On November 30, 1939, the USSR unleashed military operation against Finland, but this war became a stain of shame for the country. So, what were the grounds for unleashing the Soviet Finnish war.

Negotiations 1937-1939

The root of the Soviet-Finnish conflict was laid back in 1936. Since that time, the Soviet and Finnish sides have been in dialogue about common cooperation and security, but Finland was categorical in its decisions and in every possible way rejected the attempts of the Soviet state to unite for a joint rebuff to the enemy. On October 12, 1939, I.V. Stalin proposed that the Finnish state sign an agreement on mutual assistance. According to its provisions, the USSR made demands for the lease of the Hanko Peninsula and the islands on the territory of Finland, in exchange for part of the land in Karelia, which far exceeded the territory for exchange to the Finnish side. Also, one of the conditions of the USSR was the arrangement of military bases in the zone of Finnish borders. The Finns categorically refused to fulfill these points.

The main reason for the military clashes was the desire of the USSR to move the borders from Leningrad to the Finnish side and further strengthen them. Finland, in turn, refused to follow the request of the USSR, since the so-called "Mannerheim Line" was located on this territory - a defensive line that was erected by Finland back in the 1920s to possibly deter the attack of the USSR. That is, when transferring these lands, Finland would lose all its fortifications for the strategic protection of the borders. The Finnish leadership could not conclude an agreement with such requirements.
In this situation, Stalin decided to start the military occupation of the Finnish territories. On November 28, 1939, the unilateral denunciation (renunciation) of the non-aggression agreements with Finland, concluded back in 1932, was announced.

The goals of the USSR participation in the war

For the Soviet leadership, the main threat was that the Finnish territories could be used as a platform for aggression against the Soviet Union by European states (most likely Germany). It was quite reasonable to move the Finnish borders further from Leningrad. However, Yu. M. Kilin (author of the book "Battles of the Winter War") believes that moving the borders deep into the Finnish side for the most part would not have prevented anything, hostilities were inevitable. In turn, obtaining military bases on the Karelian Isthmus would make the position of the Soviet Union virtually invulnerable, but at the same time it would mean the loss of Finland's independence.

The goals of Finland's participation in the war

The Finnish leadership could not agree to such conditions under which they lost their independence, so their goal was to protect the sovereignty of their state. According to some historians, with the help of the Soviet-Finnish war, Western states sought a confrontation between two harsh totalitarian countries - fascist Germany and the socialist USSR, in order to ease the pressure on France and England with their help.

Mainil incident

The pretext for starting the conflict was the so-called episode near the Finnish settlement of Mainila. On November 26, 1939, Soviet soldiers were fired upon by Finnish artillery pieces. The Finnish leadership completely rejected given fact, in order for the regiments of the USSR to be thrown back several kilometers from the border. The Soviet government could not allow this, and on November 29 the USSR interrupted diplomatic cooperation with Finland. In the late autumn of 1939, the parties to the conflict began large-scale combat maneuvers.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantages were on the side of the USSR, the Soviet army was well equipped with military equipment (land, sea) and human resources. But the "Mannerheim Line" was impregnable for a whole 1.5 months, and only on January 15, Stalin ordered a massive counteroffensive of the army. Although the line of defense was broken through, the Finnish army was not defeated. The Finns managed to maintain their independence.

On March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was adopted in the capital of the USSR, as a result of which a significant piece of land passed to the Soviets, respectively, the western border was moved towards Finland for several kilometers. But was it a victory? Why was a huge country with a large army unable to resist the tiny Finnish army?
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the USSR achieved its original goals, but at what great cost? Numerous casualties, poor combat efficiency of the army, low
the level of training and leadership - all this revealed the weakness and hopelessness of the armed forces, and showed its inability to fight. The shame of defeat in this war significantly undermined the international position of the Soviet Union, especially in front of Germany, which was already following it closely. In addition, on December 14, 1939, the USSR was removed from the League of Nations for the outbreak of war with Finland.

1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, known in Finland as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a large Soviet territory in Karelia, followed by the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that the acceptance of Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state, lead to the loss of neutrality by Finland and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) was only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Mainil incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Allegedly, three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the government of Finland and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was not feasible, because then the Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was presented with a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the troops of the Leningrad Front received an order to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyösti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During the "perestroika" several versions of the Mainilsky incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret NKVD unit. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantage in forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1476 tanks and about 1200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships from the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The grouping of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The rest of the troops covered separate areas from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the "Mannerheim Line" - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of the Mannerheim line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on The Gulf of Finland and to Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

"Mannerheim Line" had a frontal width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip, 2-15 kilometers away from the main one, and the rear (Vyborg) line of defense. Over two thousand long-term firing structures (DOS) and wood-and-earth firing structures (DZOS) were erected, which were combined into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 item). The main line of defense consisted of 25 nodes of resistance, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. The strongholds were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). Between the strongholds and nodes of resistance were positions for field troops. The strongholds and positions of the field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. Only in the security zone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

On November 30, 1939, after a long artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and launched an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, they overcame the zone of operational obstacles in separate directions and reached the main strip of the Mannerheim Line. For more than two weeks, unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. Troops have been replenished. As a result, the Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. The Finnish side by the beginning of February 1940 had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, on February 28, Soviet troops reached the third. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to start a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg grouping of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the "Mannerheim Line" and the defeat of the main grouping of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult position. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government with a request for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the sea area around it were leased by the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France became aggravated, and an anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the West.

