position. True, it is worth noting that the T-70 was not a combat vehicle designed for combat on cutting edge with enemy tanks. It was intended for various auxiliary tasks, with which it coped perfectly. the best options applications for the "T-70" was reconnaissance, escort of columns, as well as fire support for infantry units in the absence of strong enemy anti-tank fire. And in the wooded and marshy area, the T-70 acted even more successfully than the thirty-four: a small mass of a combat vehicle, good driving performance and a low silhouette ensured the best survivability of the tank, because it was very difficult to accurately hit it in such conditions. The speed of the "T-70" allowed him, in case of urgent need, to fight with well-armored enemy vehicles, go into the flank of heavy German tanks and self-propelled guns, imposing close combat on them, and the sides of German combat vehicles often did not save them from the fire of the 45-mm gun "T -70" when firing at close range. And yet, this is only a theory, in reality, the fight against heavy enemy equipment was not part of the function of this tank. In the famous battle of Kursk Bulge, more than 20% of the Soviet tank fleet were precisely these combat vehicles. Although the tank did not have such impressive firepower as the thirty-fours or heavy IS-2 tanks, the Red Army needed it as an auxiliary combat vehicle. Undoubtedly, this one made his feasible contribution to the defeat of fascism. It was the versatility of the T-70, the ability to use it in various situations, and the large number of these tanks at the front that made it the best Soviet light tank of the Second World War.

Already in October 1941 it became clear that new lightweight the T-60 tank, whose mass production began a month earlier, is almost useless on the battlefield. Its armor was easily penetrated by all Wehrmacht anti-tank weapons, and its own weapons were too weak to deal with enemy tanks. Strengthen both without fundamental change design was not possible The engine and gearbox were already working in an overstressed mode. The increase in the mass of the combat vehicle, inevitable with increased armor and armament, would simply lead to the failure of these units. A different solution was required.

In September 1941, the Design Bureau of Plant No. 37, at that time the leader in the production of the T-60, proposed a variant of its modernization, which received the T-45 index. In fact, it was still the same T-60, but with a new turret, in which a 45-mm gun was installed. This vehicle was supposed to use a new 100 hp ZIS-60 engine, which would make it possible to increase the thickness of the tank's frontal armor to 35-45 mm. However, the ZIS plant could not master the production of the engine due to the evacuation from Moscow to the Urals, to the city of Miass. The attempt to install the ZIS-16 engine with a power of 86 hp did not save the situation. With its development, not everything went smoothly either, and time did not wait.

In parallel with the plant number 37, work on the creation of a new light tank deployed at the Gorky Automobile Plant. There was nothing unusual in such a development of events - this enterprise already had experience in the production of armored vehicles, being engaged in the serial production of T-27 tankettes and T-37A small amphibious tanks in the 1930s. A number of prototypes of armored vehicles were also designed and manufactured here. In September In 1941, the plant was given the task of organizing the mass production of the T-60 light tank, for which a separate structural subdivision tank production and the corresponding design bureau In early September, the chief designer of plant No. 37 N.A. Astrov overtook on his own from Moscow to Gorky a prototype of the T-60 tank, which was to be used at GAZ as a standard. N.A. Astrov himself was also left at GAZ to help organize the production of tanks.

It was Astrov who presented to the GABTU of the Red Army a draft of a new light tank with reinforced armor and weapons, created on the basis of the T-60.

As power plant on this machine it was supposed to use a pair of GAZ-202 automobile engines. Prototypes of twin power units, which received the GAZ-203 index, were manufactured by the end of November. However, at the very first tests of the twins, after 6-10 hours of operation, the crankshafts of the second engines began to break, and only thanks to the efforts of the designers under the guidance of A.A. Lipgart, the resource of the twin power unit was brought to the required 100 hours. The design of the new tank at the GAZ Design Bureau began at the end of October 1941. It was carried out very quickly, using the technique adopted in the automotive industry, unusual for tank designers. General views combat vehicles were drawn in full size on special aluminum plates measuring 7 × 3 m, painted with white enamel and divided into squares measuring 200 × 200 mm. To reduce the drawing area and improve its accuracy by main view- longitudinal section - a plan was superimposed, as well as full and partial transverse sections. The drawings were made as detailed as possible and included all the components and parts of the internal and external equipment of the machine. These drawings later served as the basis for control during the assembly of the prototype and even the entire first series of machines.

