In the Chinese cities of Qingdao and Rushan, old Soviet projects 7 have been preserved - known to naval historians as the legendary Soviet "sevens", which are now used as museum ships.

Destroyers of this type immortalized themselves thanks to their participation in the Great Patriotic War. In 1955, four of these ships from the Pacific Fleet of the USSR were transferred to friendly China. One was later scrapped, and the last - the fourth - the ship was transferred to the city of Dalian as a training ship for the Naval Institute.

On January 14, 1955, the Chinese Navy received the first two Soviet destroyers of Project 7. They were renamed in honor of the Manchu cities. Destroyers Zealous" and " Decisive"Received new names:" Jilin" and " Changchun". The next two ships - " Record"And" Sharp "were transferred to China on July 6, 1955 and renamed to" Anshan" and " Fushun" respectively. All destroyers of this type were carefully preserved by Chinese sailors and survived safely until the end of the 1980s. But soon destroyer « Fushun”Was scrapped and disassembled at a shipyard in Zeng Su province.

All "Far Eastern" destroyers of Project 7 in August 1945 were part of the 1st destroyer battalion of the light forces detachment and took part in the hostilities against Japan on Pacific... In the early 50s passed overhaul and modernization with the installation of new radar stations and a three-legged foremast. The destroyers underwent another modernization in China in the period from 1971 to 1974. During the conversion, torpedo tubes were dismantled on the ships, and in their place were placed two paired launchers for the Hayin-22 anti-ship missiles, which are analogous to the Soviet P-15 anti-ship missiles. Obsolete anti-aircraft guns were replaced by four paired artillery mounts B-11 caliber 37 mm.

Of the three Project 7 destroyers that remain, the best preserved. destroyer « Zealous", Which was withdrawn from the fleet in 1986 and since September 19, 1991 under the name" Taiyuan"(Tail number 104) was installed in Dalian as a museum ship on the territory of the local naval institute.

Destroyer « Record"After being expelled from the fleet in 1986, it was relocated to Qingdao and since April 24, 1992 it has been an exposition of the local naval museum.

Destroyer « Decisive"Was purchased by the city of Rushan, Shandong province in August 1990 for use as it, but, unfortunately, no work has been carried out on the Changchun ship so far, so the legendary destroyer is gradually aging, turning into a pile of iron.

photos of Project 7 destroyers

destroyers of project 7 on the march

the destroyer "Anshan" in a military campaign



the destroyer "Taiyuan" as a museum ship


130 mm gun of the destroyer "Taiyuan"

The Sevens - Project 7 destroyers - rightfully occupy a prominent place in our naval history. And it is not surprising - after all, these are active participants in the Great Patriotic War, the most massive Soviet surface ships built in the 30s, from which several generations of destroyers, large rocket ships and even cruisers. One destroyer of this type became a Guards destroyer, four - Red Banner.

At the same time, a lot of contradictory things have been said and written about them. This is especially true of their military operations during the war years - here real, often tragic events were replaced by legends for a long time. But this is in literature intended for the general reader. And for professionals, under the heading "secret", other materials were prepared containing an impartial analysis of military operations, their results, tactics, combat damage to ships. Access to such information has appeared quite recently, and therefore, many of the facts and conclusions presented in this issue may seem unexpected to the reader. We hope that they will clearly show both the advantages and disadvantages of the "sevens" - these are certainly interesting and beautiful ships of our fleet.

The decree "On the program of naval shipbuilding for 1933-1938", adopted on July 11, 1933 by the Labor and Defense Council, provided for the construction of 1,493 combat and auxiliary ships, including 8 cruisers and 50 destroyers. Its implementation caused a lot of problems in all industries. National economy, but in those years it was not customary to reckon with the price. “We are building and will build a large naval fleet” - this almost poetic appeal from the newspaper Pravda on December 9, 1936 could become an epigraph to a story about the pre-war Soviet shipbuilding.

The development of the project for a new destroyer was entrusted to the Central Design Bureau of Special Shipbuilding TsKBS-1 back in 1932, V.A. Nikitin was appointed as the chief project manager, and P.O. Trakhtenberg was appointed as the responsible executor. By that time, the team already had some experience of similar work (the creation of the leader of the Leningrad-class destroyers), however, the shortcomings of the latter and the tight design timeframe forced them to resort to the help of the Italian companies Ansaldo and Odero.

This choice was by no means accidental. First, Italy was then our important military and political ally. Secondly, it was these firms in 1928-1932 that built a series of Dardo-class ships, anticipating the type of destroyer of the Second World War. Everything about them was unusual: the general layout, one chimney, 120-mm artillery in twin deck mounts ... 4 enlarged Maestrale-class destroyers, laid down in 1931, became a modification of this type. The last ships were chosen as the basis for the creation of new Soviet destroyers. In 1932, a delegation of shipbuilders headed by Nikitin visited Italy, and the set of drawings for the Maestrale brought by her formed the basis of the future project. Our designers borrowed the layout of the machine and boiler plant and the general architecture of the ship, but domestic weapons, mechanisms and equipment forced us to move away from the prototype in many ways. In reality, the contribution of the Italian colleagues was limited to the development of a theoretical drawing (firm "Ansaldo") and running the model in the experimental pool in Rome.

The technical design of the destroyer (named "Project No. 7") was approved in December 1934. Its main tactical and technical elements were as follows: a standard displacement of 1425 tons, a total of 1715 tons, a maximum length of 112.5 m, a width of 10.2 m, a draft of 3.3 m, a speed of 38 knots, armament - four 130-mm guns and two three-tube torpedo tubes (TA) caliber 533 mm. It should be noted that by that time most of the equipment and weapons did not exist even on paper, but no displacement reserve was included in the project.

The final design work was carried out in extreme haste, since Stalin demanded that the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry lay down the first destroyers already in 1935, and hand over the entire series (increased to 53 units) to the Navy in 1937-1938. The government clearly overestimated the then capabilities of the domestic industry.

The experience of the First World War, which was considered the "criterion of truth" for shipbuilders of the 1920s and 1930s, testified that the destroyer, as the most versatile ship in the fleet, was steadily turning from a purely torpedo ship to an artillery-torpedo ship. Therefore, the increase in the firepower of the destroyers of the interwar period was primarily due to an increase in the caliber and ballistic characteristics of artillery installations.

The farthest in this direction were, perhaps, Soviet designers. Project 7 destroyers were originally designed for the "cruising" caliber - 130mm. True, the guns of the Obukhovsky plant with a barrel length of 55 calibers, which were the main weapon of the cruisers of the Soviet fleet in the 1920s, turned out to be too heavy, and the Bolshevik plant was instructed to develop new ones, shortened by 5 calibers. In 1935, a new artillery system, designated B-13, was put into service, and a year later its serial production began.

It is curious that initially the B-13 guns were created for shells of 55-caliber cannons, for which they were equipped with liners with a shallow (1 mm deep) thread. At the end of 1936, they decided to switch to liners with a deep (2.7 mm) thread, for which new shells were developed. Thus, the same gun model required different ammunition, which created additional problems during the war years. For example, in November 1941 at Gromkom it was necessary to change almost new ANIMI liners to NII-13 liners only because the first in the Northern Fleet ran out of shells.

The B-13 gun in a deck mount with a 13 mm thick bulletproof armor shield had a barrel length of 50 calibers, a weight of 12.8 tons, and a vertical guidance angle of -5 to + 45 °. All types of projectiles (high-explosive, semi-armor-piercing and remote grenades) were of the same weight - 33.5 kg and were fired from the barrel from initial speed 870 m / s for a maximum range of 139 kbt (27.5 km). The ammunition also included diving shells weighing 33.14 kg and lighting shells weighing 34.5 kg. They were fired using reduced charges at a range of 17 and 58 kbt, respectively. Barrel survivability at first was only 150-200 shots, but then, thanks to a number of improvements, it was brought to a pretty decent value - about 1100 shots (although the "passport" value is only 420 shots). The swinging part was equipped with a barrel bore blowing device. Ammunition - separate, the shutter - piston, with a plastic shutter. Ammunition, which was 150 rounds per barrel (175 in overload), was located in four cellars. Its supply was carried out by two elevators (one for charges, the other for shells) to each gun; in case of failure, manual feed pipes were available. Loading was carried out manually, the rate of fire depended on the elevation angle and ranged from 6-10 rounds per minute. According to the testimony of the former artillery electrician of the destroyer "Razumny" K.A. Lyubimov, the rate of fire of 13 rounds per minute was reached during the training firing at the Pacific Fleet. The firing angles of the pair of bow guns of the "seven" were from 0 ° to 14 ° on both sides, the stern guns were from 14 ° to 18 °.