Losses Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irretrievable losses of the Finnish troops - about 23 thousand people, sanitary - over 43 thousand people.

(Additional

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940. The reasons for the start, the course and results of the war are still considered very ambiguous. The instigator of the war was the USSR, whose leadership was interested in territorial acquisitions in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Western countries almost did not react to the Soviet-Finnish conflict. France England and the United States tried to adhere to the position of non-intervention in local conflicts so as not to give Hitler a reason for new territorial seizures. Therefore, Finland was left without the support of the Western allies.

Reason and causes of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war was provoked by a whole range of reasons, primarily related to the protection of the border between the two countries, as well as geopolitical differences.

  • During 1918-1922. The Finns attacked the RSFSR twice. To prevent further conflicts in 1922, an agreement was signed on the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border, according to the same document, Finland received Petsamo or the Pecheneg region, the Rybachy Peninsula and part of the Sredny Peninsula. In the 1930s, Finland and the USSR signed a non-aggression pact. At the same time, relations between the states remained tense, the leaderships of both countries were afraid of mutual territorial claims.
  • Stalin regularly received intelligence that Finland had signed secret pacts of support and assistance with the Baltic states and Poland if the Soviet Union attacked one of them.
  • In the late 1930s, Stalin and his associates were also worried about the rise of Adolf Hitler. Despite the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, many in the USSR feared a military clash and considered it necessary to start preparing for war. One of the most strategically important cities in the USSR was Leningrad, but the city was too close to the Soviet-Finnish border. In the event that Finland decided to support Germany (and this is exactly what happened), Leningrad would be in a very vulnerable position. Shortly before the start of the war, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Finland with a request to change part of the Karelian Isthmus to other territories. However, the Finns refused. Firstly, the lands offered in exchange were infertile, and secondly, on the site that interested the USSR, there were important military fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.
  • Also, the Finnish side did not give its consent to the lease by the Soviet Union of several Finnish islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula. The leadership of the USSR planned to place its military bases in these territories.
  • Soon the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland;
  • Germany and the USSR signed a secret non-aggression pact and secret protocols to it, according to which the Finnish territory was to fall into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. To some extent, this agreement untied the hands of the Soviet leadership regarding the regulation of the situation with Finland

The reason for the start of the Winter War was. On November 26, 1939, the village of Mainila, located on the Karelian Isthmus, was fired from Finland. The Soviet border guards, who were in the village at that time, suffered the most from the shelling. Finland denied its involvement in this act and did not want the conflict to develop further. However, the Soviet leadership took advantage of the situation and announced the start of the war.

Until now, there is no evidence confirming the guilt of the Finns in the shelling of Mainila. Although, however, there are no documents indicating the involvement of the Soviet military in the November provocation. The papers provided by both sides cannot be considered as unambiguous evidence of someone's guilt. Back in late November, Finland advocated the creation of a common commission to investigate the incident, but the Soviet Union rejected this proposal.

On November 28, the leadership of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact (1932). Two days later, active hostilities began, which went down in history as the Soviet-Finnish war.

In Finland, the mobilization of those liable for military service was carried out, in the Soviet Union, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were put on full combat readiness. An extensive propaganda campaign was launched against the Finns in the Soviet media. In response, Finland began to carry out an anti-Soviet campaign in the press.

From mid-November 1939, the USSR deployed four armies against Finland, which included: 24 divisions (the total number of military reached 425 thousand), 2.3 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand aircraft.

The Finns had only 14 divisions, in which 270 thousand people served, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft were available.

Course of events

The Winter War can be divided into two phases:

  • November 1939 - January 1940: the Soviet offensive in several directions at once, the fighting was quite fierce;
  • February - March 1940: massive shelling of Finnish territory, attack on the Mannerheim Line, capitulation of Finland and peace negotiations.

On November 30, 1939, Stalin gave the order to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, and already on December 1, Soviet troops captured the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk).

On the occupied territory, the Soviet army established contacts with Otto Kuusinen, who was the head of the Communist Party of Finland and an active member of the Comintern. With the support of Stalin, he proclaimed the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic. Kuusinen became its president and began to negotiate with the Soviet Union on behalf of the Finnish people. Official diplomatic relations were established between the FDR and the USSR.

The 7th Soviet Army moved very quickly towards the Mannerheim Line. The first chain of fortifications was broken in the first decade of 1939. The Soviet soldiers could not advance further. All attempts to break through the following lines of defense ended in losses and defeats. Failures on the line led to the suspension of further advance inland.

Another army - the 8th - was advancing in the north of Lake Ladoga. In just a few days, the troops covered 80 kilometers, but were stopped by a lightning attack by the Finns, as a result, half of the army was destroyed. The success of Finland was due, first of all, to the fact that the Soviet troops were tied to the roads. The Finns, moving in small mobile detachments, easily cut off equipment and people from the necessary communications. The 8th Army retreated, having lost people, but did not leave this region until the very end of the war.