1 - drive wheel, 2 - 45-mm cannon, 3 - DT machine gun, 4 - MK-4 observation device, 5 - plug of a hole for firing from personal weapons. 6 - carrier roller, 7 - guide wheel, 8 - road wheel, 9 - transmission access hatch, 10 - air intake hatch armor, 11 - hatch cover over the filler neck of the cooling system, 12 - air outlet shutters, 13 - spare support kayuk, 14 - manhole covers over the filler necks of fuel tanks, 15 - commander's hatch cover, 16 - mufflers, 17 - hatch cover for installing a portable blowtorch to start the engine in winter, 18 - headlight, 19 - driver's hatch cover, 20 - hatch for manual engine start, 21 - emergency exit hatch cover, 22 - towing device

At the end of December 1941, for the tank, which received the factory designation GAZ-70, an armored hull was welded and a turret designed by V. Dedkov was cast. Along with the cast, a version of the welded tower was also developed. The assembly of the tank began in January 1942 and, for a number of reasons, proceeded rather slowly. It was only completed on February 14, after which the tank was sent to Moscow, where it was shown to representatives of the GABTU. The military did not arouse much enthusiasm for the new car. In terms of armor protection, the tank was only slightly superior to the T-60, and the nominally increased, thanks to the installation of a 45-mm gun, the power of weapons was leveled by the placement of one person in the tower, a master of all trades - commander, gunner and loader. However, N. A. Astrov promised to eliminate the shortcomings as soon as possible Quite quickly, it was possible to increase the armor, bringing the thickness of the lower frontal hull plate to 45 mm, and the upper one to 35 mm. under the index T-70 Two days later, the GKO decree on the production of a tank saw the light, according to which plants No. 37 and No. 38 were involved in its production since April. However, reality did not allow these plans to be fully realized. engines than the T-60. It was not possible to establish the production of a cast turret, and GAZ had to hastily provide other plants with documentation for a welded turret. As a result, the April plan for the production of the T-70 was fulfilled only by GAZ, which assembled 50 vehicles. Plant No. 38 in Kirov managed to produce only seven tanks, and plant No. 37 failed to assemble them either by April or later. The layout of the new vehicle did not fundamentally differ from that of the T-60 tank. The tank commander was located in the rotating turret, also shifted to the port side. In the middle part of the hull along the starboard side, two engines were installed in series on a common frame, which made up a single power unit. The transmission and drive wheels were located in front.

The hull of the tank was welded from rolled armor plates 6,10,15,25,35 and 45 mm thick. Welded seams were reinforced with riveting. The frontal and stern hull sheets had rational angles of inclination. In the upper frontal sheet there was a driver's hatch, in the lid of which the tanks of the first releases had a viewing slot with a triplex, and then a rotary periscope observation device was installed.

The welded faceted turret, made of armor plates 35 mm thick, was mounted on a ball bearing in the middle part of the hull and had the shape of a truncated pyramid. The welded joints of the turret walls were reinforced with armor corners. An entrance hatch for the tank commander was made in the roof of the tower. A periscope mirror observation device was installed in the armored cover of the hatch, which provided the commander with a circular view. In addition, there was a hatch for flag signaling in the cover.

On the T-70 tank, a 45-mm tank gun mod 1938 was installed and, to the left of it, a coaxial DT machine gun. For the convenience of the tank commander, the gun was shifted to the right of the longitudinal axis of the turret. The length of the gun barrel was 46 calibers, the height of the line of fire was 1540 mm. The aiming angles of the twin installation along the vertical ranged from -6 ° to + 20 °. Telescopic sights TMFP were used for firing (a TOP sight was installed on some of the tanks) and a mechanical one as a backup. Sighting range firing was 3600 m, maximum - 4800 m. When using a mechanical sight, only direct fire at a distance of no more than 1000 m was possible. The rate of fire of the gun was 12 rounds per minute. on right. The trigger mechanism of the gun was foot, the gun was lowered by pressing the right pedal, and the machine gun - by pressing the left one. The ammunition included 90 shots with armor-piercing and fragmentation shells for the cannon (of which 20 shots were in the store) and 945 rounds for the DT machine gun (15 disks). starting speed armor-piercing projectile weighing 1.42 kg was 760 m / s, fragmentation weighing 2.13 kg - 335 m / s. After firing an armor-piercing projectile, the cartridge case was ejected automatically. When firing a fragmentation projectile, due to the shorter recoil length of the gun, the shutter was opened and the cartridge case was removed manually. The power plant GAZ-203 (70-6000) consisted of two four-stroke 6-cylinder carburetor engines GAZ-202 (GAZ 70-6004 - front and GAZ 70-6005 - rear) with a total power of 140 hp. The crankshafts of the engines were connected by a coupling with elastic bushings. flywheel housing front engine to prevent transverse vibrations of the power unit, they were connected by a rod to the starboard side. The battery ignition system, lubrication system and fuel (except tanks) system for each engine were independent. Two gas tanks with a total capacity of 440 liters were located on the left side of the aft compartment of the hull in a compartment isolated by armored partitions.