According to their ballistic performance cannons B-13 significantly outnumbered the artillery of foreign destroyers. For comparison, it can be noted that the 127 mm Japanese gun shell weighed 23.1 kg, the American 127 mm - 24.4 kg, German 128 mm - 28 kg, Italian 120 mm - 22.1 kg, British 120 mm - 22.7 kg, and only the French 130-mm cannon shells weighed almost the same as the Soviet - 34.8 kg. But the barrel length of the latter was only 40 calibers, and the maximum firing range did not exceed 17 km. The only foreign guns, superior in power to the Soviet ones, were 138-millimeter guns. French leaders and 140-mm cannon of the Yugoslav leader "Dubrovnik". However, these ships, close to light cruisers, were much larger than the "sevens" and cannot be considered as analogues.

The fire control system was also quite consistent with the artillery. Especially for the destroyers of Project 7, in 1937, they created the TsAS-2 central firing machine, leading its lineage from the "central" Italian firm"Galileo" (this system was installed on leaders like "Leningrad"). The assault rifle was located in the fighting compartment under the bow superstructure and made it possible to continuously determine the full angles of vertical and horizontal guidance of the guns with constant observation of the target or "on self-propelled". Observation of the surface target was carried out using two 4-meter rangefinders located in the command-rangefinder post (KDP) B-12-4. In general, the system responded modern requirements and was not inferior to the best foreign counterparts.

Thus, the task set before the Soviet designers was completed: the artillery weapons of the "seven" by the end of the 30s were rightfully considered the best in the world. But, unfortunately, all this turned out to be unnecessary! While extolling the experience of the First World War, naval strategists did not take into account the rapid development of new combat assets, and, first of all, aviation.

As a result, the magnificent B-13 cannons, along with a perfect fire control system, were used mainly for the unusual task of firing at ground targets. But in front of the Luftwaffe bombers, the Sevens were practically defenseless.

However, this was not only our misfortune: the destroyers of foreign fleets of pre-war construction were also armed only with anti-ship artillery. The exception was the US Navy. And as a result, the American 127-mm gun with a barrel length of 38 calibers, very modest in its characteristics, turned out to be by right the best weapon of World War II destroyers precisely because of its versatility - the ability to fire both surface and air targets.

The anti-aircraft weapons of the "sevens" at the time of their commissioning included two 76-mm 34-K guns, two 45-mm 21-K semi-automatic machines and two 12.7-mm DShK or DK machine guns. Alas, such a composition of weapons cannot be called satisfactory either in quantity or in quality. The 45 mm guns had a low rate of fire, the 76 mm guns were very poorly positioned, and the machine guns were generally almost useless. But the main drawback was the lack of naval anti-aircraft fire control devices (MPUAZO). The latter in the USSR began to be developed with a delay, and the first such system "Horizon-1" (for the cruiser "Kirov") appeared only in 1939. Its counterpart for destroyers, created on the basis of the Soyuz anti-aircraft firing machine, was put into service just before the start of the war and managed to appear only on the Seven-U.

At the very beginning of the war, the "sevens" began to be armed with more effective anti-aircraft guns - 37-mm 70-K assault rifles. On the North Sea destroyers, they were first installed (in July - August 1941) in addition to 45-mm cannons - one on the rostrum behind chimney and one on the poop. Later (on "Thundering", "Grozny", "Crushing" in June 1942) they also replaced 45-millimeter marks at the cuts of the forecastle. By 1943, all the North Sea "sevens" had 4 70-K submachine guns. Black Sea destroyers Project 7 during the war years carried mainly 5 such anti-aircraft guns: they were not placed on the quarterdeck, but they were mounted in pairs on the bow superstructure, next to the second 130-mm gun. In 1942, all the sevens that remained in service at the Northern Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet were re-armed with two coaxial 12.7-mm Colt Browning machine guns. The most powerful anti-aircraft armament during the war years was the Baltic "Threatening": four DShK machine guns, four 37-mm machine guns and three 76-mm 34-K guns.

An important part of anti-aircraft weapons were British radars, supplied under Lend-Lease to equip Soviet ships. The first radar station (radar) of the 286-M type was received in 1942 "Thundering". Most of the Pacific "sevens" installed type 291 radar.

But in general, the anti-aircraft weapons of the Soviet destroyers remained frankly weak until the end of the war. Let us compare: American destroyers of the Allen M. Samner and Gearing type in 1945 carried up to 16 barrels of 40-mm automatic Bofors, not counting the Erlikons. And this with six universal 127-mm guns! It is not surprising that some of them managed to shoot down up to 10 or even 20 Japanese aircraft in one battle.

The torpedo armament of the Project 7 destroyers included two 39-Yu three-tube torpedo tubes with 7 ° end tubes dissolving, which was a copy of Novikov's devices with a caliber increased to 533 mm instead of 450 mm. The method of shooting is gunpowder. According to the project, the destroyers could carry an additional 6 spare torpedoes in racks, but manually reloading the devices in fresh weather was impossible. The SF command was the first to understand this and in March 1942 ordered the spare torpedoes to be removed. Soviet steam-gas torpedoes 53-38 and 53-39 were very advanced, but in battle they were used by "sevens" only once - "Boykim" and "Merciless" in December 1942 (and even then unsuccessfully).

Mine weapons were used more often. "Seven" could take on deck up to 60 min KB-3, or 65 min arr. 1926, or 95 min arr. 1912 (in overload).

Anti-submarine armament originally consisted of lever bomb throwers and diving shells for 130 mm guns. The stock of depth charges was only 25 pieces — 10 large B-1 and 15 small M-1; later it was brought up to 40 B-1 and 27 M-1 (on "Grozny" in 1944). During the war, two BMB-1 bombers were installed on all ships. In 1942, Grozny was the first Soviet ship to receive the Dragon-128s sonar (sonar).

The destroyers were equipped with DA-2B aft smoke equipment (continuous operation time 30 minutes, productivity 50 kg / min), DA-1 steam-oil equipment with exhaust through the chimney (three nozzles of white and black smoke) and MDSh smoke bombs (10 - 20 pieces) ... Anti-chemical protection was provided by filtering units supplying purified air to the wardroom, officers' cabins and the bow wash station. For the elimination of toxic substances, there were two chemical combat posts and two washing points. The total supply of degassing substances is 600 kg of bleach and 100 liters of reagents. In addition, 225 sets of protective chemical protection clothing were kept on each ship.

As an anti-mine weapon, the "sevens" had two sets of K-1 paraventrals and LPTI demagnetizing windings, the installation of which began in July 1941. It is impossible not to note the quality of domestic paravans. Their "whims" caused a lot of trouble for the Soviet sailors. But this is not so bad. Instead of fighting mines, paravans K-1 often turned into "killers" of their own ships, touching the minerail and bringing the mine to the side. Similar cases occurred, in particular, with the destroyers "Proud", "Threatening", "Guarding", "Sharp-witted".

Summarizing the above, one should highlight such advantages of the Project 7 destroyers as powerful artillery weapons, perfect fire control devices (TsAS-2), good torpedoes and, in general, a decent speed. The power plant, with all its disadvantages, has proven itself to be more reliable than that of the German destroyers. But the main merit of our designers and shipbuilders is that such a large series of ships was nevertheless built and built on time. It was the Sevens that renewed the surface fleet and brought the Soviet Navy to a qualitatively new level.

As for the shortcomings, the most serious of them were the unsatisfactory strength of the hull, short cruising range, weak anti-aircraft armament, and the absence of MPUAZO. To this can be added the unimportant living conditions of the crew: with a staff of 231 enlisted personnel permanent places(together with the hanging bunks) there were only 161, which forced the Red Navy men to sleep on tables, on the deck, or together on the same bunk.

Interesting conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of combat experience. Of the 28 "sevens" that entered service in 1938-1942 (not counting the one who died while towing the "Resolute"), the Pacific ships, except for the "Reasonable" and "Enraged", practically did not participate in the war. Thus, 18 destroyers fought directly with the enemy. 10 of them died (including the "Guarding", later raised and restored). If we add the destroyers of the 7U project here, it turns out that of the 36 warships that fought, 18 died - exactly half.

Distribution of the sunken "sevens" and "sevens-U" for the reasons of death: on mines - 9 units, from aerial bombs - 8, from navigation accidents - 1 ("Crushing"). Another 11 destroyers received heavy damage, including the loss of the bow or stern of the hull.

