The Soviet-Finnish war and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through the minefields, in tight ranks and holding hands. Any Russian person who has recognized the incommensurability of losses, it turns out, must simultaneously admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

Again I will quote the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim:
« It happened that the Russians in the battles of early December marched with songs in dense rows - and even holding hands - on minefields Finns, ignoring the explosions and accurate fire of the defenders.

Do you represent these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures named by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24923 people killed and died from wounds of the Finns. Russian, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why pity these Russes?

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book "Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940". with reference to Nikita Khrushchev, they give the following data:

"From total 1.5 million people. sent to fight in Finland, the losses of the USSR killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as great amount various military equipment ... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with "meat".
About the reasons for the defeat, Mannerheim writes as follows:
"At the final stage of the war, the most weak point there was not a shortage of materials, but a shortage of manpower.

Stop!

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such meager losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and write about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in The Great Slandered War claims:
« Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded. The primary source of this figure is the translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä, published in the newspaper “Za rubezhom” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish edition “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost in the “winter war” more than 23,000 people killed; over 43,000 people were wounded. During the bombing, including of merchant ships, 25,243 people were killed.

The last figure - 25,243 killed in the bombing - is in doubt. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to read the Finnish original of Seppälä's article.

Mannerheim, as you know, estimated the losses from the bombing:
“More than seven hundred were killed civilians, and twice as many were injured.

The largest numbers of Finnish losses are given by the Military History Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army in it amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official figures, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 captured

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Losses. In the number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet, even those with whom relatives cut off contact in 1939-1940 are taken into account.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers ranked these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Who and how considered the Finnish losses is absolutely incomprehensible. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the strength of the Armed Forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war, Finland experienced a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even insignificant losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the vanquished ”Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to the calculation of Aritz, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 increased by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves up to the age of 45, which did not happen in any of the countries, even in Germany.”

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. In Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses in the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
In total, 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish site http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died in the period 1939-1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not converge.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR claims that hot Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army casualties. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as shutskor, in general statistics there were no losses. And they had a lot of paramilitaries.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

Whatever the case, two explanations arise:
The first - if the Finnish data on their losses are correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they "raised their paws" almost without suffering losses.
The second - if we consider that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply underestimated their own losses on a large scale.

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. This military conflict was preceded by long negotiations over the exchange of territories, which ultimately ended in failure. In the USSR and Russia, this war, for obvious reasons, remains in the shadow of the war with Germany that soon followed, but in Finland it is still the equivalent of our Great Patriotic War.

Although the war remains half-forgotten, heroic films are not made about it, books about it are relatively rare and it is poorly reflected in art (with the exception of the famous song "Take Us, Suomi Beauty"), there are still disputes about the causes of this conflict. What was Stalin counting on when starting this war? Did he want to Sovietize Finland or even include it in the USSR as a separate union republic, or was the Karelian Isthmus and the security of Leningrad his main goals? Can the war be considered successful or, given the ratio of sides and the scale of losses, a failure?

background

A propaganda poster from the war and a photo of the Red Army party meeting in the trenches. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

In the second half of the 1930s, unusually active diplomatic negotiations were going on in pre-war Europe. All major states were feverishly looking for allies, feeling the approach of new war. The USSR did not stand aside either, which was forced to negotiate with the capitalists, who, in Marxist dogma, were considered the main enemies. In addition, the events in Germany, where the Nazis came to power, an important part of whose ideology was anti-communism, pushed for active action. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Germany had been the main Soviet trading partner since the early 1920s, when both defeated Germany and the USSR found themselves in international isolation, which brought them closer.

In 1935, the USSR and France signed an agreement on mutual assistance, clearly directed against Germany. It was planned as part of a more global eastern pact, according to which all Eastern European countries, including Germany, were to enter a single system. collective security, which would fix the status quo and make aggression against any of the participants impossible. However, the Germans did not want to tie their hands, the Poles also did not agree, so the pact remained only on paper.

In 1939, shortly before the expiration of the Franco-Soviet treaty, new negotiations began, to which Britain joined. The negotiations took place against the backdrop of the aggressive actions of Germany, which had already taken part of Czechoslovakia for itself, annexed Austria and, apparently, did not plan to stop there. The British and French planned to conclude an alliance treaty with the USSR to contain Hitler. At the same time, the Germans began to make contacts with a proposal to stay away from a future war. Stalin probably felt like a marriageable bride when a whole line of “suitors” lined up for him.

Stalin did not trust any of the potential allies, however, the British and French wanted the USSR to fight on their side, which caused Stalin to fear that in the end it would be mainly the USSR that would fight, and the Germans promised a whole bunch of gifts just for the USSR to stay aside, which was much more in line with the aspirations of Stalin himself (let the damned capitalists fight each other).

