The tanks of World War II were a leap in the development of armored vehicles, showing how important its role is on the battlefield. German generals were the first to understand the power of quick strikes, crushing infantry and enemy fortifications. Guderian and Manstein managed to defeat the Polish army in a couple of weeks using combat vehicles, after which it was the turn of the French. The Anglo-French troops held out for more than a month, but could not oppose anything to the German tanks and were pressed against Dunker, from where they were able to evacuate.

The history of World War II tanks began in 1939, when the outcome of battles was often decided by cutting blows from light and medium tanks, their breakthrough and the destruction of the rear. In the period up to 1941, there were practically no anti-tank weapons and experience in combating armored vehicles. Later, heavy tanks with anti-cannon armor began to appear, for example, the Soviet KV-1, which was almost invulnerable to German guns, but unreliable and with poor maneuverability. Germany in 1942 used one of the most powerful tanks of the Second World War - the Tiger, which has powerful armor and a magnificent gun.

Soviet response

Despite the appearance of multi-ton monsters, medium tanks were still in demand. It was they who performed the role of workhorses, making daring breakthroughs on the flanks, hastily transferred to dangerous sectors of the front, destroying enemy columns on the march. Best tank World War II, the T-34 was just a medium, weighing about 30 tons, thin sloping armor, a medium-caliber cannon and a speed of more than 50 km / h. The Americans classified their Pershing as heavy, although it was average in performance. Of course, it is worth mentioning the Wehrmacht, which threw the Panther into battle in 1943, which became one of the most massive and dangerous German military vehicles, thanks to a combination of mobility, armor and firepower.

For many years, there was a kind of rivalry between the USSR and Germany for the creation of the most advanced machine. The Germans relied on technology and performance, trying to make it possible to destroy any enemy from afar and withstand any retaliatory shot. The disadvantages of this approach were the complexity and cost of production. Soviet engineers relied on manufacturability and mass production, even when creating the legendary thirty-four. This approach paid off during bloody tank battles, and later, when Germany began to experience a shortage of resources, Soviet tanks finally won.

Other countries

The armored vehicles of other countries lagged far behind in development. Japanese tanks did not have serious protection and weapons, like the Italian and French, and looked like guests from the past.

Great Britain, in addition to Churchill, who distinguished himself with excellent armor, but poor mobility and reliability, also produced other vehicles. The massive Cromwell was distinguished by good mobility, a powerful gun, and could withstand the Panthers. The comet, which appeared at the end of the war as a result of Cromwell's modification, was even more successful and successfully combined the necessary characteristics.

The US created 49,234 medium Shermans, which left a noticeable mark in World War II. Not distinguished by protection or firepower, the tank became the most massive after the T-34 due to its successful design and ease of production.

Of interest are the experimental tanks of the Second World War, such as the built Maus, which became the largest tank of the Second World War, or the giant Ratte, which remained on the drawings.

During the war years, a huge number of armored vehicles were produced, some of which are little known and are in the shadow of history.

On this page you will find a list of tanks from the Second World War with photos, names and descriptions that is in no way inferior to an encyclopedia and helps to find out interesting details and not get confused in the variety of combat vehicles.

Introduction

To understand which tank is the best, you must first understand what it is intended for. The illiterate majority believes that the main purpose of the tank is to meet the enemy’s combat vehicle in an open field and defeat it. In this case, naturally, the main characteristics of the tank are the thickness of the armor and the initial velocity of the projectile. At the same time, the caliber of the projectile and, accordingly, the gun should not be very inferior to the caliber battleship. This is how, according to amateurs and fans of electronic games, ideal tanks look like.














In fact the main task a tank is to enter a hole in the enemy’s defense (which was provided by artillery or competent intelligence) and surround, defeat, scare. To accomplish this task, completely different qualities are needed - mobility, reliability of the undercarriage and engine, a large supply of transportable fuel and shells. They may object to me. The enemy will throw his tank forces into the breakthrough area and a direct collision is inevitable.
The answer to this question was found by German troops in the summer of the forty-first year. With the threat of a frontal tank strike, you must run away hiding behind anti-tank weapons. From these positions, we will try to determine the best tank of the Second World War.

Required armor thickness

Ideal armor consists of several layers - a hard layer, plastic (for extinguishing a cumulative jet), a layer of medium hardness, a substrate, a lining. In total, twelve meters are obtained. This I mean that it is simply not possible to protect a tank one hundred percent. Now I will express not a lot of complicated but very important idea for the subsequent understanding. The armor of the tank should be SUCH THICKNESS so that the enemy would have to use powerful enough and, accordingly, HEAVY AND EXPENSIVE anti-tank guns. The concepts of heavy and expensive for each historical period will be determined by the level of development of industry. For the period of the Second World War, an anti-tank gun with a high initial speed armor-piercing projectile with a caliber of 76.2 mm and above was both heavy and expensive. The most striking example is our anti-tank guns ZIS-2 and BS-3. The ZIS-2 was not much heavier than a forty-five-millimeter anti-tank gun, but ten thousand of them were fired in three years. And an anti-tank gun of a caliber of forty-five millimeters, only in the forty-third year, seventeen thousand were fired. With BS-3 it's even worse. They pierced anything, but the weight of three thousand six hundred kilograms made it difficult to maneuver. And the high cost made it possible to produce only one and a half thousand guns. Another very case in point. In the forty-fourth year, they tried to strengthen the reservation of the T-34-85. The thickness of the front sheet was increased to seventy-five millimeters. The driver's hatch was made a hundred millimeters thick. But as it turned out, the German tank gun of 88 mm caliber still pierces the frontal armor. Therefore, they decided not to overload the suspension and transmission and leave the armor with a thickness of forty-five millimeters, although in the forty-fourth year such armor protected only from fragments.
Powerful and heavy anti-tank guns have low maneuverability and low rate of fire. They are difficult to disguise and in general they are simply few. Therefore, it is not possible to reliably cover the ENTIRE front with them.

Knowing the criteria for an ideal tank - optimal armor, large ammunition load, mobility, reliability and range, let's analyze the most massive tanks of the Second World War.

M-4 Sherman



The American T-4 Sherman tank was a genuine misunderstanding made on the knee. He was very tall and had a very funny "tractor" suspension. Its gun power and armor protection were mediocre. Due to the lack of a planetary rotation mechanism, its transmission can be called primitive. But this primitive transmission was made in America and had amplifiers and synchronizers where needed. Therefore, the control of the tank was easy, and the design itself was quite reliable. The ammunition load was quite large, the radio station was the best in the world. The shells did not detonate when the tank was hit. And most importantly, it was produced in huge quantities. In an open field against the Tiger, Sherman had no chance. But as a TOOL global war he was much more useful than the Tiger. I strongly advise you to read the memoirs of a veteran who fought almost the entire war on foreign tanks. The book is on the Internet, called - "Tankman on a foreign car." Reading these memoirs, I concluded that in the forty-fourth and forty-fifth years, our command used tank troops in the main CORRECTLY.

German tanks

I'll start from the end, with the Panther and the Tiger. Both tanks were typical. They had a very modern and efficient suspension. But from the point of view of production and combat operation, this suspension was the height of idiocy. Weight, especially for the tiger, was disastrously overpriced. Fuel supply is minimal. Therefore, there is no need to talk about any mobility. These tanks could operate as efficiently as possible only in the role of a mobile firing point.

The T-4 tank had an ancient "tractor" suspension and modern spaced armor. He received a long-barreled gun of 75 mm caliber only by the middle of the war. Because of the muzzle brake that appeared, it was often confused with the Tiger.



The most perfect was the German tank T-3. He had a modern torsion bar suspension, plus oil compensators on the first and last rollers. He had the highest speed - almost seventy kilometers per hour. Moreover, the speed measurement was carried out by our specialists in Kubinka. True, why such a speed is not clear to the tank. They don’t drive at such a speed not in a column, not across the battlefield. A legitimate question arises - why was the best combat vehicle removed from service? The answer is the simplest - the narrow hull did not allow the installation of a 75 mm caliber gun.

