Detachments in the Red Army. terrible, terrible story. The truth about detachments in the Soviet army: only the facts

PROTECTING DEPARTMENTS

Barrage detachments - units that were located behind the main troops and were designed to prevent the flight of military personnel from the battlefield, to capture spies, saboteurs and deserters, and to return to units those who had fled from the battlefield and lagged behind military personnel. Detachments were also called units, the purpose of which was to fight against bagmen and speculation during the years of the Civil War.

There have never been barrage detachments in the Russian (tsarist) army. Like penal units, the first barrage units in the Red Army appeared in August 1918 on the orders of Leon Trotsky. His position: “You can't build an army without repression. You can't lead masses of people to their death without having the command of the death penalty in their arsenal. The command will put the soldiers between possible death ahead and inevitable death behind. “We have to make it fight. If you wait for the peasant to lose his senses, then it will be too late ... Detachments should be deployed in the immediate rear and push behind those who are lagging behind, hesitant and hungry. At the disposal of detachments should be a truck with a machine gun, a car with a machine gun or cavalrymen with machine guns ”(6).

Trotsky's barrage detachments were staffed by both workers and soldiers of the Red Army - mostly Latvians, Hungarians, Chinese and other "internationalists". Trotsky, on the other hand, belongs to the primacy of applying such measures to strengthen combat readiness as the execution of every tenth (decimation) commander and Red Army soldier, as well as the use of the institution of hostages for family members of tsarist officers who served in the Red Army.

From the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, at the front, together with the Special Departments, barrage detachments of the NKVD troops acted to protect the rear. In the famous order No. 227 of July 28, 1942, it was required to form 3-5 barrage detachments in each army. As of October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments were formed, consisting of 200-300 people. The results of the activities of the barrage detachments at various stages of the war can be judged from published documents. From the memorandum of the Deputy Head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR S. R. Milyitein to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs to the General Commissar of State Security JI.P. Beria: “... From the beginning of the war to October 10 this year. (1941) Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front. Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 military personnel by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear. Of those detained by the Special Departments, 25,878 people were arrested, the remaining 632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front. Among those arrested by the Special Departments: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, disseminators of provocative rumors - 3987, self-shooters - 1671, others - 4371. In total - 25 878. According to the decisions of the Special departments and by the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot in front of the line. These data are distributed along the fronts as follows...” (7).

It follows from the cited document that the most people arrested were Western front- one thousand people per month - 4013 people in four months. On the same front, they shot the most - 2136 people (more than 16 people a day). The chance of surviving arrest is less than 50 percent. And they were shot in front of the ranks most often on the North-Western Front - 730 people in the first incomplete 4 months of the war (five to six people a day). From the memorandum of the Deputy Head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front V.M. Kazakevich to the Office of Special Departments of the NKVD: “From August 1 to October 15, 1942, 140,755 servicemen who fled from the front line were detained by barrage detachments. Of those detained: 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,276 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points. The memorandum characterizes the situation in the zone of operations of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts. Of the total number of these fronts, the number of those detained by barrage detachments is 25.7%, that is, every fourth soldier left the battlefield (8).

For the first time in military history at the direction of Marshal Zhukov, mobile (on tanks) barrage detachments were created, moving immediately behind the advancing troops. This initiative of the Grand Marshal is evidenced by a quote from his written report to Stalin, given in the book by D. Volkogonov “Triumph and Tragedy”: commanders specially appointed by the Military Councils of the armies. As a result of all the measures taken, the troops of the 31st and 20th armies successfully broke through the enemy defenses. Zhukov. Bulganin. The need for barrage detachments disappeared when the situation on the fronts changed. Therefore, by order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0349 of October 29, 1944, they were disbanded.

Barrage detachments of the Red Army

In the early days of the Great Patriotic War, the leaders of a number of party organizations, the commanders of the fronts and armies took measures to restore order in the troops retreating under the onslaught of the enemy. Among them is the creation special units who acted as guards. So, on the North-Western Front, already on June 23, 1941, in the formations of the 8th Army, detachments were organized from the retreating units of the border detachment to detain those leaving the front without permission. In accordance with the decree "On measures to combat enemy paratroopers and saboteurs in the front line", adopted by the Council People's Commissars of the USSR On June 24, by decision of the military councils of the fronts and armies, barrage detachments were created from the troops of the NKVD.

27th of June Head of the Third Directorate (counterintelligence) of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Major of State Security A.N. Mikheev signed Directive No. 35523 on the creation of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads and railway junctions in order to detain deserters and all suspicious elements who had penetrated the front line.

Commander of the 8th Army Major General P.P. Sobennikov, operating on the North-Western Front, in its Order No. 04 on July 1, he demanded that the commanders of the 10th, 11th rifle and 12th mechanized corps and divisions "immediately organize detachments of barriers to detain those who fled from the front."

Despite the measures taken, there were significant shortcomings in the organization of the barrage service at the fronts. In this regard, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, in his telegram No. 00533 dated July 26, on behalf of the Headquarters, demanded that the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions and the commanders of the troops of the fronts "immediately personally figure out how the frontier service is organized and give exhaustive instructions to the chiefs of the rear guard." On July 28, Directive No. 39212 was issued by the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Commissar of State Security, 3rd rank B.C. Abakumov on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line.

During the fighting, a gap formed between the Reserve and Central Fronts, to cover which on August 16, 1941, the Bryansk Front was created under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In early September, his troops, at the direction of the Stavka, launched a flank attack in order to defeat the German 2nd Panzer Group, which was advancing to the south. However, having pinned down very insignificant enemy forces, the Bryansk Front was unable to prevent the enemy grouping from reaching the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko appealed to the Headquarters with a request to allow the creation of barrage detachments. Directive No. 001650 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 5 gave such permission.

This directive marked the beginning of a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. If before that they were formed by the bodies of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then by the Special Departments, now the decision of the Stavka legalized their creation directly by the command of the troops of the army, so far only on the scale of one front. Soon this practice was extended to the entire active army. September 12, 1941 Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov signed Directive No. 001919, which prescribed to have in each rifle division “a barrage detachment of reliable fighters no more than a battalion in number (calculated as one company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons vehicles in the form of trucks and a few tanks or armored vehicles. The tasks of the barrage detachment were to provide direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, in stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, in eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, etc.

September 18 the Military Council of the Leningrad Front adopted Decree No. 00274 “On intensifying the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of the city of Leningrad”, in accordance with which the head of the Defense of the military rear of the front was instructed to organize four barrage detachments “to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without documents ".

October 12, 1941. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. A note to Stalin in which he proposed "to organize a group of command personnel along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow" to organize the reflection of enemy tanks, which should be given a "barrage detachment to stop the fleeing." On the same day, the State Defense Committee adopted Decree No. 765ss on the creation of a headquarters for the protection of the Moscow zone under the NKVD of the USSR, to which the troops and regional organizations of the NKVD located in the zone, police, fighter battalions and barrage detachments were operationally subordinate.

May-June 1942 During the hostilities, the Volkhov Group of Forces of the Leningrad Front was surrounded and defeated. As part of the 2nd shock army, which was part of this group, detachments were used to prevent flight from the battlefield. The same detachments operated at that time on the Voronezh front.

July 28, 1942, as already noted, order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, which became a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. On September 28, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar of the 1st rank E.A. Shchadenko signed order No. 298, in which the state No. 04/391 of a separate barrage detachment of the army was announced.

Barrage detachments were primarily created on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the end of July 1942 I.V. Stalin received a report that the 184th and 192nd rifle divisions of the 62nd army left the village of Mayorovsky, and the troops of the 21st army left Kletskaya. On July 31, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, V.N. Gordov was sent directive No. 170542 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, signed by I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, who demanded: “In two days, to form at the expense of the best composition barrage detachments of up to 200 people each, which arrived at the front of the Far Eastern divisions, which should be placed in the immediate rear and, above all, behind the divisions of the 62nd and 64th armies. The barrage detachments are to be subordinated to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments. The next day, General V.N. Gordov signed order No. 00162 / op on the creation within two days in the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies of five barrage detachments, and in the 1st and 4th th tank armies - three barrage. At the same time, it was ordered within two days to restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Supreme High Command No.

