Soviet military units in Afghanistan deployment locations. military operations. Types and types of military operations

Soviet war in Afghanistan e lasted 9 years 1 month and 18 days.

Date of: 979-1989

Place: Afghanistan

Outcome: The overthrow of H. Amin, the withdrawal of Soviet troops

Enemies: USSR, DRA against - Afghan Mujahideen, Foreign Mujahideen

Supported by : Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, USA, UK, Iran

Side forces

USSR: 80-104 thousand military personnel

DRA: 50-130 thousand military personnel According to the NVO, no more than 300 thousand

From 25 thousand (1980) to more than 140 thousand (1988)

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a prolonged political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (OKSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of the Afghan society sympathizing with them, with political and financial support of foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in accordance with the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. friendly regime in Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR introduced a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from among the emerging special unit KGB "Vympel" killed the incumbent President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By decision of Moscow, the protege of the USSR, the former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague, B. Karmal, became the new leader of Afghanistan, whose regime received significant and versatile - military, financial and humanitarian - support from the Soviet Union.

Chronology of the Soviet war in Afghanistan

1979

December 25 - Columns of the Soviet 40th Army cross the Afghan border on a pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to assist the troops being brought in.

1980

January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government rebellion by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. During the battle, about 100 rebels were killed; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded.

February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. During the movement of oncoming columns in the middle of the tunnel, a collision occurred, a traffic jam formed. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated.

March is the first major offensive divisions of the OKSV against the Mujahideen - Kunar offensive.

April 20-24 - Massive anti-government demonstrations in Kabul are dispersed by low-flying jets.

April - U.S. Congress authorizes "direct and open aid» Afghan opposition in the amount of $15 million. The first military operation in Panjshir.

June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.

1981

September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in the province of Farah; the death of Major General Khakhalov.

October 29 - the introduction of the second "Muslim battalion" (177 OSSN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev ("Kara Major").

December - the defeat of the base point of the opposition in the Darzab region (Dzauzjan province).

1982

November 3 - Tragedy at the Salang pass. More than 176 people died as a result of the explosion of a fuel tanker. (Already during the years of the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, Salang became a natural barrier and in 1997 the tunnel was blown up on the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud to prevent the Taliban from advancing to the north. In 2002, after the unification of the country, the tunnel was reopened).

November 15 - meeting of Y. Andropov and Ziyaul-Khak in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani leader, during which he informed him about the "new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need for a speedy resolution of the crisis." The meeting also discussed the question of the expediency of the war and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops from Pakistan, it was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

1983

January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group of Soviet civilian specialists numbering 16 people. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.

February 2 - The village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by bombs in retaliation for the hostage-taking in Mazar-i-Sharif.

March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation headed by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordoves with Y. Andropov. He thanks the UN for "understanding the problem" and assures the mediators that he is ready to take "certain steps", but doubts that Pakistan and the US will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.

April - an operation to defeat opposition groups in the Nijrab Gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.

May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan "to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops."

July - Dushman offensive on Khost. An attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.

August - the hard work of D. Cordoves' mission to prepare agreements on a peaceful settlement of the war in Afghanistan is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country has been developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about "dialogue with the UN".

Winter - hostilities intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad valley (the reports most often mention the province of Laghman). For the first time, armed opposition detachments remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases directly in the country began.

1984

January 16 - Dushmans shot down a Su-25 aircraft from the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.

April 30 - During a major operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.

October - over Kabul from the Strela MANPADS, dushmans shoot down an Il-76 transport aircraft.

1985

April 26 - Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war revolt in the Badaber prison in Pakistan.

June - army operation in Panjshir.

Summer is a new course of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for a political solution to the "Afghan problem".

Autumn - The functions of the 40th Army are reduced to covering the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are involved. The creation of basic base areas in hard-to-reach places of the country has begun.

1986

February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of the development of a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.

March - the decision of the R. Reagan administration to start deliveries to Afghanistan to support the Mujahideen MANPADS "Stinger" of the ground-to-air class, which makes combat aviation 40th Army vulnerable to defeat from the ground.

April 4-20 - an operation to defeat the Javar base: a major defeat for the dushmans. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan's detachments to break through the "security zone" around Herat.

May 4 - at the XVIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, instead of B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence service KhAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General. The plenum proclaimed the policy of solving the problems of Afghanistan by political means.

July 28 - M. Gorbachev defiantly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army from Afghanistan (about 7 thousand people). The withdrawal date will be rescheduled at a later date. In Moscow, there are disputes about whether to withdraw troops completely.

August - Massoud defeated the base of government troops in Farkhar, Takhar province.

Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from the 173rd detachment of the 16th special forces brigade captures the first batch of three Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems in the Kandahar region.

October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.

November 13 - The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU sets the task of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan within two years.

December — an emergency plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

1987

January 2 - An operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces General of the Army V. I. Varennikov was sent to Kabul.

February - Operation "Strike" in the province of Kunduz.

February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.

March - Operation Thunderstorm in the province of Ghazni. Operation Circle in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.

May - operation "Volley" in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul. Operation "South-87" in the province of Kandahar.

Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the border.

1988

Soviet spetsnaz group preparing for operation in Afghanistan

April 14 - Through the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became the guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting on May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

June 24 - Opposition detachments captured the center of the province of Wardak - the city of Maidanshahr.

1989

February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Contingent, Lieutenant-General B.V. Gromov, who, allegedly, was the last to cross the border river Amu-Darya (the city of Termez).

War in Afghanistan - results

Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book "Limited Contingent" expressed this opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in the war in Afghanistan:

I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for asserting that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, completed their tasks, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, and returned to their homeland in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition detachments as the main enemy of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us lies in the fact that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans only what they could.

The 40th Army had several main tasks. First of all, we had to assist the government of Afghanistan in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted in the fight against armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent aggression from outside. These tasks were fully completed by the personnel of the 40th Army.

The Mujahideen, before the start of the withdrawal of OKSVA in May 1988, never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single large city.

Military casualties in Afghanistan

USSR: 15,031 dead, 53,753 wounded, 417 missing

1979 - 86 people

1980 - 1,484 people

1981 - 1,298 people

1982 - 1,948 people

1983 - 1,448 people

1984 - 2,343 people

1985 - 1,868 people

1986 - 1,333 people

1987 - 1,215 people

1988 - 759 people

1989 - 53 people

By rank:
Generals, officers: 2,129
Ensigns: 632
Sergeants and soldiers: 11,549
Workers and employees: 139

Out of 11,294 people 10,751 people discharged from military service for health reasons remained disabled, of which - 1st group - 672, 2nd group - 4216, 3rd group - 5863 people

Afghan Mujahideen: 56,000-90,000 (civilians from 600 thousand to 2 million people)

Losses in technology

According to official data, there were 147 tanks, 1314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel trucks, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, no information was published on the number of combat and non-combat losses of aviation, on the losses of aircraft and helicopters by type, etc.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

- Boris Nikitich, what tasks did the topographic service of the 40th Army face in supporting combat operations in Afghanistan?

There were many tasks: the operational provision of formations, units and individual subunits with maps, topographic and geodetic reconnaissance, the production of terrain models for command and control agencies and interaction at all levels in the preparation and planning of operations, topographic training of troops.

One of the main tasks of the topographic service was to provide maps of the combat operations of the troops on the territory of Afghanistan and to create stocks of maps for the planned directions of the theater of operations. At the initial stage, the troops did not have large-scale maps of the entire territory of this country. The largest was a 1:200,000 scale map - for conducting reconnaissance and organizing road marches, but it did not display specific objects, did not have precise landmarks, and therefore did not allow solving many tasks in the interests of the troops. Therefore, initially in 1982-1983 they began to urgently make maps at a scale of 1: 100,000, and then on their basis, satellite images and the results of topographic and geodetic reconnaissance, from 1983-1984 they began to create maps at a scale of 1: 50,000 for work in the most operationally important areas Afghanistan, which already allowed artillery to fire at target coordinates. Then there was an increase in the "fifty" cards: with the change in the situation as a result of hostilities, with the clarification of some natural features, operational corrections were made to them. And when we covered the entire area of ​​Afghanistan with maps at a scale of 1:50,000, we also created special maps of geodetic data due to this. This is how the geodetic base appeared - the exact coordinates of some objects, points, so necessary for shooting missile troops and artillery, to bind troops to the terrain.

By 1985, by 1985, troops of the 40th Army were provided with maps of a scale of 1: 100,000 by 70-75 percent, by 1986 - by almost all 100. And maps of a scale of 1: 50,000 were completely provided somewhere by 1986-1987 .

How was the topographic survey carried out?

Topographers of all formations and units of the 40th Army were involved in conducting topographic reconnaissance of the area during the period of the advancement of troops and in the course of hostilities. Probably 60 percent of all topographic reconnaissance fell on aerial photography. Especially before major military operations. There was a squadron of aircraft near Kabul, among them an An-30 aircraft with equipment for photographing from the air - it flew to the most important areas. Photographing in this case was carried out by the pilots themselves, since they were more prepared to work with this technique, and the topographers who flew with them only clarified the task for them. The aviators had their own photo lab, and when later on the ground we processed the captured information together with them, such work brought good fruit. Although the An-30 flew under the cover of helicopters, topographic reconnaissance from the air was still quite a risky business - at any moment these aircraft could be knocked out. But, thank God, this never happened.

All on earth necessary information collected in the course of natural daily observations. The specificity of Afghanistan was that no one sent any special topographic and geodetic expeditions anywhere, topographers moved throughout the territory only as part of the troops during certain operations. Everything was noted. For example, convoys, as a rule, were driven by army, divisional, brigade topographers, and before any march they reminded drivers and senior vehicles: "Guys, you see something suspicious somewhere - report right away." What was noticed? Where there was no vegetation before, a bush suddenly appeared - which means that this is a landmark for someone. A triangle of stones appeared by the road, clearly laid out by human hands - also a landmark. Similar information was given to us by intelligence units, special forces. Later, after the topographers determined the coordinates of the discovered landmarks, the artillerymen gave harassing fire there, and sometimes this was effective.

All the obtained topographic information flowed to the heads of the topographic services of divisions, brigades, and from them to me, the head of the topographic service of the 40th Army. We summarized this information and transferred it to the topographic service of the Turkestan military district, which at that time worked according to the wartime staff - the number of officers was increased. From there, the information for further processing was distributed among the topographic and geodetic detachments of the Topographic Service of the USSR Armed Forces, which had to make appropriate corrections to the maps within the specified time frame. In stationary conditions, four topographic and geodetic detachments of central subordination worked simultaneously - Noginsk, Golitsyn, Irkutsk, Ivanovo and Tashkent Cartographic Factory. In addition to them, in each military district there were two or three field topographic and geodetic detachments, which were also engaged in the operational correction of maps. Each of the detachments worked on a certain region of Afghanistan according to the order of the Military Topographic Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Already corrected and supplemented maps again entered our topographic service, which was stationed in the vicinity of Kabul near the headquarters of the 40th Army, in the Darulaman region. The sorting soldiers of the army topographic unit, which was located there, quickly typed these maps, loaded them into special AShT vehicles (army headquarters topographic vehicle based on ZIL-131) and transported them piece by piece. When it was necessary to deliver maps more quickly, we were given helicopters.

For inserts from a personal file

PRIVATE BUSSINESS PAVLOV Boris Nikitich PAVLOV Boris Nikitich Born on May 1, 1951 in the village of Fedosino, Borovichi District, Novgorod Region. In 1974 he graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military Topographic Command School, in 1985 - from the Military Engineering Academy. V.V. Kuibyshev. From 1969 to 2002, he served in various positions in the ranks of the Soviet and then Russian Armed Forces. From March 1987 to February 1989 he was the head of the topographic service of the 40th Combined Arms Army in Afghanistan. In 2002, he retired to the reserve with the rank of colonel from the post of head of the Central Base topographic maps RF Armed Forces. He was awarded the Order of the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree, "For Military Merit", the medal "For Military Merit", medals of Afghanistan. Married, has two sons.

- During your trip, did the troops experience a shortage of maps?

There were enough cards and there were no problems, because the machine prints one sheet, ten thousand - the difference is in an extra half an hour of time. The cards were printed for us by the Irkutsk, Kiev, Minsk factories and the Dunaev Moscow factory. But basically the Tashkent factory - until the very withdrawal of troops. In addition, marching cartographic units were printed: structural units that, both in the field and in stationary conditions, ensured the publication of the required number of maps.

We made special maps and combat graphic documents on our own. In the army topographic unit there were printing presses of the type OP-3, OP-4, "Romayor", "Dominant". The last two are imported, and OP-3, OP-4 - domestic cars, which were installed both permanently and in the field version on Ural vehicles. They were served by soldier-specialists: laboratory assistants, photographic laboratory assistants and directly printers, who were trained at the request of the districts by the Zvenigorod training topogeodesic detachment - the only educational institution of its kind.

Special maps included maps of mountain passes and passes, maps of overcoming water lines, snow avalanches, maps of geodetic data. From larger maps, we took coordinates and transferred them to small-scale ones. Maps of geodetic data were indispensable especially for gunners. When we urgently needed more than usual number of special cards, we sent the originals by plane to Tashkent and after 2-3 days they brought us the already published edition.

And why was it necessary to make mock-ups, why couldn’t it be limited to just cards?

On the map, not everything reached the consciousness of the commanders. After all, there are only mountains and rocks, and one had to have a good imagination and an ideal visual memory in order to understand everything with the help of a single map. And everything was immediately visible on the layout: where is which mountain, where does the gorge lead, which parts follow which, how do they move forward and from where. The layout is an ideal practice for future actions. All operations required the production of separate layouts for working out interaction issues, so this was another main type of our activity - the production of layouts of the terrain at the level of the army headquarters. Similar mock-ups were made at the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments - their own mock-up workers worked everywhere. And in general, planning operations, working out the actions of troops and setting tasks on these mock-ups is a common practice for all formations and units of the 40th Army in Afghanistan.

We made layouts of the area almost 2-3 times a month directly in front of the army headquarters. Especially for these purposes, a site was allocated, closed with a camouflage net, so that no outsiders could see the mock-ups. Only strictly defined persons entered this site. For the manufacture of models, as a rule, earth, sand, cement, paints and figures were used, which were cut and sawn by our soldiers. Their actions were led by intelligent officers. It was a very laborious, serious and painstaking work. It happened that the team was given to us at 10 pm, and by 6 am the model had to be ready. And the dimensions of each of these models were considerable - about 6x10 meters. Not only the command of the army headquarters, but also all the chiefs of the military branches and services have always given this work of topographers the highest rating.

Were the Afghans allowed to these models at the army headquarters?

There were persons who were admitted with the permission of the army commander. Because commands were sent down from Moscow from above - to teach them to fight, and we allegedly only supported them. However, as soon as they were allowed to our models, the operations were not so successful.

How did you assess the topographic training of Soviet officers?