In addition, negotiations with England and France reached an impasse due to the refusal of the Poles to let Soviet troops through its territory in the event of war (which was inevitable in the conditions of a European war). In the end, the USSR decided to stay out of the war by signing a non-aggression pact with the Germans.

Negotiations with the Finns

Arrival of Juho Kusti Paasikivi from talks in Moscow. October 16, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

Against the backdrop of all these diplomatic maneuvers, long negotiations began with the Finns. In 1938, the USSR offered the Finns to allow it to establish a military base on the island of Hogland. The Soviet side was afraid of the possibility of a German strike from Finland and offered the Finns an agreement on mutual assistance, and also gave guarantees that the USSR would stand up for Finland in the event of aggression from the Germans.

However, the Finns at that time adhered to strict neutrality (according to the laws in force, it was forbidden to join any alliances and place military bases on their territory) and feared that such agreements would drag them into an unpleasant story or, which is good, bring them to war. Although the USSR offered to conclude the treaty in secret, so that no one would know about it, the Finns did not agree.

The second round of negotiations began in 1939. This time, the USSR wanted to lease a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland in order to strengthen the defense of Leningrad from the sea. Negotiations also ended in vain.

The third round began in October 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the outbreak of World War II, when all the leading European powers were distracted by the war and the USSR had a free hand to a large extent. This time the USSR offered to arrange an exchange of territories. In exchange for the Karelian Isthmus and a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the USSR offered to give large territories Eastern Karelia, even larger than those given by the Finns.

True, it is worth considering one fact: the Karelian Isthmus was a highly developed territory in terms of infrastructure, where the second largest Finnish city of Vyborg was located and a tenth of the Finnish population lived, but the lands offered by the USSR in Karelia were, although large, but completely undeveloped and there were no there was nothing but woods. So the exchange was, to put it mildly, not quite equivalent.

The Finns agreed to give up the islands, but they could not afford to give up the Karelian Isthmus, which, besides being a developed territory with large population, so the Mannerheim defensive line was also located there, around which the entire Finnish defensive strategy was based. The USSR, on the contrary, was primarily interested in the isthmus, since this would allow moving the border from Leningrad at least a few tens of kilometers. At that time, there were about 30 kilometers between the Finnish border and the outskirts of Leningrad.

Mainil incident

In the photographs: a Suomi submachine gun and Soviet soldiers dig a pole at the Mainil frontier post, November 30, 1939. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

Negotiations ended without results on 9 November. And already on November 26, an incident occurred near the border village of Mainila, which was used as a pretext for starting a war. According to the Soviet side, from Finnish territory to Soviet territory flew artillery shell, which killed three Soviet soldiers and a commander.

Molotov immediately sent a formidable demand to the Finns to withdraw their troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers. The Finns, on the other hand, stated that, according to the results of the investigation, it turned out that no one from the Finnish side fired and, probably, we are talking about some kind of accident on the Soviet side. The Finns responded by suggesting that both sides withdraw their troops from the border and conduct a joint investigation into the incident.

The next day, Molotov sent a note to the Finns accusing them of perfidy and hostility, and announced the rupture of the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Two days later, diplomatic relations were broken off and the Soviet troops went on the offensive.

At present, most researchers believe that the incident was organized by the Soviet side in order to obtain a casus belli for an attack on Finland. In any case, it is clear that the incident was only a pretext.

War

In the photo: Finnish machine-gun crew and propaganda poster from the war. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

The main direction for the strike of the Soviet troops was the Karelian Isthmus, which was protected by a line of fortifications. This was the most suitable direction for a massive strike, which also made it possible to use tanks, which the Red Army had in abundance. It was planned to break through the defenses with a powerful blow, capture Vyborg and head towards Helsinki. A secondary direction was Central Karelia, where massive hostilities were complicated by the undeveloped territory. The third blow was delivered from the northern direction.

The first month of the war was a real disaster for the Soviet army. It was disorganized, disoriented, chaos and misunderstanding of the situation reigned in the headquarters. On the Karelian Isthmus, the army managed to advance several kilometers in a month, after which the soldiers ran into the Mannerheim line and were unable to overcome it, since the army simply did not have heavy artillery.

In Central Karelia, things were even worse. The local forest areas opened wide scope for partisan tactics, for which the Soviet divisions were not ready. Small detachments of Finns attacked columns of Soviet troops moving along the roads, after which they quickly left and lay in forest caches. Road mining was also actively used, because of which the Soviet troops suffered significant losses.

