The Georgian Armed Forces are completing calendar year a series of exercises and training that increasingly correspond to the appearance of the army that began to emerge a year ago.

The Ministry of Defense under the leadership of Levan Izoria consistently carried out the reorganization of the army. In particular, standardization and reduction of departments (from 53 to 35) and directorates of the General Staff were carried out. In addition, the Ministry of Defense abandoned the institution of advisers, and the bloated category of regular ranks was reduced. Similar actions were planned for the General Staff. The total was reduced to 30% officers. Also, the plans of the Minister of Defense include changing the locations of the brigades, which are located within the boundaries of various cities, which “limits their maneuverability.”

As a result of optimization, the Georgian Armed Forces were left with 4 maneuver brigades with three components - infantry, mechanized and armored (before the start of optimization there were 4 infantry, 1 mechanized and 2 artillery brigades). As for aviation, as a result of optimization, it has actually been eliminated as a strike force (primarily, we are talking about Su-25 attack aircraft), the emphasis has been shifted to air defense. Special attention is focused on improving the capabilities of helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles aircraft.

At the same time, the total number of the army remains at the level of 37 thousand (term conscript service reduced from 15 to 12 months).

Such large-scale optimization is associated not only with financial and economic, but also with military and political aspects. It is more than obvious that, unlike the mid-2000s, the Georgian armed forces are no longer preparing for any large-scale military operations against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In solving the long-standing problems of the former autonomies, and now the new states of the Caucasus recognized by Russia, the country's leadership gives priority to political tools (at the same time, there is still no talk of signing a legally binding agreement on the non-use of force - Note ed.). At the same time, compact and mobile units will be formed that can not only be quickly deployed to the border region, but also sent as part of an international coalition to maintain peace in a particular country. The United States, which is Georgia’s main military-political partner, is extremely interested in sending its “small allies” outside NATO trained and integrated into the Western military system military contingents in different points peace.

In light of the above, the importance of working with reserves is increasing, and therefore the military leadership of Georgia is of greatest interest in the experience of forming and training reserves in the armies of countries Northern Europe, both neutral (Finland) and NATO countries (Norway). In particular, with next year A pilot program will be launched in Georgia new system military reserve, during the implementation of which it is planned to use the Finnish experience of military development.


Joint Georgian-Norwegian exercises for reservists “Paldo-2017”

Georgian soldiers at a funeral ceremony in memory of those killed in the 2008 war. Photo: Shakh Aivazov / AP, archive

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was confident that he had created a modern army capable of defeating not only Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also Russia

The Armed Forces (AF) of Georgia, like many other post-Soviet armies, were built from a state of complete chaos, becoming a synthesis of the remnants of the Soviet army and the local people's militia. In the Georgian case, local specifics were added - the country in the early 90s experienced a “triple” civil war- for power in Tbilisi and for the retention of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The first of these wars was largely responsible for the loss of the other two. In 1993, Georgia had 108 tanks, 121 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers inherited from the USSR, 17 artillery pieces, four combat aircraft and a helicopter. However, a significant part of this equipment was lost in Abkhazia. After this, for ten years the Georgian army remained, in fact, a “legal bandit formation,” extremely underfunded and completely incapacitated.

Saakashvili, who came to power at the end of 2003, achieved a radical change in the situation in the country in general and in the army in particular. Thanks to the improvement economic situation and curbing “grassroots” corruption, funding for the Armed Forces has increased not even by several times, but by orders of magnitude. In addition, Western military assistance appeared, the scale of which, however, was greatly exaggerated in our country (in reality it amounted to several percent of the country’s military budget). Georgia began to purchase abroad en masse, primarily in the Czech Republic and Ukraine; other suppliers included Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, and the USA. Almost exclusively used ones were purchased soviet weapons, or an Eastern European one created on its basis, which, however, was modernized using Western technologies. There were almost no systems of non-Soviet origin. The exceptions were 1 battery of the Israeli Spider anti-aircraft missile system (SAM), 6 extremely outdated American UH-1H Iroquois transport helicopters and a Greek French-built missile boat.

By August 2008, the Georgian ground forces had five infantry brigades, as well as one artillery and special forces brigade. They were armed with 247 tanks (191 T-72, 56 T-55), more than 150 infantry fighting vehicles, about 150 armored personnel carriers, about 50 self-propelled guns, about 200 towed guns, about 300 mortars, about 30 rocket launchers volley fire(MLRS), 60 anti-aircraft self-propelled units(ZSU) and anti-aircraft guns.