On October 1, 1942, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky sent a directive to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front № 157338 , wherein it was said about the poor organization of the service of detachments and their use not for their intended purpose, but for the conduct of hostilities.

During the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), barrage detachments and battalions on the Stalingrad, Don and South-Eastern fronts detained servicemen fleeing the battlefield.
From August 1 to October 15, it was detained 140 755 the person who was arrested 3980 , shot 1189 , sent to penal companies 2776 and penal battalions 185 people returned to their units and transit points 131 094 person.

Commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, according to the report of the special department of the front to the Office of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR of October 30, 1942, proposed using detachments to influence the infantry of the unsuccessfully advancing 66th Army. Rokossovsky believed that the barrage detachments were supposed to follow the infantry units and force the fighters to attack by force of arms.

Army detachments and detachments of divisions were also used during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In a number of cases, they not only stopped those fleeing the battlefield, but also shot some of them on the spot.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed mass heroism and self-sacrifice. This, however, does not mean that there were no cases of desertion, abandonment of the battlefield and alarmism. Barrage formations were widely used to combat these shameful phenomena.

In the autumn of 1943, measures were taken to improve the structure of the barrage detachments. IN directive 1486/2/org Chief of the General Staff Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, sent on September 18 by the commander of the troops of the fronts and the 7th separate army, it was said:

"one. In order to strengthen the strength of the rifle companies, the non-standard barrage detachments of the rifle divisions, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 of 1941, should be disbanded.

2. In each army, in accordance with the order of the NPO No. 227 of 28.7.1942, 3-5 full-time barrage detachments according to the state No. 04/391, each numbering 200 people, should be contained.

In the tank armies, there should not be barrage detachments.

In 1944, when the troops of the Red Army were successfully advancing in all directions, barrage detachments were used less and less. At the same time, they were used in full measure in the front line. This was due to the increase in the scale of atrocities, armed robberies, thefts and killings of the civilian population. Order No. 0150 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal A.M. was sent to combat these phenomena. Vasilevsky on May 30, 1944

Barrage detachments were often used to solve combat missions. The improper use of barrage detachments was mentioned in the order of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command G.K. Zhukov dated March 29, 1943, commander of the 66th and 21st armies. In a memorandum “On the shortcomings of the activities of the front detachments of the troops of the front”, sent on August 25, 1944 by the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A.A. Lobachev to the head of the Chief political administration of the Red Army, Colonel-General A.S. Shcherbakov noted:

"one. The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the people's commissar of defense. Most of the personnel of the detachments are used to guard army headquarters, guard communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc.

2. In a number of detachments, the headquarters staffs were extremely swollen ...

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of detachments to the position of ordinary commandant's companies...

4. The lack of control on the part of headquarters has led to the fact that in most detachments military discipline is at a low level, people have blossomed ...

Conclusion: Most detachments do not fulfill the tasks specified by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. Guarding headquarters, roads, communication lines, performing various chores and assignments, serving internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the functions of detachments of the troops of the front.

I consider it necessary to raise the question before the People's Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation.

However, not only the use of barrage detachments to perform tasks unusual for them was the reason for their disbandment. By the autumn of 1944, the situation with military discipline in the active army had also changed. Therefore, I.V. Stalin October 29, 1944 signed Order No. 0349 the following content:

“In connection with the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for the further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.
I order:

1. Separate barrage detachments should be disbanded by November 15, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.

In the work "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: Statistical study"It is noted:" In connection with the change for the better for the Red Army after 1943, the general situation on the fronts also completely eliminated the need for the continued existence of barrage detachments. Therefore, all of them were disbanded by November 20, 1944 (in accordance with the order of the NPO of the USSR No. 0349 of October 29, 1944).

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✪ Intelligence: Igor Pykhalov about detachments, part two

