They pass through the Gali, Ochamchira, Gulripsh districts and go to the eastern suburbs of Sukhum. Street fighting begins in the city.

On August 14, 1992, the Presidium of the AFRA adopts a resolution "On the mobilization of the adult population and the transfer of weapons to the regiment of the internal troops of Abkhazia."

On August 15, 1992, a mass movement of support for the fighting people of Abkhazia unfolds in the republics of the North Caucasus.

On August 18, 1992, Sukhum was completely captured by Georgian troops. The national flag of the Republic of Abkhazia was thrown down from the pediment of the building of the Supreme Council. Fierce fighting in her area. Lower and Upper Escher.

On August 18, 1992, on the territory controlled by Georgian troops, robberies, looting and violence become widespread.

On August 18, 1992, Abkhaz partisan formations began to actively operate in the occupied Ochamchira region.

On August 18, 1992, in Grozny, the KGNK parliament decides to send volunteer units to Abkhazia.

On August 18, 1992, T. Kitovani said in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta: The Abkhaz campaign is coming to an end.

On August 20, 1992, a meeting of the leaders of the republics of the North Caucasus, the Rostov Region, the Stavropol and Krasnodar Territories took place in Armavir. In an appeal to B. Yeltsin concern was expressed over the slow reaction of the Russian Federation to the events in Abkhazia.

On August 25, 1992, speaking on Sukhumi TV, the commander of the Georgian troops, Colonel G. Karkarashvili, presented the Abkhaz side with an ultimatum to end hostilities within 24 hours. The colonel said: "If 100,000 Georgians die out of the total number, then all 97,000 of yours will die."

August 30 - September 1, 1992 offensive operations of the Georgian troops in an unsuccessful attempt to push the Abkhaz units on the eve of the Moscow summit.

On September 3, 1992, negotiations were held in Moscow with the participation of B. Yeltsin, E. Shevardnadze and V. Ardzinba. The final document was signed: a ceasefire from 12:10 on September 5, the removal of armed formations from Abkhazia, the redeployment of the armed forces of Georgia, the resumption of the activities of legitimate authorities.

September 5, 1992 in 10 minutes. after the beginning of the truce, at 12:00, it was violated by the shelling of the Abkhazian positions in the village by the Georgian side. Escher. In the same place, at 22:30, the Georgian units attempted a tank attack.

On September 9, 1992, at a meeting in Sukhum, an agreement was reached on a ceasefire from 00:00 on September 10. The agreement has been broken. The next agreements of 15.09 and 17.09 were also not respected by the Georgian side.

On September 16, 1992, the Presidium of the ARRA adopts a resolution "On the armed aggression of the troops of the State Council of Georgia against Abkhazia" and "On the genocide of the Abkhaz people."

On September 22, 1992, the Russian Federation completed the transfer of weapons from the Akhaltsikhe motorized rifle division to Georgia.

On September 25, 1992, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation adopts a resolution "On the socio-political situation in the North Caucasus in connection with the events in Abkhazia."

Since September, a months-long blockade by Georgian troops of the Abkhazian city of Tkuarchal began.

October 1-6, 1992, a military operation to liberate the city of Gagra and the Gagra region from the invaders:

On October 1, 1992, at 17:00, the Abkhaz units go on the offensive, the village is occupied. Colchis (now Psahara); 2 - after fierce fighting, Gagra was liberated;

On October 4, 1992, at a rally in the city of Sukhum, E. Shevardnadze declares: "Gagra has been and remains the western gate of Georgia, and we must return it"; Georgian units receive air reinforcements;

On October 6, 1992, the Abkhaz units liberate Leselidze (now Gechripsh) and Gantiadi (now Tsandripsh); Abkhazia regains control over its sector of the Abkhaz-Russian border; the retreating troops of the State Council of Georgia, having fled from Abkhazia, cross the border river Psou, surrender their weapons to Russian servicemen and are declared interned.

October 14-21, 1992 diplomatic activity aimed at forcing Abkhazia to make unjustified concessions.

On October 14, 1992, UN Deputy Secretary-General Antoine Blanqui arrives in Gudauta;

On October 23, 1992, as a result of a targeted action by Georgian special services in Sukhum, the funds of the State Historical Archive of Abkhazia and the archive of the Institute of Language, Literature and History were set on fire and destroyed.

October 26 - November 2, 1992 heavy fighting is going on on both fronts. The Abkhaz troops come close to the city of Ochamchira, but subsequently return to their original positions. In the Sukhum direction, the Abkhazian troops inflict serious damage on the enemy.

November 20-29, 1992 ceasefire during the evacuation of Russian military units from Sukhum. The Georgian side is using the truce to build up manpower and military equipment.

November 24, 1992 the occupation authorities create the so-called. "Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia".

December 14, 1992 The Georgian side shoots down a Russian MI-8 helicopter, which was taking out residents of the besieged Abkhazian city of Tkuarchal. The crew and 60 passengers, mostly women and children, were killed.

YEAR TWO

(January-September 1993)

January 5, 1993 offensive operations of the Abkhaz troops on the Gumista front. The advanced units reach the outskirts of Sukhum, but further success cannot be developed.

On January 11, 1993, Vladislav Ardzinba was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia.

January 18, 1993 in the area with. Saken was forced by the Georgian side to land a helicopter heading for the town of Tkuarchal. The Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia, Zurab Labakhua, who was on board, and the persons accompanying him were interned.

On January 31, 1993, a humanitarian action begins to provide assistance to the residents of the besieged Tkuarchal;

February 1, 1993 The Georgian side unilaterally suspends the action.

On February 18, 1993, S. Shakhrai and R. Abdulatipov visited Tbilisi and attempted a political solution to the conflict.

On February 20, 1993, the SU-25 attack aircraft suppressed Georgian artillery firing points that fired at a Russian military facility in the village of Eshera. The incident was used by Tbilisi to whip up yet another anti-Russian and anti-Abkhaz hysteria.

On March 4, 1993, the Parliament of Georgia disavowed the communiqué on the results of the visit of S. Shakhrai and R. Abdulatipov; The thesis about the need to take into account the "new realities" in resolving the conflict was subjected to fierce criticism by parliamentarians.

On March 16, 1993, in the course of a counterattack, the Abkhaz formations crossed the Gumista River and captured the strategic heights near Sukhum. However, the offensive did not develop further. After bloody battles on March 17 and 18, the Abkhaz units returned to their original positions.

On March 17, 1993, the session of the Moscow Council adopted an appeal to the RF Armed Forces demanding the imposition of sanctions against Georgia:

On April 26, 1993, in response to an appeal from the deputies of the Georgian parliament, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia issued a statement, noting that for the first time in 8 months, the Georgian parliament called not for general mobilization, the continuation of bloodshed, but for an end to the war.

On April 26, 1993, an attack aircraft SU-25 of the Georgian Air Force bombed Gudauta. In a new statement of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia, this action is regarded as evidence of the former desire of the Georgian leadership "to rely on the forceful solution of the problem of Georgian-Abkhazian relations."

On May 14, 1993, Boris Pastukhov was appointed personal representative of the President of the Russian Federation on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

On May 20, 1993, in accordance with the agreement between B. Yeltsin and E. Shevardnadze (at a meeting in Moscow on May 14), which was joined by Abkhazia, a ceasefire was introduced in the war zone. The rules are often violated. From May 31 fighting actually started again.

May 20-25, 1993 Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Eduard Brunner visits Gudauta, Sukhum and Tbilisi.

On May 22-23, 1993, the Georgian side deploys about 500 mercenaries from Ukraine to the Gumista Front.

On May 24, 1993, the Georgian side shot down a Russian MI-8 helicopter with humanitarian cargo for the blockaded Tkuarchal. 5 crew members were killed.

On June 2, 1993, the State Emergency Committee of the Russian Federation began a large-scale action to provide humanitarian assistance to Tkuarchal and evacuate its inhabitants. After the very first flight of 4 Russian helicopters, the Georgian side interrupted the action, refusing to guarantee flight safety.

On June 15-18, 1993, the first round of Abkhazian-Georgian negotiations on the development of a ceasefire agreement was held in Moscow with the mediation of the Russian Federation.

June 16-17, 1993, the second stage of the humanitarian action to save the inhabitants of Tkuarchal. During both stages, 5030 people were taken out of the blockaded city and districts. Since the end of the month, shelling by the Abkhazian artillery of enemy positions on the outskirts of Sukhum has intensified.

July 2, 1993 in the area with. Tamysh of the section of the Ochamchira Front, an assault force of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia was landed, holding the strategic bridgehead for more than a week;

On July 3, 1993, an offensive began on the Gumista front: the Gumista river was forced, the enemy's defense was broken through;

On July 12, 1993, control was established over the Shroma-Sukhum highway; in the following days, fierce battles for with. Tsugurovka, suppression of counter-offensives of Georgian troops.

July 18-24, 1993 B. Pastukhov's shuttle trips between Gudauta, Sukhum and Tbilisi in order to conclude an armistice agreement as soon as possible.

On July 27, 1993, an agreement on a ceasefire and a mechanism for monitoring its observance was signed in Sochi.

On August 9, 1993, V. Ardzinba sent a message to B. Yeltsin and Boutros Gali, drawing attention to the Georgian side's disregard for the Sochi Agreement: shelling of Abkhaz positions continues, the schedule for the withdrawal of troops and equipment is disrupted.

On August 22, 1993, the Joint Control Commission states: the plan and schedule for the withdrawal of troops and equipment by the Abkhaz side has been fulfilled, the Georgian side is not fulfilling its obligations.

August 24, 1993 meeting in Moscow between B. Yeltsin and V. Ardzinba. Attention Russian President addressed to the violation of the Sochi Agreement by the Georgian side.

On September 17, 1993, the river was forced on the Gumista front. Gumista; 20 - the Abkhaz command offers the Georgian troops to stop resistance and leave the blockaded Sukhum along a safe corridor, there was no answer;

September 27, 1993 Sukhum, the capital of the Republic of Abkhazia, was liberated. Second army corps Georgian army was defeated. The national flag of the Republic of Abkhazia is hoisted on the pediment of the building of the Supreme Council;

On September 30, 1993, pursuing the retreating enemy, the Abkhaz troops reached the Abkhaz-Georgian border along the river. Ingur.

The territory of the Republic of Abkhazia has been liberated from the invaders.

Chronicle of the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Materials of the book are used: Abkhazia 1992 - 1993. Chronicle of the Patriotic War. Photo album. Ed. Gennady Gagulia. Author and compiler Rauf Bartsyts. The author of the text is Yuri Anchabadze. M., 1995.

Tens of millions of people in the former Soviet Union and beyond, who have visited Abkhazia, it is difficult to forget about the sea and palm trees in Gagra, the smell of the needles of the relic pine grove in Pitsunda, Lake Ritsa, the Sukhumi embankment, the underground beauties of the New Athos karst cave ... But in August 1992 The cypress-oleander paradise suddenly turned into hell - Abkhazia was plunged into the abyss of war.

