In the 1990s, Yugoslavia demonstrated to the whole world what, under a slightly different set of political circumstances, the collapse of the former Soviet Union: on the territory of constituent parts former Yugoslavia protracted and bloody civil wars flared up with the collapse of the vertical of state power, the acute problem of refugees and the forced intervention of the world community.

On various territories and lands (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, the adjoining water area of ​​the Adriatic, etc.) since 1992, a whole range of operations has been unfolded, in which the UN, OSCE, NATO, and the EU took part , WEU, as well as a number of countries as members of coalitions to conduct individual operations.

At the same time, a number of operations were in the nature of coercive actions (sea and air blockade of part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, separate components of the operation in Albania, air operation of pressure on the FRY, etc.). The other part of the operations was in the nature of a preventive deployment (Macedonia). There were also operations and their individual components that correspond to the classical understanding of peacekeeping (for example, the post-Dayton organization of elections in Bosnia under international control and etc.). Not all of these operations were carried out by the UN itself (see Chapter 1 on the role of the OSCE, NATO and the WEU in individual operations), and some (the air operation to pressure the authorities of the FRY) did not have a UN mandate at all. In general, the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Albania has introduced many innovations and changes in the practice of UN peacekeeping.

The scale and strength of the Russian contingent taking part in operations in this region (changing from 900 military personnel in 1992 to a maximum of 1,500 in 1994 and somewhat exceeding 1,000 at the present time) is, although significant, let's say in comparison with the operations in Moldova and South Ossetia (in 2000, 460 and 462 Russian peacekeepers were stationed there, respectively), but far from decisive. For comparison, it is enough to mention that only the ground component of the forces of the SFOR operation amounted to 33,400 military personnel from different countries, not counting civilians.

In many ways, however, Russia's involvement in operations in the former Yugoslavia was and remains unique.

Firstly, this is an atypical situation in which the Russian military and not only Western military “observers”, but also NATO combat units, who have been training for decades for “ big war”, acted jointly in solving the tasks set by the UN.

Secondly, the level of military force used in these operations as a whole was extremely high, on average much higher than in most of all other operations of previous decades, with the exception of Desert Storm. As a result, increased demands were placed on military professionalism and the ability of the Russian military to actually interact in combat with the military of other countries, and not only those that were previously allies under the Warsaw Pact.

Thirdly, given the ethnic and historical proximity or interconnection of individual countries with one or another warring force, it was especially difficult to maintain an unbiased, equidistant attitude of peacekeepers to the parties to conflicts. Although the unofficial “pro-Serbian” orientation of the Russian peacekeepers only counterbalanced the unofficial “pro-Croatian”, “pro-Muslim” or “anti-Serbian” orientation of some Western countries participating in the coalitions, in general, Russia does not play the nationalist “card” in this complex of conflicts. and takes a position as a relatively unbiased mediator.

Fourth, Russia's cooperation with other countries and organizations in conducting operations in the former Yugoslavia was significantly affected by Russia-NATO contradictions in connection with NATO expansion and NATO's actions without a UN mandate in the FRY in 1999. More broadly, peacekeeping cooperation in Yugoslavia was and remains influenced by the intersection and clash of interests of the great powers in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.

Parts and formations of Russian landing troops were first involved in the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia already in 1992. At that time, there were no specially trained peacekeeping contingents in Russia (with the exception of a small group of military observers from previous UN operations, which had experience only in non-combat operations “under the banners” of the UN). A special Russian motorized rifle battalion for landing in Yugoslavia was formed from the Airborne Forces on the basis of the Presidential Decree "On the direction of the Russian contingent to Yugoslavia to participate in peacekeeping operations UN” and the order of the Commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS[i]. The size of the contingent was determined at 900 people armed with light small arms, and equipped with 150 vehicles and 15 armored personnel carriers. The battalion was formed and underwent abbreviated training and instruction in 6 weeks.

How simple structure contingent (headquarters, headquarters company, five motorized rifle companies), and light weapons and the absence of communications, intelligence, reinforcement units indicated that Russia did not have adequate experience in participating in military peacekeeping operations and was preparing for "classic" peacekeeping, in which weapons used only for a "show of force". But the real situation of the civil war in Yugoslavia made it necessary even during the UNPROEP / UNPROFOR operation, even before the transition to SFOR / SFOR, to change the rules of combat contact and increase the combat power of the contingent. The battalion requested and received from Russia another 54 modern armored personnel carriers-80, 82-mm artillery guns, mobile rocket launchers to fight tanks and portable anti-aircraft systems. The "separation" of the belligerents required action according to the rules of a serious war.

In 1994, the 554th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion was reinforced by the 629th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion, and total Russian military in Yugoslavia reached 1,500 people. on 95 armored combat vehicles.

When the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1031 on the former Yugoslavia on December 15, 1995, the Russian contingent received a new status, changed its structure (brigade) and scale. First of all, in connection with the adoption in the Russian Federation in the same year of a new law on the participation of Russian contingents in peacekeeping operations, the question of the participation of Russian peacekeepers in the UN operation was submitted for discussion by the Russian parliament. The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation confirmed the decision on Russia's participation in the operation, and in mid-February 1996. By his decree, the President of the Russian Federation increased the permitted number of contingents to 1,600 people.

The Russian brigade received in Yugoslavia an area of ​​​​responsibility of 1,750 square kilometers, which included a line of separation of the warring parties 275 kilometers long. An American brigade, a Turkish brigade, as well as the joint Sever brigade, which consisted of the peacekeeping contingents of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland, served in the immediate vicinity of the Russian peacekeepers.

