It all started with development rockets based on black powder in 1921. N.I. took part in the work on the project. Tikhomirov, V.A. Artemyev from the gas dynamic laboratory.

By 1933, the work was almost completed and official tests began. To launch them, multiply charged aviation and single-shot ground launchers were used. These shells were the prototypes of those later used on the Katyushas. The development team of the Reactive Institute was engaged in finalization.

In 1937-38, rockets of this type were put into service. air force Soviet Union. They were used on the I-15, I-16, I-153 fighters, and later on the Il-2 attack aircraft.

From 1938 to 1941, the Jet Institute was working on the creation of a multi-charge launcher mounted on the basis of truck. In March 1941, ground tests of installations were carried out, which received the name BM-13 - Fighting Machine 132 mm shells.

The combat vehicles were equipped with high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132 mm caliber called M-13, which were put into mass production just a few days before the start of the war. On June 26, 1941, the assembly of the first two serial BM-13s based on the ZIS-6 was completed in Voronezh. On June 28, the installations were tested at a training ground near Moscow and were placed at the disposal of the army.

An experimental battery of seven vehicles under the command of Captain I. Flerov first took part in the battles on July 14, 1941 for the city of Rudnya, occupied by the Germans the day before. Two days later, the same unit fired at the Orsha railway station and the crossing over the Orshitsa River.

The production of BM-13 was established at the plant. Comintern in Voronezh, as well as at the Moscow Compressor. The production of shells was organized at the Moscow plant. Vladimir Ilyich. During the war, several modifications were developed rocket launcher and shells for it.

A year later, in 1942, shells with a caliber of 310 mm were developed. In April 1944, a self-propelled unit with 12 guides was created for them, which was mounted on the chassis of a truck.

origin of name


In order to maintain secrecy, the management strongly recommended calling the BM-13 installation whatever you like, so as not to disclose the details of its characteristics and purpose. For this reason, the soldiers at first called the BM-13 "guards mortar".

As for the affectionate "Katyusha", there are many versions regarding the appearance of such a name for a mortar installation.

One of the versions says that the mortar installation was called "Katyusha" after the name of Matvey Blanter's popular song before the war to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky "Katyusha". The version is very convincing because during the shelling of Rudnya, the installations were located on one of the local hills.

The other version is somewhat more prosaic, but no less soulful. There was an unspoken tradition in the army to give weapons affectionate nicknames. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed "Mother", the ML-20 howitzer gun was called "Emelka". Initially, the BM-13 was called "Raisa Sergeevna" for some time, thus deciphering the abbreviation RS - a rocket.


The installations were such a closely guarded military secret that during the fighting it was strictly forbidden to use traditional commands like "fire", "volley" or "plee". They were replaced by the commands "play" and "sing": to start it was necessary to turn the handle of the generator very quickly.

Well, one more version is quite simple: an unknown soldier wrote the name of his beloved girl on the installation - Katyusha. The nickname stuck.

Tactical and technical characteristics

Chief designer A.V. Kostikov

  • Number of guides - 16
  • Guide length - 5 meters
  • Weight in camping equipment without shells - 5 tons
  • Transition from traveling to combat position - 2 - 3 minutes
  • Time to load the installation - 5 - 8 minutes
  • Volley duration - 4 - 6 seconds
  • Projectile type - jet, high-explosive fragmentation
  • Caliber - 132 mm
  • Maximum projectile speed - 355 m / s
  • Range - 8470 meters

Among legendary weapons, which became symbols of the victory of our country in the Great Patriotic War, a special place is occupied by guards rocket mortars, nicknamed by the people "Katyusha". The characteristic silhouette of a truck of the 40s with an inclined structure instead of a body is the same symbol of resilience, heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers, like, say, the T-34 tank, the Il-2 attack aircraft or the ZiS-3 gun.

And here is what is especially remarkable: all these legendary, glory-covered models of weapons were designed quite shortly or literally on the eve of the war! The T-34 was put into service at the end of December 1939, the first production Il-2s left the assembly line in February 1941, and the ZiS-3 gun was first presented to the leadership of the USSR and the army a month after the outbreak of hostilities, on July 22, 1941. But the most amazing coincidence happened in the fate of "Katyusha". Its demonstration to the party and military authorities took place half a day before the German attack - June 21, 1941 ...

From heaven to earth

In fact, work on the creation of the world's first jet system salvo fire on a self-propelled chassis began in the USSR in the mid-1930s. An employee of the Tula NPO Splav, which produces modern Russian MLRS, Sergey Gurov, managed to find in the archives agreement No. missiles.

Volley guards mortars. Photo: Anatoly Egorov / RIA Novosti

There is nothing to be surprised here, because Soviet rocket scientists created the first combat rockets even earlier: official tests took place in the late 20s and early 30s. In 1937, the RS-82 82 mm caliber rocket was adopted, and a year later, the RS-132 132 mm caliber, both of which were in the variant for underwing installation on aircraft. A year later, at the end of the summer of 1939, the RS-82s were first used in combat. During the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, five I-16s used their "eres" in combat with Japanese fighters, surprising the enemy with new weapons. And a little later, already in time Soviet-Finnish war, six twin-engine SB bombers, already armed with the RS-132, attacked the ground positions of the Finns.

Naturally, they were impressive - and they really were impressive, although to a large extent due to the unexpectedness of the application new system weapons, and not its ultra-high efficiency - the results of the use of "eres" in aviation forced the Soviet party and military leadership to rush the defense industry to create a ground version. Actually, the future "Katyusha" had every chance to be in time for the Winter War: the main design work and tests were carried out back in 1938-1939, but the results of the military were not satisfied - they needed a more reliable, mobile and easy-to-handle weapon.

In general terms, what a year and a half later will enter the soldiers' folklore on both sides of the front as "Katyusha" was ready by the beginning of 1940. In any case, copyright certificate No. 3338 for a “rocket auto-installation for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy using rocket shells” was issued on February 19, 1940, and among the authors were employees of the RNII (since 1938, bearing the “numbered” name NII-3) Andrey Kostikov, Ivan Gvai and Vasily Aborenkov.

This installation was already seriously different from the first samples that entered the field tests at the end of 1938. The rocket launcher was located along the longitudinal axis of the car, had 16 guides, each of which was equipped with two shells. And the shells themselves for this machine were different: the aviation RS-132s turned into longer and more powerful ground-based M-13s.

Actually, in this form, a combat vehicle with rockets entered the review of new types of weapons of the Red Army, which took place on June 15–17, 1941 at a training ground in Sofrino near Moscow. Rocket artillery was left "for a snack": two combat vehicles demonstrated firing on the last day, June 17, using high-explosive fragmentation rockets. The shooting was observed by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Georgy Zhukov, Chief of the Main Artillery Directorate Marshal Grigory Kulik and his deputy General Nikolai Voronov, as well as People's Commissar of Armaments Dmitry Ustinov, People's Commissar of Ammunition Pyotr Goremykin and many other military men. One can only guess what emotions overwhelmed them when they looked at the wall of fire and the fountains of earth that rose on the target field. But it is clear that the demonstration made a strong impression. Four days later, on June 21, 1941, just a few hours before the start of the war, documents were signed on the adoption and urgent deployment of mass production of M-13 rockets and a launcher that received official name BM-13 - "combat vehicle - 13" (according to the rocket index), although sometimes they appeared in documents with the M-13 index. This day should be considered the birthday of Katyusha, which, it turns out, was born only half a day before the start of the Great Patriotic War.