On September 30, 1993, Georgian troops, who had seized most of the territory of Abkhazia a year earlier, were utterly defeated. About 2 thousand defenders of Abkhazia laid down their heads on the altar of Victory. More than a quarter of them are not Abkhazians, they are Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Greeks, Turks, representatives of the North Caucasian republics, Cossacks and others. The Georgian side suffered even more, tens of thousands of inhabitants of this blessed land became refugees, and the army lost about 2,000 killed and 20,000 wounded.

What are the reasons for this war? Could it have been prevented? Was there a chance to find a compromise in all the complexities of the Abkhaz-Georgian relations? We will try to give answers to these questions.

The fertile land in which the Abkhazians lived has long attracted the eyes of neighboring peoples, was a crossroads of cultures. The ancient Greeks sailed here and founded their states, there were Roman and Byzantine fortresses, from the 8th to the 10th centuries. there was an Abkhazian kingdom, which in 975 became part of Georgia. In the 16th-18th centuries, the political influence of Turkey increased in Abkhazia.

On February 17, 1810, Abkhazia, separately from Georgia, voluntarily became part of Russia. In the centuries-old history of relations between the Abkhaz and Georgian peoples, there was a joint struggle against the conquerors (Arab Caliphate), and territorial disputes, wars. However, a qualitatively new situation in Georgian-Abkhazian relations began to take shape in the last third of the 19th century, when, after the Caucasian War of 1817–1864. and the uprisings of the Abkhazians in 1866, their mass evictions to Turkey began. This phenomenon was called "mahadzhirstvo".

The depopulated part of Abkhazia was settled by Russians, Armenians, Greeks and especially by the population of Western Georgia. And if in 1886 the Abkhazians made up 86% of the population on their territory, and the Georgians - 8%, then in 1897 already, respectively - 55% and 25%. After the establishment of Soviet power, Abkhazia was an independent Soviet Socialist Republic. But under the pressure of I. V. Stalin, it first concluded a federal treaty with Georgia, and in 1931 entered it on the rights of autonomy. In the 1930s–1950s the repressions of L.P. Beria and the mass resettlement of Georgian peasants brought the Georgian population in the republic to 39%, and the Abkhaz to 15%. By 1989, this figure had reached 47% and 17.8%, respectively. In Sukhumi and Gagra, the Georgian population was even higher. This was accompanied by the extrusion of their language and culture from the everyday life of the Abkhazians. The protests of the Abkhaz intelligentsia and the growth of national Abkhaz self-consciousness reached a peak by 1989 during the period of Gorbachev's perestroika, after the XIX All-Union Party Conference.

The meeting of the Abkhaz public in the village of Lykhny and the appeal to the Central Committee of the CPSU to restore the status of Abkhazia as a union republic were used by Georgian nationalists to their advantage. On April 9, 1989, a rally began in Tbilisi demanding to stop "Abkhazian separatism", and ended in fact with a demand for Georgia's secession from the USSR. On March 17, 1991, 57% of the population of Abkhazia voted for the preservation of the USSR. Elections to the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, which was headed not by a representative of the state party apparatus, but by a scientist, doctor historical sciences, director of the Abkhaz Institute of Language, Literature and History Vladislav Ardzinba, also split it in half. The ensuing civil war in Georgia in December 1991-January 1992 and the overthrow of the nationalist Gamsakhurdia only aggravated the situation. Under the guise of fighting the Zviadists of Gamsakhurdia, the State Council of Georgia partially sent its troops into the territory of Abkhazia and tried to dissolve the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, elected on January 6, 1992. The subsequent parade of sovereignties, instead of negotiations and the conclusion of a new treaty between Abkhazia and Georgia, as a result of the collapse of the USSR, did not defuse the situation. The leadership of Abkhazia was in the mood for negotiations between V. Ardzinba and E. Shevardnadze, but in response shots rumbled, tanks moved forward, blood was shed ...

The forces that brought E. Shevardnadze to power in Georgia, led by people with a criminal record Kitovani and Ioseliani, did not want to wait.

The commander of the Mkhedrioni detachment, Jaba Ioseliani, in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, shortly before the start of the Georgian-Abkhaz war, highly appreciated the contribution of E. Shevardnadze to the destruction of the USSR: “Shevardnadze destroyed the empire “from within and from above”, “sneaking in there”.”

By this time, Ioseliani was known for wide punitive campaigns against South Ossetia.

Historical Russia (the Russian Empire, the USSR, the Russian Federation), which claims succession, instead of uniting peoples around itself, acted differently: contrary to its own interests, the allied, and then the Russian leadership, made remarkable efforts to alienate their allies - by no means, of course, not acquiring allies in the face of Georgia.

Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia Stanislav Lakoba would later have every reason to say: "It seems that Russia is ready to sacrifice its national interests for the sake of the territorial integrity of Georgia."

Georgia's highest expression of gratitude can be considered the intensive shelling of the Russian military units stationed in the village of Nizhnyaya Eshera by units of the State Council of Georgia, which began on September 22, 1992 at 11.30 am. The Russian servicemen were forced to return fire from the BMP to suppress the Georgian firing points.

The war on the part of Georgia was unleashed when the possibilities for a peaceful solution to the conflict were far from being exhausted. Alas, instead of an agreement, the Georgian leadership decided to solve the national problem by force, up to the genocide of an entire nation. The far-fetched pretext of bringing in troops to protect communications and defeat the remnants of the "Zviadists" turned into a repetition of the "experience of annexing South Ossetia." But the troops of the State Council of Georgia also had their own characteristics. This is a combination of primitive criminal violence with the widespread use against the civilian population and civilian objects of combat helicopters equipped with rockets and bombs, tanks, howitzers, installations of the Grad system, as well as weapons prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1949 - "needle" shells and cluster bombs. This was especially evident during the destruction of places of compact residence of the Abkhaz ethnic group in the villages of the Sukhumi and Ochamchira regions and remained characteristic of the actions of the armed forces of the State Council of Georgia throughout the war.

At the same time, the war that began on August 14, 1992, combined the features of almost all local wars, already deployed by that time on the territory of the former USSR. The swiftness and cruelty of the aggression with the use of powerful military equipment made it look like the just ended war in Transnistria; rampant criminal terror against the civilian population by the Georgian army already had a precedent in South Ossetia; many months of occupation, the prolongation of hostilities for more than a year had an analogy in Nagorno-Karabakh. The common, generic feature of these wars was also extremely sharply expressed in Abkhazia: the screaming inequality in armaments, legalized by the allied, and then by the Russian leadership. Republics of the "first class" received their share in the division of the Soviet Army, autonomy - nothing. They were forced to solve their own security problems already in the midst of the conflict.

This was especially pronounced in Abkhazia, in view of its historical connection with the peoples of the North Caucasus and the resonance that Georgia's attack on it caused here.

In the aggregate of all these signs, the war of 1992-1993. in Abkhazia still occupies a special place in the chain of wars caused by the collapse of the USSR. The paradoxical combination of different, seemingly mutually exclusive elements in it has no analogues. Here it is called "domestic". All over the republic there are monuments and honor its defenders. And this name has two plans. The first, obvious one, of course, is the defense of their small homeland. But the second one was also quite clearly indicated: a semantic and spiritual-emotional connection with the memory of the Great Patriotic War, which was still universal and alive in the country. This found its expression in many features: both in the name of Marshal Baghramyan, given to the Armenian volunteer battalion, and in likening Tkuarchal besieged Leningrad, and in the inscription "fascists", on bridges, buildings, etc. in relation to the troops of the State Council of Georgia.

Finally, there was no alienation of "Sovietness", which by that time had flooded the territory of Georgia and Russia itself. On the contrary, Abkhazia, like South Ossetia and Transnistria, was a territory that tried to protect the Union as a universal value, and this was bizarrely combined with the wide participation in the Abkhazian militia of volunteers from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (KGNK), not very alien to Russophobia, and the Cossacks, known his ability to defend the interests of the state.

It remains an indisputable historical fact, which can be confirmed by documents and evidence, that the battalion of the KGNK (highlanders) and the so-called “Slavbat” (Cossacks and volunteers from the Russian regions of Russia) provided real assistance to Abkhazia. It was they, about 1.5 thousand people, including the battalion of Shamil Basayev (286 people), together with the Abkhaz militia, who took shape in the regular army, and not the mythical large-scale support of the Russian army, turned the tide of the war.

Fighters of the women's Abkhaz battalion

The true reason for the failure of the war for Georgia was shown even by the authors of the “World History of Wars”, Ernest and Trevor Dupuis, who are very unfavorable to the Abkhazians. Having an overwhelming superiority in forces, the Georgians failed to take advantage of it. The Georgian army showed absolute helplessness on the battlefield. There was no unified command in it until very recently. Quarrels and grievances between military leaders became in the order of things.

During the more than a year of the war in Abkhazia, the Georgian army has not carried out a single operation that was more or less competent from a military point of view.

The entire course of hostilities confirms the correctness of this assessment.

In the early morning of August 14, 1992, Georgian troops entered the Republic of Abkhazia. Up to 2 thousand Georgian "guards", 58 units of armored vehicles and buses "Ikarus", 12 artillery mounts. The column stretched for several kilometers along the highway from Gali to Ochamchira. In addition, the offensive was supported from the air by four MI-24 helicopters and naval forces.

During the operation codenamed "Sword" in Tbilisi, according to Abkhaz intelligence, they planned that the main forces would follow the railroad, land their garrisons at all key points, and the awakened Abkhazia would be in their hands. Another grouping was sent by sea from Poti to Gagra on the night of August 14-15. The amphibious assault, numbering several hundred national guardsmen with four armored vehicles, moved on two landing ships, two Comets and a barge. On the eve of the inglorious campaign in Abkhazia, according to experts from the Center for Caucasian Studies, Georgia received from the warehouses of the former ZakVO about 240 tanks, many armored personnel carriers, about 25 thousand machine guns and machine guns, dozens of guns and rocket and artillery systems, including "Grad" and " Hurricane". These weapons, which previously belonged to the 10th motorized rifle division, were transferred in accordance with the Tashkent agreements. The then Minister of Defense T. Kitovani promised not to use it in Abkhazia, but he did not keep his word.

The amphibious assault at dawn on August 15 stopped in the roadstead near the village of Gantiadi (now Tsandryti), 7 km from the border with the Russian Federation. The administration of Gagra had already been notified of the landing. Behind him in different places visual observation was carried out from the shore, but there were too few forces and means to prevent his landing. At about one o'clock in the afternoon, the amphibious assault force rapidly approached the shore and landed at the mouth of the Khashunse River. Among the fighters of the Abkhazian people's militia who prevented him, some were with machine guns, most with hunting rifles, some were unarmed at all. Nevertheless, the militias fought. The defense was held until seven in the evening, and then they received an order to retreat to the sanatorium "Ukraine" - a section of the highway convenient for defense on the western outskirts of Gagra. But there was a danger of a strike from the rear, from the side of the village of Psakhara (Kolkhida) on the eastern outskirts of Gagra, where members of the local Gagra group “Mkhedrioni” who sat by the road and joined them by employees of the Gagra police department of Georgian nationality fired at passing cars and killed several civilians.

Part of the Georgian landing moved to the river Psou. After a short skirmish at a post near the border, eight servicemen of the internal troops of Abkhazia had to withdraw to the Russian side, where they were disarmed and interned.