The country's air force was armed with 12 Su-25 attack aircraft, 12 L-39C training aircraft (theoretically could be used as light attack aircraft), 6 An-2 transport "maize" aircraft, 8 attack helicopters Mi-24, 18 multi-role helicopters Mi-8 and 6 of the above-mentioned UH-1H.

Ground-based air defense included 7 divisions of the old S-125 air defense system left over from the USSR, as well as two more modern divisions of the Buk-M1 air defense system received from Ukraine (each with three batteries, each with two launchers and one ROM, 16 missiles each) , from 6 to 18 Osa-AK and Osa-AKM air defense systems (and from 48 to 72 missile defense systems for them), as well as, possibly, 50 Igla MANPADS and up to 400 missile defense systems for them.

Apparently, Ukrainian equipment was at least partially maintained by Ukrainian instructors, including during the war. In addition, thirty Grom MANPADS and up to one hundred missile defense systems for them were received from Poland, and one battery of the latest Spider air defense system (five or six launchers) was received from Israel. Ukraine also supplied a significant number of various radars to Georgia, including the most modern ones.

The Georgian Navy had two missile boats (the aforementioned “Greek-French” type “Combatant-2” with Exocet anti-ship missiles and the former Soviet Project 206MR received from Ukraine with P-20 anti-ship missiles) and several patrol boats.

Although military conscription was formally preserved in Georgia, the combat units were staffed by contract soldiers, that is, they were a “professional army.”

In general, in 4.5 years the Georgian Armed Forces have come very far from the state of the “legal bandit formation” of the times of Shevardnadze. However, their potential was not enough to establish effective control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even more so for a war with Russia. But the subjective factor played a decisive role in the further development of events.


Joint exercises between the Georgian military and NATO at the Vaziani base, 2009. Photo: Nina Shlamova / AP

Saakashvili felt very dizzy from the successes that he actually had in politics and economics, while he was distinguished by obvious psychological instability, complete incompetence in military matters and faith in the West. He believed that he had created a modern professional network-centric army, which would not only instantly defeat the Armed Forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but, if necessary, would easily defeat the Russian Armed Forces. And in the event of some extremely unlikely unforeseen circumstances, NATO, of course, will immediately come to the rescue. By the way, there is nothing funny about this, because the majority of our population is absolutely confident in the advantage of a “professional army”, in the gigantic combat power of NATO and its aggressive nature. Another thing is that the president of the country should not be guided by philistine ideas, but must see reality.

At the beginning of the Georgian offensive on the night of August 7–8, almost the entire military-political leadership of South Ossetia fled from Tskhinvali to Java. However, Georgian troops became bogged down in street fighting with virtually uncontrollable Ossetian militias. And then the Russian army entered the battle.

Contrary to popular belief, Russian troops did not have any numerical superiority on land. There were very big problems in the air as well. During the August war, the Russian Air Force for the first time in its practice encountered modern air defense, although not very large in size. The results of this collision were quite sad for us: one Tu-22M, one or two Su-24s, three or four Su-25s were lost. True, the Georgian air defense definitely accounted for only the Tu-22M and one Su-24. About others lost cars there are significant differences. It is possible that all Su-25s were shot down by their own. The Georgians did not lose a single one combat aircraft and only three helicopters, all on the ground.

However, the war ended with an almost instantaneous crushing defeat of the “modern professional” army of Georgia. Already on the third day of the war, the Georgian army, in fact, simply disintegrated, ceasing all resistance and abandoning great amount weapons, ammunition and fully operational equipment. Which, by the way, confirmed well known fact, which in our country is now considered unfashionable or even indecent: among other things equal conditions a conscript army will always defeat a hired (“professional”) army, at least due to the much higher motivation of its personnel. Russian army will die only in one case - if she is nevertheless made “professional”. Then she will never defeat anyone again.

And NATO, of course, did not lift a finger to save Georgia. This could have been very easily guessed in advance if one were guided not by propaganda, but by a real study of the alliance’s activities.

During the war, Georgia retained the Air Force, which, however, did not help it in any way. The Georgian naval forces ceased to exist, they were not destroyed Black Sea Fleet in a mythical “sea battle”, and a landing force that captured Poti from land and blew up both missile boats and most of the patrol boats in the harbor. At the same time, the Georgian sailors simply fled.