First hit

The production of new weapons was unfolding at two enterprises at once: the Voronezh plant named after the Comintern and the Moscow plant Kompressor, and the Moscow plant named after Vladimir Ilyich became the main enterprise for the production of M-13 shells. The first combat-ready unit - a special jet battery under the command of Captain Ivan Flerov - went to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941.

The commander of the first Katyusha rocket artillery battery, Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov. Photo: RIA Novosti

But here's what's remarkable. The first documents on the formation of divisions and batteries armed with rocket-propelled mortars appeared even before the famous firing near Moscow! For example, the directive of the General Staff on the formation of five divisions armed with new equipment was issued a week before the start of the war - June 15, 1941. But reality, as always, made its own adjustments: in fact, the formation of the first units of field rocket artillery began on June 28, 1941. It was from that moment, as determined by the directive of the commander of the Moscow Military District, that three days were allotted for the formation of the first special battery under the command of Captain Flerov.

According to the preliminary staffing table, which was determined even before the Sofri firing, the rocket artillery battery was supposed to have nine rocket launchers. But the manufacturing plants could not cope with the plan, and Flerov did not have time to receive two of the nine machines - he went to the front on the night of July 2 with a battery of seven rocket-propelled mortars. But do not think that just seven ZIS-6s with guides for launching the M-13 went towards the front. According to the list - there was not and could not be an approved staffing table for a special, that is, in fact, an experimental battery - there were 198 people in the battery, 1 passenger car, 44 trucks and 7 special vehicles, 7 BM-13 (for some reason they appeared in the column "210 mm guns") and one 152 mm howitzer, which served as a sighting gun.

It was in this composition that the Flerov battery went down in history as the first in the Great Patriotic War and the first in the world combat unit of rocket artillery that took part in hostilities. Flerov and his gunners fought their first battle, which later became legendary, on July 14, 1941. At 15:15, as follows from archival documents, seven BM-13s from the battery opened fire on the Orsha railway station: it was necessary to destroy the trains with Soviet military equipment and ammunition that had accumulated there, which did not have time to reach the front and got stuck, falling into the hands of enemy. In addition, reinforcements for the advancing units of the Wehrmacht also accumulated in Orsha, so that an extremely attractive opportunity for the command to solve several strategic tasks at once arose.

And so it happened. By personal order of the Deputy Chief of Artillery Western front General George Cariofilli, the battery struck the first blow. In just a few seconds, a full battery of ammunition was fired at the target - 112 rockets, each of which carried a warhead weighing almost 5 kg - and all hell broke loose on the station. With the second blow, Flerov's battery destroyed the pontoon crossing of the Nazis across the Orshitsa River - with the same success.

A few days later, two more batteries arrived at the front - Lieutenant Alexander Kun and Lieutenant Nikolai Denisenko. Both batteries delivered their first blows to the enemy in the last days of July, the difficult 1941 of the year. And since the beginning of August, the formation of not individual batteries, but entire regiments of rocket artillery began in the Red Army.

Guard of the first months of the war

The first document on the formation of such a regiment was issued on August 4: a resolution of the USSR State Committee for Defense ordered the formation of one guards mortar regiment armed with M-13 installations. This regiment was named after the People's Commissar for General Engineering Petr Parshin - the man who, in fact, turned to the GKO with the idea of ​​​​forming such a regiment. And from the very beginning he offered to give him the rank of guards - a month and a half before the first guards rifle units appeared in the Red Army, and then all the rest.

"Katyusha" on the march. 2nd Baltic Front, January 1945. Photo: Vasily Savransky / RIA Novosti

Four days later, on August 8, the staffing of the Guards Regiment of Rocket Launchers was approved: each regiment consisted of three or four divisions, and each division consisted of three batteries of four combat vehicles. The same directive provided for the formation of the first eight regiments of rocket artillery. The ninth was the regiment named after People's Commissar Parshin. It is noteworthy that already on November 26, the People's Commissariat for General Engineering was renamed the People's Commissariat for Mortar Weapons: the only one in the USSR that dealt with a single type of weapon (it lasted until February 17, 1946)! Is this not evidence of the great importance the country's leadership attached to rocket launchers?

Another evidence of this special attitude was the resolution of the State Committee for Defense, which was issued a month later - on September 8, 1941. This document actually turned rocket mortar artillery into a special, privileged type of armed forces. Guards mortar units were withdrawn from the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army and turned into guards mortar units and formations with their own command. It reported directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and it included the headquarters, the weapons department of the M-8 and M-13 mortar units and operational groups in the main directions.

The first commander of the guards mortar units and formations was military engineer 1st rank Vasily Aborenkov - a man whose name appeared in the author's certificate for "a missile auto-installation for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy using rocket shells." It was Aborenkov who, first as head of the department and then as deputy head of the Main Artillery Directorate, did everything to ensure that the Red Army received new, unprecedented weapons.

After that, the process of forming new artillery units went full steam ahead. The main tactical unit was the regiment of guards mortar units. It consisted of three divisions of rocket launchers M-8 or M-13, an anti-aircraft division, as well as service units. In total, the regiment included 1414 people, 36 combat vehicles BM-13 or BM-8, and from other weapons - 12 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm caliber, 9 anti-aircraft DShK machine guns and 18 light machine guns, not counting small arms of personnel. A volley of one regiment of M-13 rocket launchers consisted of 576 rockets - 16 “eres” in a salvo of each vehicle, and a regiment of M-8 rocket launchers consisted of 1296 rockets, since one machine fired 36 shells at once.

"Katyusha", "Andryusha" and other members of the jet family

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the guards mortar units and formations of the Red Army became a formidable strike force that had a significant impact on the course of hostilities. In total, by May 1945, the Soviet rocket artillery consisted of 40 separate divisions, 115 regiments, 40 separate brigades and 7 divisions - a total of 519 divisions.

These units were armed with three types of combat vehicles. First of all, it was, of course, the Katyushas themselves - BM-13 combat vehicles with 132-mm rockets. It was they who became the most massive in the Soviet rocket artillery during the Great Patriotic War: from July 1941 to December 1944, 6844 such vehicles were produced. Until Lend-Lease Studebaker trucks began to arrive in the USSR, launchers were mounted on the ZIS-6 chassis, and then American three-axle heavy trucks became the main carriers. In addition, there were modifications of launchers to accommodate the M-13 on other Lend-Lease trucks.

The 82 mm Katyusha BM-8 had much more modifications. Firstly, only these installations, due to their small dimensions and weight, could be mounted on the chassis of light tanks T-40 and T-60. Such self-propelled jet artillery mounts received the name BM-8-24. Secondly, installations of the same caliber were mounted on railway platforms, armored boats and torpedo boats, and even on railcars. And on the Caucasian front, they were converted for firing from the ground, without a self-propelled chassis, which would not have been able to turn around in the mountains. But the main modification was the launcher for M-8 rockets on a car chassis: by the end of 1944, 2086 of them were produced. These were mainly BM-8-48s, put into production in 1942: these machines had 24 beams, on which 48 M-8 rockets were installed, they were produced on the chassis of the Form Marmont-Herrington truck. In the meantime, a foreign chassis did not appear, BM-8-36 installations were produced on the basis of the GAZ-AAA truck.