But the main events of the outbreak of the war developed in the Sukhum direction and, of course, in Sukhumi.

Shortly before the war, at the insistence of the head of the Gat region, the Abkhaz leadership removed the post on the bridge across the Ingur River. In Gala, local "guards" joined the Georgian troops. Then the Georgian column moved to the first patrol post near the village of Okhurei, Ochamchira district, where nine reservists were on duty from a separate regiment of internal troops (OPVV), created on the basis of the disbanded 8th regiment of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. They were taken prisoner by fraud. At about 12:00 on August 14, near the village of Agudzera, the reservists of the local OPVV battalion resisted the attackers. But it was quickly suppressed by superior forces, and then the Georgian troops moved freely.

By 12 noon, the Georgian troops were in Sukhumi, in the area of ​​​​the camp site named after the XV Congress of the Komsomol. Here they were joined by local Georgian formations. Subsequently, the column moved towards the center of Sukhumi. The Georgian guards attacked the positions of the OPVV fighters, who, under the onslaught of a significantly superior enemy, were forced to retreat to the Red Bridge. Here, the military commissar of the republic, S. Dbar, took up the organization of defense. The Red Bridge was blocked and mined. The reservists, against whom tanks and helicopters operated, were armed with Molotov cocktails made during the battle. In addition, snipers and machine gunners, who had settled in the nearest high-rise buildings, acted against the defenders of the Red Bridge. After the Georgian tanks went on the offensive, the lead one was hit by the Abkhaz fighters, and then the tank was delivered to their positions. After the repair, he began to terrify his former owners. On the same day, August 14, after an appeal to the people of the republic by the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia V. G. Ardzinba, the Presidium of the Supreme Council announced a general mobilization of citizens from 18 to 40 years old.

“... The troops of the State Council of Georgia invaded our land... Our proposals to resolve issues of mutual relations peacefully were answered with tanks, guns, planes, murders and robberies. And this shows the true role of the current leadership of Georgia. The world resolutely condemns this barbaric action, and its moral and material support is provided to us. I think that we must endure in this difficult hour and we will endure. - V. G. Ardzinba said in an appeal on television.

In these first days of the war, the first casualties appeared on both sides. As a result of shelling from a helicopter on the beach of the sanatorium of the Russian Ministry of Defense, a Russian officer and several members of the families of military personnel were killed. All vacationers were then urgently evacuated to the territory of Russia.

Already on August 15, the Georgian side is undertaking a diplomatic maneuver. On the initiative of Georgian Defense Minister T. Kitovani (head of the armed group of the State Council), negotiations began. An agreement was reached to prevent further bloodshed on the withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides from the line of confrontation outside the city. However, already on August 18, Georgian troops treacherously captured Sukhumi, which was left unprotected by the Abkhaz formations that retreated across the Gumista River. Guardsmen of Tengiz Kitovani solemnly erected on the dome of the building of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia state flag Georgia with the autograph of his patron. In the "best traditions" of the Middle Ages, Kitovani gave them the city for 3 days. Massive robberies of shops, warehouses, private houses and apartments of non-Georgians began, as well as murders and abuse of civilians on a national basis. The troops of the OPVV were forced to start creating the Gumista defensive line.

On August 18, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia adopted a Decree on the establishment of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the republic, chaired by V. Ardzinba. Colonel V. Kakalia was appointed commander of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia, and Colonel S. Sosnaliev, who arrived in Abkhazia on August 15, 1992 as a volunteer from Kabardino-Balkaria, was appointed chief of staff.

From the first days of the war, at the call of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (KGNK) to provide fraternal assistance to the Abkhaz people to Abkhazia from the North Caucasus and the South of Russia through the Main Caucasian Range Volunteers began to arrive in groups and alone. Volunteers poured into the Abkhaz armed formations. Some of them, especially Chechens and Cossacks, had good field training. Shamil Basaev was appointed commander of the 1st battalion of the KGNK, and Ruslan Gelaev of the 2nd. Nine years later, R. Gelaev, together with a group of Georgian saboteurs, unsuccessfully tried to check the strength of his former brother-soldiers. Such zigzags were made by the history of the war between Georgia and Abkhazia.

In turn, snipers from Lithuania and Latvia, mercenaries from the western regions of Ukraine began to fight on the side of Georgia.

From the very beginning of the war, a very difficult situation arose in Abzhui Abkhazia - the Ochamchira region and the city of Tkuarchal. These regions were cut off from the main part of the country, where the military and political leadership republics.

From the first day of the war in Abzhui Abkhazia, partisan detachments began to be spontaneously created, which did not allow the Georgian troops to capture Tkuarchal. Aslan Zaktaria commanded these groups.

After the capture of Sukhumi by the Georgians, the leadership of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia were evacuated to Gudauta, a regional center 35 km west of Sukhumi.

Thus, by August 18, the Armed Forces of Abkhazia controlled the area from the Gumista River to the village of Kolkhida (turn to Pitsunda) and the mining village of Tkuarchal with a number of Abkhazian villages in the Ochamchira district in the east of the republic. But in these areas there was practically no Georgian population left, which in Sukhumi met the tanks of the State Council with flowers.

But the Georgian troops, instead of developing their military success, engaged in wholesale robberies, looting and drunkenness. The looted property of citizens of the Abkhaz, Armenian, Russian nationalities, state institutions, museums, scientific institutes was taken out, as a rule, towards Tbilisi. The bronze monument to Lenin in front of the building of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia was removed and sent for melting down, the rest of the monuments were fired from tanks and machine guns. Traces of this vandalism throughout Abkhazia are visible 10 years later - in 2002.

Even Givi Lominadze, who was appointed chairman of the Provisional Committee for the Stabilization of the Situation in Abkhazia and who did so much for their arrival, was discouraged by the behavior of the “brave winners”: “I heard and could imagine what war is, but the guards attacked the city like locusts.”

The Georgian military committed atrocities in the city and in the countryside, raped women, and killed them. Dozens and hundreds of people were taken hostage, beaten and abused. All this caused a massive flow of refugees. The world community could not but respond to the misfortune of little Abkhazia. On August 20, a delegation of the Supreme Council of Russia visited Gudauta, Tbilisi, Sukhumi. The demonstrations swept through the cities of the Middle East, Europe and America, where representatives of the numerous Adyghe-Abkhazian diaspora live. The Confederation of Mountain Peoples began to send volunteers to Abkhazia. Russian President B. Yeltsin did not want to come into conflict with E. Shevardnadze. But a trilateral meeting between Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia was scheduled for September 3rd. At the same time, the Georgian military leaders tried to solve the "Abkhazian problem" by their own methods.

A clear idea of ​​how they saw it, and at the same time about themselves, is given by the speech of the then commander of the Tetri Artsivi special forces brigade, later the commander of the troops of the State Council of Georgia in Abkhazia, a former captain Soviet army 27-year-old Colonel (then Brigadier General) Georgiy Karkarashvili, which sounded on August 25 on Sukhumi television: “If 100 thousand Georgians die out of the total number, then all 97 thousand of yours will die, who will support the decisions of Ardzinba.”

The crew of the legendary BMP "01 Apsny" of the Abkhazian army, recaptured from the enemy in the battle near the Red Bridge in Sukhumi on August 14, 1992

It was an open threat of genocide against the Abkhaz people. In response, V. Ardzinba stated that this struggle of a well-armed and trained army against, in fact, the civilian population is deeply immoral, inhumane, that "we will defend the Motherland to the end, if necessary, we will go to the mountains and wage a guerrilla war."

During late August - early September, Georgian troops unsuccessfully tried to break through the defenses of the Abkhaz forces on the Gumista River and seize the remaining Abkhaz territory before negotiations began. But they did not succeed either before the negotiations or after the conclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of Georgian troops. The Georgian side did not comply with it, and, in turn, the Abkhazians, mountaineers, Cossacks on October 2, 1992, themselves went on the offensive near Gagra. Heroically defending his land, knocking out a tank, Gudautian Sergey Smirnov died, the young commander Artur Shakhanyan, a graduate of the 17th Sukhumi secondary school, died a heroic death, a favorite of the fighters. Side by side with the Abkhazians, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, Ukrainians, the Georgians also fought, who later became the heroes of Abkhazia and deserved orders and glory.

Special mention should be made of the Cossacks. Once upon a time, during the uprising of 1866, the Abkhazians, who had risen against tsarism, destroyed a chapel in the village of Lykhny, near the walls of which Cossacks had been buried before. In 1992, a Cossack who came to fight for Abkhazia was buried with honors inside this ruined chapel - a gesture symbolizing a new page in the relationship between Abkhazia and the Cossacks.

All these people, regardless of nationality, stood up for justice, against the barbarism of the Georgian leadership and its methods of warfare (On August 29, 1992, the Abkhazian positions were fired from howitzers with needle shells, prohibited international conventions).

The Russian leadership as a whole in relation to the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia took a "balanced" approach, balancing tactics.

At the same time, the session of the Supreme Council of Russia on September 24-25, 1992 adopted a resolution "On the situation in the North Caucasus in connection with the events in Abkhazia." In particular, it said: “To strongly condemn the policy of the leadership of Georgia, which is trying to solve the problems of interethnic relations through violence and demand from it an immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of military units from the territory of Abkhazia, and observance of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Suspend the transfer of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, units and formations of the Armed Forces to Georgia Russian Federation, as well as to stop the transfer of weapons, military equipment, ammunition to Georgia under previously concluded contracts. Refrain from concluding with Georgia economic agreements until the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia”. It is noteworthy that this resolution was adopted by an overwhelming number of votes and reconciled both the “right” and the “left”, including such ideological opponents as S. Baburin and M. Molostov.

Even greater troubles awaited E. Shevardnadze on the fronts of the Georgian-Abkhazian war. The English military magazine Caucasian World (Caucasus World) published a lengthy article “Abkhazians. Military aspects of the war: a turning point” (author - Georg Hewitt), dedicated to the battle for Gagra. It is of exceptional interest for the history of military art. Before the start of the offensive, the Abkhaz forces did not have superiority either in manpower or in equipment, but the Abkhaz detachments controlled all the heights above the city. The strategy of the Abkhaz and North Caucasian volunteers was to cross the Bzyn River south of Gagra and occupy the strategically important village of Colchis. The invasion of Gagra itself was carried out by an attack in three directions, from the southern passages to the city. One group followed the coastline and attacked the city from the beach and swampy area through a tourist camp located in the southern part of the city. The other two Abkhaz detachments made their way through the city along parallel axes (along the Old and New Highways). The Abkhaz detachments breaking through along the Old Highway were supposed to make their way to the city center and unite with the detachments advancing along the coast. The detachments advancing along the New Highway were to shorten the road to Gagra, heading towards the northern edge of the city in order to block any Georgian reinforcements that might arrive from the north. Thus, the Abkhaz detachments sought to trap the Kartavelin forces defending Gagra. The attack went according to plan. Both detachments of Abkhazians met in battle against the Georgian forces defending the railway station. The struggle for it lasted three hours (from 6.00 to 9.00). On October 2, the Abkhaz detachments continued to advance throughout the day. The next place of determined resistance was the sanatorium opposite the supermarket. But by 17.35 this position was surrounded and destroyed. Other Abkhaz detachments proceeded down the Old Highway through the center of the city, and by 1600 all the main strongholds of the Georgian defense were under the complete control of the Abkhaz, including the Abkhazia Hotel and the police station. An hour and a half later, Gagra was completely under the control of the Abkhazians.