T-44 is the best fighting machine

I will say right away that the T-44 tank did not have to fight, and it reached its full perfection two years after the end of the war. But using his example, you can show what the ideal combat vehicle of the Second World War should have been.
The history of the design of the T-44 tank began with a strong desire of Soviet designers to replace or at least improve the legendary T-34 tank. Fundamental changes and design improvements accumulated, but Stalin, fearing a reduction in mass production, forbade their implementation. After the liberation of eastern Ukraine, the question arose what kind of car to run in Kharkov? And here we decided that it was time for a new model.
The new tank had a simple hull with vertical side plates. This made it possible to erect a large tower. The driver's hatch and the machine gun nest were missing from the front sheet. It has become monolithic and more durable. The suspension has become a modern torsion bar. And most importantly, tank designers severely beat the designers of diesel engines. Those, in turn, removed to other places all the auxiliary mechanisms of the engine, which were in favor of its dimensions. As a result, the hull of the tank turned out to be three hundred millimeters lower. In the transmission, the gear ratios of the gears were changed and this reduced the operating loads and increased reliability. Almost all fuel tanks were located in the engine compartment. I say practically because in the forward part of the hull to the right of the driver's mechanic, they still placed one tank of fuel. The only thing that did not let the new car into a brighter future was the onboard clutches inherited from the T-34.
The new car was fired at the training ground from German cannons of 75 and 88 mm caliber. Then they added the thickness of the armor and fired again. As a result of the increase in weight, the suspension and transmission stopped "pulling". The suspension was urgently reinforced and the side clutches were replaced with planetary turning mechanisms. The result was the T-54. It turns out that the T-44 came very close but did not become the best combat vehicle of the Second World War.

Designing the best tank of World War II

Of course, we take the T-44 hull as a basis. We put the planetary transmission. It will make it possible to make a sufficiently mobile machine weighing thirty-six tons with an engine power of five hundred and twenty horsepower. We remove the fuel tank from the fighting compartment. And instead of it we make a vertical tank in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe stern leaf. At the same time, the body is lengthened by only twenty centimeters, and we get four hundred liters of diesel fuel. Frontal and side armor eighty millimeters thick. It may be objected to me that the frontal armor is usually made thicker than the side. But our frontal armor is sloping and its REDUCED thickness is one hundred and sixty millimeters. We make the tower welded and with a more developed aft part. This will increase ammo capacity and improve the balance of the turret. As for weapons, we will limit ourselves to an eighty-five millimeter caliber gun. Weaving is certainly more powerful, but the ammunition load is almost halved. And as we found out during raids on the rear of the enemy, ammunition is the main thing. So we got the best tank of the Second World War.

HOW TO IDENTIFY A FOOL?

The fool does not read the article (or reads but does not understand the meaning of what he read), but immediately begins to comment. And most importantly, unlike a smart person, a fool never doubts.
What am I talking about? Just another comment on an article.
Quote.
The best among which tanks?
The T-44 was just the logical conclusion of the T-34/85. And just like the T-34/85, it had a weak 85 mm ZIS-S-53 gun.
For comparison, the main tanks of the Americans of those years, the M26 Pershing, were equipped with a powerful 90 mm cannon.
The British A41 Centurion was equipped with the most powerful 76 mm QF 17 pounder cannon. And even the lighter A34 Comet (generally light, cruising) was equipped with a powerful 76 mm QF 77 mm HV cannon, next to which the Soviet 85 mm ZIS-S-53 tank gun nervously smoked on the sidelines.
Therefore, the USSR got out and invented some kind of "medium tanks". The time of which (medium infantry, actually) ended during the Second World War and the whole world switched to the MAIN BATTLE TANK, PLUS some additionally had auxiliary light tanks. So these auxiliary light tanks, in terms of technical characteristics, approximately corresponded to the T-44.
Why did the essentially auxiliary BTT suddenly become some kind of "best" there, taking into account the existing main one (MBT)?
End of quote.
Let's start from the end. I didn't understand the last sentence. There are some strange abbreviations that, when deciphered, break the logic of the Russian language - taking into account the existing main MAIN BATTLE TANK.
Apparently the author wanted to say that the T-44 was an auxiliary tank. Just wondering which tank the author considers the main one?

But the main claim of the author is to the weak gun of the T-44 tank. Why does he need a more powerful gun? Fight the king tigers?
That is, my entire article, where I explain that a tank IS A COMPLEX OF QUALITIES - mobility, protection, the amount of ammunition and much more, did not enter the author's brain. It is practically impossible to explain that the T-44 tank was supposed to fight the tigers last.
Now about tanks with good and powerful guns. The American had a muzzle brake on the cannon, that is, after firing for about twenty seconds, he did not see anything in the scope and did not understand where his projectile had flown.
By the way, the installation of a muzzle brake made it possible to install a hundred millimeter caliber gun on the T-44.

The photo shows a T-44 with a 100 mm cannon. A projectile weighing sixteen kilograms accelerated to a speed of nine hundred meters per second.
Let's compare the power of the guns. American - 3970000 joules, ours - 6400000 joules. Even somehow it became not convenient for the Americans.
The author also recalls some MEDIUM infantry tanks. So, in our country, the role of infantry tanks at the end of the war was performed by the SU-152 and IS-2. True, they were called breakthrough tanks.

The history of the armored forces begins at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the first models of self-propelled armored vehicles, more like matchboxes on tracks, nevertheless showed themselves perfectly on the battlefields.

The high cross-country ability of the fire fortresses gave them a huge advantage in a positional war. A truly successful combat vehicle had to easily overcome trenches, barbed wire and a landscape of front lines dug up by artillery preparation, inflict good fire damage, support the “queen of the fields” (infantry) and never break. It is not surprising that the most influential powers in the world immediately joined the "tank race".

The dawn of the tank era

The laurels for the creation of the first tank rightfully belong to the British, who designed and successfully used their “Tank. Model 1” in 1916 at the Battle of the Somme, completely demoralizing the enemy infantry. However, there were still decades of painstaking work ahead on armor, rate of fire, cross-country ability, it was necessary to change the weak carburetor engine to a more powerful diesel engine, come up with a rotating turret, solve problems with heat dissipation and the quality of movement and transmission. The world was waiting for tank duels and anti-tank mines, round-the-clock operation of steel mills, crazy projects of multi-towered monsters and, finally, the silhouette of a modern tank, carved in the fire and fury of the wars of the twentieth century, now familiar to anyone.

Calm before the storm

In the 1930s, England, Germany, the USA and Soviet Union, anticipating big war, racing created and improved their tank lines. Design engineers of heavy armored vehicles were poached and bought from each other by hook or by crook. For example, in 1930, the German engineer E. Grote worked at the Bolshevik plant, who created a number of interesting developments that later formed the basis of later models of tanks.

Germany hastily forged the ranks of the Panzerwaffe, the British created the Royal Tank Corps, the USA - the Armored Force. By the beginning of the war, the tank forces of the USSR already had two legendary vehicles that did a lot for victory - the KV-1 and T-34.
By the beginning of World War II, the competition to each other was mainly the USSR and Germany. The Americans also produced an impressive amount of armored vehicles, giving only 80 thousand under lend-lease to the allies, but their vehicles did not gain such fame as the Tigers, Panthers and T-34s. The British, because of the disagreements that existed before the war, in which direction to develop the tank industry, gave up the palm and used mainly American M3 and M5 tanks on the battlefields.

Legendary tanks of World War II

"Tiger" - a heavy German breakthrough tank, was created at the factories of Henschel und Sohn. For the first time he showed himself in a battle near Leningrad in 1942. It weighed 56 tons, was armed with an 88 mm cannon and two machine guns, and was protected by 100 mm armour. Carried five crew members. Could dive under water to 3.5 meters. Among the shortcomings are the complexity of the design, high cost (the production of one "Tiger" cost the treasury, like the cost of two medium tanks "Panther"), incredibly high fuel consumption, problems with undercarriage in winter conditions.