Further complicating the situation was the fact that the Soviet troops did not have enough camouflage coats and the soldiers were a convenient target for Finnish snipers in winter time. At the same time, the Finns used camouflage, which made them invisible.

The 163rd Soviet division was advancing in the Karelian direction, the task of which was to reach the city of Oulu, which would cut Finland in two. The shortest direction between the Soviet border and the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia was specially chosen for the offensive. In the area of ​​​​the village of Suomussalmi, the division was surrounded. Only the 44th division, which had arrived at the front, reinforced by a tank brigade, was sent to help her.

The 44th division moved along the Raat road, stretching for 30 kilometers. After waiting for the division to stretch out, the Finns defeated the Soviet division, which had a significant numerical superiority. Barriers were set up on the road from the north and south, which blocked the division in a narrow and well-shootable area, after which, by the forces of small detachments, the division was cut on the road into several mini-"boilers".

As a result, the division suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, frostbite and prisoners, lost almost all equipment and heavy weapons, and the command of the division, which got out of the encirclement, was shot by the verdict of the Soviet tribunal. Soon, several more divisions were surrounded in this way, which managed to escape from the encirclement, suffering huge losses and losing most of the equipment. The most notable example is the 18th Division, which was surrounded in South Lemetti. Only one and a half thousand people managed to break out of the encirclement, with a regular strength of the division of 15 thousand. The command of the division was also shot by the Soviet tribunal.

The offensive in Karelia failed. Only in the northern direction did the Soviet troops act more or less successfully and were able to cut off the enemy from access to the Barents Sea.

Finnish Democratic Republic

Campaign leaflets, Finland, 1940. Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

Almost immediately after the start of the war in the border town of Terioki, occupied by the Red Army, the so-called. the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, which consisted of high-ranking communist figures of Finnish nationality who lived in the USSR. The USSR immediately recognized this government as the only official one and even concluded a mutual assistance agreement with it, according to which all the pre-war requirements of the USSR regarding the exchange of territories and the organization of military bases were fulfilled.

The formation of the Finnish People's Army also began, which was planned to include soldiers of Finnish and Karelian nationalities. However, during the retreat, the Finns evacuated all their inhabitants, and they had to replenish it at the expense of soldiers of the corresponding nationalities who were already serving in the Soviet army, of which there were not very many.

At first, the government was often featured in the press, but the failures on the battlefields and the unexpectedly stubborn resistance of the Finns led to the prolongation of the war, which was clearly not included in the original plans of the Soviet leadership. Since the end of December, the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic has been mentioned less and less in the press, and since mid-January they no longer remember it, the USSR again recognizes the one that remained in Helsinki as the official government.

End of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

In January 1940, active hostilities were not conducted due to severe frosts. The Red Army brought heavy artillery to the Karelian Isthmus to overcome the defensive fortifications of the Finnish army.

In early February, the general offensive of the Soviet army began. This time it was accompanied by artillery preparation and was much better thought out, which made it easier for the attackers. By the end of the month, the first few lines of defense were broken through, and in early March, Soviet troops approached Vyborg.

The original plan of the Finns was to hold back the Soviet troops for as long as possible and wait for help from England and France. However, no help came from them. Under these conditions, the further continuation of resistance was fraught with the loss of independence, so the Finns went to negotiations.

On March 12, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, which satisfied almost all the pre-war demands of the Soviet side.

What did Stalin want to achieve?

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org

Until now, there is no unequivocal answer to the question, what were the goals of Stalin in this war. Was he really interested in moving the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad for a hundred kilometers, or did he count on the Sovietization of Finland? In favor of the first version is the fact that in the peace treaty Stalin made the main emphasis on this. The creation of the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic headed by Otto Kuusinen speaks in favor of the second version.

Disputes about this have been going on for almost 80 years, but, most likely, Stalin had both a minimum program, which included only territorial demands in order to move the border from Leningrad, and a maximum program, which provided for the Sovietization of Finland in the event of a favorable combination of circumstances. However, the maximum program was quickly withdrawn due to the unfavorable course of the war. In addition to the fact that the Finns stubbornly resisted, they also evacuated the civilian population in the places of the offensive of the Soviet army, and Soviet propagandists had practically no opportunity to work with the Finnish population.

Stalin himself explained the need for war in April 1940 at a meeting with the commanders of the Red Army: “Did the government and the party do the right thing in declaring war on Finland? Could the war have been avoided? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally. There, in the West, the three biggest powers are at each other's throats; when to decide the question of Leningrad, if not in such conditions, when our hands are busy and it seems to us favorable environment in order to hit them at this moment"?