Most of all, the "seven" suffered from mines. However, significant losses do not at all indicate their low survivability. The fact is that for 9 "fatal" explosions on mines, there are 9 more, when the ship was saved (or another mine was needed for death - as in the case of "Proud" and "Sharp-witted"). In addition, two ships received one torpedo hit each: "Sentinel" with torpedo boats, "Furious" - from a submarine. In both cases, the destroyers suffered heavy losses (the bow of the first was torn off, the stern of the second), but they remained afloat and later recovered. Thus, for 20 mine and torpedo explosions, 9 destroyers were killed, which is 45%. That is, according to this indicator The "sevens" turned out to be much more tenacious than all their foreign counterparts in the class of the period of the Second World War. True, none of our destroyers was able to withstand the simultaneous impact of two mines or torpedoes, although there were such examples in the British and American fleets.

If you try to compare the losses among the "sevens" with the damage they inflicted on the enemy, then the picture will turn out to be very bleak. Confirmed enemy losses include one submarine (U-585, sunk by Thundering on March 29, 1942) and no more than 40 aircraft. Of course, these numbers cannot be compared purely mechanically. The Black Sea, and even the Baltic, "sevens" simply did not have a worthy enemy at sea, and the tasks that they had to perform were not envisaged by any pre-war plans. For example, the evacuation of troops from besieged Sevastopol or Hanko - for these purposes, destroyers were far from the best means.

By the beginning of the 1930s, the Red Army's Naval Forces (Navy) had only seventeen destroyer destroyers - "noviks":

12 units in the Baltic Sea;

5 units on the Black Sea.

Such destroyers, built before the First World War, could not deal with the expanded combat missions of ships of their class with high efficiency. Therefore, in July 1931, the USSR Labor and Defense Council decided to provide for the forced creation of new destroyers in the next naval development program. For these purposes, the Central Design Bureau of Special Shipbuilding (TsKBS-1) was created.

Project 7 destroyers, also known as the "Wrathful" class, are a type of destroyers of the so-called "Stalin series" built for the Soviet Navy in the second half of the 1930s, one of the most massive types of destroyers in the history of Russian and of the Soviet fleets. The most massive Soviet destroyers of the 1920s-1930s.

A total of 53 units were laid. Of these, 28 were completed according to the original project. 18 were completed according to the 7U project. 6 were dismantled on the slipway. One ("Resolute") sank while being towed after launching and was not completed.

Project 7

TsKBS-1 began designing a "serial EM", which was given the designation "Project 7". In 1932, under the leadership of the chief engineer of TsKBS-1 V.A. Nikitin, the Soyuzverf commission was sent to Italy, which chose the largest shipbuilding company Ansaldo, which had many years of experience in designing high-speed EM and KRL. The commission got acquainted with the latest Italian destroyers and the documentation of the Mistral-class EM under construction, which became the closest prototype in the development of Project 7.

December 21, 1934 common project"Serial destroyer" was approved by the decree of the Council of Labor and Defense. Total amount ships to be built according to the approved project changed more than once (upward), as a result, it was planned to hand over 21 ships to the fleet in 1937, and another 32 in 1938. Of these 53 destroyers, 21 were destined for the Baltic and Northern fleets, 10 for the Black Sea Fleet and 22 for the Pacific Fleet.

The construction of the ships was envisaged at factories No. 189 Shipyard named after. Ordzhonikidze and No. 190 Shipyard named after Zhdanov in Leningrad, and factories № 198 Shipyard im. Marty and No. 200 Shipyard named after 61 Communards in Nikolaev.

Comparison with foreign destroyers confirms that when designing new series destroyers made significant progress and the ship in its combat qualities was not inferior to the best foreign models of that time, and in terms of the firing range of the main caliber guns and the speed it significantly exceeded them.

Powerful artillery armament, perfect fire control devices, decent torpedoes and a decent travel speed. The power plant, with all its disadvantages, has proven itself to be more reliable than that of the German destroyers. But the main merit of our designers and shipbuilders is that such a large series of ships was nevertheless built and built on time. It was the G7s that renewed the surface fleet and brought the Soviet Navy to a qualitatively new level.

Project 7-U

On May 13, 1937, the British destroyer Hunter, which was carrying out a patrol service near the port of Almeria and performing the functions of observing the course of hostilities (there was a civil war in Spain), was blown up by a drifting mine.

In August 1937, at a meeting of the Defense Committee in Moscow, the incident with the Hunter was mentioned. The situation was analyzed when a ship with a linear arrangement of a boiler-turbine installation, as a result of a single hit by a shell, mine or torpedo, could lose speed. As a result, Project 7, which had the same power plant layout, was called "sabotage". 14 already launched ships of project 7 were ordered to be altered, and the rest were dismantled on the stocks.

The project of the improved project 7-U was developed jointly by the design bureaus TsKB-17 (until October 1936 - TsKBS-1) and the Northern Shipyard named after V.I. A. Zhdanova (chief designer - N. A. Lebedev). The final project was approved by the People's Commissariat of the Navy on August 29, 1938.

Initially, it was planned to re-mortgage absolutely all ships of Project 7. However, fortunately, Deputy People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Tevosyan IF managed to convince the committee to finish building 29 destroyers under Project 7 and only the next 18 to re-mortgage according to Project 7U. The last 6 units under construction, which were in a low degree of readiness, were decided to be dismantled.

Thus, during 1938-1939, 18 destroyer hulls of project 7, which were on the stocks of the Leningrad plants named after Zhdanov and Ordzhonikidze, and the Nikolaev named after 61 Communards, were re-mortgaged according to project 7-U. For this, the almost finished buildings of Project 7 had to be partially dismantled. A number of structures were removed in the area of ​​the machine-boiler rooms. As a result, the ships of the 7-U project became part of only two fleets - the Baltic and the Black Sea.

The Far Eastern destroyers, due to the intense work schedule and weak production base in Vladivostok and Komsomolsk-on-Amur, were completed according to project 7.

The lead destroyer of Project 7-U was the Sentinel. During factory tests, which took place in the fall of 1939, a significant overload of the ship was revealed and, as a result, its reduced stability. Elimination work (the stability was increased due to the laying of solid ballast), as well as the elimination of many discovered defects, delayed the completion of the tests for more than a year. As a result, by the beginning of World War II, shipbuilders managed to deliver to the customer only half of all 18 declared ships of the 7-U project: 8 in the Baltic and 1 in the Black Sea. The remaining 9 were urgently completed and tested already in combat conditions.

Tactical and technical characteristics

Frame

The main difference between the Project 7-U destroyer was the layout of the engine and boiler rooms. The appearance of the fourth boiler and their increased dimensions, as a result of which the boilers did not fit inside the hull, led to the fact that the boilers rose about 2 meters above the main deck, eating up the volume of the central superstructures.

The body was made of low-manganese steel with a thickness of 5-10 millimeters. Most of the connections were riveted, although the stringers, part of the upper deck and a number of other elements were welded. During the war, a serious drawback of low-manganese steel was revealed: fragility. Sheets made from it, when hit by fragments of bombs and shells, split and themselves gave a large number of fragments that struck personnel, devices and mechanisms. The usual "Steel 3", used in the construction of decks and superstructures, did not crack and did not give such fragments.

Power plant

In 1936, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade ordered 12 sets of main turbo-gear units (GTZA) and auxiliary mechanisms for the ships of Project 7 from the British firms Metro-Vickers and Parsons. Such GTZA had a capacity of up to 24,000 liters. with., but could be launched in a cold state, without preheating, which theoretically reduced the time to prepare the ship for going to sea.

In March 1938, the turbines received from England were distributed among the factories. Of the eight sets of power plants from Metro-Vickers, 7 went to Leningrad # 189 and # 190, and another was sent to the KBF base as a backup. Four sets of Parsons went to the Black Sea: 3 - to the Nikolaev plant No. 200 and one - to the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. All imported GTZA ended up on ships re-mortgaged according to the 7-U project.

Steam for the turbines was generated by 4 hipped-roof vertical water-tube boilers with a side screen and one-way gas flow, equipped with loop superheaters. Heating surface of each boiler is 655 m², productivity is 80 tons of steam per hour. Steam parameters are approximately the same as those of Project 7 ships: pressure 27.5 kg / s², temperature 340 ° С. Each boiler was housed in an isolated compartment.

One of the disadvantages of such a system is the increased fuel consumption: four boilers compared to three in project 7. Moreover, it was not possible to increase the fuel reserves of the 7-U project: after the installation of a more cumbersome power plant in a cramped building, there are already was not left. And after laying the solid ballast, the stock of fuel oil even had to be slightly reduced.

Armament

Main caliber

The main caliber artillery (GK) of the Project 7U destroyers remained the same as that of their predecessors: four 130-mm B-13-2 guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers, manufactured by the Bolshevik plant. The ammunition capacity included 150 shots per barrel, in overload (according to the capacity of the cellars), the ship could take up to 185 shots per barrel - that is, a total of up to 740 shells and charges. The ammunition was fed manually, the delivery was carried out by a pneumatic sluice.