The T-34 was developed at the design bureau of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant under the leadership of Mikhail Koshkin just before the war. It was a manoeuvrable, well-protected tank equipped with a powerful diesel engine and a long-barreled 76mm gun. The reports, however, mentioned problems with optics, visibility, cramped fighting compartment, lack of radios. Due to the lack of space for a full-fledged crew, the commander had to act as a gunner.

M4 Sherman - the main American tank of that period - was produced at the factories of Detroit. Third (after T-34 and T-54) most bulk tank in the world. It has medium armor, is equipped with a 75-millimeter gun, and successfully proved itself in battles against German tanks in Africa. Cheap, easy to use, maintainable. Among the shortcomings: it easily overturns due to the high center of gravity.

"Panther" is a German tank of medium armor, the main competitor of Sherman and T-34 on the battlefields. Armed with a 75 mm tank gun and two machine guns, the thickness of the armor is up to 80 mm. First used in the Battle of Kursk.

The well-known tanks of the Second World War also include the German fast and light T-3, the Soviet heavily armored Joseph Stalin, which performed well in the storming of cities, and the ancestor of the single-turret heavy tanks KV-1 Klim Voroshilov.

Bad start

In 1941, the Soviet tank troops suffered crushing losses, since the German Panzerwaffe, having weaker light-armored T-4 tanks, were significantly superior to the Russians in their tactical skills, in the coherence of the crews and command. T-4, for example, initially had good overview, the presence of a commander's cupola and Zeiss optics, and the T-34 received these improvements only in 1943.

The rapid German strikes were skillfully reinforced by self-propelled guns, anti-tank guns and air raids, which made it possible to inflict massive damage. “It seemed to us that the Russians had created a tool that they would never learn to use,” wrote one of the German generals.

tank winner

After the completion of the T-34-85, with its “survivability”, it could seriously compete even with heavily armored, but clumsy German “Tigers”. Possessing incredible firepower and thick frontal armor, the "Tigers" could not compete with the "thirty-fours" in terms of speed and maneuverability, bogged down and drowned in difficult areas of the landscape. They required tankers and special rail vehicles for transportation. The Panther tank, with its high technical characteristics, like the Tiger, was capricious in operation, was expensive to manufacture.

During the war, the “thirty-four” was finalized, the crew compartment was expanded, equipped with intercoms, and an even more powerful gun was installed. Heavy armor easily withstood a 37mm gun. And most importantly, Soviet tankers mastered the methods of communication and interaction of tank brigades on the battlefield, learned to use the speed, power and maneuverability of the new T-34-85, delivered swift blows to the rear of the enemy, destroying communications and fortifications. The machine began to brilliantly perform the tasks for which it was originally intended. Soviet industry has established a stream production of improved, well-balanced models. It is especially worth noting the simplicity of design and the possibility of quick and cheap repairs, because for a tank it is important not only to effectively carry out combat missions, but also quickly return to service after damage or breakdown.

You can find a model of that time that surpasses the T-34 in terms of individual characteristics, but it is precisely in terms of the combination of performance characteristics that this tank can rightfully be called the best and most effective tank of the Second World War.

Although the first World War was marked by the appearance of tanks, World War II showed the real fury of these mechanical monsters. During the fighting they played important role, both among the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and among the powers of the "axis". Both opposing sides created a significant number of tanks. Listed below are ten outstanding tanks of World War II - the most powerful vehicles given period ever built.


10. M4 Sherman (USA)

The second largest tank of the Second World War. Released in the USA and some others Western countries anti-Hitler coalition mainly due to American program Lend-Lease, which provided military support to the foreign Allied Powers. The Sherman medium tank had a standard 75 mm gun with 90 rounds of ammunition and was equipped with relatively thin frontal (51 mm) armor compared to other vehicles of that period.

Designed in 1941, the tank was named after the famous American Civil War general, William T. Sherman. The machine participated in numerous battles and campaigns from 1942 to 1945. The relative lack of firepower was compensated by their huge numbers: about 50,000 Shermans were produced during the Second World War.

9. Sherman Firefly (UK)



The Sherman Firefly was a British variant of the M4 Sherman tank, which was equipped with a devastating 17-pounder anti-tank gun, more powerful than the original 75 mm Sherman gun. The 17-pounder was destructive enough to damage any known tank of the time. The Sherman Firefly was one of those tanks that terrified the Axis and was characterized as one of the deadliest fighting vehicles of the Second World War. In total, more than 2,000 units were produced.

8. T-IV (Germany)



The PzKpfw IV is one of the most widely used and massive (8,696 units) German tanks during World War II. It was armed with a 75 mm cannon, which could destroy the Soviet T-34 at a distance of 1200 meters.

Initially, these vehicles were used to support infantry, but eventually took on the role of a tank (T-III), and began to be used in battle as the main combat units.

7. T-34 (Soviet Union)



This legendary tank was the most massive during the War and the second most produced of all time (about 84 thousand vehicles). It is also one of the longest running tanks ever made. Until now, many surviving units are found in Asia and Africa.

The popularity of the T-34 is partly due to the sloped 45 mm frontal armor, which was not penetrated by German shells. It was a fast, agile and durable vehicle, causing serious concern to the command of the invading German tank units.

6. T-V "Panther" (Germany)



The PzKpfw V "Panther" is a German medium tank that appeared on the battlefield in 1943 and remained until the end of the war. A total of 6,334 units were created. The tank reached speeds of up to 55 km/h, had strong 80 mm armor and was armed with a 75 mm gun with an ammunition capacity of 79 to 82 high-explosive fragmentation and armor-piercing shells. The T-V was powerful enough to damage any enemy vehicle at the time. It was technically superior to the tanks of the Tiger and T-IV types.

And although later, the T-V "Panther" was surpassed by numerous Soviet T-34s, she remained her serious opponent until the end of the war.

5. "Comet" IA 34 (UK)



One of the most powerful combat vehicles in Great Britain and probably the best that was used by this country in the Second World War. The tank was armed with a powerful 77 mm cannon, which was a shortened version of the 17-pounder. Thick armor reached 101 millimeters. However, the Comet did not have a significant impact on the course of the War due to its late introduction to the battlefields - around 1944, when the Germans were retreating.

But be that as it may, during its short service life, this military machine has shown its effectiveness and reliability.

4. "Tiger I" (Germany)



"Tiger I" - German heavy tank developed in 1942. It had a powerful 88-mm gun with 92-120 rounds of ammunition. It was successfully used against both air and ground targets. The full German name for this beast is Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E, the Allies simply called this car "Tiger".

It accelerated to 38 km / h and had armor without a slope with a thickness of 25 to 125 mm. When it was created in 1942, it suffered from some technical problems, but was soon freed from them, turning into a ruthless mechanical hunter by 1943.

The Tiger was a formidable vehicle, which forced the Allies to develop better tanks. It symbolized the strength and power of the Nazi war machine, and until the middle of the war, not a single Allied tank had sufficient strength and power to withstand the Tiger in a direct collision. However, during the final stages of World War II, the Tiger's dominance was often challenged by better-armed Sherman Fireflies and Soviet IS-2 tanks.

3. IS-2 "Joseph Stalin" (Soviet Union)



The IS-2 tank belonged to a whole family of heavy tanks of the Joseph Stalin type. It had characteristic sloped armor 120 mm thick and a large 122 mm gun. The frontal armor was impenetrable to German 88 mm anti-tank guns at a distance of more than 1 kilometer. Its production began in 1944; a total of 2,252 tanks of the IS family were built, of which about half were modifications of the IS-2.

During the Battle of Berlin, IS-2 tanks destroyed entire German buildings using high-explosive fragmentation shells. It was a real ram of the Red Army when moving towards the heart of Berlin.

2. M26 "Pershing" (USA)



The United States created a heavy tank, which belatedly took part in World War II. It was developed in 1944 total produced tanks amounted to 2,212 units. Pershing was more complex model compared to the Sherman, it had a lower profile and larger tracks, which provided the car with better stability.