The battle for the police station was extremely fierce, as it was defended by local Georgian policemen and members of the elite White Eagle squad. Abkhazians took 40 prisoners near the Rehabilitation Center.

In the early morning hours of October 3, Georgian helicopters arrived from Sukhumi, but there were too few of them to stop the Abkhaz advance.

One of the Abkhaz detachments at the training ground. In the background is an interesting "home-made" - an infantry fighting vehicle with ten tubes for launching shells from the Grad MLRS (apparently, the M4 Sherman with a 114-mm launcher served as a prototype rockets"Calliope")

Captured Georgian soldiers. In the foreground - General Zurab Mamulashvili, taken prisoner on July 4, 1993 at the Sukhumi hydroelectric power station

Subsequently, the Georgian defense of Gagra turned into a large-scale retreat. The Georgian population fled in the thousands towards the Russian border.

At noon on October 3, a Georgian SU-25 bomber attacked Abkhaz positions at the intersection of the old and new highways in the Ukraina sanatorium. The Georgians, with the forces of the White Eagle formation, began to prepare for a counteroffensive. 60 detachments were to go around the sanatorium through the mountains and attack it from a height. At the same time, part of the Georgian forces (military police, Kutaisi and Tetri Artsvi battalions) advanced south of the highway, seizing Old Gagra and attacking the sanatorium. But this offensive failed after the Georgians saw two ships on the coast and Abkhazians landing from them on the coast.

The next day, October 5, the Abkhaz drive the White Eagle into a very difficult mountainous area. By 18:00 these elite Georgian forces were defeated. After that, the Georgian formations were dispersed in the surrounding villages, and at 8.40 on October 6, the Abkhaz reached the border with Russia and raised their flag.

The remnants of the Georgian formations suffered heavy losses over the next twelve days, including the death of Gogi Karkaroshvili, brother of the commander-in-chief of the Georgian troops. The head of the State Council himself miraculously escaped by helicopter, which made two flights and took away 62 militants.

Abkhaz formations captured 2 tanks, 25 infantry fighting vehicles, a radio station, a boat and thousands of prisoners.

Near Gagra, selected Georgian battalions were defeated: Didgori, Tskhaltub, Rustavi, Gagra 101 and other elite units of the Mkhedrioni. The defeat of the Georgian units foreshadowed, ultimately, defeat in the war.

Abkhazia got the opportunity to receive weapons and volunteers through the mountain passes and its northern borders.

The Georgian units were unable to organize defense in depth, their forward positions were instantly broken through. In street battles, the Georgians could not use their heavy weapons, discipline and morale were low in their ranks, small detachments of 10-12 people defending individual buildings had no communication between themselves. Each detachment only watched its sector and knew nothing more. There were many disagreements between the leaders and their units.

In a word, the Georgian army showed real helplessness on the battlefield, there was no single command in it until very recently. A characteristic touch - in 1992, Gagra was defended by Georgian detachments, which carried out the orders of several commanders and did not interact with each other. Like mushrooms after rain, battalions (Zugdidi, Khashuri, etc.) appeared, numbering 7–8 people each, headed by self-proclaimed colonels (no one agreed to a lower rank and position). Quarrels and grievances between military leaders became in the order of things. So it was when Giorgi Karkaroshvili, after the defeat, began to accuse Colonel-General Anatoly Kamkamidze of incompetence and made it clear that he would not get along with him. (For information, unlike Major General Georgy Karkaroshvili, behind whom only the highest military school and the post of chief of staff of the artillery division in the former Soviet army, Anatoly Kamkamidze went from military school cadet to lieutenant general in this army, deputy commander of the district troops for combat training, and Eduard Shevardnadze awarded him the rank of colonel general.) The choice was made in in favor of Karkaroshvili. But, having become Minister of Defense in May 1993, he never managed to put an end to indiscipline, discord, and parochialism in the army. Against this background, his repeated promises to "punish the Abkhazians with a large-scale offensive" could only cause a smile. In the end, in the summer of 1993, in an interview with one of news agencies he was forced to admit that "there is no order and discipline in the Georgian army."

As the intensity of hostilities increased, the Georgian army turned into an army of vagabonds, blaming each other for the defeat. Abkhaz detachments, including volunteers - representatives of the diaspora from Turkey, Syria, Jordan, the highlanders of the North Caucasus, were much better prepared for joint actions. They had a well-placed intelligence, they were distinguished by experience and knowledge of the highlands.

There is an opinion that the Russian army also provided military assistance to Abkhazia. But such accusations are unfounded. Shamil Basayev declared that he was fighting on the side of Abkhazia until Russia started a war with Georgia. In this case, he will fight on the side of Georgia. In total, according to various sources, there were about 500 volunteers on the side of Abkhazia near Gagra. Georgian forces were much larger.

The Abkhaz ensured their superiority in a variety of ways.

A curious and very expressive detail: even before the start of hostilities, having no combat vehicles, the Abkhaz formed crews for them. The captured combat vehicle was handed over to one of the crews and immediately entered into battle. This allowed, eyewitnesses say, first to equalize the forces of the attackers and defenders, and then to create an advantage in technology on the Abkhaz side. By the evening of October 1, the Abkhazians took the village of Colchis and quickly advanced towards Gagra, which caused panic in the Georgian units, even detachments had to be used.

In practice, the battle for Gagra was a battle for Abkhazia itself. It showed the inability of the Georgian troops to conduct large-scale operations. There were subsequently 4 significant offensives (January 1993, March 1993, July 1993 and the final offensive in September 1993). All of them were carried out by the Abkhaz side. On October 11, 1992, by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, the Ministry of Defense of Abkhazia was formed, headed by Colonel Vladimir Arshba. On the same day, the air defense of Abkhazia near the village of Eshera shot down a Su-25 aircraft of the Georgian Air Force for the first time with a surface-to-air missile.

The defeat of the Gagra group of troops of the Republic of Georgia caused panic in Sukhumi. But in general, the war took on a protracted character. On the part of Abkhazia, there were attempts to land an amphibious assault in Ochamchira from Gudauta. The Abkhazians inflicted significant damage on the Georgian side, but were forced to retreat. After several unsuccessful, however, and not persistent enough attempts to "clean up" Ochamchira, the Abkhazians counted on the Zviadist detachments that controlled Western Georgia, and were not mistaken. Colonel Loti Kobalia did not get involved (and he did promise) in active hostilities in Abkhazia. Moreover, he put up a lot of obstacles to government troops, along the way, not missing the opportunity to profit from heavy equipment and weapons at their expense. And, when the decisive hour came in the battle for Sukhumi, the units of the 1st Army Corps of the Georgian Army got stuck somewhere on the outskirts of Ochamchira. A little later, on November 3–4, the Abkhaz army carried out reconnaissance in force on the northern outskirts of Sukhumi near the village of Giroma. At the end of November, an agreement was concluded between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides on a ceasefire for the period of evacuation from Sukhumi of some units of the Russian army - the 903rd separate radio engineering center and the 51st road depot. The leadership of Abkhazia faced two interrelated tasks: the liberation of the republic from Georgian troops and the provision of a more or less tolerable life for the population in the territory under the control of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia. This was especially true of humanitarian aid to the mining district of Tkuarchal. The whole world was shocked by the tragedy of the downed Mi-8 helicopter, which on December 14, 1992, was taking civilians (women, children, the elderly) out of the besieged area. The helicopter, controlled by the Russian crew, was shot down over the village of Lata, Gulriksha district, by a thermal missile "Strela" from the Georgian side. The crew and more than 60 people died. civilians. Today, a photo exhibition dedicated to this barbarity is on display at the State Museum of Abkhazia. But the world did not shudder at this barbarity. Ruling Russia also remained without any special emotions.

It is not surprising that on May 26, 1993, the tragedy repeated itself - a helicopter was shot down over Saken with flour and medicines for the besieged Tkuarchal. As a result, the squadron commander L. Chubrov, helicopter commander E. Kasimov, navigator A. Savelyev, flight mechanic V. Tsarev and radio operator E. Fedorov were killed. And again silence from official Russia. By that time, she had transferred the port of Poti to Georgia with a large amount of equipment.

In total, during the war years, about 50 Russian servicemen and members of their families died from the actions of the Georgian side.

Subsequently, the Russian army immortalized the memory of the dead Russian peacekeepers by engraving their names on the memorial installed in the sanatorium of the Moscow Military District in Sukhumi.

The coming year of 1993 was marked by a new offensive of the Abkhazians against Sukhumi. They managed to seize several areas on the left bank of the Gumista. But deep snow contributed to the growth of losses among the attackers, and they were forced to retreat under heavy artillery and mortar fire. The bodies of 23 dead from Abkhazia were exchanged for captured Georgians. In mid-March, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia made a new attempt to liberate Sukhumi by forcing Gumista in its lower reaches. The preparations for the attack were meticulous. The equipment was also thought out - body armor and waterproof suits - which in this situation saved the lives of many Abkhazians. But at the same time, having learned from Gagra's bitter experience, the Georgian command took the most serious measures to strengthen the defense of the city from the proposed offensive. And yet, on the night of March 16, after intensive artillery preparation and bombing from the air, the Abkhaz units (including the Armenian battalion named after Marshal Baghramyan, created shortly before) crossed to the left bank of the Gumista, broke through the defenses of the Georgians in several places and started fighting for mastering strategically important heights. Separate groups seeped into the city.

However, the Abkhaz offensive failed, although, according to the Georgian leaders, "the fate of the city hung in the balance." Many groups that went forward were surrounded, stayed on the left bank for up to 2-3 days, but managed, in the end, to get to the right bank and carry out the wounded. Since the beginning of the war, the Abkhazian army has not suffered such tangible losses in any combat operation, there were three times more than on January 5. The Georgians also received great damage.

Again, a rather long period began, lasting this time three and a half months, when the fighting on the Gumista front was reduced to fierce artillery skirmishes, and the Abkhaz and Georgian armed formations entered into direct contact only on the Eastern Front, in the Ochamchira region. During this period, the number of Cossacks increased in the Armed Forces of Abkhazia, and new mercenaries from Western Ukraine appeared in the Georgian army. The presence of a group of Russian troops on the territory of Abkhazia during this period was a deterrent. At the same time, Russia's shuttle diplomacy represented by Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Kozyrev and Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation B. Pastukhov in Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Gudauta did not give the desired effect. There was a threat of the division of Abkhazia, and not the end of the conflict.

Since it was not possible to agree on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the territory of Abkhazia, the leadership of the Republic of Abkhazia had no choice but to continue the struggle by force of arms.

