Ampoule. Forgotten WWII weapons? Volley fire systems in WWII Ammunition of the former German Army
By the end of the 30s, almost all participants in the coming world war had formed general directions in development small arms. The range and accuracy of the defeat was reduced, which was offset by a greater density of fire. As a consequence of this - the beginning of the mass rearmament of units with automatic small arms - submachine guns, machine guns, assault rifles.
The accuracy of fire began to fade into the background, while the soldiers advancing in a chain began to be taught shooting from the move. With the advent of airborne troops, it became necessary to create special lightweight weapons.
Maneuvering war also affected machine guns: they became much lighter and more mobile. New types of small arms appeared (which was dictated, first of all, by the need to fight tanks) - rifle grenades, anti-tank guns and RPG with cumulative grenades.
Small arms of the USSR of the Second World War
Rifle division of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was a very formidable force - about 14.5 thousand people. The main type of small arms were rifles and carbines - 10420 pieces. The share of submachine guns was insignificant - 1204. Easel, hand and anti-aircraft machine guns were respectively 166, 392 and 33 units.
The division had its own artillery of 144 guns and 66 mortars. The firepower was supplemented by 16 tanks, 13 armored vehicles and a solid fleet of auxiliary automotive and tractor equipment.
Rifles and carbines
The main small arms of the infantry units of the USSR in the first period of the war was certainly the famous three-ruler - 7.62 mm rifle by S. I. Mosin, model 1891, modernized in 1930. qualities, in particular, with an aiming range of 2 km. 
The three-ruler is an ideal weapon for newly drafted soldiers, and the simplicity of the design created huge opportunities for its mass production. But like any weapon, the three-ruler had flaws. A permanently attached bayonet in combination with a long barrel (1670 mm) created inconvenience when moving, especially in wooded areas. Serious complaints were caused by the shutter handle when reloading.
On its basis, a sniper rifle and a series of carbines of the 1938 and 1944 models were created. Fate measured the three-ruler for a long century (the last three-ruler was released in 1965), participation in many wars and an astronomical "circulation" of 37 million copies.
Sniper with Mosin rifle (with optical sight PE model 1931)
Sighting range SVT-40 - up to 1 km. SVT-40 won back with honor on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. It was also appreciated by our opponents. historical fact: having captured rich trophies at the beginning of the war, among which there were quite a few SVT-40s, the German army ... adopted it, and the Finns created their own rifle, Tarako, on the basis of the SVT-40.
The creative development of the ideas implemented in the SVT-40 was the AVT-40 automatic rifle. It differed from its predecessor in the ability to conduct automatic fire at a rate of up to 25 rounds per minute. The disadvantage of AVT-40 is low accuracy of fire, strong unmasking flame and a loud sound at the time of the shot. In the future, as the mass receipt of automatic weapons in the troops, it was removed from service.
Submachine guns
The Great Patriotic War was the time of the final transition from rifles to automatic weapons. The Red Army began to fight armed with a small amount of PPD-40 - a submachine gun designed by the outstanding Soviet designer Vasily Alekseevich Degtyarev. At that time, PPD-40 was in no way inferior to its domestic and foreign counterparts. 
Designed for pistol cartridge cal. 7.62 x 25 mm, PPD-40 had an impressive ammunition load of 71 rounds, placed in a drum-type magazine. Weighing about 4 kg, it provided firing at a speed of 800 rounds per minute with an effective range of up to 200 meters. However, a few months after the start of the war, he was replaced by the legendary PPSh-40 cal. 7.62 x 25 mm.
The creator of the PPSh-40, designer Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, was faced with the task of developing an extremely easy-to-use, reliable, technologically advanced, cheap-to-manufacture mass weapon. 
From its predecessor - PPD-40, PPSh inherited a drum magazine for 71 rounds. A little later, a simpler and more reliable sector carob magazine for 35 rounds was developed for him. The mass of equipped machine guns (both options) was 5.3 and 4.15 kg, respectively. The rate of fire of the PPSh-40 reached 900 rounds per minute with an aiming range of up to 300 meters and with the ability to conduct single fire.
To master the PPSh-40, several lessons were enough. It was easily disassembled into 5 parts, made using the stamping-welded technology, thanks to which, during the war years, the Soviet defense industry produced about 5.5 million machine guns.
In the summer of 1942, the young designer Alexei Sudaev presented his brainchild - a 7.62 mm submachine gun. It was strikingly different from its "older brothers" PPD and PPSh-40 in its rational layout, higher manufacturability and ease of manufacturing parts by arc welding. 
PPS-42 was 3.5 kg lighter and required three times less time to manufacture. However, despite the quite obvious advantages, he never became a mass weapon, leaving the palm of the PPSh-40.
By the beginning of the war, the DP-27 light machine gun (Degtyarev infantry, cal 7.62mm) had been in service with the Red Army for almost 15 years, having the status of the main light machine gun of infantry units. Its automation was driven by the energy of powder gases. The gas regulator reliably protected the mechanism from pollution and high temperatures.
The DP-27 could only conduct automatic fire, but even a beginner needed a few days to master shooting in short bursts of 3-5 shots. The ammunition load of 47 rounds was placed in a disk magazine with a bullet to the center in one row. The store itself was attached to the top of the receiver. The weight of the unloaded machine gun was 8.5 kg. Equipped store increased it by almost 3 kg.
It was powerful weapon with an effective range of 1.5 km and a combat rate of fire up to 150 rounds per minute. In combat position, the machine gun relied on the bipod. A flame arrester was screwed onto the end of the barrel, significantly reducing its unmasking effect. DP-27 was serviced by a gunner and his assistant. In total, about 800 thousand machine guns were fired.
Small arms of the Wehrmacht of World War II
The main strategy of the German army is offensive or blitzkrieg (blitzkrieg - lightning war). The decisive role in it was assigned to large tank formations, carrying out deep penetrations of the enemy defenses in cooperation with artillery and aviation.
Tank units bypassed powerful fortified areas, destroying control centers and rear communications, without which the enemy would quickly lose combat capability. The defeat was completed by the motorized units of the ground forces.
Small arms of the infantry division of the Wehrmacht
The staff of the German infantry division of the 1940 model assumed the presence of 12609 rifles and carbines, 312 submachine guns (automatic machines), light and heavy machine guns - respectively 425 and 110 pieces, 90 anti-tank rifles and 3600 pistols.Small arms of the Wehrmacht as a whole met the high requirements of wartime. It was reliable, trouble-free, simple, easy to manufacture and maintain, which contributed to its mass production.
Rifles, carbines, machine guns
Mauser 98K
The Mauser 98K is an improved version of the Mauser 98 rifle developed in late XIX century by the brothers Paul and Wilhelm Mauser, the founders of the world famous arms company. Equipping the German army with it began in 1935. 
Mauser 98K
The weapon was equipped with a clip with five 7.92 mm cartridges. A trained soldier could accurately fire 15 times within a minute at a distance of up to 1.5 km. Mauser 98K was very compact. Its main characteristics: weight, length, barrel length - 4.1 kg x 1250 x 740 mm. The indisputable merits of the rifle are evidenced by numerous conflicts with its participation, longevity and a truly sky-high "circulation" - more than 15 million units.
Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"
Perhaps the most famous small arms of the Wehrmacht during World War II was the famous MP-40 submachine gun, a modification of its predecessor, the MP-36, created by Heinrich Volmer. However, by the will of fate, he is better known under the name "Schmeisser", received thanks to the stamp on the store - "PATENT SCHMEISSER". The stigma simply meant that, in addition to G. Volmer, Hugo Schmeisser also participated in the creation of the MP-40, but only as the creator of the store. 
Automatic MP-40 "Schmeisser"
Initially, the MP-40 was intended to arm the commanders of infantry units, but later it was handed over to tankers, armored vehicle drivers, paratroopers and special forces soldiers.
However, the MP-40 was absolutely not suitable for infantry units, since it was an exclusively melee weapon. In a fierce battle in the open, having a weapon with a range of 70 to 150 meters meant for a German soldier to be practically unarmed in front of his opponent, armed with Mosin and Tokarev rifles with a range of 400 to 800 meters.
Assault rifle StG-44
Assault rifle StG-44 (sturmgewehr) cal. 7.92mm is another legend of the Third Reich. This is certainly an outstanding creation of Hugo Schmeisser - the prototype of many post-war assault rifles and machine guns, including the famous AK-47. 
StG-44 could conduct single and automatic fire. Her weight with a full magazine was 5.22 kg. In the sighting range - 800 meters - "Sturmgever" was in no way inferior to its main competitors. Three versions of the store were provided - for 15, 20 and 30 shots with a rate of up to 500 rounds per minute. The option of using a rifle with an underbarrel grenade launcher and an infrared sight was considered.
It was not without its shortcomings. The assault rifle was heavier than the Mauser-98K by a whole kilogram. Her wooden butt could not withstand sometimes hand-to-hand combat and simply broke. The flames escaping from the barrel gave away the location of the shooter, and the long magazine and sighting devices forced him to raise his head high in the prone position.
The 7.92mm MG-42 is quite rightly called one of the best machine guns of World War II. It was developed at Grossfuss by engineers Werner Gruner and Kurt Horn. Those who experienced its firepower were very frank. Our soldiers called it "lawn mower", and the allies - "Hitler's circular saw."
Depending on the type of shutter, the machine gun accurately fired at a speed of up to 1500 rpm at a distance of up to 1 km. Ammunition was carried out using a machine-gun belt for 50 - 250 rounds. The uniqueness of the MG-42 was complemented by a relatively small number of parts - 200 and the high manufacturability of their production by stamping and spot welding.
The barrel, red-hot from firing, was replaced by a spare one in a few seconds using a special clamp. In total, about 450 thousand machine guns were fired. The unique technical developments embodied in the MG-42 were borrowed by gunsmiths in many countries of the world when creating their machine guns.
Here is a small illustration:
Suppose I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front, the ratio of forces in artillery pieces and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95,604 Soviet against 54,570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active sectors it could be brought up to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation, 29,000 Soviet against 10,000 enemy) Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under hurricane fire Soviet artillery? No, an artillery piece is just a tool for firing shells. There are no shells - and the gun is a useless toy. And providing shells is just the task of logistics.
In 2009, at VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of the ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum/0/archive/1706/1706490.htm , 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm , 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0/archive/1733/1733171.htm). I collected everything in a table, supplemented it with rocket artillery, for the Germans I added from Hann the consumption of captured calibers (often it gives an insignificant addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet figures, tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-anti-aircraft) are present. Posted. Well, grouped a little differently. It turns out to be pretty interesting. Despite the superiority of Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans shot more shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e. guns 75 mm and above, without anti-aircraft guns) the Germans have more:
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If translated into tons, then the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446.113 709.957 1943 828.193 1.121.545 1944 1.000.962 1.540.933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing side. I note that for the Germans I did not consider armor-piercing shells of tank and anti-tank guns(I hope you understand why). It is not possible to exclude them for the Soviet side, but, judging by the Germans, the amendment will come out insignificant. In Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.
In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day on the barrel of a gun from 76.2 mm and above in the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both in years and in calibers: in 1944, the average daily shot for all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122-mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. The average daily shot per mortar barrel, on the contrary, is growing year by year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.
As for the Germans, I do not have the presence of guns in the army. But if we take the total availability of guns, then the average daily shot per barrel of 75-mm and higher caliber in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) fired an average of 14.5 shells per barrel per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) about 10, 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81-mm mortars fired 4.4 rounds per barrel per day, and 120-mm only 2.3. Regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to the average (75-mm infantry gun 7 rounds per barrel, 150-mm infantry gun - 8.3).
Another instructive metric is the expenditure of shells per division.
The division was the main organizational building block, but typically the divisions were reinforced by units. It is interesting to see what supported the middle division in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had in the active army (without the RGC) about 500 calculated divisions (weighted average: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). IN ground forces the active army was approximately 5.5 million, that is, the division accounted for approximately 11 thousand people. This "had to" naturally, taking into account both the actual composition of the division, and all the reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the rear.
Among the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times "thicker" than the Soviet one. At the same time, the average daily shot on the Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and on the German - three times more (16.2 tons). If we calculate for 10,000 people of the active army, then from the Soviet side to support their actions in 1944 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day, and from the German 13.8 tons.
The American division in the European theater in this sense stands out even more. It had three times as many people as the Soviet one: 34,000 (this is without Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day per 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.
In this sense, it was the Americans who implemented the recommendation of Joseph Vissarionovich "to fight with little blood but with a lot of shells." It can be compared - in June 1944 the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and the Americans also reached the Elbe at about the same time. That is, they ensured the same speed of advancement for themselves. However, the Americans on this route used up 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month in killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops advancing at the same speed spent (specifically) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. speed was provided by the expenditure of manpower.
It is also interesting to see the distribution of the weight consumption of ammunition by types of guns:
I remind you that all the numbers here are for artillery 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50-mm mortars, without battalion / anti-tank guns with a caliber from 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns hit German guns with this name, the Soviet 76-mm regiments and the American 75-mm howitzer. The remaining guns weighing less than 8 tons in combat position are counted as field guns. Systems such as the Soviet 152 mm ML-20 howitzer gun and the German s.FH 18 fall here at the upper limit. Heavier guns, such as the Soviet 203 mm B-4 howitzer, the American 203 mm M1 howitzer or the German mm mortar, as well as 152-155-170-mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.
It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire on the near tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very insignificant role (in 1945 more, but not by much). In field artillery, forces (by weight of projectiles fired) are roughly evenly distributed between the 76mm cannon, 122mm howitzer, and 152mm howitzer/howitzer cannon. Which leads to the fact that the average weight of the Soviet projectile is one and a half times less than the German one.
In addition, it should be noted that the farther the target, the (on average) it is less covered. In the near tactical zone, most of the targets are somehow dug / covered, while in the depths there are such uncovered targets as advancing reserves, enemy troops in clusters, headquarters, etc. In other words, a projectile that hits the target in depth on average does more damage than a projectile fired at the leading edge (on the other hand, the dispersion of projectiles at long distances is higher).