In general, the topographic training of troops was weak at all stages from 1979 to 1989. And what is characteristic: lieutenants, the same platoon commanders who came from schools, or senior officers more or less knew the topography, but between these categories, as it were, some kind of gap formed: the company commanders thoroughly forgot everything that they once taught, behaved as if they were seeing the map for the first time. In addition, maps of mountainous areas are more difficult to read than maps of the plains, because there were no clearings, swamps, forests, lakes in Afghanistan. The inability to read maps sometimes led to the fact that commanders, mostly motorized riflemen or tankers, led their units to the wrong place. I had only 112-118 people in the army topographic unit, deployed in wartime staff, of which about 18 officers, including lieutenants, who conducted topography classes directly in the troops with officers of any rank up to colonel. They were informed in detail about some innovations, corrections or additions on the maps that appeared, so that they could read the map correctly and set tasks for their subordinates without errors. It got to the point that as soon as we arrived at some units, the leadership tried to seat all the officers who were possible in topographic training classes - they felt a vital need. And our topographers once again began to explain everything to them, starting with conventional signs: where what means.

The Afghans had their own maps, did you somehow use them in your work?

Of course, we studied them, but they did not find application for us. These maps were in Farsi or English and very old editions. In addition, literally in a single quantity, they displayed only separate pieces of the terrain. The Afghans did not have a solid map of the whole of Afghanistan. Even maps at a scale of 1:50,000 are sheets of 30x30 cm, that is, if you measure them, they are only 15x15 km. What good did they do to us? Therefore, there was no reason to resort to the help of translators - our maps were better: visual, easy to read, understandable to any Soviet officer. From the military counterintelligence officers, such information reached us that the dushmans were looking for opportunities to get exactly Soviet maps by exchange or ransom.

Were there cases when military personnel lost their cards during military operations or due to negligence?

There were such cases, but it was not regarded as an emergency. Because a 1:200,000 scale map - "two hundred" was not considered secret. "Sotka" was marked "For Official Use". Yes, a 1:50,000 scale map was secret, but "fifty" or, as they were also called, "half-kilometer" officers of regiments, brigades and divisions, as a rule, were not issued - they were available only to staff officers within the operational control of the army. The officers of the field units received only “hundredths” cards with some partial information.

And what cards did we leave to the Afghan government troops before the withdrawal?

We left them full maps at a scale of up to 1:100,000. And "fifty" maps were left only for certain areas - the points of deployment of their military units. This was due to precautionary measures so that the card data would not then get into other countries. All other 1:50,000 scale maps I exported completely back to the territory of the USSR.

Was the topographical part of the army often subjected to attacks or shelling at the point of permanent deployment near Kabul?

There were a lot of shelling. In these cases, we had shelters dug in the ground, the barracks were lined with sandbags. The shelling was carried out with rockets mainly in the evening. Dushmans launched RS from a distance, maybe 5-6 km. As a rule, 2, 3, 4 shells, no more, because almost immediately our battery returned fire. During my business trip from 1987 to 1989, there was not a single dead among topographers. One soldier was wounded by a fragment from the RS on the territory of the unit, and one truck - "ZIL-131" ASHT was blown up by a mine - it turned out all over, but due to the maps, people remained alive, they were not even injured.

Another danger is mines. And not only on the roads, when we moved with the columns. From our topography there was a path directly to the headquarters of the 40th Army. We walk, we walk, everything seems to be fine, suddenly: broads - someone was blown up by an anti-personnel mine.

How is it that the territory was protected?

Guarded. But there were also many Afghan service workers there. And sometimes, solid dust rose from the wind - many different people in camouflage and without walked with their half-covered faces tied up. It seems that none of the Afghans should have been strangers, but they penetrated. They were paid money for it. They crawled in somehow, put mines anywhere. It happened that not only ours, but they themselves were undermined. Somehow around 4 p.m. I was walking with Colonel Nikolai Elovik, the deputy chief engineering troops 40th Army - from headquarters to his unit, suddenly, at some point, an explosion and everything flew off. Squeal, groan. They approached: a 15-year-old Afghan boy is lying, his eyes are open, without arms, without legs. Whether he breathes is unclear. We looked: "Kolya, what are we going to do?". I had a raincoat with me - they dropped it, put the guy there, intestines and everything else, and carried it to the clinic, which was nearby.

When did they themselves leave Afghanistan?

I was among the last to go out in mid-January 1989, since the cards were needed until the very end. Fierce battles were already going on outside our town between the dushmans themselves: they divided the territory among themselves, and just during this period I was instructed to withdraw a column - about 70 pieces of equipment. The column was mixed: our topographic part on trucks with equipment, special equipment and materials; units of the security battalion of the army headquarters; divisions of the Special Department; some rear units. We were given 2 tanks and 3 infantry fighting vehicles. Air cover - "turntables" Mi-24, which appeared in pairs with an interval of half an hour. On the road from Kabul to Termez there were outposts from the 103rd Airborne Division and the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. We were given a day to march. On January 14, our convoy concentrated near the bridge across the Amu Darya River and only at the beginning of February crossed the river and settled in the Termez region. The columns went in a day - so we went out in stages.

Your convoy was not fired upon?

It passed without incident, and before us there were cases of shelling of columns, there were both wounded and losses. What happened after us, we no longer knew. Then we lived for another month in tents in a training center near Termez on the border, immediately across the river, where our servicemen were once trained before being transferred to Afghanistan. Because the command of the army set the task: to be in full combat readiness with all the technical support in case of returning back - this was envisaged. A month later, on February 15, we were given the command to leave for the points of permanent deployment.

On December 25, 1979, the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began.

This undeclared war, which lasted 9 years, 1 month and 19 days, remains an unknown war to this day despite numerous published books of memoirs of participants, very detailed descriptions of the events of the war, veteran websites, etc. If we compare how much is known about the three-year Patriotic war of 1812 and the four-year Great Patriotic War, we can say that we know almost nothing about the Afghan war. The image of a ten-year “walk across the river” in the minds of people, filmmakers and journalists is not at all cleared up, and, after 33 years, all the same clichés about a “senseless bloody war”, about “mountains of corpses” and “rivers of blood”, about numerous, veterans who went crazy from these "rivers of blood", who then drank themselves or became bandits.

Some young people, seeing the abbreviation OKSVA, think that this stupid tattoo artist made a mistake in the word "Moscow". I was 16 years old when this strange war began, and a year later I graduated from school and either entered college or the army. And me and my comrades really did not want to get into this very OKSVu in Afghanistan, from where the first zinc coffins had already begun to come! Although some reckless ones themselves rushed there ...

And the way it all began...

The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret decree of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. As a formal basis, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU used the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan for the introduction of Soviet troops.

The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other took part in this conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. Dushmans during the conflict were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European countries - NATO members, as well as Pakistani special services.

December 25, 1979 at 15:00 Soviet troops began to enter the DRA in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar. On December 27, the KGB special forces "Zenith", "Grom" and the "Muslim battalion" of the GRU special forces stormed the Taj Beck Palace. During the battle, Afghan President Amin was killed. On the night of December 28, the 108th motorized rifle division entered Kabul, taking control of all the most important objects of the capital.

The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and maintenance units, divisions - 4, separate brigades - 5, separate regiments - 4, combat aviation regiments - 4, helicopter regiments - 3, pipeline brigade - 1, material support brigade - 1. And also, units of the Airborne Forces of the USSR Ministry of Defense, units and units of the GRU General Staff, the Office of the Chief Military Adviser. In addition to formations and units of the Soviet Army, there were separate units of the border troops, the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Afghanistan.

On December 29, Pravda publishes the “Appeal of the Government of Afghanistan”: “The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, taking into account the increasing intervention and provocations of the external enemies of Afghanistan in order to protect the gains of the April Revolution, territorial integrity, national independence and the maintenance of peace and security, based on the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness dated December 5, 1978, appealed to the USSR with an urgent request for urgent political, moral, economic assistance, including military aid, with which the government of the DRA had previously repeatedly appealed to the government of the Soviet Union. The government of the Soviet Union granted the request of the Afghan side.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded roads, objects of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation (gas fields, power plants, a nitrogen fertilizer plant in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, etc.). They ensured the functioning of airfields in large cities. Contributed to the strengthening of government in 21 provincial centers. They conducted convoys with military and national economic goods for their own needs and in the interests of the DRA.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages.

1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of the protection of deployment points and various objects.

2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 Transition from active combat operations mainly to support of the actions of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988.

February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Losses: According to updated data, in total in the war the Soviet Army lost 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

Materials of the sites: http://soldatru.ru and http://ria.ru and photos from open Internet sources were used.

Military operations of the Afghan war (1979-1989) - various in scale, goals, composition of participants- ground, air-ground planned combined arms operations of units and formations of the 40th army (Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan "OKSVA") during the Afghan war (1979-1989) involving significant forces and means.

Army, divisional (private - brigade, regiment, battalion) military operations were carried out by units and formations of "OKSVA" in various provinces of Afghanistan, in order to stabilize the military-political situation and strengthen state power DRA. They originate from a military operation in the Nakhrin district of Baghlan province in early January 1980, where OKSVA units, which had barely entered the DRA, suppressed an armed rebellion of the 4th artillery regiment of the DRA army. OKSVA military operations in Afghanistan, in accordance with the areas of their conduct, acquired the prefix - Panjshir, Kunar, Kandahar, Herat, Aliheil, Marmol and others. Military operations of the Afghan war (1979-1989) - various in scale, goals, composition of participants - ground, air-ground planned combined arms operations of units and formations of the 40th army (Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, OKSVA) during the Afghan war (1979 -1989) with the involvement of significant forces and means.

The first operations of the Soviet Army (SA) and the USSR Border Troops (PV) were: "Mountains-80", "Spring-80", "Autumn-80". In the future: "Strike-1,2", "Volley", "Maneuver" (Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan), "Trap" (Herat), "Highway" (Paktia, Khost), "Granite", "Thunderstorm" ( Ghazni), Javara (Paktia), South (Kandahar), Vostok 88 (Kunar, Nangarhar), Typhoon, Pamir, Panjshir and Kunar operations, etc.

They originate from a military operation in the Nakhrin district of Baghlan province in early January 1980, where units of the 186th separate motorized rifle regiment, which had barely entered the DRA, suppressed an armed rebellion of the 4th artillery regiment of the DRA army.

Prior Events and Operations Planning

In the first months of 1980, the rebels still made attempts to counteract the Soviet and Afghan troops with fairly large forces. But since the summer of the same year, due to heavy losses in manpower, they abandoned this and switched to actions, mainly in small groups using elements of partisan tactics. The main tactics of the actions of the armed opposition were shelling troops and settlements, attacking posts and small garrisons, setting up ambushes, sabotage at national economic facilities, terror against party and state officials and military personnel, and actions to disrupt transportation on the main communications of the country.

The combat activities of OKSVA for the protection of national economic and military facilities and the conduct of hostilities for the escort of transport convoys

The monthly combat plan of the 40th Army and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, developed on the map, represented the main tasks of the Soviet and Afghan troops for the coming month.
1. Areas of independent (only Afghan troops) and joint military operations, their goals, leaders, forces involved (Afghan and Soviet), reinforcements for each operation, timing
2. Areas of responsibility of formations and units in which they had to act independently with their own forces on duty, supplying these forces
3. Areas of responsibility of formations and units for combating enemy caravans by ambushes (covering the border), the number of units allocated for this purpose
4. Cities in which it is planned to liquidate the counter-revolutionary underground, terms, forces, leaders
zones of independent actions of Soviet and Afghan aviation to inflict defeat on enemy groupings and objects

On the basis of the plan of combat activity approved in Moscow, the headquarters of the 40th Army, the headquarters of its formations and units, monthly developed:
1. combat orders
2. plans for the organization and conduct of intelligence
3. action plans to ensure the upcoming hostilities
4. action plans to assist local governments in strengthening state power and stabilizing the situation

Character and purpose

By the nature of the tasks to be solved, the operations were carried out in order to defeat large enemy groupings in areas controlled by him, to protect military and national economic facilities, to ensure the escort of transport convoys, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Operations to defeat large enemy groupings in the areas controlled by him were offensive in terms of the type of troop actions, although defensive operations could also be carried out in some areas. In terms of organization and practical implementation, these operations were among the most complex. At the same time, the expenditure of forces and means was not always adequate to the results obtained. Nevertheless, the Soviet command, deprived of the opportunity to effectively influence the military-strategic situation in the country in other ways, was forced to carry out such operations.

Almost all active military operations of the Soviet troops were carried out only in conjunction with the Afghan ones - with units of the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the Russian Federation, detachments of party activists or pro-government irregular formations. The exception was ambushes on the caravan routes of the opposition - this is a type of hostilities that requires special secrecy and secrecy, for obvious reasons, Soviet units fought independently. Soviet units independently carried out tasks as part of outposts and posts in the protection of roads and restricted areas of major cities, airfields, power plants and other critical facilities. In general, the creation of mixed Soviet-Afghan units in the performance of combat missions was allowed extremely rarely.

Forms of combat activity

“The search for and improvement of the forms of combat activity of the army took place throughout the war. The following forms of combat activity of the 40th A were finally formed:

• carrying out operations to defeat the most dangerous groups of the armed opposition
• defense of communications, regime zones, important national economic facilities
• ambush combat operations of units and subunits in common system surprise and covert strikes by army troops
• combat operations for the implementation of intelligence data by duty forces and means of the army
• military operations on the wiring of columns with material and technical means in especially dangerous areas
• covering the state border

An analysis of the forms of combat activity, types of operations, methods of conducting them and defeating individual enemy groupings made it possible to reveal their structural-logical dependence. In connection with the creation of large formations by the armed opposition, the improvement of their methods of combat, the use of unexpected tactics, effective ways the fight against aviation, mine warfare in the main areas of action of the 40th A, the adoption of automatic weapons, artillery systems, modern MANPADS and communications by the end of 1980 began to take shape qualitatively new form combat activities of the 40th Army - conducting army operations.

Essence of operations of the 40th Army

The essence of operations 40-A to defeat especially dangerous rebel groups consisted in the totality of coordinated and interconnected by:
Goals, tasks, area and time of combat and reconnaissance and search operations, strikes and maneuvers of formations and units of the ground forces, aviation, missile forces and artillery, helicopter landings, bypassing, raid and assault detachments, armored groups, associations, formations and units of the Afghan army carried out both simultaneously and sequentially. In terms of scale, these could be either large-scale operations or military operations in a limited area. In turn, depending on the participating forces and means, it is advisable to divide the operation as follows.

Large-scale operations were divided into: independent combat operations; joint combat operations with formations, formations and units of the Afghan army; support for the combat operations of formations and formations of the Afghan army.

Combat operations in a limited area were divided into: private military operations; implementation of intelligence data; ambush and search and reconnaissance operations.

Types and types of military operations

According to the nature of the hostilities in Afghanistan, three types of operations were distinguished:

• air-ground to defeat large enemy groupings and its base areas
• offensive with the aim of breaking through the enemy’s defenses and ensuring the combat activities of the surrounded points of permanent deployment of formations and units of the 40th A and Afghan troops
• defensive on the main road directions, especially during the withdrawal of troops

Operations were divided into two types - scheduled and unscheduled. A total of 426 scheduled and 47 unscheduled operations were performed. They differed from each other in tasks, methods and levels of planning, involved forces and means.