Harbin. Parade of Red Army troops in honor of the victory over Japan. Photo: TASS newsreel

The latest and most powerful modification of the Katyusha was the BM-31-12 guards mortars. Their history began in 1942, when they managed to design a new M-30 rocket projectile, which was the already familiar M-13 with a new warhead of 300 mm caliber. Since they did not change the reactive part of the projectile, a kind of “tadpole” turned out - its resemblance to a boy, apparently, served as the basis for the nickname “Andryusha”. Initially, shells of a new type were launched exclusively from a ground position, directly from a frame-shaped machine, on which shells stood in wooden packages. A year later, in 1943, the M-30 was replaced by the M-31 rocket with a heavier warhead. It was for this new ammunition by April 1944 that the BM-31-12 launcher was designed on the chassis of the three-axle Studebaker.

According to the divisions of the guards mortar units and formations, these combat vehicles were distributed as follows. Of the 40 separate rocket artillery battalions, 38 were armed with BM-13 installations, and only two were armed with BM-8. The same ratio was in 115 regiments of guards mortars: 96 of them were armed with Katyushas in the BM-13 variant, and the remaining 19 - 82-mm BM-8. Guards mortar brigades were not armed with rocket-propelled mortars of caliber less than 310 mm at all. 27 brigades were armed with frame launchers M-30, and then M-31, and 13 - self-propelled M-31-12 on a car chassis.

The one with whom rocket artillery began

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet rocket artillery had no equal on the other side of the front. Despite the fact that the infamous German Nebelwerfer jet mortar, worn by Soviet soldiers nicknamed "Ishak" and "Vanyusha", had an efficiency comparable to the "Katyusha", it was much less mobile and had one and a half times less firing range. The achievements of the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition in the field of rocket artillery were even more modest.

It was only in 1943 that the American army adopted 114-mm M8 rockets, for which three types of launchers were developed. Installations of the T27 type most of all resembled the Soviet Katyushas: they were mounted on off-road trucks and consisted of two packages of eight guides each, installed across the longitudinal axis of the vehicle. It is noteworthy that in the United States they repeated the original Katyusha scheme, which Soviet engineers abandoned: the transverse arrangement of launchers led to a strong buildup of the vehicle at the time of the volley, which catastrophically reduced the accuracy of fire. There was another version of the T23: the same package of eight guides was installed on the Willis chassis. And the most powerful volley was the option of installing the T34: 60 (!) Guides that were installed on the hull of the Sherman tank, right above the turret, because of which guidance in the horizontal plane was carried out by turning the entire tank.

In addition to them, during the Second World War, the US Army also used an improved M16 rocket with a T66 launcher and a T40 launcher on the chassis of medium tanks of the M4 type for 182-mm rockets. And in the UK, since 1941, a five-inch 5” UP rocket has been in service; But all these systems were, in fact, only a semblance of Soviet rocket artillery: they failed to catch up with or surpass the Katyusha either in terms of prevalence, or in terms of combat effectiveness, or in terms of production scale, or in terms of fame. It is no coincidence that the word "Katyusha" to this day serves as a synonym for the word "reactive artillery", and the BM-13 itself became the ancestor of all modern multiple launch rocket systems.

Katyusha - a unique combat vehicle of the USSR unparalleled in the world. It was developed during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, the unofficial name of the barrelless systems of field rocket artillery (BM-8, BM-13, BM-31 and others). Such devices have been actively used Armed Forces USSR during World War II. The popularity of the nickname turned out to be so great that post-war MLRS on automobile chassis, in particular BM-14 and BM-21 Grad, were often called Katyushas in colloquial speech.


"Katyusha" BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis

The fate of the developers:

On November 2, 1937, as a result of a “war of denunciations” within the institute, the director of RNII-3 I. T. Kleymenov and the chief engineer G. E. Langemak were arrested. On January 10 and 11, 1938, respectively, they were shot at the Kommunarka NKVD training ground.
Rehabilitated in 1955.
By decree of the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev dated June 21, 1991, I. T. Kleymenov, G. E. Langemak, V. N. Luzhin, B. S. Petropavlovsky, B. M. Slonimer and N. I. Tikhomirov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.


BM-31-12 on the ZIS-12 chassis in the Museum on Sapun Mountain, Sevastopol


BM-13N on a Studebaker US6 chassis (with lowered exhaust protection armor plates) at the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Moscow

Origin of the name Katyusha

It is known why the BM-13 installations began to be called "guards mortars" at one time. The BM-13 installations were not actually mortars, but the command sought to keep their design secret for as long as possible. When the fighters and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to name the “genuine” name of the combat installation at the firing range, he advised: “Call the installation as usual artillery piece. It's important to maintain secrecy."

There is no single version of why BM-13s began to be called "Katyushas". There are several assumptions:
1. By the name of Blanter's song, which became popular before the war, to the words of Isakovsky "Katyusha". The version is convincing, since for the first time the battery fired on July 14, 1941 (on the 23rd day of the war) at the concentration of Nazis on the Market Square of the city of Rudnya, Smolensk Region. She shot from a high steep mountain - the association with a high steep bank in the song immediately arose among the fighters. Finally, the former sergeant of the headquarters company of the 217th separate communications battalion of the 144th is alive rifle division 20th Army Andrei Sapronov, now a military historian, who gave her this name. The Red Army soldier Kashirin, having arrived with him after the shelling of Rudny on the battery, exclaimed in surprise: “This is a song!” “Katyusha,” Andrey Sapronov answered (from the memoirs of A. Sapronov in the newspaper Rossiya No. 23 of June 21-27, 2001 and in Parliamentary Newspaper No. 80 of May 5, 2005). Through the communication center of the headquarters company, the news about the miracle weapon named "Katyusha" within a day became the property of the entire 20th Army, and through its command - of the whole country. On July 13, 2011, the veteran and “godfather” of Katyusha turned 90 years old.

2. There is also a version that the name is associated with the “K” index on the mortar body - the installations were produced by the Kalinin plant (according to another source, the Comintern plant). And the front-line soldiers liked to give nicknames to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed "Mother", the ML-20 howitzer gun - "Emelka". Yes, and BM-13 at first was sometimes called "Raisa Sergeevna", thus deciphering the abbreviation RS (missile).

3. The third version suggests that this is how the girls from the Moscow Kompressor plant, who worked at the assembly, dubbed these cars.
Another exotic version. The guides on which the shells were mounted were called ramps. The forty-two-kilogram projectile was lifted by two fighters harnessed to the straps, and the third usually helped them, pushing the projectile so that it exactly lay on the guides, he also informed the holders that the projectile had risen, rolled, rolled onto the guides. It was supposedly that they called him “Katyusha” (the role of those who held the projectile and rolled up was constantly changing, since the calculation of the BM-13, unlike barrel artillery, was not explicitly divided into loader, pointer, etc.)

4. It should also be noted that the installations were so classified that it was even forbidden to use the commands “plee”, “fire”, “volley”, instead of them they sounded “sing” or “play” (to start it was necessary to turn the handle of the electric coil very quickly) , which, perhaps, was also associated with the song "Katyusha". And for our infantry, the volley of Katyushas was the most pleasant music.

5. There is an assumption that initially the nickname "Katyusha" had a front-line bomber equipped with rockets - an analogue of the M-13. And the nickname jumped from an airplane to a rocket launcher through shells.