Then, if the enemy has parity in the weight of shells fired, but at the same time holds twice less people, thus it gives half as many targets for our artillery.
All this works for the observed loss ratio.
(As an extended commentary on
In the first weeks of the war, the fronts suffered significant losses and losses accumulated in the troops of the border military districts in the prewar years. Most of the artillery factories and munitions factories were evacuated from the threatened areas to the east.
The supply of arms and ammunition by military factories in the south of the country has ceased. All this significantly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition and the provision of them to the army and new military formations. Shortcomings in the work of the Main Artillery Directorate also had a negative effect on the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition. GAU did not always know exactly the state of security of the troops of the fronts, since strict accountability for this service before the war was not established. The report card for urgent reports on ammunition was introduced at the end of ., and on weapons - in April
Soon changes were made to the organization of the Main Artillery Directorate. In July 1941, the Directorate for the Supply of Ground Artillery Weapons was formed, and on September 20 of the same year, the post of chief of artillery of the Soviet Army was restored with the GAU subordinated to him. The head of the GAU became the first deputy head of artillery of the Soviet Army. The adopted structure of the GAU did not change throughout the war and fully justified itself. With the introduction of the post of Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, close cooperation was established between the GAU, the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army and Central Office military messages.
The heroic labor of the working class, scientists, engineers and technicians at the military enterprises of the central and eastern regions country, the firm and skillful leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, local party organizations by restructuring the entire national economy on a war footing allowed the Soviet military industry to produce 30.2 thousand guns in the second half of 1941, including 9.9 thousand 76- mm and larger calibers, 42.3 thousand mortars (of which 19.1 thousand 82 mm caliber and larger), 106.2 thousand machine guns, 89.7 thousand machine guns, 1.6 million rifles and carbines and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines 215. But since these deliveries of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the situation with the provision of troops in the army with weapons and ammunition continued to remain tense. It took a huge effort of the military industry, the work of the central organs of the rear, the artillery supply service of the GAU in order to satisfy the needs of the fronts in weapons, and especially in ammunition.
During the period of the defensive battle near Moscow, due to the current production, which was continuously growing in the eastern regions of the country, they were primarily provided with weapons from the Stavka reserve associations. Supreme High Command- 1st shock, 20th and 10th armies, formed in the depths of the country and transferred to the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow as part of the Western Front. Due to the current production of weapons, the needs of the troops and other fronts participating in the defensive battle and counteroffensive near Moscow were also met.
During this difficult period for our country, Moscow factories performed a great deal of work on the manufacture of various types of weapons. As a result, the number of weapons in Western front by December 1941, for some of its types, it increased from 50-80 to 370-640 percent. A significant increase in armament was also in the troops of other fronts.
During the counter-offensive near Moscow, a mass repair of out-of-service weapons and military equipment was organized in military repair shops, at enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region. Nevertheless, the situation with the provision of troops during this period was so difficult that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin personally distributed anti-tank rifles, machine guns, anti-tank 76-mm regimental and divisional guns between the fronts.
With the entry into operation of military factories, especially in the Urals, in Western and Eastern Siberia, in Kazakhstan, already in the second quarter of 1942, the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition began to noticeably improve. In 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of guns of 76 mm and larger caliber, over 100,000 mortars (82-120 mm), many millions of shells and mines.
In 1942, the main and most difficult task was to provide for the troops of the fronts operating in the Stalingrad region, in the large bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.
The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle near Stalingrad was very high. So, for example, from July 12 to November 18, 1942, the troops of the Don, Stalingrad and South-Western fronts spent: 7,610 thousand shells and mines, including about 5 million shells and mines by the troops of the Stalingrad Front 216.
Due to the huge workload railways By operational transportation, ammunition transports moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the front-line railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaisatskaya, Krasny Kut). In order to deliver ammunition to the troops faster, the Stalingrad Front Artillery Supply Department was assigned two automobile battalions, which managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition in an extremely limited time frame.
The provision of weapons and ammunition to the troops of the Stalingrad Front was complicated by the enemy's continuous bombardment of crossings across the Volga. As a result of enemy air raids and shelling, the artillery depots of the front and armies were often forced to change their location. The trains were unloaded only at night. In order to disperse supply railway trains Ammunition was sent to army depots and their departments located near the railway, in flying cars, 5-10 wagons each, and then to the troops in small automobile columns (10-12 cars each), which usually followed different routes. This method of transportation ensured the safety of ammunition, but at the same time lengthened the time for their delivery to the troops.
The supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops of other fronts operating in the Volga and Don region during this period was less complicated and laborious. During the period of the defensive battle near Stalingrad, all three fronts received 5,388 wagons of ammunition, 123,000 rifles and machine guns, 53,000 machine guns, and 8,000 guns.
Along with the current supply of troops, the rear services of the center, fronts and armies during the defensive battle near Stalingrad carried out the accumulation of weapons and ammunition. As a result of the work done, by the beginning of the counteroffensive, the troops were mainly provided with ammunition (Table 19).
Table 19
Provision of troops of three fronts with ammunition (in ammunition) as of November 19, 1942 218
| Ammunition | Front | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Stalingrad | Donskoy | Southwestern | |
| Rifle cartridges | 3,0 | 1,8 | 3,2 |
| Cartridges for pistols | 2,4 | 2,5 | 1,3 |
| Cartridges for anti-tank rifles | 1,2 | 1,5 | 1,6 |
| Hand and anti-tank grenades | 1,0 | 1,5 | 2,9 |
| 50mm mines | 1,3 | 1,4 | 2,4 |
| 82 mm mines | 1,5 | 0,7 | 2,4 |
| 120mm mines | 1,2 | 1,3 | 2,7 |
| Shots: | |||
| 45 mm cannon | 2,9 | 2,9 | 4,9 |
| 76 mm cannon regimental artillery | 2,1 | 1,4 | 3,3 |
| 76-mm cannon divisional artillery | 1,8 | 2,8 | 4,0 |
| 122 mm howitzer | 1,7 | 0,9 | 3,3 |
| 122 mm cannon | 0,4 | 2,2 | — |
| 152 mm howitzer | 1,2 | 7,2 | 5,7 |
| 152 mm howitzer-cannon | 1,1 | 3,5 | 3,6 |
| 203 mm howitzer | — | — | — |
| 37 mm anti-aircraft | 2,4 | 3,2 | 5,1 |
| 76 mm anti-aircraft | — | 5,1 | 4,5 |
| 85 mm anti-aircraft | — | 3,0 | 4,2 |
A great deal of work to provide troops with ammunition during this period was done by the heads of the artillery supply services of the fronts: Stalingrad - Colonel A. I. Markov, Donskoy - Colonel N. M. Bocharov, South-West - Colonel S. G. Algasov, as well as a special group of GAU led by the deputy head of the GAU, Lieutenant General of Artillery K. R. Myshkov, who died on August 10, 1942 during an enemy air raid on Stalingrad.