The most unsuccessful campaign of the Red Army during the Winter War is considered to be the attack on Central Karelia. Stalin sent the 9th Army here, which successfully advanced from the first days of the war. The troops were tasked with capturing the city of Oulu. This was supposed to cut Finland in two, demoralize and disorganize the army in the northern regions of the country. Already on December 7, 1939, the soldiers managed to capture the village of Suomussalmi, but the Finns were able to surround the division. The Red Army switched to all-round defense, repulsing the attacks of Finnish skiers. The Finnish detachments carried out their actions suddenly, moreover, the main striking force of the Finns was the almost elusive snipers. The clumsy and insufficiently mobile Soviet troops began to suffer huge human losses, equipment also broke down. The 44th rifle division was sent to help the encircled division, which also fell into the Finnish encirclement. Due to the fact that two divisions were under constant fire, the 163rd Rifle Division began to gradually fight its way back. Almost 30% of the personnel died, more than 90% of the equipment was left to the Finns. The latter almost completely destroyed the 44th division and returned the state border in Central Karelia under their control. In this direction, the actions of the Red Army were paralyzed, and the Finnish army received huge trophies. The victory over the enemy raised the morale of the soldiers, but Stalin repressed the leadership of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the Red Army.

In the area of ​​the Rybachy Peninsula, the 14th Army advanced quite successfully. Within a short time, the soldiers captured the city of Petsamo with its nickel mines and went straight to the border with Norway. Thus, Finland was cut off from access to the Barents Sea.

In January 1940, the Finns encircled the 54th Infantry Division (in the Suomussalmi region, in the south), but did not have the strength and resources to destroy it. Soviet soldiers were surrounded until March 1940. The same fate awaited the 168th Rifle Division, which tried to advance in the Sortavala area. Also, a Soviet tank division fell into the Finnish encirclement near Lemetti-Yuzhny. She managed to get out of the encirclement, losing all the equipment and more than half of the soldiers.

The Karelian Isthmus has become a zone of the most active hostilities. But by the end of December 1939, the fighting stopped here. This was due to the fact that the leadership of the Red Army began to understand the futility of strikes along the Mannerheim line. The Finns tried to use the lull in the war to the maximum advantage and go on the attack. But all operations ended unsuccessfully with huge human casualties.

By the end of the first stage of the war, in January 1940, the Red Army was in difficult situation. She fought in an unfamiliar, practically unexplored territory, it was dangerous to move forward due to numerous ambushes. In addition, the weather complicated the planning of operations. The position of the Finns was also unenviable. They had problems with the number of soldiers and lacked equipment, but the population of the country had tremendous experience in guerrilla warfare. Such tactics made it possible to attack with small forces, inflicting significant losses on large Soviet detachments.

Second period of the Winter War

Already on February 1, 1940, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Red Army began a massive shelling that lasted 10 days. The purpose of this action was to damage the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line and the troops of Finland, to exhaust the soldiers, to morally break their spirit. The actions taken achieved their goals, and on February 11, 1940, the Red Army launched an offensive inland.

Very fierce battles began on the Karelian Isthmus. At first, the Red Army planned to strike the main blow at the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. But the army of the USSR began to get stuck on foreign territory, incurring losses. As a result, the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhda. In the area of ​​​​this settlement, the Finnish defenses were broken through, which allowed the Red Army to pass the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns began to withdraw troops.

By the end of February 1940, the Soviet army also crossed the second line of defense of Mannerheim, breaking through it in several places. By the beginning of March, the Finns began to retreat, because they were in a difficult position. The reserves were depleted, the morale of the soldiers was broken. A different situation was observed in the Red Army, the main advantage of which was the huge stocks of equipment, materiel, replenished personnel. In March 1940, the 7th Army approached Vyborg, where the Finns put up stiff resistance.

On March 13, hostilities were stopped, which was initiated by the Finnish side. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

  • Vyborg was one of the largest cities in the country, its loss could have a negative impact on the morale of citizens and the economy;
  • After the capture of Vyborg, the Red Army could easily reach Helsinki, which threatened Finland with a complete loss of independence and independence.

Peace negotiations began on March 7, 1940 and took place in Moscow. As a result of the discussion, the parties decided to stop hostilities. The Soviet Union received all the territories on the Karelian Isthmus and the cities: Salla, Sortavala and Vyborg, located in Lapland. Stalin also achieved that he was given the Hanko peninsula for a long lease.

  • The Red Army lost about 88 thousand people who died from wounds and frostbite. Almost 40 thousand more people were missing, 160 thousand were injured. Finland lost 26 thousand people dead, 40 thousand Finns were injured;
  • The Soviet Union achieved one of its key foreign policy objectives - it ensured the security of Leningrad;
  • The USSR strengthened its positions on the Baltic coast, which was achieved by acquiring Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, where Soviet military bases were moved;
  • The Red Army gained vast experience in conducting military operations in difficult weather and tactical conditions, having learned to break through fortified lines;
  • In 1941, Finland supported Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR and allowed German troops through its territory, who managed to establish a blockade of Leningrad;
  • The destruction of the Mannerheim Line became fatal for the USSR, as Germany was able to quickly capture Finland and pass into the territory of the Soviet Union;
  • The war showed Germany that the Red Army in difficult weather conditions is unfit for combat. The same opinion was formed by the leaders of other countries;
  • Finland, under the terms of the peace agreement, was to build a railway track, with the help of which it was planned to connect the Kola Peninsula and the Gulf of Bothnia. The road was supposed to pass through the settlement of Alakurtia and connect with Tornio. But this part of the agreement was never carried out;
  • On October 11, 1940, another treaty was signed between the USSR and Finland, which concerned the Åland Islands. The Soviet Union received the right to place a consulate here, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone;
  • The international organization League of Nations, created following the results of the First World War, excluded the Soviet Union from its membership. This was due to the fact that international community reacted negatively to the Soviet intervention in Finland. The reasons for the exclusion were also constant aerial bombardments of Finnish civilian targets. Incendiary bombs were often used during the raids;