In the German troops, these machines were called "Stalin's organs" because of resemblance rocket launcher with a pipe system of this musical instrument and a powerful stunning roar that was produced when rockets were launched.

During the battles for Poznan and Berlin, the M-30 and M-31 single launchers received the nickname "Russian faustpatron" from the Germans, although these shells were not used as an anti-tank weapon. With "dagger" (from a distance of 100-200 meters) launches of these shells, the guardsmen broke through any walls.


BM-13-16 on the chassis of the STZ-5-NATI tractor (Novomoskovsk)


Soldiers loading the Katyusha

If Hitler's oracles had looked more closely at the signs of fate, then July 14, 1941 would certainly have become a landmark day for them. It was then that in the area of ​​the Orsha railway junction and the crossing over the Orshitsa River Soviet troops For the first time, combat vehicles BM-13 were used, which received the affectionate name "Katyusha" in the army. The result of two volleys on the accumulation of enemy forces was stunning for the enemy. The losses of the Germans fell under the column "unacceptable".

Here are excerpts from the directive to the troops of the Nazi high military command: "The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower cannon ... The shot is fired by electricity ... During the shot, smoke is generated ..." The obvious helplessness of the wording testified to the complete ignorance of the German generals regarding the device and specifications a new Soviet weapon - a rocket-propelled mortar.

A vivid example of the effectiveness of the Guards mortar units, and their basis was the "Katyusha", can serve as a line from the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov: "Rockets by their actions produced complete devastation. I looked at the areas that were being shelled, and saw the complete destruction of defensive structures ... "

The Germans developed a special plan to capture new Soviet weapons and ammunition. late autumn In 1941 they managed to do it. The "captured" mortar was really "multi-barreled" and fired 16 rocket mines. His firepower several times more effective than the mortar, which was in service with the fascist army. Hitler's command decided to create an equivalent weapon.

The Germans did not immediately realize that the Soviet mortar they captured was a truly unique phenomenon, opening a new page in the development of artillery, the era of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).

We must pay tribute to its creators - scientists, engineers, technicians and workers of the Moscow Reactive Research Institute (RNII) and related enterprises: V. Aborenkov, V. Artemiev, V. Bessonov, V. Galkovsky, I. Gvai, I. Kleimenov, A. Kostikov, G. Langemak, V. Luzhin, A. Tikhomirov, L. Schwartz, D. Shitov.

The main difference between BM-13 and similar German weapons was an unusually bold and unexpected concept: mortars could reliably hit all targets of a given square with relatively inaccurate rocket-propelled mines. This was achieved precisely due to the salvo nature of the fire, since each point of the shelled area necessarily fell into the affected area of ​​one of the shells. German designers, realizing the brilliant "know-how" of Soviet engineers, decided to reproduce, if not in the form of a copy, then using the main technical ideas.

Copy "Katyusha" as a combat vehicle was, in principle, possible. Insurmountable difficulties began when trying to design, develop and establish mass production of similar rockets. It turned out that German gunpowder cannot burn in the chamber of a rocket engine as stably and steadily as Soviet ones. The analogues of Soviet ammunition designed by the Germans behaved unpredictably: they either sluggishly descended from the rails to immediately fall to the ground, or they started flying at breakneck speed and exploded in the air from an excessive increase in pressure inside the chamber. Only a few units made it to the target.

The point turned out to be that for effective nitroglycerin powders, which were used in Katyusha shells, our chemists achieved a spread in the values ​​of the so-called heat of explosive transformation no higher than 40 conventional units, and the smaller the spread, the more stable the powder burns. Similar German gunpowder had a spread of this parameter even in one batch above 100 units. This led to unstable operation of rocket engines.

The Germans did not know that ammunition for the Katyusha was the fruit of more than a decade of activity of the RNII and several large Soviet research teams, which included the best Soviet powder factories, outstanding Soviet chemists A. Bakaev, D. Galperin, V. Karkina, G. Konovalova, B Pashkov, A. Sporius, B. Fomin, F. Khritinin and many others. They not only developed the most complex recipes for rocket powders, but also found simple and effective ways their mass, continuous and cheap production.

At a time when Soviet factories, according to ready-made drawings, were deploying at an unprecedented pace and literally increasing daily the production of guards rocket launchers and shells for them, the Germans had only yet to carry out research and design work on MLRS. But history didn't give them time for that.

Materials provided by: S.V. Gurov (Tula)

The list of contract work carried out by the Jet Research Institute (RNII) for the Armored Directorate (ABTU), the final settlement of which was to be carried out in the first quarter of 1936, mentions contract No. 251618s dated January 26, 1935 - a prototype rocket launcher on the BT tank -5 with 10 missiles. Thus, it can be considered proven that the idea of ​​​​creating a mechanized multiply charged installation in the third decade of the 20th century did not appear at the end of the 30s, as previously stated, but at least at the end of the first half of the 20th century. given period. Confirmation of the fact of the idea of ​​using cars for firing rockets in general was also found in the book "Rockets, Their Design and Application", authored by G.E. Langemak and V.P. Glushko, released in 1935. At the end of this book, in particular, the following is written: The main field of application of powder rockets is the armament of light combat vehicles, such as aircraft, small ships, vehicles of various types, and finally escort artillery.".

In 1938, employees of Research Institute No. 3, by order of the Artillery Directorate, carried out work on object No. 138 - a gun for firing 132 mm chemical projectiles. It was required to make non-rapid machines (such as a pipe). Under an agreement with the Artillery Directorate, it was necessary to design and manufacture an installation with a pedestal and a lifting and turning mechanism. One machine was made, which was later recognized as not meeting the requirements. At the same time, Research Institute No. 3 developed a mechanized salvo rocket launcher mounted on a modified chassis of a ZIS-5 truck with an ammunition load of 24 rounds. According to other data from the archives of the State Research Center of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Center of Keldysh” (former Research Institute No. 3), “2 mechanized installations were made on vehicles. They passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky Artfield and partial field tests at the Ts.V.Kh.P. R.K.K.A. with positive results." On the basis of factory tests, it was possible to assert: the flight range of the RHS (depending on specific gravity RH) at a firing angle of 40 degrees is 6000 - 7000m, Vd = (1/100)X and Wb = (1/70)X, the useful volume of RH in the projectile is 6.5 liters, the metal consumption per 1 liter of RH is 3.4 kg / l, the radius of dispersion of explosive agents when a projectile bursts on the ground is 15-20l, the maximum time required to fire the entire ammunition load of the vehicle in 24 shells is 3-4 seconds.

The mechanized rocket launcher was designed to provide a chemical raid with rocket chemical projectiles /SOV and NOV/ 132 mm with a capacity of 7 liters. The installation made it possible to fire at the areas both with single shots and with a volley of 2 - 3 - 6 - 12 and 24 shots. "Installations, combined into batteries of 4-6 vehicles, are a very mobile and powerful means of chemical attack at a distance of up to 7 kilometers."

The installation and a 132 mm chemical rocket projectile for 7 liters of poisonous substance successfully passed field and state tests; its adoption was planned for service in 1939. The table of practical accuracy of rocket-chemical projectiles indicated the data of a mechanized vehicle installation for a surprise attack by firing chemical, high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, lighting, and other rocket projectiles. I-th option without a pickup device - the number of shells of one salvo is 24, the total weight of the poisonous substance of the release of one salvo is 168 kg, 6 automotive installations replace one hundred and twenty howitzers of 152 mm caliber, reload speed of a car by 5-10 minutes. 24 shots, the number of service personnel - 20-30 people. on 6 cars. In artillery systems - 3 Artillery regiments. II-version with control device. Data not specified.