Subtitles

I wholeheartedly welcome you! Igor Vasilyevich, good afternoon. Good afternoon. Let's continue. Yes. Today we will continue the topic of barrage detachments, which, according to the beliefs of our accusers, always stood behind the backs of the Red Army and, accordingly, drove them into battle, because otherwise our people for some reason did not go into battle for Stalin. Or they shot in advance, like Mikhalkov's. We didn't get there yet, we were already shot. Yes. These are the beliefs we now have. And, unfortunately, it must be said that such ideas are very common. But, as we already found out last time, reality, as always, is very different from what the whistleblowers are telling us. That is, in reality, we really did have barrage detachments, and there were several types of them that were created in different time and had different subordination. As we remember, there were also barrage detachments at the 3rd departments, which later became Special Departments (that is, the NKVDs), there were barrage battalions and divisions created in September 1941, but which, oddly enough for our alternative gifted audience, instead of shooting their fighters in the back, they, together with these fighters, took part in battles, including here near Leningrad. And finally, there were also barrage detachments created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD. Now we, in fact, are approaching that very famous order No. 227, which was issued in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In principle, we have such a widespread idea that the barrage detachments appeared just then. But in fact, as I said, it is not. There it was created another type of barrage detachments, that is, army. Actually, I will quote here this order, No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin, which was given on July 28, 1942. Just with regards to the barrier detachments: “The military councils of the armies and, above all, the commanders of the armies: b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrier detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help the honest fighters of the divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland. "Alarmists and cowards". Yes, we always have people who, let’s say, have problems understanding Russian speech, they conclude from this that ... It’s easy to blame everyone, yes. Yes. But in reality, there was precisely the idea of ​​​​stopping the fleeing units, and shooting those who sow panic. Including in front of the formation, but not so that from a machine gun and everyone, but selectively. Accordingly, on July 28, this order is issued. In pursuance of this order, on August 1, the commander of the troops of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov gives his order No. 00162 / op, in which, again, regarding the barrier detachments, the following is said: “The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies form five barrier detachments within two days, and the commanders of 1 th and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each. 5. Obstructing detachments to subordinate to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments. The barrage detachments are to be equipped with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions. Provide roadblocks with vehicles. 6. Within two days, restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919. Defensive battalions of divisions to be equipped with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report on execution by August 4, 1942. As we can see, these new army detachments are being formed here, in accordance with Order 227, and the detachment battalions that have existed in all divisions since September 1941 are also being restored. But since, again, this kind of measures, they by and large needed during the retreat or in defense. Since our army, on the contrary, tried to counter-attack in the winter of 1942 (and in a number of places successfully), there, accordingly, the need for such measures temporarily disappeared, but now these barrage battalions are again being ordered to be restored. Well, there were also barrage detachments at the Special Departments, which showed themselves in the same Battle of Stalingrad. And here I will immediately quote the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front dated August 14, 1942 “On the implementation of order No. 227 ...”: “In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the squads of the 414th rifle regiment, the 18th rifle division, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, got cold feet, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by the detachment and, by order of the Special Division, they were shot in front of the ranks. I dare say, the squads remained in place, it was the commanders who abandoned their subordinates and ran to the rear. It happens, yes. Further: “A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-wounded his left hand, was convicted of a crime, for which he was put on trial by a military tribunal. On the basis of order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 people. These detachments are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns. Yes, by the way, I’ll clarify here: this is a report about the 4th Panzer Army, which was part of the Stalingrad Front, that is, three of these detachments were formed in it. “Operational workers of special departments were appointed as heads of detachments. As of August 7, 1942, the indicated detachments and detachments of detachments and battalions detained 363 people in units and formations in the army, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds. That is a suspicion of self-shooting. As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the staffing department, 73 to the special camps of the NKVD, 27 to penal companies, 2 to the medical commission, 6 people were arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line." What needs to be clarified here: it turns out that almost more than half of them were returned to their units without any repressions, 43 - not to their own department, but to the staffing department, 73 - were sent to the special camps of the NKVD, which were engaged in filtering prisoners of war, about which I already told you during one of the shows. For checking. And again, for the vast majority of them, this test will end successfully. Well, there, respectively, 27 people were sent to penal companies, 6 were arrested, 2 with suspicious wounds, they will apparently be checked to see how it was received, and 24 were shot. That is, again, instead of a brutal machine-gun execution, people were actually dealt with here and indeed some were subjected to, as they say now, repressions, but to say that these were innocent people and suffered indiscriminately, this is somehow in general ... Well, the key is - they were caught not by machine-gun fire in the back in combat positions during the battle, but detained in the rear behind the front line. In general, according to this order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, that is, in about two months, 193 army detachments were formed, including 16 of them on the Stalingrad front and 25 on the Don (that is, this actually in the area of ​​the Battle of Stalingrad). At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, detachments along the entire Soviet-German front detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line (remember this figure - 140,000+ thousand). Of the detainees, 3,980 people were arrested (that is, about 4,000), 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points. That is, again, it turns out that the number of people who have been subjected to any, let's say, repression, is less than 10%. The overwhelming number of detainees, moreover, those who fled from the battlefield, they were simply returned to their units so that they continued to fulfill their military duty. Again, let's go back, that is, through simple surveys, they find out who ran, who ran first, who yelled at the same time, "Let's run." Well, with the identified citizens, with the organizers - with alarmists and deserters - it is natural to have a special conversation. Well, what they shot - yes, but what you wanted, here, war time. Now they will break through and then ten times more will die, so you must be eliminated like mad dogs. Practically it is. Because, indeed, even starting from the time ancient world and the wars of that time, the army suffers the main losses during the flight, and not during the defense. Accordingly, since the Battle of Stalingrad was taking place just at that time, we are interested in what happened on the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front during this period (from August 1 to October 15, 1942) 36,109 people were detained (that is, approximately 36 thousand), but of them: 736 people were arrested, 433 were shot, 1056 people were sent to penal companies, to penal battalions - 33 people and returned to their units and to transit points 32,933 people. That is, the proportion is about the same, even in fact there is an even greater number of those people for whom everything turned out well. Well, in general, it’s quite clear that the battles there are really very fierce, so it really happens that the nerves can’t stand it and begin to recede, but they were simply brought to their senses and returned back. In general, to put it mildly, it is strange: to destroy your own personnel against the backdrop of battles and the advancing enemy. And on the Stalingrad Front, 15,649 people were detained, respectively, of which: 244 were arrested, 278 were shot, 218 were sent to penal companies, 42 were sent to penal battalions, and 14,833 people were returned to their units and transit points. That is, there is generally a percentage of repressions, somewhere around 5%. Again, here I’ll just give a few examples of how detachments acted on the Stalingrad front during this battle. For example: “On August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in a panic. The detachment under the command of lieutenant of state security Filatov, having taken drastic measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines. In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through deep into the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy. On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense. That is, right here, it would seem, this brutal scene - that machine-gun fire was opened, but over the heads of the retreating and as a result, respectively, the soldiers of these two regiments were not shot from machine guns by their own, but were brought to their senses and returned back to their former lines of defense and the enemy was stopped. “On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal. The actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, on the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya. That is, here we are, by the way, not the first time we are witnessing a scene when a barrage detachment not only stops the fleeing or delays the retreating fighters and brings them to their senses, but then, together with them, enters into battle with the Germans and, accordingly, also often suffers losses . Actually, this was the case in 1941, say, near Leningrad (I quoted the documents), this was also the case near Stalingrad. Again, here, for example: “On September 13, 1942, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd Army, led by the head of the detachment, lieutenant of state security Khlystov, took up defenses on the outskirts of an important height. For four days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units. Again, after two days, i.e. September 15-16: “The detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for two days against superior enemy forces in the area of ​​​​the Stalingrad railway station ...” At the same time, although this formation itself is small, as we remember, consisting of two hundred people However, they were able not only to repel the attacks of the Germans, but also to counterattack and inflict significant losses on the enemy in manpower, and held out until the arrival of ordinary army units. At the same time, moreover, as noted in the documents, there was such an extreme situation that the detachments were used as ordinary linear units. Here, on this occasion, it is said as follows: “A number of facts have been noted when barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of formations. A significant number of detachments were sent into battle on a par with line units, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were assigned for reorganization and the barrier service was not carried out. Well, further on are a few specific examples when, in this way, barrage detachments were used as ordinary units. At the same time, approximately 65-70% of the personnel suffered losses. And of course, this was not always justified. In general, in order to roughly assess the situation in which these people acted in the same Stalingrad, you can look at a number of award lists that are now posted on the Internet, since we have been running the “Feat of the People” project for several years now. And there you can see how ours, as we say "bloody gebnya", looked from this point of view. For example, senior lieutenant Vasily Filippovich Finogenov, who served as adjutant of the senior battalion, this was the name of the battalion's chief of staff at that time (this is such an army term). Here he is the senior adjutant