Simultaneously with the fighting that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, the battle for the Caucasus began in a vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Supplying the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea groups) with weapons and ammunition was an even more difficult problem than at Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition was carried out in a roundabout way, that is, from the Urals and from Siberia through Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Baku. Separate transports went through Astrakhan, Baku or Makhachkala. A long route for transports with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of goods from railway transport to the water and back, or from the railroad to the road and mountain-pack greatly increased the time of their delivery to the front and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 traveled from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia, equal to 7027 km. But, despite such huge distances, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. During the six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian (North Caucasian) Front received about 2,000 wagons of ammunition 219.
It was very difficult to deliver ammunition from the front and army warehouses to the troops defending the mountain passes and passes of the Caucasus Range. The main means of transportation here were army and military pack companies. In the 20th Guards Rifle Division, which was defending the Belorechensk direction, shells were delivered from Sukhumi to Sochi by sea, then to the divisional warehouse - by road, and to regimental combat nutrition points - by pack transport. For the 394th Rifle Division, ammunition was delivered by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. Ammunition was delivered in this way for almost all divisions of the 46th Army.
The working people of Transcaucasia rendered great help to the front. Up to 30 mechanical factories and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the manufacture of cases of hand grenades, mines and shells of medium caliber. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they manufactured 1.3 million cases of hand grenades, 1 million mines and 226 thousand cases of shells. The local industry of Transcaucasia manufactured in 1942 4294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, 46,492 machine guns 220.
The working class of besieged Leningrad worked heroically. Delivery of weapons and ammunition to the besieged city was extremely difficult, so the production of them on the spot was often of decisive importance. From September until the end of 1941 alone, the industry of the city gave the front 12,085 machine guns and signal pistols, 7,682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, Leningraders produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades.
Leningrad supplied weapons to other fronts as well. IN hard days November 1941, when the enemy was rushing to Moscow, by decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns were sent to Moscow. Disassembled guns were loaded onto aircraft and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery shop was equipped to assemble them. Then the assembled weapons were loaded onto platforms and delivered by rail to Moscow. In the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 76-mm armor-piercing shells to Moscow by air.
Despite the difficulties of the first period of the war, our industry steadily increased output from month to month. In 1942, the GAU received from military factories 125.6 thousand mortars (82-120 mm), 33.1 thousand guns of 76 mm caliber and larger without tank guns, 127.4 million shells without aircraft and mines 221, 2,069 thousand rockets 222. This made it possible to fully compensate for the combat losses of weapons and the consumption of ammunition.
Providing the troops of the army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult even in the second period of the war, which was marked by the beginning of a powerful counteroffensive. Soviet troops near Stalingrad. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts had 30.4 thousand guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of caliber 76 mm and above 223, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million cartridges for small arms and 1.2 million hand grenades. The supply of ammunition from the central bases and warehouses of the GAU for the entire time of the counteroffensive and liquidation of the encircled enemy grouping was carried out continuously. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, 1,095 wagons of ammunition were delivered to the Stalingrad Front, 1,460 wagons to the Don Front (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943), January 1, 1942) - 1090 cars and the Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) - 278 cars. In total, four fronts for the period November 1942 - January 1943 received 3923 carloads of ammunition.
The total consumption of ammunition in the battle for Stalingrad, starting from July 12, 1942, reached 9539 wagons 224 and had no equal in the history of previous wars. It amounted to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the four years of the First World War and twice the consumption of ammunition by both belligerents near Verdun.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition had to be supplied during the second period of the war to the Transcaucasian and North Caucasian fronts, which liberated the North Caucasus from Nazi troops.
Thanks to the effective measures of the Communist Party, the Soviet government, the State Defense Committee, local party and Soviet authorities, the heroic labor of the working class in 1942 significantly increased the production of weapons and ammunition. This made it possible to increase their supply to the troops. The increase in the number of weapons in the troops of the fronts at the beginning of 1943 compared with 1942 is shown in Table. 20 225.
Table 20
The fighting that unfolded in 1943 put before the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army new, even more challenging tasks on the timely accumulation and current supply of front troops with weapons and ammunition.
The volume of deliveries of weapons and ammunition especially increased during the preparations for the Battle of Kursk. In the period March - July 1943, more than half a million rifles and machine guns, 31.6 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 520 heavy machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12,326 guns and mortars, or a total of 3,100 weapons wagons 226.
In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, the artillery supply authorities of the center, fronts and armies already had some experience in planning to provide the troops of the army with weapons and ammunition. It was carried out in the following way. Monthly, the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which front, in which queue, how much ammunition (in ammunition) and by what date should be sent. On the basis of these instructions, the report cards of the fronts and their applications, the GAU planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army, based on their availability at the bases and warehouses of the NPO, production capabilities within a month, security and needs of the fronts. When the GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with the General Staff, made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition supply. The plan was considered and signed by Colonel-General, Commander of Artillery of the Soviet Army, then Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, his deputy, Chief of the GAU, General N. D. Yakovlev, and submitted to the Supreme Commander for approval.
Based on this plan, the organizational and planning department of the GAU (headed by General P.P. Volkotrubenko) reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Department. The latter, together with the TsUPVOSO, planned the dispatch of transports on terms in the range of five days and informed the fronts of the transport numbers, places and dates of their dispatch. As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the fronts from the central bases and warehouses of the NPO was preserved until the end of the war.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (on July 1, 1943), the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 21,686 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 518 rocket artillery installations, 3,489 tanks and 227 self-propelled guns.
A large number of weapons in the troops of the fronts operating on the Kursk Bulge, and the intensity of hostilities in the planned offensive operations, required an increase in the supply of ammunition to them. During April-June 1943, over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand wagons) were delivered to the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk fronts. By the beginning of the defensive battle, the fronts were provided with: 76-mm rounds - 2.7-4.3 ammunition; 122-mm howitzer shots - 2.4-3.4; 120 mm mines - 2.4-4; ammunition of large calibers - 3-5 rounds of ammunition 228. In addition, during the Battle of Kursk, 4781 wagons (over 119 full-weight trains) of various types of ammunition were supplied to these fronts from central bases and warehouses. Their average daily supply to the Central Front was 51 wagons, to Voronezh - 72 wagons and to Bryansk - 31 wagons 229.
The consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Kursk was especially high. Only during the period of July 5-12, 1943, the troops of the Central Front, repelling the fierce tank attacks of the enemy, used up 1083 wagons of ammunition (135 wagons per day). The main part falls on the 13th Army, which used up 817 wagons of ammunition in eight days, or 100 wagons per day. In just 50 days of the Battle of Kursk, the three fronts used up about 10,640 wagons of ammunition (excluding rockets), including 733 wagons of cartridges for small arms, 70 wagons of cartridges for anti-tank rifles, 234 wagons of hand grenades, 3,369 wagons of mines, 276 wagons shots of anti-aircraft artillery and 5950 wagons of shots of ground artillery 230.