The transmission consisted of a two-disc semi-centrifugal dry friction main clutch (ferrodo steel), a four-speed automotive-type gearbox (4 + 1), a main gear with a bevel gear, two side clutches with band brakes and two simple single-row final drives. The main clutch and gearbox were assembled from parts borrowed from truck ZIS-5.

The composition of the tank propulsion unit for one side included a drive wheel with a removable lantern gear ring, five single-sided rubber-coated track rollers and three all-metal support rollers, a steering wheel with a crank track tensioning mechanism and a small-link caterpillar of 91 tracks. The design of the guide wheel and the track roller were unified. The width of the cast track track was 260 mm. Suspension - individual torsion. The commander's tanks were equipped with a 9R or 12RT radio station located in the turret and an internal TPU-2F intercom. Line tanks were equipped with a light signaling device for internal communication between the commander and the driver and an internal intercom TPU-2.

During production, the mass of the tank increased from 9.2 to 9.8 tons, and the cruising range on the highway decreased from 360 to 320 km.

At the beginning of October 1942, GAZ, and since November, Plant No. 38 switched to the production of T-70M tanks with an improved undercarriage. The width (from 260 to 300 mm) and the pitch of the tracks, the width of the road wheels, as well as the diameter of the torsion bars (from 33.5 to 36 mm) of the suspension and gear rims of the drive wheels were increased. The number of tracks in the caterpillar was reduced from 91 to 80 pieces. In addition, the support rollers, stopping brakes and final drives have been reinforced. The mass of the tank increased to 10 tons, and the cruising range along the highway decreased to 250 m. The gun ammunition was reduced to 70 shots.

From the end of December 1942, Plant No. 38 stopped producing tanks and switched to the production of SU-76 self-propelled guns. As a result, starting from 1943, light tanks for the Red Army were produced only at GAZ. At the same time, in the second half of 1943, the production was accompanied by great difficulties. From June 5 to June 14, the plant was subjected to German air raids. 2170 bombs were dropped on the Avtozavodsky district of Gorky, of which 1540 were dropped directly on the territory of the plant. More than 50 buildings and structures were completely destroyed or badly damaged. In particular, the chassis workshops, wheel, assembly and thermal No. 2, the main conveyor, the locomotive depot burned down, and many other workshops of the plant were seriously damaged. As a result, the production of BA-64 armored vehicles and cars had to be stopped. However, the production of tanks did not stop, although it slightly decreased - only in August was it possible to block the May production volume. But the age of the light tank had already been measured out - on August 28, 1943, a GKO decree was issued, according to which, from October 1 of the same year, GAZ switched to the production of self-propelled guns SU-76M. In total, in 1942-1943, 8226 tanks of the T-70 and T-70M modifications were produced.

The light tank T-70 and its improved version T-70M were in service with tank brigades and regiments of the so-called mixed organization, together with the medium tank T-34. The brigade had 32 T-34 tanks and 21 T-70 tanks. Such brigades could be part of the composition of tank and mechanized corps or be separate The tank regiment was armed with 23 T-34s and 16 T-70s At the same time, the regiments could be part of mechanized brigades or be separate By the spring of 1944, light T-70 tanks were expelled from the states tank units Red Army. Nevertheless, in some brigades they continued to be used for quite a long time. In addition, some tanks of this type were used in self-propelled artillery battalions, regiments and brigades of the SU-76 as command vehicles. Often they were equipped with tank units in motorcycle units. Patriotic war.

The T-70 tanks were baptized by fire during the battles in the South-Western direction in June-July 1942 and suffered serious losses. The first battles revealed low fighting qualities new light tanks, whose armament did not allow them to fight German medium tanks (the share of light combat vehicles in the Wehrmacht was rapidly declining), and armor protection was insufficient when used as tanks for direct infantry support. In addition, the presence of only two tankers in the crew, one of which was extremely overloaded with numerous duties, as well as the lack of communications equipment on combat vehicles, made it extremely difficult to use them as part of units and led to increased losses. The final point in the combat career of these tanks was put by the Battle of Kursk - the ability to survive, not to mention emerge victorious, in an open battle with new German heavy tanks, the T-70 was close to zero. At the same time, the troops also noted positive advantages "seventies" According to some tank commanders, the T-70 was the best suited for pursuing the retreating enemy, which became relevant in 1943. The reliability of the power plant and chassis of the T-70 was higher than that of the T-34, which made it possible to make long marches . The "Seventy" was quiet, which again differed sharply from the roaring engine and the "thirty-four" rattling with caterpillars, which at night, for example, could be heard for 1.5 km.