Georgian soldiers in Gori, Georgia, August 10, 2008. Photo: Sergey Grits / AP

Despite the relative success, it suffered very significant losses to the Georgian air defense. In particular, they were captured Russian troops five Osa air defense systems, as well as, apparently, an entire Buk-M1 division with full ammunition, which was just unloaded in Poti from a Ukrainian ship, but was never brought into combat position. Therefore, not two fought, but only one division, deployed earlier, and it shot down the Tu-22M. It is possible that one Spider anti-aircraft missile launcher was captured. Apparently, all C-125 divisions were suppressed in one way or another. The vast majority of missiles were spent or lost. Therefore, by the end of the five-day war there was little left of the Georgian air defense. The losses of the ground forces amounted to at least 46 tanks (possibly from 80 to 100), approximately forty infantry fighting vehicles and fifteen armored personnel carriers, about 30 guns, mortars and MLRS. For comparison, Russia lost three or four tanks, 20 BRDMs, infantry fighting vehicles, BMDs and armored personnel carriers, and there were no losses in artillery. At the same time, the losses were almost completely compensated, since a significant part of the equipment lost by Georgia was not destroyed, but captured by Russian troops without any damage.

Currently, the Georgian Armed Forces consist only of ground forces, which include five infantry, two artillery, one engineering, one air defense and one aviation brigade (the latter is a former air force). The Navy was abolished, and the few surviving patrol boats were transferred to the Coast Guard. The only supplier of weapons to Georgia in the post-war period was Bulgaria, from where they received twelve self-propelled guns, guns and MLRS (we can say that due to this Georgia compensated for losses in artillery), as well as ten Su-25 attack aircraft, which are in non-flyable condition and intended for dismantling for spare parts for 12 Georgian attack aircraft. Georgia did not receive any more equipment from anywhere. Accordingly, there is no talk of any restoration of its potential. Currently in service there are about 140 tanks (mostly T-72, there are also twenty to thirty T-55), approximately 200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, about 250 self-propelled guns, guns and MLRS. All this equipment, including the “new” one purchased in Bulgaria, is still Soviet in origin and time of production, only aged another 5 years. It is impossible to build a modern network-centric army on its basis, something Saakashvili never understood. Our own military-industrial complex certainly won’t fix things. Although the country got the Tbilisi aircraft plant, where Soviet time Su-25 were produced; Georgia, naturally, was unable to organize their production without Russian components. In the last three years, the Tbilisi Tank Repair Plant has created domestically produced Lazika infantry fighting vehicles and Digori armored personnel carriers, but neither in quantity nor quality can they strengthen the country’s military potential.

Of course, Georgia’s admission to NATO is out of the question, if only for purely formal reasons: its territorial problems have not been resolved. The real reason The fact is that neither the United States, nor Turkey, nor, especially, Europe, are going to not only fight, but even have the theoretical risk of war with Russia because of some wild mountaineers. And even more so, there can be no question of Georgia itself returning Abkhazia and South Ossetia by military means. The popular talk in some media that “Georgia is preparing for revenge” is nothing more than cheap propaganda. The country does not have the resources to create a truly powerful and capable armed forces; NATO is not going to provide any assistance to Tbilisi. It is difficult to imagine that the elderly philosopher Margvelashvili, new president Georgia, and the young businessman Garibashvili, its future prime minister, will begin preparations for war with Russia.

The Georgian army was created for one war and lost this war. Therefore, now the army is meaningless and useless. But don’t give up on her because of this.

The collapse of the USSR led to the formation of new states. The young republics had to create their own armed forces. Georgia is no exception. Today, the Armed Forces of Georgia are becoming one of the combat-ready armies of the Transcaucasian region.

Foundation Day

At a referendum held in March 1991, Georgians almost unanimously voted for the republic to secede from the USSR. At the end of April, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia signed a decree on conscription into the National Guard, created a year earlier. The Georgian Armed Forces celebrate April 30 as their Formation Day.