Artillery supply in the Battle of Kursk was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply service of the fronts: Central - Colonel V. I. Shebanin, Voronezh - Colonel T. M. Moskalenko, Bryansk - Colonel M. V. Kuznetsov.
In the third period of the war, the supply of front troops with weapons and ammunition improved significantly. By the beginning of this period, the Soviet military industry could continuously supply them to the troops of the army in the field and new military units Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the bases and warehouses of the GAU, significant stocks of guns, mortars, and especially small arms were created. In this regard, in 1944, the production of small arms and ground artillery guns was somewhat reduced. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130.3 thousand guns, then in 1944 - 122.5 thousand. Supplies were reduced and rocket launchers(from 3330 in 1943 to 2564 in 1944). Due to this, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29 thousand in 1944 against 24 thousand in 1943).
At the same time, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the active army continued to be tight, especially with shells of 122 mm and higher caliber, due to their high consumption. The total stocks of these munitions decreased: for 122-mm rounds - by 670 thousand, for 152-mm shells - by 1.2 million and for 203-mm shells - by 172 thousand 231
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee, having considered the situation with the production of extremely scarce shells on the eve of decisive offensive operations, set the military industry the task of radically revising production programs for 1944 in the direction of a sharp increase in the production of all types of ammunition, and especially scarce ones.
By decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the production of ammunition in 1944 was significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-mm and 152-mm shells, 76-mm - by 3,064 thousand (9 percent), M-13 - by 385.5 thousand (19 percent) and M-31 shells - by 15.2 thousand (4 percent) 232. This made it possible to provide front troops with all types of ammunition in offensive operations of the third period of the war.
On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts had about 50 thousand guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and machine guns, 10 thousand machine guns 233, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition to small arms and 5 million hand grenades, which amounted to 1-2 front-line ammunition. During the operation, these fronts were supplied with more than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition 234. There were no interruptions in their supply. However, due to the early spring thaw on military roads and military supply routes, the movement of road transport became impossible, and the fronts began to experience great difficulties in transporting ammunition to the troops and to artillery firing positions. Tractors had to be used, and in some cases soldiers and the local population had to be brought in on impassable sections of the road to bring shells, cartridges, and grenades. Transport aircraft were also used to deliver ammunition to the front line.
To provide ammunition for tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, Po-2 aircraft were used. On February 7 and 8, 1944, they delivered from the Fursy airfield to settlements Baranie Pole and Druzhintsy 4.5 million rounds, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10 thousand 76- and 122-mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank units, making three to four flights a day. In total, more than 400 tons of ammunition were delivered by planes to the advancing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
Despite the great difficulties with the supply, the units, units and formations participating in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were fully provided with ammunition. In addition, their consumption in this operation was relatively small. In total, the troops of the two fronts used up only about 5.6 million rounds, including 400 thousand anti-aircraft artillery shells, 2.6 million ground artillery shells and 2.56 million mines.
The provision of troops with ammunition and weapons was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply of the fronts: the 1st Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery N. E. Manzhurin, the 2nd Ukrainian - Major General of Artillery P. A. Rozhkov.
A huge amount of weapons and ammunition was required during the preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. To fully equip the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts that took part in it, in May - July 1944, 6370 guns and mortars, over 10 thousand machine guns and 260 thousand rifles were submitted and machine guns 236. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had 2-2.5 ammunition for small arms, 2.5-5 ammunition for mines, 2.5-4 ammunition for anti-aircraft rounds, 3-4 ammunition for 76-mm shells, 2.5-5 .3 rounds of 122-mm howitzer shells, 3.0-8.3 rounds of 152-mm shells.
Never before has there been such a high supply of ammunition for the troops of the fronts in any of the earlier offensive operations on a strategic scale. For the shipment of weapons and ammunition to the fronts, the bases, warehouses and arsenals of the NGOs worked with maximum load. The personnel of all units of the rear, the workers of the railway transport did everything in their power to deliver weapons and ammunition to the troops in a timely manner.
However, during the Belarusian operation, due to the rapid separation of troops from the bases, as well as due to the insufficiently high rates of restoration of railway communications badly destroyed by the enemy, the supply of fronts with ammunition was often complicated. Road transport worked with great tension, but alone could not cope with the huge volume of supplies in the operational and military rear.
Even the relatively frequent advance of the head sections of front-line and army artillery depots did not solve the problem of timely delivery of ammunition to troops advancing in a wooded and swampy area, in off-road conditions. The dispersion of ammunition stocks along the front line and in depth also had a negative effect. For example, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front on August 1, 1944 were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front line. A similar situation was in a number of armies of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts. The advancing units and formations could not lift all the stocks of ammunition accumulated in them during the preparation of the operation. The military councils of the fronts and armies were forced to allocate a large number of vehicles to collect and deliver to the troops the ammunition remaining in the rear. For example, the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the head of logistics of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front - 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. On the 2nd Belorussian Front in the areas of Krichev and Mogilev, by the end of July 1944, stocks of ammunition were at 85 points, and at the initial positions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front - at 100. The command was forced to transfer them by planes 237. Leaving ammunition at the initial frontiers, artillery firing positions and along the path of advancement of units and formations led to the fact that the troops began to lack them, although there was a sufficient amount of ammunition registered in the fronts and armies.
The total consumption of ammunition of all calibers during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was significant. But if we proceed from the large availability of weapons, then it was generally relatively small. During the operation, 270 million (460 wagons) ammunition for small arms, 2,832,000 (1,700 wagons) mines, 478,000 (115 wagons) rounds of anti-aircraft artillery, about 3,434.6 thousand (3,656 wagons) shots of ground artillery 238.
The supply of troops with ammunition during the Belarusian offensive operation was led by the chiefs of the artillery supply of the fronts: 1st Baltic - Major General of Artillery A.P. Baikov, 3rd Belorussian - Major General of Engineering and Technical Service A.S. Volkov, 2nd Belorussian - Colonel-Engineer E. N. Ivanov and the 1st Belorussian - Major General of the Engineering and Technical Service V. I. Shebanin.
The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. During July and August, the 1st Ukrainian Front used up 4,706 wagons of ammunition, and the 1st Belorussian Front - 2,372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belorussian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high pace of the advance of the troops and their large separation from the artillery depots of the fronts and armies, poor road conditions and the large volume of supply that fell on the shoulders of road transport.
A similar situation developed in the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts that participated in the Iasi-Kishinev operation. Before the start of the offensive, from two to three rounds of ammunition were concentrated directly in the troops. But in the course of breaking through the enemy defenses, they were not completely used up. The troops advanced quickly and took with them only the ammunition that their motor transport could lift. A significant amount of ammunition remained in divisional warehouses on the right and left banks of the Dniester. Due to the great length of the military routes, their supply stopped after two days, and five to six days after the start of the offensive, the troops began to experience a great need for ammunition, despite their small consumption. After the resolute intervention of the military councils and rear services of the fronts, all vehicles were mobilized, and the situation was soon rectified. This made it possible to successfully complete the Iasi-Kishinev operation.