of the 1st army detachment, 1918 the year of birth , Russian, non-partisan: “Working as a senior adjutant in 1 A.Z.O. 62 armies for the defense of Stalingrad, following the order of NPO No. 227, detained about 6,000 soldiers and commanders who were sent to their units to defend the city of Stalingrad ... return them to their units. Further in this award we read the following: “It was ordered by the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 62nd army to close the gap with a detachment, to prevent the enemy from reaching the Volga in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bplant 221. On October 16, 1942, the detachment fought, he personally, on the orders of the head of the detachment, led the battle of the 2nd company and with light machine gun fire destroyed 27 fascists. The mortar crew of the 201st mortar battalion was out of order, he organized mortar firing and did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. There was a case, when bypassing the defense area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe detachment, the Germans attacked him, here he destroyed 6 Nazis with automatic fire. The man was serious. Yes. But, unfortunately, it was. Because for these exploits he was awarded the medal "For Courage", and a few months later he was wounded and died in the hospital. By the way, here again in this barrage detachment there were a number of such people who distinguished themselves at that time. Here, for example, Ivan Ilyich Andreev, a Red Army soldier, fighter of the 1st AZO of the 62nd Army, born in 1925, Russian, non-partisan. As we can see, this is 1942, respectively, he is a maximum of 17 years old, and most likely even 16: “... While serving in a barrage detachment when closing a gap in the area of ​​​​the Barrikady plant, he organized mortar firing of the 201st mortar battalion, calculation which was destroyed and thus did not allow the enemy to accumulate for an attack. Apparently, the two of them acted here just with Senior Lieutenant Finogenov. The following example, again from the same barrage detachment, Stepan Stepanovich Limarenko, political officer of the 1st AZO (army detachment), 62nd Army, born 1916, Russian, member of the CPSU (b): “In the fight against German fascism for the defense of the city of Stalingrad, political officer comrade Limarenko Stepan Stepanovich, performing his duties as a fighter of a detachment, under enemy fire, he detained 78 unstable Red Army soldiers who left their defensive positions and tried to retreat. Comrade Limarenko detained them and forced them to take their former lines. Just the functions of the bloody gebni are to stop the Red Army soldiers and bring them back. We read further: ... On October 16, 1942, Comrade Limarenko, together with the Red Army soldier Chernodymov V. P. detained two anti-tank guns with crews, who, seeing the German tanks, left their positions and retreated to the rear of their defense. Comrade Limarenko set up an anti-tank rifle, from which he destroyed three enemy tanks on Sculptural Street. Than the most German tanks failed to get to the Volga. Military Limarenko spoke seriously. And here is an award sheet for the Red Army soldier Chernodymov, who was with Limarenko. Born in 1921, Russian, member of the Komsomol: “Participating in the fight against German fascism to defend the city of Stalingrad, the Red Army soldier Comrade V.P. At the same time, on October 16, 1942, Comrade Chernodymov, together with political officer Comrade Limarenko, detained the calculation of two PTR rifles with rifles that German tanks saw, trying to go to the rear along Sculptural Street to our units, this calculation left their positions and went to the rear. Comrade Chernodymov personally destroyed two enemy tanks with an anti-tank rifle, the rest returned back. Here is the only thing that is not clear. What do they get there? A total of five German tanks were hit, or did they still count each one. But even if, say, three for two, it's still ... A lot. Yes. Because they used anti-tank rifles, that is, in general, this is really a feat. These are the situations. Moreover, there are many such cases described here. For example, two fighters of the 4th detachment of the 62nd Army (that was the 1st detachment, and this is the 4th), they just the next day, that is, on October 17, 1942, saved the ammunition depot, which was located on the shore The Volga, respectively, the Germans bombed it, a fire broke out there, and two fighters, instead of scrabbling, as many would have done in such a situation, they tried to save this warehouse. I will even read the award lists: “Kurbanov Tadzhedin Agalievich. Red Army soldier, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1919, Lezgin, candidate of the CPSU (b). Being at the post near crossing No. 62 on October 17, 1942, the crossing was heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result, shells and mines were set on fire in the ammunition depot near the crossing. Comrade Kurbanov, despite the bombing and the fact that the ammunition is burning - bursting, rushed to save them. Thanks to his courage and courage, the ammunition was saved." Accordingly, together with him he also took part in extinguishing this fire: “Obozny Nikolai Ivanovich. Red Army soldier, deputy political officer, fighter of the 4th detachment of the OO NKVD of the 62nd Army. Born in 1915, Russian, member of the CPSU(b). Being on October 17 of this year at a post near crossing 62, the crossing and the post where he stood were heavily bombed by enemy aircraft, as a result of which a warehouse with Katyusha ammunition and other shells and mines was set on fire. Comrade Obozny, despite the fact that the shells were bursting, rushed to pull them apart. Thanks to his courage and courage, the fire was extinguished, the ammunition was saved. Comrade Obozny is worthy of the medal "For Military Merit." Stunned. That is, again, as we know, our creators who make our current Russian films about the war are very fond of portraying our special officers or NKVD soldiers as well-fed cowardly creatures who can only hide behind other people's backs. As we can see, in reality, the vast majority of them acted in a completely different way. And indeed, in general, they were not only engaged in the performance of their function of restoring order, but also actually behaved, as befits real fighters. As I already said, in fact, during the Battle of Stalingrad, we observed three types of barrage detachments in action at once: detachments at the Special Departments, small, newly created army detachments and division detachments. At the same time, army detachments and division detachments, they acted closer to the front, i.e. they often fought and stopped mass panic on the front line, while detachments under special departments, they were already serving further in the rear, on communications, in order to again filter the contingent that was coming, well, to detain people who had deserted or, let's say, inappropriately, they are in the rear zone . Since during the Battle of Stalingrad the concepts of front and rear were already quite arbitrary, because there the Germans pressed us practically to the Volga, such a division of labor was also often not respected. For example: “On October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of ​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate infantry brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, repeated attempts were observed to abandon their units and cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. Under these conditions, to fight cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd Army created an operational group under the leadership of senior security lieutenant Ignatenko. By combining the remnants of platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd army detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who tried, under various pretexts, to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 privates and officers, and 15 servicemen, by order of special agencies, were shot in front of the ranks. We see the ratio, that is, 800 people were detained, 15 of them were shot before the line, but the rest were simply returned to the line and again continued to fight. Accordingly, if this bloody gebni did not exist, then what would happen - at first the commanders, and then the correspondingly unstable fighters, would try to cross to the other side of the Volga, leaving their positions, as a result could end ... From the point of view of the current civilians, it seems to be understandable - no one wants to die, and therefore, we will retreat, there we will be alive and will be able to benefit the Motherland more. But the whole trouble is that it was necessary to bring benefit to the Motherland at the moment, standing tightly right here, and not running anywhere. Once you receive an order, you must follow it. Sometimes at the cost of your own life. In general, yes, absolutely. Because, indeed, from the point of view of common sense, you want to be away from the front line, but from the point of view of military duty, you need to follow the order that you have been given. I will give a few more examples from the Don Front. This is a memorandum dated February 17, 1943 “On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943”: “October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, separate units 138 rifle divisions, met by powerful enemy artillery and mortar fire, faltered and fled back in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th rifle regiment, 204th rifle division, which were in the second echelon. Measures taken the command and detachment battalion of the division restored the situation. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the ranks, and the rest were returned to the front line. On October 16, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, a group of 30 Red Army soldiers of the 781st and 124th rifle divisions showed cowardice and began to flee the battlefield in a panic, dragging other servicemen with them. The army detachment of the 21st Army, which was located in this sector, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation. Actually, here what we see, again, the key words are that these 30 people, they did not just run, but at the same time, as it was rightly said, they dragged other servicemen with them. Because, unfortunately, man, he is by definition a herd creature, as you know, we came from wildlife , from social animals, and therefore, everyone runs, then ... "Everyone ran, and I ran." Yes. And therefore, naturally, it is necessary that people be found who would stop this panic and, accordingly, bring to life those who participate in such an escape. “On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293rd Infantry Division, during the enemy’s counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306th Infantry Regiment, together with platoon commanders, junior lieutenants Bogatyrev and Yegorov, left the occupied line without an order from the command and in a panic, leaving weapons, began to flee from the battlefield. The platoon of submachine gunners of the army detachment, which was located on this site, stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their previous lines, after which they successfully moved forward. That is, again, as we see, that two alarmists were identified and shot, but at the same time, the rest of the fighters, in general, as they say, came to their senses and then quite successfully fulfill their duty. But, unfortunately, such are the realities that, in general, are far from those ideals of humanism that are preached to us today. Since today it is believed that human life is the highest value, therefore, it is natural that a coward and a selfish person should, apparently, be inviolable. I will give one more example: “On November 20, 1942, during the enemy’s counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th Infantry Division, which was at a height, without offering resistance to the enemy, began to randomly retreat from the occupied area without an order from the command. The 83rd detachment of the 64th Army, serving as a barrier directly behind the combat formations of the units of the 38th Infantry Division, stopped the fleeing company in a panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy." That is, as we can see, there was no need to shoot anyone here, just roughly speaking, people running in panic had to be stopped, brought to their senses, returned back to the same positions that they occupied, after which they already quite successfully and steadfastly performed your military duty. I would also note that if they were returned to their positions, then it does not indicate that the Germans had already occupied these positions and they were kicking someone out of there, they simply abandoned the trenches and began to scatter, obeying some kind of, apparently, momentary impulse. We met a detachment, talked and returned back, and sat down again in their places, Well, do not succumb to momentary impulses. This, in fact, is, in general, a quite common situation, and not only during that war, but also in other conflicts, when people can simply simply move away from the fact that there, roughly speaking, panic rumors have spread that we bypassed or simply began to shoot very hard at the front line. Black sheep - spoils the whole herd. It's true. Accordingly, the barrage detachments acted in this way during the Battle of Stalingrad. Well, the