The results of the war

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

The USSR achieved most of its goals, but this came at a great cost. The USSR suffered huge losses, much larger than the Finnish army. Numbers in various sources differ (about 100 thousand killed, died from wounds and frostbite and missing), but everyone agrees that the Soviet army lost a significantly larger number of soldiers killed, missing and frostbite than the Finnish.

The prestige of the Red Army was undermined. By the beginning of the war, the huge Soviet army not only outnumbered the Finnish one many times over, but was also much better armed. The Red Army had three times more artillery, 9 times more aircraft and 88 times more tanks. At the same time, the Red Army not only failed to take full advantage of its advantages, but also suffered a number of crushing defeats at the initial stage of the war.

The course of hostilities was closely followed both in Germany and in Britain, and they were surprised by the inept actions of the army. It is believed that it was precisely as a result of the war with Finland that Hitler was finally convinced that an attack on the USSR was possible, since the Red Army was extremely weak on the battlefield. In Britain, they also decided that the army was weakened by the purges of officers and were glad that they did not draw the USSR into allied relations.

Reasons for failure

Collage © L!FE. Photo: © wikimedia.org , © wikimedia.org

In Soviet times, the main failures of the army were associated with the Mannerheim Line, which was so well fortified that it was practically impregnable. However, this was actually a very big exaggeration. A significant part of the defensive line was made up of wood-and-earth fortifications or old structures made of low-quality concrete that were outdated for 20 years.

On the eve of the war, the defensive line was fortified with several “millionaire” pillboxes (so they were called because the construction of each fortification cost a million Finnish marks), but it still was not impregnable. As practice has shown, with competent preparation and support of aviation and artillery, even a much more advanced line of defense can be broken through, as happened with the French Maginot line.

In fact, the failures were due to a number of blunders of the command, both higher and people in the field:

1. underestimation of the enemy. The Soviet command was sure that the Finns would not even bring to war and would accept Soviet demands. And when the war began, the USSR was sure that victory was a matter of a few weeks. The Red Army had too much advantage both in personal strength and in firepower;

2. disorganization of the army. The command staff of the Red Army was largely replaced a year before the war as a result of mass purges in the ranks of the military. Some of the new commanders simply did not fit necessary requirements, but even talented commanders have not yet had time to gain experience in commanding large military units. Confusion and chaos reigned in the units, especially in the conditions of the outbreak of war;

3. insufficient elaboration of offensive plans. In the USSR, they were in a hurry to quickly resolve the issue with the Finnish border, while Germany, France and Britain were still fighting in the West, so the preparations for the offensive were carried out in a hurry. The Soviet plan called for the main attack on the Mannerheim Line, with virtually no intelligence on the line. The troops had only extremely approximate and schematic plans for defensive fortifications, and later it turned out that they did not correspond to reality at all. In fact, the first assaults on the line were carried out blindly, in addition, light artillery did not cause serious damage to the defensive fortifications, and heavy howitzers, which at first were practically absent in the advancing troops, had to be brought up to destroy them. Under these conditions, all attempts to storm turned into huge losses. Only in January 1940 did normal preparations for a breakthrough begin: assault groups were formed to suppress and capture firing points, aviation was involved in photographing the fortifications, which finally made it possible to obtain plans for defensive lines and develop a competent breakthrough plan;

4. The Red Army was insufficiently prepared for the conduct of hostilities in a specific area in winter time. There were not enough camouflage robes, not even warm uniforms. All this goodness lay in warehouses and began to arrive in parts only in the second half of December, when it became clear that the war was beginning to take on a protracted character. By the beginning of the war, there was not a single unit of combat skiers in the Red Army, who, with great success used by the Finns. The submachine guns, which turned out to be very effective in rough terrain, were generally absent in the Red Army. Shortly before the war, the PPD (Degtyarev submachine gun) was withdrawn from service, as it was planned to replace it with more modern and advanced weapons, but they did not wait for the new weapon, and the old PPD went to warehouses;

5. the Finns enjoyed all the advantages of the terrain with great success. Soviet divisions, stuffed to capacity with equipment, were forced to move along the roads and practically could not operate in the forest. The Finns, who had almost no equipment, waited until the clumsy Soviet divisions stretched out along the road for several kilometers and, blocking the road, launched simultaneous strikes in several directions at once, cutting the divisions into separate parts. Locked in a narrow space, Soviet soldiers became easy targets for Finnish skiers and snipers. It was possible to break out of the encirclement, but this led to huge losses of equipment that had to be abandoned on the road;

6. the Finns used the scorched earth tactics, but they did it competently. The entire population was evacuated in advance from the areas that were to be occupied by parts of the Red Army, all property was also taken out, and the deserted settlements were destroyed or mined. This had a demoralizing effect on the Soviet soldiers, to whom the propaganda explained that they were going to liberate brother-workers and peasants from the unbearable oppression and bullying of the Finnish White Guard, but instead of crowds of joyful peasants and workers welcoming the liberators, they met only ashes and mined ruins.

