What the Russian "Katyusha" is, the German - "hell flames." The nickname that the Wehrmacht soldiers gave to the Soviet rocket artillery combat vehicle was fully justified. In just 8 seconds, a regiment of 36 BM-13 mobile units fired 576 shells at the enemy. feature salvo fire was that one blast wave was superimposed on another, the law of addition of impulses came into force, which greatly increased the destructive effect. Fragments of hundreds of mines, heated to 800 degrees, destroyed everything around. As a result, an area of ​​100 hectares turned into a scorched field, riddled with craters from shells. It was possible to escape only to those Nazis who, at the time of the salvo, were lucky enough to be in a securely fortified dugout. The Nazis called this pastime a "concert." The fact is that the Katyusha volleys were accompanied by a terrible roar, for this sound the Wehrmacht soldiers awarded rocket launchers with another nickname - "Stalin's organs".

See in the AiF.ru infographic what the BM-13 rocket artillery system looked like.

The birth of "Katyusha"

In the USSR, it was customary to say that the “Katyusha” was created not by any individual designer, but by the Soviet people. The best minds of the country really worked on the development of combat vehicles. To creation rockets on smokeless powder in 1921 began employees of the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory N. Tikhomirov And V. Artemiev. In 1922, Artemiev was accused of espionage and next year sent to serve his term in Solovki, in 1925 he returned back to the laboratory.

In 1937, the RS-82 rockets, which were developed by Artemiev, Tikhomirov and who joined them G. Langemak, were adopted by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet. In the same year, in connection with the Tukhachevsky case, all those who worked on new types of weapons were subjected to a “cleansing” by the NKVD. Langemak was arrested as a German spy and shot in 1938. In the summer of 1939, aircraft rockets developed with his participation were successfully used in battles with Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River.

From 1939 to 1941 employees of the Moscow Jet Research Institute I. Gvai,N. Galkovsky,A. Pavlenko,A. Popov worked on the creation of a self-propelled multiply charged installation jet fire. On June 17, 1941, she took part in a demonstration of the latest types of artillery weapons. The tests were attended People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko, his Deputy Grigory Kulik And Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov.

Self-propelled rocket launchers were shown last, and at first, trucks with iron guides fixed on top did not make any impression on the tired representatives of the commission. But the volley itself was remembered by them for a long time: according to eyewitnesses, the commanders, seeing the rising column of flame, fell into a stupor for a while. Timoshenko was the first to come to his senses, he sharply turned to his deputy: “Why were they silent and did not report about the presence of such weapons?” Kulik tried to justify himself by saying that this artillery system had simply not been fully developed until recently. On June 21, 1941, just a few hours before the start of the war, after inspecting the rocket launchers, he decided to deploy them serial production.

The feat of Captain Flerov

The first commander of the first Katyusha battery was Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov. The country's leadership chose Flerov to test top-secret weapons, including because he showed himself well during Soviet-Finnish war. At that time, he commanded a battery of the 94th howitzer artillery regiment, whose fire managed to break through. For his heroism in the battles near Lake Saunajärvi, Flerov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

A full-fledged baptism of fire "Katyusha" took place on July 14, 1941. Rocket artillery vehicles under the leadership of Flerov fired volleys at railway station Orsha, which was focused a large number of manpower, equipment and provisions of the enemy. Here is what he wrote about these volleys in his diary Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Franz Halder: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used a hitherto unknown weapon. A fiery flurry of shells burned down the Orsha railway station, all trains with personnel and military equipment of the arrived military units. The metal melted, the earth burned.

Adolf Gitler I met the news about the appearance of a new Russian miracle weapon very painfully. chief Wilhelm Franz Canaris received a thrashing from the Fuhrer for the fact that his department had not yet stolen the drawings of rocket launchers. As a result, a real hunt was announced for the Katyushas, ​​to which chief saboteur of the Third Reich Otto Skorzeny.

Flerov's battery, meanwhile, continued to smash the enemy. After Orsha, successful operations near Yelnya and Roslavl followed. On October 7, Flerov and his Katyushas were surrounded in the Vyazma cauldron. The commander did everything to save the battery and break through to his own, but in the end he was ambushed near the village of Bogatyr. Caught in a hopeless situation, and his fighters took an unequal battle. The Katyushas fired all the shells at the enemy, after which Flerov self-detonated the rocket launcher, the rest of the batteries followed the example of the commander. To take prisoners, as well as to receive an "iron cross" for the capture of top-secret equipment, the Nazis failed in that battle.

Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory, the commander of the first Katyusha battery was awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

"Katyusha" against "donkey"

Along the front lines of the Great Patriotic War, the Katyusha often had to exchange salvos with the Nebelwerfer (German Nebelwerfer - “fog thrower”) - a German rocket launcher. For the characteristic sound that this six-barreled 150 mm mortar made when firing, soviet soldiers They called him "the donkey". However, when the soldiers of the Red Army fought off enemy equipment, the contemptuous nickname was forgotten - in the service of our artillery, the trophy immediately turned into a “vanyusha”. True, the Soviet soldiers did not have tender feelings for this weapon. The fact is that the installation was not self-propelled, the 540-kilogram jet mortar had to be towed. When fired, his shells left a thick plume of smoke in the sky, which unmasked the positions of the artillerymen, who could immediately be covered by the fire of enemy howitzers.

Nebelwerfer. German rocket launcher. Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

The best designers of the Third Reich did not manage to design their analogue of the Katyusha until the end of the war. German developments either exploded during tests at the training ground, or did not differ in firing accuracy.

Why was the volley fire system nicknamed "Katyusha"?