From December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939, unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber and automatic installations were tested. However, the installation was submitted for testing unfinished and did not withstand them: a large number of failures were found during the descent of rockets due to the imperfection of the corresponding units of the installation; the process of loading the launcher was inconvenient and time consuming; the swivel and lifting mechanisms did not provide easy and smooth operation, and the sights did not provide the required pointing accuracy. In addition, the ZIS-5 truck had limited cross-country ability. (See Tests of an automobile rocket launcher on the ZIS-5 chassis, designed by NII-3, drawing No. 199910 for launching 132 mm rockets. (Test time: from 12/8/38 to 02/4/39).

The letter of award for the successful testing in 1939 of a mechanized installation for a chemical attack (outgoing NII No. 3, number 733s dated May 25, 1939 from the director of NII No. 3 Slonimer addressed to the People's Commissar of Munitions comrade Sergeev I.P.) indicates the following participants of the work: Kostikov A.G. - Deputy technical director parts, installation initiator; Gvai I.I. - lead designer; Popov A. A. - design engineer; Isachenkov - assembly mechanic; Pobedonostsev Yu. - prof. advising object; Luzhin V. - engineer; Schwartz L.E. - engineer .

In 1938, the Institute designed the construction of a special chemical motorized team for salvo firing of 72 shots.

In a letter dated February 14, 1939, to Comrade Matveev (V.P.K. of the Defense Committee under the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) signed by the Director of Research Institute No. 3 Slonimer and Deputy. Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer of the 1st rank Kostikov says: “For ground troops, the experience of a chemical mechanized installation should be used for:

  • the use of rocket high-explosive fragmentation shells in order to create massive fire on the squares;
  • use of incendiary, lighting and propaganda projectiles;
  • development of a 203mm caliber chemical projectile and a mechanized installation providing double the chemical power and firing range compared to the existing chemical one.

In 1939, the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 developed two versions of experimental installations on a modified chassis of a ZIS-6 truck for launching 24 and 16 unguided rockets of 132 mm caliber. Installation of the II sample differed from the installation of the I sample in the longitudinal arrangement of the guides.

The ammunition load of the mechanized installation /on the ZIS-6/ for launching chemical and high-explosive fragmentation shells of 132mm caliber /MU-132/ was 16 rocket shells. The firing system provided for the possibility of firing both single shells and a salvo of the entire ammunition load. The time required to produce a volley of 16 missiles is 3.5 - 6 seconds. The time required to reload ammunition is 2 minutes by a team of 3 people. The weight of the structure with a full ammunition load of 2350 kg was 80% of the calculated load of the vehicle.

Field tests of these installations were carried out from September 28 to November 9, 1939 on the territory of the Artillery Research Experimental Range (ANIOP, Leningrad) (see made at ANIOP). The results of field tests showed that the installation of the 1st sample, due to technical imperfections, cannot be admitted to military tests. Installation of the II sample, which also had a number of serious shortcomings, according to the members of the commission, could be admitted to military tests after significant design changes were made. Tests showed that when firing, the installation of the II sample sways and the knockdown of the elevation angle reaches 15 "30", which increases the dispersion of shells, when loading the lower row of guides, the projectile fuse can hit the truss structure. Since the end of 1939, the main attention has been focused on improving the layout and design of the II sample installation and eliminating the shortcomings identified during field tests. In this regard, it is necessary to note the characteristic directions in which the work was carried out. On the one hand, this is a further development of the installation of the II sample in order to eliminate its shortcomings, on the other hand, the creation of a more advanced installation, different from the installation of the II sample. In the tactical and technical assignment for the development of a more advanced installation (“modernized installation for the RS” in the terminology of the documents of those years), signed by Yu.P. Pobedonostsev on December 7, 1940, it was envisaged: to make structural improvements to the lifting and turning device, to increase the angle of horizontal guidance, to simplify the sighting device. It was also envisaged to increase the length of the guides to 6000 mm instead of the existing 5000 mm, as well as the possibility of firing unguided rockets of 132 mm and 180 mm caliber. At a meeting at the technical department of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, it was decided to increase the length of the guides even up to 7000 mm. The deadline for the delivery of the drawings was scheduled for October 1941. Nevertheless, in order to conduct various kinds of tests in the workshops of Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 - 1941, several (in addition to the existing) modernized installations for the RS were manufactured. The total number is indicated differently in different sources: in some - six, in others - seven. In the data of the archive of Research Institute No. 3, as of January 10, 1941, there are data on 7 pieces. (from the document on the readiness of object 224 (topic 24 of the superplan, an experimental series of automatic installations for firing RS-132 mm (in the amount of seven pieces. See UANA GAU letter No. 668059) Based on the available documents, the source claims that there were eight installations, but in different time. On February 28, 1941 there were six of them.

The thematic plan of research and development work for 1940 of the Research Institute No. 3 NKB provided for the transfer to the customer - the AU of the Red Army - six automatic installations for the RS-132mm. The report on the implementation of pilot orders in production for the month of November 1940 at Research Institute No. 3 of the National Design Bureau indicates that with a delivery batch to the customer of six installations, by November 1940, the Quality Control Department accepted 5 units, and the military representative - 4 units.

In December 1939, Research Institute No. 3 was given the task of developing a powerful rocket projectile and a rocket launcher in a short period of time to carry out tasks to destroy long-term enemy defenses on the Mannerheim Line. The result of the work of the institute team was a feathered rocket with a range of 2-3 km with a powerful high-explosive warhead with a ton of explosive and a four-guide installation on a T-34 tank or on a sleigh towed by tractors or tanks. In January 1940, the installation and rockets were sent to the combat area, but soon it was decided to conduct field tests before using them in combat. The installation with shells was sent to the Leningrad scientific and test artillery range. Soon the war with Finland ended. The need for powerful high-explosive shells disappeared. Further installation and projectile work was discontinued.

Department 2n Research Institute No. 3 in 1940 was asked to perform work on the following objects:

  • Object 213 - An electrified installation on a VMS for firing lighting and signaling. R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (Note: for the first time, an electric drive for a rocket artillery combat vehicle was used in the design of the BM-21 combat vehicle of the M-21 Field Rocket System).
  • Object 214 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer with 16 guides, length l = 6mt. for R.S. calibers 140-165mm. (alteration and adaptation of object 204)
  • Object 215 - Electrified installation on the ZIS-6 with a portable supply of R.S. and with a wide range of aiming angles.
  • Object 216 - Charging box for RS on a trailer
  • Object 217 - Installation on a 2-axle trailer for firing long-range missiles
  • Object 218 - Anti-aircraft moving installation for 12 pcs. R.S. caliber 140 mm with electric drive
  • Object 219 - Fixed anti-aircraft installation for 50-80 R.S. caliber 140 mm.
  • Object 220 - Command installation on a ZIS-6 vehicle with a generator electric current, aiming and firing control panel
  • Object 221 - Universal installation on a 2-axle trailer for possible range shooting of RS calibers from 82 to 165 mm.
  • Object 222 - Mechanized installation for escorting tanks
  • Object 223 - Introduction to the industry of mass production of mechanized installations.