The main gun had a caliber of 90 millimeters (70 shells were attached to it), powerful enough to penetrate the armor of the Tiger. "Pershing" had the strength and power for a frontal attack of those machines that could be used by the Germans or the Japanese. But only 20 tanks took part in the fighting in Europe and very few were sent to Okinawa. After the end of World War II, the Pershings took part in Korean War and continued to be used in the American troops. The M26 Pershing could have been a game changer had it been thrown onto the battlefield earlier.

1. "Jagdpanther" (Germany)



The Jagdpanther is one of the most powerful tank destroyers in World War II. It was based on the Panther chassis, entered service in 1943, and served until 1945. It was armed with an 88 mm cannon with 57 rounds and had 100 mm frontal armor. The gun retained accuracy at a distance of up to three kilometers and had a muzzle velocity of over 1000 m/s.

Only 415 tanks were built during the war. The Jagdpanthers went through their baptism of fire on July 30, 1944 near Saint Martin Des Bois, France, where they destroyed eleven Churchill tanks in two minutes. Technical superiority and advanced firepower had little effect on the course of the war due to the late introduction of these monsters.

It is difficult to say something new about such a celebrity as the legendary Soviet T-34 tank! This article may be purely subjective and does not claim to be the ultimate truth. But still, I would like to look at the T-34 with an impartial look. With a glance of dry numbers. Without unnecessary praises and emotions.

The T-34 tank was changed during the war, improved, and by 1945 was not at all the same as in 1941. And the T-34 of 1941 have significant differences from the T-34 of 1945. Therefore, when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the Soviet T-34 tank, it must be recalled that in most feature films about the war, we come across the T-34-85 tank, which began to be mass-produced only in 1944. But after all, the T-34-76 tank took on the brunt of the fierce battles, including the Battle of Kursk! And it is about him that we should tell in more detail. It was this tank that made the enemy doubt its superiority for the first time! And it was he who started the legend! Soviet tank T-34-76!

Those who grew up in the USSR and were brought up on Soviet films about the war, books of that period, know that the best tank of the Second World War is our legendary "thirty-four". This fact is recognized by most of the countries that took part in that war. But what about enemy tanks? For example, the German T-4 tank? Was it worse than the T-34? In what and how much?

Let's take the liberty of looking at the T-34 without looking back at the established opinion and simply compare the Soviet car with the closest German vehicle in terms of technical data, the T-4 tank.

But before considering the technique, we will have to talk about other things to explain the uneven loss of tanks by the warring parties. And also to recall that a tank is a collective weapon and the success of using a tank is made up of several factors, such as:

  • 1- application tactics;
  • 2- interaction of tanks on the battlefield;
  • 3- skill of the crew;
  • 4- reliability of technology;
  • 5 - the effectiveness of weapons and protection.

The losses of Soviet tanks in 1941 are astonishing. And if the losses of numerous T-26s or BT-7s can be attributed to their "obsolescence", which, looking at the German tanks of the 1941 model, seems very doubtful, then the losses of the "invulnerable" T-34s and KVs in 1941 defy reasonable explanation. After all, the number of these vehicles alone (more than 1800) made it possible to resist absolutely all German invasion tanks! Why did all the new cars melt in the crucible of war with incredible speed? Why did the armada of formidable steel monsters fall under the onslaught of seemingly frivolous German boxes T-3, T-4? Obviously at the initial stage of the war it was application tactics tank forces and was the decisive factor. Therefore, to correlate the losses of tanks by the parties and draw some far-reaching conclusions about combat capacity machines on the basis of losses alone is unlikely to be reasonable.

The massing by the Germans of a large number of tanks in the main directions reduced the advantage of the new Soviet combat vehicles to nothing. Not having a tank comparable to the T-34 in terms of firepower and tank protection in 1941 (and at the beginning of the war, the T-34 had a serious advantage over any enemy tank in the range of fire combat, allowing it to hit German tanks at a distance of up to 1000 meters, remaining invulnerable to them up to distance of no more than 300 meters), nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases, the Germans came out victorious.

The tactics of using tank forces led the Germans to impressive victories. Rapid raids by a large mass of tanks deep into the Soviet defenses led to chaos and confusion in the command and control of the Red Army. Concentrated strikes easily broke into the defenses of the Soviet troops. The maneuver, the unexpected change of directions of strikes at the beginning of the war, led the Germans to victories, despite the fact that their tanks in 1941 neither quantitatively nor qualitatively had any advantages over the tanks of the Red Army. By changing the direction of the main attack from the Moscow direction to Kiev, Guderian's tanks organized the "Kiev cauldron" in which the Red Army lost more than 600 thousand people alone as prisoners! The history of wars does not know such a number of prisoners in one operation! Recall that the Wehrmacht had in 1941 mostly light tanks! And the future main rival of the T-34, the T-4 tank, still had thin armor and a short-barreled gun that was not powerful enough to fight the T-34.

It can be added that the success of the German offensive was also facilitated by the fact that the German shock tank forces were always supported by artillerymen (self-propelled guns are also artillery) and the fight against enemy tanks often fell on them. And after the very first clashes with the Soviet T-34 and KB tanks, an 88-mm battery was mandatory included in the combat groups of tank divisions anti-aircraft guns. The assistance of artillery and air defense systems with the advancing tanks was a significant help in countering the new Soviet tanks. In addition, the close interaction of mobile tank formations with air force"Luftwaffe".

The counterattacks of the mechanized corps, hastily organized by the Soviet command, without interaction among themselves, led and eventually led to the loss of most of their armored vehicles in the first weeks of the war, among which were brand new "thirty-fours". Moreover, the bulk of the lost tanks were simply abandoned by the crews due to lack of fuel, breakdowns and lack of means of evacuation. And the forced tactics of “patching holes” with single tanks or small groups, used in 1941 by the Red Army, rather led to an increase in the loss of their equipment, and not to some kind of military success or victory.

The German general von Mellenthin, describing that period, noted in particular:

".... Russian tank armies had to pay dearly for the lack of combat experience. Especially poor understanding of the methods of conducting tank battles and insufficient skill were shown by junior and middle commanders. They lacked courage, tactical foresight, and the ability to make quick decisions. The first operations of tank armies ended tanks were concentrated in dense masses in front of the front of the German defense, in their movement one felt uncertainty and lack of any plan.They interfered with each other, collided with our anti-tank guns, and in the event of a breakthrough of our positions, they stopped advancing and stopped, instead of developing success. During these days, individual German anti-tank guns and 88-mm guns operated most effectively: sometimes one gun damaged and disabled over 30 tanks in one hour. It seemed to us that the Russians had created a tool that they would never learn to use ... "

We have to admit that the Western Military District, having a considerable number of T-34 tanks, simply lost them. And the T-34, being at that time really the most powerful tank, did not say its weighty word in 1941.

If we talk about the tactics of using the tank for more than later dates war, we must take into account the changing concept of the use of the tank. So by 1943, most German tanks were used precisely as "anti-tanks", i.e. designed to fight enemy tanks. Not having a numerical superiority, but having long-range guns and good sights, the German Panzerwaffe inflicted heavy damage on the advancing tanks of the Red Army. And even the massive use of Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk (and these were mainly T-34s) did not bring the expected success. The German tactics of destroying advancing Soviet tanks by firing from a spot and from ambushes fully justified itself. The 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov lost more than half of its vehicles during the day of fighting in the Prokhorovka area. And it was lost precisely from the fire of tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy. The Germans did not suffer tangible losses of their tanks.

Thus, using inappropriate tactics at certain stages of the war, the effectiveness of the use of the T-34 tank was low, incomparable with the losses, resources expended and successes gained. And often it was the choice of the wrong battle tactics that led to the unjustified loss of tanks, and it is obvious that a large number of lost T-34s can be attributed not to the shortcomings of the vehicle itself, but to the illiterate use of tank forces by the commanders of the Red Army.

Only in the later stages of the war, the changed tactics of the Soviet tank armies, when it was the tank's mobility that began to be fully used, did the T-34 turn into a real nightmare for German soldiers. The ubiquitous "thirty-fours" penetrated into the depths of the defense, destroyed the rear and communications of the enemy. In general, they did what the tank was intended for.