On July 2, 1993, the Armed Forces of Abkhazia again launched offensive operations. At night, in the village of Tamysh, Ochamchira district, an amphibious assault force of 300 people was landed. Having united in the area of ​​the Black Sea highway with units of the Abkhazian army that fought on the Eastern Front, the paratroopers cut the highway and brutally held a corridor of about 10 km for a week, preventing the Georgian military command from transferring reinforcements to the Sukhumi region. But the main actions of the offensive operation are unfolding north of Sukhumi. Having crossed Gumista in the region of the two rivers, the Abkhazian forces occupied the villages of Gunma, Akhalsheni, Kaman, as well as the village of Sukhum-HPP, within a few days. The Georgian General Mamulashvili was taken prisoner. By July 9, the strategically important village of Shroma was captured. Georgian troops tried to regain Shromy again, but failed.

There were stubborn battles for possession of the heights dominating the capital of Abkhazia. Shevardnadze himself flew to Sukhumi, and the new Minister of Defense of Georgia, Gia Karkarashvili, presented an ultimatum to Abkhazia on the withdrawal of troops from the village. Scars.

Negotiations held between opposing sides with the participation of the representative of Russia, Minister of Emergency Situations S. Shoigu, they led to the signing of an armistice agreement. The Georgian side undertook obligations to withdraw its troops and heavy equipment from the territory of Abkhazia. In turn, the Abkhaz side also undertook to demilitarize its territory and reduced its military formations to a regiment of internal troops to protect communications and important facilities. On August 17, Abkhazia saw off its defenders - volunteers from the republics and regions of the South of Russia - to their homeland. But the Georgian side was in no hurry to fulfill the agreement. Heavy equipment was not withdrawn, and on September 7, an armed group of supporters of Z. Gamsakhurdia invaded the Gall region.

In response to this, on September 16, on the Eastern Front, the Abkhaz forces made an attempt to lift the blockade from Tkuarchal on their own and reached the Kodor River (3 km from the Sukhumi airport). The expansion of the bridgehead for the attack on Sukhumi from the north also began. Georgian forces made attempts to break through from Ochamchira and break through the corridor to Sukhumi, but to no avail. By September 20–21, the Abkhazian units closed the ring around Sukhumi. After stubborn fighting, Georgian troops were driven out of the supermarket area at the entrance to Sukhumi and blockaded in the New Microdistrict. By September 25, the Abkhaz units captured the TV tower and Train Station. Starting from September 25, Russian ships, in agreement with the Abkhaz side, began to take out thousands of refugees. But the Georgian army led by E. Shevardnadze refused to leave the city voluntarily.

As a result of the offensive on September 26–27, the operation to liberate Sukhumi was completed. During the 12-day battles, the Abkhaz troops defeated the 2nd army corps of the Georgian army, numbering more than 12 thousand people. Many tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, etc. were captured as trophies.

On September 29, the Sukhumi airport was taken and the troops of the Gumista and Eastern fronts joined near the Kodor River, the blockade of the Tkuarchal region ended.

Map-scheme of the Georgian-Abkhaz war

At 8.30 on September 30, the Armed Forces of Abkhazia attacked and captured Ochamchira and by evening entered the empty Gall. By 8 pm on the same day, the Abkhaz detachments reached the Ingur River and the border with Georgia. Victory has come for the people of Abkhazia. The landslide flight of most of the Georgian population of Sukhumi, Sukhumi, Gulriksha, Ochamchira and Gall regions outside Abkhazia during the last week of September 1993 is, of course, also a huge human tragedy. But if there had not been an attempt to bring the Abkhaz people to their knees by force, there would have been no catastrophe that befell the Georgian population of the Republic of Abkhazia in September 1993. After all, never and nowhere, at any level, in any statement of the Abkhaz, seeking the sovereignty of Abkhazia, they did not raise the question of the deportation of the Georgian population from it, of ethnic cleansing. Only thanks to Shevardnadze, by October 1, 1993, the proportion of the Georgian population in Abkhazia returned to the level of 1886. Shevardnadze himself fled in disgrace with Russia's "last" helicopter to the south, leaving his army dying in Sukhumi. Russia once again rendered an invaluable service to Georgia by saving its president. Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia V. Ardzinba forbade, in order to avoid an international conflict, to shoot down this helicopter. The Russians in the helicopter with Shevardnadze became a human shield for him, a guarantee of his personal safety during this last flight. At the same time, he left his old friend and associate, the head of the administration in Abkhazia, Zhauli Shartava, to die in besieged Sukhumi. “E. Shevardnadze himself could not help but know how hated he and his friends are for the Abkhazians and North Caucasians - one could hope for indulgence only if respected people stood up for the prisoners - S. Shamba, S. Soskaliyev or Vladislav himself Ardzinba... But to the question of a major Russian official: - Where is Shartava? - followed the answer of the head of Georgia: - Everything is fine with him ... ".

Even to the most unbiased Russian observer, it is clear that the Georgian forces defeated non-Russian troops and that the victory of the people of Abkhazia was deeply logical. The decisive role in the fact that Abkhazia survived was played by the courage and heroism of its sons and daughters, all honest and courageous people of different nationalities who came to its aid.

In Abkhazia, the “Book of Eternal Memory” was published under the editorship of V.M. Ukrainians, Greeks, Circassians, Lazs, Adyghes, Tatars, Karachays, Abazins, Germans, Jews).

From the point of view of military art, this war is indicative of the fact that the July and September offensive of the Abkhazians was active, decisive, highly maneuverable, the front was 40 km wide and 120 km deep. The Abkhazian units and subunits, created on the basis of the people's militia, skillfully hit the Georgian positions with fire, broke through their defenses at a high pace, saturated with a large number of anti-tank and armored weapons, smashed them in a head-on battle with daring blows, forestalling them in opening fire. Already the first months of the war showed that the Abkhaz used the tactics of guerrilla war only to get time to mobilize their forces. After the Gagra events, their actions were dominated not by blind chance or luck, but purely strategic. This was especially important at the first stage of the war, when they were limited both in strength and in the means of waging it. In these battles, the Abkhaz fought back tanks, combat vehicles, artillery mounts, ammunition, in a word, fought for trophies, replenishing their military arsenal. And what about the Georgians? Paradoxically, but the fact, having an overwhelming superiority in strength, they failed to use it. Abkhazians showed themselves confidently in close and contact combat. This was especially evident on the Eastern Front. As a result of the 1993 military campaign, the command and personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia gained experience in fighting in specific conditions, both in urban and mountainous areas, and learned to storm strong strongholds and centers of resistance.

The actions of the Air Force, Naval Forces and Air Defense Forces of the Republic of Abkhazia, which solved common strategic tasks during the military campaign of 1993, also deserve high praise.

On August 27, 1992, the combat use of the Abkhaz aviation began from two AN-2 aircraft in the Gudauta region. Prior to this, the Abkhazians, led by military pilot Oleg Chamba, used only hang gliders, and the aviation of the troops of the State Council of Georgia dominated the sky: Su-25 attack aircraft and Mu-24 helicopters. They bombed with impunity settlements, ships with refugees, including an ordinary passenger ship that plyed along the Poti-Sochi line. The paradox of the war was that the first Abkhaz hang-glider on September 19, 1992, which carried out the bombing of Georgian armored vehicles in the Gagra region, was controlled by the Georgian O. G. Siradze. The news that the Georgians bombed the troops of the State Council of Georgia spread all over Abkhazia. Subsequently, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Abkhazia and one of the Sukhumi schools was named after him.

Hang gliders, piloted by pilots O. Chamba, Avidzba, Gazizulin, successfully carried out reconnaissance and bombed Georgian positions, and operated in such hard-to-reach places where neither helicopters nor planes can operate. In total, the Abkhaz pilots spent about 150 hours in the military sky.

An analysis of the combat experience of the Abkhazian hang gliders showed the need to equip the vehicles with a light machine gun and a landing headlight. The war confirmed that such aircraft are detected only if the pilot at low altitude increases the engine speed. the best way fire evasion is a rapid descent and low level flight. The war showed the undoubted effectiveness of motor hang gliders and the possibility of teaching a physically strong man to fly them in 30 hours. Considering the report that in 1998 Georgia also acquired hang gliders, it is possible that combat hang gliders can be used in local military conflicts, and not only in the North western part of Transcaucasia.

As Naval Forces in the war, for the landing of amphibious assaults and the protection of the coast and communications, both sides have used boats and other watercraft since August 1992.

The air defense forces of Abkhazia began counting victories on October 11, 1992, when Sergeant Oleg Chmel, a native of New Athos, shot down a Georgian Su-25 aircraft bombing ancient Christian churches. By the beginning of hostilities near Gagra in September 1992, the Abkhaz units had two 120-mm mortars and two Alazan installations delivered by the highlanders. By the end of the war, at the expense of trophies, the Abkhazian army had cannon, anti-tank and mortar batteries. The Abkhazian army acquired armored vehicles by blowing them up and capturing them from the enemy, then they were repairing them, and tanks and infantry fighting vehicles fought on their side. In the final operations of the war, carefully prepared and planned by the Abkhazians, ground forces, aviation, and warships acted according to a single plan. The directions of the main and auxiliary strikes were skillfully chosen.

It should be noted that, unlike the beginning of the war, the last offensives of the Abkhazians were fully provided with equipment, weapons, uniforms, food and ammunition. Commander-in-chief V. Ardzinba, generals S. Soskaliev, S. Dvar, M. Kshimaria, G. Arba, V. Arshba skillfully led their armed forces.

It seems to us that after the war Russia should also draw certain lessons for itself.

For centuries, the Caucasus has been in the zone of interests of the leaders of various state formations both from the West and from the East. Being located on the border of Europe and Asia, having a unique nature and raw materials, it was partly part of the Roman Empire, then the Byzantine Empire, the Arab Caliphate and the state of Genghis Khan left their traces here. It has been divided among themselves since the time of Prince Svyatoslav by Russians, Persians and Ottomans.

But the North-Western Transcaucasia is of particular national interest for Russia, and not for the United States.

Firstly, at the beginning of the 19th century. the Christian principalities of Abkhazia and Georgia voluntarily, unlike some Muslim territories, became part of the Russian Empire. Abkhazians are still striving for Russia, since they are closely connected with the Adyghes, Karachays, Circassians and other peoples of the North Caucasus.

Secondly, if Russia withdraws from this region, then the Americans will occupy it in order to have access to the raw material wealth of the Caspian Sea, to control this troubled region. In terms of explored reserves, it ranks third in the world after the Arab East and Western Siberia. This is 40-60 billion barrels of oil and 10-20 trillion cubic meters of gas. And Georgia is one of the most convenient corridors for transporting oil to the world market, bypassing Russia.

Thirdly, the Muslim factor is increasingly entering the Black Sea region. Under the auspices of Turkey, the descendants of the Crimean Tatars are increasingly settling in the Crimea, and mahajirs - businessmen from Asia Minor and the Middle East are restoring the economy of their historical homeland and exporting relic forest - sawlogs by sea routes in tons for a pittance. And this is not indifferent to Russia in the light of the ambiguous attitude of the Arabs to the Chechen problem. When the 1st war in Chechnya (1994-1996) turned out to be a failure for Russia, Georgia turned away from its northern neighbor, turning its eyes to the NATO countries. The far-fetched strategic partnership has come to an end. Moscow was not only weakened, but also deceived.