In a letter, acting Director of Research Institute No. 3, military engineer 1st rank Kostikov A.G. on the possibility of representation in K.V.Sh. under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR data for the award of the Comrade Stalin Prize, based on the results of work in the period from 1935 to 1940, the following participants in the work are indicated:

  • rocket auto-installation for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy with the help of rocket shells - Authors according to the application certificate GBPRI No. 3338 9.II.40g (author's certificate No. 3338 dated February 19, 1940) Kostikov Andrey Grigorievich, Gvay Ivan Isidorovich, Aborenkov Vasily Vasilevich.
  • tactical and technical justification of the scheme and design of the auto-installation - designers: Pavlenko Alexey Petrovich and Galkovsky Vladimir Nikolaevich.
  • testing rocket high-explosive fragmentation chemical shells of caliber 132 mm. - Shvarts Leonid Emilievich, Artemiev Vladimir Andreevich, Shitov Dmitry Alexandrovich

The basis for submitting Comrade Stalin for the Prize was also the Decision of the Technical Council of the Research Institute No. 3 of the National Design Bureau dated December 26, 1940. ,.

On April 25, 1941, the tactical and technical requirements for the modernization of a mechanized installation for firing rockets were approved.

On June 21, 1941, the installation was demonstrated to the leaders of the CPSU (6) and the Soviet government, and on the same day, just a few hours before the start of World War II, a decision was made to urgently expand the production of M-13 rockets and M-13 installations (see Fig. scheme 1, scheme 2). The production of M-13 installations was organized at the Voronezh plant named after. Comintern and at the Moscow plant "Compressor". One of the main enterprises for the production of rockets was the Moscow plant. Vladimir Ilyich.

During the war, the production of component installations and shells and the transition from mass production to mass production required the creation of a broad structure of cooperation on the territory of the country (Moscow, Leningrad, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg), Nizhny Tagil, Krasnoyarsk, Kolpino, Murom, Kolomna and, possibly, , other). It required the organization of a separate military acceptance of guards mortar units. For more information about the production of shells and their elements during the war years, see our website (further on the links below).

According to various sources, in late July - early August, the formation of Guards mortar units began (see:). In the first months of the war, the Germans already had data on new Soviet weapons (see:).

The date of adoption of the installation and shells M-13 is not documented. The author of this material established only data on the draft Resolution of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Union of February 1940 (See electronic versions of documents:,,). In M. Pervov's book "Stories about Russian rockets" Book One. page 257 states that "August 30, 1941, by the Decree of the State Defense Committee, the BM-13 was adopted by the Red Army." I, Gurov S.V., got acquainted with the electronic images of the GKO Decrees dated August 30, 1941 in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI, Moscow) and did not find in any of them any mention of data on the adoption of the M-13 installation into armament.

In September-October 1941, on the instructions of the Main Directorate of Armament of the Guards Mortar Units, the M-13 installation was developed on the chassis of the STZ-5 NATI tractor modified for mounting. The development was entrusted to the Voronezh plant. Comintern and SKB at the Moscow plant "Compressor". SKB performed the development more efficiently, and prototypes were manufactured and tested in a short time. As a result, the installation was put into service and put into mass production.

In the December days of 1941, the Design Bureau, on the instructions of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, developed, in particular, a 16-charger installation on an armored railway platform for the defense of the city of Moscow. The installation was a throwing installation of the M-13 serial installation on a modified chassis of a ZIS-6 truck with a modified base. (for more details on other works of this period and the period of the war as a whole, see: and).

At a technical meeting in the SKB on April 21, 1942, it was decided to develop a normalized installation, known as the M-13N (after the war BM-13N). The aim of the development was to create the most advanced installation, the design of which would take into account all the changes made earlier in various modifications M-13 installations and the creation of such a throwing installation that could be manufactured and assembled on a stand and assembled and assembled on the chassis of a car of any brand without a large revision of technical documentation, as was the case before. The goal was achieved by dismembering the M-13 installation into separate units. Each node was considered as an independent product with an index assigned to it, after which it could be used as a borrowed product in any installation.

During the development of components and parts for the normalized BM-13N combat installation, the following were obtained:

    increase in the area of ​​fire by 20%

    reduction of efforts on the handles of guidance mechanisms by one and a half to two times;

    doubling the vertical aiming speed;

    increasing the survivability of the combat installation due to the reservation of the rear wall of the cabin; gas tank and gas pipeline;

    increasing the stability of the installation in the stowed position by introducing a support bracket to disperse the load on the side members of the vehicle;

    increase in the operational reliability of the unit (simplification of the support beam, rear axle, etc.;

    a significant reduction in the amount of welding work, machining, the exclusion of bending truss rods;

    reduction in the weight of the installation by 250 kg, despite the introduction of armor on the rear wall of the cab and gas tank;

    reduction of production time for the manufacture of the installation by assembling the artillery unit separately from the chassis of the vehicle and mounting the installation on the chassis of the vehicle using mounting clamps, which made it possible to eliminate drilling holes in the spars;

    reduction by several times of the idle time of the chassis of vehicles that arrived at the plant for installation of the installation;

    reduction in the number of fastener sizes from 206 to 96, as well as the number of parts: in the swing frame - from 56 to 29, in the truss from 43 to 29, in the support frame - from 15 to 4, etc. The use of normalized components and products in the design of the installation made it possible to apply a high-performance flow method for the assembly and installation of the installation.

The thrower was mounted on a modified truck chassis of the Studebaker series (see photo) with a 6x6 wheel formula, which were supplied under Lend-Lease. The normalized M-13N installation was adopted by the Red Army in 1943. The installation became the main model used until the end of the Great Patriotic War. Other types of modified truck chassis of foreign brands were also used.

At the end of 1942, V.V. Aborenkov suggested adding two additional pins to the M-13 projectile in order to launch it from dual guides. For this purpose, a prototype was made, which was a serial M-13 installation, in which the swinging part (guides and truss) was replaced. The guide consisted of two steel strips placed on edge, in each of them a groove was cut for the drive pin. Each pair of strips was fastened opposite each other with grooves in a vertical plane. The field tests carried out did not give the expected improvement in the accuracy of fire and the work was stopped.

At the beginning of 1943, SKB specialists carried out work on the creation of installations with a normalized throwing installation of the M-13 installation on the modified chassis of Chevrolet and ZIS-6 trucks. During January - May 1943, a prototype was made on a modified Chevrolet truck chassis and field tests were carried out. The installations were adopted by the Red Army. However, due to the presence of a sufficient number of chassis of these brands, they did not go into mass production.

In 1944, Special Design Bureau specialists developed the M-13 installation on the armored chassis of the ZIS-6 car modified for the installation of a throwing installation for launching M-13 shells. For this purpose, the normalized “beam” guides of the M-13N installation were shortened to 2.5 meters and assembled into a package on two spars. The truss was made shortened from pipes in the form of a pyramidal frame, turned upside down, served mainly as a support for attaching the screw of the lifting mechanism. The elevation angle of the guide package was changed from the cab using handwheels and a cardan shaft for the vertical guidance mechanism. A prototype was made. However, due to the weight of the armor, the front axle and springs of the ZIS-6 vehicle were overloaded, as a result of which further installation work was stopped.