However, despite all the shortcomings, the Red Army demonstrated the ability to improve and learn from their own mistakes right in the course of the war. The unsuccessful start of the war contributed to the fact that things were already taken up in a normal way, and in the second stage the army became much more organized and efficient. At the same time, some mistakes were repeated again a year later, when the war with Germany began, which also developed extremely unsuccessfully in the first months.

Evgeny Antonyuk
Historian

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 126 thousand 875 people. The Finnish army lost 21 thousand people. 396 people killed. The total losses of the Finnish troops amounted to 20% of their total personnel.
Well, what can you say about this? There is a clear next anti-Russian falsification covered by the authority of official historiography and the Minister of Defense himself (already former).

In order to understand the details of this nonsense, you will have to make an excursion to the original source, which is referred to by everyone who cites this ridiculous figure in their writings.

G.F. Krivosheev (under the editorship). Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: Losses of the armed forces

Dan data on the total number of irretrievable losses of personnel in the war (according to the final reports from the troops on March 15, 1940):

  • killed and died of wounds during the stages of sanitary evacuation 65,384;
  • declared dead from among the missing 14,043;
  • died from wounds, contusions and illness in hospitals (as of March 1, 1941) 15,921.
  • In total, the number of irretrievable losses amounted to 95348 people.
Further, these figures are broken down in detail by categories of personnel, armies, branches of service, etc.

Everything seems to be clear. But where did the 126,000 people of irretrievable losses come from?

In 1949-1951. V the result of long and painstaking work to clarify the number of casualties by the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the General Staff ground forces nominal lists of soldiers of the Red Army were compiled dead, dead and missing in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. In total, 126,875 fighters and commanders, workers and employees were included in them, which amounted to irretrievable losses. Their main total indicators, calculated according to the name lists, are presented in Table 109.


Types of losses Total number of deadweight losses Exceeding the number of losses
According to reports from the troops According to the nominal lists of losses
Killed and died of wounds during sanitary evacuation stages 65384 71214 5830
Died from wounds and diseases in hospitals 15921 16292 371
Missing 14043 39369 25326
Total 95348 126875 31527

    http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW/poteri.txt#w04.htm-008

    We read what is written there (quotes from this work are highlighted in green):

The number of irretrievable losses given in table 109 diverges upward from the final data, which are calculated according to the reports of the troops received before the end of March 1940 and are contained in table 110.

The reason for the revealed discrepancy is that the nominal lists included, first of all exit, unaccounted for previously reported losses of Air Force personnel, as well as military personnel from among those who died in hospitals after March 1940, in-Tuesday oryh, died border guards and other military personnel who were not part of the Red Army were treated in the same hospitals for wounds and illnesses. In addition, the nominal lists of irretrievable losses include a large number of servicemen who did not return home (based on requests from relatives), especially from among those called up in 1939-1940, with whom communication ceased during the Soviet-Finnish war. After an unsuccessful search for many years, they were classified as missing. Note that these lists were compiled ten years after the Soviet-Finnish war. Ime This also explains the presence in the lists of an unreasonably large number of missing persons - 39,369 people, which is 31% of all irretrievable losses in the Soviet-Finnish war. According to reports from the troops, only 14,043 servicemen went missing during the fighting.

Thus, we have that more than 25 thousand people are incomprehensibly included in the losses of the Red Army in the Finnish War. missing, it is not clear where, it is not clear under what circumstances, and it is generally not clear when. Thus, researchers the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Finnish War are overstated by more than a quarter.
On what basis?
However, inas the final number of irretrievable human losses of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war, we have taken the number of all the dead, missing and died from wounds and diseases, taken into account in the nominal lists, that is126 875 people This number, in our opinion,more fully reflects the demographic irretrievable losses of the country in the war with Finland.
That's it. The opinion of the authors of this work seems to me completely unfounded.
firstly, because they do not substantiate this method of calculating losses
second, because they don't use it anywhere else. For example, to calculate losses in the Polish campaign.
Thirdly, because it is completely incomprehensible on what grounds they actually declare the loss data presented by the headquarters "hotly" unreliable.
However, to justify Krivosheev and his co-authors, it should be noted that they did not insist that their (in a particular case) dubious estimates were the only correct ones and provided data from alternative, more accurate calculations. You can understand them.