Therefore, without even touching on the actual technical characteristics of the tank itself, it must be admitted that the method of its use on the battlefield determines and explains both the successes and the increased losses of combat vehicles.

Another important component of the success of the tank in battle is their interaction on the battlefield. Without a stable and reliable connection between individual combat vehicles, it is unrealistic to achieve interaction. Since neither the commander observing from the side nor a comrade from a neighboring tank can warn of the danger that has arisen. Not to mention changing the combat mission during the battle or coordinating the efforts of a group of tanks to complete a specific task.

By the beginning of the war, most German tanks were radio-equipped to one degree or another. And most of them had transceivers, i.e. two-way communication. Soviet vehicles, including new types like the T-34, either had receivers (the transmitter was only on command tank, it stood out from other tanks by the presence of an antenna) or did not have radio communications at all. Therefore, usually in battle, each tank fought on its own or acted according to the naval principle "do as I do" by repeating the maneuver of the commander's tank. Of course, communication between tanks using signal flags should not be taken seriously. It is simply unrealistic to observe the flags from a tank, which already has poor visibility, during the battle. Things with communications seriously improved only in 1943, when fairly modern 9P radio stations and TPU-3bis intercoms began to be installed on 100% of tanks.

The lack of full-fledged communication between Soviet vehicles contributed to increased losses and a decrease in the effectiveness of the use of the tank itself. The Soviet military industry, having created an impressive number of armored vehicles, unfortunately, was not able to fully provide them with communications equipment, which had a very negative impact on the effectiveness of their use in the initial period of the war.

For 1941, the T-34 tank was really new. Conceptually new, because it had anti-shell armor and a powerful long-barreled 76mm cannon, which hit all Wehrmacht tanks without exception. There was nothing similar in the German "Panzerwaffe" of that period, neither in terms of the thickness of the armor, nor in terms of armament. After all, after the First World War, tanks were called upon to replace the cavalry, its mobility. And the bulletproof armor of tanks was the norm! Therefore, the first meetings with the T-34, which has anti-shell armor, made an indelible and depressing impression on the Germans.

Here is how one of the best German tank aces Otto Carius wrote about this in his book "Tigers in the Mud":

“Another event hit us like a ton of bricks: Russian T-34 tanks appeared for the first time! The astonishment was complete. How could it happen that up there, they did not know about the existence of this excellent tank? "T-34" with its good armor, perfect shape and a magnificent 76.2-mm long-barreled gun, everyone was in awe, and all German tanks were afraid of him until the end of the war. What were we to do with these monsters thrown against us in multitudes? At that time, the 37 mm gun was still our strongest anti-tank weapon. With luck, we could hit the shoulder strap of the T-34 turret and jam it. With even more luck, the tank will not be able to act effectively in battle after that. Certainly not a very encouraging situation! The only way out was 88 mm anti-aircraft gun. With its help, it was possible to operate effectively even against this new Russian tank. Therefore, we began to treat anti-aircraft gunners with the highest respect, who until then had received only condescending smiles from us.

And here is an excerpt from Paul Karel's book "Hitler Goes East":

“But the most formidable enemy was the Soviet T-34, an armored giant 5.92 m long, 3 m wide and 2.44 m high, possessing high speed and maneuverability. It weighed 26 tons, was armed with a 76 mm cannon, had a large turret, wide tracks and sloping armor. It was not far from the Styr River that the rifle brigade of the 16th Panzer Division encountered him for the first time. The anti-tank unit of the 16th Panzer Division quickly moved its 37-mm anti-tank guns into position. On the enemy tank! Range 100 meters. The Russian tank continued to approach. Fire! Hit. Another and another failure. The servants continued the countdown: the 21st, 22nd, 23rd 37-mm projectile hit the armor of the steel colossus, bouncing off it like peas off the wall. The gunners swore loudly. Their commander turned white with exertion. The distance was reduced to 20 meters. “Aim for the tower support,” ordered the lieutenant. Finally they got him. The tank turned around and began to roll away. The ball bearing of the turret was hit, the turret jammed, but otherwise the tank remained intact. The anti-tank gun crew breathed a sigh of relief. - Did you see that? the gunners asked one another. From that moment on, the T-34 became a bogey for them, and the 37-mm gun, which had proven itself so well in previous campaigns, received the contemptuous nickname "army door knocker".

Commenting on this passage, one can pay attention to the fact that the T-34, having received so many hits, did not respond even once. This indicates either that the tank commander did not manage to find the German cannon, or did not have shells and cartridges for the machine gun at all.

Thus, the T-34 tank was a tough nut to crack in 1941.

But, as you know, it is not the tank itself that fights, but its crew. And from his training, degree crew professionalism the effectiveness of the tank in battle also directly depends. And although by that time quite a few T-34s had already been produced, about 1200 pieces, and there were already 832 of them in the western military districts, there were not enough trained crews for the T-34. By the beginning of the war, no more than 150 crews for T-34 tanks were trained. Trying to preserve the resource, the T-34 tanks were mothballed, and the crews were trained on the BT-7 or even on the outdated T-26. Naturally, it was not possible to learn in a short time, and even more so in combat conditions, on a new car. But only from the driver, according to the memoirs of front-line tankers, a lot depended. And if we recall the high losses of the T-34, then a considerable percentage of lost tanks obviously fall on the inept actions of the crew.

Insufficient training of the T-34 crews in the initial period of the war (and later, due to high losses, the crews changed frequently, and there was not enough time for training tankers) led to the low efficiency of this formidable machine. Although those crews who mastered the vehicle well, and also applied the necessary tactics of warfare, achieved impressive results. Lieutenant D.F. Lavrinenko participated in 28 battles, he himself lost three T-34 tanks during these battles and on the day of his death, December 17, 1941, knocked out the 52nd tank of the enemy, becoming the most productive Soviet tanker during the Second World War .

Speaking about the enemy tankers, it should be noted that the German crews were well trained. In memories Soviet tankers this fact has been repeatedly noted. The crews of German vehicles were well soldered and even after being wounded they returned from the hospital to their native unit to their tank. In general, having produced tanks and self-propelled guns five times less than their main allies, Germany was able to create such tank troops that throughout all the years of the war, right up to its last days, were able to deliver powerful blows.

Turning to the technical side of the T-34, first of all, it is necessary to note such a drawback as the absence of a third crew member in the tank's turret and the absence of a commander's cupola. Due to the tightness of the tower, inherited from the BT tank, the commander had to act as a gunner, since there was no place for the latter. Because of this, observation of the battlefield was interrupted for the time of aiming, and it took more time to detect a new target. And this despite the fact that visibility from the T-34 was already unimportant.

In the memoirs of German tankers, this shortcoming of the T-34 is mentioned quite often, and what it leads to on the battlefield can be understood from the memoirs of R. Ribbentrop (the son of that same German minister Ribbentrop) who fought on the T-4 near Prokhorovka:

“... we noticed the first Russian T-34s. They seemed to be trying to get around us on the left. We stopped and opened fire, knocking out several enemy vehicles. Several Russian tanks were left to burn out. For a good gunner, a distance of 800 meters was ideal. As we waited for more tanks to appear, I looked around out of habit. What I saw left me speechless. Fifteen, then thirty, then forty tanks appeared from behind a low hillock 150-200 meters wide. Finally I lost count.
T-34s were moving towards us at high speed with armored infantrymen. My driver-mechanic Schüle reported on the intercom: “Commander, on the right! On right! Do you see them?" I saw them very well. At this moment, the thought flashed: “Now, the lid!”. It seemed to the driver that I said: "Leave the tank!", and he began to open the hatch. I grabbed him rather roughly and dragged him back into the tank. At the same time, I poked the gunner with my foot in the right side - this was a signal to turn the tower to the right. Soon the first shell went to the target, and after hitting the T-34 flared up. He was only 50-70 meters away from us. At the same moment, the tank next to mine was hit and caught fire. I saw Unter-Scharführer Parke leave the car, but we never saw him again. His neighbor on the right was also shot down and was soon engulfed in flames as well. An avalanche of enemy tanks rolled straight at us. Tank after tank! Wave after wave!