During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing the troops with weapons and ammunition. The total stocks of ammunition as of January 1, 1945, as compared to 1944, increased by 54 percent for mines, by 35 percent for anti-aircraft artillery shots, and by 11 percent for ground artillery shots. Nazi Germany not only fully provided for the needs of the troops of the army in the field, but also managed to create additional stocks of ammunition at the front and army warehouses of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal fronts.
The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations - East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. During the period of their training, the troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition. There were no serious difficulties in transporting them during operations due to the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways.
The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, was distinguished by the largest consumption of ammunition in the entire Great Patriotic War. During its course, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts used up 15,038 wagons of ammunition (5382 wagons in the Vistula-Oder operation).
After the successful completion of the Vistula-Oder offensive operation, our troops reached the line of the river. Oder (Odra) and began to prepare for the assault on the main citadel of Nazism - Berlin. In terms of the degree of equipment of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts with military equipment and weapons, the Berlin offensive operation surpasses all offensive operations Great Patriotic War. The Soviet rear and the Rear of the Armed Forces proper provided the troops well with everything necessary for inflicting the last crushing blow on Nazi Germany. During the preparation of the operation, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million cartridges and about 1.5 million hand grenades were sent to the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and machine guns, over 76 thousand machine guns and 48 thousand guns and mortars 240. During the Berlin operation (from April 16 to May 8), 1945, 7.2 million (5924 wagons) of shells and mines, which (taking into account stocks) fully provided for the consumption and made it possible to create the necessary reserve of them by the end of the operation.
In the final operation of the Great Patriotic War, more than 10 million shells and mines, 392 million cartridges and almost 3 million hand grenades were used up - a total of 9,715 wagons of ammunition. In addition, 241.7 thousand (1920 wagons) of 241 rockets were used up. During preparation and during the operation, ammunition was transported along the Allied and Western European gauge railways, and from here to the troops - by front-line and army vehicles. At the junctions of railways of the Allied and Western European gauges, the transshipment of ammunition was widely practiced in the areas of specially created transshipment bases. It was quite laborious and difficult work.
In general, the supply of ammunition to the troops of the fronts in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of previous years of the Great Patriotic War. If in the fourth quarter of 1944 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the fronts, then in four months of 1945 - 44,041 wagons (1,101 trains). To this figure it is necessary to add the supply of ammunition to the country's air defense forces, as well as to units marines. Given her total ammunition sent from the central bases and warehouses to the troops of the army in the four months of 1945 amounted to 1327 trains 242.
The domestic military industry and the rear services of the Soviet Army successfully coped with the task of supplying the troops of the fronts and new formations with weapons and ammunition in the past war.
The active army used up more than 10 million tons of ammunition during the war. As you know, the military industry supplied individual elements of shots to artillery bases. In total, about 500 thousand wagons of these elements were delivered during the war, which were assembled into ready-made shells and sent to the fronts. This colossal and complex work was carried out at the GAU artillery bases mainly by women, old people and teenagers. They stood at the conveyors for 16-18 hours a day, did not leave the workshops for several days, ate and rested right there, at the machines. Their heroic, selfless work during the war years will never be forgotten by the grateful socialist Fatherland.
Summing up the work of the artillery supply service of the Soviet Army during the past war, it should be emphasized once again that the basis of this type of material support for the Armed Forces was industry, which during the war years supplied the army with several million units of small arms, hundreds of thousands of guns and mortars, hundreds of millions of shells and mines, tens of billions of rounds. Along with the steady growth in the mass production of weapons and ammunition, a number of qualitatively new types of ground and anti-aircraft artillery were created, new types of small arms were developed, as well as sub-caliber and HEAT rounds. All these weapons were successfully used by the Soviet troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
As for the import of weapons, it was very insignificant and, in fact, did not have a big impact on the equipment of the Soviet troops. In addition, imported weapons were inferior to Soviet weapons in terms of their tactical and technical data. Several anti-aircraft artillery systems received by import in the third period of the war were only partially used in the air defense forces, and 40-mm anti-aircraft guns and remained at the GAU bases until the end of the war.
The good quality of weapons and ammunition supplied by the domestic military industry to the Soviet Army during the war years was largely ensured by a wide network of military representatives (military acceptance) of the GAU. Equally important in the timely supply of armaments and ammunition to the troops of the army in the field was the fact that it was based on strictly planned production and provision. Establishing since 1942 a system for recording and reporting weapons and ammunition in the troops, armies and fronts, as well as planning for their supply to the fronts, the artillery supply service continuously improved and improved organizational forms, methods and methods of work to provide the troops of the army in the field. Rigid centralization of leadership from top to bottom, close and continuous interaction of the artillery supply service of the center, fronts and armies, formations and units with other rear services, and especially with rear headquarters and the military communications service, hard work of all types of transport made it possible to provide troops of the fronts and new formations of the Stavka Supreme High Command of Arms and Ammunition. In the Main Artillery Directorate, which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a coherent system of systematic and purposeful provision of troops with weapons and ammunition has developed, corresponding to the nature of the war, its scope and methods of warfare. This system fully justified itself throughout the war. The uninterrupted supply of the army with weapons and ammunition was achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and creative activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet government, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the precise work of the USSR State Planning Commission, employees of the defense people's commissariats and all links in the rear of the Soviet Army, the selfless and heroic work of the working class .
Any beginner, or already an experienced search engine, knows how often cartridges or shells come across from the Second World War. But besides cartridge cases, or cartridges, there are even more dangerous finds. That's what we'll talk about safety on the dig.
During my 3 years of search activity, I dug out more than a hundred shells of various calibers. Starting from conventional cartridges, ending with 250 mm bombs. I have been in my hands, F1 grenades with pulled out rings, mortar mines that did not explode, etc. My limbs are still intact thanks to the fact that I know how to properly behave with them.
Let's talk about the cartridge right away. The cartridge is the most frequent and widespread find, found absolutely everywhere, in any field, farm, forest, etc. A misfired or unfired cartridge is safe as long as you don't throw it into the fire. Then it will work anyway. Therefore, this should not be done.
Further, more dangerous finds, which are also very often found and raised by our fellow search engines. These are RGD-33, F1, M-39, M-24 grenades and rarer varieties. Of course, with such things, you need to be more careful. If the check or fuse of the grenade is whole, then you can easily pick it up and drown it in the nearest lake. If, however, a check was pulled out of the grenade and it did not work, which happens very often. And you accidentally stumbled upon such a find with a shovel, it is better to bypass it and call the Ministry of Emergencies. But, as a rule, they will ignore your call, and say you shouldn’t go to such places.
Very often come across mortar mines on the ground of hostilities. They are less dangerous than grenades, but you also need to be careful with such a find, especially if the mine did not work.
Up mine, that's her dangerous place. There is a fuse located there, when a mine was fired from a mortar, flying out of the barrel, it flew down with a fuse, and hitting the ground, the same fuse worked. But, if the mine fell into a swamp or very soft earth, it might not work. Therefore, if you find something similar to this projectile in the ground, be careful with the top of the mine.