Thus, the Winter War became an occasion for Germany and Finland to gradually draw closer and interact. The Soviet Union tried to resist such cooperation, restraining the growing influence of Germany and trying to establish a loyal regime in Finland. All this led to the fact that with the outbreak of World War II, the Finns joined the Axis countries in order to free themselves from the USSR and return the lost territories.

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Manpower

By the end of November 1939, Finland had concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.

The land army interacted with and was supported by the Finnish navy and coastal defense forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were connected to the army's payroll of 337 thousand people as a military force:

The paramilitary formations of the Shutskor and "Lotta Svärd" - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of human forces involved in the war from Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

The 150,000-strong Anglo-French Expeditionary Force to help Finland was also preparing and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - the beginning of March 1940, the arrival of which only thwarted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed, possessed everything necessary. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 warships of the Navy.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent her weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million rounds of ammunition.

90% of the financial aid came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavia.

B. Fortifications

basis military power Finland was made up of unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its prefloor, main and rear lanes and defense units.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bedding) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, channels) of Finland, combined with high-tech engineering structures to create a defense line capable of giving multi-layered fire on the advancing enemy (at different levels and at different angles), along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, blockages, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and floors of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. A forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three lanes of the "Mannerheim Line" there were over 1,000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

The space between the fortifications, as well as the foreground in front of the entire "Mannerheim Line" were literally covered with solid military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for each square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire barriers, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete gouges. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, all roads for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were arranged - funnels 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 mines were set for each linear kilometer. Forest blockages reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish War Plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the approach of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega line lake

E. Directions of hostilities and the command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north of it, to the north west coast Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Kyakisalmi) - Sortavala - Laimola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later he was replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the active army of Finland.

Chief of Staff of the Headquarters - Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is General of the Swedish Army Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In the fighting on the entire 1500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, at the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

Headcount ground forces: 916 thousand people. They include: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal and engineering troops.

The ground forces were supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million people of the Red Army personnel took part in the Soviet-Finnish war and Navy, and taking into account the necessary replenishment during the war to replace the dead and wounded - over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyer destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three boats of the "D" type, seven boats of the "Shch" type, six boats of the "M" type). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) North and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

Commander of the 7th Army - Commander of the 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in terms of the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and the defense in depth of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not enough not only to break through them, but even to destroy the deep and extremely difficult fortified and, as a rule, completely mined forefield during the fighting.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they did not manage to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally intended, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor hindering the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely severe winter of 1939/40, with its frosts down to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in waging war in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army.

The course of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. fighting until the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. combat operations to break through the "Mannerheim Line" itself.

In the first period, the most successful was the advance in the north and in Karelia.

1. The troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

2. Troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses in North and Central Karelia, i.e. slightly, but still went beyond the state border. Further progress could not be ensured due to complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and total absence settlements in this part of Finland.

3. The troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia went deep into the enemy’s territory up to 80 km, but were also forced to suspend the offensive, since some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well acquainted with the area.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of hostilities:

5. Waging heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the "Mannerheim Line", which happened in different sectors of the offensive from 2 to 12 December. During the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terioki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet took possession of the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, Soomeri.

In early December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and exit to the rear of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications.

Despite the crossing of the river and heavy losses in the battles on December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the "Mannerheim Line" on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army had reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to the huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended on virtually the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided on a radical restructuring of military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy's defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the "Mannerheim Line", which consisted of a group of commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of command and control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from the control of the Leningrad Military District and passed directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the High Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (date of formation: January 7, 1940).

Front commander: commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko.

Chief of Staff of the Front: Commander of the 2nd rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov (since December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Commander V.D. Grendal (since March 2, 1940 - commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev (since February 12, 1940).

8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and reinforced:

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 RGK artillery regiments, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate battalions heavy tanks, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 RGK artillery regiments, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period was the active preparation by the troops of the theater of operations for the assault on the "Mannerheim Line", as well as the preparation by the command of the troops better conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the foreground, covertly clear mines for the foreground, make numerous passes in the rubble and wire fences before attacking directly the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line itself. Within a month, the system of the "Mannerheim Line" itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began by methodical daily artillery fire.

Only on the 43-kilometer sector, the 7th Army daily fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy.

The destruction of the front line and the depth of the enemy's defense was also caused by aviation. During the preparation for the assault, the bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and the fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (Budyonnovka, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflaps, sheepskin coats, felt boots. The front received 2,500 mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, the troops worked out new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for undermining pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft.