But the authors of the second volume official history WWII citing these unreliable data as the ultimate truth, I refuse to understand.
The most curious thing from my point of view is that they by no means consider the figures given by Krivosheev as the ultimate truth. Here is what Krivosheev writes about the losses of the Finns
According to Finnish sources, the human losses of Finland in the war of 1939-1940. amounted to 48,243 people. killed, 43 thousand people. wounded

Compare with the above data on the losses of the Finnish army. Differ in times!! But on the other side.

So, let's sum up.
what we have?

Data on the losses of the Red Army are overestimated.
data on the losses of our opponents are underestimated.

I think this the purest water defeatist propaganda!

Finland was assigned to the sphere of influence of the USSR by secret protocols to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. But, unlike other Baltic countries, she refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, as it passed 32 km from the "northern capital". In exchange, the USSR offered more extensive and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland in the conditions of World War II, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.

The Finnish leadership, headed by Prime Minister A. Cajander and head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor, the Finnish line of fortifications became known as the “Mannerheim Line”), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. On October 12 - November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with the Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached an impasse.

On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Soviet border checkpoint Mainila, a provocative shelling of Soviet positions was carried out by the Soviet side, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for an attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha region, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Further south, the 9th Army advanced on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would cut Finland in two. To the north of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim Line. And finally, on the main line 7, the army was to break through the Mannerheim line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.

On December 6-12, the troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim line, but could not take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.

An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of vehicles. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. So several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the fighting in December - January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe was the defeat of the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.

Frosts hit, snow filled up the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers they died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.

Volunteers of various views went to the country - from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with arms and food.

On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.

The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that in a few days Helsinki might fall. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became tougher. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nishtad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not remove the demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.

Sources:

On both sides of the Karelian front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;

Secrets and lessons of the Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. SPb., 2000.

After the Civil War of 1918-1922, the USSR received rather unsuccessful and poorly adapted borders for life. Thus, the fact that Ukrainians and Belarusians were separated by the line of the state border between the Soviet Union and Poland was not taken into account at all. Another of these "inconveniences" was the proximity of the border with Finland to the northern capital of the country - Leningrad.

In the course of the events preceding the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union received a number of territories that made it possible to significantly move the border to the west. In the north, this attempt to move the border encountered some resistance, which was called the Soviet-Finnish, or Winter, War.

Historical digression and the origins of the conflict

Finland as a state appeared relatively recently - on December 6, 1917, against the backdrop of a collapsing Russian state. At the same time, the state received all the territories of the Grand Duchy of Finland along with Petsamo (Pechenga), Sortavala and territories on the Karelian Isthmus. Relations with the southern neighbor also did not work out from the very beginning: in Finland, the Civil War, in which the anti-communist forces won, so there was clearly no sympathy for the USSR, which supported the Reds.

However, in the second half of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, relations between the Soviet Union and Finland stabilized, being neither friendly nor hostile. Defense spending in Finland declined steadily in the 1920s, reaching its peak in 1930. However, the arrival of Carl Gustav Mannerheim as Minister of War changed the situation somewhat. Mannerheim immediately set a course to re-equip the Finnish army and prepare it for possible battles with the Soviet Union. Initially, the line of fortifications, at that time called the Enckel line, was inspected. The condition of its fortifications was unsatisfactory, so the re-equipment of the line began, as well as the construction of new defensive contours.

At the same time, the Finnish government took energetic steps to avoid conflict with the USSR. In 1932, a non-aggression pact was concluded, the term of which was to end in 1945.

Events 1938-1939 and causes of conflict

By the second half of the 1930s, the situation in Europe was gradually heating up. Hitler's anti-Soviet remarks forced the Soviet leadership to take a closer look at neighboring countries who could become allies of Germany in a possible war with the USSR. The position of Finland, of course, did not make it a strategically important springboard, since the local nature of the terrain inevitably turned the fighting into a series of small battles, not to mention the impossibility of supplying huge masses of troops. However, Finland's close position to Leningrad could still turn it into an important ally.

It was these factors that forced the Soviet government in April-August 1938 to begin negotiations with Finland regarding guarantees of its non-alignment with the anti-Soviet bloc. However, in addition, the Soviet leadership also demanded the provision of a number of islands Gulf of Finland under Soviet military bases, which was unacceptable for the then government of Finland. As a result, the negotiations ended in vain.

In March-April 1939, new Soviet-Finnish negotiations took place, in which the Soviet leadership demanded the lease of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Finnish government was forced to reject these demands as well, as it feared the "Sovietization" of the country.

The situation began to escalate rapidly when on August 23, 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, in a secret addendum to which it was indicated that Finland was in the sphere of interests of the USSR. However, although the Finnish government did not have data regarding the secret protocol, this agreement made him seriously think about the future prospects of the country and relations with Germany and the Soviet Union.