Anti-aircraft armament

Anti-aircraft armament consisted of a pair of 76-mm universal installations 34-K, moved to the stern. A third 45mm 21-K semi-automatic was added. Thus, all three small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were located on the site behind the first chimney, for which they had to sacrifice heavy 90-cm searchlights (instead of them, one 60-cm was now installed on the foremast).

The number of 12.7 mm DShK machine guns doubled - two more were added to the two on the upper bridge behind the forecastle cut. However, despite some improvement in comparison with its predecessors, anti-aircraft weapon Project 7-U continued to remain extremely weak and poorly placed: from the bow course nodes, the ship was practically defenseless, and the crowding of all anti-aircraft weapons on two sites made them extremely vulnerable.

The experience of the first months of the war showed how dangerous it is to ignore the threat of air attacks. Therefore, already in July 1941, destroyers began to additionally mount 37-mm 70-K assault rifles on the superstructure in the area of ​​the second pipe, and then replace them with 45-mm 21-K.

In May 1942, two 20-mm Erlikons and one four-barreled 12.7-mm Vickers machine gun were installed on the Strong.

By the end of the war, the Baltic destroyers ("Strong", "Stable", "Glorious", "Sentinel", "Strogiy", "Stroyny") received the third 76-mm gun mount 34-K (on the poop).

By 1943, the most powerful in relation to air defense systems of the Black Sea "Capable" and "Savvy" were armed with two 76-mm 34-K cannons, seven 37-mm 70-K assault rifles, four 12.7-mm DShK machine guns and two coaxial 12.7-mm machine guns "Colt-Browning" with water-cooled barrels.

Torpedo armament

Torpedo armament included two 533-mm three-tube torpedo tubes 1-N. Unlike the 39-Yu powder apparatuses installed on the Project 7 ships, the 1-N had a combined firing system - powder and pneumatic. The departure speed of the torpedo was 15-16 m / s (versus 12 m / s for the 39-Yu), which made it possible to significantly expand the sectors of fire: the destroyers of Project 7 could not fire torpedoes at sharp heading angles due to the risk that they would hit the deck ... In addition, a number of improvements were made to the TA design, which doubled the accuracy of its targeting. The ships of the 7-U project have never had a chance to use their quite modern torpedo weapons in battle.

Anti-submarine weapons

Mine and anti-submarine weapons of the Sentinel-class destroyers practically did not differ from that used on their predecessors. On the rails located on the upper deck, the ship could take 58 KB-3 mines, or 62 mines of the 1926 model, or 96 mines of the 1912 model (in overload). The standard set of depth charges is 10 large B-1 and 20 small M-1. Large bombs were stored directly in the aft bomb releasers; of the small ones — 12 in the cellar and 8 — in the stern rack on the poop.

Already during the war, the destroyers received two BMB-1 bombers, capable of firing B-1 bombs at a range of up to 110 m.

Destroyer"Grozny" (project 7)

Displacement 1525 - 1670t

Speed ​​39 knots

Length 112.5 m

Width 10.2 m

Armament:

130 mm guns 4

76 mm guns 2

45 mm guns 2

37 mm guns 3

Anti-aircraft machine guns 2

Mines, depth charges - 60 KB-3, or 65 minutes of the 1926 model, or 95 minutes of the 1912 model.

Destroyer type "Guard" (project 7U)

Displacement 2000 t

Speed ​​39 knots

Length 115 m

Width 11.8 m

Armament:

130 mm guns 4

76 mm guns 2

37 mm guns 3

Anti-aircraft machine guns 4

Three-tube torpedo tubes 2

Mines, depth charges

Combat losses.

18 units of EM project 7 took part in the hostilities.

Killed 11 units

Causes of death

Navigational accidents - 2 cases

Air bombs - 5 cases

Mines - 4 cases

Of the 11 dead EM

died without breaking the case - 1 (Guardian)

died with a broken case - 1 (proud)

perished with a complete break of the case - 9 (including EM Fast), incl. with a break in the case in two places - 2 (Resolute I and Sharp-witted)

with a crack and a break in the case - 1 (Merciless)

There were 29 cases of severe damage to EM project 7.

Typical places of cracks, breaks and breaks in the hull of destroyers of Project 7 were sections of the transition from the longitudinal recruitment system in the middle of the hull to the transverse recruitment system at the extremities - places of high concentration of voltages.

Participated in hostilities 18 units of EM project 7U

Of these, 9 units died.

Causes of death

Air bombs - 4 cases

Mines - 5 occurrences

Artillery - 1 case

Out of 10 cases of EM death

died without breaking the case - 4

died with a broken case - 2

died with a break in the case - 4

There were 19 cases of severe damage to the EM project 7U.

Destroyers of the Pacific Fleet did not take part in hostilities - 11 units.

Despite the measures taken to strengthen the enclosures of the EM project 7U in comparison with the EM project 7, this did not bring the desired result. The weakness of the structure of the case became one of the essential shortcomings of the EM of both projects, which, of course, affected their military fate.

According to the latest data, of the destroyers of the "Stalinist" series, only one ship - "Reasonable", can claim a real battle victory. It was he who, together with the destroyer Zhyvuchiy transferred by the British, on December 8, 1944, pursued the German submarine U-387, which after that did not get in touch and did not return to the base.

In the history of destroyers of both projects, the guards EM project 7U "Soobrazitelny" stands apart. Its commander Vorkov recalled the combat path of his ship: “56 times the destroyer fired at enemy battle formations, suppressed more than ten batteries, destroyed up to 30 tanks and vehicles, a lot of manpower. He used more than 2700 rounds of the main caliber, participating in the artillery support of our ground forces. Convoy without loss to Odessa, Sevastopol, Feodosia and the ports of the Caucasus 59 transports ... Carried on board about 13 thousand people wounded and evacuated from Odessa and Sevastopol. More than a thousand tons of ammunition was transported to Odessa and Sevastopol. Repulsed more than 100 enemy aircraft attacks ... Shot down five enemy aircraft. The destroyer went into action 200 times, having covered more than 60 thousand miles without repair. During the war, he spent almost 200 days at sea and did not lose a single soldier. There were no wounded on the ship either.

The article uses materials by A. Tsarenko and S. Balakin.

Article from the almanac "Marine Archive", No. 1, 2011
A.G. Markov, Chairman of the Editorial Board
Chief editor Maslov N.K.

"Crushing" is one of the most disliked themes of our historians. If possible, then they generally prefer not to remember her once again. If the latter fails, then they talk about "Crushing" casually and quickly. There are plenty of reasons for such persistent dislike. For a long time, nothing was written about "Crushing" at all. The disgraced destroyer was mentioned only in the memoirs of the commander of the Northern Fleet during the Great Patriotic War, Admiral Golovko.


The destroyer "Crushing" belonged to the series of destroyers of the "7" project. Destroyers of the project "7" (or, as they are usually called, "sevens") rightfully occupy a prominent place in our naval. And it is not surprising - after all, they were active participants in the Great Patriotic War, were the most massive Soviet surface ships built in the 30s, it is from the "sevens" that several generations trace their ancestry domestic destroyers, large rocket ships and even cruisers. One type 7 destroyer became a Guards destroyer, and four became Red Banner destroyers. At the same time, a lot of contradictory things have been said and written about them. This is especially true of the military actions of the "sevens" during the war years - here real, often tragic events were replaced by legends for a long time. There were always a lot of rumors about the tragic death of the destroyer "Crushing". The first six "sevens" were laid at the end of 1935, and the next year - all the rest. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Navy had 22 Wrath-class destroyers. These were our most massive pre-war ships.

The destroyer "Crushing" was built at the plant No. 189 named after S. Ordzhonikidze. Serial number С-292. Laid down on 10/29/1936, launched on 08/23/1937, acceptance certificate signed on 08/13/1939. Soon after commissioning, it was transferred through the White Sea-Baltic Canal (September - November 1939) to the Northern Fleet. In November, the destroyer arrived at Polyarny. During the war with Finland, he carried out patrol and convoy service, then was engaged in combat training. From July 18, 1940 to July 4, 1941, it underwent a warranty repair at the plant number 402 in Molotovsk. In total, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, he covered 10,380 miles.

After the completion of the sea trials, the "Crushing" was included in the White Sea flotilla, where it remained until September 29. During this time, he escorted transports several times, made 3 mine laying (installed 90 mines of KB-1 and 45 mines of the 1908 model), underwent short-term preventive maintenance.