next such large-scale battle, when, again, our troops had to defend themselves so stubbornly, it, as you know, was the Kursk Bulge. in the summer of 1943. And accordingly, again, detachments participated in this and acted quite successfully. For example, let's say, on the very first day of this battle on the Kursk Bulge, i.e. July 5, 1943: “The 13th Army, the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 15th Division, led by the battalion commander, Captain Rakitsky, arbitrarily left its line and retreated in a panic to the rear of the division, where it was detained by a detachment and returned to battle. » I note: not by machine-gun fire, but by the personnel of the barrage detachment. Accordingly, further: “From July 5 to July 10, 1943, the barrage detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people. Most of them were military personnel who had lost contact with their units. In the process of filtering them, 6 deserters, 19 self-mutilators and 49 cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield were identified and arrested. The rest of the detainees (that is, almost 1,800 people) were returned to duty.” Here I have such a document as a special report from the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 69th Army of the Voronezh Front, Colonel Stroilov, about the work of detachments from July 12 to 17, 1943. What does he report there: “In order to fulfill the task of detaining the rank and file and command and command staff of formations and units of the army who arbitrarily left the battlefield, the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the 69th Army on July 12, 1943 from the personnel of a separate company organized 7 detachments , 7 people each, headed by 2 operatives. These detachments were deployed in the villages of Alekseevka - Prokhodnoye, Novaya Slobodka - Samoilovka (there are a number of names here, I will not read them out). As a result of the work carried out by detachments from 12 to 17 July with. inclusive, 6956 people of ordinary and commanding staff were detained, who left the battlefield or left the encirclement of enemy troops. Further there, where all these people came from. What was done to them: “It should be noted that the number of detained servicemen, starting from July 15, has sharply decreased compared to the first days of the work of the detachments. If on July 12 2842 people were detained, and on July 13 - 1841 people, then on July 16 394 people were detained, and already on July 17 only 167 people were detained, and then those who had left the encirclement of enemy troops. The massive retreat of the rank and file, command and command personnel from the battlefield by the detachments organized by us, which began at five o'clock on July 12, 1943, was basically stopped at 16 o'clock on the same day, and subsequently completely stopped. Accordingly: “From among the detainees, 55 people were arrested, of which: suspicious of espionage - 20 people, terror - 2, traitors to the Motherland - 1, cowards and alarmists - 28, deserters - 4. The rest of the detainees were sent to their units . In view of the fact that the withdrawal of military personnel from the battlefield has been stopped, I removed the detachments, and their personnel were sent to perform their direct military duties. By the way, here we see that these were barrage detachments, which were created just under a special department, i.e. what has been in effect since the beginning of the war. Yes, I’ll further explain here that this famous “Smersh” is mentioned here, it was just created the day before, or rather, not the day before, but a few months before that, on April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD, it was again transferred to the Army and, accordingly, reorganized into the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Accordingly, people from there, i.e. from Smersh, they acted like this - they stopped those who retreated in such a panic in the face of the enemy. Accordingly, here is another document, a memorandum addressed to V.S. Abakumov on the results of checking the counterintelligence units of the 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front from July 12 to 30, 1943, signed by Colonel Shirmanov: “In order to prevent possible panic and to fight cowards deserting from the battlefield, I, together with the heads of departments "Smersh" of the 13th and 70th armies in all divisions, brigades and regiments, obstacle groups and barriers were organized under the leadership of the operational staff of the armies, corps, divisions. As a result of these measures, about 1300 servicemen who were leaving the battlefield in an unorganized manner were detained in the sector of the 13th and 70th armies, among whom cowards and alarmists, deserters, self-mutilators and other anti-Soviet elements were identified. Most of the military personnel were returned in an organized manner to their positions and took part in the battles. That is, again, we see that it is practically the same as in the previous documents. Well, I'll read another note. Memorandum of the head of the counterintelligence department "Smersh" of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis dated August 13, 1943 on, respectively, the work for July 1943: “By strengthening the barrage service as for battle formations, and in the rear of the units in the reporting period, 4501 people were detained, of which: arrested - 145 people, transferred to the prosecutor's office - 70 people, transferred to the NKGB bodies - 276 people, sent to special camps - 14 people, sent to units - 3303 people That is, again, it turns out, however, there are still about 2/3, a little more, who were simply sent to their units. Of the indicated number, the Smersh counterintelligence bodies of only one army, where the head of the Department, Colonel Pimenov, detained: elders - 35 people, policemen - 59 people who served in german army- 34 people who were in captivity - 87 people, subject to conscription in the spacecraft - 777 people. Of these, 4 agents of the German gendarmerie were arrested and exposed. That is, here, among other things, the process of checking our people who have been in the German occupation also begins and, accordingly, one of them could again behave, let's say, wrong. Well, many suffer because they checked those who ended up in the occupied territories. Firstly, everyone left the occupied territories, evacuated to the east, this time. Secondly, once there, you could do very different things, for example, wash the floors in the commandant's office and inform the partisans about what was happening in the commandant's office, or you could serve as a policeman in this commandant's office, walk around with weapons, arrest, shoot fellow citizens. Well, that should probably be the answer. Somehow it doesn’t fit at all, everyone is so white and fluffy, and, probably, in order to reveal this, it is necessary to carry out checks. Probably, in order to carry out checks, some of the citizens must be taken into custody and even, oh, horror! To arrest. The same thing, which is typical, is happening now. By the way, in one of our previous conversations, he just gave an example of one of the check-filtration camps and how the same elders were checked there, and how it turned out that some of them were not even released, but even hired into the ranks of the NKVD. That is, apparently, these were either our agents, or those people who showed themselves so well precisely in that capacity, as assistants to the partisans, underground workers, that they were, in general, accordingly appreciated on their merits. Well, those who exactly served the Germans, it was in good faith, so to speak, treating ... From the bottom of their hearts. Yes. Those became “innocent victims of illegal Stalinist repressions,” as we say. Recently, digressing a little to the side, I bought a book called, in my opinion, “Thank God, the Germans have come.” And there are memoirs of some scum named Osipov, they used to be on the Internet ... There was some kind of woman in the occupied city of Pushkin, here we had one near Leningrad ... Yes, I remember one. There is such patented scum that I don’t even know how at all ... well, these are not people ... there is some, you know, a collective mixture of Gozman and Novodvorskaya. Nothing changes. You are bastards of such a caliber that normal person , I don’t know, he won’t sit next to the field. Quiet horror ... And what do you have there, you should have regretted it, or what? But the scum went with the Germans, first to Riga, then to Berlin, and then, of course, as scum should be, ended up in the United States. Well, yes. By the way, we want to analyze this book with Yegor separately. Well, returning, in fact, to our topic, since after the Kursk Bulge a radical turning point in the war took place, i.e. Since we have already begun to advance and liberate first our territory, and then the occupied countries of Europe, then, accordingly, the need for such units and subunits that are engaged in defensive service has gradually disappeared. And in the end, on October 29, 1944, an order was issued by People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 0349 “On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments”, which sounded like this: “Due to the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared. I order: 1. To disband separate barrage detachments by November 13, 1944. Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions. 2. Report the disbandment of the barrier detachments by November 20, 1944.” That is, on this, in fact, the combat path of the army detachments ended. Well, it’s clear that the same platoons that were under the Smersh organs continued to operate until the end of the war, because the functions of protecting the rear, respectively, detaining a suspicious element, etc., as if no one removed them in any normal army they in this or that structure are all the same executed. In general, summing up, behold, a cruel time, terrible circumstances, they require cruel and terrible measures. An order called "Not a step back!" was known to the troops. There is a wonderful book by citizen Simonov, The Living and the Dead, which, in my opinion, shows very, very well how the servicemen felt about this order, what they thought about it and what they said. It was necessary - it was, it ceased to be necessary - and they dismissed it. By the way, on this occasion, just about what people said, I will quote one veteran, respectively, his memoirs were published somewhere in the zero years. This is a certain M.G. Abdulin, he served in the 293rd Rifle Division during the Battle of Stalingrad. And there was an interview with him, we had such a magazine “Brother”, in my opinion, and now it is still being published: “- Mansur Gizatulovich, tell us how the famous order No. 227 was adopted in the trenches? - It was a stern order. He appeared when the retreat reached the Volga. And he was a strong sobering agent - "Not a step back!" The order stopped the people. There was confidence in the neighbors on the right and on the left - they would not retreat. Although it was not easy to realize: there was a barrage detachment behind you. How did these units work? - I do not know of a case when they would shoot at the retreating. Under the "new panicle" in the first weeks after the order, the guilty fell, and someone not very guilty. I remember that I was sent from the company to observe the execution of seventeen people "for cowardice and alarmism." I had to tell my people about what I saw. Later I saw the barrage detachment under very dramatic circumstances. In the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe heights of Five Kurgans, the Germans pressed us so that we scrambled, leaving our overcoats, in some tunics. And suddenly our tanks, and behind them the skiers - a barrage detachment. Well, I think, here it is, death! A young Estonian captain approaches me. “Take,” he says, “the overcoat from the dead, you will catch a cold ...” Here is such an eyewitness account and there are quite a few such examples. But in general, no one gives examples of how to shoot from machine guns. Only Nikita Sergeyevich Mikhalkov in the cinema. More precisely, how to say, we still have our accusers, they are, as they say, like a fool with a written bag, they are still rushing with a fragment from the memoirs of the tankman Loza, who was a participant in the events when the commander ordered to hit from tank machine guns in front of the fleeing in order to stop them . But then again, at the same time, there are those who tried to brandish it, respectively, either they read the text inattentively, or simply distort it. Because the fire was not to defeat, but precisely in order to stop. Well, they don’t understand such trifles, it doesn’t matter, “everyone was killed anyway.” It really ended up that several people were killed there, but this is ... well, what to do if a unit is running and, accordingly, if these people are not stopped, then the losses will be much greater. As citizen Papanov said: "They will help you, but don't steal." That's it, you don't have to run, you have to honestly fulfill your military duty. Thank you, Igor Vasilievich. About what next time? And next time, then, continuing this topic of bloody gebni, we can consider how our penal units acted and existed: that is, penal battalions and penal companies. Fine. Looking forward to. Thanks. And that's all for today. See you again.