According to the Georgian edition of Arsinali, about 8 thousand people came to the recruitment centers, although it was planned to recruit 900 recruits. From the collapsed USSR, the Army of Georgia inherited:

  • 108 tanks
  • 121 armored personnel carriers
  • 8 aircraft units
  • 17 artillery systems

Time for a change

The State Emergency Committee, which seized power in Moscow in August 1991, issued a decree on the disarmament of illegal armed groups. President Gamsakhurdia, executing the decree, decided to abolish the National Guard, transferring command of the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. After the overthrow of the State Emergency Committee, the president stated that the dissolution of the guard was necessary to prevent forceful actions by the forces of the Transcaucasian Military District. However, the command of the National Guard did not carry out the order of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

On September 2, an apposition rally took place in the center of Tbilisi, at which they demanded the resignation of the current government. The rally was dispersed by riot police using weapons. 6 people died. Called by the president to strengthen the defense, the guard forces sided with the demonstrators.

It so happened that the first combat of the future Georgian Armed Forces took place on the streets of its own capital. For two weeks, parts of the guards fought with supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Three wars in three years

On January 19, 1992, South Ossetia declared independence. National Guard units besieged Tskhinvali and others settlements. In May, South Ossetian self-defense units attacked the Georgian villages of Tamarasheni and Eredvi. The confrontation, with varying success, continued until June. Fighting ended after Russia intervened in the conflict. Vice President Alexander Rutskoy gave the order Russian Air Force strike at the Georgian troops attacking Tskhinvali. On June 24, the Sochi ceasefire agreement was signed.

Political disagreements between the Georgian government and Abkhazia began in the run-up to the referendum on preserving the USSR. Despite Georgia's refusal to participate in the referendum, the Abkhaz authorities held a vote on their territory. Almost the entire non-Georgian population of the autonomy voted to preserve the Union.

In August 1992, disagreements between the governments of Georgia and Abkhazia turned into hot phase. Full-scale military operations began with the use of aviation and artillery. The government of Abkhazia was forced to leave Sukhumi, relocating to the Gudauta region. However, the Georgian army was defeated, and in the fall of 1993 the Abkhaz government regained control over the territory of its republic. Official statistics recorded that 16 thousand died during military clashes:

  • 10 thousand Georgians
  • 4 thousand Abkhazians
  • 2 thousand volunteers from neighboring republics

Tension in the region was fueled by the ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who wants to return power in the country to his own hands. Army of the Republic of Georgia, battered Abkhazian war, sent combat-ready units to storm the disgraced president’s supporters. The headquarters of the Zviadists was captured on November 6, 1993. ex-president With small detachment went to the mountains. On the eve of 1994, Zviad Gamsakhurdia died in the village of Dzveli Khibula.

Rose Revolution

The Georgian Armed Forces spent the next ten years in a ruined state. Photos and video materials from those years indicate the decline of the Georgian armed forces in the 90s. Calm in the region was maintained by those created in 1995 under an agreement with Tbilisi, Russian bases. The military remained on Georgian territory until 2007.

The Rose Revolution of 2003 brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. The new government has made a lot of efforts to increase funding for the armed forces. Over four years, the military budget increased 30 times and reached $940 million. The number of military personnel as of September 2007 was 32 thousand people. Also, under the “Train and Equip” program, since 2003, the Georgian military has been trained by instructors from the United States.

Since 2004, the implementation of a project to bring it to standards began, jointly with the Americans. Not long before, the joint Georgian-American exercise “Immediate Response 2008” took place. Several battalions were trained according to NATO standards and the command was reformed Ground Forces Georgia.

Since the late 90s, the Georgian military has gained experience in formations peacekeeping forces UN and NATO forces:

  • 1999-2008, as part of the NATO contingent, resolved the conflict in Kosovo and Metohija
  • 2003 - contingent of peacekeeping forces in Iraq
  • 2004 - as part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan

Five Day War

The fighting began on the night of August 8, 2008. The Georgian army shelled the capital of South Ossetia with Grad multiple rocket launchers, then tanks attacked Tskhinvali. Photos and videos of the shooting were published by news publications around the world. Russian peacekeepers were also attacked by the Georgian military. The media reported that Georgian army units occupied six villages in South Ossetia.


Russia initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council and brought combat readiness 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, the Russian side demanded that the Georgian aggression be condemned; the Georgian representative blamed the Ossetian side for the shelling. The Council was unable to come to a clear decision, and promised to address this problem as soon as possible.