On October 1, the "Crushing" arrived at Polyarny and became part of a separate destroyer division.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Northern Fleet was the youngest and smallest, but at the same time the most active operational formation of our Navy. By June 1941, its largest ships were precisely the "seven". Five destroyers of this type ("Loud", "Grozny", "Thundering", "Swift" and "Crushing") together with three "noviks" made up the 1st separate destroyer battalion. At the end of 1942, with the arrival of the Pacific "Reasonable", "Furious" and the leader "Baku", a destroyer brigade was formed (commander - 1st rank captain, then rear admiral, P.I. Kolchin).

Until January 1, 1942, he went out 11 times to fire at enemy positions, firing 1297 130-mm shells. In addition, together with the "Grozny" and the British cruiser "Kent" participated in the search for German destroyers (albeit without results), escorted transports. The most difficult campaign was a joint escort operation with "Grozny" on December 24-26. During a 9-point storm with a 7-point wave and strong icing of the superstructures, the roll of the ship reached 45 °, and due to the salinity of the refrigerator, for some time it was necessary to go on one TZA. By some miracle, the ships escaped major damage. This time, "Crushing" just got lucky and made it to the base.

On March 28, after the completion of the scheduled preventive maintenance, "Crushing" together with the "Thundering" and the British destroyer "Oribi" went out to meet the convoy PQ-13, and in the morning of the next day they entered its escort. At 11 hours 18 minutes, in poor visibility, shooting was heard, and after 2 minutes, bursts from five artillery shells rose at the left side of the "Crushing". After 6-7 seconds, 3 more shells fell on the bow and stern. The destroyer has increased its speed. A few seconds later, at a course angle of 130 ° and a distance of 15 cables, the silhouette of a ship identified as a German destroyer of the Raeder class was discovered. "Crushing" opened fire and with the second volley achieved a cover with a shell hitting the area of ​​the enemy ship's second pipe. He got tired and turned sharply to the left. Our destroyer made 4 more volleys in pursuit, but no more hits were observed. The falling snow charge hid the enemy from sight. In total, "Crushing" fired 20 130-mm shells.

Sailors of the Soviet destroyer of Project 7 "Crushing" with a ship's pet, the area of ​​bow torpedo tubes, nose view. Northern Fleet

This fleeting battle occupies a prominent place in the history of Soviet naval art, since it is the only one in the entire Great Patriotic War an episode when our surface warship collided with an enemy of its own class and even emerged from it as a winner. The German destroyer Z-26 is usually indicated as the enemy of the "Crushing". However, in recent times materials appeared in the press in which other versions were put forward. So, the authors of a number of publications, rightly pointing out that by the moment described, the Z-26 was badly damaged and was fired back from the cruiser Trinidad from the only surviving gun, and the Z-24 and Z-25 circling around the convoy were far enough from the place of the skirmish, say the hypothesis that "Crushing" was fighting ... the English destroyer "Fury". This seems unlikely, since hitting the allied destroyer (by the way, which arrived in Murmansk the next day) would certainly have been reflected both in documents and in historical literature. It is more logical to assume that Z-26 served as a target for the gunmen of the Crushing ship, but someone else was firing on the Soviet destroyer, since the first 5-gun salvo could not have been fired by any of the destroyers in the vicinity (both British and German the ships had 4 main guns each). By the way, the report of the commander of the "Crushing" says nothing about the Germans firing. So the two volleys that fell at the side could well belong to the same cruiser Trinidad, which mistook the Crushing and Thundering for the Z-24 and Z-25. In any case, an unambiguous explanation of some inconsistencies in the Soviet, German and English descriptions this fight is not.

In April, the "Crushing", while guarding convoys, repeatedly repelled air attacks, again suffered a 9-10-point storm. under lend-lease. However, lack of fuel forced "Crushing" after 8 hours to go to base. Having replenished the supply of fuel oil, "Crushing" on the evening of May 1 returned to the location of the cruiser, but, alas, it was too late. Six hours before the approach of the destroyer "Edinburgh" was sunk. Later, the British complained that the Soviet destroyers abandoned their damaged cruiser at the most difficult moment. These claims had nothing to do with the commander of the "Crushing" and his team and are fully related to the command Northern Fleet, which, when planning the operation, did not take into account the fuel reserves and their consumption on their ships.

On May 8, the "Crushing" sailed twice into the Ara Bay to fire at coastal targets. According to intelligence, both attacks were successful and inflicted some damage on the enemy. The second campaign, however, almost ended in tragedy. During shelling of coastal targets, "Crushing" suddenly attacked at once 28 German aircraft. The destroyer managed to urgently unfasten the anchor chain (there was no time to choose the anchor) and, successfully maneuvering, avoided hits from the bombs that rained down on him. At the same time, the ship's anti-aircraft gunners managed to shoot down one bomber from a 37-mm machine gun.

Torpedo tube 39-Yu of one of the destroyers of the Northern Fleet ("Crushing")

From May 28 to May 30, "Crushing" together with "Grozny" and "Kuibyshev" was guarded by the allied convoy PQ-16. The convoy transports all this time were subjected to massive attacks by fascist bombers and torpedo bombers. On May 29, in just one attack, the Germans dropped 14 torpedoes on the ships of the convoy, but none of them hit the target, but the Focke-Wulf torpedo bomber was shot down by a 76-mm shell from the Shattering one from a distance of 35 cables. The next day, another plane, this time a Junkers-88, was destroyed by a direct hit from a 76-mm destroyer shell, and two others were damaged. And here the "Crushing" team was the best of the best. As for the destroyer anti-aircraft gunners, they were rightfully considered the best in the entire Northern Fleet. On the evening of May 30, the convoy's transports, reliably covered by our destroyers, safely reached the Kola Bay.

On July 8, Crushing and Thundering were heading towards the infamous PQ-17 convoy. On the way, the destroyers got into floating 4-point ice. Forced to slow down to a small speed and deprived of the ability to maneuver, on the night of July 10, they were attacked by four Ju-88 bombers, dropping 8 bombs on each ship. Fortunately, there were no direct hits, but the Crushing received minor damage and deformation of the hull from close explosions. Later the attack was repeated, but the destroyers were lucky again - they repulsed this attack without loss. Our ships, however, did not manage to meet the transport, and they were forced to return to Vaenga.

During the summer and autumn of 1942, "Crushing" underwent a short-term preventive maintenance. At this time, the ship was also used for escorting transports, was engaged in combat training. In total, from the beginning of the war until September 1, 1942, the "Crushing" made 40 military campaigns, covering a total of 22,385 miles in 1,516 running hours. Without a doubt, this was one of the most warships of the Soviet Navy at that time.

In total, during the war years, "Crushing" fired 1639 130-mm shells (including 84 - at aircraft), 855 - 76-mm and 2053 - 37-mm shells, while shooting down 6 enemy aircraft (2 of them together with other ships ). During the same time, two cases of spontaneous firing of torpedoes occurred on the ship (during one of them, the Red Navy sailor Starchikov died). Two more sailors drowned as a result of accidents - this exhausts the loss of the ship's personnel up to its last trip... Not a single person suffered from the enemy's combat impact on the "Crushing".

On November 17, 1942, another QP-15 convoy left Arkhangelsk. 26 Allied transports and 11 British escort ships unloaded at the Arkhangelsk port returned to Iceland for new party military supplies for the fighting Soviet Union.
At the first stage of the transition in the Northern Fleet's zone of responsibility, the convoy cover forces were always reinforced by the ships of the Northern Fleet. This time, the leader “Baku” was assigned to escort the QP-15 under the braid pennant of the division commander, Captain 1st Rank P.I. Kolchin (commander of the leader - captain 2nd rank V.P. Belyaev) and destroyer "Crushing" (commander - captain 3rd rank MA Kurilekh). In the conditions of a severe storm, which reached hurricane force by the morning of November 20, with frequent snow charges and practically zero visibility, the convoy ships and escort ships lost sight of each other. The convoy dispersed and there was essentially no one to guard. For the ships of the convoy, the severity of the storm was compensated for by the safety from possible attacks by German submarines and aircraft. Attack in a stormy sea with such tremendous power wind and great excitement were impossible. Therefore, with the permission of the convoy commander, Soviet ships before reaching the designated escort point, they began to independently return to the base.

76-mm cannon 34-K on one of the destroyers of the Northern Fleet ("Grozny" or "Crushing"), 1942

When returning to Polyarny on the leader "Baku" from the impacts of waves of nine-point force, the hull tightness was broken, all bow rooms along the 29th frame were flooded, water penetrated into the 2nd and 3rd boiler rooms - only boiler No. 1 remained in operation. The condition of the ship was critical, the roll reached 40 ° aboard. The personnel waged a desperate struggle for unsinkability. With serious injuries, but "Baku" nevertheless reached the base, where he had to get up for repairs.