Barrage units in history

The history of barrier detachments is very ancient, the historian V.A. Artamonov notes the presence of cavalry barrier detachments already in antiquity.

Such warriors were still in the days of the Greek historian Xenophon. In his work of the 4th century BC, Cyropedia, the historian wrote about the back rank, the function of which was: "encourage those who do their duty, restrain the cowardly with threats and punish with death all who intend to turn to the rear, instill more fear in cowards than enemies." In the same Xenophon, one can also find psychological sketches in which the attitude towards those who give in to panic during the battle is quite unambiguous: “The mass of people, when it is full of confidence, evokes indomitable courage, but if people are cowardly, then the more of them, the more terrible and panicky fear they succumb to.” Here Xenophon defines the primary function of the back rank - to stop desertion in the bud, when people have not yet succumbed to mass panic.

Barrage units during the Civil War

Food detachments

As early as December 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food came up with a proposal to liquidate all detachments, except for the detachments of the People's Commissariat of Food and provincial food committees. But a clear ban on all authorities, except for the People's Commissariat for Food, to set up detachments and requisition food, was adopted by the Council of People's Commissars only on June 29, 1920.

The detachments were liquidated in the second half of 1921 after the introduction of the New Economic Policy.

Trotsky's guard detachments

About barrage detachments on the fronts civil war, Trotsky himself writes directly in the book Around October:

Hastily put together regiments and detachments, mainly from the decomposed soldiers of the old army, as you know, very deplorably crumbled at the first clash with the Czechoslovaks.

- To overcome this disastrous instability, we need strong barrage detachments of communists and militants in general, I told Lenin before leaving for the east. - Must be forced to fight. If you wait until the man is out of his mind, perhaps it will be too late.

- Of course, this is correct, - he answered, - only I am afraid that the barrage detachments will not show the due firmness. The Russian man has got it, he is not enough for decisive measures of revolutionary terror. But it is necessary to try.

The news of the assassination attempt on Lenin and the murder of Uritsky overtook me in Sviyazhsk. In these tragic days, the revolution was undergoing an internal turning point. Her "kindness" departed from her. Party damask received its final temper. Decisiveness increased, and where necessary, ruthlessness. At the front, the political departments, hand in hand with the barrage detachments and the tribunals, set the backbone into the loose body of the young army. The change was not long in coming. We returned Kazan and Simbirsk. In Kazan, I received a telegram from Lenin, who was recovering from the assassination attempt, about the first victories on the Volga.

During the Great Patriotic War

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War

On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issues Directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. In particular, it provided: ]

Organization of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command with the inclusion in their composition of operational workers of the Third Directorate with the tasks:

a) detention of deserters;
b) detaining the entire suspicious element that has penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operatives of the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NPO (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material along with the detainees under jurisdiction.

By order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed with special departments of divisions and corps, with special departments of the armies - separate rifle companies, with special departments of fronts - separate rifle battalions, staffed by personnel of the NKVD troops.

Instructions for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front on the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists

… § 4
Special departments of the division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities:
a) organize a barrier service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other movement routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who arbitrarily left their combat positions;
b) carefully check each detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled the battlefield;
c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and an investigation is conducted to bring them to trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within a 12-hour period;
d) all servicemen who stray from the unit are organized by platoon (port) and, under the command of proven commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;
e) in especially exceptional cases, when the situation requires the adoption of decisive measures for the immediate restoration of order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to execute deserters on the spot. On each such case, the head of the special department informs the special department of the army and the front;
f) carry out the sentence of the military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, before the formation;
g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to units and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;

h) report daily to the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrests, and convictions, as well as about the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and materiel transferred to the unit.

From the directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 dated July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line: [ ]

... One of the most important means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us is organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all servicemen, without exception, making their way from the front to the front line in an unorganized manner, as well as servicemen who enter other units in groups or alone.

However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is still insufficiently organized, the checks of detainees are carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel.
In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in the Red Army, I propose:
1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose allocate experienced operational workers to the detachments. To establish, as a rule, that the questioning of all detainees without exception should be carried out only by security officers.
2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments, and identified by undercover and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity.
If the investigation does not obtain data on their involvement in the German intelligence agencies, such persons should be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, establishing constant monitoring of them both by the organs of the special department and by the commissar of the unit.

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 to the commander of the troops of the fronts, armies, division commanders, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions [ ] .

September 12, 1941.
The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are quite a few panicky and directly hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and start shouting: “We are surrounded!” and drag the rest of the fighters with them. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then, alone, begins to leave the forest. Similar phenomena take place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, alarmist and hostile elements could not gain the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.
In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, Stavka Supreme High Command orders:
1. In each rifle division, have a barrage detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (calculated as 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.
2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to be considered direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and combat elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.
3. To oblige employees of special departments and political staff of divisions to provide all possible assistance to division commanders and barrage detachments in strengthening the order and discipline of the division.
4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the troops of the fronts and armies.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin

Stalingrad battle

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

Since the time of the Khrushchev “thaw”, some historians have carefully cultivated and “cultivate” to this day one “terrible and terrible” myth. about how a barrage detachment, originally created with a well-defined, reasonable and decent goal, has now turned into a horror movie.

What it is?

The very concept of this military formation very vague, it says, in particular, about "the performance of certain tasks on a certain sector of the front." This can even be understood as the formation of a separate platoon. Both the composition and the number and tasks of the barrier detachments throughout the war changed repeatedly. When did the first defensive detachment appear?

History of occurrence

It should be remembered that in 1941 the legendary NKVD was divided into two diverse objects: the committee of internal affairs and the department of state security (NKGB). Counterintelligence, from which the detachments went, was separated from the composition of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. At the end of July 1941, a special directive was issued on work in wartime, after which the formation of special units began.

It was then that the very first barrage detachment was created, the task of which was to detain deserters and "suspicious elements" in the front line. These formations did not have any "execution right", they could only detain the "element" with its subsequent escort to the authorities.

Again, when both departments were merged again, the barrage detachment came under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. But even then, no special “relaxations” were made: members of the formations could arrest deserters. IN special occasions, which included only episodes of armed resistance, they had the right to be shot. In addition, special detachments had to fight traitors, cowards, alarmists. Order of the NKVD No. 00941 dated 07/19/1941 is known. It was then that the special companies and battalions manned by NKVD troops.

What function did they perform?

It was these barrage units that played the most significant role in the Second World War. Again, there were no “mass executions” under their jurisdiction: these units were supposed to create defensive lines to protect against German counterattacks and detain (!) Deserters with their transfer to the investigating authorities over the next 12 hours.

If a person simply fell behind his unit (which was normal in 1941), again, no one shot him. In this case, there were two options: either the serviceman was sent to the same unit, or (more often) they were reinforced by the nearest military unit.

In addition, the barrier detachments in the Second World War played the role of a "filter" through which people who had escaped from German captivity, and those individuals in the front line, whose testimony was in doubt, were passed. There is a case when such a detachment caught a group of German spies ... by paper clips! The commandants noticed that the “seconded Soviet servicemen” had brand new stainless metal clips on their documents (ideal, by the way)! So do not consider the fighters as murderers and sadists. But this is exactly how they are portrayed by many modern sources ...

The fight against banditry and the role of the 33rd detachment

One of the tasks that some categories of historians for some reason "forget" about was the fight against banditry, which in some regions took frankly menacing proportions. So, for example, the 33rd barrage detachment (North-Western Front) showed itself.