Such a number of them was simply incredible, and they all moved at high speed. We didn't have time to take a defensive position. All we could do was shoot. From this distance, every shot hit the target. When are we destined to get a direct hit? Somewhere in my subconscious, I realized that there was no chance of salvation. As always in such situations, we could only take care of the most urgent. And so we knocked out the third, then the fourth T-34 from distances of less than thirty meters. In our PzIVs, the loader had about 18-20 shells at hand, of which most were high-explosive fragmentation and only a part were armor-piercing. Soon my loader shouted: “Armor-piercing ran out!” All our ammunition, ready for immediate use, was used up.

Further, the shells were to be fed to the loader by the gunner, radio operator and driver. To remain motionless at that moment would surely mean being discovered and destroyed by Russian tanks. The only hope for us is to get over the ridge, although the Russians have overcome it. There our chances of salvation were higher than here, where we were in full view.

We turned around in the middle of the mass of Russian tanks and drove back about fifty meters, on the reverse slope of the first ridge. Here, having found ourselves in a slightly more reliable shelter, we again turned around to face the enemy tanks. And at that moment, a T-34 stopped thirty miles to our right. I saw the tank swing slightly on the suspension and turn the turret in our direction. I looked straight into the barrel of his gun. We could not fire immediately, because the gunner had just handed over a new projectile to the loader. “Press! Let's!" I shouted into the microphone. My driver Schüle was the best in the battalion. He immediately switched on the gear, and the clumsy one moved off. We passed the T-34 in some five meters. The Russian tried to deploy the tower behind us, but he failed. We stopped ten meters behind a stationary T-34 and turned around. My gunner hit the turret of a Russian tank directly. The T-34 exploded, and its turret flew three meters into the air, almost hitting the barrel of my gun. All this time, new T-34s with landing troops on armor were rushing around us one after another. In the meantime, I tried to drag inside the flag with a swastika, fixed on top in the chrome part of the tank. The flag was needed so that our pilots could see where we were. I was only halfway done, and now the flag was fluttering in the wind. One of the Russian commanders or gunners, sooner or later, should have paid attention to him. A fatal hit was only a matter of time for us.

We had only one chance: we had to keep moving. A stationary tank was immediately recognized by the enemy as an enemy tank, since all Russian tanks were moving at high speed. On top of that, our own tanks, dispersed along a wide front below, along the anti-tank ditch at the railway embankment, could still knock us out. They opened fire on the advancing enemy tanks. On the battlefield shrouded in smoke and dust, stroking against the sun, our tank could not be distinguished from the Russians. I constantly broadcast our call sign: “Attention everyone! It's Kunibert! We are in the middle of Russian tanks! Don't shoot at us!" There was no answer. In the meantime, the Russians set fire to several vehicles, passing through Peiper's battalion and our artillery battalion. But by this time the fire of our two remaining tank companies had already begun to show. A division of self-propelled guns and Peiper's motorized infantry (the latter with melee weapons) also inflicted damage on tanks and pressed Russian infantrymen who jumped from the T-34 and tried to advance on foot to the ground. A thick veil of smoke and dust hung over the battlefield.

More and more groups of Russian tanks continued to roll out of this hell. On a wide slope they were shot by our tanks. The whole field was a hodgepodge of broken tanks and vehicles. Without a doubt, we partly owe our salvation to this very circumstance - the Russians did not notice us. Suddenly, ahead of me, I saw a dense, dense mass of Russian infantry and ordered the driver: “Turn a little to the left!” A few seconds later, he noticed them too. Firing with the tribesmen, we ran into a mass of infantry from the rear. They did not even realize that a German tank was catching up with them.

Our salvation lay in moving to the left, in the direction of the road. There we were supposed to meet our infantry and break away from the Russian tanks. Meanwhile, the rest of the crew - the driver, radio operator and gunner - collected armor-piercing shells throughout the tank. As soon as such a projectile was located, we immediately knocked out another one of the T-34s, which caught up with us after we stopped. Incredibly, we still haven't been shot at. All experts are sure that this happened due to the lack of a separate tank commander among the Russians - the tanks were commanded by gunners who could only look in the direction where their gun was deployed. If not for this, we were doomed.

To our displeasure, the Russians also moved to the left towards the road to cross the anti-tank ditch there. We never understood why the Russians directed their attack through an area blocked by an anti-tank ditch, the existence of which they certainly knew. Because of this obstacle, they must have inevitably lost momentum in the offensive, having covered only a kilometer. Therefore, the Russians turned left to go to the road and cross the ditch on the bridge. However, an incredible scene played out there. At the repaired bridge across the anti-tank ditch, the advancing enemy was met by the fire of our tank and anti-tank guns. I managed to hide my tank behind a destroyed T-34. From there we entered into battle with enemy tanks. They were moving towards the bridge from all directions. So it was even easier for our battalion and for us to choose targets. Burning T-34s collided with each other. Everywhere there were fire and smoke, shells and explosions. T-34s were on fire, and earlier they tried to crawl to the side. Soon the entire slope was littered with burning enemy tanks. We stopped behind the smoking carcass of an enemy vehicle. And then I heard the voice of my loader: “There are no more armor-piercing!” We have used up the entire ammunition load of armor-piercing shells. Now we were left with only high-explosive fragmentation shells, useless against well-armored T-34s.

Now we are engaged in the destruction of the Soviet infantry. This was not easy, as the Russian infantry got to our positions, and we could accidentally hit one of our own self-propelled guns or an armored personnel carrier from Peiper's battalion. At first I didn't shoot. Then I heard the gunner scream. He groaned, “My eye! My eye!" A stray shell hit the turret precisely in a small hole for the gunner's sight. The shell did not penetrate the armor, but nevertheless entered deep enough to drive the sight inside with terrible force. My gunner, who was looking through the scope at that moment, was seriously wounded in the head. Our tank could no longer fight. I decided to withdraw from the battle and cross the bridge over the anti-tank ditch to go to the rear. There I could try to collect those tankers who managed to get out of this chaos…….. …The losses of my company turned out to be surprisingly low. Only those two vehicles were completely lost, the death of which I saw at the very beginning of the battle. In the other two companies completely lost cars did not have. The artillery battalion and Peiper's battalion also managed to get by with minimal losses ... ... In our defense zone there were more than a hundred wrecked Russian tanks. (Of these, 14 fell on the share of the crew of von Ribbentrop) ... ".

The above rather lengthy excerpt from the memoirs of a German officer shows how the presence of a commander's turret on the T-4 and its absence on the T-34, coupled with the absence of a third crew member in the tank's turret, allowed the German tank to emerge victorious from a seemingly hopeless situation for it. . The German tank remained undiscovered by our tankers, although it was in the thick of the Soviet tanks. You can add to this that many German tank commanders leaned out of the hatch during the battle to look around, and this despite the presence of a commander's cupola and more advanced observation devices!

Comparison of the T-4 and T-34 turrets clearly indicates the advantage of the German tank. The spacious T-4 turret accommodated three crew members. In the rear part of the roof of the tower there was a commander's cupola with five viewing slots with triplex glass. From the outside, the viewing slots were closed with sliding armored shutters, and the hatch in the roof of the turret, designed for the entry and exit of the tank commander, was a double-leaf lid (later a single-leaf). The turret had a dial-hour type device for determining the location of the target. The second such device was at the disposal of the gunner and, having received an order, he could quickly turn the turret on the target. At the driver's seat there was a turret position indicator with two lights (except for Ausf.J tanks), thanks to which he knew what position the turret and gun were in (this is especially important when driving along wooded area and settlements).

The commander was minding his own business - inspecting the battlefield, looking for a target, the gunner turned the turret and fired a shot. Due to this, both the rate of fire and the efficiency of the T-4 turned out to be higher than that of the T-34. The working conditions of the crew are also not in favor of the Soviet tank.