Planned operations in Afghanistan - called the actions of troops to defeat large enemy groupings, provided for in the plans for combat operations of the headquarters of the 40th Army and the apparatus of the chief military adviser in the Armed Forces of the DRA for a month, in large areas, involving significant forces and means or to solve tasks that should be performed over a long period of time. In addition, in a war without a front line, the enemy created large armed detachments in the most important areas, the decision to destroy which must be taken in short time in order to quickly disrupt the plans of the rebels. Planned military operations (and some unplanned ones) were, as a rule, large-scale, involving significant forces and means. They covered large areas of the country and were sometimes quite long in time. Such operations were led by the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the army commander, his deputies, and formation commanders. If large-scale operations were carried out independently by the Afghan troops, and the Soviet units only supported them, then the head was either the Minister of Defense (sometimes his deputy) or the corps commander. At the same time, the role of Soviet advisers to the Afghan leader, who were inseparably on his side, sharply increased. command post.

Unscheduled operations in Afghanistan, these are military operations for the immediate destruction of precisely established enemy units, the actions of which could lead to dangerous consequences. In connection with the increase in the activity of enemy operations, the role of unscheduled operations increased, which required the formations and units capable of solving suddenly arising tasks to be ready. According to the special conditions of conducting - operations were divided into operations:
in mountainous areas, operations in valleys with a green and village zone and operations in settlements.
Unscheduled combat operations in Afghanistan were carried out mainly by duty units - reinforced companies and battalions against specific opposition detachments and groups according to the decisions of the commanders of formations, units and even detached battalions after receiving reliable intelligence information, with a report of their decision to a higher commander. This situation was due to the fact that, due to the relatively high mobility of the enemy, intelligence data concerning individual detachments and groups quickly became outdated. It was necessary to ensure pre-emptive actions in order to fend off in time or not allow hostile actions against Soviet and government troops and authorities at all. In many cases, these pre-emptive actions were carried out not by ground forces, but by air and artillery strikes, if the intelligence had full accurate coordinates.

The forms and methods of conducting military operations of the SV (1980-1984) in the DRA were Joint and independent military operations (combat operations): Joint military operations were carried out to defeat the largest enemy groupings in the most important areas in order to achieve more significant goals. They were carried out by formations and units of the OK SV, the Afghan army, together with units of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At first, military operations were carried out in a certain area, with the mastery of which the goal of the operations was achieved, then they took on the character of a small military operation. In connection with political changes in the general strategy of opposition leaders in 1982, changes were made to the tactics of conducting armed struggle. The main efforts of the Afghan opposition were focused on maintaining and expanding the sphere of their territorial control. Work was actively carried out to reorganize the armed formations on the basis of the introduction of a clearer organizational structure close to military.

Independent combat operations are typical for the first period of the war, when the Afghan army had not yet been fully formed organizationally, the command and troops had no combat experience, and the personnel had low morale and fighting spirit. At this stage, the troops of the 40th A had to bear the main burden of conducting combat operations, the main efforts were focused on defeating the rebel groups along the main communications, in the most threatened areas that make up the bases of the counterrevolutionary forces. The increased activity of the armed opposition formations, their higher equipment, as well as the completion of the creation of the Afghan army, made it possible to move on to the conduct of "joint operations" at the second stage of the war.

Joint efforts with the Armed Forces, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA

The 40th Army, together with the DRA Armed Forces, carried out a number of large-scale planned and unscheduled operations. The most characteristic operations of the second stage were "Pandzherskaya" and "Kunarskaya". In 1984, in connection with the decision by the leadership of the opposition not to reduce activity in the winter, a new approach was required to conduct joint large-scale operations. The duration of the operation averaged about 10 days. The number of troops attracted from the 40th Army (up to 30 battalions) and the RA Armed Forces (up to 19 battalions) has increased. The geography of hostilities also expanded, their number in the green zone increased, more hostilities were conducted at night. An example of the largest-scale operations can be operations carried out in the winter of 1984 in the province of Paktika (Urgun district), in the summer - in the Panjer and Andarab valleys "

The scale of military operations

In terms of scale, special operations will be divided into army (as part of the army) and private combat operations (as part of a division, regiment, battalion). Depending on the participating forces and means, it is advisable to consider army operations as:

• independent operations, joint with the troops of a friendly country
• support for military operations of associations and units of a friendly army

According to the nature of hostilities, the following types can be distinguished special operations:

• air-ground strike to defeat enemy groupings in its base areas with the widespread use of helicopter assault forces
• offensive with the aim of releasing own troops at points of permanent deployment and breaking through enemy defenses
• defensive during the protection and defense of important objects of the operational formation of the army and the main objects and communication centers.

Forces and means

“The composition of forces and means for conducting each operation was determined based on its scale, position, nature of the enemy’s actions and the chosen method of defeating him, as well as terrain features. At the same time, it was taken into account that the partisan nature of the actions of the opposition armed formations in the mountains required the involvement of much more forces and means than to perform the same task under normal conditions. This led to the participation in a number of operations of four to five or more combined arms formations and a number of units of various branches of the military and special forces of the army "

Geography of military operations of the Army and Border Troops in Afghanistan

To facilitate the identification of the concretization of the operation among the OKSVA military personnel, a prefix was used indicating the name (geography) of the region, their conduct - Province, County, Settlement, Mountain Range, Pass. Thus, the following operations are reflected in the memoirs of participants in the events:

1. Panjshir; Kunar; Herat; Bagramsky;

2. Kandahar; Helmand; Aliheil; Urgun;

3. Marmal;

4. Tashkurgan;

5. Surubian; Andhoy; Murghab;

4. Kufab; Talukan; Ishkamysh; Khanabad;

6. Baghlan; Kunduz

7. Darzab; Dzharkudukskaya; Imam Sahib

"All major army operations: "Kunar, Panjshir, Aliheil, Herat, Khosta" and many others were carried out with the support of ground attack aviation "were Joint - Ground Forces and Ground Forces, in the conditions of continuous redeployment of ground forces at the stage of air support for the SHA, with attacking actions on call, against identified enemy targets. Article "Attack aircraft in the Afghan war" magazine "BULLETIN OF THE ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES" No. 2 (23) / 2008).

Periods of military operations

First period

1st period (initial) - from January 1980 to January 1982. “By the nature of the military-political tasks being solved and the peculiarities of the armed struggle, the military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods. The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, its placement in garrisons, the organization of protection and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military and economic facilities, as well as the conduct of military operations to ensure solutions to these problems.

The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan; deployment (PPD) of his garrisons; organization of security and defense (PPD) and the most important military and economic facilities; conducting combat operations to ensure the solution of these tasks. The winter of 1980 was especially difficult for the Soviet soldiers. The calculation that the Afghan army would solve the main tasks of the armed struggle against the opposition did not justify itself. “Despite a number of measures to increase its combat readiness, the government army remained weak and incapacitated. Therefore, the Soviet troops bore the brunt of the fight against the armed opposition groups. Anti-government formations in the 1st period acted against the Soviet troops with relatively large forces, did not avoid direct confrontation with them. This made it possible to defeat large counter-revolutionary groups in the areas of Faizabad, Talikan, Takhar, Baghlan, Jalalabad and other cities.

Second period

2nd period (active) - from January 1982 to January 1987 (according to others: March 1982 - April 1986), before the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation (PNR), it was characterized by the introduction of active large-scale hostilities, mainly on their own, and also together with formations and parts of the DRA Armed Forces. “The opposition, having suffered a number of major military defeats in the first period of the war, moved the main groupings of its troops to hard-to-reach mountainous areas, where it became practically impossible to use modern equipment ...”. The opposition, using the knowledge of the area, skillfully used various tactics. When meeting with the superior forces of the Soviet troops, the formations evaded the battle. Methods for hiding members of formations in settlements, among the civilian population, were worked out.

At the same time, the enemy did not miss the opportunity to deliver a sudden blow, using small forces. During the 2nd period, the detachments of the armed opposition abandoned the positional struggle and maneuver actions were widely used. Fights were fought only in those cases when the situation forced it - during the defense of the base areas, when the opposition forces were completely blocked and clashes could not be avoided. In such cases, "blocked detachments acted in close combat, which practically excluded the use of aviation and sharply narrowed the possibilities for using artillery, especially from closed fire positions."

Third period

3rd period (passive) from September 1986 to January 1988 - the period of implementation of the policy of national reconciliation. “In the third period of their stay in Afghanistan, the troops of the 40th Army came out with the most numerous composition. The grouping of their ground troops included four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments and six separate battalions. As part of these forces, there were about 29 thousand units of military equipment, of which up to 6 thousand tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles. To ensure the actions of troops from the air, the commander had four aviation and three helicopter regiments at his disposal. The total number of OKSV personnel reached 108.8 thousand people, including 73 thousand in combat units. It was the most combat-ready group for the entire period of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but views on their use have changed significantly.

The fourth period

4th period - from January 1988 - preparation for the withdrawal of troops and the withdrawal itself in February 1989. The impetus for the fourth period was laid back in September 1986 by the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, which proclaimed a course towards national reconciliation. By this time, it became clear to sensible people that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem. The adoption of the course of "national reconciliation" reflected the real situation in the country, when it was impossible to achieve an end to the war by military means. However, the implementation of the policy of reconciliation became possible only after the implementation, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, of a whole range of preliminary measures that created the necessary ground for this. The main and decisive step was the decision of the USSR government, agreed with the Afghan leadership, to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, subject to the cessation of armed assistance to the Afghan rebels from Pakistan and other countries.

The commander of the 40th Army and the headquarters of the Army monthly developed a combat plan, subsequently it was coordinated with the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the group of the General Staff, the headquarters of the TurkVO, the apparatus of the chief military adviser of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Afghanistan and the KGB representative office at the USSR Embassy, ​​and signed by the commander of the troops of the TurkVO, chief military adviser, KGB representative at the USSR Embassy and approved by the USSR Ministry of Defense. On the basis of the approved monthly combat plan of the 40th Army - for each army operation, the commander developed a decision.

Depending on the conditions and scale of the operation, they were approved large-scale - by the Ministry of Defense, the commander of the TurkVO troops, the head of the operational group of the Moscow Region, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Southern Direction, and sometimes the commander of the army (small operations), if the head of the operation was the deputy commander.

Having received permission from the higher command to conduct the operation, the army commander clarified the task of defeating the enemy. To assess the situation, he involved the chief of staff, the commanders of aviation and artillery, the head of intelligence and the head of the intelligence center, the head of the operations department and the head of the engineering troops. As a result of assessing the situation, the commander determined the basics of the plan for the operation. Then, under the leadership of the commander, the involved officials concretized the plan, working out a decision for the operation.

The adopted decision was consistently detailed, affecting a wide range of issues. The army commander personally coordinated the decision with the chief military adviser in Afghanistan and the KGB representative at the USSR embassy. After agreement, the decision was reported to the headquarters of the TurkVO and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. As the deadline approached (but no later than 5-7 days before the start of the operation), the chiefs of the armed forces were involved in the development of the plan.
Then combat missions were assigned to commanders of formations and units. At the same time to carry out large-scale operations, such as Panjshir 1982-1985, Kunar 1980-1985. and others, the operation plan was worked out by a strictly limited circle of people a month before they began, then submitted to the General Staff, and only after finalization was brought to the heads of departments and services.

Known military operations in the period (1979-1989) - "Mountains-80", "Spring-80", "Autumn-80", "Strike-1,2", "Volley", Tornado, Operation "Maneuver", "Trap", "Magistral", "Granite", " Thunderstorm" in the province of Ghazni, "Jawara", "South" (Kandahar), "Typhoon" and others.

Memoirs of General of the Army Varennikov V.I. about the conducted military operations:

During my stay in Afghanistan, a number of interesting and complex operations were carried out. Of course, the operation of the operation is different. Some left no memories. Others will never fade. I especially remember the operations in the Kunar Gorge, during the assault on the Javara base, on the Parachinar ledge, in the Kunduz region, west of Herat to the Kokari-Sharshari base on the Iranian border in the Lurkokh mountain range, in the Lashkargah region, in the province of Kandahar and immediately beyond Kandahar.

The result of "major combined arms operations" was the defeat of numerous well-organized formations of the Afghan Mujahideen throughout Afghanistan, the capture of important strongholds (fortifications) and transshipment bases, with a wide arsenal of weapons, ammunition and intelligence documentation.

Combat activities of the Afghan Mujahideen

“The main force of the rebels were regional groups and detachments. Their goals, organizational forms and tactics of warfare were determined by local tribal and religious authorities - "field commanders", and the zone of action was limited to the areas of residence of members of the armed opposition formations. At the initial stage of formation, they did not have a permanent composition and organization. The composition of detachments and groups in socio-ethnic terms was heterogeneous. As a rule, the formation included representatives of one national-ethnic group. At their level, the field commanders had no contact with foreign organizations of the Afghan counterrevolution, this was the prerogative of the opposition leaders. Their main advantage was the active support of the local population.” “In the course of the armed struggle, the opposition forces used various methods of military operations - ambushes, raids, shelling. Mining, sabotage, terror, caravan escort were widely practiced. Opposition ambush actions were carried out with the aim of disrupting the supply of national economic and military goods, seizing materiel, weapons, ammunition, as well as the physical destruction of OKSVA military personnel. Such cases were of a systemic and private nature.

Ambushes and raids

The ambush was most often carried out by a small group of 10-15 people. Her battle order consisted of observers and three or four subgroups. The observers created observation posts in the mountains or advanced to the probable routes of movement of enemy columns. The observers were unarmed and pretended to be civilians (shepherds, peasants). Children were often used as observers.
The basis of the ambush was the fire subgroup, which included the main forces and firepower of the opposition. It, as a rule, was located in the center of the battle formation in the immediate vicinity of the enemy's area of ​​​​destruction and was carefully camouflaged. The forces of attack on the columns were placed along the road at a distance of 150 to 300 m from the canvas. On the flanks were grenade launchers, machine gunners, snipers. At dominant heights, DShKs were installed, adapted to fire at ground and air targets.
So, in just three years (from 1985 to 1987), more than 10 thousand ambushes were recorded. Opposition ambushes on columns with NE equipment were arranged on sections of roads passing through passes and gorges. In the mountains, ambush positions were arranged on the slopes or ridges of heights, the entrance or exit from the gorge, on the pass sections of the roads. In the "green zones" they were organized in places where government and Soviet troops were likely to rest or in the areas of their expected actions. The defeat was inflicted by fire both from the front and from the flanks. Often, ambushes were arranged at several lines as the troops advanced - both in columns and in battle formations. In settlements, ambushes were carried out behind adobe fences, in houses - with the calculation, by deceptive actions, to lure the enemy into a “fire bag.