Soldiers at the front liked to give names to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was called "Mother", the ML-20 howitzer gun - "Emelka". BM-13, at first, was sometimes called "Raisa Sergeevna", as the front-line soldiers deciphered the abbreviation RS (rocket). Who and why was the first to call the rocket launcher "Katyusha" is not known for certain. The most common versions link the appearance of the nickname:

• with a song popular during the war years M. Blanter into words M. Isakovsky"Katyusha";
• with the letter "K" embossed on the installation frame. Thus, the plant named after the Comintern marked its products;
• with the name of the beloved of one of the fighters, which he wrote on his BM-13.

*Mannerheim line- a complex of defensive structures 135 km long on the Karelian Isthmus.

**Abwehr- (German Abwehr - "defense", "reflection") - the body of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Germany in 1919-1944. He was a member of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

*** The last combat report of Captain Flerov: "7 Oct. 1941 9 p.m. We were surrounded by the village of Bogatyr - 50 km from Vyazma. We will hold on to the end. No exit. Getting ready to explode. Farewell, comrades."

Despite the fact that 67 years have passed since the victorious end of the Great Patriotic War, many historical facts need to be clarified and more carefully considered. This also applies to the episode. initial period of the war, when the Katyushas fired their first salvo at the concentration of German troops at the Orsha railway station. Well-known historians-researchers Alexander Osokin and Alexander Kornyakov, based on archival data, suggest that the first Katyusha volley was fired at other Katyusha installations in order to prevent their capture by the enemy.

Three sources of information about the first salvo "Katyusha"

71 years ago, on July 14, 1941, at 15:15, the first volley of an unprecedented new type of weapon, rocket artillery, thundered against the enemy. Seven Soviet BM-13-16 multiple rocket launchers (combat vehicles with 16 132 mm rockets each), mounted on a ZIL-6 automobile chassis (soon to be called "Katyusha"), simultaneously hit the railway station of the city of Orsha, clogged with German trains with severe military equipment, ammunition and fuel.

The effect of the simultaneous (7-8 sec.) impact of 112 132 mm caliber rockets was amazing in the literal and figurative sense - at first the earth shuddered and rumbled, and then everything blazed. Thus, the First Separate Experimental Rocket Artillery Battery under the command of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov entered the Great Patriotic War... Such is the interpretation of the Katyusha's first salvo known today.

Photo.1 Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov

Until now, the main source of information about this event remains the combat log (ZhBD) of the Flerov battery, where there are two entries: “July 14, 1941, 3:15 p.m. They struck at the fascist trains at the Orsha railway junction. The results are excellent. A continuous sea of ​​\u200b\u200bfire"

And “14.7. 1941 16 hours 45 minutes. Volley at the crossing of the Nazi troops through Orshitsa. Big losses the enemy in manpower and military equipment, panic. All the Nazis who survived on the east coast were taken prisoner by our units ... ".

Let's call it Source #1 . We are inclined to believe, however, that these are not texts from the ZhBD of Flerov’s battery, but from two combat reports sent by him to the Center by radio, because then no one in the battery had the right to have any documents or any papers with him.

Photo.2 Volley "Katyusha"

The story of the designer Popov. This is mentioned in the second main source of information about the fate and feat of the Flerov battery - the story of one of the participants in the development of "Katyusha" design engineer NII-3 Alexei Popov, which was recorded by the famous Soviet journalist Yaroslav Golovanov in 1983. Here is its content:

Photo.3 Constructor Alexey Popov

« On June 22, the war began. By June 24, we received an order to prepare three installations for shipment to the front. At that time, we had 7 RUs and about 4.5 thousand PCs for them. On June 28, I was called to the research institute. - “You and Dmitry Aleksandrovich Shitov will go with a battery to the front, to teach new technology ...”

So I found myself at the disposal of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov. He managed to finish only the first year of the Academy. Dzerzhinsky, but was already a shelled commander: he participated in the Finnish campaign. Zhuravlyov, the political officer of the battery, selected reliable people from military registration and enlistment offices.

Muscovites, Gorky, Chuvashs served with us. Secrecy hindered us in many ways. For example, we could not use the combined arms services, we had our own medical unit, our own technical unit. All this made us clumsy: 7 rocket launchers accounted for 150 vehicles with attendants. On the night of July 1-2, we left Moscow.

Photo.4 Preparing "Katyusha" for combat work

On the Borodino field they swore: under no circumstances should they give the installation to the enemy. When there were especially curious people who tried to find out what we were carrying, we said that under the covers there were sections of pontoon bridges.

They tried to bomb us, after which we received an order: to move only at night. July 9th we arrived at Borisov district, deployed the position: 4 installations to the left of the highway, 3 RU and 1 aiming gun - to the right. They stayed there until July 13th. We were forbidden to fire from any type of personal weapon: pistols, 10-shot semi-automatic rifles, Degtyarev machine gun.

Each of them also had two grenades. They sat idle. Time spent studying. It was forbidden to take notes. Shitov and I spent endless practical lessons". Once the Messerschmidt-109 passed low over our battery, the soldiers could not stand it and fired at it from rifles. He turned around and, in turn, fired at us with a machine gun. After that we moved a little...

On the night of July 12-13, we were alerted. Our gunners pushed the cannon forward. An armored car drives up: “What part ?!” It turned out that we were so classified that the detachments that were supposed to hold the defense left. "The bridge will be blown up in 20 minutes, leave immediately!"

We left for Orsha. July 14 went to rn railway a node where many echelons were concentrated: ammunition, fuel, manpower and equipment. We stopped 5-6 km from the hub: 7 cars with RC and 3 cars with shells for a second salvo. They did not take the gun: direct visibility.

At 15:15 Flerov gave the order to open fire. A volley (7 vehicles with 16 rounds each, total 112 rounds) lasted 7-8 seconds. The railway junction was destroyed. There were no Germans in Orsha itself for 7 days. We got away right away. The commander was already in the cockpit, raised the jacks and go! They went into the woods and sat there.