The tasks carried out in Bosnia by the Russian contingent also included control at five checkpoints, patrolling numerous roads and territories, reconnaissance, search and inspection of objects. Throughout the participation in the SFOR / IFOR operations in 1997-1999, in which, in agreement with the UN, NATO forces played a leading role, the Russian brigade was not involved in mass battles. Losses of 4 people killed and 11 wounded occurred mainly as a result of mine explosions.

question political significance was building a chain of command. For "ideological" reasons, it was considered wrong to agree to the direct subordination of the Russian contingent to the command of NATO structures, although it was the NATO command that, in accordance with the UN mandate, carried out the overall coordination of operations. A special military-political condition was agreed through diplomatic channels: the commander of the Russian brigade, General L. Shevtsov, received the status of Deputy Commander of the entire operation in the former Yugoslavia and reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO Ground Forces in Central Europe.

The Russian command group in the NATO Supreme Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) solved tasks not only of a military nature, but also of a political and diplomatic nature. Among them, in particular, coordination of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords with the Bosnian military-political leadership, as well as organizing and holding meetings of joint reconciliation commissions, in which representatives of the Bosnian political forces and the military leadership of the SFOR operation participated.

By March 1999, when the NATO air operation in the FRY, which began without the sanction of the UN Security Council, led to the freezing of Russia-NATO relations and the formal withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, the overall result of cooperation between Russian peacekeepers and the military of the coalition countries was generally positive. The crisis was not caused by internal factors in the development of the operation in Bosnia itself, but became a projection into the peacekeeping sphere of "macropolitical" tension in Russia-NATO relations.

The political complaints about NATO's actions in the FRY can be summarized as follows:

  • The Alliance violated the UN Charter by launching a coercive operation in the territory sovereign state against the will of the legally elected government of the country and without a mandate from the UN Security Council;
  • The operation was performed outside NATO's area of ​​direct responsibility, limited, in accordance with the Washington Treaty of 1949, by the territory of the member countries;
  • The operation was exceeding the limits of the necessary use of force because not all channels of political influence have been exhausted;
  • Operation violates the prerogatives regional organizations because, firstly, the OSCE, as the leading regional organization collective security NATO was pushed aside and the OSCE mandate was also absent, secondly, NATO itself never recognized itself (and was not recognized by the UN) as a regional security organization and, thirdly, operations with elements of coercive actions (bombing and blockade) are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UN Security Council rather than regional organizations and agreements;
  • The operation is controversial from the point of view of being classified under the category of "humanitarian intervention", since the fact of the genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo (which could be the basis for such intervention) was not recorded and confirmed by the UN or the OSCE, and the flows of refugees from Kosovo after the start of the intervention (bombing) significantly exceeded the refugee flows before the operation;
  • Finally, NATO and Western powers have set a dangerous precedent by openly ignoring Russian protests and the position of powers such as China and India, which, among others, have spoken out at the UN against forceful intervention.

At the same time, it is obvious that Russia reacted not only and not so much to the events in the former Yugoslavia itself (although opposition to the bombings was consistent and supported by public opinion within Russia), but to the exclusion of Russia from the process of making cardinal decisions on problems of all-European security (which, undoubtedly, , included the decision to bomb Yugoslav territory).

It should be realistically realized that the Russian leadership did not stand aside from the use of military force in the Yugoslav conflict in general, and the recognition of the need for coercive actions, including against the government of S. Milosevic, in particular. political problem consisted primarily in the violation by the North Atlantic Alliance (and the leadership of a number of Western powers) of the rules and procedures for making decisions on the use of force in the international community. As soon as 11 weeks after the start of the bombing, the UN Security Council nevertheless managed to adopt an agreed resolution on the international operation in Kosovo and the FRY, the Russian military-political leadership persistently returned the Russian contingent to the international forces intervention (the famous paratroopers raid led by General Zavarzin from Bosnia to Pristina airport in Kosovo). Cooperation between Russia and NATO in the area of ​​peacekeeping was immediately unfrozen. At the same time, although the bombing as a type of influence on the government of S. Milosevic was stopped, other coercive elements in the operation (for example, a strictly controlled embargo on the supply of weapons to the parties to the conflict) remained.

The allocation of a zone of responsibility in the predominantly Albanian sector to the Russian contingent in Kosovo led to difficult implementation peacekeeping functions, partial blocking of elements of the contingent by the local population. Nevertheless, Russia has returned to the list of countries actively participating in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Some of the lessons learned from the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia can be summarized as follows:

  • There has been a certain "specialization" of various international organizations in conducting operations in conflict regions. The UN cannot cope in modern conditions with the organization of military operations to establish peace (peace enforcement), if the conflict has the scale of a real civil war. This requires a well-functioning integrated military organization. Involving NATO is assessed in UN circles as a whole as effective and, apparently, will continue to be practiced if there is a consensus in the ranks of NATO itself. The WEU failed to prove itself effectively even in the "hothouse" conditions of carrying out elements of operations "under the wing" of NATO. The OSCE skillfully carries out activities to restore the political infrastructure and hold free elections in conflict regions. The UN, on the other hand, ensures the general political coordination of the interests of the powers regarding the conflict and intervention in it, and this function (coordination of the interests of the major powers regarding the conflict) is becoming increasingly important.
  • Yugoslavia demonstrated how the stages of disruption of interaction between the organizations of the international community (UN. OSCE) and the great powers (the first such disruption occurred during the conclusion of the Dayton agreements on Bosnia outside the UN and the OSCE, the second - during the deployment of NATO actions in the FRY contrary to the position of a number of great powers) , and the stages of their well-coordinated interaction. Experience shows that, as before, in the international community, the positive involvement of the UN, the OSCE, and other multilateral mechanisms in the process of peacekeeping cannot be replaced by the will and strength of individual powers. The international community still considers the joint action of "great powers" and "great organizations" as the norm, and not their opposing efforts to each other.
  • At the same time, as a relatively new formula of interaction, the practice of transferring operations by the United Nations to created adhoc coalitions of powers. It is expedient for Russia to develop the practice of participating in such coalitions and apply it to the development of coalition participation in peacekeeping in the CIS.