In clashes with enemy tanks, the crews of the T-70 had to show miracles of ingenuity. Much also depended on the crew's knowledge of the features of their car, its advantages and disadvantages. In the hands of skilled tankers, the T-70 was a formidable weapon. For example, on July 6, 1943, in the battles for the village of Pokrovka in the Oboyan direction, the crew of the T-70 tank from the 49th Guards Tank Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant B.V. Pavlovich, managed to knock out three medium German tanks and one Panther1. A completely exceptional case occurred on August 21, 1943 in the 178th tank brigade. When repulsing an enemy counterattack, the commander of the T-70 tank, Lieutenant A.L. Dmitrienko noticed a retreating German tank. Having caught up with the enemy, the lieutenant ordered his driver to move next to him (apparently, in the "dead zone"). It was possible to shoot at point-blank range, but when he saw that the hatch in the turret of a German tank was open ( German tankers almost always went into battle with open turret hatches), Dmitrienko got out of the T-70, jumped onto the armor of an enemy vehicle and threw a grenade into the hatch. The crew of the German tank was destroyed, and the tank itself was towed to our location and, after minor repairs, was used in battles.

M. BARYATINSKY

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lovers military history sign designed by Nikolai Alexandrovich Astrov Soviet tank T-70.

The characteristics of this combat vehicle immediately speak for themselves: this Combat vehicles the battlefield is of the light type.

A depressing fact prompted the military to create a new tank: combat tests of light and medium tanks of the Red Army (models from T-38 to T-60) during the first year of the Second World War revealed their non-competitiveness.

In January 1942, the 70th tank was demonstrated to Stalin as an enhanced version of the previous representative of the T-60 light tank line, and its serial production began in March.

Brief TTX light tank T-70

Consider the main characteristics of the brainchild of Astrov:

Frontal armor thickness: bottom - 45 mm; top - 35 mm;

Side armor thickness - 15 mm;

Main armament: 20-K cannon, 45 mm caliber, (previously used in the T-50 tank);

Ammunition - 90 shells;

Machine gun 7.62 mm, 15 discs with 945 rounds;

Two four-stroke six-cylinder petrol engines with a capacity of 70 hp each. With.;

Cross-country speed - up to 25 km / h, on the highway - 42 km / h;

Power reserve over rough terrain - 360 km, on the highway - 450 km;

On the command vehicle - walkie-talkie 12T or 9R.

The project of the T-70 tank was initially critical

T-70 is a tank of the Great Patriotic War, reviews of which are rather contradictory. And this is despite the fact that the number of such manufactured tanks (almost 8.5 thousand units) was second only to the famous T-34! objective view on its advantages and disadvantages reveals the main reason for this historical and technical incident. It is banal: often a failed project is initiated and promoted not by end users (in this case, the military), but by the top party leadership.

The original pre-war thesis for the development of armored forces - "The army needs good light tank!" - turned out to be wrong. The strategists did not take into account the prospect of arming the Wehrmacht (and this happened in 1942) with artillery of 50 and 75 mm caliber. Reinforced enemy guns effectively hit the T-70 from any angle. The tank was inferior to the German "tigers" and "panthers" with 75-caliber guns both in terms of firepower and armor protection. The commander of the Fifth Tank Army Katukov M.E. wrote unflatteringly about them to G.K. Zhukov, pointing out the impossibility of using the T-70 in an oncoming tank battle due to pre-guaranteed losses.

Wrong direction of design?

Indeed, Russian WWII tanks were initially created in a banal way by improving the previous model, without predicting, based on intelligence, the weapons of the battlefield created by the enemies. Based on the foregoing, unflattering reviews about the imperfection of the T-70 seem natural. Simply improving the T-60 tank was not enough. Now, after more than 70 years since the implementation of the project of this weapon, we can already justify the dead end of such motivation.

Light tanks (photos of them are proof of this) would be ideal on the fronts of the First World War. It was for the guns of that time that the armor of the tank designed by Astrov was practically impenetrable. The second important trump card was the speed and maneuverability of the T-70.

In other words, the need to produce light tanks for the army in the middle of the 20th century was a fantasy of the Soviet strategists of that time, who had not grown either tactically or strategically since civil war. Customers of weapons should think adequately to their contemporary military thought!

Are the identified design flaws of the T-70 an indicator of its failure?

Such shortcomings were characteristic of almost all light tanks of that time, therefore, looking ahead, we state the fact: none of them became really effective on the battlefield.