Territorial zones of military operations

In order to defeat large enemy groupings in areas controlled by him, according to the nature of the tasks to be solved, ground forces operations were divided into: protection of military and national economic facilities; ensuring the wiring of transport columns; liquidation of the rear system of the armed opposition - base areas;

The actions of units and formations in the areas of responsibility (territories) were of a regular nature. The enemy grouping was located on large area, in relatively small detachments that occupied settlements, gorges, mountains, which did not allow her to be surrounded. Then “the whole region was divided into zones, in each of which a division or regiment operated independently. Aviation at that time, according to the plan of the commander, provided support to those troops that most needed it, and also blocked the entire area of ​​​​operation "

“The combat zone on the territory of Afghanistan was conditionally divided into four regions, which were controlled by units army aviation and partly by troops:

• In the north of the country, these are the districts of the cities: Kunduz, Khanabad, Faizabad, Puli-Khumri, Tashkurgan, Mazar-i-Sharif
• East: Khost, Asabad, Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kabul, Bagram
• In the south: Munarai, eastern and southern border zone with Pakistan, Kandahar, Lashkargah
• In the west - areas: Farah, Shindanda and Herat "

Northern territorial zone military operations

"Northern Territorial Zone"- the territories of the so-called lands: "Afghan Turkestan" and "Khazarjat". The peoples inhabiting this territory have historical, cultural, and family ties with the peoples of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics.

Inhabited by: Tajiks (majority); Uzbeks (tribes: Kattagans, Sarays, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kangly, Chagatai, etc.); Hazaras - (in equal shares); Pashtuns (at different times settled by Afghan rulers - tribes: Shinvari, Safi, Mangal, Salarzai, Jaji, Chitrali, Turi, Afridi, etc.); Turkmens (tribes: Ersars (i), Ali-Eli, Saryka, Salors, Tekins); also Kazakhs; Arabs, etc.

"Northern territorial zone" - includes the provinces: Balkh, Samangan, Sari-Pul, Faryab, Jauzdzhan

Provinces, districts, neighborhoods of cities and towns of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan - the zones of the most active confrontation between the armed Afghan opposition (Afghan Mujahideen) and the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the period (1979-1989)

Balkh: Alburz, Kaflandara, Chashmayi-Shafa, Marmol, Dzhangali, Alakjar, Bagi-Pakhlavan, Kuland, Kurbaka Khan, Baluchi, Sari-Asia, Khoja-Iskander, Tajikoilton, Agarsay (Agirsai), Tashkanda, Alagan, Dakhnayi-Karnay , Sari-Mang, Paykamdara, Tangimarmol, Kishinda-Payin, Toragay, Julga, Akkupruk, Bogosht, Chashmayi-Soval, Bauragay, Baigizi, Balanddarik, Tukzar, Langari-Shah-Abdulla, Nawabad, Sokhtayi-Sufla, Bayramshah, Shorcha, Mui -Mutorak and other Samangan: Tashkurgan, Aybak, Naibabad, Akmazar, Lorgan, Daulatabad (Davlatabad), Pirnakhchir, Dekhi-Nau, Darai-Suf, Kuli-Ishan, Rabok, Daulati-Koh (Kuh), Khodzhaprayshan, Sayad, Chakmakli , Kokjar, Khasanheil, Kokhnasamangan-Kalan, Juyi-Zindan, Mangtash, Zorget, Chogai, Sheikhala, Kochnehal, Kokjar, Delkhaki and others. , Darzab (Derzab), Mugul, Sardara, Belarsai, Tirgali, Pirgarib, Almar, Dzhigilda, Khoja Pogakli, Baragani-Kalan, Khojadokoh (Khojadokukh), Akcha, Khaval, Pasnay, Khanedan, Ganjia, Dzhargan, Dekhi-Surkh, Bedistan and etc. So in the Northern territorial zone in the province of Fariab in December 1981 - January 1982, the Government forces of the DRA carried out a "carefully prepared operation to destroy the" Islamic committees "". In addition to the ground forces, an airborne assault force (1200 people) and 52 Air Force aircraft were involved in the operation: 24 Su-17MZ, 8 Su-25, 12 MiG-21 and 8 An-12. From army aviation, 60 Soviet and 12 Afghan helicopters participated in the operation. The whole operation was prepared in strict confidence. Leakage of information from a narrow circle of people privy to the details of the operation with the participation of the Afghan military led to dire consequences. In this case, a "legend" was developed for the Afghan military. Only two or three hours before the start of the operation, the Afghan military was introduced into the plan of the operation.

The main part of the "Operation" fell on January 15-16, 1982. The scale of the operation provided for the involvement of significant forces and means: MiG-21 aircraft (to suppress air defense groups), three strike groups of 8 Su-17MZ each (the first of them was also given eight Su-25s, which are especially effective during the assault). The strike groups carried weapons from the FAB-250 and RBC-250 with ball bombs. The raid was carried out simultaneously “on warehouses with weapons, air defense positions and strongholds of armed detachments. The headquarters of Islamic committees, residential buildings where members of armed groups could hide, and rural schools where anti-government agitation was conducted were subject to destruction.

After the withdrawal of the strike groups, the Mi-24D treated the area, they also provided fire support during the landing from the Mi-8T and Mi-6. The landing was carried out with a minimum "gap" - starting the landing with a segment of 20 minutes, at the end of the air strike. Even low cloudiness in the area of ​​the operation did not prevent aviation from achieving success - the base in this area ceased to exist. Aviation losses amounted to: one Mi-24D and two Mi-8T, shot down by fire from DShK machine guns in the landing zone "

North-Eastern Territorial Zone of Military Operations

Includes provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhshan

• Kunduz: Kunduz, Chahardara (Chardara), Madras, Aliabad, Khanabad, Mulla-Ghulyam, Bala-Hisar, Imam-Sahib, Dasht-i-Archi, Asiabad, Kalai-i-Zal, Alchin, Zaheil, Isaheil, Kataheil, Aliheil, Chugayi - Soufla, Umarheil, Mullaheil, Mahajirin (Makhidzhirin), Ibrahimheil, Chinzai, Musazai, Kulabi, Dzhangalbash, Murshek, Chimtana, Arab, Arabha, Khushka-Dara, Dara-e-Bachi, Dam-e-Yankala, Basiz, Kubak, Derzan, Tundai-Kalai, Kyzyltash, Munkhesh, Shinkamysh, Begalak, Dzhunguli, Khojapista, Garuch, Chaharsavi, Abaka, Shah-Ali, and others.
• Baghlan: Nakhrin, Banu, Chaugani, Logaryan, Fuloli, Shafiheil, Lakanheil, Taraheil, Burka, Seyid, Khost-O-Fereng, Shamark, Andarab, Malkhan, Doshi, Khinjan, Buzdara, Tilkhana, Dakhana-Gori, Lagay, Baghlan-i- Jadid and others
• Takhar (aka Tahor): Talukan (Talikan, Tulukan, Talekan), Bangi, Chah Ab (Chakhi Ab), Varsaj, Dargad, Khazar Sumuch, Chal, Majir, Mugul, Ishkamysh, Farkhar, Nakhrin, Mirheil, Shastdara, Yafsaj, Jarav , Dehmiran, Yangi Kala, Kalafgan, Darra-Kalan, Khojagar, Khavadshah Bahaudin (Khoja Bahautdin), Balajari, Lashi-Javayi, Chinzai, Ishanan, Shafak, Gaoharsang, Zardalu-Darayi-Paine, etc.
• Badakhshan: Fayzabad, Kishim, Baharak, Shaesta, Yavarzan, Balajara, Ishkashim, Kufab, Saigan, Zardev, Varzhdud, Gulkhana, Artynzhilau, Rustak, Pasha-Dara, Busht, Dahan-Spingav, Mangu, Gavaki, Dekhi-Basi, Gorji, Suskan, Uzunkul, Tashnap, Gurisang, Vojib, Porani, Karamugul (Karamugol), Guzyk-Dara, Bagi-Shah and others.

"North-Eastern Territorial Zone", historically - the lands of "Kattagan and Badakhshan".
Inhabited: Tajiks (evenly distributed); Pashtuns - mainly in the provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan (tribes - gilzai, shinwari, safi, mangal, salarzai, jaji, chitrali, turi, afridi, etc.); Uzbeks - mainly in the provinces:
Takhar, Kunduz (tribes: ); the Hazaras - in the province of Kunduz, Baghlan; also the Arabs; pashai; Kazakhs.
In the province of Badakhshan live: Tajik Ismailis; various Pamir peoples: Rushans (Rykhen, Rukhnis), Ishkashims (Ishkoshumi, Ishkoshims), Vakhs (Vakhs, Khiks), Sangli, Zebak, Munjan, Shughni (Khugni), Darvaz, etc.; In the highlands of the extreme north-east of Afghanistan in the region (Wakhan Corridor) of the same province live Afghan Kyrgyz.

In the period from the beginning of 1918 to the beginning of the 1940s - counties of the provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Faryab, Badghis were an outpost and a transshipment base for thousands of armed formations of the Basmachi and their leaders "Kurbashi" - Ibrahim-Bek, Madamin-Bek, Muetdin-bek, Mahmud-bek, Junaid Khan, Utan-Bek, Kurshirmat, Abdul Ahad Kari, Katta Ergash, Kichik Ergash, Seyyid-Mubashir Khan Tirazi, Enver Pasha, Jafar Khan , D. Sardar, Nurmamada, Kizil-Ayaka and others.
In the course of many years of armed confrontation, the Basmachi detachments were either destroyed or squeezed out by the detachments of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army outside the borders of "Red Turkestan" to adjacent territories - to the Emirate of Afghanistan. A significant part of the survivors - active, irreconcilable members of the Basmachi movement settled in the districts of the northeastern provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and integrated into Afghan society. In the early 1990s, strongholds and transshipment bases of the “irreconcilable Tajik opposition” were located on this territory.

Western territorial zone of military operations

Includes provinces: Herat, Badghis, Horus, Farah- (it also includes: northwestern, southwestern - parts of Afghanistan)

• Herat: Herat, Shindand, Sharshari, Karvangah, Siyah-Kort, Zinjan, Cherdobag, Sangi-Siyah, Amrud, Dargara, Karyani, Bartakht, Khushnak, Karezi-Ilyas, Islamkala, Adraskan, Rabati-Mirza, Karyayi-Gukhar, Kafasan, Khoja- Galten, Tangitanchi, Toragundi (Turagundi), Karakishyan, Takhti-Safar, Shevan, Karukh and others.
• Badgis: Kalai-Nau and others.
• Gor (aka Gur): Surkhakan, Chaghcharan, Pasaband and others.
• Farah: Anardara, Bidikash, Lurkoh, Farahrud, Kokhi-Yakadara, Suji (Sudjik), Khaki-Safed, Tarnakrud, Khuji, Kale-Amoni and others.

"Western Territorial Zone", historically - the lands of the Persian "Khorasan", the territory earlier, for the most part, part of the Persian Empire.
Inhabited predominantly Tajiks (some of whom are Shiites), also live: Farsivans (Persians), Charaymaks, Pashtuns (tribes: Nurzai, Achakzai, Isakzai, etc.); qizilbash; afshars; Turkmens (tribes: Ersars (s), Ali-Eli, Saryka, Salors, Tekins); Uzbeks (tribes: Kattagans, Sarays, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kanglys, Chagatai, etc.); Hazaras; talish; Kurds; firuzkuhi; teimuri; taimon; jamshids, etc.
The population of this region has ancient historical and cultural ties with neighboring Iran. For many years, the Iranian government has provided political and financial support to the region.

Central territorial zone of military operations

Includes provinces: Kabul, Wardak

• Kabul, Wardak: Kabul, Kattaheil, Jun-Zindan, Kala Atamukhamed-Khan, Pagman, Surubi, Mirbachakot, Maydanshahr, Shamali, Shakardara, Karabag, Mukur, Yakdara, Istalif, Guldar, Sarpul (Surpul), Hosseinkot, Kofi-Safi, Kuz-Myaheil, Khairad Khana, Dehsabab (Dehsaba), Husseinheil, Mizan, Vakh, Vaka, Sheikhabad, Saidabad, Mahalla, Karezi-Mir, Dehi-Kazi, Dehi-Sabz, Luka, Chakhorasiab, Cha-Khordegi, etc.

"Central territorial zone" inhabited: Tajiks (majority), Pashtuns of the Ghilzai and Karlani tribal unions, Hazaras, Kyzylbash, Indians, etc. The surroundings of Kabul and the province of Wardak are also inhabited by Pashtun tribes: Dothani, Mullahel, Babrakhil and others.

"Central territorial zone, including the Panjshir Gorge" includes provinces: Bamiyan, Parvan, Panjshir, Kapisa(places of compact residence of Panjshir Tajiks Panjshirs - Afg. panjeri) and the Khazarians ( Khazar) - Bamiyan, the historical and cultural capital of the Khazars, the so-called - "Khazarjat".

• Bamiyan: Sokhdara, Bamiyan, Qalayin-Talib, Lalaheil, Sheray, Taibuti, Qalayi-Mulla, Dekhi-Khazar, Duabi, Munara, Khawal, Selkash, Chakhardeh, Munari, Shashpul, Akhangaran and others., inhabited by the Khazars (Afg. Khazars).
• Parvan; Jabal-Us-Saraj, Charikar, Bagram, Durmala, Shinaraheil, Karabakh, Katali, Ayeli-Kazi, Dilak, Dani-Rivat, Kalatan (Kalatak), Astana, Gyakhheil, Sangsulak, Khidzhani-Belandi, Ferenzhal, Kishi-Charikar, Dekhinau , Naddeh and others., inhabited by: Tajiks, Hazaras, Pashtuns (tribes: shinwari, ahmadzai, momand ).
• Panjshir: Gorband, Rukh, Bazarak, Khazar, Shutul, Pishgor, Pasi-Shahi-Mardan, Anava, Mahmudrak, Gulbahar (Gulbahor), Dekhi-Khazar, Kijol, Pini, Piavusht, Taveh (administrative and spiritual center of the Khazars and others) inhabited by Panjshir Tajiks ( afg."panjsheri"), partly by the Hazaras.
• Kapisa: Nijrab, Shatori, Tagat, Hasanhanheil, Hisarab, etc.

Inhabited: Tajiks, Sunni Hazaras, Pashtuns, etc.

Eastern territorial zone of military operations

Includes provinces - Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman

Hisar, Parachinar, Khyber, Narai, Marulgad, Saidoni-Fuvladi, Shibokan, Aukaf, Birinjau, Mamaheil, Bandu, Khada, Ada, Charbag, Huvaizi, Shakidan, etc., inhabited by Pashtun tribes: Mohmand, Khugyani, Orakzai, Masud, Vaziri, Zaimukhti, Bajauri, Diri, Swat, Bunerami, Shinvari, Afridi, etc.
• Kunar: Asadabad, Asmar, Ganjgal, Sangam, Daridam, Pajigal, Maravara, Birkot, Khara, Votapur, Perone, Shamirkot, Cognac, Shawl, Gola, Bar-Narang, Sarkani, Damdara, Shpelai, Bargundai, Loya-Bacha, Dalikandao, Mukur, Bar-Mangish, Alatrol, Zangboshahuna, Vutolanta-Gai, Tangai, Shahid, Mangwal, Sarband, Shaunkrai, Shigal, Binshaikandao, Lobkam, Kacha, Nava, Spinatsuka, Baruga, Janshagal, etc.
• Lagman: Alishang, Mehterlam, Surkhrud, Rodbor, Birkot, Khairohel, Sangi-Daulatkhan, Shahidan, Shakhi, Shukundurbab and others.