The place where we shot from, the Germans then bombed. We got a taste of it and an hour and a half later we destroyed the German crossing. After the second salvo, they left along the Minsk highway towards Smolensk. We already knew that they would be looking for us…”.

Let's call it Source #2.

Report of two marshals about "Katyusha"

99% of all publications about the first volleys of the Katyusha and the fate of the Flerov battery are based only on these two sources. However, there is another very authoritative source of information about the first salvos of the Flerov battery - a daily report of the High Command of the Western Direction (Marshals of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko and B.M. Shaposhnikov) to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (I.V. Stalin) dated July 24, 1941 of the year. It says:

“The 20th army of Comrade Kurochkin, holding back attacks of up to 7 enemy divisions, defeated two German divisions, especially the newly arrived at the front 5 infantry division advancing on Rudnya and to the east. Especially effective and successful in defeating the 5th Infantry Division was the RS battery, which with three volleys at the enemy concentrated in Rudnya inflicted such losses on him that he took out the wounded all day and picked up the dead, stopping the offensive for the whole day. There are 3 volleys left in the battery. Please send two or three more batteries with charges ”(TsAMO, f. 246, op. 12928 ss, d. 2, ll. 38-41). Let's call it Source #3.

For some reason, it does not mention the volleys of the Flerov battery on July 14 across the Orsha and across the Orshitsa crossing, and does not indicate the date of its three volleys in Rudna.

Colonel Andrei Petrov's version

Having carefully studied all the circumstances of the first volley of Katyushas, ​​Andrey Petrov (engineer, retired colonel) in his article “The Mystery of the First Katyusha Volley” (NVO for June 20, 2008) made an unexpected conclusion: On July 14, 1941, the BM-13 battery of Captain Ivan Flerov fired at the accumulation of not enemy, but Soviet echelons with strategic cargo at the Orsha railway station!

This paradox is A. Petrov's brilliant guess. He gives several convincing arguments in her favor (we will not repeat) and leads to a number of questions related to the mysteries of the first salvo of the Katyusha and the fate of Captain Flerov and his battery, including:

1) Why was the commander of the heroic battery not immediately awarded? (After all, A.G. Kostikov - Chief Engineer NII-3, which appropriated to itself the authorship of Katyusha alone, was already accepted by Stalin on July 28, 1941, and on the same day he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. And the heroically deceased I.A. Flerov only in 1963 was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, I degree, and only in 1995 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation).

2) Why did the Marshals of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko and B.M. Shaposhnikov, fully informed about the battery of I.A. Flerov (for example, they even knew that they had only three volleys of shells left), reported to the Headquarters as the first use "Katyusha" about their volleys in Rudna, and not in Orsha?

3) Where did the Soviet command have very accurate information about the intended movements of the echelon, which had to be destroyed?

4) Why did Flerov's battery fire on Orsha on July 14 at 15.15, when the Germans had not yet occupied Orsha? (A. Petrov claims that Orsha was occupied on July 14, a number of publications indicate the date July 16, and Source No. 2 says that after the volley the Germans were not in Orsha for 7 days).

Additional questions and our version

When studying the available materials about the first salvo of the Katyusha, we had several additional questions and considerations that we want to state, considering all three of the above sources to be absolutely reliable (although for some reason Source No. 1 still lacks archival references).

1) Source #2 states that “On July 9, the battery arrived in the Borisov region, deployed its position and stood there until July 13 ... We sat idle. Time spent studying. But Borisov is located 644 km from Moscow, 84 km west of Orsha. Taking into account the return to it, this is an extra 168 km of night roads for a battery of 157 cars! Plus 4 extra days incomprehensible duty, each of which could be the last for the Flerovites.

What could have been the reason for this additional "forced march" of such an unbearable caravan of battery vehicles, and then its long sitting idle? In our opinion, there is only one thing - the expectation of the arrival of the echelon, which was most likely indicated to Flerov by the High Command as the primary target to be destroyed.

This means that the battery was sent not just to conduct military combat tests (with a simultaneous demonstration of the power of the new weapon), but to destroy a very specific target, which after July 9 was supposed to be in the area between Borisov and Orsha. (By the way, let's not forget that on July 10 the German offensive began, which became the beginning of the fiercest defensive battle of Smolensk, and the second part of the battery raid took place in its conditions).

2). Why did the High Command indicate to Flerov as a target a specific train that ended up on July 14, 1941 at 15.15 on the tracks of the Orsha freight station? How was it better or, rather, worse than hundreds of other trains on the clogged highways of the Moscow direction? Why were the installations sent from Moscow to meet the advancing German troops secret weapon and the column accompanying them literally hunted for this composition?

There is only one answer to the above questions - most likely, Flerov was really looking for a train with Soviet military equipment, which in no case should have fallen into the hands of the Germans. After going through its best types of that period, we came to the conclusion that these were not tanks (they then got to the Germans in huge number, so there was no point in eliminating one or more trains with them).

And not airplanes (which at that time were often transported with dismantled wings in trains), because in 1939-1941, not even delegations, but commissions, German aviation was shown everything.

Oddly enough, it turned out that, most likely, the first volley of Flerov's Katyushas was made according to the composition (or compositions) of other Katyushas that moved to the western border even before the start of the war, so that, according to a secret agreement between Stalin and Hitler on the Great transport anti-British operation through Germany to transfer to the shores of the English Channel (one of the authors of this publication first published such a hypothesis of the beginning of the war in 2004.) But where could the Katyushas come from before the war?