Operations in the former Yugoslavia have shown the need (and possibility) of close political interaction of broad groups of powers in real time of the unfolding conflict ( we are talking not only about the relatively successful maintenance of consensus in ambiguous conditions by NATO countries, but also about the practice of agreeing on decisions in adhoc coalitions of countries operating in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo). This important example for Russia, which needs to use the mechanisms of political consultations and maintaining consensus among the CSTO countries.

[i] Order dated February 26, 1992 Strictly speaking, due to well-known hopes for maintaining a unified military infrastructure of the CIS, the contingent was not “Russian” at first, it represented the entire former Soviet Union, all CIS countries, and only later in Yugoslavia began to talk about separate Russian and separate Ukrainian contingents.

A year later, the "ceiling" was lowered to 1400 people, and the actual number in the late 90s. did not exceed 1340 people.

Is it possible to revive a country without the values ​​of brotherhood and friendship of peoples?
The Bulletin of the Bashkir State Pedagogical University published an article dedicated to the activities of an active participant in the international movement "Teachers for Peace and Mutual Understanding" Alfiya Fatkullina

SERVING THE IDEALS OF PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

At the end of last year, the Bashkir State Pedagogical University celebrated its 40th anniversary and literally on the same days honored the veteran of the university Fatkullina Alfiya Fazylzhanovna, who turned 80 years old.

80 years is such an age height from which the path traveled is seen in the most significant events, deeds, people. All insignificant memory erases. And it is very important when meeting with such people to penetrate into the experience they have accumulated, to try on today, to preserve and pass on to the future. And Alfiya Fazylzhanovna's experience in patriotic and international education is truly invaluable. For almost half a century, she studied and summarized the experience of schools in Bashkiria and the entire Soviet Union, being the chairman of the republican section of patriotic and international education at the Bashkir branch of the Pedagogical Society of the RSFSR, a member of the scientific council on problems of patriotic and international education of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR, a member of the scientific and methodological section of the patriotic and international education of youth under the Central Committee of the Komsomol.

She has participated in more than 50 conferences and seminars. It seems that such a vital need to serve people and the practice of patriotism and internationalism is largely due to the spirit of the times, which shaped the mind and heart of a girl, a girl and a specialist - a teacher, a scientist. When she was 14 years old, the Great Patriotic War began. She knows well what "everything for the front, everything for victory" means. Her graduation party was covered with joy and happiness of the Victory.

In 1945 she became a student of the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute. I was in Chelyabinsk in 1968 and I know how proud the Urals are of their contribution to the victory, especially their tanks and Magnitogorsk. I can imagine what a patriotic spirit reigned here in the 40s and 50s!

The pathos of victory and the pathos of the restoration of the country gave rise to beautiful poems and songs, feature films and performances. The very air of the country was filled with patriotism, feelings of brotherhood and friendship of peoples, and it was not difficult for the school, the teacher to participate in the education of these holy feelings. Moreover, at the school there were pioneer and Komsomol organization, whose ideology was based on the formation of collectivism, patriotism and internationalism.

Scientists and teachers, party and Komsomol workers thought out and implemented a system of patriotic and international education. The merit of Alfiya Fazylzhanovna is the development of the concept, methodology, methodology and system of patriotic and international education in a multinational school, taking into account age features children. The educational and methodological manuals published by her, books were highly appreciated in the country, and speeches at pedagogical seminars, work at the faculty for advanced training of school leaders of the republic contributed to practical application her recommendations in the schools of the republic.

The clubs of international friendship (KIDs) and museums of military and labor glory became a special pride of our heroine. Only in Ufa, 89 clubs and 43 museums were created. The experience of the international friendship club of school No. 86, led by a teacher German language Lind E.I., was summarized and recommended educational institutions. The CID worked remarkably well at Serafimovskaya high school(headed by Zhemaletdinov G.K.), who had close ties with the KIDs of the Baltic states, especially Lithuania and Latvia.

It is no coincidence that it was in Ufa, on the basis of the Pedagogical Institute in the spring of 1977, that the All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference “Issues of Patriotic and International Education in the Light of the Decisions of the XXV Congress of the CPSU” was held. More than 200 people took part in it: philosophers, sociologists, historians, teachers, subject teachers, heads of kindergartens, clubs and museums.

The changes that took place in the 1990s, including the slogan of “de-ideologization,” turned out to be serious costs in the public and individual consciousness. The collapse of the USSR economic crisis struck primarily at such feelings as pride in the country, friendship and brotherhood of peoples.

The cult of national isolation, individualism has become one of the reasons for the growth of aggression and intolerance in all social relations, from national to family and interpersonal. The ideas of patriotism and internationalism were, at best, consigned to oblivion, at worst, anathema.