Of course, you can transport it and bring it to the nearest body of water to drown it. But you need to be more careful. And by no means drop it and hit it with a shovel.
And of course, larger shells, these are high-explosive fragmentation shells, which are better left untouched because of their size and the volume of the affected area. If you can tell by the brass band whether it's shot or not. If it is not shot, then it can be taken into the river and drowned, and if it is shot and for some reason did not work. It is best not to touch or move it.
The photo shows a 125 mm caliber projectile:
In general, shells are not as dangerous as everyone talks about them. By observing elementary safety precautions, and those short rules that you met in this article, you will protect yourself from dangerous finds, and you can safely engage in excavations without fear of explosions.
And by the way, do not forget about the law of Art. 263 of the Criminal Code "illegal storage of ammunition and weapons", even a small cartridge can be attributed to this.
Thanks to Soviet films about the war, most people have a strong opinion that the mass small arms (photo below) of the German infantry during World War II is an automatic machine (submachine gun) of the Schmeisser system, which is named after its designer. This myth is still actively supported by domestic cinema. However, in fact, this popular machine gun was never a mass weapon of the Wehrmacht, and Hugo Schmeisser did not create it at all. However, first things first.
How myths are created
Everyone should remember the shots from domestic films dedicated to the attacks of the German infantry on our positions. Brave blond guys walk without bending down, while firing from machine guns “from the hip”. And the most interesting thing is that this fact does not surprise anyone, except for those who were in the war. According to the movies, the "Schmeissers" could conduct aimed fire at the same distance as the rifles of our fighters. In addition, the viewer, when watching these films, had the impression that the entire personnel of the German infantry during the Second World War was armed with machine guns. In fact, everything was different, and the submachine gun is not a mass small arms weapon of the Wehrmacht, and it is impossible to shoot from it “from the hip”, and it is not called “Schmeisser” at all. In addition, to carry out an attack on a trench by a submachine gunners unit, in which there are fighters armed with magazine rifles, is an obvious suicide, since simply no one would have reached the trenches.
Debunking the Myth: The MP-40 Automatic Pistol
This Wehrmacht small arms in WWII is officially called the MP-40 submachine gun (Maschinenpistole). In fact, this is a modification of the MP-36 assault rifle. The designer of this model, contrary to popular belief, was not the gunsmith H. Schmeisser, but the no less famous and talented craftsman Heinrich Volmer. And why is the nickname “Schmeisser” so firmly entrenched behind him? The thing is that Schmeisser owned a patent for the store that is used in this submachine gun. And in order not to violate his copyright, in the first batches of MP-40, the inscription PATENT SCHMEISSER was stamped on the store receiver. When these machine guns came as trophies to the soldiers of the allied armies, they mistakenly thought that the author of this model of small arms, of course, was Schmeisser. This is how the given nickname was fixed for the MP-40.
Initially, the German command armed only command staff with machine guns. So, in the infantry units, only the commanders of battalions, companies and squads should have MP-40s. Later, drivers of armored vehicles, tankers and paratroopers were supplied with automatic pistols. Massively, no one armed the infantry with them either in 1941 or after. According to the archives in 1941, the troops had only 250 thousand MP-40 assault rifles, and this is for 7,234,000 people. As you can see, a submachine gun is not at all a mass weapon of the Second World War. In general, for the entire period - from 1939 to 1945 - only 1.2 million of these machine guns were produced, while over 21 million people were called up in the Wehrmacht.
Why were the infantry not armed with the MP-40?
Despite the fact that experts later recognized that the MP-40 is the best small arms of the Second World War, only a few of them had it in the infantry units of the Wehrmacht. This is explained simply: the effective range of this machine gun for group targets is only 150 m, and for single targets - 70 m. This despite the fact that Soviet soldiers were armed with Mosin and Tokarev (SVT) rifles, the effective range of which was 800 m for group targets and 400 m for single targets. If the Germans fought with such weapons, as shown in domestic films, then they would never have been able to reach the enemy trenches, they would simply have been shot, as in a shooting gallery.
Shooting on the move "from the hip"
The MP-40 submachine gun vibrates a lot when firing, and if you use it, as shown in the films, the bullets will always miss the target. Therefore, for effective shooting, it must be pressed tightly against the shoulder, after unfolding the butt. In addition, this machine gun was never fired in long bursts, as it quickly heated up. Most often they were beaten in a short burst of 3-4 rounds or fired single shots. Despite the fact that the tactical and technical characteristics indicate that the rate of fire is 450-500 rounds per minute, in practice this result has never been achieved.
Advantages of the MP-40
It cannot be said that this rifle was bad, on the contrary, it is very, very dangerous, but it must be used in close combat. That is why sabotage units were armed with it in the first place. They were also often used by scouts of our army, and the partisans respected this machine gun. Application in the near lung combat rapid-fire small arms gave tangible advantages. Even now, the MP-40 is very popular with criminals, and the price of such a machine is very high. And they are delivered there by “black archaeologists”, who excavate in places of military glory and very often find and restore weapons from the Second World War.
Mauser 98k
What can you say about this rifle? The most common small arms in Germany are the Mauser rifle. Its aiming range is up to 2000 m when firing. As you can see, this parameter is very close to the Mosin and SVT rifles. This carbine was developed back in 1888. During the war, this design was significantly upgraded, mainly to reduce costs, as well as to rationalize production. In addition, this Wehrmacht small arms were equipped with optical sights, and he was equipped with sniper units. The Mauser rifle at that time was in service with many armies, for example, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Sweden.
Self-loading rifles
At the end of 1941, the first automatic self-loading rifles of the Walther G-41 and Mauser G-41 systems entered the infantry units of the Wehrmacht for military trials. Their appearance was due to the fact that the Red Army was armed with more than one and a half million such systems: SVT-38, SVT-40 and ABC-36. In order not to be inferior to the Soviet fighters, the German gunsmiths urgently had to develop their own versions of such rifles. As a result of the tests, the G-41 system (Walter system) was recognized and adopted as the best. The rifle is equipped with a trigger-type percussion mechanism. Designed for firing only single shots. Equipped with a magazine with a capacity of ten rounds. This automatic self-loading rifle is designed for aimed fire at a distance of up to 1200 m. However, due to the large weight of this weapon, as well as low reliability and sensitivity to pollution, it was released in a small series. In 1943, the designers, having eliminated these shortcomings, proposed an upgraded version of the G-43 (Walter system), which was produced in the amount of several hundred thousand units. Before its appearance, Wehrmacht soldiers preferred to use captured Soviet (!) SVT-40 rifles.
And now back to the German gunsmith Hugo Schmeisser. He developed two systems, without which the Second World War could not have done.
Small arms - MP-41
This model was developed simultaneously with the MP-40. This machine was significantly different from the Schmeisser familiar to everyone from the movies: it had a handguard trimmed with wood, which protected the fighter from burns, was heavier and longer-barreled. However, this Wehrmacht small arms were not widely used and were not produced for long. In total, about 26 thousand units were produced. It is believed that the German army abandoned this machine in connection with the lawsuit of ERMA, which claimed that its patented design was illegally copied. Small arms MP-41 was used by parts of the Waffen SS. It was also successfully used by Gestapo units and mountain rangers.