Fourth, the total redistribution of the world by force under the pretext of combating terrorism is bringing NATO ever closer to our borders. Georgia, through Shevardnadze, declared that by 2005 it would join NATO. The current state of the Georgian army, armed Russian weapons 1960s–1970s (T-72 tanks, Su-25 aircraft, anti-aircraft missile systems that shot down even Powers) are no longer satisfied with the Georgian leadership. Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze, a native of Sukhumi, graduated from three military colleges - in Italy, Germany and the United States. Only in Lately In addition to the American special forces from the Green Berets in the Pankisi Gorge, Germany handed over 150 trucks and 500 sets of uniforms to the Georgian armed forces. Turkey supplies kerosene for aviation and diesel fuel for armored vehicles. The Americans gave 6 Iroquois helicopters and 4 more such machines were allocated for disassembly for spare parts.

And finally After the collapse of the USSR, Russians and Russian citizens who found themselves outside the Russian Federation found themselves, for the most part, in a difficult and humiliating situation. But to such regions of the so-called Near Abroad as Crimea, Abkhazia, where there are a significant number of Russian citizens, and although, so to speak, the body belongs to Ukraine and Georgia, but the soul and heart are with Russia, we should have a particularly reverent attitude. Moreover, under certain circumstances, the nationalists of Ukraine and Georgia have already united more than once and are ready to unite again against “Russian imperial thinking”, and in last resort- give these territories and peoples to a third force that defends its interests all over the world, energetically destroying bin Laden and all potential terrorists.

Therefore, Russia should take a clearer position with regard to Western Transcaucasia. After the Russian peacekeepers were taken hostage in March 2002, the State Duma of Russia made a balanced but firm statement. The territorial integrity of Georgia is not denied, but there is no room for a forceful solution to the Abkhazian problem.

The Belgian researcher Bruno Conniters, in his book Western Security Policy and the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, expressed a fairly independent point of view on the events in Western Transcaucasia. He says that "in the end, Georgia may not be able to build its own statehood." Georgia is essentially a state without territory, without Abkhazia, without South Ossetia, with the independence of Adzharia, the hidden bitterness of Mengrelia, the isolation and isolation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani enclaves.

Conniters is also supported by compatriots - Olivier Pay and Eric Remacle, that the UN and the OSCE may change the policy of "double standards" in the future and "not deny statehood to peoples who have been waging a painful war for independence for a long time."

The Georgian people, who have lived in friendship with Russia for centuries, and the current Georgian leadership are two different concepts.

But until we revive our economy, maintain powerful and combat-ready armed forces, we will not be seriously considered either in the Caucasus or in the international arena as a whole.

Notes:

15 developing countries are armed with ballistic missiles, another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 states.

The engineering structure itself, which bore this name and included a high wall of reinforced concrete slabs, was installed in August 1961 and lasted until 1990.

Imre Nagy was a freelance member of the NKVD from 1933.

Dupuis E. and T. The World History wars. St. Petersburg: Polygon, 1993. Vol. IV. S. 749.

Sharia V. Abkhaz tragedy. - Sochi, 1993. S. 6–7.

Sharia V. Abkhaz tragedy. - Sochi, 1993. S. 41.

Myalo K. Russia in the wars of the last decade of the XX century. - M., 2001.

Pavlushenko M. Icarus of Abkhazia / / Technique of youth. No. 11, 1999.

Conniters B. Western Security Policy and the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict. - M., 1999. S. 70.

Pe O., Remacle E. UN and OSCE Policy in Transcaucasia. disputed borders. - M., 1999. S. 123–129.

After the Bolshevization of Georgia in 1921, the Soviet leadership created two legally equal ethno-territorial units on the territory of the future Georgian SSR - Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic which were placed among themselves legally in federative relations. This situation remained for about 10 years, and only in 1931, at the insistence of the Georgian leadership and with the consent of Moscow, was the status of Abkhazia changed in such a way that in legal terms it became an autonomous republic of Georgia.

Tensions in relations between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy were periodically manifested back in the Soviet period. The migration policy pursued as early as under Lavrenty Beria led to the fact that Abkhazians began to make up a small percentage of the population of the region (by the beginning of the 1990s, they were no more than 17% of the total population of Abkhazia).

The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia was formed (1937-1954). ) by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as Georgians settling Greek villages liberated after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. Abkhaz language(until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school program and replaced obligatory study Georgian language. Mass demonstrations and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest - in May and September 1978.

Aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began in 1989 . On this day in the village of Lykhny the 30 thousandth Gathering of the Abkhazian people who made the offer on the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia and restoring it to the status of a union republic. in Sukhumi clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians. Troops were used to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during Zviad Gamsakhurdia's tenure in Tbilisi.

On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the 1978 Constitution of the Georgian SSR and restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1921.

The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet constitution of Georgia as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council restored the operation of the Constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state

August 14 In 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia which developed into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was laid by entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of releasing the vice-premier of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held in the territory of Abkhazia, guarding communications, incl. railroad, and other important facilities.

This move provoked fierce resistance from the Abkhaz, as well as from other ethnic communities in Abkhazia. The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over part of its territory and preserve its integrity. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and, ultimately, gain independence.

September 3, 1992 in Moscow during meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia) was signed document, providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.

By the end of 1992, the war had become positional character where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993, hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, occupied by Georgian troops.

On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.

At the end of September In 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of the Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely leave Abkhazia.

On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, with the mediation of Russia, it was signed Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces. Based on this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of CIS Heads of State in the conflict zone Since June 1994, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the CIS have been deployed whose task is to maintain the regime of non-resumption of fire.

Collective peacekeeping forces, fully staffed by Russian military personnel, control a 30-kilometer security zone in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. About 3,000 peacekeepers are constantly stationed in the conflict zone. The mandate of the Russian peacekeepers is set at six months. After this period, the Council of CIS Heads of State decides to extend their mandate.

April 2, 2002 was signed Georgian-Abkhaz protocol , according to which Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers were entrusted with patrolling the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (territory of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia).

July 25 2006 units of the Georgian armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (up to 1.5 thousand people) were introduced into Kodori Gorge to conduct a special operation against local armed Svan formations (“militia”, or “Monadire” battalion) of Emzar Kvitsiani, who refused to obey the demand of Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili to lay down their arms. Kvitsiani was accused of "treason".

Official negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were then interrupted. As the authorities of Abkhazia emphasized, negotiations between the parties can be resumed only if Georgia begins to implement the UN Security Council Resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of troops from Kodori.

On September 27, 2006, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, by the decree of the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia. In the village of Chkhalta, on the territory of the gorge, the so-called "legitimate government of Abkhazia" in exile is located. Abkhazian military formations controlled by Sukhumi are stationed a few kilometers from this village. The Abkhazian authorities do not recognize the "government in exile" and are categorically against its presence in the Kodori Gorge.

On August 3, 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia announced "the completion of the active phase of the anti-criminal police special operation in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge."

September 26, 2006 President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili announced that this region of Abkhazia, now controlled by the Georgian government, would be called Upper Abkhazia and that from September 27, the government of the Abkhaz autonomy, which previously worked in Tbilisi, will begin to function there. This date was not chosen by chance - September 27, the day of the fall of Sukhumi, is celebrated in Tbilisi as a tragedy, in Sukhumi as a holiday.

After the expulsion of the rebellious field commander Emzar Kvitsiani from the Kodori Gorge in August, the Georgian authorities announced the full restoration of their jurisdiction over the gorge and their intention to place structures of the Abkhazian autonomy there. The reaction of "Lower Abkhazia" to this intention turned out to be painful and harsh. Sukhumi warned Tbilisi that he would do everything to prevent Tbilisi officials from entering the Kodori Gorge.

October 13, 2006 years United Nations Security Council accepted Resolution No. 1716, which contains "an appeal to both parties to refrain from any action that may impede the peace process", and the UN Security Council "expresses its concern over the actions of the Georgian side in the Kodori Gorge in July 2006 in connection with all violations of the Moscow agreement on ceasefire and disengagement of this May 14, 1994, as well as other Georgian-Abkhazian agreements regarding the Kodori Gorge.

On October 18, 2006, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia turned to the Russian leadership with a request recognize the independence of the republic and establish an associated relationship between the two states.

Since the beginning of spring 2008, units of the armed forces of Georgia have carried out a number of tactical exercises, including in areas adjacent to the Security Zone.
April 30 Russia has increased the number of peacekeepers in Abkhazia from two to three thousand people. This is the maximum number of peacekeepers provided for by the Moscow agreement on a ceasefire and disengagement of forces of May 14, 1994.
On April 4, the authorities of Abkhazia reported that the air defense forces of the unrecognized republic shot down two Georgian unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. The Georgian Foreign Ministry called these reports "absurd and disinformation."

May 16, 2008 General Assembly The UN, at the initiative of Georgia, adopted resolution on the return of refugees to Abkhazia . In accordance with the text of the resolution, the General Assembly "emphasizes the urgent need to develop a timetable as soon as possible to ensure the immediate voluntary return of all refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes in Abkhazia (Georgia)".

The vast majority of EU members, as well as Japan, China, and Latin American countries abstained from voting. Among those who abstained are the overwhelming majority of the CIS countries.

On July 18, President of the unrecognized republic Sergey Bagapsh met with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Gali to discuss the plan presented by Germany to resolve the Georgian-Abkhazian problem. The Abkhaz side rejected the plan, arguing that it should include provisions on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the upper part of the Kodori Gorge and the signing of an agreement on the non-resumption of hostilities.

On August 9, President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh told reporters that in the Kodori Gorge, an operation began to oust the Georgian units.

On August 10, martial law was introduced in the regions of Abkhazia bordering on Georgia. At the direction of the president, the mobilization of reservists of the Abkhazian army has been announced. 12th of August Abkhazia launched an operation to oust Georgian troops from the Kodori Gorge. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia stressed that the Russian military is not involved in the hostilities in Kodori. On the same day, the Abkhazian army entered the upper part of the Kodori Gorge and surrounded the Georgian troops.

Seeds of Decay: Wars and Conflicts on the Territory of the Former USSR Zhirokhov Mikhail Aleksandrovich

Georgian-Abkhazian War 1992–1993

The formal reason for the start of active hostilities was the events of July 23, 1992, when at the meeting of the 1st session of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, the Resolution "On the termination of the Constitution of the Abkhaz ASSR of 1978" was adopted. At the same meeting, it was decided to restore the Constitution of the Abkhaz SSR of 1925 until the adoption of the new Constitution, according to which Abkhazia was considered an independent republic and, according to Article 4 of which, "united with Georgia on the basis of an agreement." In fact, the Abkhaz leadership was returning their country to the state of the mid-1920s.

At the same meeting, several fundamentally important issues were resolved - a new name for the state was adopted - "Republic of Abkhazia", ​​and also changed national emblem and a flag. The new flag of "independent Abkhazia" was raised on the same day over the building of the Supreme Council in Sukhumi.

In the mass media, the events of July 23 were unequivocally assessed - the leading Russian television and radio company Ostankino announced in the evening news that the Republic of Abkhazia had declared full independence. There was no person among the population of Abkhazia who would interpret what is happening differently.