"Eastern Territorial Zone" inhabited by the tribes of the Pashtun union of Karlani (Karrani), the largest of which is the Safi tribe (Gandari clan), also by tribes: Mohmand, Gigiani, Shinvari, Khugyani, Tarqlani, Myshvani, Sarkani, Safi, Vaziri, etc.; various Nuristani peoples. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical position in the military and economic purposes from the time of "Western India" and the Anglo-Afghan wars to the present day.

Southeastern territorial zone of military operations

"South-Eastern Territorial Zone" includes provinces: Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Zabul

• Ghazni: Kunsaf, Kulidzhana, Aukaf, Birinzhau, Bandu, Mamheil, Sheikhabad, Duranai, Drusarugar, Abdara, Durinai, Vulusvali, Safedsanga and others.
• Logar: Baraki-Barak, Dubandai, Dehi-Manaka, Vagjal, Chaunay, Vali-Sufla, Nave-Kala, Charkh, Mazgin, Aushar, Abchakan, Tandan, Dobari, Kalabahadur, Gardezkheylutir, Bedak, Surkhob (Surkhab), Sepest, Naikaray, Altamur , Mulla-Bahadur, Shikarkaladak, Mukhameddaga, Kalatajkhan, Mamaheil, Puli-Alam and others.
• Paktia: Gardez, Mukhammedaga, Chamkani, Shaboheil, Aliheil, Daj, Sufla, Urgun, Kvash, Nazarjay, Gurbaz, Barankalai, Safidsang, Padhabi-Shana, Shasti-Saidabad, Puli-Kandahari and others.
• Paktika and Khost: Vazakhway and others.
• Zabul (aka Zabol): Kalat, Jilavur, Loy Manar, Shukurkalai, Apushello, Shekude, Duri, etc.

"South-Eastern Territorial Zone" inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions: The first - "Gilzai" it includes: Suleimanheil, Haroti, Hatoki, Tokhi, Nasyr, etc. The second - "Karrani" (Karlani), includes: Jadran, Jaji, Thani, Waziri, etc.
The Pashtun tribes inhabiting the territories of the provinces: Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Zabul include the tribal union "Karlani" (Carlanry, Carrani) made up of tribes Jaji, Jadran, Mangal, Makbil, Chamkani, Vaziri, Gurbuzi, Mandozai, Sabri, Thani, Turi, Orakzai, Shinwari, Khugyani, etc.
Tribes: Orakzai, Shinwari, Hugyani, also belonging to the "Karlani" union, live mainly in the "Eastern Territorial Zone" in the province of Nangarhar and Kunar.
The territory of Kalat-i Ghilzai, the Ghazni-Kandahar Plateau are the place of the traditional settlement of the Pashtun-Ghilzais of the tribal Hotaki clan, the territories to the north are inhabited by the tribes of the Pashtun-Ghilzais: Tohi, Haroti (Haruti), Taraki, Andari, Suleimanheil, Ahmadzai and others.
In the provinces of Ghazni and Logar there are settlements of Pashtun tribes: Dothani, Mullahel, Babrakhil, etc.
also live: ormuri and parachi, etc.
Many Uzbeks live in the provinces of Ghazni and Paktia (tribes: Kattagans, Sarays, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kanglys, Chagatai, etc.).

This territory, as well as the "Eastern Territorial Zone", has always been a zone of absolute influence of the mountain Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes from the time of "Western India" and the Anglo-Afghan wars to this day.

Southern territorial zone of military operations

"Southern Territorial Zone" includes provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan- (it also includes the southwestern part of Afghanistan)

• Kandahar: Kandahar, Nagahan, Sinjaray, Santaray, Shinarai, Torshikot, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Payi Mulu, Islamdara, Khusravi-Sufla, Gundshan, Kishkinahud, Nagahan, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Spinbuldak, Spinahula, Anizani, Anizamal, Arghandab, Haji -Razmukhammed, Pasab, Palmukhamed, Zakiri-Sharif, Kara, Gulyamuddinkhan and others.
• Nimroz: Dilaram, Bagar, Karyati-Chara, Kotalak, Chakhansur, Khushkhadir and others.
• Helmand (aka Helmand): Girishk, Lashkargah, Kajaki-Sufla, Shinkarai, Nikazi, Sangin, Musa-Kala and others.

"Southern Territorial Zone" inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions, one of which: "Durrani" or (Abdali)- consists of two branches: "Zirak", tribes: Popalzai, Sadozai, Alikozai, Barakzai, Muhammadzai, Achakzai; Also - the branch "Panjpay": Nurzai, Alizai, Iskhakzai, it includes: Mohamedzai, Yuzufzai, Nurzai and others.
The second major tribal union is the Ghilzai. It consists of branches - "Turan", it includes tribes: Hotaki, Tokhi (Toki), Haroti (Haruti), Nasir (Nasyr); And Burkhan.
Burkhan consists of tribes: Ibrahimkheil, Suleimanheil, Aliheil, Sahak, Andarheil, Nasar, Tarakheil, etc.; also a branch of "Musa", consists of tribes: Ahmadzai, Andar, Taraki, Sahak and others.. The south of Afghanistan is inhabited, also: Balochs, Braguis, Kyzylbashs, Tajiks, Afshars, Hazaras, etc..
This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes from the time of "Western India" to the present.

1979 year

Events preceding the "Operation Storm 333" and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

• April-May 1979, at the request of the Afghan leadership, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to supply Afghanistan with "special property" in the amount of 53 million rubles: 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers, 48,000 units small arms, 100 grenade launchers, 680 air bombs
• May 5 - The formation of the "Muslim battalion" of the GRU began in TurkVO. It was completed with people of the indigenous nationalities of the Central Asian republics.
• July - An airborne battalion was relocated to Bagram to provide protection for Soviet transport aircraft (see photo). KGB special group "Zenith-1" began work in Afghanistan
• August 5 - Mutiny in the 26th Afghan Parachute Regiment and Commando Battalion Kabul
• August 28-25 - Visit to the DRA of the Soviet military delegation headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces I. G. Pavlovsky
• September - A special group of the KGB "Zenit-2" arrived in Kabul.
• November 22 - Lieutenant-General V.S. Paputin, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, flew to the DRA
• December 3-14 - "Muslim battalion" (154th separate detachment of special forces) of the GRU General Staff and the 3rd infantry brigade of the 345th opdp were transferred to the Bagram airbase
• Early December - The opposition increased the number of its armed formations to 40 thousand people and launched hostilities against the new government in 12 provinces of Afghanistan
• KGB General Kirpichenko arrived in the DRA - the first deputy. head of foreign intelligence of the KGB.

End of 1979. Representatives of the PDPA, headed by Babrak Karmal, who has been living in Czechoslovakia as an emigrant since August 1978, with the support of the special services of the socialist states, create illegal structures to combat the regime of X. Amin. Moscow is preparing for a coup in Kabul. Islamists in Afghanistan also continue their struggle. In fact, a civil war broke out in the country. December 1979

• At the request of Amin, two Soviet battalions were transferred to Afghanistan to strengthen the protection of the residence of the head of state and the Bagram airfield. B. Karmal arrived with one of them.
• December 10 - Minister of Defense D. Ustinov informed the Chief of the General Staff N. Starkov that the Politburo had made a preliminary decision on the temporary entry of troops into the DRA, and set the task of preparing an approximately 75-80 thousandth group of troops. At the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense, D. Ustinov said that it was necessary to prepare a group of troops. Directive No. 312/12/00133 was sent to the troops.

D. Ustinov gave an oral order to N. Ogarkov on the formation of a new combined arms army in TurkVO

• December 12 - At a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to send Soviet troops into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. According to the memoirs of A. A. Gromyko, the decision "on the introduction of some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as to create favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states .. ." was unanimously adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
• December 13 - An operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev, a little later the group was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. The commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel General Yu.P. Maksimov, ordered his first deputy, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, to prepare troops for entry. He flew to Termez and was appointed the first commander of the 40th Army.
• December 14 - A special group of the KGB of the USSR "Thunder" arrived in Kabul, reinforcing the Zenit-2 group.
• At 22:00, the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Termez.
• December 17 - "Muslim battalion" advanced from Bagram and concentrated in the area of ​​​​the residence of X. Amin - the Taj-bek / Kabul / palace.
• December 23 - The task force of the headquarters of the Airborne Forces, headed by the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, General Guskov, arrived in Kabul.
• December 24 - Directive N 312/12/001 33 of the Ministry of Defense and the NGSh defines specific tasks for the introduction and deployment of troops on Afghan territory. Participation in hostilities was not provided.
• December 25 - At 12:00 /claim../ an order was received to cross the state border. At 15:00, the entry of troops began / 108 honey, 103rd airborne division /.
• December 27 - Directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense N 312/12/002 set specific combat missions to suppress the resistance of the rebels.

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 86 people.
• Losses: tanks-1, armored vehicles-1, aircraft and helicopters-6

1980s

Military operations and general reports for 1980

• 1st Kunar operation to neutralize the rebellious Afghan mountain infantry regiment in the Asmara Gorge. On February 28-29, the personnel of the 3rd Airborne Battalion of the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmara region landed from helicopters, by mistake of the higher command planning the military operation, was blocked by dushmans in the Asmara Gorge . 35 soldiers were killed, 40 wounded, 1 soldier went missing.
• the first military operation in Nakhrin district, Baghlan province.
• 1st Combined Arms Panjshir Operation.
• August 3 - during the arrival to the rescue of the units of the 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, fighting in the mountainous area of ​​​​the Mashkhad Gorge of the Kishim county, Badakhshan province - the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion was ambushed and took the fight near the village of Shayest ( 783rd ORB) 201st MSD, 49 servicemen were killed (37 scouts of the 783rd ORB and 12 guardsmen of the 149th Guards SMEs), 48 in total, were wounded.
• autumn - 2nd Combined Arms "Panjshir operation".
• fighting in the provinces of Kapisa, Kabul, Logar, Wardak, in the Lurkoh (Farah) mountain range - "Purge of Herat".
• the first large-scale combined-arms operation "Strike" -1 ~ in the central provinces.
• The rebels (oppositionists) set about equipping warehouses and bases of weapons, ammunition, food in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, as well as preparing caves for winter.

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1484 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 30612
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 725
• Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 173, aircraft and helicopters - 40

1981 year

Military operations and general reports for 1981

• January-February - Operational military operations to eliminate the counter-revolutionary underground in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Khost
• March - "3rd Panjshir operation"
• in the eight northern provinces of Afghanistan (out of 26) there are 200 detachments of rebels with a total number of 8.5 thousand people.
• early September - "Marmal operation" defeat of the base areas of the rebels 30 km south of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif
• from September 6 - "4th Panjshir operation" - "Canyon".
• mid-October - "Urgun operation"
• (September-December) - 46 operations were carried out against the Mujahideen, 250 actions of duty units.
• December - military operation to defeat the large base area of ​​​​the rebels "Darzab" in the north of the DRA

“During the year, hostilities were especially active in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Nangarhar, around Kabul. For 1981 - Organized 4 points for collecting and sending the bodies of the dead personnel in Shindand, Bagram, Kabul, Kunduz. According to the General Staff, over 20 thousand rebels were destroyed, 7763 were captured, up to 12 thousand small arms, 1.5 million various ammunition, 79 DShK, 22 mortars, etc. were captured ... "

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1298 people.
• Injuries and diseases - no data
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) no data
• Losses: Tanks - 28, Armored vehicles - 128, Aircraft and helicopters - 26, Guns and mortars - 17

1982 year

Military operations and general reports for 1982

“Planned combat operations were, as a rule, large-scale, relatively long in time, they involved a large number of troops. In total, during the years of our stay in Afghanistan, our troops acted in 416 planned operations. In 1982, operations were carried out that could be entered into the annals of the Afghan war ... "

“In late January - early February, opposition formations were defeated in a wide valley - the “green zone” Jabal-Ussaraj, Charikar, Mahmudrak. The IPA group of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan operated in this zone. They constantly shelled the Bagram airfield, garrisons and government buildings, robbed civilian vehicles, and committed sabotage against Soviet outposts and columns. The presence of a large IPA group near the capital had a destabilizing effect on Kabul ... "

“By the end of January 25, our units suddenly blocked the area for the enemy. The employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan organized filtration points. In the following days, the encirclement was shrinking, resisting groups of rebels were destroyed. On February 5, sweeping operations were completed. The enemy suffered big losses. The situation in the provinces of Kabul, Parwan and Kapisa has improved significantly, which has had a positive impact on the situation in the capital and on the Hairatan-Kabul highway ... "

“Another example of a major military operation is the defeat of a large opposition base area in the Darzab region on the border of the provinces of Jowzjan and Faryab:

• held from 15 to 19 February 1982. But the most famous were six operations in Panjshir.
• in (April-May) 1982, the so-called "2nd Panjshir" was carried out - the loudest operation in the history of the Afghan war ... "

“The valley of the Panjshir River is one of the most geographically complex regions of the DRA. It stretched 70 km long and 12 km wide all the way to the Pakistani border. It has a huge number of caves, holes, gorges, passes, dominant heights, passages (adjacent to the main valley and giving free access to various regions and to the main highway connecting Kabul with the Soviet Union through the Salang pass ... "

“That is why the Panjshir, which also has significant wealth of emeralds, rubies and lapis lazuli, was chosen to host the so-called Central Guerrilla Base of Ahmad Shah Massoud. He created here a well-equipped system of defense, fire and control of the rebel forces operating in a huge vital territory ... "

“Fighting began on the night of May 16, 1982. The Soviet subunits, suddenly for the enemy, seized all the dominant heights at the entrance to the gorge and at a depth of up to 10 km from the entrance to it. Then the landing of an airborne assault began, which divided the entire enemy grouping into four isolated parts .... "

“Soviet and Afghan battalions moved along the heights to the right and left of the gorge and military equipment along its bottom to join the landing force on foot. During the hostilities, 203 firing structures, 25 mortars, 120 heavy machine guns, about 30 weapons and ammunition depots were destroyed and captured, about 100 caves adapted for defense were blown up ... "

“During the year, along with planned combat operations, private military operations were also carried out by the OKSVA command or by decisions of the commanders of formations and units. By tactics they were no different from major operations. If the situation required, detours were used, landings were made, the enemy was surrounded, blocked settlements etc. The operations were most effective if they were carried out at a distance of no more than 10-15 km from the points of deployment, with advancement to the areas at night. In total, more than 220 private operations of various scales have been carried out in Afghanistan ... "

Continuation of large-scale military operations of Soviet troops in the provinces:

• Kandahar, Kapisa and Parwan
• January-February, (particularly intense fighting took place in the provinces of Parvan - in the "Green Zone" of Charikar, near Jabal-Ussaraj at the entrance to the "Panjshir Gorge", and Kapisa - near the settlement of "Mahmudrak"
• April - combined arms operation in the province of Nimroz
• "5th Panjshir operation"
• May-June - large-scale combined arms operation in the province of Logar
• December - withdrawal of troops from the "Panjshir"
• January, fighting in Kandahar.
• end of January-beginning of February-Fighting in the green zone Jabal-Ussaraj, Charikar, Mahmudraki
• operation in Nimruz province
• May 16-June, "5th Panjshir operation." 36 battalions were involved in it: (20 Afghan and 16 Soviet, with a total number of about 1.2 thousand people), more than 320 armored vehicles, 155 guns and mortars, 104 helicopters and 26 aircraft. Soviet units lost 93 people killed and 343 wounded.
• August-September, "6th Panjshir operation"

The situation around Kabul has become much more complicated due to the strengthening of the Mujahideen detachments in the provinces of Parvan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, Laghman and their effective actions. Significant forces of the Mujahideen were concentrated in the province of Kunar. On March 1, 1982, in the camp of the rebels, the number of detachments reached the number of up to 50 thousand people.