Photo.5 One of the first versions of the Katyusha MU-1, also known as the 24-round M-13-24 (1938)

"Katyusha" appeared before the war

Almost every publication about the birth of the Katyusha claims that the Soviet high military command saw it for the first time in a few days, and the government decided to put it into service a few hours before the start of the war.

In fact, two and a half years before the start of the war - from December 8, 1938 to February 4, 1939 - at the GAU training ground in Kazakhstan, field and state tests of mechanized multiple rocket launchers on a ZIS-5 vehicle were successfully carried out: MU-1 and 16-round MU-2 for firing RS-132 rockets.

The MU-1 had a number of shortcomings, and the MU-2 (drawing No. 199910) on a three-axle ZIS-6 vehicle was planned to be put into service in 1939. The State Commission was headed by the deputy head of the GAU and the head of the Artkom Koromkor (since May 1940, Colonel General of Artillery) V.D. Grendal.

Just before the start Finnish war From October 26 to November 9, 1940, demonstrative firing tests of rocket technology were carried out at the Rzhevsky training ground near Leningrad, including the BM-13-16 mechanized launcher on the ZIS-6 chassis.

The commission was headed by the chief of artillery of the Red Army commander (since May 1940, Colonel-General of Artillery) N.N. Voronov. Based on the positive test results, NII-3 was obliged to introduce in 1940 in industry the mass production of mechanized installations BM-13-16, called "object 233" (it is interesting that the production of RS-132 was not assigned to NII-3, so all this year it was carried out serial factories of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition).

It is known that several types of rocket launchers on tanks were used to break through the Mannerheim Line. A number of other facts testify to the fact that it was Katyushas that were mass-produced even before the start of the war:

• of the 7 launchers of the Flerov battery, only 3 were manufactured by NII-3, and the remaining 4 are somewhere else
• already on July 3, the first Katyusha division was formed (43 installations, including 7 Flerov's)
• by mid-August 1941, 9 four-divisional Katyusha regiments were formed (12 installations each), 45 divisions, and in September another 6 three-divisional regiments

Total 1228 installations for July - September. Later they were called "guards mortar units". Such a pace would be unrealistic if the drawings for installations were transferred to mass-produced plants from June 22, 1941.

So the train with "Katyushas" and several trains with RSs to them could well be taken to the border in last days before the war. After June 22, 1941, moving only at night, these secret trains were especially secretly taken to the rear, so that in no case would they get to the Germans. But why?

The clue was announced by Levitan in the evening summary of the Sovinformburo

It can hardly be considered a mere coincidence that on July 22, 1941, in the evening summary of the Sovinformburo, the announcer Levitan said: “On July 15, in the battles west of Sitnya, which is east of Pskov, during the retreat German units captured by our troops secret documents and chemical property of the 2nd battalion of the 52nd mortar chemical regiment of the enemy. One of the captured packages contained: secret instruction ND No. 199 “Shooting with chemical projectiles and mines”, editions of 1940, and secret additions to the instructions sent to the troops on June 11 of this year ... German fascism is secretly preparing a new monstrous atrocity - the widespread use of poisonous substances ... "

Photo 6. Six-barreled mortar "Nebelverfer" - "Vanyusha" (1940)

This is an amazing coincidence - the very next day after the first salvo of the Soviet Katyushas, ​​samples of German jet technology, possibly the six-barreled Vanyushas (they are also Nebelverfers, they are also Donkeys), fell into the hands of the Soviet troops.

The fact is that the Katyushas, ​​or rather, their prototypes - a number of rocket launchers, starting with the MU-1 and ending with the BM-13-16, were developed in the USSR in the mid-1930s by order of the Chemistry Department of the Red Army, first of all, to carry out a surprise chemical attack.

And only later, high-explosive fragmentation and high-explosive incendiary charges were developed for their rocket projectiles, after which the development went along the line of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU).

It is also possible that the financing of the first developments was carried out by the chemical department on orders from the German Reichswehr. Therefore, the Germans could well know many of their aspects. (In 1945, the commission of the Central Committee discovered that one of the Skoda factories produced shells for the SS troops - analogues of the Soviet M-8 rocket shells and launchers for them).

Photo 7. Alexander Nikolayevich Osokin, writer-historian

Therefore, Stalin decided to play it safe. After all, he understood that the Germans would definitely film the trains destroyed by the first salvo of Flerov's Katyushas, ​​they would be able to determine that they depicted fragments of Soviet rocket launchers, which means they would be able to use their film and photo frames for propaganda purposes: here, they say, Soviet Union preparing to apply chemical attacks against the German (and therefore it can also against the English!) Troops poisonous substances thrown with the help of the latest rocket technology.

This could not be allowed. And where did our intelligence manage to find a similar one so quickly? German technology- rocket launchers, and even documentation for them? Judging by the dates indicated in the Information Bureau report, their development was completed before the start of the war (and practice confirms this - already on June 22, six-barreled Nebelwerfers fired at the Brest Fortress). It may not be accidental that later the German rocket launcher "Vanyusha" was nicknamed?

Maybe this is a hint at his Russian roots and kinship with the Katyusha? Or maybe there was no defeat of the 52nd German chemical regiment, and the Vanyusha-Nebelwerfers, along with instructions, were transferred to the USSR during the years of friendly cooperation, say, in order to maintain allied parity?

There was another, also not very pleasant option - if the rocket launchers and shells for them destroyed in Orsha were of German or joint Soviet-German production (for example, the same Shkodov ones) and had both Soviet and German markings. This threatened serious showdowns with both their own and allies in both warring countries.