Insufficient visibility in general is one of the significant shortcomings of the T-34. From the above quote, we have seen what good visibility means. Good visibility is the key to victory. I saw it earlier - you can hit the target before the enemy. If we compare that of the T-34 and the German T-4, then the advantages of the German tank are obvious. The presence of a commander's turret (it appeared on the T-34 in the summer of 1943) with all-round visibility and high-quality Zeiss optics (the high quality of which could not be compared with the T-34 observation devices), a spacious turret and the presence of a full-fledged tank commander give of this category, the German T-4 has an unconditional advantage.

In the test report of the T-34 at the end of 1940, such shortcomings of the tank were noted “... the lack of visual communication between tanks when solving a fire mission, due to the fact that the only device that allows all-round visibility - the PT-6, is used only for aiming ... Turning the turret in any direction is possible only if the head deviates from the forehead of the PT- 6, that is, the rotation of the tower is actually done blindly ... " The same report on the surround view device concludes that design flaws "make the viewing device unusable." The side viewing devices of the T-34 had a significant dead space and a small viewing angle. In addition, it was impossible to clear them without leaving the tank. Here's more from the report “..All sighting devices PT-6, TOD-6 installed on the tank and observation devices in the fighting compartment and control compartment are not protected from precipitation, road dust and dirt. In each individual case of loss of visibility, the instruments can only be cleaned from the outside of the tank. In conditions of reduced visibility (fog), the head of the PT-6 sight fogs up in 4-5 minutes until the visibility is completely lost .. "

The visibility from the T-34 driver's seat was no better. Polished steel prisms, later replaced by Plexiglas prisms, gave a distorted muddy picture. In addition, the surveillance devices quickly got dirty from the outside and it was not possible to wipe them without leaving the car. Outside, the driver’s observation devices were protected from dirt by special “cilia”, lowering one of which for some time managed to keep the observation devices clean. In general, visibility through the instruments was clearly insufficient, and most of the T-34 drivers opened the hatch “on the palm” to improve visibility. There was no visibility from the radio operator’s gunner’s seat at all, so he was mostly inactive in combat or helped the driver shift gears. Shooting from a machine gun mounted in a ball mount could, in fact, only at random, so neither the review nor the firing sector contributed to aimed shooting. In general, in the memoirs of our tankers, one rarely hears a mention of machine gun fire, which cannot be said about the memories of German tankers. The Germans used the machine gun quite intensively, not to mention the fact that sometimes the commander opened the hatch and fired from a machine gun or scattered grenades. Obviously, in terms of visibility, the T-34 was inferior to the German tank.

Generally speaking about the technical side of the T-34, one cannot fail to note the many shortcomings of this tank. From layout to technical. Suppose the lack of barrel purging after a shot and insufficient ventilation of the fighting compartment led, after several shots, to filling the tower with powder gases, from which the loader sometimes lost consciousness.

Even the T-34 did not have a rotating pole and the loader, when turning the turret, was forced to mince his feet on the ammunition rack. And this must be recognized as a significant drawback that affects the rate of fire of the tank and the convenience of the loader.

Mobility. The T-34 had a fairly reliable diesel engine in the future. There would be no particular complaints about him, but everything was spoiled by the problem with the build quality, due to the low production culture. The failure rate was high. For example, poor quality air filters significantly reduced engine life. In the autumn of 1942, the T-34 and KB-1 tanks were sent to the USA for study. Their tests across the ocean began on November 29 and lasted exactly one year. As a result, the engine of the T-34 failed after 72.5 hours, and that of the KB-1 after 66.4 hours. The T-34 traveled only 665 km. The engine worked under load for 58.45 hours, without load - 14.05 hours. There were 14 breakdowns in total. In conclusion, based on the test results, it was noted that the air cleaner is completely unsuitable for this engine, practically does not retain dust, but, on the contrary, accelerates wear and reduces reliability. The problem with the reliability of the engine was to some extent resolved by the end of the war with the advent of the T-34-85.

It didn't matter what happened with the transmission. The gearbox at first did not have synchronizers and was so tight when changing gears that it was often necessary to use a sledgehammer to shift gears, which was constantly at hand by the driver mechanic. Or resort to the help of a gunner-radio operator. Sometimes in combat, gears were not switched at all, but they picked up speed by increasing engine speed.

After joint testing of domestic, captured and Lend-Lease equipment in 1942, this gearbox earned the following rating from the NIBTPolygon officers:

“The gearboxes of domestic tanks, especially the T-34 and KB, do not fully meet the requirements for modern combat vehicles, being inferior to the gearboxes of both allied and enemy tanks, and are at least several years behind the development of tank building technology ". The modernized gearbox will be installed on the T-34 in the spring of 1943, which will greatly facilitate the work of the driver, who, on long marches in the "struggle" with the transmission, was exhausted like a weightlifter in training in the gym.

The main clutch also created its share of problems. Due to rapid wear, as well as due to an unsuccessful design, it almost never turned off completely, it "led", and it was difficult to shift gears in such conditions. When the main clutch was not switched off, only very experienced driver-mechanics could “stick” the desired gear. During 1943, the main clutch was also modernized.

The maneuverability of the tank is significantly affected by the ratio of the length of the supporting surface to the track width - L / B. For the T-34, it was 1.5 and was close to optimal. For medium German tanks, it was less: for the T-3 - 1.2, for the T-4 - 1.43. This means that their agility was better (in parentheses, we note that the Tiger had a better indicator, as for the Panther, its L / B ratio was the same as that of the T-34).

To top it off, we can cite the words of P.A. Rotmistrov, commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, from a letter to G.K. Zhukov in August 1943:

"... We have to state with bitterness that our tank equipment, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not give anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that took place on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), the extremely slow and uneven rotation of the tower, exceptionally poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation, are not completely eliminated today ... ".

The German T-4 (and other German tanks) had a gasoline engine. For a long time it was considered a disadvantage. In fact, it did not cause any particular inconvenience. Moreover, the engineers of the NIIBT test site in Kubinka in 1943 came to a conclusion that was directly opposite to the everyday assessment of the possibility of ignition various kinds fuel:

“The use by the Germans of a carburetor engine rather than a diesel engine on a new tank, released in 1942, can be explained by: […] a very significant percentage of tank fires with diesel engines in combat conditions and their lack of significant advantages over carburetor engines in this regard, especially with the competent design of the latter and the availability of reliable automatic fire extinguishers ".

The T-4 engines were generally reliable and did not bring much trouble. Moreover, for some time gasoline engines were installed on tanks in the post-war period. As for the reasoning about the high fire hazard or explosiveness of gasoline vapors, then, as shown fighting, diesel fuel vapors explode and burn no worse under the influence high temperatures arising when a projectile hits, 70% of the lost T-34s burned down.

Although the T-4 was 7 tons lighter than the Soviet tank, it lacked the power of its 250 horsepower engine for effective maneuvering. In addition, although quite reliable, but a stiff suspension could shake the soul out of tankers, especially on high speed. Obviously, the T-4 was not suitable for rapid raids behind enemy lines. Here the advantage of the Soviet tank. Due to the high draft, wide tracks, powerful diesel engine, the T-34 had both greater speed and better maneuverability. It was speed and maneuver in the hands of an experienced mechanic-driver that became the trump card of the T-34 on the battlefield. By constantly and skillfully maneuvering, experienced crews managed to avoid direct hits from enemy shells.

Due to the high mobility of the T-34, our tank armies, during the offensive in 1944, performed rather complex maneuvers in operational depth, while avoiding collisions with enemy counterattack groups in unfavorable conditions for themselves, forestalling enemy reserves in occupying pre-prepared intermediate defensive lines or changing the direction of the strike in the event of a collision with strong knots of resistance.

It can be said that the operational-tactical mobility of the T-34 tanks during this period became the most important type of their protection.

For example, during the Vistula-Oder operation, the tank armies of the 1st Belorussian Front overcame 11 (!) Well-prepared intermediate defensive lines and fortified areas in the operational depth of the enemy defense.