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1948 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 29455
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 894
• Losses: Tanks - 17, Armored vehicles - 107, Aircraft and helicopters - 40, Guns and mortars - 14

1983 year

Military operations and general reports for 1983

“The main small arms were Kalashnikov assault rifles of Chinese and Egyptian production, American rifles, machine guns and grenade launchers of West German, English, Swedish and Israeli production. Widely used large-caliber DShK machine guns, mortars of caliber 60-82 mm. Since 1983, a large number of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines began to appear: Italian, American, British. The most widely used were mines and plastic case, as well as land mines with remote control and radio-controlled mines. Handicraft surprise mines were also often used ... "

• January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group (16 people) of our civilian specialists. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.
• fighting in Logar province
• April - Operation to defeat opposition groups in the "Nijrab Gorge" (Kapisa province). Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.

“Autumn - For the first time, opposition detachments did not leave for the winter to rest in Pakistan and Iran. The creation of fortified areas and bases directly in Afghanistan began. At the end of 1983, there were a total of 212 specialized centers and training centers for rebels (1,178 in Pakistan and 34 in Iran), which made it possible to train more than 75,000 people a year.

For a year - in funerals they are most often called: Kunduz, Puli-Khumri, Kabul, Herat, Shindand, Kandahar ... "

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1446 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 4127
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 945
• Losses: Tanks-13, Armored vehicles-186, aircraft and helicopters-37

1984 year

Military operations and general reports for 1984

“1984-1985 became the period of maximum intensification of hostilities in Afghanistan. In essence, OKSVA was drawn into a full-scale civil war that unfolded throughout the country. The political and military leadership of the USSR set two tasks for the Soviet troops: together with the Afghan government army, to defeat large armed formations of the rebels in the base areas and to assist Kabul in strengthening the state authorities on the ground ... "

“In the military history of 1984, operations in the provinces of Parvan, Kapisa, Kabul, Laghman (February-March) should be noted. Due to the partisan nature of the enemy's actions, as well as serious miscalculations, not all operations achieved their goal. The year was the most tragic in terms of the number of losses suffered by our troops - 2343 soldiers and officers died ... "

“The Mujahideen got a large number of Chinese-made rockets and installations. Appeared American MANPADS Stinger and English Bluepipe. On April 20, the number of Stingers reached 47. In 1984, 62 launches of MANPADS were noted.

• (late February - early March) Fighting in the provinces of Parvan, Kapisa, Kabul, Laghman
• since April 21 - a large-scale combined-arms operation in the Panjshir Gorge. During which the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses and lost: 53 killed, 58 wounded.
• the largest "by composition, involved forces and means, duration and significance" there were operations in the river valleys: Panjshir, Andarab and in the "green zones" around the cities of Kabuli Herat
• December, an operation to defeat the base areas of the rebels in the mountains of Lurkoh, Farah province), located in the three gorges.
• (January-May) 85 operations were carried out, of which 51 were joint with parts of the Afghan army and 84 were independent, - 18 thousand rebels were destroyed, 3839 small arms, 146 DShK, 42 mortars, 101 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers were captured .

1984 is the bloodiest year in the history of the Afghan war (1979-1989)

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 2343 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 7737
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1388
• Losses: Tanks -7, Armored vehicles - 88, planes and helicopters - 66

1985 year

Military operations and general reports for 1985

“This year, the fighting in Afghanistan has reached a kind of peak. The fighting became more and more fierce, and the Soviet troops still remained the main force in the confrontation between the official Afghan authorities and the armed opposition. It was in 1985 that the largest operations were carried out against the counter-revolutionary forces in the provinces of Panjshir, Kunar, Herat, Paktia, Khost and a number of other regions of Afghanistan. Particularly heavy and bloody were the battles against the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud in Panjshir and the province of Kunar. Parts of the limited contingent of Soviet troops, continuously participating in operations, suffered significant losses. During the year, 1868 people died in the fighting in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

• April 1, another military operation in the "Panjshir Gorge" against the formations of Ahmad Shah Massoud.
• April 21, battle of the 1st company of the 500th (later 334th) separate special-purpose battalion of the 15th separate brigade of the GRU GSH special forces (5th separate motorized rifle battalion), as a result of which they got into a gorge in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani border ambushed and killed 28 scouts.
• A large-scale combined-arms operation involving significant forces and means (including the government forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) to capture the Javara base area in Paktia province
• On April 26, a group of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war (24 people), who had been held for several years in a special prison in the Badaber region (24 km south of Peshawar in Pakistan), made an armed uprising in order to free themselves from captivity. All died in battle with dushmans.
• May, fighting in Helmand province
• (May-June), large-scale "Kunar operation" - fighting throughout the "Kunar Gorge" from Jalalabad to Barikot (170 km), during the 1st stage of the operation, more than 11 thousand people landed by helicopters. (units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 56th Guards Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, 108th Motorized Rifle Division, 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 45th Engineer Regiment, Air Force 40 th army) and other parts of OKSVA
• May 25, during the "Kunar operation (1985)" - the personnel of the guards of the 4th company and the attached forces of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 149th guards motorized rifle regiment accepted a fierce battle near the village of Konyak near the city of Asadabad of the Kunar province with a large number of casualties losses (23 died, 19 were injured of varying severity)
• September, large-scale "Marmol operation" in the province of Balkh
• mid-October, a large-scale military operation in the south of Baghlan province, counties (Andarab, Banu, Nakhrin, Burka, Seyid)
• On October 19, during the fighting in the Panjshir gorge, as a result of an error in orientation from hypothermia, 5 servicemen died and 35 received frostbite of varying degrees.
• October, fighting in the provinces: Farah, Baghlan, Kapisa, Parwan
• performed more than 80 operations
• OKSVA reached its maximum number - 105.8 thousand people.
• the losses of the rebels amounted to 17 thousand people.
• the blackest year for our border guards - 124 dead

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1886 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 8219
• Dismissed from the army (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1751
• Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 185, aircraft and helicopters - 66

1986 year

Military operations and general reports for 1986

By the beginning of 1986, the internal political situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen. If in 1981-1983 opposition formations were active in the territory, numbering 45 thousand people, then by 1986 their number was already 150 thousand.

• in February-April, a large-scale military operation was carried out in the Khost district, during which the IPA transshipment base of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Jawara - Wolf Pit) was destroyed
• large-scale military operation against the grouping of Abdul Basir in the province of Badakhshan
• the defeat of the transshipment "base Marulgad" (Nangarhar)
• March, large-scale hostilities in the Shekude region (Paktia)
• repeated large-scale combined arms operation in "Marulgada"
• large-scale combined-arms operation to defeat the grouping of Abdul Wahed Vadud (Badakhshan)
• large-scale military operation in the area of ​​the "Apushello gorge" (Zabul)
• April, a large-scale military operation against the groups of Najmuddin (Badakhshan) and S. Mansur (Baglan)
• April, large-scale combined-arms operation in the province of Paktia (near Khosta), the result - the defeat of the Javara base
• large-scale military operation in the province of Baghlan
• (May 10-25), fighting in Paktia province (Daj and Aliheil counties)
• June, fighting in Kandahar province
• June, large-scale combined-arms operation "Maneuver" (Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan)
• fighting in the province of Parvan (Panjshir Gorge)
• fighting in Laghman province
• (August 18-26), a large-scale combined-arms operation "Trap" in the province of Herat, the defeat of the base area "Kokari-Sharshari", the liquidation of the border transshipment base and the grouping of Ismail Khan in the "green zone" of Herat.

On July 15, the number of armed opposition reached 150 thousand people. In a year. 847 launches of MANPADS were noted. US assistance to the armed opposition amounted to $ 500 million.

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1333 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 62 129
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 1311
• Losses: tanks - 14, armored vehicles - 126, aircraft and helicopters - 61

1987 year

Military operations and general reports for 1987

"The most famous operation of 1987 was Operation Magistral. The situation in the province of Paktia, namely in the Khost district, was extremely difficult. Armed opposition detachments almost completed blocking Khost. critical situation with food, after the withdrawal of the garrison of Soviet troops from Khost, there was a real threat of losing the city. By the fall of 1987, the Mujahideen had restored their Javara base here, which had been destroyed by Soviet troops in the spring of 1986. The situation was further complicated by the fact that it was here that the so-called "Afghan government" was supposed to be located, as opposed to the "government of Najibullah." After repeated requests from the Afghan leadership, the OKSV command decided to plan and conduct a major military operation to break the blockade to provide the population of Khost with food and the necessary material resources. Such an operation was successfully carried out in November 1987 - January 1988.

“After the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation, the Soviet troops tried to stop active hostilities, focusing on the protection of communications, but this did not succeed, and at the request of the Afghan leadership, a number of operations were carried out against the irreconcilable counter-revolution - around Kabul, in the Kandahar region. It was necessary to conduct constant hostilities against caravans that delivered weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran to the opposition detachments. Second half of January. The opposition stepped up the fighting."

• from January - February 21, large-scale combined-arms operation "Strike" (Kunduz province)
• February 4 - March 11, large-scale combined-arms operation "Shkval" (Kandahar province)
• March 2 - 21, large-scale combined-arms operation "Thunderstorm" (Ghazni).

• March 8 - March 21 large-scale combined arms operation "Circle" (Kabul, Logar)
• April 11-1, fighting in the province of Herat
• April 12-24 large-scale combined-arms operation "Spring" in the province of Kabul
• May - large-scale combined-arms operation "Volley" (provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul)
• end of May, large-scale combined-arms operation "South-87" (Kandahar province, Arghandab river valley)
• (November January - 1987, 1988) large-scale combined arms operation "Magistral" to unblock the road Gardez - Khost

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 1215 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 56 498
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1472
• Losses: tanks - 7, armored vehicles - 128, aircraft and helicopters - 68

During the year, US assistance to the Afghan armed opposition amounted to $706 million.

1988 year

Military operations and general reports for 1988

“After the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from Kunduz, Talukan and Khanabad, these settlements were handed over by government forces to Afghan armed formations virtually without a fight. President Najibullah appealed to our command with a request to assist in the liberation of Kunduz. In a short time, the city was captured.

• With the withdrawal of a number of parts of OKSVA, four provinces - Kunar, Paktika, Takhar and Bamiyan - gradually came under the control of the opposition. The centers of the provinces of Kandahar, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Badakhshan were blocked. Rocket and artillery shelling of Kabul and many provincial centers of the country intensified.
• May 15 - August 1, Soviet troops left the garrisons of Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Kandahar, Faizabad, Kunduz
• On August 7, the RA government troops fled from Kunduz without resistance. In addition to Kunduz, the rebels captured Khanabad, Talukan, Bamiyan

As a result of the combat activities of the 40th Army, more than 1,000 anti-aircraft mountain installations and more than 30,000 rockets for them, more than 700 mortars and approximately 25,000 mines were captured. From the GRU reference: "... the volume of official US assistance to the counter-revolution exceeded $ 2 billion. In 1988, assistance in the amount of more than $ 700 million is planned ..."

OKSVA DATA

• Irretrievable losses - 759 people.
• Injuries and diseases - 55121
• Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1549 4.
• Losses: tanks - 22, armored vehicles - 176, aircraft and helicopters - 30

1989 year

Military operations and general reports for 1989

“The withdrawal of units of the 40th Army in January-February continued strictly according to plan. At the same time, communications from Kabul through the Salang Pass were reliably protected from possible attacks by the Mujahideen, especially by the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud. But it was not possible to avoid a large-scale military operation.”

“January 23 - 26, a joint military operation of the Soviet troops against the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud in South Salang. On the morning of January 23, an air and artillery fire strike was delivered to Panjshir and the gorges adjacent to it. Combing of the area from bands of rebels and setting up blocks on the highway by Afghan troops began. The main efforts were concentrated on the protection of bridges, galleries and tunnels. In two days of hostilities, more than 600 rebels, 10 warehouses, 36 strongholds, and a large number of weapons were destroyed. A tent city was set up in the Chaugani region to receive local residents who left the combat area and provide them with material and medical care. Losses of Soviet troops - 3 killed, 5 wounded.

• February 4, 1989 The last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul
• On February 15, the last unit of the 40th Army and with it the commander of the army, Colonel-General B.V. Gromov left Afghanistan. The opposition, in turn, began large-scale military operations against the Najibullah regime.

OKSVA DATA

• irretrievable losses - 53 people.
• injuries and diseases - 93
• losses: tanks - 2, armored vehicles - 17, aircraft and helicopters - 7

Location and Areas of Responsibility of OKSVA Connections

The fulfillment of the Government's tasks for the protection of the southern borders of the USSR and the provision of international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan by a limited contingent of Soviet troops was provided by the forces and means of units and formations:

• three "motorized rifle", one "airborne" - divisions
• separate: two motorized rifle, air assault, (since 1985) two special-purpose GRU, material support - brigades, etc.
• separate: two motorized rifle, paratrooper, engineering and sapper, rocket artillery- regiments etc.
• separate: regiments and squadrons - aviation units OKSVA and border troops KSAPO.

The deployment of formations on the territory of the DRA assigned to each area of ​​​​responsibility, taking into account the peculiarities (site) of the terrain, the concentration of military tension, and the political and military tasks facing.