Photo 8. Alexander Fedorovich Kornyakov designer of small arms and artillery weapons

So the next day after the defeat of the trains in Orsha, they gave a summary of the Information Bureau about the defeat of the 52nd German chemical regiment. And the Germans had to silently agree with the Soviet version of the defeat of the mortar chemical regiment, and what could they do? So this is what happened:

• the Soviet High Command was constantly informed where the echelon with the Katyushas was located, which was supposed to secretly destroy the Flerov battery
• the battery actually fired on the accumulation of trains in Orsha even before the Germans entered it
• Timoshenko and Shaposhnikov did not know about the Katyusha strike on Orsha
• Flerov was not awarded in any way (how is it to reward for hitting his own echelon ?!), and there were no reports of the first Katyusha strike in 1941 (for the same reason).

We hope that the train with Katyushas was driven onto a separate track, an air raid was announced and people were removed for the duration of its shelling, which, of course, was attributed to the Germans. We also assume that the second volley of the Flerov battery on the same day against the advancing German divisions in the area of ​​​​the crossing on the Orshitsa River was fired, first of all, in order to dispel a possible suspicion that main task batteries was the elimination of a specific Soviet echelon.

We believe that after the second salvo, the Germans spotted and surrounded the combat installations of the Flerov battery, and not three months later in early October 1941, but immediately after their salvo across the crossing. Probably, after air raids and an unequal battle, which ended with Flerov’s command “Blow up the installations!”, He himself blew up one of them along with himself.

The rest were also blown up, while part of the battery personnel died, part hid in the forest and got out to their own, including A. Popov. Several people, incl. the wounded crew commander, sergeant from Alma-Ata Khudaibergen Khasenov, were taken prisoner. He was released only in 1945, never talked about anything at home, only after Flerov was awarded the Order in 1963, he dropped: "I fought in his battery."

None of those who went out to their own never told when Flerov died, for a long time he was considered missing (as he is still listed in the Podolsky archive today, however, for some reason since December 1941), despite the fact that the date of his death was allegedly set - October 7, 1941 and the burial place - near the village of Bogatyr under Pskov.

Then, perhaps, at his command, only the very first volleys of Katyushas were fired, and all the rest - near Rudnya, near Yelnya, near Pskov - at the command of his comrades: Degtyarev, Cherkasov and Dyatchenko - commanders of the 2nd, 3rd , the 4th battery of a separate special-purpose artillery battalion created on July 3, 1941 ... And then another 10 thousand Katyusha combat vehicles that fired 12 million rockets smashed the enemy!

Municipal educational institution

"Secondary school" p. Podielsk

"Katyusha" - the weapon of Victory

Artist: Adrian Korolev

5th grade student

Head: history teacher

Padalko Valentina Alexandrovna

Podielsk

2013

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...3

1. The first battle of “Katyusha”………………………………………………………......4

2. Creation of "Katyusha"…………………….………...…………………………4-5

3. Why is it called “Katyusha”…………………………………………………..5

4. “Katyushas” at the front …….…………………………………………………….5-6

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….......7

Sources…………………………..………………………………………….....7

Applications……………………………………………………………………..8-9

Introduction

Relevance of the topic:

The best German gunsmiths were thrown to unravel the mystery of the Katyusha. The German scientists working on the captured Russian rockets could not understand the principle of the terrible fire effect. They never managed to solve the "mystery of the Katyusha" until the very end of the war.Rocket launcher "Katyusha" is a bright symbol of the Victory.

Object of study: the history of the jet mortar - "Katyusha"

Subject of study: creation and participation in the Great Patriotic War rocket launchers"Katyusha".

Purpose of the study: learn about Katyusha rocket launchers

Research objectives:

1. Study and analyze information on the research topic.

2. To issue the results of the study in the form of a presentation and research work.

To solve these problems, the followingresearch methods:

Analysis, generalization;

1. The first battle of "Katyusha"

For the first time during the war, Katyushas entered the battle on July 14, 1941. The battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov destroyed several echelons with fuel, ammunition and armored vehicles at the Orsha station with one salvo. The station literally ceased to exist. Later, Captain Flerov died after his unit was surrounded. The fighters of the jet battery blew up the cars and began to break out of the "cauldron". The captain was seriously injured and died. However, then in 1941 he wrote in a report: "A continuous sea of ​​\u200b\u200bfire."This first battle showed the high efficiency of the new weapon. "Katyusha" for all subsequent years of the war became a thunderstorm for the enemy.

The effect for the German troops stationed there, who had just captured the Orsha station, turned out to be simply stunning - it seemed to them that a monstrous tornado had covered it, leaving death and fire in its wake. The vaunted Nazi warriors, moving victoriously deep into Soviet territory, tore off their insignia, threw down their weapons and fled to the rear - away from the terrible Russian miracle weapon. That morning, near Orsha, the Germans lost up to an infantry battalion.

Almost immediately, the fascist leadership began the hunt for the Russian miracle weapon. Hitler demanded that his army be equipped with such "automatic multi-barreled flamethrower guns" as soon as possible.

What is the newest weapon that terrified the enemy?

2. Creation of Katyusha

Rockets for "Katyusha" were developed by Vladimir Andreevich Artemyev. In 1938-1941, A. S. Popov and others created a multiply charged launcher mounted on a truck.On December 25, 1939, the M-13 rocket projectile and launcher, later called the Combat Vehicle 13 (BM-13), were approved by the Red Army Artillery Directorate.BM-13 was put into service on June 21, 1941; it was this type of combat vehicles that first received the nickname "Katyusha".BM-13 was loaded with 16 rockets of 132 mm caliber. The volley was carried out within 15-20 seconds. Firing range - 8-8.5 km. The speed of the BM-13 on a good road reached 50-60 km / h. In an hour, one combat vehicle could make 10 volleys and fire 160 shells.The crew consisted of 5 - 7 people: gun commander - 1; gunner - 1; driver - 1; loader - 2-4.