Over the five days of the war, the Russian ground force, aviation and navy inflicted great damage on the Georgian side. However, Georgian air defense systems showed coordinated work, shooting down six Russian Air Force aircraft. On August 13, Georgia and Russia, with the mediation of France, signed a plan for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, during the conflict the losses of people and weapons amounted to:

  • 170 people killed and missing
  • 7 capital ships
  • 7 military aircraft
  • 35 tanks destroyed, 30 trophies of the Russian army
  • 11 armored personnel carriers were burned, 17 trophies of the Russian army
  • 6 self-propelled howitzers and 20 non-self-propelled guns

After the war

After the end of the war, reform of the Georgian armed forces continued. The Navy did not restore it; the surviving ships were handed over to the coast guard. Air Force became part of the Ground Forces.

The US government has allocated $1 billion to Tbilisi to restore its army potential. At a meeting of the defense ministers of the United States and Georgia in July 2015, a decision was made to establish a NATO training center in Tbilisi.

The creation of a military industry is a priority for the Georgian authorities. In 2011, the production of Didgori armored vehicles was launched, and in 2012 the following tests were carried out:

  • BMP "Lazika"
  • Multiple launch rocket system ZCRS-122
  • Unmanned aerial vehicle

Georgia is arming its troops with the help of foreign partners. Israel is supplying drones and modernizing tanks. The Pentagon supplies Georgian units different kinds small arms and armored vehicles. An agreement has been concluded with France for the sale of air defense systems to Georgia. Ukraine actively supported the Georgian military during the conflict in South Ossetia and is arming it now.

Troop structure

Today, the only type of Georgian armed forces is the Ground Forces. Tactical ground forces consist of brigades and battalions. There are 5 battalions: 2 light infantry, communications and electronic warfare battalions, and a medical battalion. The basis of the Ground Forces is 10 brigades:

  • 5 infantry
  • 2 artillery
  • 1 aviation
  • 1 air defense
  • 1 engineering

The Special Operations Forces are directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Georgian Army. They carry out intelligence and counter-terrorism operations. The main reserve of the Armed Forces is the National Guard. Eliminating the consequences of emergencies, protecting important facilities, and suppressing riots are the main tasks of the Guard.

The number of military personnel in the Georgian army is 35 thousand 825 people, five and a half thousand of this number are in the reserve. The army consists of contract soldiers and people called up for compulsory service. The term of military service is 12 months. Call on military service in Georgia citizens aged 18 to 27 years.

World situation

According to the analytical agency Global Firepower Georgian armed forces are in 82nd place among 136 countries in the world. For 27 years the army has changed in better side, despite big losses V local conflicts. Improvements would occur faster if the Georgian authorities made more efforts to solve problems in the political field.

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Armed forces Georgia(cargo. საქართველოს შეიარაღებული ძალები - Sakartvelos Sheiaragebuli Dzalebi) - state military organization Georgia, designed to ensure the implementation of political decisions in the field of defense, identify threats, maintain military formations V high degree readiness, performing tasks in accordance with international obligations Georgia.

The structure of the Georgian Armed Forces includes the Ground Forces, Special Operations Forces, the National Guard, as well as centrally subordinate units and institutions. Until 2008, they also included the Georgian Navy and the Georgian Air Force, however, both of these types of Armed Forces were practically destroyed during the so-called. "Five Day War". Subsequently, the Air Force (to a small extent) was revived as a unit of the Ground Forces. As for the Navy, the Georgian leadership decided not to restore it.

The history of the army of independent Georgia actually begins on December 20, 1990 with the creation of the National Guard led by Tengiz Kitovani. National Guard was created by one of the first decrees of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who headed the Georgian SSR on November 14. Subsequently, the development of the Georgian Armed Forces continued on its basis. The Georgian armed forces were staffed both by soldiers of the Soviet Army who served on the territory of the republic, and by Georgian officers in other republics of the USSR who wished to return to Georgia.

At the end of December 1991, it was decided to create the first detachment special purpose(initially made up of five people), which received the unofficial name “Giorgadze group” (since the initiative to create it came from the chief of the Georgian MGB, Igor Giorgadze). In the spring of 1992, more than half of the personnel became subordinate to the Main Directorate of Special Purposes of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia.

On March 22, 1995, Russian Defense Minister P. S. Grachev and Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze initialed an agreement on the creation of Russian military bases on Georgian territory (in Akhalkalaki, Batumi, Vaziani and Gudauta). Georgian President E. Shevardnadze noted that he was satisfied with the agreements on military cooperation with Russia and said that Russian bases in Georgia would become the main stabilizing factor in security throughout Transcaucasian region.