Already in October 1939, the Soviet government put forward new proposals for Finland. They provided for the movement of the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus 90 km to the north. In return, Finland was supposed to receive about twice as much territory in Karelia, in order to significantly secure Leningrad. A number of historians also express the opinion that the Soviet leadership was interested in, if not Sovietizing Finland in 1939, then at least depriving it of protection in the form of a line of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, already then called the "Mannerheim Line". This version is very consistent, since further events, as well as the development by the Soviet General Staff in 1940 of a plan for a new war against Finland, indirectly indicate precisely this. Thus, the defense of Leningrad, most likely, was only a pretext for turning Finland into a convenient Soviet foothold, like, for example, the Baltic countries.

However, the Finnish leadership rejected the Soviet demands and began to prepare for war. The Soviet Union was also preparing for war. In total, by mid-November 1939, 4 armies were deployed against Finland, which included 24 divisions with a total number of 425 thousand people, 2300 tanks and 2500 aircraft. Finland had only 14 divisions with a total strength of about 270 thousand people, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft.

In order to avoid provocations, the Finnish army in the second half of November received an order to withdraw from the state border on the Karelian Isthmus. However, on November 26, 1939, an incident occurred, for which both sides blame each other. Soviet territory was shelled, as a result of which several servicemen were killed and wounded. This incident occurred near the village of Mainila, from which it got its name. Clouds gathered between the USSR and Finland. Two days later, on November 28, the Soviet Union denounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, and two days later, Soviet troops were ordered to cross the border.

The beginning of the war (November 1939 - January 1940)

On November 30, 1939, Soviet troops went on the offensive in several directions. At the same time, the fighting immediately took on a fierce character.

On the Karelian Isthmus, where the 7th Army was advancing, on December 1, at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops managed to capture the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). Here the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic was announced, headed by Otto Kuusinen, a prominent figure in the Comintern. It was with this new "government" of Finland that the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. At the same time, in the first ten days of December, the 7th Army managed to quickly master the forefield and ran into the first echelon of the Mannerheim Line. Here, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and their advance practically stopped for a long time.

To the north of Lake Ladoga, in the direction of Sortavala, the 8th Soviet Army advanced. As a result of the first days of fighting, she managed to advance 80 kilometers in a fairly short time. However, the Finnish troops that opposed her managed to carry out a lightning operation, the purpose of which was to encircle part of the Soviet forces. The fact that the Red Army was very strongly tied to the roads played into the hands of the Finns, which allowed the Finnish troops to quickly cut off its communications. As a result, the 8th Army, having suffered serious losses, was forced to retreat, but until the end of the war held part of the Finnish territory.

The least successful were the actions of the Red Army in central Karelia, where the 9th Army was advancing. The task of the army was to conduct an offensive in the direction of the city of Oulu, with the aim of "cutting" Finland in half and thereby disorganizing the Finnish troops in the north of the country. On December 7, the forces of the 163rd Infantry Division occupied the small Finnish village of Suomussalmi. However, the Finnish troops, having superiority in mobility and knowledge of the area, immediately surrounded the division. As a result, Soviet troops were forced to take up all-round defense and repulse sudden attacks by Finnish ski units, as well as suffer significant losses from sniper fire. The 44th Infantry Division was advanced to help the encircled, which soon also found itself surrounded.

Having assessed the situation, the command of the 163rd Infantry Division decided to fight back. At the same time, the division suffered losses of approximately 30% of its personnel, and also abandoned almost all equipment. After its breakthrough, the Finns managed to destroy the 44th rifle division and practically restore state border in this direction, paralyzing the actions of the Red Army here. This battle, known as the Battle of Suomussalmi, resulted in rich booty taken by the Finnish army, as well as an increase in the general morale of the Finnish army. At the same time, the leadership of two divisions of the Red Army was subjected to repression.

And if the actions of the 9th Army were unsuccessful, then the troops of the 14th Soviet Army, advancing on the Rybachy Peninsula, acted most successfully. They managed to capture the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and large nickel deposits in the area, as well as reach the Norwegian border. Thus, Finland lost access to the Barents Sea for the duration of the war.

In January 1940, the drama played out south of Suomussalmi, where in general terms the scenario of that recent battle was repeated. The 54th Rifle Division of the Red Army was surrounded here. At the same time, the Finns did not have enough forces to destroy it, so the division was surrounded until the end of the war. A similar fate awaited the 168th Rifle Division, which was surrounded in the Sortavala area. Another division and a tank brigade were surrounded in the Lemetti-Yuzhny area and, having suffered huge losses and lost almost all materiel, nevertheless made their way out of the encirclement.