11. The front troops were tasked with breaking through the "Mannerheim Line", defeating the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reaching the Kexholm - Antrea - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began with a powerful two-hour artillery preparation at 8.00, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy defenses by the end of the day in a decisive sector and by February 14 wedged into the depth of the line by 7 km, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions 123 sd. (lieutenant colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire "Mannerheim Line". To develop success in the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command pulled up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important knot of fortifications. But as a result of 3-day battles and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karhulsky knot of resistance, while the neighboring Khottinensky knot had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanjärvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army also went on the offensive, the tanks of which approached the Muola-Ilves junction.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, inner line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that one more such breakthrough - and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant-General H.V. Esterman was suspended. On February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. was appointed to his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the enemy's rear, inner defense line, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command expected that, stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and, in the conditions of the coming spring, had unique system flooding the foredfield for 30 km, Finland will be able to drag out the war for at least a month and a half, which will enable England and France to deliver a 150,000-strong expeditionary force to Finland. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. Troop Commander Vyborgsky district was appointed Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieutenant General K.L. Ash, which testified to the confidence of the Finnish command in their forces and the seriousness of their intentions to hold back a long siege of the fortified city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army advanced on Kexholm and st. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The offensive of the Soviet troops began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, the Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a northeasterly direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 23:00, and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At that time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, all hoping that Western assistance would be in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government, which had entered into negotiations, would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position made it necessary to wage war until the last minute and led to huge losses, both on the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Side losses*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter
What was in the fortieth year
Killed in Finland on the ice.

Lying somehow clumsily
Childishly small body.
Frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew off.
It seemed that the boy was not lying,
And still running
Yes, the ice held the floor ...

In the midst of a great war cruel,
From what - I will not apply my mind -
I feel sorry for that distant fate,
As if dead, alone
Like I'm lying
Frozen, small, dead,
In that war, not famous,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of those killed - 65,384 people.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss in the troops during the period of hostilities - 391.8 thousand people. or, rounded, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish "Blue and White Book" of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war is 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.е. 20%, while Soviet losses are 40% of those involved in operations, or, in other words, 2 times higher in percentage terms.

Note:

* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and in journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and general trend of these publications, there was an increasing number of Soviet losses from 1990 to 1995 and a decrease in Finnish ones. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryaga, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Apothecary in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while the data of the Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

Baryshnikov V. N. From the Cool Peace to the Winter War: Finland's Eastern Policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state un-t. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg State University, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.

Winter war 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ros. acad. Sciences, Inst. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Resp. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehvilyainen. - 381s.

["Winter War" 1939-1940]: A selection of materials //Rodina. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons forgotten war/ V. Prokhorov// New time. - 2005. - N 10.- S. 29-31

Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: by doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541s. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Names. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [per. from English. V. D. Kaidalova]. - M. : Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa : talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla:, 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: S. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Used materials from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Used materials from the book: Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

The Soviet-Finnish war for a long time remained a "closed" topic, a kind of "blank spot" (of course, not the only one) in Soviet historical science. For a long time the course and causes of the Finnish war were hushed up. There was one official version: the policy of the Finnish government was hostile to the USSR. The documents of the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (TsGASA) remained unknown to the general public for a long time.

This was partly due to the fact that the Great Patriotic War ousted the Soviet-Finnish from the minds and studies, but at the same time, they tried not to resurrect it on purpose.

The Soviet-Finnish war is one of the many tragic and shameful pages in our history. Soldiers and officers "gnawed through" the Mannerheim line, freezing in summer uniforms, having neither proper weapons nor experience of war in the harsh winter conditions of the Karelian Isthmus and the Kola Peninsula. And all this was side by side with the arrogance of the leadership, confident that the enemy would ask for peace in 10-12 days (that is, they hoped for Blitzkrieg *).

Random photos of nature

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It did not add to the USSR any international prestige or military glory, but this war could teach the Soviet government a lot if it had the habit of learning from its own mistakes. The same mistakes that were made in the preparation and conduct Soviet-Finnish war, and which led to unjustified losses, then, with some exceptions, were repeated in the Great Patriotic War.


There are practically no complete and detailed monographs on the Soviet-Finnish war containing the most reliable and up-to-date information about it, with the exception of a few works by Finnish and other foreign historians. Although they, in my opinion, can hardly contain complete and up-to-date information, since they give a rather one-sided view, as well as Soviet historians.

Most of the hostilities took place on the Karelian Isthmus, in the immediate vicinity of St. Petersburg (then Leningrad).


When visiting the Karelian Isthmus, you constantly come across the foundations of Finnish houses, wells, small cemeteries, then the remains of the Mannerheim line, with barbed wire, dugouts, caponiers (how we loved to play “war games” in them!), Then at the bottom of a half-overgrown funnel you will stumble upon bones and a broken helmet (although this may be the consequences of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War), and closer to the Finnish border, entire houses and even farms have been preserved that they did not have time to take away or burn.

The war between the USSR and Finland, which lasted from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940 (104 days), received several different names: in Soviet publications it was called the "Soviet-Finnish War", in Western publications - "Winter War", among the people - "Finnish War", in publications of the last 5-7 years it also received the name "Unfamous".


Reasons for the start of the war, preparation of the parties for hostilities

According to the "Non-Aggression Pact" between the USSR and Germany, Finland was assigned to the sphere of interests of the USSR.