After examining the samples missile weapons Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin decided to launch the mass production of M-13 rockets and the BM-13 launcher and to begin the formation of missile military units.For three s an extra year produced almost 30 thousand Katyushas and 12 million rockets

3. Why is it called "Katyusha"

There is no single version of why BM-13s became known as Katyushas. There are several assumptions. Here is one of them - by the name of Blanter's song, which became popular before the war, to the words of Isakovsky "Katyusha". Reporting to the headquarters on the fulfillment of Flerov's combat mission, the signalman Sapronov said: "Katyusha sang perfectly." The meaning of the newly invented code word was understood at the battalion headquarters, and this word went first to the division headquarters, and then to the army headquarters. So after the first combat use, the name "Katyusha" was assigned to the BM-13-16 installation.

H The most probable of them is associated with the factory mark "K" of the manufacturer of the first combat vehicles BM-13 (Voronezh plant named after the Comintern).

4.Katyusha at the front

The legendary Katyushas took part in all major operations during the Great Patriotic War.
Rocket artillery was used to reinforce rifle divisions, which significantly increased their firepower and increased stability in combat.

In September 1943, 6,000 rockets were used up in a strip of a whole front - 250 kilometers during artillery preparation.

At the end of July near the village of Mechetinskaya combat vehicles collided with the main forces of the 1st German Panzer Army, Colonel General Ewald Kleist. Intelligence reported that a column of tanks and motorized infantry was moving. When motorcyclists appeared, cars and tanks followed them, the column was covered with battery volleys to the full depth, the wrecked and smoking cars stopped, tanks flew at them like blind men and caught fire themselves. The advance of the enemy along this road was suspended. Captain Puzik's group destroyed 15 enemy tanks and 35 cars.

Volleys of "Katyushas" heralded the beginning of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad.

In 1945, during the offensive, the Soviet command pulled together an average of 15-20 rocket artillery combat vehicles per kilometer of the front. Traditionally, Katyushas completed the artillery attack: rocket launchers fired a volley when the infantry was already on the attack. Often, after several volleys of Katyushas, ​​the infantrymen entered the deserted locality or into enemy positions without encountering any resistance.

Katyushas were successfully used until the very end of World War II, earning the love and respect of Soviet soldiers and officers and the hatred of the Nazis.She became one of the symbols of victory.

Conclusion.

Conclusions.

Thus, while doing research on this topic, we learned that during the Great Patriotic War, the most advanced weapons were used - rocket launchers - Katyushas;

It was this type of combat vehicles that first received the nickname "Katyusha";

They became for the entire time of the war a formidable weapon for the enemy.

Research results.

The collected material can be used in history lessons and extracurricular activities.

Sources.

1.Katyusha (weapon) -http://ru.wikipedia.org/

2. Combat rocket launchers "Katyusha" -http://ria.ru/

3. Katyusha - http://opoccuu.com/avto-katusha.htm

Application

Vladimir Andreevich Artemiev - designer of the BM-13 (combat vehicle 13)

One of the first installations of "Katyusha"

Fighting vehicle rocket artillery BM-8

Rockets BM-8

The commander of the battery "Katyusha" captain I.A. Flerov.

Officially, the first salvo of the 1st experimental battery "Katyusha" (5 out of 7 installations) under the command of Captain Flerov fired at 15 hours and 15 minutes. July 14, 1941 at the railway junction in Orsha. The following description of what happened is often given: “Over the hollow, overgrown with bushes, where the battery hid, a cloud of smoke and dust shot up. There was a rumbling screech. Throwing out tongues of bright flame, more than a hundred cigar-shaped projectiles rapidly slid off from the guide launchers. For a moment, black arrows were visible in the sky, gaining altitude with increasing speed. Elastic jets of ash-white gases roared from their bottoms. And then everything just disappeared.” (…)

“A few seconds later, in the thick of the enemy troops, one after another, fractionally shaking the ground, explosions thundered. Huge geysers of fire and smoke shot up where the ammunition wagons and fuel tanks had just stood.

But if you open any reference literature, you can see that the city of Orsha was abandoned by the Soviet troops a day later. And who was fired upon? Imagine that the enemy was able to change the track in a matter of hours railway and it is problematic to drive trains to the station.

It is even more unlikely that the Germans were the first to enter the captured city with ammunition trains, for the delivery of which even captured Soviet steam locomotives and wagons are used.

"Katyusha" on the streets of Berlin.
Photo from the book "The Great Patriotic War"

Female name Katyusha entered the history of Russia and in world history as the name of one of the most scary sights weapons of World War II. At the same time, none of the weapons was surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and disinformation.

PAGES OF HISTORY

No matter how much our fathers-commanders kept the Katyusha materiel secret, just a few weeks after the first combat use, it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. But the history of the creation of "Katyusha" for many years was kept "with seven seals" both because of the ideological attitudes and because of the ambitions of the designers.

The first question is why rocket artillery was used only in 1941? After all, powder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, rockets were widely used in European armies (rockets by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others). Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their huge dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron - “tails” were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French from rowing barges fired rockets at Odessa, and the Russians in the 50-70s of the XIX century - the Central Asian cities.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, powder rockets become an anachronism, and between 1860-1880 they are removed from service with all European armies (in Austria - in 1866, in England - in 1885, in Russia - in 1879). In 1914, only signal rockets remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main artillery control(GAU) with combat missile projects. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive rocket project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and not black, but smokeless powder was used as fuel. Moreover, the good fellows from the State Agrarian University did not even try to work out an interesting project, but swept it away from the threshold. It is curious that the designer was Hieromonk Kirik.

It was not until World War I that interest in rockets revived. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, slow-burning gunpowder was created, which made it possible to dramatically increase the flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with an increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

The second reason: the need to create powerful weapon for airplanes of the First World War - "flying whatnots".