All light Russian tanks of the Second World War were designed to order by the lead designer Astrov Nikolai Alexandrovich, like the T-70. Tests of new weapons, carried out in 1941, revealed areas for improving the tank:

Strengthening armor;

Replacement of a single cast turret with a double hexagonal turret;

Reinforcement of transmission, tracks, tires of road wheels;

Replacing the main gun with a more modern one (the latter was never implemented).

What can be said here? Were there too many flaws in the base model? Is it really just such a basic model that was in demand by the Red Army?

The inappropriateness of light tanks on the battlefield was proved by the further evolution of tank building: armies different countries gradually, in principle, they abandoned such weapons of the battlefield. Instead, other light armored vehicles have been developed, mainly performing the role of support, which no longer act as the main fire armored force of the battlefield. However, on the other hand, the very process of creating and modifying the T-70 turned out to be very creative.

Serial types

The industrial production of light tanks T-70 was carried out in a version corresponding to the original design of the designer Astrov, as well as in a modified version of the T-70M.

The first variety had unreinforced armor, lighter weight - 9.2 tons and more ammunition - 90 shells; the second - greater weight (9.8 tons), achieved through additional armor, strengthening of nodes and parts. The ammo capacity of the upgraded tank was reduced to 70 rounds.

In fact, these were structurally different combat vehicles with different, non-interchangeable parts.

- fiasco for the T-70 light tank

In reality, the army needed medium and heavy tanks capable of effectively hitting enemy armored vehicles.

The party bosses did not hear the dishonestly repressed and shot in the basement of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Soviet Court Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky: “The future war will be a war of tank formations!”

And, accordingly, the defense industry of the USSR since 1942 mass-produced the T-70 - a tank whose combat potential in 1943 did not stand the severe test - an uncompromising oncoming tank battle near the village of Kursk Bulge).

The armor did not save: the 75th and 50th caliber of enemy artillery easily penetrated even its frontal part. Moreover, the tank turned out to be vulnerable even to outdated German regimental artillery of 37 mm caliber. Exam counter tank battle was a failure and, accordingly, after the Kursk Bulge, the mass production of the T-70 was stopped.

However, oddly enough, it was at the second stage of the Great Patriotic War, when the Red Army was advancing uncontrollably, that a number of qualified combat commanders expressed regret at the premature farewell to the T-70. The tank still, despite the obvious shortcomings, was useful!

On the positive combat qualities of the T-70

It was not given to reveal its positive to new tankers. At the same time, aces tank battle in conditions of crossed and wooded area even preferred this light vehicle to the more armored medium T-34. What motivated them to make this choice? Firstly, German heavy guns and heavy tanks almost equally hit the T-34 and T-70. Moreover, due to the smaller lung size tank, aimed fire at it is possible from a distance of half a kilometer, while at the T-34 - from a kilometer distance.

Also, with the help of the T-70, it was possible to use the surprise factor when attacking the enemy. At the same time and heavy tank The IS and the medium T-34 were deprived of this capability due to the noisier diesel engines.

Almost close, unnoticed, a light tank T-70 drove up over rough terrain to the enemy camp. After all, the noise of the twin gasoline car engine with a capacity of 140 liters. With. the sound level resembled only a passenger car. Lieutenant General Bogdanov reported to the main armored directorate that the T-70, due to its low noise, ideally performed the function of pursuing a retreating enemy.

The location of the fuel tanks in the rear of the hull contributed to the extremely rare detonation of fuel when it hit the tank.

In 1944, when about one and a half thousand T-70 tanks remained in the tank units of the Red Army, the OGK of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry stated its effectiveness in urban battles. The "Seventy" was difficult to hit with "faustpatrons" and grenades due to its small size and high maneuverability.

Manufacturability

It should be recognized that the Soviet T-70 tank in its design turned out to be one of the most technologically efficient. For its manufacture, a thoroughly balanced production base of the GAZ plant was used. Cooperation with factories-suppliers of components and parts was effectively established.

The repair of weapons on the basis of the T-70, damaged on the fronts, was effectively organized.

Initially, the designer Astrov set up its production at the Gorky Automobile Plant.

In 1942, the factory workers produced 3495 units of this weapon, and in 1943 - 3348. Then the production of the T-70 in 1942 was also debugged at plant No. 38 (Kirov). 1378 of these tanks were manufactured here.

It was also planned to involve the Sverdlovsk Plant No. 37 in the production of the tank. However, it was not prepared here, and the technological costs turned out to be critically high. Twice as many engines were required as for the T-60, making more powerful rolled armor more labor intensive. As a result - a modest result: 10 tanks and the cessation of production.