On the Karelian Isthmus, by the end of December, the fighting to break through the Finnish fortified line subsided. This was explained by the fact that the command of the Red Army was well aware of the futility of continuing further attempts to strike at the Finnish troops, which brought only serious losses with minimal results. The Finnish command, understanding the essence of the lull at the front, launched a series of attacks in order to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops. However, these attempts were failed with heavy losses for the Finnish troops.

However, in general, the situation remained not very favorable for the Red Army. Its troops were drawn into battles on foreign and poorly explored territory, in addition, in adverse weather conditions. The Finns did not have superiority in numbers and technology, but they had a well-established and well-established tactics of guerrilla warfare, which allowed them, acting with relatively small forces, to inflict significant losses on the advancing Soviet troops.

The February offensive of the Red Army and the end of the war (February-March 1940)

On February 1, 1940, a powerful Soviet artillery preparation began on the Karelian Isthmus, which lasted 10 days. The purpose of this preparation was to inflict maximum damage on the Mannerheim Line and the Finnish troops and wear them down. On February 11, the troops of the 7th and 13th armies moved forward.

Fierce battles unfolded along the entire front on the Karelian Isthmus. Main blow Soviet troops inflicted on locality The amount that was located in the Vyborg direction. However, here, as well as two months ago, the Red Army again began to get bogged down in battles, so the direction of the main attack was soon changed to Lyakhda. Here, the Finnish troops could not hold back the Red Army, and their defenses were broken through, and a few days later - the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finnish command was forced to begin to withdraw troops.

On February 21, Soviet troops approached the second line of Finnish defense. Fierce fighting again unfolded here, which, however, ended by the end of the month with a breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in several places. Thus, the Finnish defense collapsed.

At the beginning of March 1940, the Finnish army was in a critical situation. The Mannerheim Line was broken through, the reserves were practically depleted, while the Red Army developed a successful offensive and had practically inexhaustible reserves. The morale of the Soviet troops was also high. At the beginning of the month, the troops of the 7th Army rushed to Vyborg, the fighting for which continued until the ceasefire on March 13, 1940. This city was one of the largest in Finland, and its loss could be very painful for the country. In addition, in this way, the Soviet troops opened the way to Helsinki, which threatened Finland with the loss of independence.

Considering all these factors, the Finnish government set a course for the beginning of peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. On March 7, 1940, peace negotiations began in Moscow. As a result, it was decided to cease fire from 12 noon on March 13, 1940. Territories on the Karelian Isthmus and in Lapland (the cities of Vyborg, Sortavala and Salla) departed to the USSR, and the Hanko Peninsula was also leased.

Results of the Winter War

Estimates of the losses of the USSR in Soviet-Finnish war vary significantly and, according to the Soviet Ministry of Defense, are approximately 87.5 thousand people who died and died from wounds and frostbite, as well as about 40 thousand missing. 160 thousand people were injured. Finland's losses were significantly smaller - about 26 thousand dead and 40 thousand wounded.

As a result of the war with Finland, the Soviet Union managed to ensure the security of Leningrad, as well as strengthen its position in the Baltic. First of all, this concerns the city of Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, on which Soviet troops began to be based. At the same time, the Red Army gained combat experience in breaking through the enemy’s fortified line in difficult weather conditions (the air temperature in February 1940 reached -40 degrees), which no other army in the world had at that time.

However, at the same time, the USSR received in the north-west, albeit not a powerful, but an enemy who, already in 1941, let German troops into its territory and contributed to the blockade of Leningrad. As a result of Finland's performance in June 1941 on the side of the Axis, the Soviet Union received an additional front with enough great length, diverting from 20 to 50 Soviet divisions in the period from 1941 to 1944.

Britain and France also kept a close eye on the conflict and even had plans to attack the USSR and its Caucasian fields. At present, there is no complete data on the seriousness of these intentions, but it is likely that in the spring of 1940 the Soviet Union could simply “quarrel” with its future allies and even get involved in a military conflict with them.

There are also a number of versions that the war in Finland indirectly influenced the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. Soviet troops broke through the Mannerheim Line and practically left Finland defenseless in March 1940. Any new invasion of the Red Army into the country could well be fatal for it. After defeating Finland, the Soviet Union would have come dangerously close to the Swedish mines at Kiruna, one of Germany's few sources of metal. Such a scenario would have brought the Third Reich to the brink of disaster.

Finally, the not very successful offensive of the Red Army in December-January strengthened the belief in Germany that the Soviet troops were essentially incompetent and did not have good command staff. This delusion continued to grow and reached its peak in June 1941, when the Wehrmacht attacked the USSR.

As a conclusion, it can be pointed out that as a result of the Winter War, the Soviet Union nevertheless acquired more problems than victories, which was confirmed in the next few years.

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.