And, finally, the most important reason - the rocket was best suited as a means of delivering chemical weapons.

CHEMICAL PROJECT

As early as June 15, 1936, the head of the chemical department of the Red Army, corps engineer Y. Fishman, was presented with a report from the director of the RNII, military engineer 1st rank I. Kleimenov and the head of the 1st department, military engineer 2nd rank K. Glukharev on preliminary tests of 132 / 82-mm short-range rocket-chemical mines . This munition supplemented the 250/132 mm short-range chemical mine, the tests of which were completed by May 1936. Thus, “RNII has completed all the preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful short-range chemical attack weapon, and is awaiting from you a general conclusion on testing and an indication of the need for further work in this direction. For its part, the RNII considers it necessary now to issue an experimental-gross order for the manufacture of RHM-250 (300 pieces) and RHM-132 (300 pieces) in order to conduct field and military tests. The five pieces of RHM-250 remaining from the preliminary tests, of which three at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RHM-132 can be used for additional tests according to your instructions.

According to the RNII report on the main activity for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of OM were manufactured and tested. Tests carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU of the Red Army gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMA did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave the RNII new tasks for shells with a longer range.

For the first time, the Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was mentioned on January 3, 1939, in a letter from People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: basically passed factory tests by shooting at the Sofrinsky control and test artillery range and is currently undergoing field tests at the Central Military Chemical Range in Prichernavskaya.

Note that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. The work was also financed through the Chemical Department and, finally, the warheads of the missiles are exclusively chemical.

132-mm RHS-132 chemical projectiles were fire tested at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was fired by single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of firing a series of full ammunition did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of RH, which, in terms of an artillery caliber of 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing in a salvo of 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiments, provided that the fire was fired with unstable RH. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption per 156 liters of RH when firing rocket projectiles was 550 kg, while when firing chemical 152-mm projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The automotive mechanized rocket launcher for chemical attack showed significant advantages over artillery systems. A system capable of firing both single fire and a series of 24 shots within 3 seconds is installed on a three-ton machine. Movement speed is normal truck. Transfer from marching to combat position takes 3-4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cab or from cover.

The warhead of one RHS (reactive-chemical projectile. - "NVO") holds 8 liters of OM, and in artillery shells similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of ​​12 hectares, one volley from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of ​​​​contamination of OM with one volley is 6-8 hectares.

I note that the Germans also prepared their multiple rocket launchers exclusively for chemical warfare. So, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket projectile and a six-barreled tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barreled mortar. Mortar tests began in 1937. The system received the name "15-cm smoke mortar type" D ". In 1941, it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), i.e. 15 cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not to set up smoke screens, but to fire rockets filled with poisonous substances. Interestingly, the Soviet soldiers called 15 cm Nb.W 41 "Vanyusha", by analogy with the M-13, called "Katyusha".

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemyev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The range of the 22.7-kg rocket was 1300 m, and the Van Deren mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our rockets of the period of the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the powder cartridges of the engine. Seven 24-mm powder cartridges, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls is 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket is 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) checkers in the same way give a caliber of 132 mm.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred feathered rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with an annular stabilizer that did not exceed the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such shells could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight with the help of an annular stabilizer. Then they fired 82-mm rockets with a four-bladed tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in the scope of the plumage, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The plumage with a span of more than 200 mm shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened the stability of the flight. Lightening the plumage by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades until they were destroyed.

Grooved guides were adopted as launchers for feathered missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the shells. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

I note that the Germans stabilized their rockets until 1942 exclusively by rotation. Turbojet rockets were also tested in the USSR, but they did not go into mass production. As it often happens with us, the reason for the failures during the tests was explained not by the wretchedness of the execution, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST volleys

Whether we like it or not, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems on June 22, 1941 near Brest. “And then the arrows showed 03.15, the command “Fire!” sounded, and the devilish dance began. The earth shook. Nine batteries of the 4th Mortar Regiment special purpose also contributed to the infernal symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and hit the city and fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th Artillery Regiment unleashed their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - positions Soviet artillery. It seemed that there would be no stone left unturned from the fortress.”

This is how the historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15 cm rocket-propelled mortars. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28 cm high-explosive and 32 cm incendiary turbojet shells. The shells were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the engine part was 140 mm).

A 28-cm high-explosive mine, with a direct hit on a stone house, completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by a blast wave. Fragments of the mine flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The head part contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or ammatol brand 40/60. It is curious that both 28-cm and 32-cm German mines (rockets) were transported and launched from the simplest wooden closure such as a box.

The first use of Katyushas took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two salvos from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of "Katyusha" was a complete surprise for the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the High Command of the German Ground Forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower gun ... The shot is fired by electricity. During the shot, smoke is generated ... If such cannons are captured, report immediately. Two weeks later, a directive appeared entitled "Russian gun throwing rocket-like projectiles." It said: “...Troops report on the use by the Russians of a new type of weapon that fires rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds ... Every appearance of these guns must be reported to the general, commander of the chemical troops at the high command, on the same day.

Where the name "Katyusha" came from is not known for certain. The version of Pyotr Hook is curious: “Both at the front, and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in the press, I met the most different explanations how a formidable weapon got a girl's name. Some believed that the beginning was laid by the letter "K", which was put by the Voronezh Comintern on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the guards mortars were named after a dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis.

When soldiers and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to name the “genuine” name of the combat installation at the firing range, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. It's important to maintain secrecy."

Soon, a younger brother named Luka showed up at Katyusha. In May 1942, a group of officers from the Main Armaments Directorate developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber rocket was attached to the M-13 rocket engine. head part, made in the form of an ellipsoid, with a maximum diameter of 300 mm.