An objective look at the design flaws of the tank

The fact is clear: the idea efficient lung tanks on the fronts of World War II turned out to be a complete utopia. Therefore, the work on the project to create the T-70 (despite the mass of original engineering findings, which we will write about later) obviously looked like, i.e., was doomed to failure.

Let's begin with soviet tanks The Second World War (and the subject of our description as well) had a layout design that was not devoid of obvious shortcomings, involving 5 compartments:

managerial;

Motor (right - in the middle of the body);

Combat (tower and left - in the middle of the hull);

Aft (where the gasoline tanks and the radiator were located).

A tank with similar compartments was front-wheel drive, so its undercarriage was characterized by increased vulnerability.

T-70 - an exhibit of the armored museum in Kubinka (Moscow region)

It's no secret that light tanks (a photo of the Japanese "Ha-Go" and the German PzKpfw-II, modern with the T-70, is presented below) should be designed taking into account mutually exclusive technical and combat criteria:

Efficient distribution of duties between crew members (functional overload of the tank commander in a crew of two, which also included the driver);

The firepower of the gun was insufficient ( lung design tank assumed as the main armament a 45-mm rifled automatic gun 20-K model 1932).

Those wishing to see the typical armament of the T-70 - the main gun and the coaxial machine gun DT-29 with a caliber of 7.62 mm - are recommended to visit the specialized military armored museum (Kubinka). Museum guests can see both the equipment and the equipment of the crew members' seats.

The tank commander was in the turret compartment, which is shifted to the left relative to the longitudinal axis, and also captures the left middle part of the hull. According to his duties, he directed the actions of the driver through intercom, monitored the situation, loaded and fired from the weapon and the machine gun coaxial with it.

The driver was in front of the hull, in the middle.

Since the exhibits of the museum have been carefully restored and, as they say, are on the move, tourists can see the operating components and assemblies of the T-70, making a visual impression for themselves. What do we mean when we mention the functional overload of the tank commander? Too many mechanical, routine processes in it were not automated. This shortcoming can be noticed by those who visited the museum (Kubinka). One has only to carefully examine the mechanisms of the restored combat vehicle. Judge for yourself:

Manual drive of the turret rotation device;

Manual lift for the gun;

When firing shells of a fragmentation type, the semi-automatic did not work, and the commander was forced to manually open the shutter and pull out a red-hot spent cartridge case.

Due to these factors, which objectively interfere with combat, the design rate of fire - up to 12 rounds per minute - turned out to be unattainable. In reality, the T-70 fired up to 5 shots per minute.

By the way, in the same museum, namely in pavilion No. 6, visitors will be able to see tanks Nazi Germany: “tigers” and “panthers”, which opposed the Soviet tank we are considering.

Rapidly evolving, but still far from perfect, Soviet tanks from the Second World War invariably attract the attention of visitors.

Demanded undercarriage T-70

Especially for the T-70, a twin GAZ-203 engine was developed. Ahead is the GAZ-70-6004 engine, and behind is the GAZ-70-6005. Six-cylinder four-stroke engines - both have been derated for increased reliability and service life.

The T-70 transmission, inherited from the previous model, received generally positive reviews. It consisted of:

Double disc clutch;

Gearboxes 4-speed;

Cardan shaft of stepped type;

bevel final drive;

Onboard clutches multi-disc;

Single row final drives.

The T-70 caterpillar consisted of 91 tracks 26 cm wide.

Instead of a conclusion: military equipment based on the T-70

However, the T-70 tank was not a dead end model. was developed by the Design Bureau of Plant No. 38 (Kirov) on the basis of its extended undercarriage. The main armament of this self-propelled gun was the 76 mm ZIS-3 gun. The T-70 itself turned out to be technologically advanced and promising.

The design of the new weapons was dramatic. The first designer, Semyon Alexandrovich Ginzburg, was accused of non-existent "sins" after the depressing consequences of Kuskoy Duga, deprived of the right to design, sent to the front, where he died. The commissar of tank construction I. M. Zaltsman, who was in conflict with him, had a hand in this. However, this ambitious official was soon motivatedly dismissed from his post.

Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev, appointed to his position, appointed a competition for the modification of the SU-76, where representatives of GAZ and plant No. 38 were involved.

As a result, the ACS was reconfigured and put into mass production. The 75-mm gun made it possible to successfully destroy enemy self-propelled guns, light and medium tanks. It was also relatively effective against the heavy Panther, penetrating the gun mantlet and side armor. In the fight against the newer and more armored “Tiger”, the SU-76 turned out to be ineffective before the introduction of cumulative and

In the second half of 1944, the Red Army entered service created on the basis of the chassis of the T-70 tank.