With the transition of armed opposition detachments to constant tactics - sabotage, terror, shelling of troops, capture of outposts, units and formations of the 40th A were forced to defend the most important communications linking Afghanistan with the territory of the USSR: Termez-Kabul-Jalalabad; Kushka-Herat-Kandahar; Mazar-i-Sharif-Kunduz-Fayzabad total length more than 2 thousand km. 1. The purpose of the defense of communications is the defeat of rebel groups along highways and roads; disruption of their sabotage; ensuring the unhindered movement of Soviet and Afghan convoys with material cargo. The defense was carried out by divisions, regiments, battalions and companies. 2. The area of ​​responsibility in defense along the front was: 108 MSD - 420 km; 5 MSD - 640 km; 201 MSD - 400 km. The battalions defended the area for an average of 30-40 km. So, the front of defense of the 177th SME of the 108th MSD in the especially dangerous section of the Salang Pass was up to 120 km. In total, the defense of communications and regime zones was carried out by about 1000 outposts, set up by formations, units and subunits of the 40th Army.

The capital of Afghanistan - the city of Kabul, the airport, airfield, other important objects were assigned to

• 103rd Guards Vitebsk Airborne Division ( 317, 350, 357, 1179 - guards airborne and artillery airborne forces, regiments). At various times, the 2nd and 3rd battalions were deployed at a distance - in the provinces: Bamiyan, Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul
• 108th Nevelsk motorized rifle division - reserve of the 40th army: ( 177, 180, 181, 682 - motorized rifle regiments and other parts of the division) was responsible for the situation: around Kabul, in the area of ​​"South Salang", "Panjshir Gorge", on the routes: "Jabal Us-Saraj - Kabul", "Kabul - Jalalabad"(provinces: Parvan, Kapisa, Wardak). At the same time, parts of the division participated in private, divisional and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• 5th Guards Zimovnikovskaya Motor Rifle Division: ( 12, 101, 371 guards - motorized rifle regiments and other parts of the division) provided control over the military situation in the west of Afghanistan, the border with Iran (provinces: Badghis, Herat, Farah, Helmand), including on the track "Kushka - Herat - Shindand - Kandahar". At the same time, parts of the division participated in private, divisional and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• 201st Gatchina motorized rifle division: ( 122, 395, 149 guards - motorized rifle regiments and other parts of the division), traditionally responsible for the northeast of Afghanistan (provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Balkh, Samangan, Takhar), including for the tracks: "Khairaton - Salang Pass", "Kunduz - Talukan - Fayzabad". At the same time, parts of the division participated in private, divisional and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• In the east, south and southeast of the Republic of Afghanistan, along the long border with Pakistan, combat missions were carried out by: 66th separate motorized rifle brigade (provinces: Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunar), 70th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (provinces: Helmand, Nimruz, Uruzgan, Kandahar), 56th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade (provinces: Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost), their outposts were dispersed along strategic highways "Jalalabad - Kabul", "Girishk - Kandahar", "Baraki-Barak - Gardez", respectively. At the same time, these "brigades" participated in private and large-scale (army) military operations, both in their area of ​​​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• Separate - two "motorized rifle", "airborne", "engineering and sapper" regiments (860 OMSP, 191 OMSP, 345 OPDP, 45 OESP) were stationed in the provinces: Badakhshan, Ghazni and Parwan. At the same time, these "separate units" participated in private and large-scale military operations, both in their area of ​​responsibility and remotely from its borders.
• In 1985, to previously operating in Afghanistan: 154th, 177th battalions (detachments) and 459th separate company special forces GRU GSh MO six more were added: 334th, 668th - included in the 15th ObrSpN, and: 173rd, 186th, 370th, 411th - included in the 22nd Guards ObrSpN. "Separate motorized rifle battalions", in fact - "special purpose" were deployed in the eastern, southeastern and southern - border provinces with Pakistan: Kunar, Nangarhar, Logar, Ghazni, Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar, Farah and included in 15th and 22nd "Separate special forces brigades of the GRU General Staff" with points of permanent deployment in cities: Jalalabad and Lashkargah participated in private military operations and raids in the immediate area of ​​​​responsibility. The list of tasks included reconnaissance and search and ambush operations.

Combined-arms operations to capture fortified areas

Army General Varennikov V. I. on military operations:
“During my stay in Afghanistan, a number of interesting and complex operations were carried out. Of course, the operation of the operation is different. Some left no memories. Others will never fade. I especially remember the operations in the Kunar Gorge, during the assault on the Javara base, on the Parachinar ledge, in the Kunduz region, west of Herat to the Kokari-Sharshari base on the Iranian border in the Lurkokh mountain range, in the Lashkargah region, in the province of Kandahar and immediately beyond Kandahar ".

- from the memoirs of Army General Varennikov V.I.

Excerpt from Valentin Runov's book “The Afghan War. Fighting":

“In the areas of responsibility of large opposition groups, base areas were created, located in areas of hard-to-reach terrain near the areas of upcoming operations. They created stocks of means of armed struggle and material and technical means, organized a control system, warning, air defense, there was a center for training rebels, workshops for the repair of weapons and the manufacture of home-made ammunition, a garage, a prison, a hospital, and recreation areas for personnel. As a rule, up to 500 people could be in such a base area at the same time.

“Transshipment bases were organized for temporary storage of weapons, ammunition, materiel and on caravan routes near the borders with Pakistan and Iran. They were intermediate bodies for the supply of groups and detachments, where the distribution and sale of weapons was carried out, an access regime was established, a system of observation, warning, air defense, and security. Sometimes transshipment bases were combined with base areas. There were 18 large supply bases on the territory of Afghanistan, including 9 base areas, two transshipment bases and 7 transshipment points.

Operations Border Wax KSAPO in Afghanistan

Period from 1980-1981

In HIS memoirs, Lieutenant General Gennady Zgersky, commander of the "Central Asian Border District" of the KSAPO KGB of the USSR in the period from 1980 to 1984, divided the periods of military operations of the units of the border troops in Afghanistan into four periods.

1st period (initial) - from January 1980 to January 1982. Special units of the border troops on the territory of the DRA in the period from 1980-1981. carried out dozens of planned and private operations, hundreds of military raids and ambushes, which helped to stabilize the situation and strengthen the authorities in the northern regions of Afghanistan. The crews of border helicopters also took the most direct part in the hostilities” From the book “The Dangerous Sky of Afghanistan. The experience of the combat use of Soviet aviation in local war 1979-1989" Author M. Zhirokhov.

"Mountains-80" The first major operation to clear the Afghan border from the Mujahideen in the northern part of Badakhshan was undertaken in February - March 1980. The units of the Khorog, Moscow and Pyanj border detachments for 30 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, in cooperation with the landing troops under the cover of helicopters, cleared of fighters of the field leader Abdulla Vakhob, a kishlach zone with a strip of more than 150 km and a depth of up to 10 km. The landing and its combat support was carried out by 11 Mi-8T helicopters. On February 23, 1980, a festive day for us, at the time of the border landing, one of the helicopters was fired upon by the enemy and shot down. Aviation of the border troops in that war worked hard. In 1980, there were major operations: "Spring-80", "Summer-80" and "Summer-80", in the border regions of northern Badakhshan and Takhar province, where a significant territory was liberated, this allowed the DRA authorities in the region remote from the center, create authorities.

"Murghab operation" To cover the border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with Pakistan and China on May 23, 1980, Operation "Roof" was carried out. The border guards of the Murgab detachment of the Red Banner Eastern Frontier District (KVPO) posted garrisons in the north-east of Afghanistan (in the "Hindukush appendix"), closing more than 200 kilometers of the Afghan-Pakistani border, intercepting caravans with weapons, militants and enemy agents following from behind border to Afghanistan. In this operation, more than a dozen Mi-8T helicopters of the Alma-Ata 10th OAP were involved in this operation to land the AP and cover the advancing ground group.

"Kufab operation" October 17, 1981 In the Operation in the Kufab Gorge against the detachment of the field commander Abdullah Vakhob (150 bayonets). “Despite careful preparation, surprise was not achieved. The helicopters of the combined detachment came under fire from the Mujahideen: the first helicopter could not parachute the border guards, and the second one threw out only three, who immediately died in a shootout. But most of all went to the fourth car, which was the commander of the detachment, Captain Bogdanov. Mi-8 senior lieutenant Skripkin came under fire from the DShK. In the very first minutes, the helicopter commander died .... "The second pilot managed to land the car and throw out the troops, the helicopter caught fire on the ground and then exploded. At the initial stage, 43 people landed, who came under fire from a pillbox equipped under a large boulder. The border guards managed to throw grenades at him. The battle lasted 12 hours. The victory came at a high price: 19 border guards were killed, and about thirty more were wounded.

2nd period (active) - from January 1982 to January 1987, from the beginning of the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation (PRP).

"Tashkurgan operation" One of the most difficult tactically was the operation to send troops into the northern part of the provinces of Takhar and Kunduz in January - February 1982, carried out by six MMGs and an airborne assault maneuver group for 78 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles with the support of two infantry battalions The 20th Afghan division and parts of the Soviet 201st motorized rifle division was the "Tashkurgan operation" in April 1982. 16 combat armed opposition detachments were pulled into the Tashkurgan region. Against them, 6 motorized groups were thrown at 51 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, an airborne assault maneuver group of the Eastern Border Circle and 10 infantry battalions of the 18th and 20th Afghan divisions, a Soviet motorized rifle battalion, an artillery battalion and a Grad battery of the 201st motorized rifle division and 8 border helicopters. The strongholds of the rebels, who offered fierce resistance, were suppressed by the fire of mortars, howitzers and rocket artillery, rocket and bomb strikes by helicopters were widely used.

3rd period (passive) - from January 1987 to 1989 - the period of implementation of the policy of national reconciliation

4th period - since 1988 - preparation for the withdrawal of troops and the withdrawal itself in February 1989

Period from 1982-1987

The main type of hostilities in the period from 1982-1987. became an air assault operation, the essence of which was the rapid, sudden and mass landing of well-armed and maximally light air assault units and groups to capture landing sites along the perimeter of the cover (blocking) area. Landing was carried out with strong fire support of combat operations of landing units from the air, with a subsequent build-up of forces and assets on captured or newly selected landing sites. With the occupation of the initial lines (areas), the search and destruction of the enemy was carried out. Usually such operations were prepared for a long time and carefully, carried out boldly, boldly and within a limited time frame. "Landing and combat support of the personnel of the DShMG, launching missile and bomb attacks on the Mujahideen, aerial reconnaissance, evacuation of the sick and wounded, this is how the Aviation of the Border Troops conducted combat activities in Afghanistan ...". From the Book "We attack from heaven" by S. Sergeev.

"Kufab operation" From May 2 to May 18, 1982, a "ceremonial" special operation was carried out in the area of ​​the Kufab Gorge. She was directly led by the head of the border troops of the KGB of the USSR, General of the Army V.A. Matrosov, who arrived for this purpose from Moscow to the Moscow border detachment. At the site of the local airport near the border outpost "Iol", from where the helicopter group worked, the deputy head of the PV, Lieutenant General I.P., was present. Vertelko. Personal participation in this operation was also taken by the commander of the aviation of the border troops, Major General N.A. Rokhlov. More than 15 Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were involved in the special operation. Rocket and bomb attacks by helicopters and landing of border assault groups were carried out in the areas of Dargak, Mushtiva, Madut, Saidan, Karniv, Chashm-Dara, Nawabad, Rogak, Kalai-Kuf, Sshari-Pul and other points. And on the positions of the Mujahideen near Mushtiv, a massive simultaneous bombing attack was carried out by nine helicopters, following in a single formation in a column of links, and it is natural that the column was headed by Major General Rokhlov. The operation lasted 17 days. During the operation, only one side from this group of helicopters used up: bombs (OFAB-250, OFAB-100) - 40 pieces, incendiary tanks (ZAB) - 2 pieces, NURS (S-5KPB) - 646 pieces, cartridges (12 .7 mm) - 1845 pieces, cartridges (7.62 mm) - 500 pieces; landed: 66 people and 7850 kg of cargo.

"Kunduz operation" In the early days of August 1982, near the city of Imam Sahib, an operation was carried out to neutralize the group of "doctor" Shams, who had influence on almost the entire province of Kunduz. At that time, the 7th company of the 56th airborne assault brigade of the OKSV was stationed in Imam Sahib at that time. So the border guards often had to interact with the paratroopers in solving combat missions. In its course, the border guards for the first time encountered the use of a new weapon for themselves - MANPADS. During the next approach to the enemy firing position, the Mi-24 helicopter, piloted by senior lieutenant Zhernov, was fired not only from the DShK, but also by missiles. One of the missiles overtook the rotorcraft, which caught fire. Having lost maneuverability, the "crocodile" began to fall under the continuous fire of the Mujahideen. One of the large-caliber bursts ripped the cockpit of the helicopter pilots in half.

"Andkhoy Operation" Andkhoy was turned by dushmans into a powerful defensive center with fortified armored underground structures, the approaches to which were mined with guided land mines. In the course of the operation to eliminate the Andkhoy grouping of the enemy, the border guards for the first time used sapper groups, which, while clearing the quarters, blocked and blew up pillboxes and other underground structures of the Mujahideen. Having suffered heavy losses at the end of 1983, the armed opposition changed its tactics. While retaining their strength, the militants began to evade direct clashes and intensified the counter-revolutionary underground, sabotage and terrorist acts. The main forces went high into the mountains, where they created heavily fortified defenses in hard-to-reach areas, making sorties into the northern regions of the country and to the border of the USSR.

"Marmal operation" The border guards were given the task of liquidating the mountain bases of the Mujahideen. One of the first such operations was "Marmolskaya", carried out in January - February 1984. It involved 3 motorcycle groups, 4 airborne assault maneuver groups, 30 helicopters, 9 Afghan infantry battalions, 1 combined artillery battalion of the 201st motorized rifle division and an Air Force fighter aviation regiment. The created group took its starting position on Afghan territory - in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif. From here, the operation was controlled. The operation was carried out without military intelligence on the basis of operational data. During the hostilities, the blocking was carried out by ten simultaneously landed troops of border guards. Afghan units, acting as part of two outflanking detachments from the east and west, blocked the Marmol depression. Search groups of Afghan servicemen were thrown into their starting positions by helicopters and acted under their fire cover. The large-scale actions of the troops were preceded by powerful artillery and aviation preparation, during which air defense fire weapons were reliably suppressed, minefields and guided bombs. Unable to withstand the onslaught, the rebels left the base, leaving a huge amount of weapons and ammunition in the caves.

"Tashkurgan operation" In March-April 1985, another Tashkurgan operation was carried out to destroy mountain bases. The operation involved 6 motorized groups, 3 airborne assault maneuver groups for 72 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 28 border helicopters, 10 Afghan battalions of the 18th and 20th infantry divisions, 3 motorized rifle battalions, 1 artillery regiment and 12 helicopters of the 201st motorized rifle division. Taking into account the tactics of the actions of the Mujahideen (avoiding strikes during their blocking), in this operation blocking and clearing the area were carried out simultaneously with large-scale demonstration actions away from the direction of the main strike. The enemy was taken by surprise and defeated.