According to the agreement, the bases were provided for 25 years with the possibility of further extension. In November 1999, at the Istanbul OSCE Summit, a Russian-Georgian statement was signed (which became official app to the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe), according to which the Russian military bases in Vaziani and Gudauta must be eliminated before July 1, 2001.

After the start of NATO operations to stabilize the situation in Kosovo and Metohija in the summer of 1999, Georgia sent military personnel to the KFOR contingent in October 1999. Initially, a platoon was sent there; from 2002 to 2003, 100 peacekeepers served in the region, and since 2003, 180 military personnel. On April 15-16, 2008, Georgia stopped participating in the operation and withdrew its military personnel.

In November 2000, conscripts were allowed to legally buy your way out of military service. Initially, a deferment from conscription was granted for 1 year; in April 2005, the payment amount was increased to . In 2010, the payment cost was still US$1,100.

In 2001, the US Department of Defense and the Georgian Ministry of Defense reached an agreement to use specialists from the American private military company MPRI in the interests of reorganizing the Georgian armed forces in accordance with NATO standards.

In 2001, in Vilnius, Lithuanian Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius and Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze signed a military cooperation agreement.

In 2002-2004, a American program"Train and Equip", followed by the "Sustainment and Stability Operations" program. As part of these programs, the main goal of which was to bring the Georgian army into compliance with NATO standards, several battalions of the Georgian army were retrained, and the command of the Ground Forces was actually completely reorganized.

In September 2004, the internal troops of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs were transferred to the subordination of the General Staff of the Georgian Ministry of Defense.

In October 2005, the Concept was adopted national security, in which the United States, Türkiye, the European Union and Ukraine were named as Georgia’s strategic partners.

In October 2006, the government and parliament of Georgia decided to increase the size of the army from 26 thousand to 28 thousand military personnel.

In September 2007, the government and parliament of Georgia decided to increase the size of the army from 28 thousand to 32 thousand military personnel.

In January 2008, Georgian President M. Saakashvili made a statement that Georgia was completing equipping its armed forces with equipment and weapons of NATO standards.

On July 15, 2008, the government and parliament of Georgia decided to increase military spending, as well as increase the size of the army from 32 thousand to 37 thousand military personnel.

Immediately after the end of hostilities in August 2008, the United States allocated $1 billion to Georgia “to restore its military potential.” On January 20, 2009, Assistant Secretary of the US Department of Defense for international security stated that the US will help this country[that is, Georgia] in reforming and modernizing its defense system". On October 14, 2008, US President George W. Bush signed the 2009 military spending bill passed by Congress, which included permission for the Pentagon to assist in the reconstruction of Georgia in the amount of up to $50 million.

In 2008, construction of fortifications around Tbilisi began (in October 2013, Georgian President M. Saakashvili announced that the construction of fortifications was 70% completed).

Also, after the end of the war in South Ossetia, the Georgian government intensified programs for the development of the country’s military-industrial potential, production of weapons and military equipment:

On May 5, 2009, the armored battalion in Mukhrovani declared disobedience to the authorities, but after negotiations the soldiers surrendered to government forces.

According to the report (IISS), the total strength of the Georgian armed forces in 2011 was 20,655 military personnel.

According to the magazine “Foreign military review» in 2012, the total number of armed forces was 37,800 people. The country's mobilization resource is up to 300 thousand people. While IISS in its report for 2012, as well as in 2011, estimated the number of personnel of the Georgian Armed Forces at 20,655 people.

In July 2012, Georgian President M. Saakashvili announced that part of the junior command staff of the Georgian army would undergo training in the United States. In addition, a platoon of military personnel was sent to joint exercises Rapid Trident-2012(July 14-26, 2012)

In July 2013, a new type of uniform was introduced into the Georgian army. On February 10, 2014, samples of a Georgian-made army helmet and body armor were presented to the Minister of Defense.

On December 25, 2014, it was announced that the Georgian armed forces would continue to participate in the operation in Afghanistan after 2014 - one battalion and one company were allocated to participate in NATO’s Operation Resolute Support

On February 5, 2015, at a meeting of NATO defense ministers, a decision was made to create a permanent NATO training center in Tbilisi.

Ground Forces, SV- the only branch of the Georgian Armed Forces. They are designed to conduct combat operations independently or in cooperation with units of the Forces special operations. The main tactical unit in the Ground Forces is the brigade. Ground forces include 5 infantry, 2 artillery, one engineer, one aviation brigade and one brigade air defense. Besides, in combat strength The ground forces have 5 separate battalions: 2 light infantry battalion, communications battalion, electronic warfare battalion and medical battalion.