Especially a company detached from the Baltic Fleet. Even several armored cars were "seconded" to it. This detachment operated in the Estonian forests. The situation in those parts was serious: there was practically no desertion in the local units, but the local Nazi units really interfered with the army. Small gangs constantly attacked small units military personnel and civilians.

Estonian events

As soon as the “narrow specialists” from the NKVD entered the game, the perky mood of the bandits quickly faded away. In July 1941, it was the barrage detachments that took part in the cleansing of Virtsu Island, recaptured as a result of a counterattack by the Red Army. Also along the way, the discovered German outpost was completely destroyed. Many bandits were neutralized, the pro-fascist organization in Tallinn was crushed. Barrage detachments also participated in reconnaissance activities. The formation we have already mentioned, acting “on behalf of” the Baltic Fleet, directed its own aircraft at the discovered positions of the Germans.

During the battle for Tallinn, the same detachment participated in the most difficult battle, covering (and not shooting) the retreating soldiers and repelling German counterattacks. On August 27, there was a terrible battle, during which our people repeatedly threw back a stubborn enemy. It was only through their heroism that an organized retreat became possible.

During these battles, more than 60% of the entire personnel of the barrage detachment, including commanders, were killed. Agree, this is not very similar to the image of the "cowardly commandant", hiding behind the backs of his soldiers. Subsequently, the same formation participated in the fight against the bandits of Kronstadt.

Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of September 1941

Why did the barrage units have such a bad reputation? The thing is that September 1941 was marked by an extremely difficult situation at the front. It was allowed to form special units in those parts that managed to establish themselves as "unstable". Just a week later, this practice spread to the entire front. And what, there are barrage detachments of thousands of innocent soldiers? Of course not!

These detachments obeyed were armed with transport and heavy equipment. The main task is to maintain order, help the command of the units. Members of the barrage detachments had the right to use military weapons in cases where it was necessary to urgently stop the retreat or eliminate the most malicious alarmists. But that rarely happened.

Varieties

Thus, there were two categories of detachments: one consisted of NKVD soldiers and caught deserters, and the second prevented the willful abandonment of positions. The latter had a much larger staff, since they consisted of Red Army soldiers, and not fighters of internal troops. And even in this case, their members had the right only to shoot individual alarmists! No one has ever shot their own soldiers en masse! Moreover, if there was a counterattack, it was the “animals from the barrage detachments” who took the whole blow, allowing the fighters to retreat in an organized manner.

Results of the work

Judging by 1941, these units (the 33rd barrage detachment especially distinguished themselves) detained about 657,364 people. 25,878 people have been officially arrested. 10,201 people were shot by the verdict of the military field court. All others were sent back to the front.

The barrage detachments played a significant role in the defense of Moscow. Since there was simply a catastrophic lack of combat-ready units to defend the city itself, the NKVD personnel were literally worth their weight in gold, they organized competent defensive lines. In some cases, barrage detachments were created on the local initiative of the authorities and internal affairs bodies.

On July 28, 1942, the Stavka issues the notorious order No. 227 of the NPO. He ordered the creation of separate detachments in the rear of unstable units. As in the previous case, the fighters had the right to shoot only individual alarmists and cowards who arbitrarily left their positions in battle. The detachments were provided with all the necessary transport, and the most capable commanders were put at their head. There were also separate barrage battalions at the divisional level.

The results of the hostilities of the 63rd detachment

By mid-October 1942, 193 army detachments had been created. By this time, they managed to detain 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3980 of them were arrested, 1189 servicemen were shot. All the rest were sent to the penal unit. The Don and Stalingrad directions were the most difficult; an increased number of arrests and detentions was recorded here. But these are "little things". It is much more important that such units provided real assistance to their colleagues at the most critical moments of the battle.

This is how the 63rd barrage detachment (53rd army) showed itself, coming to the aid of its unit, to which it was “seconded”. He forced the Germans to stop the counteroffensive. What conclusions follow from this? Pretty simple.

The role of these formations in restoring order was very great, they also managed to return a considerable number of military personnel back to the front. So, one day the 29th Infantry Division, in whose flank the advancing German tanks managed to break through, began to retreat in a panic. Lieutenant of the NKVD Filatov, at the head of his squad, stopped the fleeing, together with them going to combat positions.

In an even more difficult situation, the barrage unit under the command of the same Filatov made it possible for the fighters of a badly battered rifle division to retreat, while she herself began a battle with an enemy breaking through, forcing him to retreat.

Who were they?

In critical situations, the fighters did not shoot their own, but competently organized the defense and led the offensive themselves. Thus, there is a known case when the 112th Rifle Division, having lost almost 70% (!) of its personnel in the most difficult battles, received an order to retreat. Instead of them, a barrage detachment of Lieutenant Khlystov took over the position, which held the position for four days, doing this until reinforcements arrived.

A similar case is the defense of the Stalingrad railway station by the “dogs of the NKVD”. Despite their numbers, which were significantly inferior to the German one, they held their positions for several days and waited for the approach of the 10th Infantry Division.

Thus, barrage detachments are "last chance" detachments. If the fighters of the line unit leave their positions unmotivated, the members of the barrage battalion will stop them. If a military unit suffers the heaviest losses in a battle with a superior enemy, the "frontiers" give them the opportunity to retreat and continue the battle themselves. In other words, the defensive detachments are military units USSR, during the battle playing the role of defensive "bastions". Units made up of NKVD troops, among other things, could be engaged in identifying German agents and catching deserters. When was their work completed?

End of work

By order of October 29, 1944, the barrage detachments in the Red Army were disbanded. If the personnel were recruited from ordinary linear units, similar formations were formed from them. The NKVD soldiers were sent to special flying units”, whose activity was to purposefully catch bandits. There were practically no deserters by that time. Since the personnel of many detachments were recruited from the best (!) Fighters of their units, these people were also often sent for further study, forming a new backbone of the Soviet Army.

Thus, the “bloodthirstiness” of such units is nothing more than a stupid and dangerous myth that offends the memory of people who liberated the countries captured by the Nazi troops.

A new stage in the history of detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and the Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin was issued, which, in particular, ordered:

"2. To the military councils of the armies, and above all to the commanders of the armies:

[...] b) to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them to shoot alarmists and cowards in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division and thereby help the honest fighters of the divisions fulfill their duty to the Motherland ”(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. P. 445).

In pursuance of this order, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant-General V.N. Gordov, on August 1, 1942, issued his order No. 00162 / op, in which he ordered:

"five. The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, and 65th armies should form five barrage detachments within two days, and the commanders of the 1st and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each.

Protective detachments are to be subordinated to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. Put the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments.

The barrage detachments are to be equipped with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions.

Provide roadblocks with vehicles.

6. Within two days, restore the barrage battalions in each rifle division, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919.

Defensive battalions of divisions to be equipped with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report on execution by August 4, 1942. (TsAMO. F.345. Op.5487. D.5. L.706).

From the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 “On the implementation of Order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Tank Army to it”:

“In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the departments of the 414th joint venture, the 18th SD, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, got cold feet, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by barriers. detachment and the resolution of the Special Division were shot in front of the ranks.

A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-injured his left hand, was convicted of a crime, for which he was put on trial by a military tribunal. [...]

On the basis of order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 people. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.

Operational workers of special departments were appointed as heads of detachments.

As of August 7, 1942, the indicated detachments and detachments of detachments and detachments detained 363 people in units and formations in army sectors, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds.

As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the staffing department, 73 to NKVD special camps, 27 to penal companies, 2 to the medical commission, 6 people. - Arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the ranks"

(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. P. 181-182).

In accordance with NPO order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, including 16 on the Stalingrad Front (the discrepancy between this figure and the order of Lieutenant General Gordov cited above is explained by a change in the composition of the Stalingrad Front, from which a number of armies) and 25 on the Don.

At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had fled from the front line. Of the detainees, 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

The largest number of detentions and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points. 15,649 people were detained along the Stalingrad Front, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.

During the defense of Stalingrad, the barrage detachments played important role in restoring order in units and preventing unorganized withdrawal from occupied lines, the return of a significant number of military personnel to the front line.