The Finnish nation is a national minority. By 1939, the population of Finland was 3.5 million people (that is, it was equal to the population of Leningrad at the same time). As you know, small nations are very concerned about their survival and preservation as a nation. "The little people can disappear, and he knows it."


Perhaps this can explain its secession from Soviet Russia in 1918, the constant desire, even somewhat painful, from the point of view of the dominant nation, to protect its independence, the desire to be a neutral country during the Second World War.


In 1940, in one of his speeches, V.M. Molotov said: "We must be realistic enough to understand that the time of small peoples has passed." These words became a verdict in the fate of the Baltic states. Although they were said in 1940, they can be fully attributed to the factors that determined the policy of the Soviet government in the war with Finland.



Negotiations between the USSR and Finland in 1937 - 1939.

Since 1937, on the initiative of the USSR, negotiations have been held between the Soviet Union and Finland on the issue of mutual security. This proposal was rejected by the Finnish government, then the USSR offered Finland to move the border a few tens of kilometers north of Leningrad and lease the Hanko peninsula for a long time. Instead of Finland, a territory in the Karelian SSR was offered, several times larger than the exchange one, but such an exchange would not be beneficial for Finland, since the Karelian Isthmus was a well-developed territory, with the warmest climate in Finland, and the proposed territory in Karelia was almost wild , with a much harsher climate.


The Finnish government was well aware that if it was not possible to agree with the USSR, war was inevitable, but it hoped for the strength of its fortifications and for the support of Western countries.


October 12, 1939, when the second World War, Stalin suggested that Finland conclude a Soviet-Finnish mutual assistance pact, modeled on the pacts concluded with the Baltic states. Under this pact, a limited contingent of Soviet troops was to be stationed in Finland, and Finland was also invited to make an exchange of territories, as discussed earlier, but the Finnish delegation refused to conclude such a pact and left the negotiations. From that moment on, the parties began to prepare for hostilities.


Reasons and goals for the participation of the USSR in the Soviet-Finnish war:

For the USSR, the main danger was that Finland could be used by other states (most likely Germany) as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. common border Finland and the USSR - 1400 km., Which at that time was 1/3 of the entire northwestern border of the USSR. It is quite logical that in order to ensure the security of Leningrad, it was necessary to move the border further from it.


But, according to Yu.M. Kilin, author of an article in No. 3 of the International Affairs magazine for 1994, while moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus (according to negotiations in Moscow in 1939) would not solve the problems, and the USSR would not have won anything, therefore the war was inevitable.


I would still like to disagree with him, since any conflict, be it between people or countries, arises from the unwillingness or inability of the parties to agree peacefully. In this case, this war was, of course, beneficial for the USSR, as it was an occasion to demonstrate its power, to assert itself, but in the end everything turned out the other way around. The USSR in the eyes of the whole world not only did not begin to look stronger and more invulnerable, but on the contrary, everyone saw that it was a "colossus with feet of clay", unable to cope even with such a small Army as the Finnish one.


For the USSR, the Soviet-Finnish War was one of the stages of preparation for a world war, and its expected outcome, in the opinion of the military-political leadership of the country, would significantly improve the strategic position of the USSR in Northern Europe, and would also increase the military-economic potential of the state, correcting disproportions National economy that arose as a result of the implementation of a largely chaotic and ill-conceived industrialization and collectivization.


From a military point of view, the acquisition of military bases in the South of Finland and 74 airfields and landing sites in Finland would make the positions of the USSR in the North-West practically invulnerable, it would be possible to save money and resources, and time would be gained in preparing for big war, but at the same time it would mean the destruction of the independence of Finland.


But what does M.I. think about the reasons for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war? Semiryaga: "In the 20-30s, many incidents of a different nature took place on the Soviet-Finnish border, but usually they were resolved through diplomacy. Collisions of group interests on the basis of the division of spheres of influence in Europe and on Far East By the end of the 1930s, they created a real threat of a conflict on a global scale, and on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.


At that time, the main factor that predetermined the Soviet-Finnish conflict was the nature of the political situation in Northern Europe. For two decades after Finland, as a result of October revolution gained independence, its relations with the USSR developed in a complex and contradictory way. Although between the RSFSR and Finland on October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was concluded, and in 1932 the “Non-Aggression Pact”, which was later extended to 10 years.



Reasons and goals for Finland's participation in the Soviet-Finnish War:

"During the first 20 years of independence, it was believed that the USSR was the main, if not the only threat to Finland" (R. Heiskanen - Major General of Finland). "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland; the Finnish people ... are forever a friend of Germany." (First President of Finland - P. Svinhufvud)


In the Military Historical Journal No. 1-3 for 1990, an assumption appears about such a reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish War: "It is difficult to agree with the attempt to lay all the blame for the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War on the USSR. In Russia and Finland, they understood that the main culprit of the tragedy it was not our peoples and not even our governments (with some reservations), but German fascism, as well as the political circles of the West, who benefited from the German attack on the USSR.The territory of Finland was considered by Germany as a convenient springboard for an attack on the USSR from the North. historian L. Woodward, Western countries intended, with the help of the Soviet-Finnish military conflict, to push Nazi Germany to war against the USSR." (It seems to me that Western countries it would be very beneficial for the two to collide totalitarian regimes, since it would undoubtedly weaken both the USSR and Germany, which were then considered sources of aggression in Europe. The Second World War was already underway and a military conflict between the USSR and Germany could lead to the dispersal of the Reich's forces on two fronts and the weakening of its military operations against France and Great Britain.)