Ground Forces Aviation- branch of the army as part of the Army. Air Force aviation consists of a separate aviation brigade, as well as a separate helicopter base. Structurally being part of the Ground Forces, it actually combines the functions army aviation and the abolished Air Force. Designed for air support of ground units and units, as well as for reconnaissance.

Special Operations Forces, MTR designed for reconnaissance, special and counter-terrorism operations. Structurally, they represent a group of special operations - the formation of a brigade level of central subordination (directly subordinate to the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces).

National Guard, NG- the basis of the reserve of the Armed Forces. NG is intended to eliminate the consequences of emergency situations, protect important strategic facilities, suppress riots and events civil defense.

In 1997, Georgia ratified the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States ( Status of forces agreement).

In the period from the beginning of 1998 to August 2001, the volume military assistance Georgia received from the United States amounted to $72 million.

In 2002, under the military assistance program, Bulgaria donated free of charge to Georgia a batch of weapons and ammunition worth 89 thousand US dollars (58 PM pistols, 1100 hand grenades, 1 million cartridges for small arms, 578 pcs. 82 mm mortar mines and 70 pcs. 120 mm mortar shells).

In the period from the beginning of 1998 to December 2004, the volume of military assistance received by Georgia from Turkey amounted to $37.4 million.

Arms supplies from Ukraine began in 1999 and increased significantly after the victory of the “Orange Revolution” in 2005.

Active military cooperation with Israel began in 2000, and in October 2007, Israeli military specialists arrived in Georgia. In the period until June 2008, up to 40 unmanned aerial vehicles (including five Hermes-450 and four Skylarks), 100 portable H-PEMBS kits for clearing anti-tank minefields, 50 portable L-PEMBS kits were received from Israel. PEMBS for clearing anti-personnel minefields, 500 camouflage nets; In addition, five Su-25 attack aircraft were upgraded to the level of the Su-25KM “Mimino Stability Operation” (GSSOP I), US military instructors trained 2 thousand Georgian army personnel (3 battalions). The total cost of the first stage of the program was $50 million.

On September 19, 2006, the second phase of the Stability Preservation Operations (GSSOP II) program began and was completed in June 2007. The approved cost of GSSOP II was $40 million, the planned number of trained military personnel was 1 infantry brigade.

At the end of November 2006, an agreement was signed in Tbilisi, according to which Turkey provided Georgia with material and financial assistance in the amount of $1.8 million (part of the amount was transferred to the Ministry of Defense in the form Money, the rest came in the form of " financial assistance») .

By the beginning of May 2008, using funds received from the United States under the military assistance program, 8 thousand military personnel of the Georgian army underwent military training; also, two military bases were built and equipped according to NATO standards: in the city of Senaki (for 3 thousand military personnel, costing $17 million) and a military base 65 km west of Tbilisi (for 4 thousand military personnel, costing $18 million) .

In July 2008, the US-Georgian exercise Immediate Response 2008 was held.

Following the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008, Ukraine resumed arms supplies and military assistance to Georgia in the fall of 2008. In October 2008, 35 T-72 tanks and a batch of ammunition were transferred to Georgia; in December 2008 - rocket launchers BM-21 and a batch of small arms; in March 2009 - anti-tank and anti-personnel mines; in April-May 2009 - equipment and spare parts for Su-25 attack aircraft; in June 2009 - one armored personnel carrier and one anti-aircraft missile system S-200. To pay for these supplies, Georgia transferred 5.6 million US dollars to Ukraine.

Following the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008, Turkey resumed arms supplies and military assistance to Georgia in mid-2009. In total, from 1997 to June 2009, the volume of military assistance received by Georgia from Turkey amounted to more than $45 million, and another $2.65 million was transferred for the purchase of air defense equipment.

At the end of 2008, Romania sent small arms and anti-tank grenades in the amount of 3.6 million euros.

Following the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008, the US resumed training of the Georgian army on September 1, 2009. In October 2009, US military instructors, as part of a program to train Georgian military personnel to participate in the war in Afghanistan, conducted a two-week Immediate Response exercise.

In 2010, the Israeli company Ropadia entered into a contract for the supply of a large batch of weapons to the Georgian army (50 thousand AKS-74 assault rifles, 15 thousand 5.56 mm assault rifles, 1 thousand grenade launchers