Today, amateur collectors have the opportunity to purchase any model of the T-70 tank. The price of the base model (full size) is 5 million rubles. Let's make a reservation that it is equipped with the original chassis, but, of course, it is not intended for combat. At the same time, the latest improvements are offered: from a leather interior to an echo sounder.

In October 1941, it became clear that the new light tank T-60, which was launched in September, was practically useless on the battlefield. The fact is that he had too weak weapons and armor, which was easily pierced by enemy tanks. It was impossible to correct these shortcomings without a fundamental change in the design, since its engine and gearbox were already working in an overstressed mode. The increase in the mass of the tank, which is inevitable with the strengthening of armor and weapons, would put these units out of action.

At the end of October 1941, specialists from the design bureau of the Gorky Automobile Plant began to develop a new tank, who received the index GAZ-70 or military designation T-70.

The work went very quickly, using the prima adopted in the automotive industry, which is unusual for tank designers. General views of the combat vehicle were made in full size on special aluminum plates measuring 7 × 3 meters, which were painted with white enamel and divided into squares measuring 200 × 200 mm. To reduce the area of ​​the drawing and increase its accuracy, a plan was superimposed on the main view - a longitudinal section, as well as full and partial transverse sections. The drawings, which included all the details and assemblies of the external and internal equipment tank, performed as detailed as possible and in the future they served as the basis for control during the assembly of the prototype.

Construction and description

The T-70 light tank had a classic design, with a front-mounted transmission. The place of the driver-mechanic was located in the bow of the hull at the left side, and the place of the tank commander was in a rotating turret shifted to the left side. In the middle part of the hull along the starboard side on a common frame, two engines coupled in series were installed, which made up a single power unit. The transmission and drive wheels were in front.

The body was welded from rolled armor plates, which had a thickness of 6, 10, 15, 25, 35 and 45 mm. In especially critical places, the welds were reinforced with riveting. The frontal and stern sheets of the armored hull had rational angles of inclination. A welded faceted turret made of armor plates 35 mm thick was mounted on a ball bearing in the middle part of the hull. The welded joints of the tower were reinforced with armor squares. The frontal part of the tower had a cast swinging mask with loopholes for the installation of a gun, a machine gun and a telescopic sight. An entrance hatch for the tank commander was made in the roof of the turret. A periscope mirror observation device was installed in the armored hatch cover, which provided the commander with an all-round view. Also in the lid there was a hatch for a flag alarm.

A 45-mm tank gun of the 1938 model of the year and a coaxial DT machine gun were installed as weapons on the T-70 tank. The gun was shifted to the right of the longitudinal axis of the turret, which provided greater convenience for the commander. The gear turret traverse mechanism was mounted to the left of the commander, and the twin-mount screw hoist to the right. The gun had a trigger foot mechanism, which was carried out by pressing the right pedal, and the machine gun - on the left. The ammunition load consisted of 90 shots with armor-piercing and fragmentation shells for the cannon and 945 rounds for the DT machine gun.

Gun characteristics:

• fire line height - 1540 mm;
• tilt angle of the twin unit vertically - from -6 to +20 degrees;
• effective firing range - 3600 m;
• maximum firing range - 4800 m;
• rate of fire - 12 rds / min.

The GAZ-203 engine was chosen as the power plant, which consisted of two four-stroke six-cylinder GAZ-202 carburetor engines with a total power of 140 hp. The crankshafts of the engines were connected by means of a coupling with elastic bushings. The flywheel crankcase of the front engine was connected by a link to the starboard side, which made it possible to prevent lateral vibrations. For each engine, the battery ignition system, lubrication system and fuel system were independent. The tank was equipped with two fuel tanks with a total capacity of 440 liters, which were located on the left side of the aft compartment of the hull in a compartment isolated by armored partitions.

The transmission of the T-70 tank consisted of a two-disk semi-centrifugal main clutch of dry friction, a four-speed automotive-type gearbox, a bevel gear final drive, two side clutches with band brakes, and two simple single-row final drives. The main clutch and gearbox were assembled from parts borrowed from the ZIS-5 truck.

The note: “Commander tanks were equipped with a 9R or 12RT radio station, which was placed in the tower, and an internal intercom TPU-2F. On line tanks installed a light-signal device for internal communication between the commander and the driver-mechanic and an internal intercom TPU-2.

The propeller on each side included: drive wheels with a removable lantern gear ring, five single-sided rubber-coated road wheels and three all-metal support rollers, a guide wheel with a crank track tensioning mechanism and a small-link caterpillar of 91 tracks with a pitch of 98 mm. The design of the guide wheel and track roller were unified. The width of the cast track track was 260 mm. Suspension - individual torsion bar.