All this has become heartache Alfiya Fazylzhanovna, because she understands that patriotism, friendship and brotherhood of peoples are the psychological foundation of both the present and the future of Russia. Without these values ​​it is impossible to revive and raise the country not so much economically as spiritually. IN last years both the authorities and part of the intelligentsia began to understand this. Words are heard more and more often about the need to educate a patriot and a citizen. New holidays - the Day of Russia, the Day of the Republic, the Day of Concord, the Day of the Flag, are gradually gaining ideological and emotional saturation. But in order for the holidays to have the effect of civic education, a huge work of the intelligentsia, especially creative and pedagogical, is required. The school, the entire pedagogical community can, through the state, become a social customer for the creation of poems and songs, rituals and attributes, scripts and compositions, TV shows and films, textbooks and manuals that help with early childhood have a great feeling of love for the Motherland. Unfortunately, the government has not yet organized this work. Even government concerts dedicated to civil holidays often cause embarrassment with half-naked girls and pop content. And involuntarily recall May 19 - Pioneer Day, October 29 - Komsomol Day. What wonderful songs, poems, traditions, scripts, films. The best poets, writers, composers, directors, athletes considered it an honor to fulfill the orders of the Komsomol Central Committee. It is a pity that modern youth organizations have not yet revealed their purpose - the organization and education of children and youth.

The best people of the BSPI were engaged in the education of young people at that time. Since 1992, she has been a member of the coordinating council of the international movement "Educators for Peace and Mutual Understanding". She took an active part in the work international congresses(Norway - 1998, Austria - 1998, France - 2000, Germany - 2003, India - 2004). Now she is actively involved in the movement "For a Culture of Peace". On her initiative, an information and methodological center for the culture of peace was created at the Belarusian State Pedagogical University. For her personal contribution to science in 2002, Alfiya Fazylzhanovna was elected in 2002 a full member of the Academy of Pedagogical and Social Sciences.

Optimism, vitality, creative activity cause surprise and deep respect for this woman. And you believe that the work of her life will be continued by new generations of students, teachers, and scientists.

V.V. Goneeva,
Veteran of Pedagogical University

Marat Egorov: a word about the world
The newspaper "Bulletin of the World" dated December 25, 2008 published an article by the Chairman of the Belarusian Peace Foundation and Vice-President International Association funds of the world Marat Egorov "You can't stop the wind with your palm!", in which the veteran of the Great Patriotic War expresses his thoughts on peacekeeping and peacekeepers

YOU CAN'T STOP THE WIND WITH YOUR PALM!
(printed in abbreviated form)

If humanity wants to survive, and not burn out in the flames of a new world war, it must find the strength to overcome the accumulated grievances, grief, death of loved ones, fires and explosions. And all together to go along the single road of the world.

A real peacekeeping organization is essentially a kind of metronome. He is able to make people's hearts beat in a single rhythm - the rhythm of calm creation and confidence in the future.

In the entire history of mankind, more than 15,000 wars have taken place, which have claimed over 3.5 billion lives. New types of weapons are capable of destroying all life on our planet.

In any case, the guiding principle of the fighters for peace must be humanism. It includes universal responsiveness, mercy, readiness to help in grief, need, to protect from violence. Peacekeeping implies activity in upholding peace on Earth, as the most important condition for further human progress, moral responsibility for the fate of peoples, and the preservation of life on earth.

Peace can only be achieved when the ice of alienation between peoples is melted. This can only be done through friendship at all levels: from children to presidents.

For the happiness of living in peace and tranquility, a lot of blood and tears of previous generations of people have been shed. We live only because millions of earthlings gave their lives for it.

Monuments testify to this. They are not only a tribute to the past, to those whose time has run out. According to the monuments, new conscientious and gifted people verify their future. Obelisks and memorials can be torn down and forgotten. But time is an impartial judge. It calls people People, and all the rest - little people. It'll be this way forever!

Everyone must find their peak and overcome it. By the height of the peak, they judge what kind of opportunities and abilities a person had. Everest is not for everyone.

VETERANS OF A KIND ARE LIVING MONUMENTS.

Their life is not for everyone
Would come on the shoulder.
Their courage has been tested by the war.
I don't want their glory for myself.
Their payment for it was double.
They will not be among us very soon.
Doctors are powerless to prolong their age.
Their wisdom is our strength.
Their memory is our sister's conscience.

These words are written not by hand, but by the heart of a front-line soldier - Yuri Mikhailovich Beledin from Volgograd.

Do universities now teach a concrete - historical approach to the analysis of the past? It is impossible to ignore the real background against which this or that event took place. Modern standards to it, in my opinion, are not applicable, and their consequences are fraught with errors in the future. It is necessary to perceive the facts of the past without a shadow of irony and speculation.

Peacekeeping is not a one-time assignment, not an unfortunate burden, but a vocation and high confidence of the people. It must be justified, it must be proud and cherish. It’s not enough just to “do your duty”. It is important not to smolder, but to burn - to warm people with the warmth of their hearts. Light up their path to a peaceful future, like the legendary Danko.

PEACEKEEPER. This is not a job or a hobby. This is the meaning of human life, its highest destiny. The creation of the world means the absolute harmony of the life around us. That is why the peacekeepers were named in Holy Scripture"sons of God". They always followed God's providence, the most secret aspirations of the Almighty. That is why our peacemaking activity correlates with Divine peacemaking. That is why, honoring the fighters for peace, occasionally honoring them with our modest awards, we pay tribute to their deeds, their selfless work.