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, the specialists of the SKB and the developers of rockets were asked to improve the accuracy of fire of 132 mm caliber shells. To give rotational motion, the designers introduced tangential holes into the design of the projectile along the diameter of the head working belt. The same solution was used in the design of the standard projectile, and was proposed for the projectile. As a result of this, the accuracy indicator increased, but there was a decrease in the indicator in terms of flight range. Compared to the standard M-13 projectile, whose flight range was 8470 m, the range of the new projectile, which received the M-13UK index, was 7900 m. Despite this, the projectile was adopted by the Red Army.

In the same period, specialists from NII-1 (Lead Designer Bessonov V.G.) developed and then tested the M-13DD projectile. The projectile had the best accuracy in terms of accuracy, but they could not be fired from standard M-13 installations, since the projectile had a rotational motion and, when launched from ordinary standard guides, destroyed them, tearing off the lining from them. To a lesser extent, this also took place during the launch of M-13UK projectiles. The M-13DD projectile was adopted by the Red Army at the end of the war. Mass production of the projectile was not organized.

At the same time, SKB specialists began exploratory design studies and experimental work to improve the accuracy of firing rockets and by working out guides. It was based on new principle launching rockets and ensuring their strength is sufficient for firing M-13DD and M-20 projectiles. Since giving rotation to feathered rocket unguided projectiles in the initial segment of their flight trajectory improved accuracy, the idea was born to impart rotation to projectiles on guides without drilling tangential holes in the projectiles, which consume part of the engine power to rotate them and thereby reduce their flight range. This idea led to the creation of spiral guides. The design of the spiral guide has taken the form of a trunk formed by four spiral bars, of which three are smooth steel pipes, and the fourth, the leading one, is made of a steel square with selected grooves forming an H-shaped section profile. The bars were welded to the legs of the annular clips. In the breech there was a lock to hold the projectile in the guide and electrical contacts. A special equipment was created for bending guide rods in a spiral, having different angles of twisting along their length and welding guide shafts. Initially, the installation had 12 guides rigidly connected into four cassettes (three guides per cassette). Prototypes of a 12-charger were developed and manufactured. However, sea trials showed that the chassis of the car was overloaded, and it was decided to remove two guides from the upper cassettes from the installation. The launcher was mounted on a modified chassis of a Studebeker off-road truck. It consisted of a set of rails, a truss, a swing frame, a subframe, a sight, vertical and horizontal guidance mechanisms, and electrical equipment. In addition to cassettes with guides and farms, all other nodes were unified with the corresponding nodes of the normalized M-13N combat installation. With the help of the M-13-SN installation, it was possible to launch M-13, M-13UK, M-20 and M-13DD shells of 132 mm caliber. Significantly better results were obtained in terms of accuracy of fire: with M-13 shells - 3.2 times, M-13UK - 1.1 times, M-20 - 3.3 times, M-13DD - 1.47 times) . With the improvement in the accuracy of firing with M-13 rocket projectiles, the flight range did not decrease, as was the case when firing M-13UK shells from M-13 installations that had beam-type guides. There was no need to manufacture M-13UK shells, complicated by drilling in the engine case. The M-13-CH installation was simpler, less laborious and cheaper to manufacture. A number of labor-intensive machine work has disappeared: gouging long guides, drilling a large number of rivet holes, riveting linings to guides, turning, calibrating, manufacturing and threading spars and nuts for them, complex machining of locks and lock boxes, etc. Prototypes were manufactured at the Moscow plant "Kompressor" (No. 733) and were subjected to ground and sea trials, which ended with good results. After the end of the war, the M-13-SN installation in 1945 passed military tests with good results. Due to the fact that the modernization of the M-13 type shells was coming, the installation was not put into service. After the 1946 series, on the basis of the order of the NKOM No. 27 dated 10/24/1946, the installation was discontinued. However, in 1950 a Brief Guide to the BM-13-SN Combat Vehicle was issued.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, one of the directions for the development of rocket artillery was the use of throwing installations developed during the war for mounting on modified types of domestic-made chassis. Several options were created based on the installation of the M-13N on the modified truck chassis ZIS-151 (see photo), ZIL-151 (see photo), ZIL-157 (see photo), ZIL-131 (see photo) .

Installations of the M-13 type after the war were exported to different countries. One of them was China (see photo from the military parade on the occasion national day 1956, held in Beijing (Beijing).

In 1959, while working on a projectile for the future Field Rocket System, the developers were interested in the issue of technical documentation for the production of the ROFS M-13. This is what was written in a letter to the Deputy Director for Research at NII-147 (now FSUE "GNPP Splav" (Tula), signed by Toporov, Chief Engineer of Plant No. 63 of the SSNH Toporov (State Plant No. 63 of the Sverdlovsk Economic Council, 22.VII.1959 No. 1959c): "In response to your request for No. 3265 dated 3 / UII-59 on sending technical documentation for the production of ROFS M-13, I inform you that at present the plant does not produce this product, but the classification has been removed from the technical documentation.

The plant has outdated tracing papers of the technological process of machining the product. The plant has no other documentation.

Due to the workload of the photocopier, the album of technical processes will be blue-printed and sent to you no earlier than in a month.

Compound

Main cast:

  • Installations M-13 (combat vehicles M-13, BM-13) (see. gallery images M-13).
  • Main rockets M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1.
  • Ammunition transport vehicles (transport vehicles).

The M-13 projectile (see diagram) consisted of two main parts: the warhead and the reactive part (jet powder engine). The warhead consisted of a body with a fuse point, the bottom of the warhead and an explosive charge with an additional detonator. The jet powder engine of the projectile consisted of a chamber, a nozzle cover that closed to seal the powder charge with two cardboard plates, a grate, a powder charge, an igniter and a stabilizer. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there were two centering thickenings with guide pins screwed into them. The guide pins held the projectile on the guide of the combat vehicle until the shot and directed its movement along the guide. A powder charge of nitroglycerin gunpowder was placed in the chamber, consisting of seven identical cylindrical single-channel checkers. In the nozzle part of the chamber, the checkers rested on the grate. To ignite the powder charge, an igniter made of smoky gunpowder is inserted into the upper part of the chamber. Gunpowder was placed in a special case. Stabilization of the M-13 projectile in flight was carried out using the tail unit.

The flight range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but at the same time there was a very significant dispersion. In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, which received the designation M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of fire at the M-13-UK projectile, 12 tangentially located holes are made in the front centering thickening of the rocket part (see photo 1, photo 2), through which during operation rocket engine part of the powder gases comes out, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the range of the projectile was somewhat reduced (to 7.9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and to an increase in the density of fire by 3 times compared to the M-13 projectiles. In addition, the diameter of the critical section of the nozzle of the M-13-UK projectile is somewhat smaller than that of the M-13 projectile. The M-13-UK projectile was adopted by the Red Army in April 1944. The M-13UK-1 projectile with improved accuracy was equipped with flat stabilizers made of steel sheet.