So, on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in a panic. The detachment under the command of lieutenant of state security Filatov, having taken drastic measures, stopped the soldiers retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines. In another section of this division, the enemy tried to break through deep into the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.

On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in a panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.

On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The consolidated brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized withdrawal. The actions of the detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade occupied the former lines and, at the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully holding back his onslaught. So, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. The detachment of the 62nd Army, led by the head of the detachment, lieutenant of state security Khlystov, took up defenses on the outskirts of an important height. For four days, the fighters and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners, inflicting big losses. The detachment held the line until the approach of military units.

On September 15-16, the detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought for two days with superior enemy forces in the area of ​​​​Stalingrad railway station. Despite its small size, the detachment not only repelled German attacks, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th Infantry Division came to replace it.

In addition to the army detachments created in accordance with order No. 227 during Battle of Stalingrad the restored barrage battalions of divisions operated, as well as small detachments manned by NKVD servicemen under special departments of divisions and armies. At the same time, army barrier detachments and division battalions carried out the barrier service directly behind the combat formations of the units, preventing panic and mass exodus of military personnel from the battlefield, while security platoons of special departments of divisions and companies at special departments of the armies were used to carry out barrier service on the main communications of divisions and armies in order to detain cowards, alarmists, deserters and other criminal elements hiding in the army and front-line rear.

However, in a situation where the very concept of the rear was very conditional, this "division of labor" was often violated. So, on October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of ​​​​the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate divisions from the main forces of the 62nd Army. rifle brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, repeated attempts were observed to abandon their units and cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. Under these conditions, to fight cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd Army created a task force under the leadership of senior security lieutenant Ignatenko. By combining the remnants of platoons of special departments with the personnel of the 3rd army detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who tried, under various pretexts, to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 privates and officers, and 15 servicemen, by order of special agencies, were shot in front of the ranks.

In the memorandum of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Don Front dated February 17, 1943 to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR “On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943”, a number of examples of actions are given defensive squads:

“In the fight against cowards, alarmists and the restoration of order in units that showed instability in battles with the enemy, an exceptionally large role was played by army detachments and division detachments.

So, on October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, separate parts of the 138 division division, met by powerful artillery and mortar fire of the enemy, faltered and fled back in a panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion of the 706th joint venture, 204th SD, which were in the second echelon.

By the measures taken by the command and detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the ranks, and the rest were returned to the front line.

On October 16, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, a group of 30 Red Army soldiers of the 781st and 124th divisions showed cowardice and began to flee the battlefield in a panic, dragging other servicemen with them.

The army detachment of the 21st Army, which was located in this sector, eliminated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous situation.

On November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293 division division, during an enemy counterattack, two mortar platoons of the 1306 joint venture, together with platoon commanders, ml. lieutenants Bogatyrev and Egorov, without an order from the command, left the occupied line and, in a panic, throwing their weapons, began to flee from the battlefield.

The platoon of submachine gunners of the army detachment, who was on this site, stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their previous lines, after which they successfully moved forward.

On November 20, 1942, during an enemy counterattack, one of the companies of the 38th division division, which was at a height, without resisting the enemy, began to randomly retreat from the occupied area without an order from the command.

The 83rd detachment of the 64th Army, serving as a barrier directly behind the battle formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the fleeing company in a panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy "(Stalingrad epic. .. S.409-410).

End of the road

After the defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad and the victory on the Kursk Bulge, a turning point occurred in the war. Strategic Initiative passed to the Red Army. In this situation, the barrage detachments lost their former importance. On August 25, 1944, the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A. Lobachev, sent a memorandum “On the shortcomings in the activities of the front troops’ detachments” to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel General Shcherbakov, with the following content:

“According to my instructions, in August, the front’s PU workers checked the activities of six detachments (a total of 8 detachments).

As a result of this work, it was established:

1. Detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, the protection of communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc. Characteristic in this regard is the activity of the 7th detachment of the 54th Army. According to the list, the detachment consists of 124 people. They are used as follows: the 1st automatic platoon guards the 2nd echelon of the army headquarters; The 2nd automatic platoon was attached to the 111th brigade with the task of guarding the communication lines from the corps to the army; the rifle platoon was attached to 7th sk with the same task; the machine-gun platoon is in the reserve of the detachment commander; 9 people work in the departments of the army headquarters, including the platoon commander st. lieutenant GONCHAR is the commandant of the army logistics department; the remaining 37 people are used at the headquarters of the detachment. Thus, the 7th detachment is not at all involved in the barrier service. The same situation in other detachments (5, 6, 153, 21, 50)

In the 5th detachment of the 54th army out of 189 people. staff only 90 people. are guarding the army command post and guarding service, and the remaining 99 people. used in various jobs: 41 people. - in the service of the AHO of the army headquarters as cooks, shoemakers, tailors, storekeepers, clerks, etc.; 12 people - in the departments of the army headquarters as messengers and orderlies; 5 people - at the disposal of the commandant of the headquarters and 41 people. serving the headquarters of the detachment.

In the 6th detachment of 169 people. 90 fighters and sergeants are used to protect the command post and communication lines, and the rest are on chores.

2. In a number of detachments, the headquarters staffs were extremely swollen. Instead of the prescribed staff of 15 people. officers, sergeants and privates, the headquarters of the 5th detachment has 41 people; 7th detachment - 37 people, 6th detachment - 30 people, 153rd detachment - 30 people. etc.

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. In the 21st detachment of the 67th army out of 199 people. 75% of the participants in the battles, many of them were awarded. In the 50th detachment for military merit 52 people were awarded

4. The lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most detachments military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded. Over the past three months, 30 penalties have been imposed on soldiers and sergeants in the 6th detachment for gross violations of military discipline. Not better in other units ...

5. Political departments and deputy. the chiefs of staff of the armies for the political part have forgotten about the existence of detachments, they do not direct party political work ...

On the revealed shortcomings in the activities of detachments on August 15, he reported to the Military Council of the front. At the same time, he gave instructions to the chiefs of the political departments of the armies on the need for a radical improvement in the party-political and educational work in detachments; revitalizing the intra-party activities of party organizations, intensifying work with party and Komsomol activists, holding lectures and reports for personnel, improving cultural services for soldiers, sergeants and officers of detachments.

Conclusion: The detachments for the most part do not fulfill the tasks defined by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various chores and assignments, the maintenance of commanders-in-chiefs, supervision of internal order in the rear of the army are in no way included in the functions of detachments of front troops.

I consider it necessary to raise a question before the People's Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation ”(Military History Journal. 1988. No. 8. P. 79-80).

Two months later, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 0349 of October 29, 1944 "On the disbandment of individual barrage detachments" was issued:

“In connection with the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for the further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.

So, the barrage detachments detained deserters and a suspicious element in the rear of the front, and stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves often engaged in battle with the Germans, and when the military situation changed in our favor, they began to perform the functions of commandant companies. In carrying out their direct tasks, the detachment could open fire over the heads of the fleeing units or shoot cowards and alarmists in front of the formation - but certainly on an individual basis. However, none of the researchers has yet been able to find in the archives a single fact that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired to kill their troops.

Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of front-line soldiers.

For example, in the Military History Journal, an article by the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army P.N. Lashchenko, says the following on this subject:

“Yes, there were guard detachments. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own, at least on our sector of the front. Already now I requested archival documents on this subject, such documents were not found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, they covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, they detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.

I will say more, the front received reinforcements, naturally, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers already fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, reliable and strong shoulder senior. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and in battles suffered heavy losses. This is an irrefutable fact."

Almost the same words described the activities of the detachments in the newspaper "Vladimirskie Vedomosti" by the holder of the Order of Alexander Nevsky A.G. Efremov:

“Indeed, such detachments were deployed in threatening areas. These people are not some monsters, but ordinary fighters and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, alarmism was suppressed. When the turning point in the course of the war came, I did not see these detachments anymore.

If you wish, you can bring more than a dozen memories of this kind, but those given along with the documents will be enough to understand what the barrage detachments really were.