After successful ground tests, on June 8, 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the start of its mass production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were solved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 Guards mortar divisions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charged single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo, respectively, was 384 shells.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Belev. On the afternoon of June 5, two regimental volleys hit the German positions in Annino and Upper Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were wiped off the face of the earth, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modifications M-31) made a great impression both on the enemy and on our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and inventions about the Luka at the front. One of the legends was that warhead rockets are stuffed with some kind of special, especially powerful, explosive capable of burning everything in the area of ​​​​the gap. In fact, conventional explosives were used in the warheads. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through volley fire. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of a whole group of projectiles, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, a high-explosive warhead was mainly used. Behind characteristic shape The head of the M-30, the front-line soldiers called him "Luka Mudishchev" (the hero of Barkov's poem of the same name). Naturally, this nickname, in contrast to the replicated "Katyusha", the official press preferred not to mention. The Luka, like the German 28 cm and 30 cm shells, was launched from a wooden corking box in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in a simple launcher.

Needless to say, after the war, the journalistic and writer fraternity commemorated Katyusha out of place and out of place, but chose to forget her much more formidable brother Luka. In the 1970s and 1980s, at the first mention of Luka, veterans asked me with surprise: “How do you know? You didn't fight."

ANTI-TANK MYTH

"Katyusha" was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the father commanders wished it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and victorious reports rushed to the headquarters. If you believe the secret publication "Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War" (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes "Katyushas" destroyed 95 enemy tanks! If this were true, then the anti-tank artillery should have been disbanded and replaced by multiple rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of wrecked tanks were influenced by the fact that for each wrecked tank, the crew of the combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - commander, 500 rubles. - to the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Alas, due to the huge dispersion, shooting at tanks is ineffective. Here I am picking up the most boring brochure "Tables of firing rockets M-13" of the 1942 edition. It follows from it that at a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the side deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of shells could not be calculated. It is not difficult to imagine the probability of a rocket hitting a tank at such a distance. If, theoretically, we imagine that the combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at the tank at close range, then even here the muzzle velocity of the 132-mm projectile was only 70 m / s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of the Tiger or Panther.

It is not without reason that the year of publication of the shooting tables is specified here. According to the TS-13 firing tables of the same M-13 rocket projectile, the average range deviation in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the side deviation is 200 and 300 m, respectively. Obviously, the 1957 table is more accurate, in which the dispersion increased by almost 1.5 times, so that in the tables of 1944 there are errors in the calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification to raise fighting spirit personnel.

There is no doubt if the M-13 projectile hits the middle or light tank, then it will be disabled. The frontal armor of the "Tiger" is not able to penetrate the M-13 projectile. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand meters, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their huge dispersion, while at shorter distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

And here is another example, told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshansk offensive on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. The troops jumped off the tanks and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “smeared over the viewing slots with mud, covered the aiming holes in the turret with black soil, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on hatches, tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone bawled: “Rus, kaput! Give up! But then two combat vehicles BM-13 left. "Katyusha" front wheels quickly descended into the ditch and fired a volley of direct fire. Bright fiery arrows hissed and whistled into the hollow. A moment later, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the rocket explosions dissipated, the tanks stood unharmed at first glance, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot...

Having corrected the damage to the tracks, having thrown out the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha went to Mogilev-Podolsky. So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 shells were fired at two Shermans point-blank, and their tarpaulin was only burned.

WAR STATISTICS

The first M-13 firing mounts had the BM-13-16 index and were mounted on the chassis of a ZIS-6 vehicle. The 82 mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 vehicles, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was stopped.

The launchers of the M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941-1942 were mounted on anything. So, six M-8 guide shells were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guides - on a motorcycle, sled and snowmobile (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railway platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically, launchers in 1942-1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford Marmont, Bedford, etc. During the 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), the Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 types of chassis (except for the Willis with mountain launchers) - 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker car. In April 1943, such a system was put into service under the symbol BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 was adopted on the BM-31-12 Studebaker chassis.

But in post-war years the Studebakers were ordered to be forgotten, although the combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions, the Studebaker was referred to as a "cross-country vehicle." On numerous pedestals, "Katyusha" mutants ascended on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war types of vehicles, which stubbornly pass off as genuine military relics, but the genuine BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis was preserved only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, back in 1941 the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132-mm M-13 and 82-mm M-8 shells. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet shells and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized shells. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, on the basis of the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile, 8 cm R.Sprgr rockets were created in Zbroevka. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although outwardly the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were placed obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in stabilizing the projectile, but it eliminated the eccentricity of the single-nozzle thrust rocket engine. But the eccentricity, that is, the displacement of the engine thrust vector due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in checkers, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 types.

On the basis of the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a whole range of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small batches. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. Missiles M-13 and M-31 with oblique plumage were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indices - TS-46 and TS-47.

The apotheosis of the combat use of the Katyusha and Luka was the assault on Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars, as well as 1,785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1,620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions) were involved in the Berlin operation. In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the rich experience they had gained in the battles for Poznan, which consisted in direct fire with single projectiles M-31, M-20 and even M-13.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results turned out to be very significant. Shooting single rockets during the fighting in such a huge city as Berlin has found the widest application.

To conduct such fire in the guards mortar units, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created: an officer - group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8–10 for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the fire missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets used up in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd shock army, the following were used up: M-13 shells - 6270; shells M-31 - 3674; shells M-20 - 600; shells M-8 - 1878.

Of this amount, rocket artillery assault groups used up: M-8 shells - 1638; shells M-13 - 3353; shells M-20 - 191; shells M-31 - 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings that were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, and killed over 1,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious "Katyusha" and her unfairly offended brother "Luka" became a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!