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze interrupted his trip to Western Georgia in connection with the events in Abkhazia and urgently returned to Tbilisi, where the State Council, convened on July 25, invalidated the decisions of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia of July 23.

The Abkhaz parliament somewhat softened the wording, but the events of August 11, when the peacekeeping delegation was captured by the "Zviadists" in Western Georgia, mixed all the cards. At midnight on August 11-12, Eduard Shevardnadze spoke on republican television, saying: I believed that evil also has its limits, but I was convinced that it is limitless ... We showed generosity to the whole world, forgave all our enemies, there will be no more forgiveness.

Tbilisi issued an ultimatum to those who kidnapped and harbored the hostages in Abkhazia, demanding their immediate release. The ultimatum expired on August 13, but the hostages were not released. Then the Minister of Defense of Georgia, Tengiz Kitovani, was entrusted with carrying out operations to eliminate criminal groups, protect roads and free hostages. At the same time, the action plan was not a secret for anyone in Georgia and was made public in the media on August 12.

On the night of August 13-14, near the Ingiri station, either “Zviadists” or Russian sappers (the question of the “authorship” of this undoubted provocation is still open) blew up the railway bridge, a threat also arose for the automobile bridge - the last road thread connecting the coast ( Batumi, Poti, Sukhumi) from Tbilisi. It was impossible for the Georgians to delay further, and on the morning of August 14, Georgian armed formations under the command of Tengiz Kitovani guarded the crossings over the Inguri and entered the territory of Abkhazia.

However, in fact, the war began at noon on August 14, when Vladislav Ardzinba addressed the population of the republic (his speech was simultaneously broadcast on radio and television and was repeated every 30 minutes throughout the day), calling on the people of Abkhazia to "patriotic war" with the "enemy" .

On the morning of August 14, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia “On the mobilization of the adult population and the transfer of weapons to the regiment of the Internal Troops of Abkhazia” appeared. According to this document, all men from 18 to 40 years old were called up to the army, and on the basis of the regiment, 5 battalions of 500 people were to be formed in a short time.

In addition, Ardzinba asked for help from external forces. Almost immediately Chechnya, the leaders of the North Caucasian republics and the Cossacks announced their support for Sukhumi. At the same time, the Russian military units deployed in the region (in Sukhumi, Nizhniye Eshery and at the Bombora airfield near Gudauta) at the request of Moscow observed "the strictest neutrality" and were ready to fight back only in the event of "armed provocations" directed against them from anyone there were sides. (Looking ahead, I note that the Russian units in the conflict could not achieve complete neutrality - numerous cases of direct participation of Russian military personnel in battles were noted.)

Initially, success accompanied the Georgian troops. Already by the middle of the first day of the war, they entered Sukhumi, capturing government buildings, a television center, and the most important communications. The government and the Supreme Council of Abkhazia were forced to move to Gudauta.

On August 15, the Georgians landed an amphibious assault in the Gagra region, pushing a small detachment of Abkhazians who were trying to resist into the mountains.

A serious problem for the Abkhaz armed formations was the lack of heavy weapons, which was compensated only at the expense of the enemy. Thus, the first tank was captured by the Abkhaz militia on the very first day of the war, on August 14, 1992. Several more armored vehicles were captured from August 31 to September 2, 1992 during the failed tank breakthrough of Georgian troops towards the city of Gudauta. More than 40 armored vehicles became trophies of the Abkhaz army after the defeat of the Gagra group of Georgians.

However, further events began to develop not according to the Tbilisi scenario. Retreating from Sukhum, the Abkhaz units entrenched themselves on the left bank of the river. Gumista, which actually marked the line of the Western Front. In the rear of the Georgian troops, mainly in the territory of the Ochamchira region, the Eastern Front was formed, which became the focus of the partisan movement.

The most important factor was the volunteer movement in defense of Abkhazia that emerged from the very first days of the conflict and was gaining momentum. Its composition was international - there were Kabardians, Adyghes, Circassians, Chechens, Armenians, Russians.

With each passing day, the conflict more and more took on the character of a real war, which was an unpleasant surprise for the Tbilisi leadership, which, apparently, was counting on a show of force or a blitzkrieg.

In agreement with Tbilisi, Russia came up with a peacekeeping initiative. On September 3, 1992, Boris Yeltsin, Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladislav Ardzinba met in Moscow. Difficult negotiations ended with the signing of the final document, which provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops, the exchange of prisoners of war, the return of refugees, who by that time numbered several tens of thousands of people, and the resumption of the activities of the authorities of Abkhazia throughout the republic. However, not a single point of the agreement was fulfilled, the Georgian troops continued to remain in their previous positions. The fighting resumed.

On October 2–6, the Gagra bridgehead was liquidated. The Georgian troops were defeated, and the Abkhaz units reached the Russian-Abkhaz border on the river. Psou, thereby breaking through the ring of military blockade around Gudauta.

By the end of 1992, the situation with the high-altitude mining town of Tkvarcheli escalated, which, with the outbreak of the conflict, was practically cut off from the rest of Abkhazia. Communication with Gudauta was maintained only through a humanitarian air corridor, but after the Georgian side shot down a helicopter with refugees from the besieged city on December 14, 1992, all communication with the outside world was interrupted.

The residents of Tkvarcheli were saved from hunger and suffering by an unprecedented humanitarian action of the Russian Emergencies Ministry, carried out only in the summer of 1993.

At the same time, hostilities intensified sharply. So, on July 2, on the coast of the Eastern Front, the Abkhazians landed an amphibious assault. On the Western front Having crossed Gumista, the Abkhaz troops one by one liberated the settlements on the right bank north of Sukhum, approaching the near approaches to the city.

The desperate situation in which the Georgian troops found themselves forced Russian government put pressure on the Abkhaz side. On July 27, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Sochi.

However, on September 16, 1993, hostilities resumed. They began on the Eastern Front, where the Abkhaz units attacked the Georgian positions. At the same time, clashes began on the Western Front, where the Abkhaz were able to take control of the heights dominating Sukhum. Continuing the offensive, on September 20 they completely surrounded the city, on the 22nd they captured the airport, on September 27 Sukhum fell, and Eduard Shevardnadze, who was there, fled. On the direct orders of Boris Yeltsin, the President of Georgia was taken out of the besieged Sukhumi with the help of the Black Sea Fleet.

As it was, back in December 1993, the correspondent of Krasnaya Zvezda Vladimir Pasyakin told: “The Chernomorians were tasked with evacuating the head of the Georgian state from Sukhumi. On a landing ship on an air cushion type "Zubr". The duties of the commander on this "flying" ship were performed by the division chief of staff captain 3rd rank Sergey Kremenchuksky, the brigade commander captain 1st rank Viktor Maksimov was the senior on board. However, in the indicated place and at the indicated hour, the Zubr was twice met with literally a flurry of fire. At the same time, Shevardnadze left Sukhumi in a completely different way. Whether there was a leak of information in this case, or whether the Black Sea residents were deliberately set up - time will tell.

Seven years later, on the pages of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (January 25, 2000), the situation was clarified by the commander of the coastal troops and marines of the Black Sea Fleet in 1987–1995. Major General Vladimir Romanenko: “In September 1993, Shevardnadze went to Abkhazia, deciding to get acquainted with the situation on the spot. However, as a result of the active actions of the Abkhaz armed forces, the President of Georgia was blocked at the Sukhum airfield. The situation was critical - the airfield was surrounded on all sides by "shilks", Shevardnadze's guards fought off the offensive of the Abkhazian armed formations with their last strength.

The development of the situation was closely followed in Moscow: by both Supreme Commander-in-Chief Boris Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. The task - to ensure the removal of Shevardnadze from Abkhazia - was set directly by Grachev. The Zubr high-speed landing ship on an air cushion under the command of Captain First Rank Maksimov urgently left Sevastopol. On the ship was a company of marines, led by Colonel Korneev. Managed the operation directly with command post Fleet Commander Eduard Baltin, I was next to him.

At that time, a company of the Airborne Forces was in Sukhumi, but by that time it was running out of ammunition and food, and it could not influence the situation. It was planned that the airborne company would bring Shevardnadze ashore and put him on a ship. Naturally, all Abkhaz anti-aircraft weapons stood around the airfield waiting for the takeoff of the Yak-40 aircraft with Shevardnadze on board.

I must say that the noise of the engines of the landing ship resembles the noise of a jet aircraft. The Zubr approached the shore at night, and the Abkhazians decided that they were being attacked by a powerful Russian air force. All air defense systems were brought ashore.

A continuous line of fire was visible from the ship, and it was impossible to approach the shore. The ship is made of highly flammable alloys and can be punctured by direct fire. The Zubr went back to sea several times. The ship constantly changed the direction of the expected landing, in addition, it was not visible at night, only a powerful roar was heard. The ship fired to kill along the shore with all its means.

The Abkhaz formations, not understanding with whom they were fighting, either tried to repel air strikes, or prevented the landing of an amphibious assault. Taking advantage of the distraction of the forces and means of the Abkhaz air defense, Shevardnadze's pilots raised the Yak-40 and at a very low altitude above the river went to sea, turned around, went towards Poti and sat down near Kutaisi ...

To this day, the Abkhazian military remains puzzled as to how a single ship created such a panic. Although exactly one year after these events, Baltin and I visited Ardzinba in Sukhumi. He received us quite warmly, there was a very serious conversation about the events of a year ago. So Shevardnadze owes his life to the Black Sea Fleet.”

Sukhumi was taken with fighting, and the Abkhazians reached the border of the republic along the Inguri River, and most of the Mingrelians, who were innocently guilty of living in the eastern regions of Abkhazia, fled to Georgia in a panic. On this September 30, 1993, the Georgian-Abkhaz war, which lasted 413 days, ended.

According to unspecified data, 16,000 people died during the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict: 10,000 Georgians and 4,000 Abkhazians. For your information - before the war, 537 thousand people lived in the region.

According to statistics, a total of 3,368 civilians were killed throughout Abkhazia. Among them, 218 people of non-Georgian nationality: 99 Russians, 35 Armenians, 23 Ukrainians, 22 Greeks, 18 Jews, 15 Abkhazians, 4 Azerbaijanis, 1 Estonian and 1 Moldavian. The remaining 3150 are Georgians by nationality.

The conflict brought many surprises for the leadership of official Tbilisi. No one, and, above all, the initiators of the campaign, the Shevardnadze-Kitovani-Ioseliani triumvirate that was operating at that time, did not expect that the campaign would not be limited to 2-3-day skirmishes with the subsequent suppression of Abkhazian separatism, but would end only a year later with defeat and a disorderly flight from Sukhumi.

The defeat became for Georgia almost the highest point of public disappointment, which destroyed the last hopes for the expected state and cultural renaissance of the country. The loss of Abkhazia also debunked another, seemingly unshakable constant of public self-consciousness - the idea of ​​a single, indivisible, unitary Georgia, within which the only possibility of its independent existence was seen.

A big surprise for the Georgians was the support provided to Abkhazia by the North Caucasian peoples. Finally, the very military defeat at the hands of the Abkhazians, who were usually treated as a minority (“you are only 17% in Abkhazia and less than 1.5% in Georgia”), painfully hurt the heightened national self-consciousness of the Georgians.