I was lucky to take part in the international action "Peace in the Middle East", which brought together representatives of 120 countries. We walked through the streets of the cities of Palestine and Israel, making an impassioned appeal to people who had been at war with each other for centuries to rise above their prejudices. We chanted: Peace, Pis, Sholom, Salam Aleichem. And we felt that our calls reach the hearts of not only ordinary people but also to the rulers of these countries.

On the picture: Marat Yegorov with the flag of the Republic of Belarus - a participant in the international action "Peace in the Middle East".

On this day, each of us imagined ourselves as a sower of goodness and believed that our words are a kind of seeds that will surely bring wonderful shoots of goodness not only to the inhabitants of this long-suffering territory, but to all of humanity. It seemed to us that the Palestinians and Israelis realized the need to preserve the most valuable, the most important thing - the right to life ...

Marat Egorov

History of 554 opb of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in the letters of a veteran
In connection with the preparation for publication on the Internet electronic version Books of Memory "In the service of peace. 1973-2008" the bulletin publishes correspondence with a veteran of the 554th battalion, reserve major Andrei Goncharov

IN eBook In memory of Russian peacekeepers there is a section dedicated to the contingents of the UN peacekeeping forces. It will publish the names of participants in the UN peacekeeping operations carried out on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

As you know, the list of the Russian contingent of UN peacekeeping forces, currently published on the website of the Museum of Peacekeeping Operations in the section "", was compiled on the basis of data provided to the Museum of Peacekeeping Operations by the Personnel Department of the Airborne Forces in the late 90s.

In the years that passed before the end of UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, several hundred more Russian servicemen became participants in the peacekeeping process, who, having adequately fulfilled their peacekeeping duty in the Balkans, were awarded the UN medal "In the Service of Peace."

Andrey GONCHAROV's letters not only name the new names of participants in peacekeeping operations, but also describe the history of 554 opb - the first peacekeeping battalion of the Russian armed forces.

From: V.V. Gergel
To whom: A. Goncharov
date: 04.01.2009 16:55
Subject: Book of Memory

Dear Andrey!

Good afternoon

Valery Vladimirovich Gergel is writing to you - a participant in the first UN peacekeeping operation (UNTSO 1973-1976).

In 1992, the first Book of Memory of Soviet and Russian peacekeepers was published under the title "In the Service of Peace. 1973-1993". It published full list 554 battalion, which was once provided to us by the Commander of the Airborne Forces, General Podkolzin and the personnel department of the Airborne Forces.

On the picture: Damascus (Syria), 1976. United Nations Truce Supervision Authority in Palestine (UNTSO). The building of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC).

At an evening dedicated to the National Day of one of the groups of UN military observers.

From right to left: Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Marenko, senior UN military observer group in Syria, Major Anatoly Isaenko, UN military observer, representative of the German armed forces, military attache of the Soviet embassy in Syria.

Other photos can be found in the publications.

Successful performance of logistic tasks in peacekeeping operations is influenced by the following: factors: conditions for conducting peacekeeping operations; scale of the conflict opposing sides; tasks of the UN Security Council, the joint command, the General Staff of the Armed Forces; building a line of demarcation between the opposing sides; depth of the area of ​​responsibility; military-political situation in the area of ​​the zone of responsibility; physical and geographical features of the region; established by the UN mission, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the logistic headquarters of the Armed Forces, the procedure for the logistic support of peacekeeping forces.

The Russian Armed Forces were used most extensively in peacekeeping operations during the Yugoslav conflict. The armed forces of the Russian Federation participated in the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia from April 1992 to February 1994 on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 743 of February 26, 1992 and the Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation of March 6, 1992 No. "Rusbat-1") in the amount of 420 people.

The tasks of the 554 separate infantry battalion prescribed by the UN mandate were: delineation of the warring parties; monitoring compliance with the terms of the truce; monitoring compliance with withdrawal conditions heavy weapons beyond the 30-kilometer zone from the contact line of the parties; escort of convoys with humanitarian cargoes; patrolling areas of responsibility; assistance to the civilian population (protection, medical assistance, evacuation) in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. The main task was to prevent the resumption of hostilities and the separation of the troops of the Serbian Yugoslav People's Army and the Croatian-Muslim confederation in the area settlements Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci, Klisa, Tenya, Orolik, where armed clashes took place due to territorial disputes. The command post of the battalion was located on the territory of the airfield of the Croatian city of Osijek, the rest of the combat units were stationed 20-25 km from the command post along the line of the battalion's area of ​​responsibility.

The battalion was subordinate to the command of the headquarters of the UN sector and interacted with the French, Norwegian, Danish, British and Ukrainian battalions.

The 554th separate infantry battalion consisted of two infantry companies (each company had three infantry platoons and an economic department) and a headquarters company, which included a reconnaissance platoon, an anti-aircraft missile platoon, a communications department, a repair platoon and an economic platoon (Fig. 30.1).


Fig.30.1 Organizational structure 554 opb

The economic department of an infantry company included two units of tankers (AC-5.5-4320 - 1 unit; ATMZ-5-4320 - 1 unit) and an ambulance UAZ-452A. Supervised the work of the rear of an infantry company - deputy company commander for logistics. Such a composition of the rear increased the autonomy of the infantry company in the rear in the performance of peacekeeping missions in the areas of responsibility.



The rear of a separate infantry battalion included the following officials: deputy battalion commander for rear (officer); head of the fuel and lubricants service (officer), head of the fuel depot (ensign); head of the clothing service (officer), head of the clothing warehouse (ensign); head of the food service (officer), head of the food warehouse (ensign) and head of the canteen (ensign). The economic platoon of the headquarters company had functions similar to the material support platoon of a motorized rifle battalion.