Destroyer Crushing was much worse. A strong wind with snow blasts spread a large wave. Crushing's speed dropped to a minimum, and the ship kept its bow against the wave. But it didn't help much. Soon "Baku" was lost from sight, and in order to find it, from the destroyer they started firing shells and shining a searchlight, but to no avail ...

It is not known whether the battalion commander, Captain 1st Rank Kolchin, ordered the commander of the "Crushing" Kurilekh to go to the base on his own. The fact that missiles were fired from "Crushing", trying to find "Baku", suggests that, most likely, no command from the divisional commander to the destroyer was received at all. So Kurileh had to act at his own peril and risk.

Thus, we can talk about the divisional commander's failure to fulfill his direct duties - after all, as a detachment commander, he was responsible not only for the leader on whom he held his pennant, but also for the destroyer subordinate to him. Kolchin essentially abandoned "Crushing" to its fate. The only thing that justifies the divisional commander in this case is the plight of “Baku” himself, who barely made it to the base. Of course, in such a state, the leader could not provide any significant assistance to the destroyer. Most likely, it was this argument that was taken into account in the investigation of what happened to "Crushing", and no one accused Kolchin of anything. They just kind of forgot about him.

Left to its own devices, "Crushing", consistently changing its course from 210 to 160 ° and gradually slowing down to 5 knots, with difficulty "raked" against the wave, having in operation the main boilers No. 1 and 3 (No. 2 was in the "hot standby" ), 2 turbogenerators, 2 turbo-fire pumps, the fuel supply was about 45% of the total (only in the area of ​​the machine-boiler rooms), the rest of the reserves were within the normal range. November 20 at 2:30 pm in the aft cockpit they heard a strong crackling (audible on the bridge) - it was the sheets of the upper deck flooring between the aft superstructure and 130-mm gun No. 4 that burst, just where the stringers ended and the hull area began with a transverse set system (173rd frame ). At the same time, a corrugation was formed on the outer skin of the left side, then both shaft lines broke. Within 3 minutes, the aft part came off and sank, taking with them six sailors who did not manage to leave the tiller and other aft compartments. Followed shortly after powerful explosion- it worked, having reached a given depth, the detonators of depth charges ... The situation became critical in an instant.
The remaining aft compartments were quickly filled with water up to the aft bulkhead of the 2nd engine room (159th frame). The ship, which had lost its course, turned lagged to the wave, the roll reached 45–50 °, and the keel - 6 °. There was a trim aft, the stability decreased slightly, which was noticeable by the increased rolling period; the ship was "stale" in a banked position. The deck and superstructures were continuously covered with a wave, movement on the upper deck was extremely difficult, while the bottom was in full swing; reinforced and compacted the aft bulkhead of the engine room, drained the sections of the 159-173 frame, using not only a standard ejector, but also an oil transfer electric pump. All mechanisms worked flawlessly, the operation of drainage means and lighting was fully ensured, water filtration almost stopped, the aft bulkheads absorbed the shock of waves, the stability of the ship improved and the trim decreased. They even put into operation the reserve boiler No. 2 (the commander of the electromechanical warhead took the initiative) to "load the personnel with work." All that was left was to wait for help. However, even this hope in the conditions of the most severe storm was rather dubious ...

Having learned about the accident, Golovko ordered the leader of “Baku” to immediately go to the aid of “Crushing”. At the same time, orders were given to the destroyers Uritsky and Kuibyshev, located in Iokanka, and the destroyer Razumny, located in the Kola Bay, to also go to the aid of the Crushing and, having found it, lead to the Kola Bay; rescue ships "Shkval" and "Pamyat Ruslan", tugboat No. 2 to be ready to go to sea.

The destroyers left for their intended purpose. And an hour later, another radiogram came from Kurilekh: “The stern was torn off by the wave to the engine room. The poop drowned. I keep on the surface. Wind - south, ten points ... "

Aft part of "Crushing" with an additional 37-mm submachine gun, 1942

Place "Crushing" - latitude 75 degrees 1 minute, longitude 41 degrees 25 minutes. It is four hundred and twenty miles north of Iokanka.
At about 1800 hours, “Kuibyshev” (the commander of the Gonchar ship) and “Uritsky” (the commander of the Kruchinin ship) approached under the general command of Simonov (the battalion commander). Later, "Razumny" (the commander of the Sokolov ship) approached.

The state of the sea in the area where the Crushing was found was no better than the day before. Attempts of "Reasonable" to approach the wrecked ship and take it in tow ended in failure. Twice they started a tug, and twice the tug burst. Meanwhile, the weather worsened even more. Having reported this, Sokolov asked permission to remove the people and refuse to tow. Apparently, taking people off is the only way to save them. Sokolov's decision is correct in the first part, but it is premature to refuse to tow. First you need to take pictures of people, then you will see.

From the next message it is clear that Sokolov failed in either one or the other. It was impossible to approach the board of the Crushing. The ships were thrown so hard that when they came close they had to break from impacts against each other. Attempts to keep "Reasonable" machines in place while approaching the maximum possible distance were unsuccessful. Many times the "Reasonable" approached the "Crushing" in order to enable the people of the damaged ship to get to the deck of the "Reasonable". Only one person managed to safely jump from the “Crushing” to the deck of the “Reasonable”. That was the end of Sokolov's attempts to film people.

Soon “Kuibyshev” and “Uritskiy”, both types of “Novik”, approached. Ships of this type stayed on the wave better.
Since the fleet headquarters sent a notification about enemy submarines in this area, Sokolov on "Razumny" took on the task of providing the ships with anti-submarine defense, and "Kuibyshev" and "Uritsky" took up the removal of personnel from the "Crushing".
Of course, nothing came of Simonov's intention to bring “Kuibyshev” sideways to “Crushing”. I had to establish a ferry for people with the help of a gazebo. At the same time, fuel oil was released from the damaged ship, which somewhat reduced the sea roughness at the side. And yet the steel ends broke off almost immediately. Then a hemp cable was wound from the Kuibyshev and a gazebo was attached to the cable. To transport people in such a way, in such a wave, and even in snow charges, seemed impossible. And yet it was done. Simonov was in charge of the stern, from where he started the cable and where they began to transport the people of the "Crushing", and the commander of the "Kuibyshev" Gonchar controlled the machines with the help of the machine telegraph, trying to maneuver the moves so as not to break the hemp cable. Both Simonov and Gonchar acted not only skillfully, but also with great art, both have full maritime prowess, flair and will.

Ninety-seven people of the "Crushing" had already been transferred to the "Kuibyshev" when the hemp cable burst.
The weather continued to deteriorate. I had to resort to another method: to shoot people with lifebuoys tied every two meters into a new hemp cable. Such cables, each 300 meters long, were fed to the "Crushing" from one side of the "Kuibyshev", from the opposite - "Uritskiy". It is difficult to imagine how it all looked in the snow charges that covered the ships every now and then, in the roughness of the sea, seven to eight points, in the darkness ... Nevertheless, there is already a message that in this way, pulling up lifebuoys with people in them, it was possible to seventy-nine more people aboard the Kuibyshev. “Uritsky” took eleven.

15 people remained on board the "Crushing", among them the miner, senior lieutenant Lekarev and the deputy commander for political affairs of the BC-5, senior lieutenant Vladimirov. Where are the other officers? With Kurilekh it is clear: he hastened to save his person, and where is the deputy, chief officer, navigator, artilleryman and others? Did they follow Kurilekh's example? ..

Requested by the headquarters of the fleet, Vladimirov said that the command had left the ship. Right there, he very sensibly reported on the measures he had taken: he raised vapors, started the mechanisms. The final words of Vladimirov's report: - The destroyer is holding up well.

In connection with the departure of the destroyers from the "Crushing" Golovko ordered to immediately go there "Loud". He left at 17 o'clock. Information about his movement is not very encouraging. At 18 hours 10 minutes, when leaving the Kola Bay, I lay down on a course of 60 degrees, walked at a speed of 20 knots with a weak wind and a calm sea. However, as the ship moved north, by 21 o'clock, the wind and wave gradually increased to six points. Due to the strong impacts of the wave in the body, the stroke of the “Loud” was reduced to 15 knots. In 45 minutes the wind and wave are already seven points. Reducing the stroke to ten knots, Loud turned into the wind to weaken the shock of the waves.

Golovko later recalled in his memoirs:
“I regret that I didn’t send minesweepers to“ Crushing ”yesterday. Rumyantsev offered to send them, but then I did not accept his offer. This is my mistake. I was sure that after the destroyers found the "Crushing", they will be able to take it in tow. A day has been lost, for it is still necessary to send minesweepers.