“Subsequently, large-scale operations by the method of simultaneous or sequential blocking (covering) of several areas located at a considerable distance from each other were used by Soviet border guards repeatedly. The main role in them belonged to the landing units and border aviation "

[V.A. Bogdanov "The Afghan War 1979-1989", Chapter 5 pp. 93-94]

[Chapter 5 pp. 95-96. V.A. Bogdanov "The Afghan War 1979-1989": Memoirs - M .: Soviet writer, 2005]

[Chapter 5 pp. 95-96. V.A. Bogdanov "The Afghan War 1979-1989": Memoirs - M .: Soviet writer, 2005]

"40th Army war in the mountains" p.98 Author Doctor of Military Sciences Head of the General Staff Colonel-General V.M. Barynkin

Book "40th Army War in the Mountains" Chapter III. Conducting special operations by the army in a mountain theater of operations. Section II. “Features of the use of air (helicopter) assault forces in special army operations” - p. 47. Author doctor of military sciences, head of the GOU General Staff - Colonel-General V.M. Barynikin

The book "40th Army war in the mountains" Chapter. "Preparation of special operations by the Army". Section "Peculiarities of the work of the commander and staff of the army when making a decision and planning an operation" - p.48. Author doctor of military sciences, head of the GOU General Staff - Colonel-General V.M. Barynikin

The first stages of preparation for the operation. The operation to capture and destroy H. Amin received the code name "Storm-333". Forces for carrying out this action were formed gradually. As early as mid-September, immediately after the seizure of power by H. Amin, 17 officers from the special unit of the KGB of the USSR headed by Major Y. Semenov arrived in Kabul to study the situation. They settled in one of the villas of the Soviet embassy and for the time being worked in various departments.

On December 9 and 12, a "Muslim" battalion was transferred from the airfields of the Uzbek cities of Tashkent and Chirchik to the Bagram airbase near Kabul. All officers and soldiers were dressed in Afghan military uniforms, tailored according to samples sent through military intelligence.

At the beginning of December, two more subgroups of the Zenit special KGB group (30 people each) arrived in Bagram, and on December 23, the Grom special group (30 people). They had such code names in Afghanistan, in the Center they were called differently: the group "Grom" - division "A" or, according to journalists, "Alpha", and "Zenith" - "Vympel". The number of "Zenit" in Afghanistan, together with those who arrived earlier, has reached more than 100 people. The general management of them was carried out by A.K. Polyakov.

Transfer of units. Around mid-December, the forced transfer of small army units to Afghanistan began. With one of them illegally arrived B. Karmal, who settled in Bagram under the protection of employees of the 9th department of the KGB. M.A. was also here. Vatanjar, S. Gulyabzoy and A. Sarvari, associates of the former Secretary General of the PDPA N.M. Taraki. In mid-December, it was planned to remove H. Amin, and the new leadership had to be in Afghanistan by the time of the coup.

"Object Oak". On December 11, the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General N. Guskov, set the task of capturing the "object Dub" - Amin's residence in the center of Kabul. There was no plan of the palace, no system of its protection. It was only known that the palace was guarded by about two thousand guards. The assault was entrusted to only twenty-two "Zenit" and a company of the "Muslim" battalion. On December 13, at 15.30, the personnel received an order for military operations. The fighters were supposed to advance from Bagram to Kabul in an hour and take Amin's residence by storm. It is not known how this adventure would have ended, but, fortunately, at 16 o’clock the “light out” command followed.

Employees of "Zenith" V. Tsvetkov and F. Erokhov shot sniper rifles at 450 meters - from this distance they intended to shoot at the Afghan leader. Having chosen positions on the route of Amin's usual route in Kabul, they established a watch, but reinforced security along the entire route prevented.

The assassination attempt on Amin on December 16 also ended in failure. He was slightly wounded, and his nephew Asadulla Amin, chief of the Afghan counterintelligence, was seriously injured and, after an operation performed by the Soviet surgeon A. Alekseev, was sent by plane to the Soviet Union for treatment. An An-12 plane flew in from Ferghana for the oppositionists who were in Bagram, headed by B. Karmal, and they again flew to the USSR.

Amin moves the residence. It was only late in the evening of December 17 that the "Zenit" and the "Muslim" battalion were given the task of moving from Bagram to Kabul to the Dar-ul-Aman region, where the residence of the head of the DRA was moving. December 18 Colonel V.V. Kolesnik, who previously led the training of the "Muslim" battalion, received an order from the head of the GRU, General of the Army P.I. Ivashutin to fly to Afghanistan to carry out a special government assignment. Lieutenant Colonel O.U. was sent along with him. Sweden. On December 19 at 6.30 they departed from the Chkalovsky airfield via Baku and Termez to Bagram. They flew from Termez with two more fellow travelers - KGB officers, Major General Yu.I. Drozdov and captain of the 2nd rank E.G. Kozlov.

Kolesnik and Shvets went to the location of the battalion, which was located about a kilometer from the Taj Beck Palace, in an unfinished building with windows without glass. Instead of them, they pulled on raincoats, put stoves, potbelly stoves. That year, the winter in Kabul was severe, at night the air temperature dropped to 20 below zero.

The day before, H. Amin moved to the Taj Beck Palace and found himself "under the wing" of the "Muslim" battalion.

Palace security system. It was organized carefully and thoughtfully. Inside, H. Amin's personal guard, consisting of his relatives and especially trusted people, served. They also wore a special uniform, different from other Afghan servicemen: white bands on their caps, white cuffs on their sleeves, white belts and holsters. The second line consisted of seven posts, each of which had four sentries armed with machine guns, grenade launchers and machine guns. They were changed every two hours.

The outer ring of guards formed the points of deployment of the battalions of the guard brigade (three motorized infantry and a tank). They were located around the Taj Beck at a short distance. On one of the dominant heights, two T-54 tanks were dug in, which could shoot through the area adjacent to the palace with direct fire. In total, there were about 2,500 people in the security brigade. In addition, an anti-aircraft regiment was located nearby, armed with twelve 100-mm anti-aircraft guns and sixteen anti-aircraft machine gun mounts. There were other army units in Kabul: two infantry divisions and a tank brigade.

"Filkin's letter". On December 21, Kolesnik and Khalbaev were summoned by the chief military adviser, Colonel-General S.K. Magometov and ordered to strengthen the protection of the palace by units of the "Muslim" battalion. They were ordered to take up defensive positions between the guard posts and the line of location of the Afghan battalions.

According to S.K. Magometov, when he spoke on special communications with D.F. Ustinov, the Minister of Defense asked him: "How are the preparations for the implementation of the plan to remove Amin from power going?" But S.K. Magometov knew absolutely nothing about this. After some time, the representative of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant-General B. Ivanov, apparently, after talking with Yu.V. Andropov, invited S.K. Magometov and showed him the plan developed by the KGB. The chief military adviser was indignant later, saying that it was not a plan, but "a silly letter." I had to develop an operation to capture the palace again.

Directives of 24 and 27 December. In directive No. 312/12/001, signed by D.F. Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov on December 24, determined specific tasks for the introduction and deployment of troops on Afghan territory. Participation in hostilities was not provided. Specific combat missions for formations and units to suppress the resistance of the rebels were set a little later, in the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR dated December 27 No. 312/12/002.

Less than a day was allotted for carrying out all the activities related to the entry of troops into the DRA. Such haste naturally entailed additional losses.

On the evening of December 24, S.K. Magometov and V.V. Kolesnik arrived at the field call center, which was deployed at the "Club e-Askari" stadium not far from the American embassy. On government communications, they called General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev (he was in Termez as part of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense). The First Deputy Chief of the General Staff ordered them to report the decision in cipher with two signatures by the morning of December 25. Immediately, a report was written at the communication center, and by two in the morning the encryption was sent. V.V. Kolesnik was appointed by the USSR Ministry of Defense as the head of Operation Storm-ZZ3. Yu.I. Drozdov. Setting him the task of HF, Yu.V. Andropov and N.A. Kryuchkov pointed out the need to think through everything to the smallest detail, and most importantly, to ensure the safety of the participants in the operation as much as possible.

Amin's trust. H. Amin, despite the fact that in September he deceived L.I. Brezhnev and Yu.V. Andropov, oddly enough, trusted the Soviet leaders. He surrounded himself with Soviet military advisers, consulted with high-ranking representatives of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense at the relevant bodies of the DRA, completely trusted only doctors from the USSR, and ultimately hoped for our troops.

Operation plan. The plan of the operation provided for preventing the advance of Afghan battalions (three motorized infantry and a tank) to the Taj Beck Palace. A company of special forces or paratroopers was to operate against each battalion. The commander of the attached parachute company was Senior Lieutenant V. Vostrotin. One of critical tasks was the capture of two dug-in tanks. For this, 15 people were assigned, headed by the deputy commander of the "Muslim" battalion, Captain Satarov, as well as four snipers from the KGB. The success of the entire operation largely depended on the actions of this group. They started first.

In order to accustom the Afghans and not to arouse suspicion ahead of time, they began to carry out demonstration actions: shooting, going out on alarm and occupying established defense sites. At night, they launched lighting rockets, because. at night there were severe frosts, according to the schedule, the engines of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were warmed up so that they could be started immediately on a signal. At first, this caused concern. When the rockets were launched for the first time, the location of the battalion was instantly illuminated by the searchlights of the anti-aircraft regiment and the head of the palace guard, Major Jandad, arrived.

Gradually, the Afghans got used to and ceased to react warily to such "maneuvers" of the battalion. Only Kolesnik, Shvets and Khalbaev knew the new task in the battalion.

Soviet military advisers and specialists who worked in the air defense forces of the DRA established control over all anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition storage areas, as well as temporarily disabled some anti-aircraft installations (removed sights, locks). Thus, an unhindered landing of aircraft with paratroopers was ensured.

Palace plan. On December 26, advisers under the personal protection of H. Amin - employees of the 9th department of the KGB of the USSR - were able to lead the intelligence agents-saboteurs to the palace, where they carefully examined everything, after which General Drozdov drew up a floor plan of the Taj Beck. The officers of "Thunder" and "Zenith" M. Romanov, Ya. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and Zh. Mazaev carried out reconnaissance of the area and reconnaissance of firing points located at the nearest heights. Not far from the palace, on a hill, there was a restaurant where the highest officers of the Afghan army usually gathered. Under the pretext that Soviet officers allegedly needed to book seats for the New Year, the commandos visited a restaurant from where the Taj Beck was visible at a glance.

On the morning of the 27th, direct preparations for the assault began. The Taj Beck Palace was located on the outskirts of Kabul in Dar-ul-Aman, on a high hill overgrown with trees and shrubs, which was also equipped with terraces, and all approaches to it were mined. The only road leading to it was heavily guarded. Its thick walls were able to hold back an artillery strike. If we add to this that the area around the palace was shot through, it becomes clear what a difficult task the army special forces and special groups of the KGB of the USSR faced.

Tasks for December 27th. Our military advisers received different tasks: on December 27, some had to stay in the units for the night, organize a dinner with the wards of the Afghans (for this they were given alcohol and snacks) and under no circumstances allow the Afghan units to act against the Soviet troops, others, on the contrary , it was ordered not to stay in the units for a long time, and they left home earlier than usual. Only specially appointed people remained, who were accordingly instructed.

On December 27, in the middle of the day, Drozdov and Kolesnik once again went around the positions of the battalion, informed the officers about the plan of the operation and announced the procedure. The commander of the "Muslim" battalion, Major Khalbaev, the commanders of the special groups M. Romanov and Y. Semenov set combat missions for the commanders of subunits and subgroups, organized preparations for the assault.

The beginning of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. On December 22 and 23, the Soviet ambassador informed H. Amin that Moscow had granted his request to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan and were ready to begin their deployment on December 25. The Afghan leader expressed his gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to assist the troops being brought in.

On the night of December 24, the commander of the troops of the Turkestan district, Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov reported by telephone to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff on the readiness of the troops to carry out the assigned task, and then sent them a cipher telegram with a report on readiness.

On December 25, 1979 at 12.00, the troops received an order signed by the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Ustinov, that the troops of the 40th Army and Air Force aviation begin crossing and flying over the state border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on December 25 at 15.00 (Moscow time).

The scouts and the air assault battalion of Captain L.V. were the first to cross. Khabarov, who was to take the Salang Pass, and then the rest of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division went over the pontoon bridge under the leadership of General K. Kuzmin.

At the same time, military transport aircraft began airlifting and landing the main forces of the 103rd Airborne Division and the remnants of the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment to the airfields of the capital and Bagram. Unfortunately, there were casualties - on December 25, when landing in Kabul, an Il-76 crashed into a mountain and exploded (commander - Captain V.V. Golovchin), on board of which there were 37 paratroopers. All paratroopers and 7 crew members were killed.

27th of December airborne units 103rd Division Major General I.F. Ryabchenko and the detached forces from the KGB of the USSR, according to the plan, went to important administrative and special facilities in the capital and "strengthened" their protection.

On the night of December 28, another motorized rifle division, previously deployed in Kushka, entered Afghanistan (commander - General Yu.V. Shatalin). She went to Herat and Shindand. One regiment of this division was stationed at the Kandahar airfield. Later it was reorganized into the 70th brigade.

Parts of the 108th motorized rifle division by the morning of December 28 concentrated in the area northeast of Kabul.

Amin rejoices. H. Amin was in euphoria: he finally managed to achieve his cherished goal - Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. On the afternoon of December 27, he arranged a magnificent dinner, receiving members of the Politburo, ministers with their families in his luxurious palace. The formal reason for the celebration was the return from Moscow of the secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA Panjshiri. He assured H. Amin: the Soviet leadership was satisfied with the version of N.M.'s death he presented. Taraki and the change of the leader of the country. The USSR will provide military assistance to Afghanistan.

H. Amin solemnly said: "The Soviet divisions are already on their way here. Everything is going fine. I am constantly in touch with Comrade Gromyko by phone, and we are discussing together the question of how best to formulate information for the world about the provision of Soviet military assistance to us."

Poisoning. On the afternoon of December 27, the Secretary General was also expected to speak on Afghan television. Top military officials and heads of political agencies were invited to shoot at the Taj Beck Palace. However, during dinner, many guests felt unwell. Some lost consciousness. H. Amin also completely "turned off". His wife immediately called the commander of the presidential guard, Jandad, who called the Charsad Bistar Central Military Hospital and the Soviet embassy clinic. Products and pomegranate juice were immediately sent for examination, suspected chefs were detained. Enhanced security mode.

When the Soviet doctors - the therapist Viktor Kuznechenkov and the surgeon Anatoly Alekseev - drove up to the external guard post and, as usual, began to hand over their weapons, they were additionally searched, which had never happened before. Something happened? Our doctors determined immediately: mass poisoning. H. Amin lay stripped to his underpants, with a drooping jaw and rolling eyes. He was unconscious, in a severe coma. Died? They felt the pulse - a barely perceptible beat.

Colonels Kuznechenkov and Alekseev, not thinking that they were violating someone's plans, set about saving the head of the "USSR-friendly country." First, the jaw was put in place, then breathing was restored. They took him to the bathroom, washed him and began to do a gastric lavage ... When the jaw stopped falling and urine began to flow, the doctors realized that Amin had been saved.