The powerful diesel engine and wide tracks of the T-34 provided it with superior mobility and maneuverability over the T-4, and over the rest of the German tanks.

He also surpassed them in speed, perhaps second only to the T-3 in this, but this is subject to movement on a good highway. Of course, the imperfection of the transmission in the initial period of the war often offset this dignity.

One of the most important advantages of the T-34 over almost all Wehrmacht tanks was its low fuel consumption compared to its main opponents. Actually, it turned out to be low precisely due to its use as power plant diesel engine. The fuel consumption of the T-34, depending on the driving conditions, was 1.5-2 times less than that of the German T-4. As a result, the T-34 had a one and a half times greater range at one gas station, 300 km versus 200 km for the T-4.

Armament T-34 for the initial period of the war was quite sufficient. The F-34 gun mounted on the T-34 tank (about 450 T-34 tanks were initially armed with the L-11 gun, but because of its complexity and high cost, the F-34 gun was preferred) at a distance of up to 1500m was guaranteed to hit the armor of everyone without exception German tanks 1941-1942, including the T-4. By itself, the 76.2 mm Grabin tank gun was not only powerful enough, but also cheap and technologically advanced. There can be no complaints about this gun, it did its job and did it well.

As for the effectiveness of the T-34-76 gun against the armor of such tanks as the Tiger or Panther, of course, the F-34 gun was weak, because the effective fire range was reduced to 200 meters and that did not guarantee a reliable defeat of the enemy tank. And this despite the fact that the guns of these German tanks could easily hit the T-34 at a much longer distance. It was difficult for such a "thirty-four" to fight these German cars.

Only after the appearance of the modernized T-34-85 in 1944, our tank finally pushed the boundaries of effective fire combat. Although the T-34-85, like the T-34-76, still remained vulnerable to German guns, but now it could inflict damage on its own, and even the Tiger's armor was no longer an insurmountable obstacle for it! The 85mm gun of the updated T-34 came in handy in the later stages of the war, because it had good armor penetration. Up to the point that it pierced the armor of the "Tiger" right through! This added confidence to the Soviet tankers in battle and faith in their car.

And what about the Germans? The Germans were looking for ways to solve the problem in the face of the T-34, a monster that suddenly appeared for them. And already in the spring of 1942, the T-4 received a very decent 75-mm long-barreled gun! This gun reliably hit the T-34 at a distance of 1000 m! This gave the German tank an advantage in direct confrontation at long range. Moreover, at german cannon turned out to be higher and the rate of fire! And at least twice! If the F-34 gun had a rate of fire 4-8 rounds per minute (real rate of fire did not exceed 5 rounds per minute, due to the peculiarities of the ammunition rack), then the German PaK 40(tank version was designated KwK 40) issued 12-14 shots per minute. In addition, the armor penetration of the German gun also turned out to be higher - from a range of 500 m at a projectile encounter angle of 90 degrees, it pierced 135 mm(96-120 mm tank version) armor, against 70-78 mm at the Russian cannon. But even from one and a half kilometers the German 7.5-cm tank gun KwK 40(L/48) could penetrate armor 77 mm, A pak40 mounted on anti-tank self-propelled guns - 98mm from a distance even more 1800m!

In general, the armament of the German T-4 tank from 1942 until the advent of the T-34-85 was more effective (at least for fighting tanks) than the armament of the Soviet T-34 tank.

It must be recalled that in addition to improved weapons, the T-4 also received improved armor! Here is what was noted after the shelling tests at the training ground "... the thickness of the frontal armor of the T-4 and Armsturm-75 tanks (SAU) is currently 82-85 mm and is virtually invulnerable to the most massive armor-piercing shells of 45 mm and 76 mm caliber in the Red Army ..."

Like it or not, in the confrontation with the T-34, the German vehicle had a significant superiority in armament and in terms of armament, it was actually not inferior even to the T-34-85, given the unchanged armor of the updated Soviet tank.

It must be admitted that the T-34-76, starting from the middle of 1942, had no superiority over the updated T-4, either in armament or in armor! And this situation did not change until 1944, when, largely due to Lend-Lease supplies of machine tools and materials for our tank builders, the situation began to change for the better and the much "killer" T-34-85 entered the scene.

The help of the allies was very helpful. For example, the largest manufacturer of thirty-fours, Nizhny Tagil Plant No. 183, could not switch to the production of T-34-85, since there was nothing to process the ring gear of the tower with a diameter of 1600 mm. Therefore, new vertical lathes were ordered from the UK (Lowdon) and the USA (Lodge). And the 10,253 T-34-85 tanks produced by the Nizhny Tagil "Vagonka" owe allied assistance. As well as improving the quality of the tank itself. An American engineer who visited the Stalingrad Tractor Plant at the end of 1945 discovered that half of the machine park of this enterprise was supplied under Lend-Lease.

Now let's ask ourselves the question posed in the title of the article, was the T-34 tank the best tank of the Second World War? Could a tank with so many different flaws be "the best"? The question is quite interesting and rather complicated. In terms of combat qualities, the T-34 may not have been the “best” tank of the Second World War. All the same, low quality and some design flaws do not give us such confidence in this statement. Driving a tank using tight levers and pedals, observing and shooting accurately, being in a cramped space smoky with powder gases, without communication with the outside world, is a dubious pleasure. All this required great physical and moral stress from the T-34 crews and not a hefty skill and dedication! Incomparable with the comfort and living conditions of the T-4 for German tankers!

In addition, the sloped armor of the T-34, about which there is so much talk, made its way through all the guns of the Wehrmacht, with the exception of the 37-mm anti-tank and 50-mm tank gun in 42 caliber. Tankers bitterly joked about this, paraphrasing a famous song - "Armor is bullshit, but our tanks are fast!" However, the vaunted diesel engine, on which this very “speed” depended, basically did not develop full power and did not work out even half of the already small motor resource, delivering, in alliance with the transmission, numerous troubles for the crew.

And yet this tank is a winner! He came to Berlin! Quantity won over quality. The Soviet military industry managed to produce so many tanks that the Germans did not have enough shells for them. Turning a blind eye to the number of T-34s lost on the battlefields and burnt out crews, we can say that based on the realities of those days, the T-34 tank was really the best. But the best for Soviet generals and Soviet industry. Indeed, in terms of combat qualities, he did not stand out in any way before the T-4, nor before the American Sherman. But its design made it possible to produce tanks at a faster pace and in large quantities. The numbers of "thirty-fours" produced by the world cover the number of German T-4s by an order of magnitude! In total, more than 61 thousand of them were produced, up to and including 1946! And the war period had at least 50 thousand, while all modifications of the T-4, before the end of the war, were assembled 8696 pieces, which is almost half the number of "thirty-fours" issued in 1943 alone ( 15821 pieces)! And it is this criterion that must probably be recognized as decisive.

The T-34 tank itself was quite simple. Easy not only to manufacture, but also to service. Didn't require much skill service personnel. It was very repairable. After all, from breakdowns and malfunctions at the beginning of the war, it failed more tanks than from the influence of the enemy. Only with the advent of the T-34-85 did the quality of the tank somehow improve. Apparently, it is precisely in the extreme simplicity of the design that the popularity of this combat vehicle lies with both tankers and production workers.

Summarizing the above, we must admit that the legendary Soviet tank T-34, with all its shortcomings, turned out to be the most suitable in all respects for the Soviet army, Soviet industry, Soviet realities, as well as for the Russian mentality. Soviet designers managed to create such a lifesaver, which, in terms of the combination of characteristics, as well as the manufacturability of production, turned out to be the most suitable for that period and that reality for our Motherland. In difficult wartime conditions, devastation and other hardships, the production of T-34 tanks only increased. The troops received the tank in increasing numbers and a positive result was achieved! This tank brought victory and glory to the Soviet army. And his fame is well deserved! As well as glory to its creators and millions Soviet people who created it for their country! And we quite reasonably call it the best tank in that war!

It was a Russian tank, for the Russian army and Russian industry, most adapted to our conditions of production and operation. And only Russians could fight on it! No wonder it is said: "What is good for a Russian is death for a German."