MP-43, or StG-44
The next weapon of the Wehrmacht (photo below) was developed by Schmeisser in 1943. At first it was called MP-43, and later - StG-44, which means " assault rifle» (sturmgewehr). This automatic rifle appearance, and for some technical specifications, resembles (which appeared later), and differs significantly from the MP-40. Its range of aimed fire was up to 800 m. The StG-44 even provided for the possibility of mounting a 30 mm grenade launcher. For firing from cover, the designer developed a special nozzle, which was worn on the muzzle and changed the trajectory of the bullet by 32 degrees. This weapon entered mass production only in the fall of 1944. During the war years, about 450 thousand of these rifles were produced. So few of German soldiers I have been able to use this machine. StG-44s were supplied to the elite units of the Wehrmacht and to Waffen SS units. Subsequently, this weapon of the Wehrmacht was used in
FG-42 automatic rifles
These copies were intended for parachute troops. They combined the fighting qualities of a light machine gun and an automatic rifle. The Rheinmetall company took up the development of weapons already during the war, when, after evaluating the results airborne operations conducted by the Wehrmacht, it turned out that the MP-38 submachine guns do not fully meet the combat requirements of this type of troops. The first tests of this rifle were carried out in 1942, and at the same time it was put into service. In the process of using the mentioned weapon, shortcomings were also revealed, associated with low strength and stability during automatic firing. In 1944, the upgraded FG-42 rifle (Model 2) was released, and Model 1 was discontinued. The trigger mechanism of this weapon allows automatic or single fire. The rifle is designed for the standard 7.92 mm Mauser cartridge. Magazine capacity is 10 or 20 rounds. In addition, the rifle can be used to fire special rifle grenades. In order to increase stability when firing, a bipod is fixed under the barrel. The FG-42 rifle is designed for firing at a range of 1200 m. Due to the high cost, it was produced in limited quantities: only 12 thousand units of both models.
Luger P08 and Walter P38
Now consider what types of pistols were in service with the German army. "Luger", its second name "Parabellum", had a caliber of 7.65 mm. By the beginning of the war, the units of the German army had more than half a million of these pistols. This small arms of the Wehrmacht was produced until 1942, and then it was replaced by a more reliable "Walter".
This pistol was put into service in 1940. It was intended for firing 9 mm rounds, the magazine capacity is 8 rounds. Sighting range at "Walter" - 50 meters. It was produced until 1945. The total number of P38 pistols produced was approximately 1 million units.
Weapons of World War II: MG-34, MG-42 and MG-45
In the early 30s, the German military decided to create a machine gun that could be used both as an easel and as a manual one. They were supposed to fire at enemy aircraft and arm tanks. The MG-34, designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1934, became such a machine gun. By the beginning of hostilities, the Wehrmacht had about 80 thousand units of this weapon. The machine gun allows you to fire both single shots and continuous. To do this, he had a trigger with two notches. When you click on the top, shooting was carried out with single shots, and when you click on the bottom - in bursts. It was intended for Mauser rifle cartridges 7.92x57 mm, with light or heavy bullets. And in the 40s, armor-piercing, armor-piercing tracer, armor-piercing incendiary and other types of cartridges were developed and used. This suggests the conclusion that the impetus for changes in weapons systems and tactics for their use was the Second World War.
The small arms that were used in this company were replenished with a new type of machine gun - MG-42. It was developed and put into service in 1942. The designers have greatly simplified and reduced the cost of the production of these weapons. So, in its production, spot welding and stamping were widely used, and the number of parts was reduced to 200. The trigger mechanism of the machine gun in question allowed only automatic firing - 1200-1300 rounds per minute. Such significant changes adversely affected the stability of the unit during firing. Therefore, to ensure accuracy, it was recommended to fire in short bursts. Ammunition for the new machine gun remained the same as for the MG-34. The range of aimed fire was two kilometers. Work on improving this design continued until the end of 1943, which led to the creation of a new modification, known as the MG-45.
This machine gun weighed only 6.5 kg, and the rate of fire was 2400 rounds per minute. By the way, not a single infantry machine gun of that time could boast of such a rate of fire. However, this modification appeared too late and was not in service with the Wehrmacht.
PzB-39 and Panzerschrek
PzB-39 was developed in 1938. This weapon of the Second World War was used with relative success at the initial stage to combat tankettes, tanks and armored vehicles with bulletproof armor. Against heavily armored B-1s, British Matildas and Churchills, Soviet T-34s and KVs), this gun was either ineffective or completely useless. As a result, he was soon replaced anti-tank grenade launchers and reactive anti-tank guns "Pantsershrek", "Ofenror", as well as the famous "Faustpatrons". The PzB-39 used a 7.92 mm cartridge. The firing range was 100 meters, the penetration ability made it possible to "flash" 35-mm armor.
"Panzerschreck". This German light anti-tank weapon is a modified copy of the American Bazooka rocket-propelled gun. German designers provided him with a shield that protected the shooter from hot gases escaping from the grenade nozzle. Anti-tank companies of motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions were supplied as a matter of priority with these weapons. Rocket guns were exceptionally powerful weapons. "Panzershreki" were weapons for group use and had a service crew consisting of three people. Since they were very complex, their use required special education calculations. In total, in 1943-1944, 314 thousand units of such guns and more than two million rocket-propelled grenades were produced for them.
Grenade launchers: "Faustpatron" and "Panzerfaust"
The early years of the Second World War showed that anti-tank guns could not cope with the tasks set, so the German military demanded anti-tank weapons with which to equip an infantryman, acting on the principle of "shot and thrown." The development of a disposable hand grenade launcher was started by HASAG in 1942 (chief designer Langweiler). And in 1943 mass production was launched. The first 500 Faustpatrons entered the troops in August of the same year. All models of this anti-tank grenade launcher had a similar design: they consisted of a barrel (smooth-bore seamless pipe) and an over-caliber grenade. An impact mechanism and an aiming device were welded to the outer surface of the barrel.
"Panzerfaust" is one of the most powerful modifications of the "Faustpatron", which was developed at the end of the war. Its firing range was 150 m, and its armor penetration was 280-320 mm. The Panzerfaust was a reusable weapon. The barrel of the grenade launcher is equipped with a pistol grip, in which there is a firing mechanism, the propellant charge was placed in the barrel. In addition, the designers were able to increase the speed of the grenade. In total, over eight million grenade launchers of all modifications were manufactured during the war years. This type of weapon caused significant losses Soviet tanks. So, in the battles on the outskirts of Berlin, they knocked out about 30 percent of armored vehicles, and during street fighting in the capital of Germany - 70%.
Conclusion
The Second World War had a significant impact on small arms, including the world, its development and tactics of use. Based on its results, we can conclude that, despite the creation of the most modern means weapons, the role of rifle units is not reduced. The accumulated experience of using weapons in those years is still relevant today. In fact, it became the basis for the development and improvement of small arms.
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