During production, the mass of the tank increased from 9.2 to 9.8 tons, and the cruising range on the highway decreased from 360 to 320 km.

The performance characteristics and overall dimensions of the T-70 tank:

• length - 4285 mm;
• width - 2420 mm;
• height - 2035 mm;
• clearance - 300 mm;
• armament - cannon 20K model 1934 caliber 45 mm, machine gun DT model 1929 caliber 7.62 mm;
• means of communication - intercom TPU-2 and radio station 12RT or 9R on command tanks;
• overcome obstacles - the angle of elevation is 28 degrees, the width of the ditch is 1.0 meters, the height of the wall is 0.6 meters, the depth of the ford is 0.9 meters;
• maximum speed - 45 km / h;
• cruising range - 250 km.

Assembly and testing

At the end of December 1942, a hull was made for the first tank and a turret designed by V. Dedkov was cast. Simultaneously with the cast, a welded version of the tower was also developed. In January 1942, assembly began, which, for a number of reasons, was completed only on February 14. Then the tank was sent to Moscow and shown there to representatives of the Main Armored Directorate. The military reacted rather coolly to the new tank, since in terms of armor protection it only slightly exceeded the T-60 and had an increased mass due to the installation of a 45-mm cannon, and the power of weapons was leveled by only one place for a person in the tower, who should perform the duties of a commander, gunner and loader. However, the chief designer N.A. Astrov promised to eliminate all shortcomings in a short time.

Then, tests were carried out on a prototype of the T-70 tank and trial firing from the main weapon. The new tank, compared to its predecessor, had a higher specific power (15.2 hp/t versus 11 hp/t), more powerful weapons (45 mm gun instead of 20 mm) and enhanced armor protection (45 -mm armor instead of 20-35mm).

Based on the test results, the new tank was adopted by the Red Army by a decree of the State Defense Committee (GKO) dated March 6, 1942. Two days later, the next GKO decree was issued on the production of a tank from April at factories No. 37 and No. 38, as well as the Gorky Automobile Plant. However, the new tank required twice as many parts as the previous tank, while the production of the turret failed, and the Gorky Automobile Plant had to hastily provide documentation for the welded turret to other plants.

The T-70 tank was produced from spring to November 1942, and then it was replaced by a modernized one.

The use of T-70 tanks during the Great Patriotic War

The tank and mechanized corps could include tank brigades consisting of 32 tanks T-34 and 21 T-70 tanks. However, by the spring of 1944, this tank model was excluded from the states of the tank units of the Red Army, but in some brigades they continued to operate for quite a long time.

The first to receive new tanks were the 157th and 162nd separate tank brigades, which were formed in the city of Murom in the first half of 1942. each of these brigades had 65 such vehicles. Even before the start of hostilities, both brigades were reorganized into a more traditional staff of a mixed organization. The new tanks received their baptism of fire during the fighting in the southwestern direction in June-July 1942, where they suffered significant losses. Already the first battles showed their low combat qualities, insufficient armor protection when using tanks as infantry support and weak weapons, which did not allow them to fight against German medium tanks.

However, in capable hands, the T-70 tank was a formidable weapon. So, on July 6, 1943, in the battles for the village of Pokovka in the Oboyan direction, the tank crew under the command of Lieutenant V.V. Pavlovich from the 49th Guards Tank Brigade was able to knock out three medium German tanks and one Panther.

On August 21, 1943, the tank commander, Lieutenant A.L. Dmitrienko of the 178th Tank Brigade discovered a retreating German tank and began to pursue it. Having caught up with the enemy, Dmitrienko noticed that the hatch in the tower enemy tank open, he got out of his tank, jumped onto the armor of an enemy vehicle and threw a grenade into the hatch. The crew of the German tank was destroyed, and the tank itself was towed to our location and, after minor repairs, was used in battles.

Fact: « A large number of T-70 tanks participated in the Battle of Kursk. Thus, on the eve of the battle, the tank troops of the Central Front had 1652 tanks, of which 369 units or 22% were tanks of this model.

Often these tanks were used for ramming. For example, in the combat log of the 150th Tank Brigade, which operated as part of the 40th Army of the Voronezh Front in January 1943, the following entry was preserved:

“Senior lieutenant Zakharchenko and driver senior sergeant Krivko, repelling counterattacks of tanks and having used up shells, with their company went to ram German tanks. Zakharchenko personally rammed two tanks and captured the commander and chief of staff of the 100th Special Purpose Tank Battalion.”

Fact: “During the Second World War, in addition to the Red Army, the T-70 tank was in service with the Polish Army in the amount of 53 copies and the Czechoslovak Corps in the amount of 10 copies.”