Tactical and technical characteristics

Characteristic M-13 BM-13N BM-13NM BM-13NMM
Chassis ZIS-6 ZIS-151,ZIL-151 ZIL-157 ZIL-131
Number of guides 8 8 8 8
Elevation angle, hail:
- minimal
- maximum

+7
+45

8±1
+45

8±1
+45

8±1
+45
Angle of horizontal fire, degrees:
- to the right of the chassis
- to the left of the chassis

10
10

10
10

10
10

10
10
Handle force, kg:
- lifting mechanism
- swivel mechanism

8-10
8-10

up to 13
up to 8

up to 13
up to 8

up to 13
up to 8
Dimensions in the stowed position, mm:
- length
- width
- height

6700
2300
2800

7200
2300
2900

7200
2330
3000

7200
2500
3200
Weight, kg:
- guide package
- artillery unit
- installations in combat position
- installation in the stowed position (without calculation)

815
2200
6200
-

815
2350
7890
7210

815
2350
7770
7090

815
2350
9030
8350
2-3
5-10
Full salvo time, s 7-10
The main performance data of the combat vehicle BM-13 (at Studebaker) 1946
Number of guides 16
Applied projectile M-13, M-13-UK and 8 M-20 rounds
Guide length, m 5
Guide type rectilinear
Minimum elevation angle, ° +7
Maximum elevation angle, ° +45
Angle of horizontal guidance, ° 20
8
Also, on the rotary mechanism, kg 10
Overall dimensions, kg:
length 6780
height 2880
width 2270
Weight of a set of guides, kg 790
Weight of artillery piece without shells and without chassis, kg 2250
The weight of the combat vehicle without shells, without calculation, with a full refueling of gasoline, snow chains, tools and spare parts. wheel, kg 5940
Weight of a set of shells, kg
M13 and M13-UK 680 (16 rounds)
M20 480 (8 rounds)
The weight of the combat vehicle with the calculation of 5 people. (2 in the cockpit, 2 on the rear fenders and 1 on the gas tank) with a full gas station, tools, snow chains, a spare wheel and M-13 shells, kg 6770
Axle loads from the weight of the combat vehicle with the calculation of 5 people, full refueling with spare parts "" and M-13 shells, kg:
to the front 1890
to the back 4880
Basic data of combat vehicles BM-13
Characteristic BM-13N on a modified truck chassis ZIL-151 BM-13 on a modified truck chassis ZIL-151 BM-13N on a modified truck chassis of the Studebaker series BM-13 on a modified truck chassis of the Studebaker series
Number of guides* 16 16 16 16
Guide length, m 5 5 5 5
The greatest elevation angle, hail 45 45 45 45
The smallest elevation angle, hail 8±1° 4±30 " 7 7
Angle of horizontal aiming, hail ±10 ±10 ±10 ±10
Effort on the handle of the lifting mechanism, kg up to 12 up to 13 to 10 8-10
Force on the handle of the rotary mechanism, kg up to 8 up to 8 8-10 8-10
Guide package weight, kg 815 815 815 815
Artillery unit weight, kg 2350 2350 2200 2200
The weight of the combat vehicle in the stowed position (without people), kg 7210 7210 5520 5520
The weight of the combat vehicle in combat position with shells, kg 7890 7890 6200 6200
Length in the stowed position, m 7,2 7,2 6,7 6,7
Width in the stowed position, m 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3
Height in the stowed position, m 2,9 3,0 2,8 2,8
Transfer time from traveling to combat position, min 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-3
Time required to load a combat vehicle, min 5-10 5-10 5-10 5-10
Time required to produce a volley, sec 7-10 7-10 7-10 7-10
Combat vehicle index 52-U-9416 8U34 52-U-9411 52-TR-492B
NURS M-13, M-13UK, M-13UK-1
Ballistic index TS-13
head type high-explosive fragmentation
Fuse type GVMZ-1
Caliber, mm 132
Full projectile length, mm 1465
Span of stabilizer blades, mm 300
Weight, kg:
- fully equipped projectile
- equipped warhead
- bursting charge of the warhead
- powder rocket charge
- equipped jet engine

42.36
21.3
4.9
7.05-7.13
20.1
Projectile weight coefficient, kg/dm3 18.48
Head part filling ratio, % 23
The strength of the current required to ignite the squib, A 2.5-3
0.7
Average reactive force, kgf 2000
Projectile exit speed from the guide, m/s 70
125
Maximum projectile speed, m/s 355
Tabular maximum range of the projectile, m 8195
Deviation at maximum range, m:
- by range
- side

135
300
Powder charge burning time, s 0.7
Average reactive force, kg 2000 (1900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Muzzle velocity of the projectile, m/s 70
The length of the active section of the trajectory, m 125 (120 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
Maximum projectile speed, m/s 335 (for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)
The greatest range of the projectile, m 8470 (7900 for M-13UK and M-13UK-1)

According to the English catalog Jane "s Armor and Artillery 1995-1996, section Egypt, in the mid-90s of the XX century, due to the impossibility of obtaining, in particular, shells for combat vehicles of the M-13 type, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (Arab Organization for Industrialisation) was engaged in the production of 132 mm caliber rockets.Analysis of the data below allows us to conclude that we are talking about a projectile of the M-13UK type.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization included Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia with the majority of production facilities located in Egypt and with the main funding from the Gulf countries. Following the Egyptian-Israeli agreement in mid-1979, the other three members of the Persian Gulf countries withdrew their financial resources, intended for the Arab Organization for Industrialization, and at that time (data from the Jane's Armor and Artillery 1982-1983 catalog) Egypt received other assistance in projects.

Characteristics of the 132 mm Sakr rocket (RS type M-13UK)
Caliber, mm 132
Length, mm
full shell 1500
head part 483
rocket engine 1000
Weight, kg:
starting 42
head part 21
fuse 0,5
rocket engine 21
fuel (charge) 7
Maximum plumage span, mm 305
head type high-explosive fragmentation (with 4.8 kg of explosive)
Fuse type inertial cocked, contact
Type of fuel (charge) dibasic
Maximum range (at elevation angle 45º), m 8000
Maximum projectile speed, m/s 340
Fuel (charge) burning time, s 0,5
Projectile speed when meeting with an obstacle, m/s 235-320
Minimum fuse cocking speed, m/s 300
Distance from the combat vehicle for cocking the fuse, m 100-200
Number of oblique holes in the rocket engine housing, pcs 12

Testing and operation

The first battery of field rocket artillery, sent to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941 under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov, was armed with seven installations made in the workshops of Research Institute No. The battery wiped out the Orsha railway junction from the face of the earth, along with the German echelons with troops and military equipment on it.

The exceptional effectiveness of the actions of the battery of Captain I. A. Flerov and the seven more such batteries formed after it contributed to the rapid increase in the pace of production of jet weapons. Already in the autumn of 1941, 45 divisions of three-battery composition with four launchers in the battery operated on the fronts. For their armament in 1941, 593 M-13 installations were manufactured. As military equipment arrived from industry, the formation of rocket artillery regiments began, consisting of three divisions armed with M-13 launchers and an anti-aircraft division. The regiment had 1414 personnel, 36 M-13 launchers and 12 anti-aircraft 37-mm guns. The volley of the regiment was 576 shells of 132mm caliber. At the same time, the living force Combat vehicles the enemy was destroyed on an area of ​​over 100 hectares. Officially, the regiments were called Guards Mortar Regiments of Artillery Reserve. Supreme High Command. Unofficially, rocket artillery installations were called "Katyusha". According to the memoirs of Evgeny Mikhailovich Martynov (Tula), former child during the war years, in Tula at first they were called infernal machines. From ourselves, we note that multi-charged machines were also called infernal machines in the 19th century.

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