At the beginning of 1994, the situation in the area of ​​the city of Sarajevo escalated, and in February an additional 629 separate infantry battalion (“Rusbat-2”) was sent there with the task of stabilizing the situation in this sector, providing humanitarian aid refugees and ensure their safety. To accomplish this task, the battalion was assigned a zone of responsibility with an area of ​​40 km 2 (the distance between 554 opb and 629 opb was about 200 km).

The provision of fuel, oils and lubricants was carried out through a fuel depot deployed by the French battalion in the area of ​​Sarajevo airport. In the staff of the fuel service 629 opb in addition to 8 units of tankers (2 units in each infantry company and 2 units in the headquarters company), there were: the MNUG-20 motor-pump unit, R-4 and R-8 tanks of domestic production, as well as French-made R-5 tanks, which were equipped with a battalion fuel depot with a capacity of 65 m 3 . In total, the warehouse of the battalion contained 2.0 refills of motor gasoline and 1.8 refills of diesel fuel. A battalion filling station was equipped, where fuel was refueled and the storage and distribution of oils and lubricants was organized. In order to organize the protection of the warehouse, the tanks were placed on the ground and lined with sandbags. An earthen parapet was poured around the perimeter of the warehouse.



The battalions were supplied with fuel, oils and lubricants of high quality Slovenian production, gasoline was supplied grade A-95, diesel fuel high degree paraffin cleaners, gear oils of seven grades, gun oil of three grades. A feature of keeping records and reporting on the fuel service was that the UN specialists from the headquarters of the sector demanded that data be submitted daily by fax on the consumption and availability of fuel in the battalion as of 15.00. Based on these fax reports, they wrote off fuel from the battalion. The receipt of fuel was carried out after the head of the fuel service of the battalion showed the presence of free tanks in the report. By fax, the battalion received an invoice for receiving fuel and lubricants from the warehouse of the sector, according to this document, fuel, oils and lubricants were obtained.

To the features of logistics 554 and 629 opb the following can be attributed: the supply of the personnel of the battalion was carried out according to UN standards, the same for all battalions; personnel, as inventory, were given televisions, refrigerators, video equipment, audio equipment, microwave ovens, fans, heaters, washing machines; badges of belonging to the UN troops were issued: berets blue color, ceremonial blue scarves, UN sleeve insignia, UN flags; uniforms (uniforms) for the personnel of the battalions had their own - domestic; washing of the personnel was carried out in the shower modules of the battalions (French-made); underwear was washed in subdivisions (each platoon had a washing machine), bed linen was washed in city laundries; food was obtained from a warehouse deployed by the French near Sarajevo airport, the range of products is very wide (fruits, juices, mineral water, cheeses, condiments, etc.); personnel were fed in the officers' and soldiers' canteens (personnel from the local population worked in the officers' canteen); the battalion was provided with dry rations of French production; storage of perishable products was carried out in container-type refrigerators; in order to improve nutrition on the territory of the battalions, smokehouses were built with their own efforts and funds, for smoking chickens and fresh fish; catering at checkpoints was organized using small-sized kitchens, which necessitated the training of additional non-staff cooks.

The attitude of the local population (Bosniaks and Muslims) to the presence of Russian battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely negative, which greatly complicated the work of the rear.

In 1995, the Russian leadership decided to withdraw battalions from Sarajevo, as provocations and the continued presence of Russian troops in this region became dangerous. The region has resumed fighting with the use of heavy equipment, in August-September 1995, the UN coalition forces made attempts to stabilize the situation, bombed the positions of the Yugoslav People's Army by NATO aircraft, but no significant success was achieved. The problem of refugees arose, the Serbs fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina settled along the border with Serbia, proclaiming the formation of a state not recognized in the world - the Republic of Serpska.

In connection with the current situation, the Government of the Russian Federation, on the basis of Resolution of the UN Security Council No. 1031 of 12/15/1995 and Decree of the Federation Council No. 772 of 01/05/1996, decided to increase its presence in the conflict zone. In accordance with the directive of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, a separate airborne brigade was formed on the basis of two airborne divisions to participate in a peacekeeping operation and subsequently introduced into the conflict zone (Fig. 30.2).

The task of the brigade was to prevent the resumption of hostilities and ensure the security of the situation. 20 days were allotted for the formation and direct training of the brigade. The peculiarity of the preparation was correct definition and the creation of an optimal organizational and staffing structure for rear units with appropriate technical equipment, which makes it possible to increase the autonomy, adaptability and flexibility of the tactical actions of the brigade.

Rice. 30.2. Organizational and staffing structure of a separate

airborne brigade

The features of the staff structure of the rear of the brigade were: in addition to the head of the service, an auditor officer, a catering officer, a veterinarian, a food service technician (ensign), the head of the officer's canteen, the head of the soldier's canteen, a cook-instructor, a mobile mechanized bakery (the head of the bakery is an officer, the bakery technician is an ensign); in addition to the head of the service, an auditor officer, a warehouse manager, and a storekeeper-motorist were introduced to the staff of the fuel service; the staff of the clothing service consisted of the head of the service, the head of the warehouse, the head of the clothing repair shop, the head of the field bath, and the head of the field laundry; the apartment maintenance service was headed by the head of the service, the staff of the service was partially staffed by military personnel rmo(electrician, plumber, driver of a garbage truck, driver of a cleaning and watering vehicle), partly the staff was recruited seasonally from local residents(Serb refugees) as stokers in the boiler room of the brigade.