I call P.V. Panfilov (commander of the minesweeper division) and set him the task of reaching the "Crushing" with two minesweepers - TShch-36 and TSh-39; remove everyone who remained on the broken ship; then take it in tow and sail to the Kola Bay, weather permitting; if the weather does not allow either to take pictures of people or to tow the ship, then stay at the "Crushing" and guard it until the weather improves; if, due to its condition, the destroyer cannot be towed even in good weather, remove all personnel from it, after which the ship will be blown up and destroyed. At 23 o'clock, both minesweepers left for their destination. "

“Reasonable” at 15 hours 15 minutes, and “Kuibyshev” and “Uritsky” at 15 hours 30 minutes left “Crushing”, since it is impossible to continue rescuing personnel with the help of ends and lifebuoys, and the fuel supply does not allow waiting for the weather to improve : it was barely enough on all three ships on the way back. Before leaving, Simonov sent a semaphore to the "Crushing" that everyone who remained on board the broken ship would be removed by the submarine as soon as the weather improved.

In the current situation, it was impossible to continue withdrawing the personnel of the "Crushing" to destroyers. The waves began to roll over the ships, and a threat to the lives of all people on all ships was created. The removal of personnel was accompanied by casualties: eight people died from impacts by waves against the hull and under the propellers, ten people were brought aboard the Kuibyshev and Uritsky in an unconscious state, their lives could not be saved.

In total, 179 people were admitted to Kuibyshev, 11 to Uritsky, and one to Razumny.
Finally, they asked how many people remained on board. The destroyer answered: "Fifty fuel oil." The question was repeated, adding that the minesweepers were already on their way. Then a rocket soared over the "seven", then another, a third ... At the bridge it was decided at first that a table of conditional signals was used, but the fourth rocket, the fifth rocket went, and it became clear that each rocket was a farewell salvo over a grave that had not yet been dug, and there were such rockets counted fifteen.

Both minesweepers (TShch-36 and TShch-39) arrived by deadline at 09:10 on November 25 in the area of ​​the "Crushing" accident and began a search in formation for the front, shifting the tack to the east. The ships kept at the line of sight of each other. Visibility at the start of the search is from 10 to 12 cables. The search is carried out in conditions of snow charges at northwest wind up to five points. The excitement of the sea is four points. Nothing like what happened for several days. "Crushing" was not found ...

On November 26, the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov signed a directive to investigate the death of the destroyer "Crushing" No. 613 / Sh, and on November 30 - a directive on the preparation of an order on the death of the destroyer "Crushing" No. 617 / Sh.

In mid-December 1942, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Vice-Admiral Golovko, with a pain in his heart, as he writes in his memoirs, signed an order: stop the search for "Crushing", consider the ship dead.

Kurilekh, Rudakov, Kalmykov, Isaenko were put on trial. The navigator, signalman and medical officer were sent to the penalty platoon. The commander of the ship, Kurileh, was shot.

The history of the tragedy of the destroyer "Crushing" showed not only examples of cowardice, but also great self-sacrifice in the name of saving comrades. Therefore, those who try to hide the truth about this tragic page our naval history. It was "crushing", and we are obliged to remember those who died at its military posts, having fulfilled their military and human duty to the end.
1. Lekarev Gennady Evdokimovich, born in 1916, senior lieutenant, commander of warhead-3.
2. Vladimirov Ilya Aleksandrovich, (1910), political instructor of BCh-5.
3. Belov Vasily Stepanovich, (1915), chief sergeant-major, foreman of the team of bilge drivers.
4. Sidelnikov Semyon Semenovich, (1912), midshipman; chief boatswain.
5. Boyko Trofim Markovich, (1917), foreman of the 2nd class, commander of the department of turbine drivers.
6. Nagorny Fedor Vasilievich, (1919), Red Navy, signalman
7. Lyubimov Fedor Nikolaevich, (1914), senior Red Navy sailor, senior boiler driver.
8. Gavrilov Nikolay Kuzmich, (1917), senior Red Navy sailor, senior turbine engineer.
9. Purygin Vasily Ivanovich, (1917), senior Red Navy sailor, senior boiler driver.
10. Zimovets Vladimir Pavlovich, (1919), Red Navy sailor, electrician.
11. Savinov Mikhail Petrovich, (1919), Red Navy, bilge operator.
12. Ternovoy Vasily Ivanovich, (1916), foreman of the 2nd class, the commander of the department of mechanics.
13. Artemiev Prokhor Stepanovich, (1919), Red Navy, boiler operator.
14. Dremlyuga Grigory Semenovich, (1919), Red Navy, boiler operator.
15. Chebiryako Grigory Fedorovich, (1917), senior sailor, senior rangefinder.
16. Shilatyrkin Pavel Alekseevich, (1919), Red Navy, boiler operator.
17. Bolshov Sergey Tikhonovich, (1916), senior Red Navy sailor, senior electrician.
The approximate place of death of the destroyer "Crushing": latitude 73 degrees 30 minutes north, longitude 43 degrees 00 minutes east. Now this area of ​​the Barents Sea has been declared a memorial place, passing by which the ships of the Northern Fleet lower the St. Andrew's flags.

They were chosen as the basis for the creation of new Soviet destroyers.

Destroyers of project 7

"Grozny"
Project
Country
Manufacturers
Operators
Subsequent typeproject 7-U
Planned 53
Built by 28
Canceled 6
Losses 9
Main characteristics
DisplacementDesign: 1,425 tonnes (standard), 1,715 tonnes (full) Actual: 1,525 - 1,670 tonnes (standard)
Length112.5-8 m (maximum)
Width10.2 m
Draft3.1 m
Engines2 PTU GTZA-24, 3 boilers
Power48,000 l. with.
Travel speed38 knots (design)
37.35-39.05 knots (full)
Sailing range2,640 miles (at 19.83 knots, design)
Crewtotal 246 (including 15 officers)
Armament
Navigational weaponsgyrocompass "Kurs-1"
Artillery4 × 1 130/50 mm B-13
Flak2 × 76 mm 34-K, 2 × 45 mm 21-K, 2x12.7 mm DShK or DK
Anti-submarine weapons2 bombs BMB-1 (only on ships of factories No. 199-202)
Mine torpedo armament2 × 3 533 mm TA 39-Yu; 60 min KB-3 or 65 arr. 1926 or 95 min arr. 1912 g.
Media files at Wikimedia Commons

A total of 53 units were laid. Of these, 28 were completed according to the original project. 18 were completed according to the 7-U project. 6 were dismantled on the slipway. One ("Resolute") sank while being towed in a storm after launching (the ship was commanded by the future commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy S.G. Gorshkov) and was not completed.

Development history

Construction history

Armament

Main caliber

The main caliber artillery of the Project 7 destroyers: four 130-mm B-13-I guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers, manufactured by the Bolshevik plant, vertical guidance angles from -5 to + 45 °. All types of projectiles (high-explosive, semi-armor-piercing and distance grenades) were of the same weight - 33.5 kg and were fired from the barrel with an initial speed of 870 m / s for a maximum range of 139 kbt (25.7 km). The ammunition capacity included 150 shots per barrel, in overload (according to the capacity of the cellars), the ship could take up to 185 shots per barrel - that is, a total of up to 740 shells and charges. The ammunition was fed manually, the delivery was carried out by a pneumatic sluice.

Anti-aircraft armament

Anti-aircraft armament consisted of: a pair of 76-mm 34-K universal mounts, two 45-mm 21-K semi-automatic machines, two 12.7-mm DShK machine guns. During the war, anti-aircraft armament was strengthened by replacing 21-K semi-automatic machines with 70-K automatic cannons and installing additional 1-3 (depending on the availability of weapons) 70-K machine guns. DShK machine guns or received under the Lend-Lease anti-aircraft machine guns Vickers or Colt. The destroyer of the Baltic Fleet "Terrible" also received an additional 76-mm cannon 34-K.

Torpedo armament

Torpedo armament included two 533-mm three-pipe torpedo gunpowder apparatus 39-Yu. The departure speed of the torpedo was 12 m / s. 533-mm torpedoes 53-38 (53-38U), length 7.4 m, weight 1615 (1725) kg, explosive mass (TNT) 300 (400) kg, range: 4.0 km, stroke 44.5 knots, 8 , 0 - 34.5, 10.0 - 30.5. According to the project, the destroyers could carry an additional 6 spare torpedoes in racks, but manually reloading the devices in fresh weather was impossible. The command of the Northern Fleet was the first to understand this and in March 1942 ordered the spare torpedoes to be removed.

Anti-submarine weapons

On the rails located on the upper deck, the ship could take 60 min of KB-3, or 65 min of the 1926 model, or 95 min of the 1912 model (in overload). Standard set of depth charges - 25 pieces (10 large B-1 and 15 small M-1); later it was brought to 40 B-1 and 27 M-1. Large bombs were stored directly in the aft bomb releasers; small - 12 in the cellar and 8 in the stern rack on the poop.