Preparing the parties for war

In the USSR, supporters of a forceful approach to solving the Finnish question were: People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army Mekhlis, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov and People's Commissar of the NKVD Beria. They opposed negotiations and any preparations for war. This self-confidence was given to them by the quantitative superiority of the Red Army over the Finnish (mainly in the amount of equipment), as well as the ease of introducing troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus in September 1939.


"The hat-throwing moods led to the fact that serious miscalculations were made in assessing the combat readiness of Finland."


On November 10, 1939, Voroshilov was presented with the estimated data of the General Staff: "The material part of the armed forces of the Finnish Army is mainly pre-war models of the old Russian Army, partially modernized at military factories in Finland. The rise of patriotic sentiment is observed only among young ages."


The initial plan of military operations was drawn up by Marshal of the USSR B. Shaposhnikov. According to this plan (highly professionally drawn up), the main military operations were to be carried out in the coastal direction of Southern Finland. But this plan was designed for a long period and required preparation for war within 2-3 years. The implementation of the "Agreement on Spheres of Influence" with Germany was required immediately.


Therefore, at the last moment before the start of hostilities, this plan was replaced by a hastily drawn up "Meretskov plan", designed for a weak enemy. Military operations according to this plan were carried out in heavy natural conditions Karelia and the Arctic. The main stake was placed on a powerful initial blow and the defeat of the Finnish Army in 2-3 weeks, but the operational concentration and deployment of equipment and troops was poorly provided with intelligence. The commanders of the formations did not even have detailed maps areas of hostilities, while Finnish intelligence determined with high accuracy the main directions of the Red Army's strikes.


By the beginning of the war, the Leningrad Military District was very weak, as it was considered as secondary. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of August 15, 1935 "On the development and strengthening of areas adjacent to the borders" did not improve the situation. The condition of the roads was especially deplorable.


In the course of preparations for the war, the Military-Economic Description of the Leningrad Military District was compiled - a document unique in its informativeness, containing comprehensive information on the state of the economy of the North-West region.


On December 17, 1938, when summing up the results at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, it turned out that there were no stone-paved roads, military airfields on the proposed territory of hostilities, the level of agriculture was extremely low (Leningrad region, and even more so Karelia - areas of risky farming, and collectivization almost destroyed what had been created by the labor of previous generations).


According to Yu.M. Killina, blitzkrieg - lightning war - was the only possible one in those conditions, and at a strictly defined time - the end of autumn - the beginning of winter, when the roads were the most passable.


By the forties, Karelia became the "patrimony of the NKVD" (almost a quarter of the population of the KASSR by the 39th year were prisoners, on the territory of Karelia were the Belomorkanal and Soroklag, which contained more than 150 thousand people), which could not but affect its economic condition.


The logistical preparation for the war was at a very low level, since it is almost impossible to catch up in a year for what was lost in 20 years, especially since the command flattered itself with hopes of an easy victory.

Despite the fact that preparations for the Finnish war were carried out quite actively in 1939, the expected results were not achieved, and there are several reasons for this:


Preparations for the war were carried out by different departments (Army, NKVD, people's commissariats), and this caused disunity and inconsistency in actions. The decisive role in the failure of the logistical preparations for the war with Finland was played by the factor of the low controllability of the Soviet state. There was no single center involved in preparing for the war at all.


The construction of roads was carried out by the NKVD, and by the beginning of hostilities the strategically important road Svir - Olonets - Kondushi had not been completed, and railway"Murmansk - Leningrad" the second track was not carried out, which significantly reduced it throughput. (The construction of the second track has not been completed yet!)


The Finnish war, which lasted 104 days, was very fierce. Neither the People's Commissar of Defense nor the command of the Leningrad Military District at first imagined the peculiarities and difficulties associated with the war, since there was no well-organized intelligence service. The military department approached the preparation of the Finnish war not seriously enough:


Rifle troops, artillery, aviation and tanks were clearly not enough to break through the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus and defeat the Finnish Army. Due to the lack of knowledge about the theater of operations, the command considered possible application heavy divisions and tank troops in all areas of combat operations. This war was fought in the winter, but the troops were not sufficiently equipped, equipped, supplied and trained to conduct combat operations in winter conditions. The armament of the personnel was mainly heavy weapons and there were almost no light pistols - machine guns and company 50-millimeter mortars, while the Finnish troops were equipped with them.


The construction of defensive structures in Finland began already in the early 1930s. Many countries Western Europe they helped in the construction of these fortifications: this is how Germany participated in the construction of a network of airfields capable of accommodating 10 times more aircraft than was in the Finnish Air Force; the Mannerheim line, the total depth of which reached 90 kilometers, was built with the participation of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium.


The troops of the Red Army were highly motorized, and the Finns had tactical and rifle training at a high level. They blocked the roads, which were the only way for the Red Army to advance (it’s not particularly convenient to attack in a tank through forests and swamps, and what are the boulders on the Karelian Isthmus 4-5 meters in diameter!), And attacked our troops from the rear and flanks. For action in off-road conditions in the Finnish Army, there were ski troops. They carried all the weapons with them on sleds and skis.