In order to explain to themselves and the world what had happened, the Georgians used various propaganda tricks to belittle the contribution of the Abkhazians themselves to the victory.

Nevertheless, the war froze on the banks of the river, which the Abkhazians call the Ingur, and the Georgians - the Inguri. Since 1994, 1,500 Russian peacekeepers have been stationed in this zone. After the beginning of the peacekeeping operation of the Russian troops, 60-65 thousand refugees returned to the border Gali region of Abkhazia. There are 100-120 thousand refugees left in Georgia who are still waiting to return to Abkhazia.

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CHAPTER 5 The War of 1787-1791 The Greek project of Catherine the Great has been the favorite hobby of Russophobes and anti-Sovietists for more than 200 years, who, as we learned in 1991, represent the same thing. This project is allegedly proof of the aggressiveness of the Russians and their desire to

Opponents Armed Forces of Abkhazia
Armed Forces of Georgia Commanders Sultan Sosnaliev,
Musa Shanibov,
Shamil Basaev,
Beslan Bargandzhia,
Anri Jergenia Geno Adamia,
Guram Gubelashvili,
Gia Karkarashvili,
Davit Tevzadze,
Soso Akhalaia Military casualties ~4040 killed 4,000 killed, 1,000 missing Total losses about 300,000 refugees (mostly Georgians)

Wars of the post-Soviet space
Nagorno-Karabakh - South Ossetia (1) - Abkhazia- Georgia - North Ossetia - Transnistria - Tajikistan - Chechnya (1) - Chechnya (2) - South Ossetia (2)

Georgian-Abkhaz war (1992-1993)(in Abkhazian sources the term is often used Patriotic war of the people of Abkhazia listen)) - an armed conflict in Abkhazia between the Abkhaz and Georgian armed forces.

Simultaneously with the collapse of the USSR, political conflicts in Georgia moved into the phase of open armed confrontation both between Georgia and the autonomies (Abkhazia, South Ossetia), and within Georgia as such.

Returning to Georgia in March 1992, Shevardnadze headed the interim parliament, the State Council, formed by the leaders of the coup against Gamsakhurdia. The State Council controlled most of the territory of Georgia, with the exception of South Ossetia, Adjara and Abkhazia. At the same time, the civil war continued in Mingrelia, in the homeland of Gamsakhurdia, where forces loyal to him held the city of Zugdidi.

By the summer of 1992, Shevardnadze was indeed able to peacefully resolve the South Ossetian problem by agreeing with Russia on the deployment of peacekeeping forces in this region (see South Ossetian conflict).

The course of the war

Georgian troops enter Abkhazia

It was not possible to establish relations with Abkhazia. The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet constitution of Georgia, carried out by the Parliament of Georgia, as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the Constitution of the SSR of Abkhazia of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized at the international level). The Supreme Council was divided into two parts - Abkhazian and Georgian.

Mass dismissals of Georgians from the power structures of the autonomy began (which the name of the first Abkhaz combat pilot casts doubt on), as well as the creation of the "Abkhaz guard". As a response, Tbilisi decided to send troops into the autonomy. The official reason was the need to protect the railway, which was used as the only route for transporting goods from Russia to Armenia, which was already at war with Azerbaijan.

Apparently, Shevardnadze was not able to control the actions of the armed detachments subordinate to his partners in power, and on August 14, in the midst of the holiday season, detachments of the National Guard of Georgia numbering up to 3,000 people under the command of Tengiz Kitovani, under the pretext of persecuting detachments of supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia entered the territory of Abkhazia. The Abkhazian armed formations resisted, but in a few days the National Guard detachments occupied almost the entire territory of Abkhazia, including Sukhumi and Gagra, since all the armament of the Abkhazian army consisted of small arms, improvised armored cars and old hail cannons.

The government of Abkhazia, headed by the chairman of the Supreme Council Vladislav Ardzinba, moved to the Gudauta region. The entry of Georgian troops led to the mass exodus of the Abkhaz and Russian-speaking population, including to the territory of Russia. Here, the Abkhaz detachments received support with weapons and numerous volunteers, including from the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which declared the readiness of the Adyghes and Chechens, together with their ethnically related Abkhazians, to oppose the Georgians. The detachment of Chechen volunteers was headed by Shamil Basayev. In Abkhazia, Basayev showed himself well during the battles with the Georgian units, was appointed commander of the Gagra Front, commander of the corps of KNK troops, deputy minister of defense of Abkhazia, adviser to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Abkhazia. In the battles in Abkhazia, the Adyghe volunteers, led by General Sosnaliev, played a huge role. He was awarded the title<герой Абхазии>. Sosnaliev took the post of Minister of Defense of Abkhazia, received the rank of General of the Abkhazian army. Sending volunteers to Abkhazia was undertaken by the Congress of the Kabardian people, Adyge Khase of Adygea, Chechen Congress, KNK. KNK President Shanibov was the leader of the volunteers.

The creation, training, arming and dispatch of militia formations to Abkhazia could not go unnoticed by the Russian authorities, but the Russian leadership chose not to interfere.

Deputy Governor Krasnodar Territory Travnikov A.I., in order to stop the flight from Abkhazia to the Krasnodar Territory, and stabilize the situation with refugees, an order was given to close the state and administrative border of Russia with Abkhazia, and volunteers (who had experience in military operations) and Kuban Cossacks (camping ataman KKV A. Prokhod) from Pridnestrovie was provided with a transfer to Abkhazia.

Counter-offensive by Abkhaz forces and allies

According to the then President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, Boris Yeltsin, in a telephone conversation with him, expressed a desire to help resolve the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict by peaceful means. As a result, the National Guard detachments were ordered to stop the offensive. The offensive was stopped after the failed attack of the Georgians on the village of N. Eshera on August 31, 1992. Many in Georgia still consider Shevardnadze's decision a betrayal.

The bus of the Georgian military, destroyed on Mount Mamdzyshkha, near the city of Gagra

By October 1992, having received reinforcements and a large amount of modern weapons from Russia, the Abkhazians switched to offensive operations. The city of Gagra was recaptured, in the battles for which the so-called "Abkhazian battalion" played an important role. Having taken Gagra, the Abkhazians established control over the strategically important territory adjacent to the Russian border, established supply lines with the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus supporting them, and began to prepare for an attack on Sukhumi. During the assault on Gagra (in which, according to the Georgian side, Russian tanks) Abkhazians allegedly received about ten infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers at their disposal. Subsequently, in response to Georgia's accusations that Russia supplied the rebellious autonomy with weapons, the Abkhaz leadership claimed that captured weapons were used in the hostilities.

At the same time, in the conflict zone, on the territory controlled by the Abkhaz and Georgian forces, there were several units of the Russian Armed Forces that had been here since Soviet times (the air base in Gudauta, the military seismic laboratory in Nizhniye Esheri and the Airborne Forces battalion in Sukhumi). Formally, they maintained a neutral status, protecting the property of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and ensuring the safety of humanitarian operations (evacuation of civilians and vacationers, delivery of food to the blockaded city of Tkvarcheli). At the same time, the Georgian side accused Russian servicemen of carrying out reconnaissance operations in the interests of the Abkhazians.

Despite the de facto neutral status of Russian military personnel, Georgian armed groups subjected them to shelling, causing return fire. These provocations often led to civilian casualties. According to the Georgian side, the need to use weapons for self-defense was actually used as a formal justification for the direct participation of the Russian armed forces in the conflict on the side of the Abkhazian separatists.

Meanwhile, the conflict within the top leadership of Georgia led to the fact that in May 1993, Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani were deprived of their positions in the leadership of the armed forces.

The situation on the Abkhaz front from autumn 1992 to summer 1993 remained unchanged, until in July the Abkhaz forces launched another offensive against Sukhumi, the third in a row since the beginning of the year.

By September 30, 1993, the entire territory of the autonomy was already controlled by the Abkhaz and North Caucasian armed formations. About 250,000 ethnic Georgians, in fear of a real and perceived threat from the victors, fled - left their homes and left on their own through mountain passes or were taken to Georgia by sea. Only a small part of them were able to return home after a few years. According to some estimates, up to 10 thousand civilians died at the hands of the militants and during the flight.

The defeat in Abkhazia led to a decline in the morale of the Georgian army. At the same time, armed detachments of supporters of the deposed President Gamsakhurdia, who enjoyed great support in western Georgia, became more active. Part of the Georgian troops went over to his side. Georgia was facing a full-scale civil war.

In the context of the complete collapse of the armed forces, Eduard Shevardnadze announced his consent to join the CIS, in return asking for military assistance from Russia. Russia "recommended" the Abkhazians to stop the offensive, and the Georgian forces were able to concentrate on suppressing the rebellion in Western Georgia.

In September, the Georgian faction of the Abkhazian parliament, along with other refugees, was forced to leave Sukhumi and move to Tbilisi. Thus, at the moment, in addition to the de facto leadership of Abkhazia not recognized by official Tbilisi, the Supreme Council and the government of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic in exile continue to exist (in the summer, after the restoration of control of the Georgian authorities over the Kodori Gorge, these authorities were relocated for political reasons to the villages of the upper part of the gorge - see below).

Since June 23, 1994, the CIS peacekeeping forces have been on the territory of Abkhazia - in fact, these are the same Russian airborne units that were stationed here earlier. A 12-kilometer "safety zone" has been established along the Inguri River. The only region of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia was the Kodori Gorge (until August 2008).

Consequences of the conflict

The armed conflict - years, according to the published data of the parties, claimed the lives of 4 thousand Georgians (another 1 thousand were missing) and 4 thousand Abkhazians. The loss of the economy of the autonomy amounted to 10.7 billion dollars. A huge number of mines remained on the territory of the republic, which claimed the lives of about 700 people. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half of the population) were forced to flee from Abkhazia, of the 50 thousand who repatriated during 1994-97, 30 thousand fled again to Georgia after the events of 1998.

Georgia does not want to fully implement the adaptation program, because, having paid the refugees funds for the purchase of housing, it must remove the refugee status from a person.

The unsettledness of relations between the rebellious autonomy and Georgia, the presence of many thousands of groups of Georgian refugees is a constant source of tension in the Caucasus, a means of pressure on the leadership of Georgia.

For five years after the end of the conflict, Abkhazia existed under a virtual blockade by both Georgia and Russia. Then, however (especially with the coming to power of Vladimir Putin), Russia, contrary to the decision of the CIS summit prohibiting any contacts with separatists, began to gradually restore cross-border economic and transport links with Abkhazia. The Russian authorities maintain that all contacts between Russia and Abkhazia take place on a private, non-state level. The Georgian leadership considers the actions taken by Russia as condoning the separatist regime. Significant support for the separatist regime, according to Georgia and many members international community, is the payment of Russian pensions and benefits to the population, which became possible after the granting of Russian citizenship to a significant part (more than 90%) of the population of Abkhazia as part of the exchange of Soviet passports.

At the beginning of September, the railway traffic interrupted in the city was resumed along the Sukhum-Moscow route. To restore the road to Abkhazia, special equipment was delivered from Rostov-on-Don, including three wagons of sleepers. 105 km of the railway track, more than 10 km of tunnels were restored.