Power plant

Two main turbo-gear three-case units of a mixed active-reactive system and three water-tube boilers of a triangular type, with a capacity of 48,000 liters. with. at 415 rpm., which rotated two propellers with a diameter of 3.18 m and a pitch of 3.65 m.

Assistive devices and systems

Detection, navigation and communication aids

Driving performance: overload, stability, seaworthiness

To increase stability, a part of the "sevens" in 1940-1941 was laid with solid ballast (82 - 67 tons). The seaworthiness of the "sevens" left much to be desired. Due to the narrowed contours of the bow of the hull, they were strongly buried in the wave; when the sea is 8 points, the speed dropped to 5-8 knots.

External differences

Crew

Service during the Great Patriotic War

Baltic Fleet

By the beginning of the war, the Baltic Fleet had five "sevens" at its disposal - the destroyers "Angry", "Proud", "Threatening", "Sharp-witted" and "Guarding".

The destroyer Wrath, the lead ship of this series of destroyers, died at the very beginning of the war, on June 23, 1941, after being blown up by a German minefield. The team managed to keep the ship afloat, however, in the conditions of detecting periscopes (which most likely simply fancied to observers) and a mine explosion following the "Wrathful" cruiser "Maxim Gorky", the commander of the ship detachment I.G. Svyatov ordered to evacuate the destroyer team and shoot the damaged ship.

The destroyer "Proud" in June-August 1941 operated as part of a detachment of light forces of the Baltic Fleet, participated in mine laying, rescuing teams from the destroyers "Angry" and "Angry", provided fire support to the Soviet troops defending Tallinn. On August 28, 1941, during the evacuation of troops and navy from Tallinn, he received heavy damage from a mine blowing up near the side, the next day he was attacked by German aviation, but reached Kronstadt. On September 29, in Kronstadt, he received additional damage and was transferred to Leningrad, where he was repaired until October 8. In November, the destroyer was included in the number of ships that participated in the evacuation of the garrison of the Hanko Peninsula to Leningrad, but on the night of November 13-14, during the transition to Hanko, it was blown up by two mines and sank.

During the first months of the war, the destroyer Threatening operated in the Gulf of Riga and in the waters of the Moonsund archipelago. On July 20, during a mine laying in the Irbensky Strait, he was damaged by a mine explosion near the side, after which he left for Kronstadt and was under repair until September. In September, he supported the Soviet troops with fire at Oranienbaum, but on September 18 it again got up for repair in Kronstadt, and on September 21-23, the ship docked received several hits from aerial bombs. In October, the damaged destroyer was transferred to Leningrad, where it was repaired until June 1942. After repairs, the "Terrible" was mainly engaged in artillery support of the troops defending Leningrad, in January 1944 it supported the Soviet troops with fire during the Krasnoselsko-Ropsha offensive operation.

The destroyer Smetlivy also operated in the Gulf of Riga in June and early July, then moved to Tallinn. In the second half of July, underwent repairs in Leningrad, after which he participated in the defense of Tallinn, the Tallinn passage and support of the defenders of Leningrad Soviet troops... On November 3, the ship made a transition to the Hanko naval base, where it took on board 560 soldiers evacuated from the peninsula, but on the way back the destroyer was blown up by two mines and sank, only 80 crew members and 270 passengers were saved.

The destroyer "Guarding" in July-August operated in the Gulf of Riga together with the destroyer "Grozyaschiy". On August 11, the destroyer accompanied the hospital ship "Vyacheslav Molotov" on the crossing to Kronstadt, and was able to tow the ship that was blown up by a mine to its destination. On September 21, the destroyer located at Peterhof was attacked by a group of German bombers, received several direct hits and sank in shallow water. In October, part of the equipment and weapons was removed from the sunken ship, but it was not possible to carry out full-fledged lifting work due to the proximity of the front line. Only in July 1944, the ship, which had been lying at the bottom for almost three years, was raised and in 1948 returned to the fleet.

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet had six "sevens" - the destroyers "Fast", "Bodry", "Boyky", "Vigilant", "Impeccable" and "Merciless".

"Fast" in the early days of the war was engaged in the provision of air defense of Sevastopol. On July 1, the destroyer was sent for repairs to Nikolaev, but at the exit from the bay it blew up on a bottom mine and sank. On July 13, "Bystry" was raised and docked, but on August 30, the ship was taken out of the dock, and in early September the damaged destroyer was attacked by aircraft and sank again. The bow of the damaged destroyer was already used in the fall of 1941 to repair the same type of "Merciless", and the entire hull was raised only after the war for disposal.

"Vigorous" met the beginning of the war in Sevastopol, carried out patrol service from August to October, participated in the support and supply of the Soviet troops defending Odessa. On October 31, the ship was attacked by aircraft and received serious damage from close explosions, which is why it was repaired for a month and a half. At the end of December, the destroyer, together with the cruisers Krasny Kavkaz and Krasny Krym, the leader Kharkiv and the destroyer Nezamozhnik, delivered reinforcements and ammunition to Sevastopol; in January 1942, she participated in the tactical landing near Sudak. In February-July 1942, she again went for repairs in Tuapse, in July she was transferred to Poti, but on July 16, the destroyer, which had already completed repairs, came under attack from German bombers attacking the port of Poti, received severe damage and went out of order almost until the end of the war - the repair was completed December 31, 1944.

"Boyky", like "Bodry" in August-October, was engaged in supporting the troops in Odessa, participated in the landing at Grigorievka, then escorted transports going to Sevastopol, in early November ensured the evacuation of troops and ammunition from Yalta to Sevastopol. On December 28-30, the destroyer took part in the landing at the port of Feodosia. In January, the ship underwent repairs, after which it participated in the supply of Sevastopol, several raids, including raids to the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts. In 1943, until the ban on the use of destroyers in combat operations without Moscow's sanction, which followed in October, Boykiy made several exits to the coast of the Taman Peninsula and Crimea, shelling the coast and laying mines. Since October, the destroyer went out to sea only sporadically (including the wear and tear of mechanisms) and did not take part in hostilities.

"Vigilant" the beginning of the war met in a major overhaul in Sevastopol and until October did not participate in hostilities. In late October - early November, he took part in the evacuation of troops from Donuzlav and from the Tendrovskaya Spit to Sevastopol, in February-March he supported the southern flank of the Crimean Front. On April 17, he accompanied the Svaneti ambulance transport at the transition from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, after the death of the transport, he saved 143 people. Participated in the delivery of reinforcements to Sevastopol, was one of the last large ships that reached the city (June 25). On July 2, 1942, the destroyer in Novorossiysk was attacked by German bombers, one of the bombs hit the bow torpedo tube and caused the torpedoes to detonate, from which the ship was literally torn in two. The destroyer was not subject to restoration.

"Impeccable" at the beginning of the war was engaged in staging minefields, took part in the defense of Odessa, during the support of the landing at Grigorievka was heavily damaged by German aircraft. In November, after repairs, he took part in the evacuation of Soviet troops from Yalta and from the Tendrovskaya Spit, in the defense of Sevastopol. in January-March 1942, he supported the Soviet landing at Sudak and the southern flank of the Crimean Front. On June 24, the destroyer, together with the leader "Tashkent", delivered reinforcements to Sevastopol and took out the wounded. On June 26, the leader and the destroyer embarked on a second voyage, but in the evening of the same day, the destroyer was attacked by enemy aircraft and sank with the entire crew and soldiers on board.

"Merciless" also in the first days of the war was engaged in mine laying, then participated in the defense of Odessa and the landing at Grigorievka, during which he received significant damage and was sent for repairs to Sevastopol. In early November, the ship under repair was again attacked from the air, due to which the hastily repaired ship was evacuated to Poti, where it was under repair until September 1942. From October 1942 to October 1943, the ship took part in the transport of troops from Poti and Batumi to Tuapse, escorted transports, made several voyages to the coast of Crimea and to the shores of Bulgaria. October 6, 1943. "Merciless" together with the leader "Kharkov" and the destroyer "Capable" made a raid to Yalta and Feodosia. On the way back, the detachment of ships underwent four consecutive attacks by bombers, during the second attack the destroyer received heavy damage, and in the next attack was finished off.

Northern Fleet

Pacific fleet

Modernization

Post-war service

"Threatening" in 1946 became part of the 4th (South-Baltic) Navy, from December 1948 - part of the 8th (North-Baltic Navy). In June 1952, the ode was delivered for a major overhaul, but already in August next year repairs were discontinued, and the ship was expelled from the Navy and sent for scrap.