November 1939 troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border with Finland. The initial advance was quite successful, but the Finns launched a highly organized sabotage and partisan activity in the immediate rear of the Red Army. The supply of the troops of the LVO was disrupted, the tanks got stuck in the snow and in front of obstacles, "plugs" from military equipment were a convenient target for shooting from the air.


The whole country (Finland) has been turned into a continuous military camp, but military measures continue to be taken: mining is being carried out on the waters off the coasts of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia, the population is being evacuated from Helsinki, armed groups are marching in the Finnish capital in the evenings, blackouts are being carried out. The militant mood is constantly warmed up. There is a clear decline. This can be seen at least from the fact that the evacuated residents return to the cities without waiting for the "air bombardment".


Mobilization costs Finland colossal funds (from 30 to 60 million Finnish marks per day), workers are not paid wages everywhere, the discontent of the working people is growing, the decline of the export industry and the increased demand for products of defense industry enterprises are noticeable.


The Finnish government does not want to negotiate with the USSR; anti-Soviet articles are constantly published in the press, blaming the Soviet Union for everything. The government is afraid to announce the demands of the USSR at a meeting of the Sejm without special preparation. From some sources it became known that in the Sejm, most likely, there is opposition to the government ... "


Beginning of hostilities: Incident near the village of Mainila, November 1939, Pravda newspaper

According to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, on November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops, located one kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly shot from Finnish territory by artillery fire. Seven cannon shots were fired, which resulted in the death of three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander and the wounding of seven Red Army soldiers and one junior commander.


To investigate the incident, the head of the 1st department of the district headquarters, Colonel Tikhomirov, was summoned on the spot. The provocation caused a wave of indignation in the units located in the area of ​​​​the Finnish artillery raid.



Exchange of notes between the Soviet and Finnish governments

Note of the Soviet government regarding the provocative shelling of the Soviet troops by the Finnish military units


On November 26, in the evening, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov received the envoy of Finland A.S. Irie-Koskinen and handed him a note from the USSR government regarding the provocative shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish military units. Accepting the note, the Finnish envoy announced that he would immediately communicate with his government and give an answer.


"Mr Messenger!

On November 26, 1939, at 15:45 Moscow time, our troops, located one kilometer northwest of the village of Mainila, were unexpectedly fired upon from Finnish territory by artillery fire. Seven cannon shots were fired, which caused casualties among Soviet soldiers.


The Soviet government, informing you of this, considers it necessary to emphasize that during the negotiations with Mr. Tanner and Paaskivi, it pointed to the danger posed by concentration. a large number regular Finnish troops near the border in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad.


Now, in connection with the fact of the provocative artillery shelling of Soviet troops from the territory of Finland, the Soviet government is forced to state that the concentration of Finnish troops near Leningrad not only poses a threat to the city, but also represents a hostile act towards the USSR, which has already led to an attack on Soviet troops and victims.


The Soviet government does not intend to fan this outrageous act of attack by parts of the Finnish Army, perhaps poorly controlled by the Finnish command. But it would like to see such outrageous acts no longer take place.


In view of this, the Soviet government expresses a strong protest against what happened and offers the Finnish government to immediately withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus by 20-25 kilometers and prevent the possibility of a repeat of the provocation.


People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov.



“In connection with the alleged violation of the Finnish border, the Finnish government conducted an investigation, which established that the shots were fired not from the Finnish side, but from the Soviet side, near the village of Mainila, located at a distance of 800 meters from the Finnish border.


Based on the calculation of the speed of sound propagation from seven shots, it could be concluded that the guns from which the shots were fired are located at a distance of 1.5-2 kilometers to the South-East from the place of their rupture ... Under such circumstances, it seems possible that this is an unfortunate a case that occurred during training exercises that took place on the Soviet side and entailed human casualties. As a result, I consider it my duty to reject the protest expressed in your letter and state that the hostile act against the USSR of which you speak was not carried out by the Finnish side.


Regarding the statements made to Tanner and Paaskivi during their stay in Moscow, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in the immediate vicinity of the border on the Finnish side, mainly border troops were stationed. There were no guns of such range that their shells would fall on the other side of the border in this zone at all.


Although there are no specific motives for withdrawing troops from the border line, my government is nevertheless ready to start negotiations on this issue (mutual withdrawal of troops).


In order to leave no ambiguity about the alleged incident, my government proposes that a joint investigation be carried out in accordance with the "Convention of Frontier Commissioners" of September 24, 1928 ... "


A.S. Irie-Koskinen


"The response of the Government of Finland to the note of the Soviet Government of November 26, 1939 is a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Government of Finland towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in relations between the two countries to an extreme, namely:


Denial of the fact of shelling and an attempt to explain the incident by "training exercises" of the Soviet troops.


The refusal of the Finnish government to withdraw troops and the demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and Finnish troops, while this would mean the withdrawal of Soviet troops directly to the outskirts of Leningrad.


This is a violation of the terms of the “Non-Aggression Pact” concluded by the USSR and Finland in 1932.


In view of this, the Soviet government considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the "Non-Aggression Pact" concluded by the USSR and Finland and systematically violated by the Finnish government.