20 days before the departure of the brigade, in early 1996, a reconnaissance group headed by the brigade commander was sent to the area of ​​the peacekeeping operation. The deputy brigade commander for logistics took part in the work of the reconnaissance group. The tasks of the group were: selection and preparation of unloading sites; selection of base areas for brigade headquarters, battalions, special forces and support units; determining the location of checkpoints; studying the situation on the ground and making a decision on further actions in the conflict zone. Simultaneously with the arrival of the reconnaissance group at the Tuzla airfield from the cities of Ivanovo, where the headquarters and most of the combat, logistics and technical support units of the brigade were formed (communications company, rmo, remrota, medrota, isr, vrhr), Kostroma, where 1 pdb, commandant's company, platoon military police, sabatra; reconnaissance team trained special purpose 45 orp Airborne Forces, and from Pskov, where 2 pdb And sabatra, went train trains in the direction of Yugoslavia. At the end of January 1996, trains, having made a 3200-kilometer movement through Ukraine, Hungary, Serbia, arrived at railway station Bielina.

Upon the arrival of the trains at their destination, practice has confirmed the complexity of organizing the unloading of materiel, rear equipment, their delivery to the base areas and placement. There was a shortage of means of mechanization of loading and unloading operations.

In addition to peacekeeping tasks for the disarmament of the conflicting parties, and demining, the brigade monitored the state of military equipment and the movement of military equipment, as well as residents, and monitored the situation. The brigade solved the tasks of ensuring the delivery of food and other humanitarian supplies, assisting in the organization and conduct of elections, monitored the observance of human rights, assisted in the restoration of administrative systems and infrastructure, solved the problems of its own logistics, interacting with the command of the 1MD of the US Army , with local suppliers and service organizations. The Russian military contingent was on standby to assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and others international organizations in their humanitarian assistance.

The most difficult tasks for the rear were: establishing contacts and concluding contracts for the replacement and washing of linen, the supply of food, fuel, and fuel from local suppliers; organization of bread baking; organizing the supply of electricity and water; evacuation of the wounded and sick.

In Yugoslavia, fundamentally changed fundraising scheme. used mixed way, in which the support was carried out both by the forces and means of the unified command of the peacekeeping forces, and by the forces and means of the Center (MVO, logistics of the Airborne Forces). There was no delivery by rail, river (sea) transport. Part of the cargo (unified and camp tents, uniforms and footwear, engineering equipment, oils and special liquids, logistics equipment, repair kits for technical equipment for logistics services) was transported by air, military transport aircraft (Il-76) from a military airfield near Moscow "Chkalovsky" and the Ivanovo military airfield "Severny" to the airfield of the Bosnian city of Tuzla.

The deputy brigade commander for logistics sent an application for the necessary material resources to the headquarters of the logistics of the Airborne Forces. Within a month, the property specified in the application was received at the bases of the center and the district, prepared for shipment (by a separate communications regiment of the Airborne Forces) and transported by plane to Yugoslavia. The decision to deliver goods was made by the Commander of the Airborne Forces in agreement with the command of the BTA. The cargo was delivered by landing method by Il-76 aircraft in VAK-5 containers. The organization of the reception of material resources was as follows: in the brigade, by order of the commander, an officer was appointed responsible for receiving cargo at the airfield of the city of Tuzla; a team was allocated in advance to work on unloading materiel, equipment and combat protection of automobile columns were allocated; with the departure of the aircraft from Moscow, the automobile convoy assigned to receive cargo was sent to the airfield of the city of Tuzla, located at a distance of 80 km from the brigade's base area; with the arrival of the aircraft, the delivered material resources were received under act f.4 and delivered to the brigade; after receiving material resources, a report f.200 on the received cargo was sent to the headquarters of the rear of the Airborne Forces. In the future, the first copy of the acceptance certificate f.4 was sent to the headquarters of the rear of the Airborne Forces.

Economic calculations showed that the delivery of one 5-ton container to the territory of Yugoslavia costs 50 thousand US dollars, so it was decided to procure part of the material on the spot. Practically, contracts for the purchase of material resources and the performance of certain types of services were concluded for all rear services. feature financial support peacekeeping operation was that for all material resources and all types of services received on the spot under the contracts it was necessary to pay in foreign currency not through a bank, but in cash immediately as the service was rendered. The head of the logistics service, as part of the commission, accepted material resources from local suppliers (fuel, food, linen from the laundry), upon application for an advance payment, received money at the brigade’s cash desk (from 2 to 5 thousand US dollars) and, having issued an invoice, paid with suppliers. Then he drew up an advance report with the attachment of documents for the receipt of material resources and the amount received earlier at the cash desk of the brigade after the approval of the report by the brigade commander was debited from the account.

Delivery of material resources included a number of successive activities: obtaining material resources from local suppliers; receipt of cargo delivered by military transport aircraft; preparation of materiel for transfer to battalions; loading and delivery of materiel to the base areas of the battalions, transferring them to recipients in the base areas of the battalions or directly to outposts and checkpoints (Milidzhas, Spasoevichi, Celic, Bare, Vukasavtsy) with subsequent processing of the transfer through the battalion. The order of delivery was planned by the deputy commander of the brigade for logistics in agreement with the chief of staff of the brigade and depended on the importance of the task being performed or on the direction of concentration of the main efforts, the location of the battalion's base area.

So, KP 1 pdb was 30 km from the command post of the brigade, and the command post 2 pdb in 70 km, in addition, the base area of ​​the 2nd battalion, outposts, checkpoints were completely located on the territory of the aggressively minded population (Bosniaks), therefore, first of all, the delivery was carried out by 2 pdb. For this purpose, as a rule, transport was used rmo brigades, in exceptional cases empty vehicles WMO battalions. The frequency of delivery, the range of material resources depended on the intensity of their consumption in different situations. The supply of fuel and food was carried out once a week, bread - once every two days, change of linen - 2 times a week.

The main transport vehicles in the brigade were off-road vehicles of the Ural-4320 type, which were used in the mountainous and wooded areas of the conflict zone. On the flat part, vehicles of the KAMAZ-5310 type were used. In winter, for the passage of mountain passes, wheel tractors of the TK-6M type were included in the rear columns. The work of the supply transport became especially intense when the situation became more complicated. The consumption of material resources increased, and the departure of the rear columns to the areas of responsibility was reduced to a minimum in order to prevent the occurrence of provocations and attacks on our servicemen. In such cases, a reliable combat guard was created, 2-3 units of the BTR-80, R-142 N, and also, in the most difficult situations, Black Hawk helicopters from the 1st MD Squadron of the US Army were involved, which escorted our columns to the areas of material transfer.

A feature of the organization of rear management during the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, it turned out that in units and subunits, command posts and rear command posts were located, as a rule, jointly. This made it possible to use the controls of the command post in the interests of the rear, and to increase the reliability of the rear control system, since the standard rear communications provided only the minimum required level of control.

Features in the organization of the work of rear services brigades in carrying out the tasks of peacekeeping operations became the following.

1. For the food service. Contracts were concluded for the supply of food (bread, meat, vegetables, fruits, mineral water, biscuits, dairy products, etc.) from local suppliers; cooking was carried out in the base area of ​​the brigade in the PAK-200 kitchens and subsequently on stationary equipment in the dining room; in the base areas of battalions and companies, food was prepared in the kitchens of KP-125, KP-130, at outposts and checkpoints - in the kitchens of KP-20, MK-30, KO-75, which increased the need for spare parts for the above equipment due to intensive exploitation, and also there was a need to train freelance cooks-shooters at the rate of 2 cooks per platoon; food was provided in accordance with the Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of 1994 No. 395 according to a special norm with the issuance of additional food (per day: mineral water - 1.5 l, cookies - 50 g, milk - 100 ml, meat -100 g, cheese - 30 g , fruits - 100 g). When accepting products from local suppliers Special attention paid attention to checking the quality of meat - the task was carried out by the veterinarian of the team; storage of perishable products was carried out at the brigade food warehouse in the ALKA refrigerated trailer, storage of perishable products at the battalion food warehouses was organized in adapted premises using SHKh-0.5 refrigeration equipment, storage of perishable products at checkpoints and outposts was carried out in specially adapted rooms and facilities.

2. For clothing service. At first, laundry was washed in a brigade laundry room equipped with MPP-2.0. However, in the future, due to difficulties in maintenance and repair technical means, and also as a result of assessing the economic feasibility of the task, an agreement was concluded with a local laundry company in the suburbs of Bielina. During the replacement, the personnel arrived in the brigade fully provided with clothing items; in the brigade, the issuance of property according to the supply plans was not carried out, with the exception of the issuance of items that had become unusable. Washing was carried out in the base area of ​​​​the brigade in a room adapted for washing personnel, using disinfection-shower units DDA-66 and DDP-2, according to a schedule for six days a week. In the base areas of the battalions, washing is carried out in rooms adapted for washing personnel using DDP-2 and DDA-66. At outposts and checkpoints, washing was carried out using the simplest devices equipped in the form of showers. Due to the intensive use of washing equipment (DDP-2, DDA-66), the wear and tear of equipment (rubber-fabric, rubber-technical products, nozzles, injectors, boilers) was significantly increased, which necessitated the provision of spare parts, as well as increased requirements for technical preparing service personnel. Part of the units were housed in unified tents of the type UST-56, USB-56, UZ-68 (2 pdb, isr, control units 1 pdb) that increased wear and tear of tents and especially rigging.

3. According to the fuel service. Fuel was obtained from local suppliers on the basis of an agreement. From Hungary, via Vojvodina, Serbia, deliveries of diesel fuel and motor gasoline were delivered to the brigade by the supplier's transport. In the base area of ​​the brigade, after quality control, fuel was pumped from the supplier's transport to the brigade's transport; tanks in the fuel depot were not deepened, to increase the protective properties they were dug in and lined with sandbags.

4. Medical service. The medical center of the brigade was staffed by a reduced staff of a separate medical battalion of the division and had the entire set of medical specialists capable of providing qualified medical care.

5. For apartment maintenance service. Furniture, inventory and property of IES were brought by echelons at the beginning of the operation for the entire duration of the operation. Firewood was harvested from local sources, under agreements with local administrations. Payment for electricity, water and other utilities was made on the basis of contracts in currency, through a team, in cash.

A feature of the work of the rear was the fact that officials and rear management bodies, commanders of rear units had to make appropriate decisions not only on logistics, but also on the organization of combat, the performance of peacekeeping functions, planning in detail and providing for measures for protection, defense, protection and camouflage of rear facilities. Logistics officers were required to know the capabilities of the standard weapons of the units entrusted to them, the ability to use it, and to have appropriate operational-tactical and tactical-special training.